EXPROPRIATION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. SPOUSES AURORA SILVESTRE AND ROGELIO

SILVESTRE, G.R. NO. 237324. FEBRUARY 06, 2019, PERALTA J.*

FACTS:
In its original complaint, the Republic-DPWH sought to expropriate a 3,856-square meter lot, the real owner of
which was originally unknown. Since the owner of the property was unknown, the RTC of Valenzuela City
resorted to summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Subsequently, the RTC issued the
writ of possession prayed for by the Republic-DPWH following its ability and readiness to pay P4,627,200.00,
the amount equivalent to 100% of the property's zonal value. Next, the trial court ordered the Republic-DPWH
to issue a check payable to the order of its Clerk of Court. Discovering, that an 811-square meter of the 3,856-
square meter property sought to be expropriated was owned by Quintin, et al., the Republic-DPWH filed an
Omnibus Motion seeking to implead Quintin, et al. as defendants of the case. Accordingly, the RTC admitted
Republic-DPWH's amended complaint and ordered it to issue a manager's check payable to Quintin, et al. in the
amount of P973,200.00, the equivalent of the zonal value of the 811-square meter portion.

Respondents Silvestre, et al., filed a Manifestation alleging that they are the registered owners of lot located
along Gen. T. De Leon, Valenzuela City, consisting of 6,629 square meters. Upon verification, they discovered
that 4,367 square meters of the 6,629-square meter property was affected by the expropriation. Thus, they
prayed that the Republic-DPWH be directed to pay them P9,389,050.00 (computed as follows: 4,367 square
meters x P2,150.00 zonal value). The Republic-DPWH filed a second amended complaint impleading Silvestre,
et al., as additional defendants, and alleging that contrary to their claims, the area affected by the sought
expropriation covered only 3,045 square meters of their property with a zonal value of P1,200.00 per square
meter or a total zonal value of P3,654,000.00, which the Republic-DPWH already deposited with the court.

The RTC proceeded with the second stage of the expropriation and directed the appointed Board of
Commissioners to submit a report on just compensation. The BOC recommended the amount of P5,000.00 per
square meter as the reasonable, just, and fair market value of the 4,367-square meter portion owned by Silvestre,
et al.

However, the Repub1ic-DPWH filed a Comment, assailing the recommendation of the BOC, arguing that said
board erroneously considered the Certification issued by Project Director Gatan when there exists a more recent
Certification issued by Geodetic Engineer Efipanio Lopez which was affirmed by Project Director Gatan in his
Certification. These recent certifications indicate that only 3,045 square meters of Silvestre, et al.'s property was
to be affected by the project and not 4,367 square meters as they allege. As regards the basis for just
compensation, the Republic-DPWH faulted the BOC in valuing the property at P5,000.00, making reference to
the Mapalad Serrano property and disregarding the actual characteristics thereof. The Republic-DPWH added
that since the zonal value of the property is P1,200.00 per square meter, it cannot command a price higher than
said value.

The RTC partially adopted the recommendation of the BOC and pegged the just compensation at P5,000.00 per
square meter, but found the total affected property to be only 3,045 square meters. In a Decision, the CA
affirmed, with modification, the RTC ruling. Aggrieved, the Republic-DPWH filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the just compensation for the subject lot should be fixed between six hundred pesos and one
thousand, two hundred pesos per square meter.

RULING:
There was nothing arbitrary about the pegged amount of P5,000.00 per square meter, recommended by the
BOC, as it was reached in consideration of the property's size, location, accessibility, as well as the BIR zonal
valuation, among other things.

The BOC properly took into consideration the relevant factors in arriving at its recommendation of just
compensation. These relevant factors were based not on mere conjectures and plain guesswork of the BOC, but
on the statutory guidelines set forth in Section 5 of R.A. No. 8974, to wit:

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Section 5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or
Negotiated Sale. — In order to facilitate the determination of just compensation, the court may consider, among
other well-established factors, the following relevant standards:
(a) The classification and use for which the property is suited;
(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;
(c) The value declared by the owners;
(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;
(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvement on
the land and for the value of improvements thereon;
(f) [The] size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land;
(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence
presented; and
(h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire
similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those required from them by the government, and thereby
rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.

The BOC significantly noted that the subject property has a residential classification and is similarly situated
[within] the Mapalad Serrano property (similarly affected by the Northern Link Road Project), which was
earlier expropriated by the government. In the earlier expropriation proceeding, the amount of just compensation
was fixed at P5,000.00 per square meter.

In addition, the BOC took note of the existing business establishments (Foton Philippines, Inc., Shell gasoline
station, Seven Eleven Convenient Store, Banco de Oro, Allied Bank and Eastwest Bank), educational
institutions (St. Mary's School, Gen. T. de Leon National High School, Our Lady of Lourdes School), Parish of
the Holy Cross Church, subdivisions (Bernardino Homes and Miguelito Subdivision) near the vicinity of
appellee's property.

Lastly, as reasonable basis for comparison, the BOC took into consideration the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by and between PBCOM Finance Corporation and Francisco Erwin D. & Imelda F. Bernardo covering a
property similarly situated with the subject property where the fair market value was pegged at P8,484.85 per
square meter.

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DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION: JUDICIAL FUNCTION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

AND HIGHWAYS, VS. GILDA A. BARCELON, HAROLD A. BARCELON, AND HAZEL A.
BARCELON, G.R. NO. 226021. JULY 24, 2019, J. REYES, JR., J.

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines, through the DPWH, filed a complaint for expropriation before the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela for the acquisition of a parcel of land with its improvements thereon belonging to
Gilda A. Barcelon. The subject property is with an area of 52 square meters and zonal value of P2,750.00 per
square meter, with a one-storey residential house improvement valued at P288,418.54.

Upon deposit of a DBP manager's check amounting to P413,418.54, which was received by respondents, the
RTC issued a writ of possession. Said amount, however, was found to be lacking P18,000.00 to complete the
100% zonal value of the property, required under the rules for the immediate possession thereof. Upon
respondents' motion, the RTC ordered the release of the said balance to the respondents in an Order.

Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the RTC constituted a Board of Commissioners to
determine and recommend the amount of just compensation for the subject property. After hearing and
submission of the parties' respective position papers, the Board of Commissioners submitted its report,
recommending the amount of P10,000.00 per square meter as just compensation. It was also recommended that
the amount of P288,418.54 is the just, fair, and reasonable compensation for the improvement on the lot.
In arriving at its valuation, the Board of Commissioners considered, among others, the valuation arrived at by
the trial court, which was affirmed by this Court, in the case of Hobart Realty Development Corporation, as well
as that of the Spouses Mapalad Serrano, whose expropriated properties for the same government project are
nearby and actually within the area of respondents' property subject of this expropriation suit.

In its Decision, the RTC fixed the amount of just compensation at P9,000.00 per square meter. Questioning the
amount fixed as just compensation, as well as the interest imposed by the RTC, petitioner appealed to the CA. In
all, the CA upheld the amount of just compensation fixed by the RTC at P9,000.00 per square meter but
modified the interest imposed thereon in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied in the CA's Resolution. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA err in sustaining the amount of just compensation fixed by the RTC.

RULING:
The proximity of the subject property's location to that of Hobart Realty's and Spouses Serrano's, respectively,
was merely one of the factors considered by the RTC and the CA in their judicial valuation of the property.

The RTC also took into consideration several established factors before it came up with a notably lower amount
of just compensation compared to the Board of Commissioners' recommendation.

On appeal, the appellate court was guided by the standards for the assessment of the value of condemned
properties under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974, which is the same provision being invoked by petitioner in
the case at bar. It includes consideration of relevant factors such as the classification and use for which the
property is suited; value declared by the owners; the current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity; the
size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land; and the price of the land as manifested in
the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented, among others.

Notably, the CA found the Board of Commissioners' report to be supported by attachments or documentary
evidence, while petitioner's allegations about the subject property, i.e., the area was infested with informal
settlers, were unsupported by any evidence except certain testimonies, which at most, only prove that tagging
and relocation were conducted in the area.

The zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate. It cannot be the sole basis of
just compensation in expropriation cases.

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PROVISIONAL VALUE

CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION, VS. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY, G.R. NO. 169453.
DECEMBER 06, 2006, CARPIO MORALES, J.

FACTS:
The properties of Capitol Steel were identified as the most ideal site for the Mindanao International Container
Terminal Project, a PHIVIDEC project which involves the phased production of an 800-meter berth and the
acquisition of port equipment to handle the volume of seaborne break-bulk and container traffic in Mindanao.

PHIVIDEC filed an expropriation case before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. The Misamis Oriental RTC issued
a writ of possession in favor of PHIVIDEC. Due, however, to the unauthorized engagement by PHIVIDEC of
the legal services of a private lawyer, the expropriation case was dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of a
similar petition through a proper legal officer or counsel.

In the meantime, Capitol Steel requested the Technical Committee on Real Property Valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, by letter, for a revaluation of its properties. The TCRPV thereafter issued TCRPV Resolution
fixing the "reasonable and realistic zonal valuation" of the properties at P700 per square meter.

This Court in "Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation," annulled the entire proceedings in
Civil Case No. 99-477, by Decision.

By letter, PHIVIDEC informed Capitol Steel that it would file anew an expropriation case and that it had
deposited the amount of P116,563,500 in the name of Capitol Steel, P51,818,641 of which was deposited at the
Landbank of the Philippines and P64,744,859 at the Development Bank of the Philippines. PHIVIDEC further
informed Capitol Steel that the total amount deposited represents the zonal value of the properties, and may be
withdrawn at any time.

Subsequently, PHIVIDEC, represented by the Government Corporate Counsel, re-filed an expropriation case
and filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession to which it attached a Certificate of
Availability of Funds, and Certifications from the Landbank and the DBP that it deposited the total amount of
P116,563,500 required under Republic Act No. 8974 (R.A. 8974), "AN ACT TO FACILITATE THE
ACQUISITION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY, SITE OR LOCATION FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

The total amount deposited represents one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the properties based on the
schedule of zonal valuation for real properties under Department Order No. 40-97 fixing the zonal valuation of
the properties at Sugbongcogon and Casinglot at P300 and P500 per square meter, respectively.

Capitol Steel opposed the application of D.O. 40-97, claiming instead that under the TCRPV Resolution, the
properties have been revalued at P700 per square meter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has the authority, for purposes of denying or granting a writ of possession, to vary the
zonal valuation of the properties as established by the BIR under D.O. 40-97.

RULING:
Significantly, after a writ of possession was issued in favor of respondent on September 1, 1999 in the first
expropriation case-Civil Case No. 99-477, respondent commenced the construction of infrastructure buildings
and container port terminals. Possession of the properties has since remained with respondent, with the MICTP
now complete and fully operational.

When the second expropriation case was re-filed, R.A. 8974, which provides for substantive requirements
before a writ of possession is issued, was already in force and in effect.
Under R.A. 8974, the requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real
property are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to
the defendant; (3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current
relevant zonal valuation of the BIR including payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures if any,
or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the

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property to be seized; and (4) presentation to the court of a certificate of availability of funds from the proper
officials.

Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an expropriation case, in this case respondent, is entitled
to a writ of possession as a matter of right and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue
the writ of possession. No hearing is required and the court neither exercises its discretion or judgment in
determining the amount of the provisional value of the properties to be expropriated as the legislature has fixed
the amount under Section 4 of R.A. 8974.

To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of
possession differs from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional
value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market
value of the property.

There is no need for the determination with reasonable certainty of the final amount of just compensation before
the writ of possession may be issued.

The "current relevant zonal valuation" under Section 4 of R.A. 8974 pertains to the values reflected in the
schedule of zonal values embodied in a Department Order issued pursuant to Revenue Memorandum Order No.
56-89 issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Here, the P300 and P500 per square meter zonal values were, along with the zonal values of other real properties
located in all municipalities under the jurisdiction of Revenue District Office No. 98 (Cagayan de Oro City),
Revenue Region No. 16 (Cagayan de Oro City), subject of a public hearing and were approved by both the
TCRPV and the ECRPV and on even date, the Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation of the BIR,
issued D.O. 40-97 to implement the schedule of zonal values.

In contrast, the P700 per square meter zonal value provided for under TCRPV Resolution was not approved by
the ECRPV, was not embodied in a Department Order, and did not undergo the required public hearing and
publication required under RMO 56-89. In addition, as reflected in the TCRP Resolution, the revaluation was
based on a letter-request of Berck Y. Cheng, Executive Assistant of Capitol Steel. While the resolution took into
account the investigation, analysis and evaluation conducted by the two private appraisers hired by Capitol
Steel, the Saromo Realty and Valueworld Appraisers, Inc., PHIVIDEC, as the implementing expropriating
agency, was not notified and afforded the opportunity to participate in the revaluation.

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INVERSE COMPENSATION

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, VS. CITI APPLIANCE M.C.

CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 214546. OCTOBER 09, 2019, LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
Since 1992, Citi Appliance has owned a parcel of land in Cebu City. Sometime in 2003, it decided to construct a
16-storey commercial building on it.

The Cebu City Zoning Board required Citi Appliance to construct a one-level parking area consisting of 26
parking slots. To comply with this requirement, Citi Appliance had to make a deep excavation to lay the
foundation of the parking lot. In the process, it discovered telephone lines, cables, and manholes underground,
which had been placed there by PLDT sometime in 1983. These encroached on Citi Appliance's property,
preventing it from excavating the land.

Citi Appliance wrote PLDT, demanding that it remove the underground telephone lines, cables, and manholes,
or to shoulder the parking exemption fee. Citi Appliance made a final demand on PLDT to comply; otherwise, it
would file an appropriate action in court. When PLDT still refused to comply, Citi Appliance filed a complaint
for ejectment against PLDT.

In its Answer, PLDT argued that the area in question was part of public domain, it being a sidewalk. Assuming
that the property did belong to Citi Appliance, PLDT averred that it had the right of eminent domain.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may exercise its right of eminent domain and its right as a builder in good faith.

RULING:
Eminent domain or expropriation is the inherent right of the state to condemn private property to public use
upon payment of just compensation. This power is exercised by the legislature and may be delegated to local
governments, other public entities, and public utilities.

In exercising the power of eminent domain, the following requirements must concur:

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise informally, appropriately or injuriously
affected; and
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Expropriation may be judicially claimed only by filing a complaint for expropriation. Inverse expropriation is a
claim for compensation by the deprived landowner as a complaint or as a counterclaim. It seeks to recover the
value of property taken, even though there is no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain. Normally, it is
the expropriator-the State-that files the complaint.

Expropriation is a special civil action with a special bifurcated trial. In National Power Corporation v. Jocson:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved
in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, 'of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.' An order of dismissal, if this be
ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves
nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation
be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial
Court, 'no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof)
shall be filed or heard.'

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 The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
court of 'the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.' This is done by the Court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would
be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to
be done by the Court regarding the issue.

An expropriation suit falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court because it is a case incapable of
pecuniary estimation. It deals with the government's exercise of its authority and right to take property for public
use.

The right of an expropriator to file a complaint for expropriation is not allowed in an action such as a forcible
entry or unlawful detainer suit. These actions are summary in nature. Therefore, in this case, this Court cannot
award expropriation.

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STANDARDS FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES), VS. RODOLFO L.

LEGASPI, SR., QUEROBIN L. LEGASPI, OFELIA LEGASPI-MUELA, PURISIMA LEGASPI VDA.
DE MONDEJAR, VICENTE LEGASPI, RODOLFO LEGASPI II, AND SPOUSES ROSALINA LIBO-
ON AND DOMINADOR LIBO-ON, G.R. NO. 177611. APRIL 18, 2012, PEREZ, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Rosalina Libo-on accomplished a letter of intent signifying her willingness to sell to UPV Lot No. 1
of Psu-193912 Amd., registered in her name. A Deed of Definite Sale was executed by the parties whereby
Rosalina, with the conformity of her then tenant, Vicente Libo-on, sold the subject parcel in favor of UPV for
the stated consideration of P56,479.50. As a consequence, UPV immediately took possession of the property
and, in line with its educational development plan, started building thereon road networks, infrastructure and
school facilities.

However, Rosalina wrote a letter, informing UPV that she was rescinding the sale of the subject parcel on the
ground that she was no longer the owner of the property in view of her conveyance thereof by way of barter or
exchange in favor of respondents Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr., Querobin Legaspi, Ofelia Legaspi-Muela, Purisima
Legaspi Vda. De Mondejar, Vicente Legaspi, Rodolfo Legaspi II and the Spouses Rosalina and Dominador
Libo-on, among others. UPV subsequently learned that Lot 1 was subdivided into ten lots denominated and later
registered in the names of respondents.

Petitioner, thru UPV, filed against respondents the complaint for eminent domain.

The RTC issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to allow UPV to continue its possession of the subject
parcel upon deposit with the Iloilo Provincial Treasurer of the sum of P50,070.00, representing the provisional
valuation of the property. In their answer, however, respondents averred that petitioner’s right of expropriation
should only be limited to the three lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-8193, 8194 and
8196, containing an aggregate area of 8,516 square meters. Finding no opposition to petitioner’s motion for a
declaration on its right to expropriate the same, the RTC issued an order of condemnation, upholding UPV’s
right to expropriate said three parcels which had been denominated as Lot Nos. 21609-B, 21609-C and 21609-E.

Considering that the foregoing condemnation order covered only three (3) of the ten (10) lots comprising the
subject property, petitioner moved for the continuation of the condemnation proceedings insofar as the
remaining seven lots were concerned.

The Office of the UPV Chancellor sent respondent Rodolfo Legaspi a letter, protesting against the latter’s
occupation of a portion of the property in litigation. Calling the RTC’s attention to its 2 September 1991 Order
which allowed UPV’s continued possession of the property, petitioner also filed its 7 July 1998 manifestation
and motion praying for the grant of a writ of possession over the entirety of Lot 1. Without resolving the motion,
however, the RTC went on to issue the 16 June 2000 order, fixing the just compensation for Lot Nos. 21609-B,
21609-C and 21609-E, based on the evidence adduced by the parties and the report submitted by the
commissioners.

The RTC further issued the herein assailed condemnation order of the same date, upholding petitioner’s
authority to expropriate the remaining seven lots comprising the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC’s condemnation order is proper.

RULING:
Expropriation or the exercise of the power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state and of those
entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated to condemn private property to public use upon payment
of just compensation. Governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings therefor consist of two (2)
stages:

(a) the condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose
or public use; and
(b) the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the
court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

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The nature of these two stages was discussed in the following wise in the case of Municipality of Biñan vs.
Judge Garcia, to wit:

There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if
not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right
to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course,
since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the
merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules
expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the
right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would
be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to
be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe
the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise.
Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal
therefrom.

In the case at bench, the RTC split the determination of UPV’s right of expropriation over the ten lots into which
Lot No. 1 of Psu-193912 Amd. had been subdivided. Considering the lack of opposition on the part of
respondents, the RTC issued the order upholding UPV’s right to expropriate the three (3) lots denominated as
Lot Nos. 21609-B, 21609-C and 21609-E, with an aggregate area of 8,516 square meters. Without any appeal
having been perfected therefrom, the RTC’s order attained finality and left no more question as to the propriety
of the acquisition of said lots for the public purpose alleged in the complaint from which the instant suit
originated. Accordingly, the RTC correctly went on to issue the order fixing the just compensation for Lot Nos.
21609-B, 21609-D and 21609-E at P51,096.00, less the P50,070.00 UPV appears to have already deposited with
the Provincial Treasurer of Iloilo.

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FORECLOSURE

PATRICIA CABRIETO DELA TORRE, VS. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., G.R. NO.
221932. FEBRUARY 14, 2018, PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Patricia Cabrieto dela Torre filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene seeking judicial order for specific
performance, i.e., for respondent to execute in her favor a deed of sale covering Unit 3306, Makati Prime
Citadel Condominium which she bought from the former as she had allegedly fully paid the purchase price.
Respondent opposed the motion arguing that it was filed out of time considering that the Stay Order was issued
on August 15, 2003 and under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, any claimants and
creditors shall file their claim before the rehabilitation court not later than ten (10) days before the date of the
initial hearing; and that since the Stay Order was issued on August 15, 2003 and the publication thereof was
done in September 2003 with the initial hearing on the petition set on September 24 2003, the motion for
intervention should have been filed on or before September 14, 2003.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's claim against respondent is suspended by the issuance of the Stay Order.

RULING:
The RTC had issued a Stay Order on August 15, 2003 providing, among others, that by virtue of the authority of
the Court under Section 6 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, it is ordered that
enforcement of all claims against the petitioner, whether for money or otherwise, and whether such enforcement
is by court action or otherwise, its guarantors or sureties not solidarity, liable with the petitioner, be stayed.

Petitioner is prohibited (a) from selling, encumbering, transferring or disposing in any manner of any of its
properties, except in the ordinary course of business and (b) from making any payment of its liabilities,
outstanding as of July 2, 2003, the date of the filing of the petition.

Clearly, while respondent is undergoing rehabilitation, the enforcement of all claims against it is stayed. Rule 2,
Section 1 of the Interim Rules defines a claim as referring to all claims or demands of whatever nature or
character against a debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise. The definition is all-encompassing as
it refers to all actions whether for money or otherwise. There are no distinctions or exemptions.

Petitioner's prayer in intervention for respondent to execute the deed of sale in her favor for the condominium
unit is a claim as defined under the Interim Rules which is already stayed as early as August 15, 2003. The
RTC's Order granting petitioner's intervention and directing respondent to execute a deed of sale in her favor
and to deliver the copy of the owner's duplicate copy of the condominium certificate, with all the pertinent
documents needed to effect registration of the deed of sale and issuance of a new title in petitioner's name, is a
violation of the law.

Furthermore, petitioner's ownership of the condominium unit alleging that she had fully paid the purchase price
was disputed by respondent based on their Memorandum of Agreement dated January 20, 1997 where petitioner
acknowledged that she had paid the principal obligation on the condominium unit but had yet to pay respondent
for penalty charges and interest by reason of the delay in the payment of the monthly amortizations.
Consequently, when the RTC issued the Stay Order which suspended all claims against respondent, without
distinction, petitioner's prayer for the execution of a deed of sale is a claim covered by the Stay Order issued by
the RTC. In fact, the parties' contentions already require a full-blown trial on the merits which must be decided
in a separate action and not by the rehabilitation court.

UE-0200673-2023
MA. LUISA A. PINEDA, VS. VIRGINIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VEGA, G.R. NO. 233774. APRIL 10, 2019,
CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
In her complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent borrowed from her P500,000.00 payable within one year
with an interest rate of 8% per month. To secure the loan, respondent executed a real estate mortgage (2003
Agreement) over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title, together with all the buildings and
improvements existing thereon (Property) in petitioner's favor. On the loan's maturity, respondent failed to pay
her loan despite demand. As of May 2005, the unpaid accumulated interest amounted to P232,000.00.

In her answer, respondent denied receiving P500,000.00 from petitioner and claimed that the said amount was
the accumulated amount of another obligation she earlier secured from petitioner.

In her reply, petitioner admitted that the original loan which respondent obtained in 2000 was only P200,000.00
with an undertaking to pay 3% interest per month.

In the written interrogatories addressed to petitioner, she admitted that the P500,000.00 indicated in the 2003
Agreement referred to a previously executed undated real estate mortgage (undated Agreement) between the
parties which secured respondent's loan of P200,000.00 from her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can foreclose the mortgage.

RULING:
The RTC erred in granting petitioner's remedies or demands of collection and foreclosure of mortgage
successively. The settled rule is that these remedies of collection and foreclosure are mutually exclusive. The
invocation or grant of one remedy precludes the other.

A mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such
election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.
Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment
and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues
his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue
for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property,
are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of
action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely
accidental and are all under his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to
bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another action against the
mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice and obnoxious to law
and equity, but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of
the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This
single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the
creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of the mortgage. But
both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a
single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary
to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action
for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single
cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of
the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the
creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to
foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so
much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.

The creditor's cause of action is not only single but indivisible, although the agreements of the parties,
evidenced by the note and the deed of mortgage, may give rise to different remedies. The cause of action should
not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. And considering, as we have shown, that one of

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the two remedies available to the creditor is as complete as the other, he cannot be allowed to pursue both in
violation of those principles of procedure intended to secure simple, speedy and unexpensive administration of
justice.

Given the foregoing, the Court sustains the RTC's ruling which orders respondent to pay petitioner the loaned
amount of P200,000.00. However, the RTC's ruling that in default of respondent's payment, petitioner can
foreclose on the mortgage is erroneous.

UE-0200673-2023
HEIRS OF JOSEFINA GABRIEL, VS. SECUNDINA CEBRERO, CELSO LAVIÑA, AND MANUEL C.
CHUA, G.R. NO. 222737. NOVEMBER 12, 2018, PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Segundina Cebrero, through her attorney-in-fact Remedios Muyot, executed a real estate mortgage over the
subject property located in Sampaloc, Manila with an area of 2,281 sq. m. covered by TCT registered under the
name of Cebrero's late husband Virgilio Cebrero as security for the payment of the amount of P8,000,000.00,
pursuant to an amicable settlement entered into by the parties in the case of annulment of revocation of donation
in Civil Case. In the said settlement, Josefina Gabriel recognized Cebrero's absolute ownership of the subject
property and relinquished all her claims over the property in consideration of the payment of the said
P8,000,000.00.

Upon Cebrero's failure to pay the amount within the period of extension, Gabriel filed in an action for
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. In a Decision, the RTC of Manila ruled in Gabriel's favor and ordered
Cebrero to pay the P8,000,000.00 and interest, or the subject property shall be sold at public auction in default
of payment.

The sheriff initiated the necessary proceedings for the public auction sale when no appeal was filed and the
decision became final. Gabriel, being the sole bidder, purchased Cebrero's undivided share of one-half (1/2)
conjugal share, plus her inheritance consisting of one-ninth (1/9) of the subject property in the amount of
P13,690,574.00. The sheriff issued the Final Deed of Sale when Cebrero failed to redeem the property.

However, Gabriel had not registered the Final Deed of Sale since she disputed the Bureau of Internal Revenue's
estate tax assessment on the subject property considering that she claimed only a portion thereof. It was also
during this time that she discovered the registration of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent Celso
Laviña, Cebrero's attorney-in-fact, purportedly conveying the entire property in favor of Progressive Trade &
Services Enterprises for and in consideration of P27,000,000.00.

Eduardo Cañiza (Cañiza), allegedly in behalf of Gabriel, instituted Complaint for declaration of nullity of sale
and of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the subject property registered under Progressive, a single
proprietorship represented by its President and Chairman, respondent Manuel C. Chua.

In their Answer, respondents alleged that Gabriel has no legal capacity to sue as she was bedridden and confined
at the Makati Medical Center since 1993. The complaint should be dismissed because Cañiza signed the
verification and certification of. the complaint without proper authority. The December 15, 1993 RTC decision
in the foreclosure proceedings was void due to improper service of summons. The Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale
was not registered and recorded. Moreover, the bid price was higher than the amount in the compromise
agreement. As a mere creditor, Gabriel cannot annul the sale of the subject property to Progressive, especially
when there was a judicial consignment of the payment of lien.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Chua cannot be considered the true and lawful owner of the subject property as he was not a
purchaser in good faith.

RULING:
The real estate mortgage over a portion of the property was annotated on the transfer certificate of titles. A
mortgage is a real right, which follows the property, even after subsequent transfers by the mortgagor. "A
registered mortgage lien is considered inseparable from the property inasmuch as it is a right in rem." The sale
or transfer of the mortgaged property cannot affect or release the mortgage; thus, the purchaser or transferee is
necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the encumbrance. The implication in buying the property, with
notice that it was mortgaged, was that Progressive necessarily undertook to allow the subject property to be sold
upon failure of Gabriel to obtain payment from Cebrero once the indebtedness matured. Thus, it cannot invoke
being a buyer in good faith to exclude the property from being claimed by virtue of foreclosure of the mortgage
over the said property. This, however, does not mean that the Court rules in favor of the petitioners. Considering
that the complaint was filed by Cañiza, who has failed to prove that he was validly authorized to do so, the
complaint does not produce any legal effect.

UE-0200673-2023
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION

TOP RATE INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
RODRIGO TAN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE "ASTRO AUTOMOTIVE
SUPPLY", G.R. NO. L-67496. JULY 07, 1986, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

FACTS:

G. R. No. 67496:

Petitioner filed a complaint against Consolidated Mines Inc. and Jose Marino Olondriz, the president of
said corporation, for the payment of the purchase price of certain heavy equipment, parts and acces -
sories sold to Consolidated Mines, Inc. In said complaint, plaintiff asked that a writ of preliminary
attachment be issued against defendants on the ground that said defendants were guilty of fraud in
securing said equipment.

Respondent Court granted plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon
plaintiff's posting of a bond. Pursuant to said order, a writ of attachment was issued. The sheriff served
notices of garnishment on the tenants of the building owned by defendant Consolidated Mines, Inc.
garnishing the rentals due from said tenants, but since there were earlier notices of garnishment served
upon said tenants issued in two (2) other cases, the sheriff was not able to garnish any amount from
said tenants. The sheriff levied on the properties of defendant Consolidated Mines, Inc. and the notice
of levy was duly annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-68501 (143900) and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-68500 (14329). The notice of levy was not annotated on the transfer
certificate of title of a third property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 79776, although
notice of said levy was duly entered in the primary book of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.

"Annotated as prior encumbrances on the first two properties on December 20, 1978 was a mortgage in
favor of twelve (12) consortium banks and a notice of levy issued in Civil Case No. 136406 entitled
'Warmco Trading Company versus Consolidated Mines, Inc. and Jose Marino Olondriz' on May 15,
1981."

G. R. No. 68257:

The petitioner brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the respondents
Consolidated Mines, Inc. (CMI) and its president Jose Marino Olondriz for the collection of
P71,855.20. The amount represents the price of the heavy equipment and accessories which the
respondent CMI had purchased from the petitioner. The respondent judge ordered the attachment of
CMI's properties. Notice of the attachment of real properties of the CMI was served on the Register of
Deeds of Makati who annotated the levy on Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. S-68500 (143929), S-
68501 (143900) and 79711.

Several banks, constituting the Consortium Banks, filed a third-party claim with the sheriff, alleging that they
were the mortgagees of the real and personal properties of the CMI. They claimed that their mortgage was
evidenced by a deed executed on November 10, 1978. They, therefore, asked that the properties be released
from attachment.

The court ruled that the Consortium Banks, as mortgagees of the real and personal properties of the CMI had a
superior lien on the properties and that the petitioner could validly levy only on the mortgagor's (CMI's) equity
of redemption after the sale of the mortgaged properties.

In the meantime, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, acting as an insolvency court, authorized the sale of the
properties of the CMI. Accordingly, the properties covered by TCT Nos. S-68500 (143929) and S-68501
(143900) were sold to the private respondent Top Rate International as assignee of the El Grande Development
Corp. The sale is evidenced by a 'Deed of Confirmation of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.' On the basis of
the sale to it, Top Rate International filed a third party claim with the sheriff. It asked that the properties
covered by TCT No. S-68500 (143929) and S-68501 (143900) be discharged from attachment."

UE-0200673-2023
On the basis of the same "Deed of Confirmation of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage", Top Rate International,
Inc. also filed a third-party claim alleging that the properties involved therein had been sold to it for
P40,000,000.00 with the approval of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Special Proceeding in the course of
the involuntary insolvency proceedings filed against Consolidated Mines. Petitioner, therefore, asked that the
attachment made on these properties be discharged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an over-levy is obvious because the properties levied upon are worth more than
P40,000,000.00.

RULING:
Equity of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property after his default in the
performance of the conditions of the mortgage but before the sale of the property or the confirmation of the sale,
whereas the right of redemption means the right of the mortgagor to repurchase the property even after
confirmation of the sale, in cases of foreclosure by banks, within one year from the registration of the sale.

To levy upon the mortgagor's incorporeal right or equity of redemption, it was not necessary for the sheriff to
have taken physical possession of the mortgaged taxicabs. Levying upon the property itself is distinguishable
from levying on the judgment debtor's interest in it.

It is, therefore, error on the part of the petitioner to say that since private respondents' lien is only a total of
P343,227.40, they cannot be entitled to the equity of redemption because the exercise of such right would
require the payment of an amount which cannot be less than P40,000,000.00.

Therefore, the appellate court did not commit any error in ruling that there was no over-levy on the disputed
properties. What was actually attached by respondents was Consolidated Mines' right or equity of redemption,
an incorporeal and intangible right, the value of which can neither be quantified nor equated with the actual
value of the properties upon which it may be exercised.

UE-0200673-2023
PARTITION

TABASONDRA, ET. AL., VS. SPOUSES CONSTANTINO, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 196403. DECEMBER 07,
2016, BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:
The plaintiffs filed the complaint against the defendants. In essence, they claimed that the parcels of land are
owned in common by them and the defendants but the latter does not give them any share in the fruits thereof.
Hence, they asked for partition but the Defendants-Appellants refused without valid reasons. They maintained
that they tried to amicably settle the dispute before the Lupon, but to no avail. Thus, their filing of the suit
praying that the subject land be partitioned, that new titles be issued in their respective names, that the
defendants be ordered to render an accounting on the fruits thereon, and that such fruits also be partitioned.

In their Answer, the defendants averred that they do not object to a partition provided that the same should be
made only with respect to Cornelio's share. They contended that they already own the shares of Valentina and
Valeriana in the subject land by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale that the said sisters executed in their favor.
Moreover, they alleged that the plaintiffs are the ones who should account for the profits of the property because
it is the latter who enjoy the fruits thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition and accounting should be limited only to the 33,450.66 square meters of the
property registered under TCT No. 10612.

RULING:
The aggregate area of the subject property is one hundred thousand three hundred fifty-two (100,352) sq.m., it
follows that Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana each has a share equivalent to 33,450.66 sq. m. portion thereof.
Accordingly, when Valentina and Valeriana sold their shares, the defendants became co-owners with Cornelio.
Perforce, upon Cornelio's death, the only area that his heirs, that is, the plaintiffs and the defendants, are entitled
to and which may be made subject of partition is only a thirty-three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six
(33,450.66) sq.m. portion of the property.

As a result of Valentina and Valeriana's alienation in favor of Sebastian and Tarcila of their pro indiviso shares
in the three lots, Sebastian and Tarcila became co-owners of the 100,352-square meter property with Cornelio
(later on, with the petitioners who were the successors-in-interest of Cornelio). In effect, Sebastian and Tarcila
were co-owners of two-thirds of the property, with each of them having one-third pro indiviso share in the three
lots, while the remaining one-third was co-owned by the heirs of Cornelio, namely, Sebastian, Tarcila and the
petitioners.

Nonetheless, an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the trial court should find after trial the
existence of co-ownership among the parties, it may and should order the partition of the properties in the same
action.

To segregate the 100,352-square meter property into determinate portions among the several co-owners, the CA
should have followed the manner set in Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds. If actual
partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely, by metes and bounds and
adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party, and the
effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in severalty the portion of the
real estate assigned to him.

Accordingly, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the purpose of identifying and
segregating, by metes and bounds, the specific portions of the three lots assigned to the co-owners, and to effect
the physical partition of the property in the following proportions: Tarcila, one-third; the heirs of Sebastian, one-
third; and the petitioners (individually), along with Tarcila and the heirs of Sebastian (collectively), one-third.
That physical partition was required, but the RTC and the CA uncharacteristically did not require it. Upon
remand, therefore, the RTC should comply with the express terms of Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

UE-0200673-2023
Should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the next step for the RTC will be to appoint not more than
three competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and to command such
commissioners to set off to each party in interest the part and proportion of the property as directed in this
decision.

UE-0200673-2023
VICTORIA* T. FAJARDO, VS. BELEN CUA-MALATE, G.R. NO. 213666. MARCH 27, 2019,
CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Belen filed an Amended Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Damages against her
siblings. In the Amended Complaint respondent Belen alleged that she and the defendants siblings are
compulsory heirs of their late mother, Ceferina Toregosa Cua. Ceferina died intestate and had left certain real
and personal properties, as well as interest in real properties. Respondent Belen further alleged that she did not
receive her lawful share from Ceferina's estate. She prayed that judgment be issued ordering the partition and
distribution of Ceferina's entire estate and that she (respondent Belen) be awarded her lawful share.

Defendants Ramon, Adelaida, Emelita, and Elena filed their Answer, alleging that they were willing to settle the
partition case amicably; that respondent Belen was receiving her share from the income of the properties left by
their late mother, Ceferina; that it was respondent Belen who intentionally refused to show documents
pertaining to the supposed properties left by Ceferina; and that respondent Belen is not entitled to the reliefs she
prayed for.

Meanwhile, petitioner Victoria filed an Answer alleging that she is in favor of the partition and accounting of
the properties of Ceferina.

Pre-trial was conducted and terminated on January 25, 2007. Thereafter, respondent Belen was presented as a
witness. But after her direct examination, and before the conduct of the cross-examination, the parties agreed to
refer the case to mediation.

Hence, the RTC issued an Order of Referral dated October 22, 2008, referring the case to mediation through the
Philippine Mediation Center (PMC). During the mediation conferences, all the parties attended and successfully
arrived at an agreement on the manner of partition of Ceferina's estate. Because of the agreement reached upon
by the parties, the mediator issued an Order dated November 5, 2009 requiring respondent Belen's counsel to
draft a written compromise agreement. The terms of the agreement reached upon by the parties were thus
translated into writing. A meeting was then scheduled on April 8, 2010 for the signing of the document entitled
Compromise Agreement, which reduced into writing the prior agreement reached by the parties during the
mediation conferences.

On said date, petitioner Victoria did not appear, while all her other siblings appeared. It was subsequently
explained by petitioner Victoria's counsel that petitioner Victoria was not able to attend the meeting as she did
not have enough money to travel from Manila to Calabanga, Camarines Sur. Respondent Belen and the other
siblings proceeded to sign the Compromise Agreement and submitted the same before the RTC for approval.

The RTC rendered a Decision issuing a judgment on compromise. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Victoria
appealed the RTC's Decision before the CA. Petitioner Victoria alleged that the Compromise Agreement cannot
be binding as to her considering that she did not sign it and supposedly did not consent to its execution.

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioner Victoria's appeal, holding that "[t]he RTC did not err when it
approved the Compromise Agreement." Petitioner Victoria filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the CA in the assailed Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the parties have entered into a valid oral partition.

RULING:
The parties have come to terms as to the partition of Ceferina's estate even prior to the translation of the
agreement into written form on April 8, 2010. There was already a valid and binding oral partition that was
agreed upon by the parties.

The proceedings during the mediation conferences indubitably show that petitioner Victoria and her siblings
actually came to an agreement as to the partition of the estate of Ceferina. Hence, that an oral partition has been
entered into by the parties is a factual finding that must be left undisturbed.

The fact that petitioner Victoria failed to sign the written document bearing the terms of the parties' agreement is
of no moment. An oral partition may be valid and binding upon the heirs; there is no law that requires partition

UE-0200673-2023
among heirs to be in writing to be valid.

Under Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "there is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred
that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral
partition is valid." The Court further added that the partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by
some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property because it does not involve transfer of property from
one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in
favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance. Hence, an oral partition is not covered by the
Statute of Frauds.

Therefore, even if the document titled Compromise Agreement was not signed by petitioner Victoria, there was
already an oral partition entered into by the parties that bound all of the siblings. The written agreement only
served to reduce into writing for the convenience of the parties the terms of the agreement already entered into
during the mediation conferences.
SPOUSES SALITICO VS. HEIRS OF FELIX, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 240199. APRIL 10, 2019, CAGUIOA,
J.

FACTS:
Amanda is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land registered in her name under Original
Certificate of Title (subject property).

By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos (Huling Habilin), the subject property
was inherited by the niece of Amanda, Resurreccion, as a devisee. Thereafter, Resurreccion, as the new owner
of the subject property, executed a document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa, which transferred ownership
over the parcel of land in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. The latter then took physical possession of the
subject property.

Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate was undertaken before the RTC. Respondent Recaredo was
appointed as the executor of the Huling Habilin. The latter then filed and presented the Huling Habilin before
the Probate Court, which approved it. The Probate Court likewise issued a Certificate of Allowance.

The petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring them to vacate the subject property and
surrender possession over it to the respondents heirs. To protect their interest over the subject property, the
petitioners Sps. Salitico executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which was however denied registration by the
respondent RD.

In their Complaint before the RTC, the petitioners Sps. Salitico sought the delivery and return in their favor of
the owner's duplicate copy of OCT and the execution of the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale by way of
confirming the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. They likewise prayed that OCT P-1908 be cancelled and a new one
be issued in their names. Lastly, they also demanded payment of attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages,
and reimbursement for litigation expenses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the existence of a valid sale in the instant case necessarily mean that the RD may already be
compelled to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.

RULING:
The existence of a valid sale in the instant case does not necessarily mean that the RD may already be compelled
to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.

According to Section 92 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, with respect to the
transfer of properties subject of testate or intestate proceedings, a new certificate of title in the name of the
transferee shall be issued by the Register of Deeds only upon the submission of a certified copy of the partition
and distribution, together with the final judgment or order of the court approving the same or otherwise making
final distribution, supported by evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the case may be.

Further, under Section 91 of PD 1529, even without an order of final distribution from the testate/intestate court
and in anticipation of a final distribution of a portion or the whole of the property, the Register of Deeds may be
compelled to issue the corresponding certificate of title to the transferee only when the executor/administrator of

UE-0200673-2023
the estate submits a certified copy of an order from the court having jurisdiction of the testate or intestate
proceedings directing the executor/administrator to transfer the property to the transferees.

The aforementioned sections of PD 1529 are in perfect conjunction with Rule 90, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, which states that the actual distribution of property subject to testate or intestate proceedings, i.e., the
issuance of a new title in the name of the distributee, shall occur only when the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate,
have been paid. Only then can the testate or intestate court assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
to the same. Under Rule 90, Section 1, the testate or intestate court may also order the distribution of the
property pending the final order of distribution if the distributees give a bond in a sum fixed by the court
conditioned upon the payment of the aforesaid said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations.

Hence, under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, it is only upon the issuance by the
testate or intestate court of the final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final
distribution that the certificate of title covering the subject property may be issued in the name of the
distributees.

Hence, reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of
Court, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another person, before the transferee
may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering specific property in his/her name, a final order of
distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate
court must first be had.

In the instant case, there is no showing that, in the pendency of the settlement of the Estate of Amanda, the
Probate Court had issued an order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution, both of
which the law deems as requirements before the RD can issue a new certificate of title in the name of the
petitioners Sps. Salitico.

Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between Resurreccion and the petitioners Sps.
Salitico, which ordinarily would warrant the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 in favor of
the latter, pending the final settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and absent any order of final distribution or an
order in anticipation of a final distribution from the Probate Court, the RD cannot be compelled at this time to
cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of title in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.

UE-0200673-2023
ROGELIO LOGROSA, VS. SPOUSES CLEOFE AND CESAR AZARES, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 217611.
MARCH 27, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
In his verified complaint for partition filed before the RTC, petitioner Logrosa alleged that he, together with the
respondents are co-owners of eight (8) parcels of lands (subject properties), all situated in the Municipality of
Tagum (now Tagum City), Davao del Norte. The TCTs of the subject properties all indicate that petitioner
Logrosa, together with the respondents, are co-owners of the subject properties.

Petitioner Logrosa alleged that in 1987, the original owner of the subject properties, one Benjamin A. Gonzales
(Gonzales), sold the subject properties collectively to petitioner Logrosa and the other respondents. The records
show that a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the parties.

Answering, respondents contended that while it may be true that petitioner Logrosa's name appeared in the titles
of the properties aforementioned, however, they belied petitioner Logrosa's claim that he is a co-owner of the
same, as he never contributed as to its acquisition and never contributed for their maintenance, much less paid
the taxes due thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Logrosa is a co-owner of the subject properties who can compel partition.

RULING:
Petitioner Logrosa is a co-owner of the subject properties. There are no one dispute that there are eight
certificates of title, all of which clearly and unequivocally identify petitioner Logrosa as one of the co-owners of
the subject properties. The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a
parcel of land.

It is also not disputed by any party that a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by all the parties,
wherein it clearly states without ambiguity that one of the vendees of the subject properties is petitioner
Logrosa. Hence, no one in his right mind would include non-buyers or non-owners in a notarized deed of
absolute sale and in indefeasible certificates of title if he truly believes that he is the sole owner of the property.
Bearing in mind the strong presumption created by public documents such as a notarized instrument and
certificates of title, if respondents Sps. Azares really believed that they are the sole owners of the subject
properties, one would expect that they would, at the very least, execute another document evidencing their true
agreement as a precautionary measure. But no such precautionary measure was employed by respondents Sps.
Azares to protect their supposed right as sole owners of the subject properties.

Furthermore, it is not disputed that petitioner Logrosa possesses a portion of the subject property with no
opposition by the other parties, aside from respondents Sps. Azares, who disclaimed petitioner Logrosa's status
as co-owner only after more than two decades since the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and only as a
mere reaction to the Complaint for Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.

With respect to the tax declarations presented by respondents Sps. Azares, jurisprudence holds that tax
declarations and tax receipts as evidence of ownership cannot prevail over a certificate of title which, to
reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of ownership.

A person may exercise the right to compel the partition of real estate if he/she sets forth in his/her complaint the
nature and extent of his title and subsequently proves the same. The law does not make a distinction as to how
the co-owner derived his/her title, may it be through gratuity or through onerous consideration. In other words, a
person who derived his title and was granted co-ownership rights through gratuity may compel partition.

UE-0200673-2023
JURISDICTION

ARSENIO TABASONDRA, ET, AL., VS. SPOUSES CONRADO CONSTANTINO AND TARCILA
TABASONDRA-CONSTANTINO,* ET. AL., G.R. NO. 196403. DECEMBER 07, 2016, BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:
Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra. were siblings. They were also the registered
owners of the three (3) parcels of land located at Dalayap, Tarlac City. Cornelio died on March 15, 1991, while
Valentina and Valeriana both died single on August 19, 1990 and August 4, 1998, respectively. They all died
intestate and without partitioning the property covered by TCT No. 106012. Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and
the Defendants-Appellants, as descendants of Cornelio, possessed and occupied the property.

The Plaintiffs-Appellees filed the complaint below against the Defendants-Appellants. In essence, they claimed
that the parcels of land are owned in common by them and the Defendants-Appellants but the latter does not
give them any share in the fruits thereof. Hence, they asked for partition but the Defendants-Appellants refused
without valid reasons. They maintained that they tried to amicably settle the dispute before the Lupon, but to no
avail. Thus, their filing of the suit praying that the subject land be partitioned, that new titles be issued in their
respective names, that the Defendants-Appellants be ordered to render an accounting on the fruits thereon, and
that such fruits also be partitioned.

In their Answer, the Defendants-Appellants averred that they do not object to a partition provided that the same
should be made only with respect to Cornelio's share. They contended that they already own the shares of
Valentina and Valeriana in the subject land by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale that the said sisters executed
in their favor on August 18, 1982. Moreover, they alleged that the Plaintiffs-Appellees are the ones who should
account for the profits of the property because it is the latter who enjoy the fruits thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA did not segregate the 100,352-square meter property into determinate portions among the
several co-owners.

RULING:
The CA did not segregate the 100,352-square meter property into determinate portions among the several co-
owners. To do so, the CA should have followed the manner set in Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:

Section 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds. If actual
partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely, by metes and bounds and
adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party, and the
effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in severalty the portion of the
real estate assigned to him. xxxs

Accordingly, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the purpose of identifying and
segregating, by metes and bounds, the specific portions of the three lots assigned to the co-owners, and to effect
the physical partition of the property in the following proportions: Tarcila, one-third; the heirs of Sebastian, one-
third; and the petitioners (individually), along with Tarcila and the heirs of Sebastian (collectively), one-third.
That physical partition was required, but the RTC and the CA uncharacteristically did not require it. Upon
remand, therefore, the RTC should comply with the express terms of Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

Section 2. Order for partition, and partition by agreement thereunder. - If after the trial the
court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the partition of the real estate
among all the parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make the
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm
the partition so agreed upon by all the parties, and such partition, together with the order of the
court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the
property is situated.(2a)

A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby. (n)

UE-0200673-2023
Should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the next step for the RTC will be to appoint not more than
three competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and to command such
commissioners to set off to each party in interest the part and proportion of the property as directed in this
decision.

UE-0200673-2023
EULALIA RUSSELL, ET. AL., VS. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, ET. AL., G.R.
NO. 119347. MARCH 17, 1999, KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents, denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND
PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court. Upon the death of spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho,
the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had
remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS
AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on
June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed, private respondents divided the property among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious as the private respondents were
not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The
complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among
all the heirs.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature
of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela.

Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of
Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.

The respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. A Motion for Reconsideration of said
order was filed by petitioners alleging that the same is contrary to law because their action is not one for
recovery of title to or possession of the land but an action to annul a document or declare it null and void, hence,
one incapable of pecuniary estimation failing within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Private
respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration. The respondent judge issued another Order denying
the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MAN-2275.

RULING:
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation and
therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically
mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property
involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds
P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec.
19(2).

However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."

The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private
respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and
divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and

UE-0200673-2023
entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to
the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of
the claims asserted therein.

UE-0200673-2023
MA. ROSARIO AGARRADO, ET. AL., VS. CRISTITA LIBRANDO-AGARRADO, ET. AL., G.R.
NO. 212413. JUNE 06, 2018, REYES, JR., J.

FACTS:
The petitioners are children of the late spouses Agarrado, who, during their lifetime, acquired a 287-square
meter land (subject property) in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Emilia died intestate, leaving Rodrigo and
their children as her compulsory heirs.

Meanwhile, unknown to the petitioners, Rodrigo was involved in an illicit affair with respondent Cristita
Librando-Agarrado, with whom Rodrigo begot respondent Ana Lou Agarrado-King. As it turned out, Ana Lou
was conceived during the existence of the marriage between Rodrigo and Emilia, but was born on September
27, 1978—one month after the dissolution of Rodrigo and Emilia's marriage through the latter's death.
Eventually, Rodrigo married Cristita on July 6, 1981.

Rodrigo also succumbed to mortality and died. He left his surviving spouse, Cristita, his legitimate children by
his marriage with Emilia, and Ana Lou.

Cristita and Ana Lou filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the subject property,
with Ma. Rosario, Ruth, Roy, "and other heirs of Rodrigo Agarrado" as defendants. None of the other heirs were
however named in any pleading filed by either the respondents or petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint must be dismissed for the failure of the respondents to allege the assessed value of
the subject property.

RULING:
For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased. A partition is at once an action (1) for declaration of
co-ownership and (2) for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. Thus,
in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he/she is a co-owner of the subject
properties, and second, the conveyance of his/her lawful share.
Jurisdiction over cases for partition of real properties therefore, like all others, is determined by law.
Particularly, the same is identified by Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by Republic Act 7691.

The provisions state that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property exceeds
P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00. For those below the
foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal
Trial Courts (MTC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC).

Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property, which is the subject matter of the partition, is
essential. This, the courts could identify through an examination of the allegations of the complaint.

The rule on determining the assessed value of a real property, insofar as the identification of the jurisdiction of
the first and second level courts is concerned, would be two-tiered:

1. the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the real property as alleged in
the complaint; and
2. the rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the property, while not alleged in the
complaint, could still be identified through a facial examination of the documents already attached to
the complaint.

A scouring of the records of this case revealed that the complaint did indeed lack any indication as to the
assessed value of the subject property. In fact, the only reference to the same in the complaint are found in
paragraphs six, seven, and eight thereof. None of the assertions indicate the assessed value of the property to be
partitioned that would invariably determine as to which court has the authority to acquire jurisdiction. More,
none of the documents annexed to the complaint and as attached in the records of this case indicates any such
amount Thus, the petitioners are correct in restating their argument against the RTC's jurisdiction, for it has
none to exercise.

UE-0200673-2023
UE-0200673-2023
 ADDITIONAL CASES
FORECLOSURE

HEIRS OF JOSEFINA GABRIEL, VS. SECUNDINA CEBRERO, CELSO LAVIÑA, AND MANUEL C.
CHUA, G.R. NO. 222737. NOVEMBER 12, 2018, PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Segundina Cebrero, through her attorney-in-fact, executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property
located in Sampaloc, Manila with an area of 2,281 sq. m. registered under the name of Cebrero's late husband
Virgilio Cebrero as security for the payment of the amount of P8,000,000.00, pursuant to an amicable settlement
dated January 11, 1991 entered into by the parties in the case of annulment of revocation of donation. In the said
settlement, Josefina Gabriel recognized Cebrero's absolute ownership of the subject property and relinquished
all her claims over the property in consideration of the payment of the said P8,000,000.00.

Upon Cebrero's failure to pay the amount within the period of extension, Gabriel filed an action for foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage. In a Decision, the RTC of Manila, ruled in Gabriel's favor and ordered Cebrero to
pay the P8,000,000.00 and interest, or the subject property shall be sold at public auction in default of payment.

The sheriff initiated the necessary proceedings for the public auction sale when no appeal was filed and the
decision became final. Gabriel, being the sole bidder, purchased Cebrero's undivided share of one-half (1/2)
conjugal share, plus her inheritance consisting of one-ninth (1/9) of the subject property in the amount of
P13,690,574.00. The sheriff issued the Final Deed of Sale when Cebrero failed to redeem the property.

However, Gabriel had not registered the Final Deed of Sale since she disputed the Bureau of Internal Revenue's
estate tax assessment on the subject property considering that she claimed only a portion thereof. It was also
during this time that she discovered the registration of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent Celso
Laviña, Cebrero's attorney-in-fact, purportedly conveying the entire property in favor of Progressive Trade &
Services Enterprises for and in consideration of P27,000,000.00.

Eduardo Cañiza, allegedly in behalf of Gabriel, instituted a Complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and of
the Transfer Certificate of Title of the subject property registered under Progressive, a single proprietorship
represented by its President and Chairman, respondent Manuel C. Chua.

In their Answer, respondents alleged that as a mere creditor, Gabriel cannot annul the sale of the subject
property to Progressive, especially when there was a judicial consignment of the payment of lien.

In the Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Gabriel. It held that Chua cannot be considered the true and lawful
owner of the subject property as he was not a purchaser in good faith. At the time of sale on September 27,
1994, the mortgage pertaining to Gabriel remained annotated on the TCT registered in the name of Cebrero.
Thus, Chua had notice of Gabriel's existing interest over a portion of the property, which should have prompted
him to investigate the status of the mortgage.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. As the awardee of the foreclosure
proceedings, Gabriel is the real party-in-interest in the case. Since the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
the complaint, all proceedings subsequent thereto are considered null and void, and can never attain finality.

Upon denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners are now before this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Chua cannot be considered the true and lawful owner of the subject property as he was not a
purchaser in good faith.

RULING:
The real estate mortgage over a portion of the property was annotated on the transfer certificate of titles. A
mortgage is a real right, which follows the property, even after subsequent transfers by the mortgagor. "A
registered mortgage lien is considered inseparable from the property inasmuch as it is a right in rem." The sale
or transfer of the mortgaged property cannot affect or release the mortgage; thus, the purchaser or transferee is
necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the encumbrance.

UE-0200673-2023
The implication in buying the property, with notice that it was mortgaged, was that Progressive necessarily
undertook to allow the subject property to be sold upon failure of Gabriel to obtain payment from Cebrero once
the indebtedness matured. Thus, it cannot invoke being a buyer in good faith to exclude the property from being
claimed by virtue of foreclosure of the mortgage over the said property. This, however, does not mean that the
Court rules in favor of the petitioners. Considering that the complaint was filed by Cañiza, who has failed to
prove that he was validly authorized to do so, the complaint does not produce any legal effect. The RTC never
validly acquired jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the instant petition must be dismissed.

UE-0200673-2023
ISABEL OCAMPO, VS. IGNACIO DOMALANTA AND PONCIANO MARTINEZ, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PROVINVIAL SHERIFF OF CAVITE, G.R. NO. L-21011. AUGUST 30, 1967,
SANCHEZ, J.

FACTS:
A contested case to foreclose a real estate and chattel mortgage resulted in judgment ordering Isabel Ocampo to
pay Ignacio Domalanta P2,000.00, with 1% interest per month from December 5, 1958 until full payment, and
P500.00 as attorney’s fees, and directing that after failure to pay the above amounts in ninety days, the
properties mortgaged be sold at public auction, subject to a first mortgage in favor of the Philippine National
Bank in reference to respondent's land (located in Tanza, Cavite) mortgaged.

The judgment debt remained unpaid. The court, on Domalanta's motion, issued a writ of execution. Pursuant
thereto, respondent sheriff sold at public auction the mortgaged land of 32,558 square meters to the highest
bidder, appellee Ignacio Domalanta, for P3,537.00. Domalanta moved to confirm the sale. Over plaintiff's
objection, the court confirmed.

After the order had become final, plaintiff started the present suit to annul the sheriff's sale. On the grounds
that plaintiff mortgagor was not properly notified of the foreclosure sale; and the price for which the property
was sold was "very much lower than the actual market value" and shocking to the conscience, and thus
invalid. Respondent Domalanta moved to dismiss the complaint below on the ground of res judicata. The court
dismissed the case "with prejudice and with costs against the plaintiff." A move to reconsider was thwarted
below in the order. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a court order confirming a sheriff's sale upon a judgment in a real estate foreclosure case a bar to
a subsequent action by the judgment debtor to annul the sale upon grounds which were raised in said foreclosure
proceedings.

RULING:
The present action is barred by the conclusiveness of judgment in the anterior suit. This case must be dismissed.

Except for the Provincial Sheriff who is a nominal defendant here, the parties in the two suits below are the
same: Isabel Ocampo and Ignacio Domalanta. Subject matter is the same land. The judgment and order of
confirmation of that sheriff's sale in the first suit have both become final.

The first suit is a judicial foreclosure of mortgage; the second, annulment of the foreclosure sale conducted in
the first suit. A proceeding for judicial foreclosure of mortgage is an action quasi in rem. It is based on a
personal claim sought to be enforced against a specific property of a person named party defendant. And, its
purpose is to have the property seized and sold by court order to the end that the proceeds thereof be applied to
the payment of plaintiff's claim.

Here, the first suit was an action quasi in rem. A judgment therein "is conclusive only between the
parties." Directly applicable is paragraph (b), Section 49, Rule 39 of the old Rules of Court, which provides that
in other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity. By that provision, the confirmation order in the foreclosure case is, "with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties" and their privies.

UE-0200673-2023
RURAL BANK OF OROQUIETA (MIS. OCC.), INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 53466.
NOVEMBER 10, 1980, AQUINO, J.

FACTS:
In Civil Case "Rural Bank of Oroquieta (Mis. Occ.), Inc. vs. Procopio Serrano and Maria Cueme", a case of
foreclosure of mortgage, Judge Melecio A. Genato rendered a decision, ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff
bank within a period of "not less than ninety (90) days nor more than one hundred (100) days from" the receipt
of the decision the loan of P1,500 with twelve percent interest per annum from January 16, 1972 plus ten
percent of the principal as attorney's fees. In case of nonpayment within that period, the trial court, in order to
satisfy that obligation, ordered the sheriff to sell at public auction the mortgaged lot, a parcel of coconut land
with an area of 2.8 hectares.

That judgment became final and executory. The Serrano spouses did not pay their mortgage debt. A writ of
execution was issued. The sheriff levied upon the mortgaged lot and advertised its sale at public auction to
satisfy the mortgage obligation which, together with the sheriff's fees and costs, amounted to P2,223.60.

At the auction sale held, the mortgaged lot was sold to the bank as the only bidder. The sheriff issued a
certificate of sale. There being no redemption within the one-year period, the sheriff issued a final certificate of
sale.

Judge Genato issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the bank. The mortgagors or
judgment debtors filed a motion for the reconsideration of that order on the grounds that, because there was no
judicial confirmation of the auction sale, they still have an equity of redemption and could still pay the mortgage
debt (alleged to be usurious) and that the auction sale was fraudulent and irregular. They averred that the bank
rejected their offer to redeem the mortgaged lot and that the issuance of the writ of possession was premature.

Judge Genato granted the motion for reconsideration in his order. The bank filed a manifestation and motion
wherein it revealed that the land had already been sold to Eufemia Mejos and, therefore, its acceptance of the
redemption price amounting to P2,820.60 would not produce any legal effect.

The trial court denied the motion. The bank filed a notice of appeal. The Serrano spouses filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that they had already deposited with the clerk of court the redemption price.

The trial court in its order dismissed the appeal on the ground that the order sought to be appealed is
interlocutory or not appealable. The bank assailed that order in the Court of Appeals by means
of certiorari which was really a mandamus action to compel the trial court to give due course to its appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It sustained the trial court's position that the order sought to be
appealed is interlocutory because the trial court had not yet confirmed the foreclosure sale. The bank appealed to
this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgagors still have an equity of redemption and could still pay the mortgage debt.

RULING:
After the execution of a real estate mortgage, the mortgagor has an equity of redemption, exercisable within the
period stipulated in the mortgage deed. In case of judicial foreclosure, that equity of redemption subsists after
the sale and before it is confirmed by the court. However, in case of a judicial foreclosure of a mortgage in favor
of a banking institution, section 78 of the General Banking Law grants the mortgagor a right of redemption
which may be exercised within one year from the sale.

Under section 3, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, it is the confirmation by the court of the auction sale that would
divest the Serrano spouses of their rights to the mortgaged lot and that would vest such rights in the bank as
purchaser at the auction sale.

The clause "subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law", found in the last part of section 3,
has no application to this case because the mortgagor did not exercise his right of redemption under section 78
of the General Banking Law.

What applies to this case is the settled rule that "a foreclosure sale is not complete until it is confirmed, and

UE-0200673-2023
before said confirmation, the court retains control of the proceedings by exercising a sound discretion in regard
to it, either granting or withholding confirmation as the rights and interests of the parties and the ends of justice
may require.” "In order that a foreclosure sale may be validly confirmed by the court, it is necessary that a
hearing be given the interested parties, at which they may have an opportunity to show cause why the sale
should not be confirmed." "The acceptance of a bid at the foreclosure sale confers no title on the purchaser.
Until the sale has been validly confirmed by the court, he is nothing more than a preferred bidder. Title vests
only when the sale has been validly confirmed by the court." The confirmation retroacts to the date of the sale.

A hearing should be held for the confirmation of the sale. The mortgagor should be notified of that hearing.
Lack of notice vitiates the confirmation of the sale. The mortgagor may still redeem the mortgaged lot after the
rendition of the order confirming the sale which is void for lack of hearing and notice to the mortgagor. Notice
and hearing of a motion for confirmation of sale are essential to the validity of the order of confirmation, not
only to enable the interested parties to resist the motion but also to inform them of the time when their right of
redemption is cut off.

It is equally settled that after the foreclosure sale but before its confirmation, the court may grant the judgment
debtor or mortgagor an opportunity to pay the proceeds of the sale and thus refrain from confirming it. If after
the foreclosure sale and before the confirmation thereof, the mortgagee, as purchaser at the auction sale, sold the
mortgaged property to another person, that subsequent sale does not render the foreclosure sale more
effective. That subsequent sale does not prevent the trial court from granting the mortgagor a period within
which to redeem the mortgaged lot by paying the judgment debt and the expenses of the sale and costs.

After the confirmation of the sale, made after hearing and with due notice to the mortgagor, the latter cannot
redeem anymore the mortgaged lot (unless the mortgagee is a banking institution). It is after the confirmation of
the sale that the mortgagor loses all interest in the mortgaged property.

In the instant case, where the foreclosure sale has not yet been confirmed but the statutory one-year period for
redemption expired and the mortgaged lot was sold by the mortgagee (as the only bidder at the auction sale) to a
third person, the trial court should give the purchaser a chance to be heard before requiring the mortgagee-bank
to accept the redemption price tendered by the mortgagors.

UE-0200673-2023
PATRICIA CABRIETO DELA TORRE, V. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., G.R. No.
221932. February 14, 2018, PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc. filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for
suspension of payments and actions with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, the rehabilitation court issued
a Stay Order.
On October 15, 2004, petitioner Patricia Cabrieto dela Torre filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene seeking
judicial order for specific performance, i.e., for respondent to execute in her favor a deed of sale covering Unit
3306, Makati Prime Citadel Condominium which she bought from the former as she had allegedly fully paid the
purchase price. Respondent opposed the motion arguing that it was filed out of time considering that the Stay
Order was issued on August 15, 2003 and under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation,
any claimants and creditors shall file their claim before the rehabilitation court not later than ten days before the
date of the initial hearing; and that since the Stay Order was issued on August 15, 2003 and the publication
thereof was done in September 2003 with the initial hearing on the petition set on September 24 2003, the
motion for intervention should have been filed on or before September 14, 2003.
The RTC issued an Order granting petitioner's motion for intervention. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging that intervenor is still liable to pay P1,902,210.48 as unpaid interest and penalty
charges; and it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which has exclusive and original
jurisdiction over the controversies involving condominium units and not the RTC. The RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration in an Order. Aggrieved, respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA issued
its assailed Decision, granting the petition denying the Motion for Intervention filed by private respondent. In a
Resolution, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s claim against respondent was suspended with the issuance of the Stay Order.

RULING:
The RTC had already issued a Stay Order on August 15, 2003. Petitioner is prohibited (a) from selling,
encumbering, transferring or disposing in any manner of any of its properties, except in the ordinary course of
business and (b) from making any payment of its liabilities, outstanding as of July 2, 2003, the date of the filing
of the petition.
Clearly, while the respondent is undergoing rehabilitation, the enforcement of all claims against it is stayed.
Rule 2, Section 1 of the Interim Rules defines a claim as referring to all claims or demands of whatever nature
or character against a debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise. The definition is all-encompassing
as it refers to all actions whether for money or otherwise. There are no distinctions or exemptions.
Petitioner's prayer in intervention for respondent to execute the deed of sale in her favor for the condominium
unit is a claim as defined under the Interim Rules which is already stayed as early as August 15, 2003. In fact,
the same order also prohibited respondent from selling, encumbering, transferring or disposing in any manner of
any of its properties, except in the ordinary course of business. The RTC's Order granting petitioner's
intervention and directing respondent to execute a deed of sale in her favor and to deliver the copy of the
owner's duplicate copy of the condominium certificate, with all the pertinent documents needed to effect
registration of the deed of sale and issuance of a new title in petitioner's name, is a violation of the law. And the
RTC gave undue preference to the petitioner over respondent's other creditors and claimants.

Furthermore, Petitioner's ownership of the condominium unit alleging that she had fully paid the purchase price
was disputed by respondent based on their Memorandum of Agreement where petitioner acknowledged that she
had paid the principal obligation on the condominium unit but had yet to pay respondent for penalty charges and
interest by reason of the delay in the payment of the monthly amortizations. Consequently, when the RTC issued
the Stay Order which suspended all claims against respondent, without distinction, petitioner's prayer for the
execution of a deed of sale is a claim covered by the Stay Order issued by the RTC.

UE-0200673-2023
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., V. SPOUSES EFREN AND LOLITA SORIANO, G.R.
No. 211232. April 11, 2018, TIJAM, J.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs spouses Efren and Lolita Soriano are engaged in the business of selling defendant Coca-Cola products.
Defendant thru Cipriano informed plaintiffs that the former required security for the continuation of their
business. Plaintiffs were convinced to hand over two (2) certificates of titles over their property and were made
to sign a document. Defendant Cipriano assured plaintiffs that it will be a mere formality and will never be
notarized.

Subsequently, plaintiffs informed defendant Coca-Cola of their intention to stop selling Coca-Cola products due
to their advanced age. Thus, plaintiffs verbally demanded from the defendant the return of their certificates of
titles. However, the titles were not given back to them.

When plaintiffs were contemplating on filing a petition for the issuance of new titles, they discovered for the
first time that their land was mortgaged in favor of defendant Coca-Cola. Worse, the mortgage land was already
foreclosed. Hence, plaintiffs filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff's foreclosure sale. They alleged that they
never signed a mortgaged document and that they were never notified of the foreclosure sale. In addition,
plaintiffs aver that they never had monetary obligations or debts with the defendant. They always paid their
product deliveries in cash.

On their part, the defendant alleged that plaintiffs are indebted to them. Plaintiffs' admission that they signed the
real estate mortgage document in Tuguegarao, Cagayan indicates that the mortgage agreement was duly
executed. The failure of the parties to appear before the notary public for the execution of the document does not
render the same null and void or unenforceable.
The RTC rendered its decision nullifying the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings. Aggrieved,
the petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC decision in toto.
The CA ruled that the Real Estate Mortgage deed failed to comply substantially with the required form. Hence,
the instant petition before Us.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreclosure proceedings are valid.

RULING:
Unless the parties stipulate, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary because Section 3 of Act No. 3135 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in three public places
and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. Moreover, the same was not put into
issue in this case. The foreclosure proceedings were nullified by the courts a quo merely as a consequence of the
nullification of the REM deed. Consequently, the Court find that the foreclosure proceedings are likewise valid.

UE-0200673-2023
CONCHITA GLORIA AND MARIA LOURDES GLORIA-PAYDUAN, VS. BUILDERS SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. No. 202324. June 04, 2018, DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:
Spouses Juan and herein petitioner Conchita Gloria are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title. Petitioner Maria Lourdes Gloria-Payduan is their daughter. Juan passed away.

Conchita and Lourdes filed before the RTC a Second Amended Complaint against respondent Builders Savings
and Loan Association, Inc., Benildo Biag, and Manuel F. Lorenzo for "declaration of null and void real estate
mortgage, promissory note, cancellation of notation in the transfer certificate of title, and damages" with prayer
for injunctive relief.

Petitioners claimed that Biag duped them into surrendering TCT to him under the pretense that Biag would
verify the title, which he claimed might have been fraudulently transferred to another on account of a fire that
gutted the Quezon City Registry of Deeds; Biag instead used the title to mortgage the Kamuning property to
respondent Builders Savings; that Conchita was fraudulently made to sign the subject loan and mortgage
documents by Biag, who deceived Conchita into believing that it was actually Lourdes who requested that these
documents be signed; that the subject Mortgage and Promissory Note contained the signature not only of
Conchita, but of Juan, who was by then already long deceased, as mortgagor and co-maker; that at the time the
loan and mortgage documents were supposedly executed, Conchita was already sickly and senile, and could no
longer leave her house; that Biag and Builders Savings conspired in the execution of the forged loan and
mortgage documents, that the forged loan and mortgage documents were not signed/affirmed before a notary
public; that on account of Biag and Builders Savings' collusion, the subject property was foreclosed and sold at
auction to the latter; and that the loan and mortgage documents, as well as the foreclosure and sale proceedings,
were null and void and should he annulled. Petitioners thus prayed that the Mortgage and Promissory Note be
declared null and void; that the encumbrances/annotations in the subject title be cancelled; that the certificate of
title be returned to them.

The RTC issued its Decision dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of merit. The counterclaims and
crossclaims were likewise dismissed. Petitioners moved to reconsider. The RTC issued its Order granting
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Respondent interposed an appeal before the CA. The CA issued the
assailed Decision, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. Petitioners moved to reconsider, but in a Resolution, the CA
held its ground. Hence, the present Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgage and promissory note are null and void.

RULING:
The mortgage and promissory note are null and void.

The evidence indicates that these documents were indeed simulated; as far as petitioners were concerned, they
merely entrusted the title to the subject property to Biag for the purpose of reconstituting the same as he claimed
that the title on file with the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City may have been lost by fire. Petitioners did not
intend for Biag to mortgage the subject property in 1991 to secure a loan; yet the latter, without petitioners'
knowledge and consent, proceeded to do just that, and in the process, he falsified the loan and mortgage
documents and the accompanying promissory note by securing Conchita's signatures thereon through fraud and
misrepresentation and taking advantage of her advanced age and naivete and forged Juan's signature and made it
appear that the latter was still alive at the time, when in truth and in fact, he had passed away in 1987. A
Certificate of Death issued by the Quezon City Local Civil Registrar and marked as Exhibit "D" and admitted
by the trial court proves this fact. Under the Civil Code, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void.
(Art. 1346). Furthermore, those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are in existence and void from the
beginning. (Art. 1409).

As a consequence of Biag's fraud and forgery of the loan and mortgage documents, the same were rendered null
and void. This proceeds from the fact that Biag was not the Owner of the subject property and may not thus
validly mortgage it, as well as the well-entrenched rule that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys
no title. "In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the
property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void." And "when the instrument presented for registration
is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby
lose his title, and neither does the mortgagee acquire any right or title to the property. In such a case, the

UE-0200673-2023
mortgagee under the forged instrument is not a mortgagee protected by Law." Lastly, when "the person applying
for the loan is other than the registered owner of the real property being mortgaged, it should have already raised
a red flag and should have induced the mortgagee to make inquiries into and confirm the authority of the
mortgagor."

UE-0200673-2023
SOFIA TABUADA, ET. AL., V. ELEANOR TABUADA, ET. AL., G.R. No. 196510. September 12, 2018,
BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:
The petitioners commenced a civil case in the RTC against respondents Spouses Bernan and Eleanor Certeza,
Eleanor Tabuada, Julieta Trabuco and Laureta Redondo. The complainant included a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

At the ex parte hearing held to receive their evidence, the petitioners presented Sofia Tabuada, who testified that
she received the notice sent by the Spouses Certeza regarding their land, known as Lot 4272-B-2, that her
husband had inherited from his mother, Loreta Tabuada, and where they were residing, informing them that the
land had been mortgaged to them (Spouses Certeza); that she immediately inquired from Eleanor Tabuada and
Trabuco about the mortgage, and both admitted that they had mortgaged the property to the Spouses Certeza;
that she was puzzled to see the signature purportedly of Loreta Tabuada on top of the name Loreta Tabuada
printed on the Mortgage of Real Rights dated July 1, 1994 and the Promissory Note dated July 4, 1994 despite
Loreta Tabuada having died on April 16, 1990; that the property under mortgage was the where she and her
daughters were residing.

The petitioners offered for admission the following exhibits, namely: (a) the death certificate of Loreta Yulo
Tabuada that indicated April 16, 1990 as the date of death; (b) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-82868
of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lot No. 4272-B-2 situated in Jaro, Iloilo City and registered in
the name of Loreta Tabuada; (c) the Promissory Note dated July 4, 1994 for P68,000.00 executed by Loreta
Tabuada; (d) the Mortgage of Real Rights dated July 1, 1994 involving Lot No. 4272-B-2 under TCT No. T-
82868 executed by Loreta Tabuada as the mortgagor; (e) the list of payments of the principal obligation subject
of the real estate mortgage and the interests; and (f) the demand letter dated August 12, 2004 from the Spouses
Certeza addressed to Loreta Tabuada demanding the payment of the total obligation of P415, 452.94.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. The RTC declared the Mortgage of Real Rights null and
void for not complying with the essential requisites of a real estate mortgage. The respondents appealed. The CA
promulgated its decision, reversing and setting aside the judgment of the RTC, and dismissing the civil case
instead. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage was valid.

RULING:
Real estate mortgage was null and void
It is uncontested that the late Loreta Tabuada had died in 1990, or four years before the mortgage was
constituted; and that Eleanor Tabuada and Trabuco admitted to petitioner Sofia Tabuada that they had mortgaged
the property to the Spouses Certezas. Accordingly, Eleanor Tabuada had fraudulently represented herself to the
Spouses Certeza as the late Loreta Tabuada, the titleholder. That the titleholder had been dead when the
mortgage was constituted on the property by Eleanor Tabuada was not even contested by Eleanor Tabuada and
Tabuco. In any event, Eleanor Tabuada had not been legally authorized to mortgage the lot to the Spouses
Certeza.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses Certeza were mortgagees in good faith.

RULING:
The contention of the Spouses Certeza lacks persuasion.

The Spouses Certeza admitted that the petitioners were the relatives by blood or affinity of their co-defendants
Eleanor Tabuada, et al.; and that Sofia Tabuada, et al. and the petitioners had been living in their respective
residences built on the property subject of the mortgage. Such admissions belied the Spouses Certeza's
contention of being mortgagees in good faith. At the very least, they should have been prudent and cautious
enough as to have inquired about Eleanor Tabuada's assertion of her capacity and authority to mortgage in view
of the actual presence of other persons like the petitioners herein on the property. Such prudence and caution
were demanded of persons like them who are about to deal with realty; they should not close their eyes to facts
that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith. Indeed, the status of a
mortgagee in good faith does not apply where the title is still in the name of the rightful owner and the

UE-0200673-2023
mortgagor is a different person pretending to be the owner. In such a case, the mortgagee is not an innocent
mortgagee for value and the registered owner will generally not lose his title.

UE-0200673-2023
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, VS. ELENITA V. ABELLO, ET. AL., G.R. No. 242570. September 18,
2019, REYES, A., JR., J.

FACTS:
A Complaint for Cancellation/Discharge of Mortgage/Mortgage Liens was filed by the respondents against the
petitioner before the RTC of Bacolod City.

The complaint involves three parcels of land, all located at Bacolod City, registered under the names of Manuel
and Elenita Abello. Inscribed on the TCTs were various encumbrances. Manuel died, consequently, his heirs,
herein respondents, executed a Declaration of Heirship authorizing Elenita to act as administrator of the estate.

In their complaint, the respondents sought for the cancellation of the inscriptions claiming that since the
petitioner made no action against them since 1975, the action has already prescribed. Accordingly, the
respondents argued that they should be discharged as a matter of right and the encumbrances cancelled.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants. The parties
herein separately filed their appeal via petitions for certiorari with the CA. On appeal to the CA, the latter
dismissed the petition in its Decision. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision, but
the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution. Thus, this petition for review for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage has been prescribed.

RULING:
Prescription runs in a mortgage contract not from the time of its execution, but rather a) when the loan became
due and demandable, for instances covered under the exceptions set forth under Article 1169 of the New Civil
Code, or b) from the date of demand.

A REM is an accessory contract constituted to protect the creditor's interest to ensure the fulfillment of the
principal contract of loan. By its nature, therefore, the enforcement of a mortgage contract is dependent on
whether or not there has been a violation of the principal obligation. Simply, it is the debtor's failure to pay that
sets the mortgage contract into operation. Prior to that, the creditor-mortgagee has no right to speak of under the
REM as it remains contingent upon the debtor's failure to pay his or her loan obligation.

Thus, for an action to foreclose REM to prosper, it is crucial that the creditor-mortgagee establishes his right by
alleging the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract, particularly the maturity of the loan which it secures.
The respondents' failure to allege, much more prove this information, renders the action dismissible for failure
to prove their cause of action.

In this controversy, the respondents pray for the cancellation of the encumbrances on the TCTs which refer to
the REMs constituted on the property. Consequently, the cancellation of these annotations is dependent on
whether the action for REM has already prescribed. Therefore, an allegation of the date of maturity of the loan is
also vital in this case as it signifies the commencement of the running of the period of prescription for an action
for foreclosure REM.

Stated otherwise, the mortgagor would be unable to establish his or her right to pray for the cancellation of the
encumbrances without first establishing that the debt has already become due, as it is only at that time that the
debtor's right to foreclose the property arise and the prescriptive period begins to run.

Pertinent to the REM, it is evident from a cursory reading of the allegations that the respondents made no
mention of the particulars of the mortgage. In arguing the prescription, the respondents instead anchor on the
fact that the latest entry related to the loan from the petitioner was in 1975. But, the date of annotation is
irrelevant on the issue of whether the institution of a mortgage action has already prescribed. Instead, as
previously elucidated, what is crucial is the date of maturity of the loan in instances when demand is not
necessary, or the date of demand. Without these crucial details, the information supplied is insufficient to enable
the court to grant relief to the respondents. With this, the complaint could have been dismissed by the court a
quo on the ground of the complaint's failure to state cause of action. However, the parties proceeded to trial,
which, therefore, means that the period within which the dismissal for failure to state a cause of action would
have already lapsed.

UE-0200673-2023
UE-0200673-2023
ENGR. FELIPE A. VIRTUDAZO AND SPOUSE ESTELITA M. VIRTUDAZO, V. ALIPIO
LABUGUEN AND HIS SPOUSE DAMIANA MABUTI AND GENARA LABUGUEN, G.R. NO. 229693.
DECEMBER 10, 2019. REYES, J. JR., J.

FACTS:
A parcel of land owned by Spouses Maurin under Original Certificate Title with an area of 600 square meters
was mortgaged, together with its improvements, to the Development Bank of the Philippines as security for their
loan.

After Gavina Sadili-Maurin's death, Florentino Maurin agreed to convey a 270-sq m portion of the land and its
improvements to respondent Alipio S. Labuguen under an instrument denominated as a Memorandum of
Agreement. Alipio S. Labuguen agreed to pay and, in fact, paid P120,000.00, and undertook to assume the
obligations of spouses Maurin to DBP. Thereupon, the Labuguens occupied said portion. DBP, however, refused
Alipio S. Labuguen's offer to assume the loan obligation.
While the mortgage loan with the DBP was still outstanding, the heirs of Gavina Sadili-Maurin executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Gavina Sadili-Maurin with Sale wherein they conveyed the 270-sq m
portion of the land, with the building erected on it, to Alipio S. Labuguen. Unlike the previous MOA, the EJS
with Sale did not contain any obligation for Alipio S. Labuguen to assume spouses Maurins' loan with the DBP.
Neither the MOA nor the EJS with Sale were registered.
Upon failure of spouses Maurin to pay their loan obligations, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the entire property
and was declared the highest bidder at the auction sale.

Later, Florentino Maurin offered the entire property for sale to petitioner Engr. Felipe A. Virtudazo. Felipe
Virtudazo agreed to purchase the lot from DBP. It turned out, however, that Florentino Maurin used Felipe
Virtudazo's check to redeem the foreclosed lot in his name. This led Felipe Virtudazo to file a complaint for
Specific Performance or Recovery of Sum of Money, Damages and Attorney's Fees with Preliminary Injunction
against DBP, with spouses Maurin later on included as intervenors.
Meanwhile, Alipio Labuguen filed a complaint for Annulment of Deeds and Damages with Request for Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the heirs of Gavina Sadili-Maurin. He prayed that the EJS with Sale
be annulled as it allegedly contravenes the 10-year prohibition against conveyances of land covered by a free
patent.

Felipe Virtudazo’s complaint for Specific Performance or Recovery of Sum of Money was resolved in his favor
with the RTC finding that Florentino Maurin benefited from Felipe Virtudazo’s money which the former used in
settling his loan obligations with the DBP. Thus, the trial court ordered Florentino Maurin to return to Felipe
Virtudazo the amount of P625,000.00. The trial court also ordered DBP to deliver the Deed of Reconveyance
and the OCT over the subject property to Florentino Maurin. Pursuant to this decision, DBP executed a Deed of
Redemption in favor of Florentino Maurin. Florentino Maurin, however, failed to pay the amount of
P625,000.00 to Felipe Virtudazo. Consequently, the subject property was levied upon for auction. At the
auction, the entire property was sold in favor of spouses Felipe A. Virtudazo and Estelita. Meantime, spouses
Labuguen complaint for Annulment of Deeds was dismissed by the RTC.

Because spouses Labuguen refused to vacate the 270-sq m portion of the property and to pay the accumulated
rents, spouses Virtudazo filed the complaint a quo for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession, Attorney’s Fees
and Damages against them.

In ruling that spouses Virtudazo had a better right over the 270-sq m portion of the property, the court a
quo reasoned that the MOA and the EJS with Sale were a conditional sale that was not perfected because
spouses Labuguen failed to comply with the assumption of mortgage therein contained.

Spouses Labuguen appealed to the CA arguing in the main that the EJS with Sale was an absolute sale making
them lawful owners of the 270- sq m portion of the property. In granting spouses Labuguen’s appeal, the CA
ruled that the EJS with Sale was an absolute sale by virtue of which they became owners of the 270-sq m
portion of the lot together with the building. The CA further held that the foreclosure of the entire property and
the subsequent redemption thereof by Florentino Maurin did not extinguish spouses Labuguen’s ownership over
the 270-sq m portion. It held that Florentino Maurin’s act of redeeming the entire property served to discharge
the mortgage, and, thus restored spouses Labuguen’s right of ownership sans any lien.

ISSUE:

UE-0200673-2023
Whether or not spouses Labuguen's ownership was not perfected since the mortgage was eventually foreclosed
by DBP.

RULING:
The EJS with Sale is a perfected contract of sale.

Article 1181 of the Civil Code provides that "in conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the
extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which
constitutes the condition." A sale is conditional where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation
to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the suspensive
condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.

The MOA required spouses Labuguen's assumption of the mortgage with the DBP. The assumption of mortgage
is a condition to the seller's consent. It is not disputed that such assumption of mortgage did not take place
because DBP did not give its consent thereto. Because spouses Labuguen did not comply with the condition to
assume the mortgage, the sale as embodied under the MOA was not perfected.

Nevertheless, it appears that the Maurins and Labuguens intended to push thru with the sale of the 270-sq m
portion of the property, thus, they entered into the EJS with Sale. While the MOA required that spouses
Labuguen assume Florentino Maurin's obligation with the DBP, the EJS with Sale no longer required such
assumption of obligation.

It is likewise clear from the terms of the EJS with Sale that the payment of the mortgage obligation was not a
condition that suspended the transfer of title over the 270-sq m portion of the property. Far from being a
conditional sale, the EJS with Sale has all the elements of a contract of sale. There is consent to transfer
ownership over the 270-sq m portion of the property in exchange for the price of P120,000.00. The EJS with
Sale between Florentino Maurin and spouses Labuguen is therefore valid and binding as between them.

The fact that the property was mortgaged to DBP at the time the sale was perfected is of no moment. A mortgage
does not pass title or estate to the mortgagee as it is nothing more than a lien, encumbrance, or security for a
debt. In a contract of mortgage, the mortgagor remains to be the owner of the property although the property is
subjected to a lien. As such, the mortgagor retains the right to dispose of the property as an attribute of
ownership. Thus, Florentino Maurin had the right to sell the mortgaged property, or a portion thereof, which he,
in fact, did through the EJS with Sale.

The effect of the sale of the 270-sq m portion of the property while the mortgage in favor of DBP subsists is not
to suspend the efficacy of such sale, but that the property right which spouses Labuguen have acquired is made
subject to DBP's mortgage right. The sale or transfer of the mortgaged property cannot affect or release the
mortgage; thus, the purchaser or transferee is necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the encumbrance.

UE-0200673-2023
PARTITION

LILIBETH ESPINAS-LANUZA, ONEL ESPINAS, AS HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO ESPINAS, AND THE

MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF DARAGA, ALBAY, VS. FELIX LUNA, JR., ARMANDO VELASCO
AND ANTONIO VELASCO, AS HEIRS OF SIMON VELASCO, G.R. NO. 229775. MARCH 11, 2019. J.
REYES, JR., J.

FACTS:
During his lifetime, Simon Velasco was the owner of several properties including the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20630. Simon had four children, namely, Heriberto Velasco, Genoviva
Velasco, Felisa Velasco, and Juan Velasco. Felix Luna, Jr., is the son of Genoviva, while Armando Velasco and
Antonio Velasco are the children of Heriberto (respondents).

Respondents allege that Juan and Felisa, through deceit, connivance, and misrepresentation, executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale, which adjudicated the subject property to Leopoldo Espinas, son of Felisa.
They further contend that they discovered the fraud in 2010 when they came to know that Tax Declaration No.
02-040-0147 was issued in Leopoldo's name.

In their defense, Lilibeth Espinas-Lanuza and Onel Espinas, children of Leopoldo, argue that when Simon died
intestate, his children agreed to partition his estate such that the subject property was the joint share of Juan and
Felisa who subsequently executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale, conveying the subject property
to Leopoldo.

In a Decision, the RTC ruled that the sale by Felisa and Juan of their respective undivided shares in the co-
ownership was valid and the vendee, Leopoldo, became the owner of the shares sold to him. It concluded that
the heirs of Heriberto and Genoviva were co-owners of Leopoldo in the subject property.

In a Decision, the CA adjudged that Heriberto and Genoviva were excluded in the execution of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement entered into by Juan and Felisa as there was no showing that Heriberto and Genoviva
were already deceased when the deed was executed. It noted that the extrajudicial settlement adjudicated and
sold properties which still formed part of the estate of Simon and were, therefore, co-owned by his heirs. The
appellate court emphasized that under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, no extrajudicial settlement shall
be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. It opined that fraud had
been committed against the excluded heirs, thus, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale must be
annulled. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
January 26, 2017. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid.

RULING:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral
partition when it has been completely or partly performed.

Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in
proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty
and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce
such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, an oral partition under which the parties went
into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity
will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.

A parol partition may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in
common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of
individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be
valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their
respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the
partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise
recognizing the existence of the partition.

UE-0200673-2023
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part
performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held
that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity
would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.

In the case at bar, it has been shown that upon the death of Simon, his children, Genoviva, Heriberto, Juan and
Felisa, orally partitioned the estate among themselves, with each one of them possessing their respective shares
and exercising acts of ownership. Respondents did not dispute that the property situated in Magogon, Camalig,
Albay went to Genoviva while the property situated in Ting-ting, Taloto, Camalig, Albay went to Heriberto.
Further, they did not raise any objection to the fact that the subject property was given to Juan and Felisa as their
share in Simon's estate. It must be emphasized that no one among the children of Simon disturbed the status
quo which has been going on from the year 1966. To be sure, Genoviva and Heriberto were not without
knowledge that the subject property was transferred to Leopoldo and that the latter had introduced
improvements thereon. They could have easily questioned the transfer, but they chose to remain silent precisely
because they were already given their respective shares in the estate. Hence, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
heirs of Simon agreed to orally partition his estate among themselves, as evinced by their possession of the
inherited premises, their construction of improvements thereon, and their having declared in their names for
taxation purposes their respective shares. Actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of
the property in accordance with an alleged partition are considered strong proof of an oral partition.

In addition, a possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant
establishes a better right. Also, under Article 541 of the Civil Code, one who possesses in the concept of an
owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title, and he cannot be obliged to show
or prove it. Moreover, Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that actual possession under a claim of ownership
raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Here, aside from respondents' bare claim that they are co-owners
of the subject property, they failed to adduce proof that the heirs of Simon did not actually partition his estate.

Accordingly, considering that Felisa and Juan already owned the subject property at the time they sold the same
to Leopoldo on May 14, 1966, having been assigned such property pursuant to the oral partition of the estate of
Simon effected by his heirs, petitioners are entitled to actual possession thereof.

UE-0200673-2023
VICTORIA* T. FAJARDO, VS. BELEN CUA-MALATE, G.R. NO. 213666. MARCH 27, 2019,
CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Belen filed an Amended Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Damages against her
siblings. In the Amended Complaint respondent Belen alleged that she and the defendants siblings are
compulsory heirs of their late mother, Ceferina Toregosa Cua. Ceferina died intestate and had left certain real
and personal properties, as well as interest in real properties. Respondent Belen further alleged that she did not
receive her lawful share from Ceferina's estate. She prayed that judgment be issued ordering the partition and
distribution of Ceferina's entire estate and that she (respondent Belen) be awarded her lawful share.

Defendants Ramon, Adelaida, Emelita, and Elena filed their Answer, alleging that they were willing to settle the
partition case amicably; that respondent Belen was receiving her share from the income of the properties left by
their late mother, Ceferina; that it was respondent Belen who intentionally refused to show documents
pertaining to the supposed properties left by Ceferina; and that respondent Belen is not entitled to the reliefs she
prayed for.

Meanwhile, petitioner Victoria filed an Answer alleging that she is in favor of the partition and accounting of
the properties of Ceferina.

Pre-trial was conducted and terminated. Thereafter, respondent Belen was presented as a witness. But after her
direct examination, and before the conduct of the cross-examination, the parties agreed to refer the case to
mediation.

Hence, the RTC issued an Order of Referral, referring the case to mediation through the Philippine Mediation
Center (PMC). During the mediation conferences, all the parties attended and successfully arrived at an
agreement on the manner of partition of Ceferina's estate. Because of the agreement reached upon by the parties,
the mediator issued an Order requiring respondent Belen's counsel to draft a written compromise agreement.
The terms of the agreement reached upon by the parties were thus translated into writing. A meeting was then
for the signing of the document entitled Compromise Agreement, which reduced into writing the prior
agreement reached by the parties during the mediation conferences.

On date of the meeting for the signing of the document, petitioner Victoria did not appear, while all her other
siblings appeared. It was subsequently explained by petitioner Victoria's counsel that petitioner Victoria was not
able to attend the meeting as she did not have enough money to travel from Manila to Calabanga, Camarines
Sur. Respondent Belen and the other siblings proceeded to sign the Compromise Agreement and submitted the
same before the RTC for approval.

The RTC rendered a Decision issuing a judgment on compromise. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Victoria
appealed the RTC's Decision before the CA. Petitioner Victoria alleged that the Compromise Agreement cannot
be binding as to her considering that she did not sign it and supposedly did not consent to its execution.

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioner Victoria's appeal, holding that "[t]he RTC did not err when it
approved the Compromise Agreement." Petitioner Victoria filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the CA in the assailed Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the parties have entered into a valid oral partition.

RULING:
The parties have come to terms as to the partition of Ceferina's estate even prior to the translation of the
agreement into written form on April 8, 2010. There was already a valid and binding oral partition that was
agreed upon by the parties.

The proceedings during the mediation conferences indubitably show that petitioner Victoria and her siblings
actually came to an agreement as to the partition of the estate of Ceferina. Hence, that an oral partition has been
entered into by the parties is a factual finding that must be left undisturbed.

The fact that petitioner Victoria failed to sign the written document bearing the terms of the parties' agreement is
of no moment. An oral partition may be valid and binding upon the heirs; there is no law that requires partition

UE-0200673-2023
among heirs to be in writing to be valid.

Under Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "there is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred
that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral
partition is valid." The Court further added that the partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by
some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property because it does not involve transfer of property from
one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in
favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance. Hence, an oral partition is not covered by the
Statute of Frauds.

Therefore, even if the document titled Compromise Agreement was not signed by petitioner Victoria, there was
already an oral partition entered into by the parties that bound all of the siblings. The written agreement only
served to reduce into writing for the convenience of the parties the terms of the agreement already entered into
during the mediation conferences.

UE-0200673-2023
ROGELIO LOGROSA, VS. SPOUSES CLEOFE AND CESAR AZARES, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 217611.
MARCH 27, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
In his verified complaint for partition filed before the RTC, petitioner Logrosa alleged that he, together with the
respondents are co-owners of eight (8) parcels of lands (subject properties), all situated in the Municipality of
Tagum (now Tagum City), Davao del Norte. The TCTs of the subject properties all indicate that petitioner
Logrosa, together with the respondents, are co-owners of the subject properties.

Petitioner Logrosa alleged that in 1987, the original owner of the subject properties, one Benjamin A. Gonzales
(Gonzales), sold the subject properties collectively to petitioner Logrosa and the other respondents. The records
show that a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the parties.

Answering, respondents contended that while it may be true that petitioner Logrosa's name appeared in the titles
of the properties aforementioned, however, they belied petitioner Logrosa's claim that he is a co-owner of the
same, as he never contributed as to its acquisition and never contributed for their maintenance, much less paid
the taxes due thereon.

After trial, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit in its Decision. Hence, petitioner Logrosa
appealed the RTC's Decision before the CA, alleging, in the main, that the RTC erred in holding that there is no
co-ownership that exists between petitioner Logrosa and respondents Sps. Azares.

In its assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioner Logrosa's appeal. In the assailed Decision, the CA held that
"after a careful scrutiny of the records, the [CA] finds that the evidence adduced by [petitioner Logrosa] were
insufficient to warrant a positive finding of co-ownership."

Petitioner Logrosa filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution.
Hence, the instant Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Logrosa is a co-owner of the subject properties who can compel partition.

RULING:
Petitioner Logrosa is a co-owner of the subject properties. There are no one dispute that there are eight
certificates of title, all of which clearly and unequivocally identify petitioner Logrosa as one of the co-owners of
the subject properties. The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a
parcel of land.

It is also not disputed by any party that a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by all the parties,
wherein it clearly states without ambiguity that one of the vendees of the subject properties is petitioner
Logrosa. Hence, no one in his right mind would include non-buyers or non-owners in a notarized deed of
absolute sale and in indefeasible certificates of title if he truly believes that he is the sole owner of the property.
Bearing in mind the strong presumption created by public documents such as a notarized instrument and
certificates of title, if respondents Sps. Azares really believed that they are the sole owners of the subject
properties, one would expect that they would, at the very least, execute another document evidencing their true
agreement as a precautionary measure. But no such precautionary measure was employed by respondents Sps.
Azares to protect their supposed right as sole owners of the subject properties.

Furthermore, it is not disputed that petitioner Logrosa possesses a portion of the subject property with no
opposition by the other parties, aside from respondents Sps. Azares, who disclaimed petitioner Logrosa's status
as co-owner only after more than two decades since the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and only as a
mere reaction to the Complaint for Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.

With respect to the tax declarations presented by respondents Sps. Azares, jurisprudence holds that tax
declarations and tax receipts as evidence of ownership cannot prevail over a certificate of title which, to
reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of ownership.

UE-0200673-2023
A person may exercise the right to compel the partition of real estate if he/she sets forth in his/her complaint the
nature and extent of his title and subsequently proves the same. The law does not make a distinction as to how
the co-owner derived his/her title, may it be through gratuity or through onerous consideration. In other words, a
person who derived his title and was granted co-ownership rights through gratuity may compel partition.

UE-0200673-2023
MA. ROSARIO AGARRADO, ET. AL., VS. CRISTITA LIBRANDO-AGARRADO AND ANA LOU
AGARRADO-KING, G.R. NO. 212413. JUNE 06, 2018, REYES, JR., J.

FACTS:
Petitioners Ma. Rosario Agarrado, Ruth Librada Agarrado, and Roy Agarrado are children of the late spouses
Agarrado, who, during their lifetime, acquired a 287-square meter land (subject property). Emilia died intestate,
leaving Rodrigo and their children as her compulsory heirs.

Meanwhile, unknown to the petitioners, Rodrigo was involved in an illicit affair with respondent Cristita
Librando-Agarrado, with whom Rodrigo begot respondent Ana Lou Agarrado-King. Eventually, Rodrigo
married Cristita. Rodrigo also succumbed to mortality and died. He left his surviving spouse, Cristita, his
legitimate children by his marriage with Emilia, and Ana Lou.

Cristita and Ana Lou filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the subject property,
with Ma. Rosario, Ruth, Roy, "and other heirs of Rodrigo Agarrado" as defendants.

Eventually, the RTC rendered its January 17, 2007 Decision, which ordered the parties to partition the subject
property "among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance or any other means or method."Aggrieved,
the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, through the assailed Decision, affirmed with
modification the Decision of the RTC. Despite the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed its
Decision via Resolution. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the complaint must be dismissed for the failure of the respondents to allege the assessed value of
the subject property.

RULING:
For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased. The Court ruled that partition is at once an action (1)
for declaration of co-ownership and (2) for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
properties involved. Thus, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he/she is a co-
owner of the subject properties, and second, the conveyance of his/her lawful share.

While actions for partition are incapable of pecuniary estimation owing to its two-phased subject matter, the
determination of the court which will acquire jurisdiction over the same must still conform to Sec. 33(3) of B.P.
129, as amended.

The provisions state that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property exceeds
P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00. For those below the
foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal
Trial Courts (MTC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC).

Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property, which is the subject matter of the partition, is
essential. This, the courts could identify through an examination of the allegations of the complaint.

A scouring of the records of this case revealed that the complaint did indeed lack any indication as to the
assessed value of the subject property. None of the assertions indicate the assessed value of the property to be
partitioned that would invariably determine as to which court has the authority to acquire jurisdiction. More,
none of the documents annexed to the complaint and as attached in the records of this case indicates any such
amount Thus, the petitioners are correct in restating their argument against the RTC's jurisdiction, for it has
none to exercise.

Clearly, therefore, jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition, while one not capable of pecuniary
estimation, falls under the jurisdiction of either the first or second level courts depending on the amounts
specified in Secs. 19(2) and 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended. Consequently, a failure by the plaintiff to indicate
the assessed value of the subject property in his/her complaint, or at the very least, in the attachments in the
complaint is dismissible because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the same could not be
identified.

UE-0200673-2023
HEIRS OF ERNESTO MORALES, VS. ASTRID MORALES AGUSTIN, G.R. NO. 224849. JUNE 06,
2018, REYES, JR., J.

FACTS:
The respondent, Astrid Morales Agustin, is a grandchild of Jayme Morales, who was the registered owner of a
parcel of land with improvements. The respondent initiated the instant complaint for the partition of Jayme's
property. They alleged that they, together with the petitioners and their other cousins, were co-owners of the
subject property by virtue of their successional rights as heirs of Jayme.

In response to the respondent's complaint, the heirs of Jose Morales filed an answer, which admitted the
allegations in the complaint, and interposed no objection to the partition, "provided that their present positions
on the subject property are respected."

On the other hand, Ernesto Morales, as one of the heirs of Vicente Morales, filed an Answer with Motion to
Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-claims. He alleged that herein respondent has no cause of action against the
petitioners because: (1) the proper remedy should not be a complaint for partition but an action for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Jayme and his wife.

After a protracted hearing on motions and other incidents of the case, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of
herein respondent. The RTC ruled that: (1) the estate of a deceased who died intestate may be partitioned
without need of any settlement or administration proceeding.

Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which thereafter dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
RTC Decision. The CA opined that the settlement of the entire estate of the late spouses Jayme and Telesfora is
"of no moment in the instant case of partition" because the respondent was "asserting her right as a co-owner of
the subject property by virtue of her successional right from her deceased father Simeon Morales, who was once
a co-owner of the said property, and not from Jayme and Telesfora Morales."

Despite the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed its decision via a Resolution. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an administration proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased is a condition that
has to be met before any partition of the estate and any distribution thereof to the heirs could be effected.

RULING:
The parties are the heirs of the late Jayme Morales. The land being sought to be divided was a property duly
registered under Jayme's name. Necessarily, therefore, the partition invoked by the respondents is the partition
of the estate of the deceased Jayme.

As such, when the petitioners alleged in their answer that there is yet another property that needs to be
partitioned among the parties, they were actually invoking the Civil Code provisions, not on Co-ownership, but
on Succession, which necessarily includes Article 1061 of the Civil Code—the provision on collation. It is
therefore proper for the trial court to have delved into this issue presented by the petitioner instead of
disregarding the same and limiting itself only to that singular property submitted by the respondent for partition.

Nonetheless, the law does not prohibit partial partition. In fact, the Court, in administration proceedings, have
allowed partition for special instances. But the Court should caution that this power should be exercised
sparingly. This is because a partial partition and distribution of the estate does not put to rest the question of the
division of the entire estate.

In this case, there is no cogent reason to render the partition of one of Jayme's properties and totally ignore the
others, if any. Absent any circumstance that would warrant the partial partition and distribution of Jayme's
estate, the prudent remedy is to settle the entirety of the estate in the partition proceedings in the court a
quo. Besides, it is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from
that of partition originally instituted.

UE-0200673-2023
HEIRS OF ROGER JARQUE, VS. MARCIAL JARQUE, LELIA JARQUE-LAGSIT, AND TERESITA
JARQUE-BAILON, G.R. NO. 196733. NOVEMBER 21, 2018, JARDELEZA, J.

FACTS:
This case pertains to the ownership of an unregistered parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 2560 and declared
under the name of Laureano Jarque. Laureano was married to Servanda Hagos with whom he had four children,
namely: Roger, Lupo, Sergio, and Natalia. Petitioners are the heirs of Roger, the original plaintiff in this
case. On the other hand, respondents are the living children of Lupo.

Petitioners claim that since their grandfather Laureano's death in 1946, their father, Roger, inherited Lot No.
2560 and exercised all attributes of ownership and possession over it. Upon Servanda's death in 1975, their
children orally partitioned among themselves the properties of their parents' estate such that Lot No. 2560 and
another parcel of land in Busay, Sorsogon were ceded to Roger.

The MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners. It declared petitioners as the rightful owners and
possessors of the property. The RTC affirmed in toto the MCTC's Decision and denied respondents' motion for
reconsideration. In its Decision, the CA reversed the RTC and the MCTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the oral partition entered into by the children of Laureano was valid.

RULING:
A partition is the separation, division, and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition.

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral
partition when it has been completely or partly performed. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement
to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually
been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the
respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
thereunder. Thus, an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or
otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case
decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.

Parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in
common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of
individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be
valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their
respective parts in severalty.

In this case, Roger's exercise of ownership over Lot No. 2560 after Laureano's death in 1946 is established by
evidence. In 1960, he was able to mortgage the property to, and subsequently redeem it from, Dominador Grajo.
This is also supported by Quirino Jarque, Sergio's son and Roger's nephew, who testified that: (1) Lot No. 2560
and another property were Roger's shares or inheritance from his parents' estate.

As soon as Lot No. 2560 was identified, occupied, and possessed by Roger to the exclusion of all the other
heirs, the co-ownership as to said property was terminated. These are acts which happened prior to the alleged
sale of the property to Benito in 1972. Thus, at the time of the sale, Servanda had no right to sell Lot No. 2560
either as sole owner or co-owner.

UE-0200673-2023
FORCIBLE ENTRY / UNLAWFUL DETAINER

FORCIBLE ENTRY

RHEMA INTERNATIONAL LIVELIHOOD FOUNDATION, INC., ET AL., VS. HIBIX, INC.,

REPRESENTED BY ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, YOSHIMITSU TAGUCHE, ET AL., G.R. NOS.
225353-54. AUGUST 28, 2019, CARANDANG, J.

FACTS:
A complaint for forcible entry was filed by Rhema against Hibix, Inc. (Hibix) and its Board of Directors. Rhema
alleged that by virtue of a donation from Marylou Bhalwart, it "became the owner of a large tract of land.
Rhema averred that it previously enjoyed juridical and physical possession of the property for years when
suddenly, Hibix, together with armed men claiming to be members of the special action unit of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), forcibly evicted Rhema's personnel.

Hibix alleged the Philippine Fuji sold the property, together with its improvements, to Hibix.. Since then, Hibix
had been in possession of the property until June 25, 2008, when a certain Romeo Prado, introducing himself as
a special sheriff, together with four policemen, six security guards, and a certain Julian Go, claiming to be the
owner of the property accompanied by two armed security guards, took over the possession of the property
through force, violence, and intimidation.

According to Hibix, Prado told the security guards of Hibix that they were implementing a special writ of
execution purportedly issued by the RTC of Pasay City. Hibix, however, found out that the CA had already
enjoined the enforcement of said order, making the writ of execution that Prado presented bogus.

Hibix lodged a complaint with the NBI relative to the unlawful and forcible take-over of the property. On
August 29, 2008, Hibix and the NBI took possession of the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the elements of forcible entry are present.

RULING:
The elements of forcible entry are: (1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of
it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. Possession in forcible entry cases
means nothing more than physical possession or possession de facto; not legal possession. Only prior physical
possession, not title, is the issue.

For forcible entry to prosper, an appreciable length of time of prior physical possession is not required. However
short it is, for as long as prior physical possession is established, recovery of possession under Rule 70 of the
Rules may be granted.

In this case, it was shown that Hibix enjoyed possession of the property until June 25, 2008, when Rhema
wrestled possession of the property from Hibix. However, Hibix did not file a case for forcible entry against
Rhema. It was proven that on August 29, 2008, Hibix, aided by the NBI and without any court order, retook
possession of the property. Hence, Rhema had prior physical possession of the property from June 25, 2008 to
August 29, 2008.

Undeniably, it was Rhema who first used violence in order to deprive Hibix possession over the property. The
remedy, which the latter should have resorted to, is to file a case for forcible entry against Rhema. Instead, Hibix
went to the NBI to lodge a complaint and sought their aid to wrestle possession back from Rhema. This is
tantamount to putting the law into one's hands, which is the evil sought to be avoided by the special civil action
of forcible entry.

UE-0200673-2023
JESSICA LIO MARTINEZ, VS. HEIRS OF REMBERTO F. LIM, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 234655.
SEPTEMBER 11, 2019, BERSAMIN, C.J.

FACTS:
Respondents are the heirs of Remberto Lim who, during his lifetime, owned, possessed, and cultivated a parcel
of land. Adjoining Remberto's land is the land of his brother - Jose Lim. It is worthy to note that per the
technical description in said title, the property is bounded on both the east and west by the properties of the
Heirs of Socorro Lim, which were later on acquired by the late Remberto Lim.

Jose sold his land to a certain Dorothy and Alexander Medalla who, thereafter, subdivided the same into two (2)
smaller lots, designated as Lots 1 and 2. Lot 2 was further subdivided into nine (9) smaller lots, this time
designated as Lots 2-A to 2-I, inclusive. Lots 2-D, 2-E and 2-F were thereafter sold to herein petitioner
Martinez, pursuant to three (3) separate Deeds of Absolute Sale, and by virtue thereof, petitioner Martinez was
issued TCT Nos. 065-2010000259, 065-2010000260, and 065-2010000261 in her favor.

Petitioner Martinez and her father entered into the property and uprooted some of the acacia mangium trees that
were previously planted thereon by the late Remberto Lim and his son, Alan Lim. To further delineate their
claimed property, petitioner fenced the same and placed signs thereon that read "NO TRESPASSING" and
"NOTICE THIS PROPERTY IS OWNED BY THE MARTINEZ FAMILY."

Now then, claiming that petitioner had unlawfully encroached into a portion of their property, respondents,
through counsel, sent a demand letter to petitioner demanding that she immediately remove the fence that she
built on respondents' land as well as to turn over peaceful possession of that portion of property that petitioner
intruded into. Unfortunately, the demand was ignored by petitioner, and respondents were constrained to file the
instant complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioner
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Coron-Busuanga (MCTC)."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the forcible entry case under Rule 70 was the proper remedy to resolve this controversy.

RULING:
A proper reading of the allegations of the complaint shows that the case revolved around the actual metes and
bounds of the parties' respective properties. The complaint was anchored on the theory that the properties
registered in three certificates of title issued in the name of the petitioner had erroneously included portions of
the property covered by the tax declaration issued in the name of the respondents' predecessor in interest.
The dispute did not primarily concern merely possessory rights, but related to boundaries, and could not be
summarily determined. The MCTC should have quickly seen that the dispute did not concern mere possession
of the area in litis but the supposed encroachment by the petitioner on the portion of the respondents. In other
words, the question focused on whether the property being claimed and occupied by the petitioner had really
been part of her registered properties, or of the respondents' property. The proper resolution of such dispute in
favor of the respondents could be had only after a hearing in which the trial court was enabled through
preponderant proof showing that, indeed, the disputed area was not within the metes and bounds appearing and
stated in the TCTs of the petitioner.

A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily through the action for forcible entry covered by Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the
issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto. If the petitioner
had possession of the disputed areas by virtue of the same being covered by the metes and bounds stated and
defined in her Torrens titles, then she might not be validly dispossessed thereof through the action for forcible
entry. The dispute should be properly threshed out only through accion reivindicatoria. Accordingly, the MCTC
acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and resolving the dispute as one for forcible entry.

UE-0200673-2023
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, VS. CITI APPLIANCE M.C.
CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 214546. OCTOBER 09, 2019, LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
Since 1992, Citi Appliance has owned a parcel of land in Cebu City. Sometime in 2003, it decided to construct a
16-storey commercial building on it.

The Cebu City Zoning Board required Citi Appliance to construct a one-level parking area consisting of 26
parking slots. To comply with this requirement, Citi Appliance had to make a deep excavation to lay the
foundation of the parking lot. In the process, it discovered telephone lines, cables, and manholes underground,
which had been placed there by PLDT sometime in 1983. These encroached on Citi Appliance's property,
preventing it from excavating the land.

In April 2003, Citi Appliance applied for exemption from the parking requirement, which the Cebu City Zoning
Board initially granted on May 22, 2003. However, upon reconsideration, the Cebu City Zoning Board denied
the exemption and required Citi Appliance to pay the parking exemption fee of P3,753,600.00.

On April 26, 2004, Citi Appliance wrote PLDT, demanding that it remove the underground telephone lines,
cables, and manholes, or to shoulder the parking exemption fee. On May 28, 2004, Citi Appliance made a final
demand on PLDT to comply until June 15, 2004; otherwise, it would file an appropriate action in court.

When PLDT still refused to comply, Citi Appliance filed a complaint for ejectment against PLDT.

In its Answer, PLDT alleged that the case should be dismissed since the action for forcible entry had
prescribed. It expounded in its Position Paper that the one-year prescriptive period within which to bring an
action for forcible entry based on stealth should be reckoned from the discovery of the alleged unlawful entry,
not the last demand to vacate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the element of prior physical possession is present.

RULLING:
The three (3) elements that must be alleged and proved for a forcible entry suit to prosper are the following:

(a) that they have prior physical possession of the property;

(b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and,
(c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of
their deprivation of the physical possession of the property.

In this case, the two (2) elements of forcible entry are absent: first, respondent has no prior physical possession
of the property; and second, the action was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period.

The "fact of prior physical possession is an indispensable element in forcible entry cases." For an action for
forcible entry to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove that it was in prior physical possession of the
property before the defendant encroached on the property.

Possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than physical or material possession, not legal possession. It
is not required that the complainant is the owner of the property. If the issue of ownership is raised, the court
may resolve this question only to determine the question of possession.

A cursory reading of the complaint shows that respondent failed to allege its prior physical possession over the
property. It merely submitted proof of ownership over the property, which is not sufficient to prove prior
physical possession.

Hence, in claiming that it had prior physical possession by virtue of its absolute ownership over the land,
respondent is mistaken. An allegation of prior physical possession must be clearly stated in a complaint for
forcible entry. It cannot equate possession as an attribute of ownership to the fact of actual prior physical
possession.

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UE-0200673-2023
ISSUE:
Whether or not the one-year prescriptive period of an action for forcible entry through stealth should be
reckoned from the time the unlawful entry is discovered or from the last demand to vacate.

RULING:
In an action for forcible entry, the following requisites are essential for the MTC to acquire jurisdiction over the
case:
(1) the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property;
(2) the plaintiff was deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and
(3) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when
the entry is through stealth, the one (1)-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff-owner or
legal possessor learned of the deprivation of the physical possession of the property.

Here, a review of respondent's own narration of facts reveals that it discovered the underground cables and lines
in April 2003 when it applied for exemption from the parking slot requirement with the Cebu City Zoning
Board.

Counting from this date, the one-year prescriptive period to file the forcible entry suit had already lapsed
sometime in April 2004. Thus, by the time the complaint for forcible entry was filed on October 1, 2004, the
period had already prescribed. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities, therefore, no longer had jurisdiction to
resolve the case.

UE-0200673-2023
FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE, MARRIED TO MAURICE GEORGE FUERTE, VS. SPOUSES
SIL VINO S. ESTOMO AND CONCEPCION C. ESTOMO, G.R. NO. 223399. APRIL 23, 2018,
PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Fuerte alleged that Manuela Co executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property in her favor.
Upon Co's failure to pay the loan, Fuerte caused the foreclosure proceedings and eventually obtained ownership
of the property. However, the writ of possession was returned unsatisfied since Co was no longer residing at the
property and that the Spouses Estomo and their family occupied the same. It was only after the said return that
Fuerte discovered and verified that the Spouses Estomo were in possession of the property. In a letter, she
demanded them to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property and pay the corresponding
compensation. The Spouses Estomo refused to heed to her demands.

In their Answer, the Spouses Estomo denied that they illegally occupied the subject property. They also denied
the existence of the demand letter. They averred that they acquired the property from the Homeowners
Development Corporation on February 15, 1999 through a Contract to Sell, registered it under their names, and
had been their family home since 2000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case can be considered as one for unlawful detainer.

RULING:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:
(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its
enjoyment; and
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

A perusal of the Complaint shows that it contradicts the requirements for unlawful detainer. A requisite for a
valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only
upon the expiration of the right to possess. To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such
lawful possession must then be established. Paragraphs 2 and 3 make it clear that Spouses Estomo's occupancy
was illegal and without Fuerte's consent. Likewise, the Complaint did not contain an allegation that Fuerte or
her predecessor-in-interest tolerated the spouses' possession on account of an express or implied contract
between them. Neither was there any averment which shows any overt act on Fuerte's part indicative of her
permission to occupy the land.

Moreover, the December 1, 2008 demand letter supports the fact that she characterized the Spouses Estomo's
possession of the subject property as unlawful from the start. It is apparent from the letter that Fuerte demanded
the spouses to immediately vacate the subject property, contrary to her allegation in the instant petition that she
granted such period, during which she tolerated the spouses' possession. She failed to satisfy the requirement
that her supposed act of tolerance was present right from the start of the possession by the Spouses Estomo. It is
worth noting that the absence of the first requisite is significant in the light of the Spouses Estomo's claim that
they have been occupying the property as owner thereof, and that they have filed an annulment of sale and real
estate mortgage against Co and Fuerte even before the property was foreclosed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case "is not a bar for the parties or even third persons to
file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership" merely invites multiplicity of suits.

RULING:

UE-0200673-2023
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of
land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of
the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. These actions are intended to
avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their
claimed right of possession.

A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case, or an unlawful detainer as in this case, will not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action. Such determination does not
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land; neither is it conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. In fact, Section 18, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that a "judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall
be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land." Since there is no identity of causes of action, there can be no multiplicity of suits.

UE-0200673-2023
PABLO C. HIDALGO, V. SONIA VELASCO, G.R. NO. 202217. APRIL 25, 2018, MARTIRES, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner claims that in year 2000 its previous owner, the late Juana H. Querubin, executed a Deed of Donation
in his favor, conveying three (3) parcels of land unto him, including Cadastral Lot No. 77.

Sometime in January 2005, petitioner visited Cadastral Lot No. 77 and saw, to his surprise, that herein
respondent Sonia Velasco was in possession of the property. He sent several letters demanding that she vacates;
the last demand letter was dated 9 January 2006. Respondent replied. In a letter dated 2 February 2006, she
informed petitioner that per the instructions of one Josefina Reintegrado Baron, whom she claimed was the
property's owner and from whom she derived her rights, she was not to allow petitioner to take its possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MCTC has jurisdiction over the complaint at bar.

RULING:
In ejectment complaints, such allegations must correspond to the classes of actions defined and provided for
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

The complaint at bar identifies itself as an unlawful detainer suit. In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a
complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

1. That initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
2. That eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination
of the latter's right of possession;
3. That thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
4. That within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.

These averments are jurisdictional and must appear on the face of the complaint. The subject complaint fails to
aver the first and the second recitals. It fails to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of an action for unlawful
detainer, following which, the MCTC could not exercise jurisdiction over it.

Incidentally, the recitals in the complaint are more in tune with those in a complaint for forcible entry.

UE-0200673-2023
UNLAWFUL DETAINER

MA. ANTONETTE LOZANO, V. JOCELYN K. FERNANDEZ, G.R. NO. 212979. FEBRUARY 18, 2019,
J. REYES, JR., J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Antonette Lozano executed a Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights over the subject property
in favor of Fernandez. After the execution of the document, Fernandez continued to tolerate Lozano's possession
over the property. On July 15, 2009, she sent a demand letter to Lozano ordering her to vacate the premises.
Because Lozano failed to leave the property, Fernandez was constrained to file an action for unlawful detainer
against her before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities.

According to the petition, since 1996, Lozano had owned and possessed the subject property. She never recalled
signing any Waiver in Fernandez's favor. Lozano explained that Fernandez duped her into signing a blank
document, which was later converted to a Waiver. She denied having appeared before a notary public to notarize
the said document. Lozano claimed that the real contract between her and Fernandez was a loan with mortgage
as evidenced by the fact that she remained in possession of the property even after the execution of the said
Waiver and that she had issued checks in payment of the loan. She pointed out that Fernandez was engaged in
the business of lending imposing unconscionable interest and was in the practice of securing collateral from the
lendee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unlawful detainer based on tolerance.

RULING:
In an action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the acts of tolerance must be proved. Bare allegations of
tolerance are insufficient and there must be acts indicative of tolerance.

For there to be tolerance, complainants in an unlawful detainer must prove that they had consented to the
possession over the property through positive acts. After all, tolerance signifies permission and not merely
silence or inaction as silence or inaction is negligence and not tolerance.

In the present case, Fernandez's alleged tolerance was premised on the fact that she did not do anything after the
Waiver was executed. However, her inaction is insufficient to establish tolerance as it indicates negligence,
rather than tolerance, on her part. Inaction should not be confused with tolerance as the latter transcends silence
and connotes permission to possess the property subject of an unlawful detainer case. Thus, even assuming the
Waiver was valid and binding, its execution and Fernandez's subsequent failure to assert her possessory rights
do not warrant the conclusion that she tolerated Lozano's continued possession of the property in question,
absent any other act signifying consent.

Fernandez cannot simply claim that she had tolerated Lozano's possession because she did not do anything after
the execution of the Waiver as silence does not equate to tolerance or permission. In short, the execution of the
Waiver alone is not tantamount to the tolerance contemplated in unlawful detainer cases. The absence of an
overt act indicative of tolerance or permission on the part of the plaintiff is fatal for a case for unlawful detainer.

UE-0200673-2023
LEONORA RIVERA-AVANTE, VS. MILAGROS RIVERA AND THEIR HEIRS WITH THE LATE
ALEJANDRO RIVERA, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS WHO ARE DERIVING CLAIM OR RIGHTS
FROM THEM, G.R. NO. 224137. APRIL 03, 2019, PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a house and lot. Respondent Milagros Rivera is her sister-in-law, being the
wife of her deceased brother, Alejandro. Petitioner claims that she and her husband allowed respondents to stay
in the disputed premises out of compassion for respondent and in consideration of her deceased brother
Alejandro. However, in 2005, petitioner and her husband, finding the need to utilize the subject property and in
view of their plan to distribute the same to their children, demanded that respondents vacate the premises in
question. However, respondents refused the demand of petitioner and her husband, and even filed a case
questioning petitioner's ownership of the said property contending that they are, in fact, co-owners of the subject
property and that petitioner obtained title over the disputed lot through fraud, deceit and falsification.

On May 22, 2006, petitioner sent a formal demand letter to respondents asking them to vacate the disputed
premises, but this remained unheeded. On September 3, 2007, petitioner sent respondents another letter asking
them to leave the subject property and to pay reasonable rent from the date of receipt of the said letter until they
have fully vacated the questioned premises, but to no avail. Hence, petitioner filed an unlawful detainer case
with the MeTC of Manila on March 12, 2008.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's action for unlawful detainer was timely filed.

Is it May 22, 2006, which is the date of the initial demand letter or September 3, 2007, which was the latest
demand letter prior to the filing of the unlawful detainer case against respondents?

RULING:
An action for unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. The possession of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case is originally legal but becomes
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if the following allegations are present:
1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
the latter's right of possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.

Moreover, the sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. When the defendant, however,
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.

The one-year prescriptive period should be counted from May 22, 2006 on the ground that the demand letter
dated September 3, 2007 was merely in the nature of a reminder or reiteration of the original demand made on
May 22, 2006.

The established rule is that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature of reminders of the original
demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering
that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand. The letter of September 3, 2007,
which is a mere reiteration of the original demand, will not operate to renew the one-year period within which
petitioner should file her unlawful detainer case because the said period will still be counted from the date of the
original demand which was made on May 22, 2006.

UE-0200673-2023
THE HEIRS OF ALFREDO CULLADO, NAMELY LOLITA CULLADO, DOMINADOR CULLADO,
ROMEO CULLADO, NOEL CULLADO, REBECCA LAMBINICIO, MARY JANE BAUTISTA AND
JIMMY CULLADO, V. DOMINIC V. GUTIERREZ, G.R. NO. 212938. JULY 30, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
On May 10, 1995, Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-61499 which covered a parcel of land was issued in
Dominic Gutierrez's favor.

On May 5, 1997, Dominic's father, Dominador L. Gutierrez, representing Dominic who was then still a minor,
filed before the Regional Trial Court, an action for recovery of ownership, possession with damages with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order against Alfredo Cullado.

In the action for recovery of ownership, Dominic maintained that Cullado had been squatting on the subject land
as early as 1977, and that despite repeated demands, Cullado refused to vacate the said lot.

Cullado, in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, interposed the special and affirmative defenses of his actual
possession and cultivation of the subject parcel of land in an open, adverse and continuous manner. He likewise
asked for the reconveyance of the property, considering that Dominic and his father fraudulently had the subject
property titled in Dominic's name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioners’ counterclaims where the complaint involves an accion
publiciana.

RULING:
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However,
where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the
parties has the right to possess the property.

This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving
the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.

UE-0200673-2023
SPOUSES BELINDA LIU AND HSI PIN LIU, V. MARCELINA ESPINOSA, MARY ANN M.
ESTRADA, ARCHIE ASUMBRADO, INESITA ASUMBRADO, LORETO TUTOR, ELIAS PENAS,
BENITA ABANTAO, BASILIZA MARTIZANO, ARMAN PARAS, MIGUELITO M. ANTEGA,
JOVENTINO CAHULOGAN, AND TITO TUBAC, G.R. NO. 238513. JULY 31, 2019, HERNANDO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Belinda Y. Liu owns a parcel of land. Petitioner Hsi Pin Liu is her husband. They acquired said land
from their predecessor-in-interest who, in turn, merely tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents
Marcelina Espinosa, Mary Ann M. Estrada, Archie Asumbrado, Inesita Asumbrado, Loreta Tutor, Elias Penas,
Benita Abantao, Basiliza Martizano, Arman Paras, Miguelito M. Antega, Joventino Cahulogan, and Tito Tubac.
The latter are the present occupants of the land.

After title was transferred to the petitioners, they likewise tolerated the presence of the respondents upon the
understanding that they will peacefully vacate the land once the petitioners' need to use the same arises. When
petitioners' demands to vacate the property were made, however, the latest of which was on February 12, 2013,
the respondents refused to comply.

Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against them in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a case for unlawful detainer for they merely tolerated the possession of the property by
respondents.

RULING:
The petitioners' action for unlawful detainer must be sustained.

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action may be filed
by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied.

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted
by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, defendant's possession
became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.

Thus, an action for unlawful detainer will stand if the following requisites are present:
a. Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
b. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
the latter's right of possession;
c. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
d. Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.

The foregoing requisites have been sufficiently established in the case at bar.

The petitioners are the registered owners of the subject property, as evidenced by TCT No. 146-2010008891,
and that the respondents' occupation of the subject property was merely tolerated by the petitioners' predecessor-
in-interest and the petitioners themselves based on the understanding that the said respondents will peacefully
vacate the same once the need to use the land by the petitioners arises.

Subsequently, this occupation became illegal when respondents refused to heed petitioners' express and clear
demands to vacate the subject property, the last of which was dated February 12, 2013. It is evidently clear that
the complaint for unlawful detainer, filed on August 6, 2013, was made within one year from the time the last
formal demand to vacate was made.

Further, respondents would not have made an offer to purchase the subject land from petitioners had they been
truly in possession of the property in the concept of an owner. Their claim is thus negated by the fact that the

UE-0200673-2023
subject land is registered in the name of the petitioners. It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of an
indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence
with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. Hence, petitioners as the titleholders are entitled to
all the attributes of ownership of the property including possession.

UE-0200673-2023
CLAIRE ANNE CHANSUYCO, RONALD ALLAN CHANSUYCO AND ABRAHAM CHANSUYCO II,
VS. SPOUSES LOPE AND JOCELYN CERVERA PALTEP, AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING
RIGHTS UNDER THEM, G.R. NOS. 208733-34. AUGUST 19, 2019, LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners' father Abraham Chansuyco acquired a residential lot in the name of Abraham Chansuyco, married to
Elvira Rubio. Abraham Chansuyco died, leaving as heirs his wife Elvira and their children petitioners Claire
Ann, Ronald Allan, and Abraham II.
Petitioners claimed that the subject property was their family home. They had been estranged from their mother
Elvira since 2003. They learned that Elvira had turned over the possession of the property to respondents
Spouses Lope and Jocelyn Cervera Paltep. Petitioners attempted to take it back but Spouses Paltep refused,
asserting Elvira had already sold it to them.

Petitioners bought back from respondents 52 square meters of the property through an Absolute Deed of
Sale. They did so out of desperation to go back and stay in the only place they called home. Subsequently,
petitioners demanded that Spouses Paltep vacate the property. They averred that the property was their parents'
conjugal asset. Elvira sold it to Spouses Paltep prior to liquidation of the conjugal partnership allegedly in
violation of Article 130 of the Family Code.

Consequently, petitioners initiated a complaint with the barangay but the parties failed to amicably resolve the
matter there. Under letter, petitioners demanded that Spouses Paltep vacate the property. But Spouses Paltep
continued to refuse.

As for the respondents, they claim that they acquired the property from petitioners' mother Elvira through a
Deed of Sale dated February 2, 2004 for a consideration of P500,000.00. Petitioners later questioned their
possession and demanded that they vacate the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

RULING:
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it indicates the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
termination of the right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.

Accordingly, these aforesaid jurisdictional facts must be alleged in the complaint itself for unlawful detainer.
Failure to do so divests the first level court of jurisdiction over the case.
Here, one jurisdictional allegation is conspicuously lacking, i.e. defendants' possession of the property was
initially lawful or legal; or defendants' possession of the property was by mere tolerance.

The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare
allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May 2007, she discovered that the defendants have entered the subject
property and occupied the same", would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon
clandestinely and without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful
detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the
lower court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.

UE-0200673-2023
SPOUSES AURORA TOJONG SU AND AMADOR SU, PETITIONERS, VS. EDA BONTILAO,
PABLITA BONTILAO, AND MARICEL DAYANDAYAN, G.R. NO. 238892. SEPTEMBER 04, 2019,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, damages, and attorney's fees against respondents Eda
Bontilao, Pablita Bontilao, and Maricel Dayandayan (respondents) as well as several others before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Lapu-Lapu City (MTCC), alleging that respondents had constructed their
houses on the subject property and had been occupying the same by petitioners' mere tolerance, with the
understanding that they will peacefully vacate the premises upon proper demand.

Unfortunately, when petitioners informed respondents of their need of the subject property and requested them
to voluntarily vacate the same, respondents refused. Petitioners' formal demand for them to do so likewise went
unheeded. Thus, after efforts for an amicable settlement before the barangay similarly failed, petitioners
instituted the present complaint for unlawful detainer.

In defense, respondents claimed that petitioners had no cause of action against them, not being the real owners
of the subject property. They averred that petitioner obtained their title through fraud, having bought the subject
property from one Gerardo Dungog despite full knowledge that it was their predecessor, Mariano Ybañez, who
owned the same as evidenced by a tax declaration issued under his name. As the legitimate heirs of Mariano,
respondents claimed to be the true owners of the subject property who were in continuous possession thereof
since their youth. Consequently, they could not have been occupying the subject property by the mere tolerance
of petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unlawful detainer based on tolerance in this case.

RULING:
In an action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the acts of tolerance must be proved; bare allegations are
insufficient. For tolerance to exist, the complainants in an unlawful detainer must prove that they had consented
to the possession over the property through positive acts. After all, tolerance signifies permission and not merely
silence or inaction as silence or inaction is negligence and not tolerance.
The fact of tolerance is of utmost importance in an action for unlawful detainer. Without proof that the
possession was legal at the outset, the logical conclusion would be that the defendant's possession of the subject
property will be deemed illegal from the very beginning, for which, the action for unlawful detainer shall be
dismissed. Thus, an action for unlawful detainer fails in the absence of proof of tolerance, coupled with
evidence of how the entry of the respondents was effected, or how and when the dispossession started.

Here, petitioners failed to adduce evidence to establish that the respondents' occupation of the subject property
was actually effected through their tolerance or permission. There is dearth of evidence to show how and when
the respondents entered the subject lot, as well as how and when the permission to occupy was purportedly
given by petitioners. Hence, there was no basis for the MTCC and RTC to conclude that respondents'
occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance of petitioners.

Finally, there is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner of the property thereby
covered and is entitled to its possession. However, the fact alone that petitioners have a title over the subject
property does not give them unbridled authority to immediately wrest possession from its current possessor in
the absence of evidence proving the allegations in their unlawful detainer claim. Indeed, even the legal owner of
the property cannot conveniently usurp possession against a possessor, through a summary action for ejectment,
without proving the essential requisites thereof. Accordingly, should the owner choose to file an action for
unlawful detainer, it is imperative for him/her to first and foremost prove that the occupation was based on
his/her permission or tolerance. Absent which, the owner would be in a better position by pursuing other more
appropriate legal remedies.

UE-0200673-2023
CONTEMPT

L.C. BIG MAK BURGER, INC., VS. MCDONALD'S CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 233073. FEBRUARY
14, 2018, TIJAM, J.

FACTS:
In the Civil Case No. 90-1507, which McDonald's Corporation filed against L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. for
trademark infringement and unfair competition, the Infringement Court, acting on the prayer for the issuance of
a writ preliminary injunction, issued an Order, directing petitioner to refrain from using for its fast food
restaurant business the name "Big Mak" or any other mark, word, name, or device, which by colorable imitation
is likely to confuse, mislead or deceive the public into believing that the [petitioner's] goods and services
originate from, or are sponsored by or affiliated with those of [respondent's], and from otherwise unfairly
trading on the reputation and goodwill of the Mcdonald's Marks. in particular the mark "BIG MAC".

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent McDonald's Corporation and
McGeorge Food Industries Inc. and against petitioner L.C. Big Mak Burgers, Inc. The CA overturned the RTC
Decision in a decision. However, the Supreme Court reversed the CA in the Decision and thus reinstated the
Infringement Court's Decision. Thusly, the Infringement Court, issued a Writ of Execution to implement its
September 5, 1994 Decision.

However, respondent filed a Petition for Contempt against petitioner and Francis Dy, in his capacity as
President of L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. Basically, respondent averred therein that despite service upon the
petitioner and its president of the Writ of Execution in the trademark infringement and unfair competition case,
the latter continues to disobey and ignore their judgment obligation by continuously using, as part of their food
and restaurant business, the words "Big Mak."

In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, petitioner argued that it is evident from the August 18, 2004
Decision of the Supreme Court, that the prohibition covers only the use of the mark "Big Mak" and not the name
"L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc." Petitioner then averred that at that time, its stalls were using its company name
"L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc." and not the mark "Big Mak" and that it had already stopped selling "Big Mak"
burgers for several years already. Moreover, petitioner averred that it has already changed the name of some of
its stalls and products to "Supermak" as evidenced by pictures of its stalls in Metro Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner guilty of indirect contempt.

RULING:
Contrary to what respondent attempted to impress to the courts, it is not wholly true that petitioner continues to
use the mark "Big Mak" in its business, in complete defiance to this Court's Decision.

Testimonial and documentary evidence were in fact presented to show that petitioner had been using "Super
Mak" and/or its corporate name "L.C. Big Mak Burger Inc." in its business operations instead of the proscribed
mark "Big Mak" pursuant to the ruling of the Infringement Court. In fact, in as early as during the trial of the
said case, certain changes had already been made by the petitioner to rule out the charge of infringement and
unfair competition. During the trial of the infringement and unfair competition case, the wrappers and bags for
petitioner's burger sandwiches already reflected its corporate name instead of the words "Big Mak."

Furthermore, petitioner's use of its corporate name in its stalls and products cannot, by itself, be considered to be
tantamount to indirect contempt, contrary to the CA's conclusion. The proscription in the injunction order is
against petitioner's use of the mark "Big Mak." However, as established, petitioner had already been using its
corporate name instead of the proscribed mark. The use of petitioner's corporate name instead of the words "Big
Mak" solely was evidently pursuant to the directive of the court in the injunction order. Clearly, as correctly
found by the RTC, petitioner had indeed desisted from the use of "Big Mak" to comply with the injunction
order.

At any rate, whether or not petitioner's action in complying with the court's order was proper is not an issue in
this contempt case. Settled is the rule that in contempt proceedings, what should be considered is the intent of
the alleged contemnor to disobey or defy the court.

UE-0200673-2023
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad
sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an
interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to
disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense,
contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. To constitute contempt, the act
must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

Here, petitioner's good faith in complying with the court's order is manifest in this case.

UE-0200673-2023
ATTY. BERTENI C. CAUSING AND PERCIVAL CARAG MABASA, VS. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE
LORENZO R. DELA ROSA, OCA IPI NO.17-4663-RTJ. MARCH 07, 2018, CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa charged respondent Judge Dela Rosa with gross ignorance of the law,
gross misconduct and gross incompetence for reversing the dismissal of criminal case entitled People v.
Eleazar, et al. (Libel Cases), wherein Mabasa was one of the accused.

Complainants questioned respondent Judge Dela Rosa's November 23, 2015 Resolution granting the
prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration because, according to them, it was elementary for respondent Judge
Dela Rosa to know that the prior dismissal of a criminal case due to a violation of the accused's right to speedy
trial is equivalent to a dismissal on the merits of the case and, as such, granting the prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Complainants also criticized respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Atty. Causing's two (2) separate posts on his Facebook and blogspot accounts about the
subject criminal cases. They reasoned that respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing
to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for publicizing and taking his posts to social media. Atty.
Causing emphasized that the posts were presented using decent words and thus, it was incorrect for respondent
Judge Dela Rosa to refer his actions to a disciplinary body such as the IBP. Atty. Causing further asserted that
he did not violate the sub judice rule because this rule cannot be used to preserve the unfairness and errors of
respondent Judge Dela Rosa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of a counsel in posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal case is necessarily
subject to contempt proceedings, and not primarily with the IBP.

RULING:
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring the matter to the IBP, an independent tribunal who exercises
disciplinary powers over lawyers, was a prudent and proper action to take for a trial court judge. The Court has
explained, that judges' power to punish contempt must be exercised judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation
or vindictiveness, viz.:

x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in
order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. As
judges[,] we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and
preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.

UE-0200673-2023
MA. SUGAR M. MERCADO AND SPOUSES REYNALDO AND YOLANDA MERCADO,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON.JOEL SOCRATES S. LOPENA, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 230170. JUNE 06, 2018,
CAGUIOA, J.

FACT:
Sometime in October 2015, respondent Go filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Custody of their children.
Within the period of September 2015 to November 2015, private respondents also filed the six other cases
against petitioners. In addition, beginning February 2016, private respondents initiated another four cases
including two civil cases for Indirect Contempt.

On the other hand, on November 5, 2015, petitioner Mercado filed an Urgent Petition for Issuance of Temporary
and/or Permanent Protection Order (TPO/PPO). Therein, petitioner Mercado complained of several acts of
respondent Go allegedly constituting domestic violence. At the same time, petitioner Mercado also filed a
criminal complaint for violation of R.A. No. 9262 against respondent Go and his parents, respondent spouses
Peter and Esther Go, which was eventually dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The RTC in the PPO case granted the petition and forthwith issued a PPO in favor of petitioner Mercado. The
Order granting the PPO was appealed by respondent Go to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision, the CA denied
respondent Go's appeal. The CA's Decision was then elevated to the Court via Rule 45 appeal by certiorari,
which was denied through a Resolution for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA. Petitioner
Mercado also filed several other cases against private respondents for Indirect Contempt, Violation of R.A. No.
10175, and two cases for violation of R.A. No. 9262.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of indirect contempt.

RULING:
Petitioner Mercado is entitled to the appropriate relief under R.A. No. 9262 in case of a violation of the PPO
dated February 19, 2016 issued in Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201. Under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262, a
violation of any provision of a PPO shall constitute Contempt of Court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules:

SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. –

xxxx

Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt
of court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other
criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

UE-0200673-2023
ISIDRO A. BAUTISTA, V. TERESITA M. YUJUICO, G.R. NO. 199654. OCTOBER 03, 2018, A.
REYES, JR., J.

FACTS:
This case arose from a complaint for expropriation filed by the City of Manila against respondent Teresita M.
Yujuico. The complaint for expropriation was granted in the Decision of the RTC. The judgment on just
compensation became final and executory. The RTC of Manila issued a Writ of Execution commanding the
deputy sheriff to commence the execution of the Decision. The sheriff thereafter served a Notice of Garnishment
on the funds of the City of Manila in the Land Bank of the Philippines, YMCA Branch, Manila.

Failing to execute the judgment, the sheriff submitted his repor, which stated that Isidro refused to comply with
the order unless there is a specific direction from the OCLO of Manila. Unsatisfied with the action of Land
Bank, Teresita filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt, impleading Isidro in his capacity as the Branch Manager of
the Land Bank, YMCA Branch. She argued that Isidro unjustifiably failed to comply with the lawful orders of
the trial court directing the payment of just compensation in her favor. Teresita thus prayed to hold Isidro liable
for indirect contempt.

Isidro filed his Comment. Thereafter, the trial court conducted oral arguments on the petition for indirect
contempt. The parties were also granted 30 days to submit their respective memoranda.

After the submission of their memoranda, the RTC promulgated its Decision granting the petition for indirect
contempt. Disagreeing with the decision of the RTC, Isidro moved for the reconsideration of its Decision.
Pending the resolution of Isidro’s motion in the indirect contempt case, a Notice of Garnishment/Follow-up in
Garnishment and/or to Deliver Amount of Judgment was again sent to Isidro. This was soon followed by a
Sheriff's Notice to Deliver Money Judgment. The sheriff failed to secure the payment of just compensation.

Prompted by the continued inability of Isidro to satisfy the judgment award in her favor, Teresita filed a Motion
for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest in the indirect contempt case. The trial court denied this motion in its
Order.

Isidro filed an Urgent Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Attached Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, informing the trial court that it has released the foregoing amount in satisfaction of the award
of just compensation to Teresita. By virtue of said compliance, Isidro thus argued that the present petition for
indirect contempt was rendered moot and academic. Unfortunately, prior to Isidro's filing of the supplemental
motion for reconsideration, the trial court had denied Isidro's motion for reconsideration in an Order.

Isidro appealed the adverse ruling to the CA. After the filing of the parties' respective briefs, the CA issued its
challenged Decision dismissing the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Isidro is guilty of indirect contempt.

RULING:
The actions of the petitioner are not contumacious.

In this case, Isidro was cited in indirect contempt of court for initially failing to comply with the directive to
release the amount representing the payment of just compensation to Teresita. Isidro justified his failure to obey
by citing the bank's policy of referring the garnishment of accounts to the Land Bank, Litigation Department. He
argued that as a mere branch manager of the YMCA Branch, he was duty bound to refer the garnishment to the
Litigation Department for appropriate action.

The records indeed show that when Isidro received the notices of garnishment from the sheriff, he exerted
efforts to coordinate with the City of Manila—as the primary judgment obligor liable for the payment of just
compensation, and with the Land Bank, Litigation Department—as the garnishment concerns a legal issue with
one of the bank's account holder.

In response, the OCLO of Manila sent a letter to Isidro, categorically instructing Isidro not to release any
amount pursuant to the Notice of Garnishment. In another letter, the OCLO of Manila also again advised Isidro
that there was a stop order for the release of the payment to Teresita because she lacked several documentary
requirements for the disbursement of the SEF.

UE-0200673-2023
The Land Bank, Litigation Department also responded to the sheriff's notices of garnishment that the CSB has
no existing garnishable/leviable account, property or asset with the YMCA Branch. It further stated that despite
the existence of Resolution No. 700 approving the release of Php 37,809,345.47, the City of Manila does not
maintain any deposit account intended for the payment of the claim. As regards the Sheriff's Notice to Deliver
Amount of Judgment and/or Follow Up in Garnishment, the Land Bank, Litigation Department replied through
a letter informed the sheriff that the City Legal Officer of Manila advised Land Bank regarding its objection to
the garnishment of its funds. For this reason, Land Bank maintained that it cannot accede to the release of the
amount.

By virtue of the instructions of the City of Manila, and relying on the advice of the Land Bank, Litigation
Department, Isidro—the manager of the branch where the. City of Manila maintained its account—necessarily
refused to release the money of its depositor to the sheriff. Verily, Isidro could not have been expected to
unceremoniously part with the money of Land Bank's depositors, especially when it involves the public funds of
a local government unit. As an employee of Land Bank, Isidro was fundamentally responsible for the account of
the City of Manila, and making sure that any disbursement is in order.

Under these circumstances, Isidro's exercise of prudence is warranted. The account of the City of Manila
involves public funds, which is ordinarily exempt from execution. As such, there was no deliberate or
unjustified refusal on the part of Isidro to comply with the trial court's directive to release the amount in
Teresita's favor. Isidro clearly acted in good faith, without intending to disregard the dignity of the trial court.

Furthermore, Isidro's good faith is clearly manifest in the fact that he wasted no time in preparing the manager's
check for the amount of Php37,809,345.47, immediately after the City Treasurer of Manila acceded to its release
in a letter. He also transmitted this check to the trial court, and informed the sheriff of this development
straightaway.

Considering the absence of willful disobedience or an obstinate refusal on the part of Isidro, the Court does not
find Isidro guilty of indirect contempt.

UE-0200673-2023
LAWYERS

RE: CA-G.R. CV NO. 96282 (SPOUSES BAYANI AND MYRNA M. PARTOZA VS. LILIAN* B.
MONTANO AND AMELIA SOLOMON), VS. ATTY. CLARO JORDAN M. SANTAMARIA, A.C. NO.
11173 (FORMERLY CBD NO. 13-3968). JUNE 11, 2018, DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:
A civil action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, Reconveyance of Transfer Certificate
of Title and Damages was filed by the spouses Bayani and Myrna M. Partoza against Lilia B. Montano and
Amelia T. Solomon. The case was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court.

A Notice of Appeal was filed by the counsel on record, Atty. Samson D. Villanueva. In a Notice, the CA
required the submission of the Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 44, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, Atty. Villanueva filed his Withdrawal of Appearance; subsequently, a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Appellant's Brief was also filed. Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal of Appearance carried the conformity of
the appellant's attorney-in-fact, Honnie M. Partoza who, on the same occasion, also acknowledged receipt of the
entire records of the case from Atty. Villanueva. Thereafter, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria
submitted an Appellant's Brief.

In a Resolution, the CA directed Atty. Villanueva to submit proof of authority of Honnie to represent appellants
as their attorney-in-fact and the latter's conformity to Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal of Appearance; in the same
resolution, the CA also required respondent to submit his formal Entry of Appearance.

Atty. Villanueva then filed a Manifestation with Motion explaining that he communicated with Ronnie and with
appellants as well, but was informed that appellants were residing abroad (in Germany at the time). He then
requested for a period of 15 days, to comply with the CA's Resolution. The CA issued a Resolution granting the
Manifestation and Motion filed by Atty. Villanueva, and ordered the latter to show cause, within 10 days from
notice, why he should not be cited in contempt for his failure to comply with the CA's Resolution; and why the
Appellant's Brief filed by respondent should not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal
dismissed for his failure to comply with the Resolution.

The CA, in another Resolution, declared that: 1) as shown by the Registry Return Receipt, respondent received
the copy of its Resolution; 2) the Judicial Records Division reported that no compliance with the Resolution had
been filed by respondent; and 3) respondent was, for the last time, directed to comply with the Resolution within
five days from notice and to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for his failure to comply with
the CA's Resolutions; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by him should not be expunged from the rollo of the
case and the appeal be dismissed. All these directives by the CA were ignored by the respondent.

Thus, in a Resolution, the CA cited respondent in contempt of court. In the same Resolution, the CA once again
directed respondent: (1) to comply with the requirements of a valid substitution of counsel and to file his formal
Entry of Appearance within five days from notice; and (2) to show cause, within the same period, why the
Appellant's Brief filed should not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal be dismissed for his
failure to comply with the Rules of Court. Respondent paid no heed to this Resolution.

So it was that the CA, in a Resolution, referred the unlawyerly acts of respondent to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner Michael G.
Fabunan (Investigating Commissioner) found respondent liable for willful disobedience to the lawful orders of
the CA and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six months. The IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is administratively liable.

RULING:
There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five Resolutions of the CA. His actions were definitely
contumacious. By his repeated failure, refusal or inability to comply with the: CA resolutions, respondent
displayed not only reprehensible conduct but showed an utter lack of respect for the CA and its orders.
Respondent ought to know that a resolution issued by the CA, or any court for that matter, is not a mere request
that may be complied with partially or selectively.

UE-0200673-2023
A lawyer's obstinate refusal to comply with the court’s orders not only betrayed a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscored his disrespect towards the court’s lawful orders which was only too deserving of
reproof. Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In this case, respondent deliberately ignored five CA Resolutions,
thereby violating his duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts. In this case, we find the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the circumstances.

UE-0200673-2023
SENATE CONTEMPT

ARVIN R. BALAG, V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 234608. JULY 03, 2018,
GESMUNDO, J.

FACTS:
On September 17, 2017, Horacio III, a first-year law student of the UST, died allegedly due to hazing conducted
by the Aegis Juris Fraternity of the same university.

SR No. 504, was filed condemning the death of Horacio III and directing the appropriate Senate Committee to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, to hold those responsible accountable. The Senate Committee on
Public Order and Dangerous Drugs together with the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and
Constitutional Amendment and Revision of Codes, invited petitioner and several other persons to the Joint
Public Hearing to discuss and deliberate the Senate Bill Nos. 27, 199, 223, 1161, 1591, and SR No. 504.
Petitioner, however, did not attend the hearing scheduled. Nevertheless, John Paul Solano, a member of AJ
Fraternity, Atty. Nilo T. Divina, Dean of UST Institute of Civil Law and Arthur Capili, UST Faculty Secretary,
attended the hearing and were questioned by the senate committee members.

The Chairman of Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs, and as approved by Senate
President, issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum addressed to petitioner directing him to appear before the
committee and to testify as to the subject matter under inquiry. Another Subpoena Ad Testificandum was issued,
which was received by petitioner on the same day, requiring him to attend the legislative hearing.

On the date of the legislative hearing, petitioner attended the senate hearing. In the course of the proceedings,
the petitioner was asked if he was the president of AJ Fraternity but he refused to answer the question and
invoked his right against self-incrimination. The question was repeated but he still refused to answer. Senator
Lacson then reminded him to answer the question because it was a very simple question, otherwise, he could be
cited in contempt. Petitioner, again, invoked his right against self-incrimination. Senator Poe then moved to cite
him in contempt, which was seconded by Senators Joel Villanueva and Zubiri. Senator Lacson ruled that the
motion was properly seconded, hence, the Senate Sergeant-at-arms was ordered to place petitioner in detention
after the committee hearing. A few minutes later, Senators Lacson and Poe gave petitioner another chance to
purge himself of the contempt charge. Again, he was asked the same question twice and each time he refused to
answer.

Thereafter, Senator Villanueva inquired from petitioner whether he knew whose decision it was to bring
Horacio III to the Chinese General Hospital instead of the UST Hospital. Petitioner apologized for his earlier
statement and moved for the lifting of his contempt. He admitted that he was a member of the AJ Fraternity but
he was not aware as to who its president was because, at that time, he was enrolled in another school.

Senator Villanueva repeated his question to petitioner but the latter, again, invoked his right against self-
incrimination. Petitioner reiterated his plea that the contempt order be lifted because he had already answered
the question regarding his membership in the AJ Fraternity. Senator Villanueva replied that petitioner's
contempt would remain. Senator Lacson added that he had numerous opportunities to answer the questions of
the committee but he refused to do so. Thus, petitioner was placed under the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-
arms. The Contempt Order reads that the Committee cites Mr. Arvin Balag in contempt and ordered arrested and
detained at the Office of the Sergeant at-Arms until such time that he gives his true testimony, or otherwise
purges himself of that contempt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate has power to impose the indefinite detention of a person cited in contempt during its
inquiries.

RULING:
The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of
legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is
invoked. As long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate
may be properly exercised. Once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of
contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness.

UE-0200673-2023
The Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates upon the approval or disapproval of the
Committee Report or the expiration of one Congress. As stated in Neri, all pending matters and proceedings,
such as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while the Senate is a
continuing institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that Congress at the final
adjournment of its last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon that expiration, the imprisonment of
the detained witnesses likewise ends.

If Congress believes that there is a necessity to supplement its power of contempt by extending the period of
imprisonment beyond the conduct of its legislative inquiry or beyond its final adjournment of the last session,
then it can enact a law or amend the existing law that penalizes the refusal of a witness to testify or produce
papers during inquiries in aid of legislation. The charge of contempt by Congress shall be tried before the courts,
where the contumacious witness will be heard. More importantly, it shall indicate the exact penalty of the
offense, which may include a fine and/or imprisonment, and the period of imprisonment shall be specified
therein. This constitutes as the statutory power of contempt, which is different from the inherent power of
contempt. In cases that if Congress seeks to penalize a person cited in contempt beyond its adjournment, it must
institute a criminal proceeding against him. When his case is before the courts, the culprit shall be afforded all
the rights of the accused under the Constitution. He shall have an opportunity to defend himself before he can be
convicted and penalized by the State.

There is an existing statutory provision under Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the
refusal of a witness to answer any legal inquiry before Congress. The said law may be another recourse for the
Senate to exercise its statutory power of contempt. The period of detention provided therein is definite and is not
limited by the period of the legislative inquiry.

UE-0200673-2023
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, V. OSCAR S. REYES, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 217428. MARCH 25,
2019, J. REYES, JR., J.

FACTS:
Petitioner owns 42,002,750 shares of stock in respondent MERALCO acquired through the exercise of its
proprietary functions as a regular banking or financial institution, separate and distinct from its mandate as the
administrator of the Agrarian Reform Fund.

For purposes of paying the value of the expropriated land owned by Federico Suntay, petitioner's MERALCO
shares of stock were levied and sold at a public auction. Josefina S. Lubrica was the winning bidder in the
auction sale. Consequently, MERALCO cancelled petitioner's shares of stock and issued new certificates in
favor of Lubrica. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court to assail the
levy and sale of petitioner's shares of stock in MERALCO. Thus, the Court, in its Decision in LBP v.
Suntay, declared that the immediate and indiscriminate levy by the DARAB Sheriffs of Land Bank's
MERALCO shares, without first determining whether or not such assets formed part of the ARF, disregarded
petitioner's proprietary rights in its own funds and properties.

The Decision became final and executory. Then, the Office of the Regional Adjudicator Region IV-B issued an
Order directing the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Thereafter, the Sheriff of the Regional Adjudicator Region
IV-B (MIMAROPA) issued to MERALCO the Demand to Comply.

Consequently, MERALCO, in partial compliance to such Writ of Execution and Demand to Comply, delivered
to petitioner 38,635,950 shares of stock, including cash dividends and property dividends consisting of
108,884,212 shares of stock in Rockwell Land Corporation. MERALCO, however, failed to deliver to petitioner
the remaining 3,366,800 shares of stock out of the 42,002,750 shares illegally transferred to Lubrica.

For their part, respondents aver that the 3,366,800 shares have already been traded in the Philippine Stock
Exchange (PSE) and settled through the Securities Clearing Corporation of the Philippines. The 3,366,800
shares are now in the hands of the investing public and are no longer owned by Lubrica. Thus, MERALCO and
its officers cannot be accused of deliberately refusing to return the 3,366,800 shares to petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are guilty of indirect contempt for their failure to fully comply with the Court's
Decision in LBP v. Suntay.

RULING:
The consequence of the Court's Decision in LBP v. Suntay is the return to petitioner of the MERALCO shares of
stock transferred to Lubrica, nowhere in the aforecited dispositive portion did the Court order MERALCO to
cancel the certificates of stock issued to Lubrica. It was RARAD Casabar who directed MERALCO to cancel
the stock certificates issued to Lubrica and to any of her transferees or assignees, and to restore the ownership of
the shares to petitioner and to record the restoration in MERALCO's stock and transfer book. The Court merely
affirmed such order. As the decision did not command the respondents to do anything, they could not be held
guilty of disobedience of, or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court.

Nevertheless, petitioner admitted that of the total 42,002,750 shares transferred to Lubrica's name, 38,635,950
shares were restored to petitioner. Only 3,366,800 shares were not transferred back to petitioner's account. This
fact alone belies the imputation of disobedience, much less contemptuous acts, against the respondents.
Moreover, MERALCO was unable to return to petitioner the 3,366,800 shares not because of plain stubborn
refusal, but because these shares had been lodged with the PDTC, validly traded through the PSE, and settled by
the SCCP even prior to the suspension of trading, with title over those shares passing to third persons. Hence,
unlike the 37,233,200 lodged shares which remained in the brokers' account, as well as the 1,402,750 shares not
lodged with the PDTC, MERALCO could not have easily cancelled the certificates of stock pertaining to the
3,366,800 traded shares which could have already been passed on to several persons. In fact, petitioner itself
recognized that the 3,366,800 shares were traded and settled.

To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. Here,
petitioner failed to show any circumstance which would lead the Court to believe that MERALCO willfully
refused to turn over the remaining 3,366,800 shares.

UE-0200673-2023
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, VS. NBI DIRECTOR MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, ET. AL., G.R.
No. 194469, September 18, 2019, LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
This Petition is an offshoot of the rape-homicide case of Lejano v. People. In that case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
among others, was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde, then
killing her, her mother, and her sister in 1991.

While the criminal case was pending before the trial court, Webb filed a Motion to Direct the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to Submit Semen Specimen to DNA Analysis. In a Resolution, this Court granted
Webb’s request to order a testing on the semen specimen found in Carmela’s cadaver, in view of the Rules on
DNA Evidence.

Due to the missing semen specimen, Webb filed this Petition for Indirect Contempt. He prays that the impleaded
former and current National Bureau of Investigation officers be cited for indirect contempt for “impeding,
degrading, and obstructing the administration of justice and for disobeying the Resolution of this Honorable
Court[.]”

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents Magtanggol B. Gatdula, Carlos S. Caabay, Nestor M. Mantaring, Dr. Renato C.
Bautista, Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Atty. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, Atty. Pedro
Rivera, and John Herra are guilty of indirect contempt; particularly: (1) disobedience or resistance to a lawful
order of the court; and (2) improper conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice.

RULING:
Since the order to have the DNA test was made for petitioner’s benefit, disobedience of or resistance to the
order is in the nature of civil contempt. Petitioner has shown that respondents acted with gross negligence in
safekeeping the specimen in their custody. The records show that respondents, when repeatedly asked to
produce the specimen, convinced the trial court that they have the specimen in their custody.

While this Court has ruled that the power to cite persons in contempt should be used sparingly, it should be
wielded to ensure the infallibility of justice, where the defiance or disobedience is patent and contumacious that
there is an evident refusal to obey. The facts here sufficiently prove that there was willful disobedience.
Respondents Gatdula, Caabay, Mantaring, Dr. Bautista, Dr. Cabanayan, Atty. Arizala, and Atty. Esmeralda
should be cited in contempt for disobedience of a lawful order of this Court.

A contempt case on the second ground is in the nature of a criminal contempt. Being a criminal contempt, it
must be shown that respondents acted willfully or for an illegitimate purpose. This implies willfulness, bad
faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice. In criminal contempt, the contemnor is presumed innocent and the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the contemnor is guilty of contempt lies with the petitioner.

Here, respondents were not shown to have planned a deliberate scheme to inculpate petitioner. Petitioner’s sole
evidence against respondent Atty. Rivera is Atty. Artemio Sacaguing’s testimony stating that Alfaro supposedly
told him that Atty. Rivera asked her to execute a second affidavit. There was no other evidence presented
supporting this. This does not satisfy the quantum of evidence required of petitioner.

It was also not shown that respondent Herra coached Alfaro to identify petitioner. Allegedly, So, another Bureau
agent, witnessed how respondent Herra coached Alfaro. However, in his testimony, So merely mentioned that
respondent Herra asked him if petitioner was the person in the photo while Alfaro was around.

Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt. This Court cannot cite a person for criminal contempt unless
the evidence makes it clear that he or she intended to commit it. The evidence here does not clearly show that
respondent Herra coached Alfaro to identify petitioner. This is not proof beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the
contempt complaint against respondents Atty. Rivera and Herra must fail.

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DIRECT CONTEMPT ABSENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE DISCLOSING OF DISBARMENT

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO CITE RESPONDENT ATTY. LORNA PATAJO-

KAPUNAN FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT

ATTY. RAYMUND P. PALAD, VS. ATTY. LORNA PATAJO-KAPUNAN, A.C. NO. 9923, October 09,
2019, LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

FACTS:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued a Resolution in CBD Case No. 09-2498
entitled "Hayden Kho, Jr., complainant v. Raymund P. Palad, respondent," recommending the suspension of
Atty. Raymund P. Palad from the practice of law. He moved for reconsideration. As Hayden Kho's counsel,
Atty. Patajo-Kapunan manifested that she would no longer comment on the motion for reconsideration.

According to Atty. Raymund P. Palad, he received a text message from a friend, informing him that "Pilipino
Star Ngayon" carried a news article on his supposed one-year suspension from the practice of law. He
immediately wrote then Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno requesting an investigation of the persons who
prematurely released the information. Later on, he received more calls from his friends, informing him that Atty.
Patajo-Kapunan was on a phone patch live interview on DZMM Teleradyo with Noli de Castro. There, she
volunteered information that he had indeed been suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. He was
able to secure and transcribe an audio recording of the interview.

Hence, Atty. Patajo-Kapunan violated Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court ordaining that disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are confidential. Further, at the time of her interview, there was yet no Supreme Court decision
confirming his suspension from the practice of law. By reason of Atty. Patajo-Kapunan's premature and
inaccurate disclosure, she should be penalized with indirect contempt of court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Patajo-Kapunan should be held liable for indirect contempt of court for violating Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court.

RULING:
Atty. Patajo-Kapunan is charged for allegedly violating the confidentiality rule when she made the statement on
air about Hayden Kho, Katrina Halili and the Republic Act No. 9995.

In the related case of Palad v. Solis, the Court ruled there that Atty. Palad represented a matter of public interest
and thus attained the status of a public figure. Being a public figure, Atty. Palad is not completely immune from
comment and scrutiny so long as these were made without malice or ill-motive. The defense of absence of actual
malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or
a public figure.

Atty. Patajo-Kapunan's statement "it (RA No. 9995) covers everyone yung violation of the rights of the privacy
eh, the lawyer of Katrina has been suspended by the Supreme Court" by itself cannot be considered a malicious
statement against petitioner. For remarks directed against a public figure are privileged. In order to justify a
conviction for indirect contempt involving privileged communication, the prosecution must establish that the
statements were made or published with actual malice or malice in fact – the knowledge that the statement is
false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.

Here, as recognized in Palad v. Solis, the news of Atty. Palad's alleged one-year suspension was written by
recognized entertainment writers. The topic of his suspension had circulated in the news media and had been the
subject of public discourse. Atty. Patajo-Kapunan merely reiterated what was already common knowledge
among people who are interested in the topic, thus, she cannot be said to have made the utterance with actual
malice.

More, the transcript of the interview reveals that Atty. Patajo-Kapunan's statement was spontaneous rather than
premeditated. Her answers to the previous questions were not shown to have intended to lead up to the point
where she could highlight Atty. Palad's suspension. There is no indication at all that it was calculated to demean,
discredit, or embarrass Atty. Palad. Further, the fact that it was a live interview did not give Atty. Patajo-
Kapunan enough time for circumspection to consider her answers. Thus, she may not be punished for blurting
out a piece of information which was already swirling around the public's consciousness.

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