Neo Realism
Neo Realism
1. Introduction
Neo-Realism is a school of Realist thinking, which is also known as Structural
Realism. The neo-realist school began with the writings of Kenneth Waltz. In
1979, Waltz wrote one of the classics of international relations theory; Theory of
International Politics. Waltz tried to provide a scientific basis to the realist
thinking. In the cold war environment Waltz highlighted the value of
understanding the systemic constraints upon the behaviour of the actors of
international politics. Waltz explained that the bipolar system prevailing during
the cold war meant stability in the system and hence relative peace. Stephen Walt is
another prominent neo-realist thinker, who modified the balance of power
argument of Waltz and developed balance of threat theory. Walt explained that
the perceived threat is responsible for the alliance behaviour of states. In the
post cold war era the most influential realist thinker is John Mearsheimer. John
Mearsheimer countered K.Waltz on some grounds and propounded his own
variant of structural realism. He called his variant of realism as offensive realism.
Unlike Waltz, Mearsheimer believed that all states want to hegemonize the
international system. Today neo-realism is the most dominant theory of
international politics. Most of the other new theoretical schools of international
relations begin as a response to the argument of neo realist school.
K. Waltz argues that the structure of the international system has three defining
features-
A.Organizing principle,
B.Differentiation of units
C.Distribution of capabilities.
John J. Mearsheimer ( born December 1947) is one of the most influential international
relations scholars, who is still alive. He works at University of Chicago, United States of
America. an American professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. After K.
Waltz, he tried to reformulate the relaist
Mearsheimer begins with the fundamental question; why states compete for power.
He provides five assumptions to answer this question in a structural realist way.
These five assumptions taken together answers the question. The five assumptions
given by Mearsheimer are :
i) There is an anarchic international environment, and the Great powers are the
main actors in this international system.
ii) Each state has the power to inflict some harm on its neighbour.
iii) there is no way available to the states to know the intentions of the other states.
iv) Under the above mentioned condition, survival is the primary goal of every
state.
v) The states are rational actors. It means that every state wants to maximize
his chances of survival and minimize the chances against survival. And the state
is capable of making strategy to do the same.
Reading the above five assumptions together creates a scenario where the great
powers always behave like a revisionist states and intend to gain as much
relative power as possible in the self help environment.
The next question that Mearsheimer attempts to answer is how much power is
enough for states. As mentioned above this is the key question that sets
Mearsheimer apart from K.Waltz. Waltz and other defensive realists do not
support the pursuit of hegemony by any state. Waltz wants states to pursue an
„appropriate amount of power‟ for survival. There are three basic reasons behind
this belief.
1. First, when a major power will try to become a hegemon,all other powers will join
together to stop that major power. And at the end that major power will be
either destroyed or made more insecure.
2. Second, the defensive realists argue that defense is always a better strategy
than offense and a offensive major power will end up fighting a „a series of losing
wars‟.
3. Third, the defensive realists say that even if there are chances of conquests, the
costs of the conquest far outweighs the benefits of the conquest. Therefor, being
offensive for a major power means inviting a lot of trouble and punished by the
system. So for “K. Waltz the anarchic structure of world politics propels states
not to maximize their share of world power but rather to be first and foremost
concerned with preventing relative losses- in the words of Joseph Grieco, states
act as defensive positionalists” (Toft, 2005, ).
Offensive realists take an opposite view on this issue. For offensive realists the
condition of anarchy pressurizes states to maximize their relative power without
those concerns mentioned by the defensive realists. The offensive realists
counter the above three arguments of the defensive realists.
1. Firsts, the offensive realists argue that balancing against an aggressor is
inefficient and even the states sometimes adopt the strategy of buck-passing
instead of joining a balancing coalition
2.Second, about the offence-defence balance, the “historical record shows that
sides that initiate war wins more often than not” (Mearsheimer, 830
3.Third, the cost of the war may be recovered from the vanquished territories by
various means.
Hence, given these reasons the major powers will ultimately like to be a
hegemon. Mearsheimer argues that “the past behaviour of the great powers has
been more in accordance with the predictions of the offensive rather than
defensive realism. During the first half of the twentieth century, there were two
world wars in which three great powers attempted and failed to gain regional
hegemony: imperial Germany, imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. The second
half of that century was dominated by the cold war, in which the USA and the
Soviet Union engaged in an intense security competition that came close to blows
in the Cuban Missile Crisis” (Mearsheimer, 2009; 84).
Another difference between defensive realists and offensive realists arises
from the fact that at many times the great powers behave in contradiction to the
structural realist theory. The defensive realist argue that those state behaviours are
non-rational behaviours and can be explained by a separate theory of foreign
policy. So the defensive realists essentially employ non-structural logic to explain
some events of international politics. On the other hand there is no separate
theory of foreign policy for offensive realists to explain such behaviours of
great powers. Hence the offensive realists accept that states do behave
sometimes in certain ways where the theory fails to explain their behaviour.
The next question that Mearsheimer addresses is How states get power? We
have already understood that in Mearsheimer‟s view the global hegemony is the
ultimate aim of any great power. However, there are tactical difficulties in achieving
global hegemony as the world is far apart and global power projection across the
oceans are too difficult. In this scenario, the state aim becomes regional
hegemony. Therefore, the focus of Mearsheimer‟s thinking is regional level. A
major power in pursuit of hegemony adopts two types of strategies; one direct
set of strategies to gain power and other indirect set of strategies to check other
aggressors.
State Strategies
Strategies for gaining power
1. War- principle way, may be efficient but costly.
2. Blackmail- cost efficient but ineffective against greatness
3. Bait and bleed- cost efficient but difficult to bail rivals into conflict.
4. Bloodletting- cost efficient but risk of exposure.
Strategies for checking aggressors
1. Balancing- efficient but costly, formation slow, hampered by costs, action
problems
2. Buck-passing- cost efficient but risky if the buck-catcher fails or succeeds too
well.
If all the great powers aspires to be a hegemon, then is the great power war
inevitable? Mearsheimer argues that “ there will always be a struggle between
nation-states for power and domination in the international system. There has
always been conflict over power. And there is nothing that anyone can do prevent it.
This is why the title of one of his books is The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”
( Jackson and Sorenson, 2013;85)
Neo-realism or waltz structural realism attracted criticism from the start, after the
theory of international politics was published: Neo-realism fails to accurately
account for issues like wars, avoidance of wars, power balancing, power seeking,
death of states, arms races, alliance formations, security competition etc. as it sees
war as inevitable because anarchy cannot be avoided. The subalterns criticize neo-
realism for excluding the Third World when it comes to International Relations. They
argued that it ignores the state behavior, dominant concerns & causes of conflicts in
the Third World & considers it to be weak and militarily & economically dependent
on the external benefactors. Neo-realism theory highlights security as the main
objective of any state thus states in trying to maximize their power get over
excitedabout all the power they have and this leads to an increase in their interests
and also geographical expansion. The subalterns criticize neo-realism as it
suggests that it is only the external forces that influence the state behavior.
However, it is both the internal and external forces that influence the state behavior
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