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PhilippineJournal of Public Administration, Vol. XLV, No. 3 (July 2001)
The BLISS Housing Program:

Blissful or Blistering?
MA. OLIVA Z. DOMINGO*
The Bagong Lipunan Sites and Services Program more popularly

known as the BLISS Housing Program was instituted as a means to
address the growing housing requirements of the country. More than
just providing shelter, the program intended to develop productive, self-
reliant communities in an atmosphere that would ensure the physical,
intellectual and spiritual well-being of man. This article outlines the
BLISS concept within the milieu of the government's housing program,
including its most salient features. It eventually narrows down to one
major component-the Urban BLISS level. The case of the UP BLISS
San Vicente project is illustrated here to give clearer insights on the
issues, concepts and strategies utilized in the course of the project's
implementation.
Introduction
Social Development is broadly defined as the "enhancement of the well-

being and the progressive enrichment of the quality of people's lives"
(Macpherson 1989: 70). It is measured not just by material well-being or
improved access to services, but by "progress in achieving more complex and
sometimes nebulous social goals-such as equity, 'social justice,' as well as
enhancing the capacity for action by the people, so that their creative potential
can be released ...." (UNCRD 1988: 10).
The Bagong Lipunan Sites and Services Program, more popularly known
as BLISS, is a government program which attempted to address not only the
material but the abstract goals of social development as well. Launched in 1979
as a nationwide program to respond to the desperate housing needs of the
country, it sought to provide more than just a roof over one's head. It was
envisioned to develop productive, self-reliant communities in an environment
that would effect a "full physical, intellectual and spiritual development" of
Filipinos (MHS n.d.b). To achieve these objectives the program received full
administrative and financial support from no less than fifteen government
agencies led by the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS).
Decades after its launching, and after millions of pesos spent on it and the
publicity it generated, one wonders whether the vision of the BLISS program
has been realized. The Program is an interesting subject of study in social
*Assistant Professor, National College of Public Administration and Governance,

University of the Philippines.
BLISS HOUSING PROGRAM 187
development for it covers an array of social development issues, concepts,

strategies, and approaches.
This study describes the BLISS concept within the context of the
government's shelter program. It starts with a description of the main features
of the BLISS concept and subsequently focuses on one major component-the
Urban BLISS level. The experience in one Urban BLISS site, the U.P. BLISS
San Vicente project, is presented as a case study to provide a clearer
understanding of the concepts, issues, and strategies applied and the dynamics
involved. This project site was the first Urban BLISS undertaking and was
projected as the showcase for all other Urban BLISS projects.
The study takes a look at the social development strategies and

approaches adopted in the BLISS program. Were these appropriate for the
attainment of the Program's objectives? Were these effectively implemented
and operationalized? Were the program's social development goals realized as a
result of the operationalization of these strategies?
This study addresses these intriguing questions and draws lessons from
the BLISS program. From the point of view of the government as well as the
beneficiaries, was the BLISS program a blissful or a blistering experience?
The BLISS Program
The National Shelter Plan
The Philippines proudly claims that it is one of the first countries to

incorporate ekistics into its national development plan. Ekistics is the science
of human settlements which draws from the research and experience of various
professions. The Department (subsequently the Ministry) of Human
Settlements' was established on 2 June 1978, by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 1396, to pursue this approach. It aimed to carry 3ut government policy to
foster the growth and renewal of rural and urban communities "in an
integrative manner that promotes optimum use of land, adequate shelter,
environmental protection, utilization of appropriate technology and rational
interdependence amongst self-reliant communities, all these towards the fullest
development of man as a civic person and as a human being, involving in this
process the coordinated contribution of the public and private sectors" (MHS
n.d.a: 32).
The MHS had the task of preparing a National Multi-Year Human

Settlements Plan to translate the Philippine Development Plan "into spatial
and temporal terms." It was likewise to plan and implement projects for urban
renewal and development, among others (MHS n.d.a: 33 - P.D. No. 1396, Sec. 4
2001
188 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
d). The Multi-Year Human Settlements Plan was for 23 years spanning the
period 1978 to 2000. It was anchored on the "humanist ideology which places
man at the center of all development efforts, as the primary resource and the
primary beneficiary" (MHS 1984: 30). Part of this broad plan was a National
Shelter Program which aimed to produce a total of one million homes in a
period of ten years through increased government involvement and active
private sector participation. This housing program extended beyond physical
structures. It regarded housing as "the venue for human development, social
renewal and mass-based economic development" (MHS 1984: 24).
The four basic components of the shelter system-regulation, production,

finance, and marketing-were integrated and synchronized in the MHS and its
attached agencies.
Regulatory powers were vested upon the Human Settlements Regulatory

Commission (HSRC) which implemented subdivision regulations and building
standards.2 The production component was lodged with the National Housing
Corporation (NHC) 3 and the Human Settlements Development Corporation
(HSDC), 4 in cooperation with the private sector. The NHC was responsible for
the manufacture of standardized housing components which the HSDC
stockpiled and made readily available to contractors. The financing of the
shelter program was undertaken by several agencies: the HSDC, the Home
Financing Corporation (HFC),5 the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC), 6 and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).'
Altogether, these agencies actively supported the marketing effort (MHS 1982b:
47-50).
The Shelter Development Group (SDG) within the MHS served as the
central coordinating body for the government agencies, private companies, and
civic groups involved in the housing program. In addition to the HSRC, NHC,
HSDC, NHMFC, HDMF, and HFC, the other government agencies included the
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Public Works and Highways, Ministry of
Natural Resources, National Electrification Administration, Local Water
Utilities Administration, Manila Electric Company, 8 and the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MHS 1982b: 52).
The BLISS Concept
The BLISS program is a component of the National Shelter Program.

Consistent with the human settlements thrust of the MHS, BLISS was
envisioned to involve all aspects of community development. Model communities
were expected to rise through the implementation of a package of basic services.
These included the improvement and upgrading of housing conditions, rational
land use, development of an economic base for the community, and the teaching
July
BLISS HOUSING PROGRAM
of the values of cooperation and self-reliance (MHS 1982a: 55). BLISS was not
only intended to ease the serious shortage of housing for low- and middle-
income families. It also aimed to provide amenities that would catalyze the
delivery of the "eleven basic needs of man." Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1396
identifies these eleven basic needs as: water, power, food, clothing, shelter,
medical services, education (later expanded to include culture and technology),
sports and recreation, economic base (livelihood), mobility, and ecological
balance.
The BLISS program was planned to run for five years from 1979 to 1983.
Two main kinds of BLISS communities were envisioned: Rural BLISS and
Urban BLISS.
Rural BLISS was designed to upgrade the living conditions in the

countryside through the construction of housing clusters near highways, farms,
or shorelines. There are three Rural BLISS types. Level I is a neighborhood
community composed of 50-100 families within an area of at least 2.5 hectares.
It involved the organization of the local poor into a cooperative association
which would engage in a venture financially aided by government. The
additional income generated by the venture would allow families to afford a
house and lot and other necessary services. The development of this type of
community called for the construction of new units or the upgrading of existing
ones. The target was to have 300 model sites every year for five years until
every town and city in the country had one. The Tolosa demonstration project
in Leyte is an example of a Level I site (Benitez 1980: 54; Maramag 1979: 52,
MHS 1982a: 57).
Under Level II, the material resources of each province are identified together
with their potential for the development of an agro-industrial community.
Composed of 100-500 families, the community was planned to live productively on
50-200 hectares of a developed estate. This is usually situated near an agricultural
or vocational school which could serve as training center for livelihood projects.
The BLISS projects in Tarlac and Bamban, Tarlac are Level II sites (Benitez 1980:
54; Maramag 1979: 53; MHS 1982a: 57; Focus 1983: 25).
Level III is an ecological community of 500 or more families located near a

watershed area of at least 500 hectares. It involved the construction of a water
impounding basin which would serve as a communal fishpond as well as a flood
control structure. This is also tapped as an irrigation facility and even a mini-
hydro electric plant. One model community was planned for each of the 12
regions of the country (Benitez 1980: 54; Maramag 1979: 53; MHS 1982a: 57).
The approach applied in the rural areas was simulated in the Urban BLISS
sites. This involved the construction of clusters of medium-sized walk-up
apartments in each of the four cities and 13 municipalities then comprising
2001
Metro Manila. Contrary to common perception, Urban BLISS units are not fully-
subsidized, low-priced government housing projects. Emphasis is on
affordability. The affordability level set by the MHS for each unit was a
maximum of 30 percent of gross family earnings. Families were supposed to be
able to augment their income through livelihood projects in the site itself.
Similar to the Rural BLISS sites, the livelihood component was an essential facet
in Urban BLISS areas (Benitez 1980: 54; Maramag 1979: 53; MHS 1982a: 57).
Policies and guidelines governing the BLISS program emanated from the
Cabinet Coordinating Committee for BLISS (CCC) which considered project
proposals. Once a project was approved, the CCC endorsed the same to the
HSDC for funding and appropriate action. Chaired by the Minister of Human
Settlements, the CCC was composed of the heads of the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) and the following Ministries: Agriculture;
Budget; Education and Culture; Energy; Health; Industry; Labor; Local
Government and Community Development; National Defense; Trade; and Public
Works, Transportation, and Communications. The CCC was assisted by a
National Secretariat and the Deputy Ministry of Human Settlements served as
Secretary General. The MHS was likewise responsible for reporting,
monitoring, and fund disbursements of the BLISS program (MHS 1982a: 59).
BLISS sites were expected to stimulate the growth and development of

surrounding areas by serving as: a) technology outposts to showcase low and
simple technologies which may be learned and demonstrated at the barangay
level; b) demonstration centers where various extension workers could conduct
training activities and introduce innovations and at the same time serve as
service centers for neighboring areas; c) production and marketing centers
which generate income and employment opportunities; and d) laboratories for
community learning and model-building (MHS 1982a: 55-56).
Establishment of BLISS communities was done in three stages. The pre-

implementation phase usually took six months. Initially, local officials identified
possible sites. A Human Settlements Officer from the MHS would then visit the
site and brief the local officials on the design and intent of BLISS and the need for
interagency support. A survey of the community's needs and problems followed.
An interagency team was later assigned to address the problems identified.
Prospective beneficiaries were subsequently organized into a community

association, the Bagong Lipunan Community Association (BLCA). They were
briefed on the functions of the BLCA and their corresponding duties and
responsibilities as members.
At the launching of the program in 1979, mayors of municipalities that had

completed their local development plans (LDPs) were invited to a briefing about
the BLISS Program. An assessment of community needs and problems and how
July
these were to be addressed normally preceded the formulation of an LDP. Thus,

the municipalities represented in the 1979 briefing were deemed to have
satisfied the requirements of Phase I. Ninety-eight municipalities submitted
applications for inclusion in the BLISS program. However, only 50 were
approved (Philippine Development 1979: 29).
Phase 2 normally lasted from nine to twelve months. During this phase,
feasibility studies for community projects were drawn up. Residents were
trained in managing the community's facilities and services. The Rural BLISS
seed capital of R1 million for each site was provided by the national
government, and local governments had to match this with counterpart funds.
Construction then began. Qualified beneficiaries were awarded their units and
started moving in as soon as the structures were completed.
Phase 3 called for the participation of residents in income-generating

projects managed by the BLCA. The MHS provided supervision and technical
support from Phases 1 to 3 and gradually phased out as soon as the BLCA
demonstrated its viability and self-reliance (Philippine Development 1979: 26-
27).
The main features of the BLISS program (MHS 1982a: 56-57) are:
1. Shelter and Livelihood - Indigenous materials and local

architectural motifs were incorporated in housing designs. The
housing units provide for the minimum spaces necessary for
healthful and comfortable living for the average Filipino family.
These structures were accompanied by income-generating projects
for the beneficiaries of the community.
2. Reorientation of Attitudes on Land Ownership, Use, and

Management - The traditional value regarding land ownership
views land as a commodity of trade (freehold). The Program
sought to reorient this into one that views land as a social resource
(stewardship). This is effected through the usufruct arrangement
where the control, disposition, and jurisdiction of the land is in the
hands of government. Beneficiaries are only entitled to the use of
the land and its fruits. The Program aimed to demonstrate that
with security of tenure, low loan repayment schedules, and income-
generating projects, a freehold is not necessary.
3. Community Resource Management - The resources of the

community provided the starting point for determining which
enterprises the beneficiaries could engage in. This was not only a
source of livelihood but was also supposed to provide for the basic
community needs such as food or power, among others.
2001
4. Self-Reliance - Through the integrated delivery of the eleven

basic services under the MHS concept, the BLISS sites were
expected to develop into self-reliant communities. This reflects a
shift from the traditional mendicancy attitude and was based on
the premise that even the very poor were "capable of improving
their quality of life provided they are properly motivated and
willing to commit their own available resources."
5. Technology Transfer - Appropriate labor-intensive technologies

were adopted to support the livelihood program of the community.
As mentioned earlier, BLISS sites were also envisioned to
stimulate the development of surrounding areas where they could
pass on appropriate technologies.
6. Countryside Mobilization - Government agencies, both national

and local, were called upon to maximize their involvement in the
BLISS effort and to establish effective linkages among themselves
as well as with the beneficiaries. Thus, the Program became a
mechanism for mobilizing government and the people towards
countryside development inasmuch as BLISS areas are supposed to
be found all over the country.
7. Institutional Development - Beneficiaries were encouraged to

participate in community activities, from the planning to the
implementation and evaluation stage. This was mainly through
their membership in the BLCA. This homeowners' association
concept (sometimes referred to as the HOWA concept) is the vital
mechanism used in all BLISS sites. Training programs were also
planned for the development of the management and other skills of
the BLCA members. The HOWA concept shall be explained in
greater detail in a subsequent section.
As more BLISS sites were developed, more agencies became involved in

the program. These agencies were called upon to mobilize their respective
bureaus and offices in providing technical and financial support in their
respective areas of concern. 9
The Metro Manila Commission (now the Metro Manila Development

Authority or MMDA) was also very much involved in Urban BLISS Projects
(UBPs) inasmuch as the Minister for Human Settlements and the Metro Manila
Governor were one and the same person.
Together, therefore, these agencies shared in the social development

efforts to deliver "the eleven basic needs of man" in the BLISS areas.
July
The Bagong Lipunan Community Association
The homeowners' association concept, or HOWA, was adopted in all BLISS

project sites. The HOWAs were envisioned as "model community associations"
(MCAs) working for the progress and development of the community. Echoing
the "New Society" or Bagong Lipunan theme of the Martial Law regime, the
MCAs were called Bagong Lipunan Community Associations (BLCA). These
were intended to be the focal points in harnessing people's participation in
activities that promote development in BLISS communities. The BLCA was
likewise designed to enhance local integration and interagency responsibility in
managing community facilities and services.
Membership in the BLCA is a requisite for all BLISS beneficiaries. Soon

after prospective BLISS beneficiaries are identified, they are given training
and orientation courses by the MHS on the aims and objectives of the BLCA.
Beneficiaries are required to complete the course and sign up as BLCA
members. Members elect officers and members of the governing board from
among themselves. As a rule, BLCA officers hold office for a year after which
another general election is held.
The BLCA Board formulates rules and regulations governing BLCA

membership which are ratified by the general membership. Member-
beneficiaries must strictly comply with these rules and regulations. A
beneficiary's right to continue occupancy of a housing unit is contingent on
being a BLCA member in good standing. A beneficiary may voluntarily
withdraw membership or may be disqualified, expelled, or terminated for
violating the conditions of his membership. In such case, the right to occupy a
BLISS unit is forfeited and the beneficiary is required to automatically
surrender the same without need of any judicial order. The unit then becomes
available for disposition by the BLCA subject to the approval of the MHS and
the HFC. It is, therefore, in the interest of the beneficiary to abide by the
provisions of BLCA membership. This involves paying one's housing occupancy
dues on time; paying association dues to the BLCA; paying maintenance dues
for the upkeep of the site; attending meetings, seminars, and skills training
courses; and actively participating in major BLCA functions, including social
affairs (MHS n.d.c: 1-2).
The BLCA is a multipurpose cooperative which must be registered either

with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or with the HFC (see
Endnote 5). Clothed with a legal personality, the BLCA is able to engage in
business activities and other legal transactions. It is responsible for
implementing income-generating ventures, the proceeds of which are shared
among the residents in proportion to their participation. Part of the earnings of
the BLCA is also used to finance community services and maintain facilities
(Philippine Development 1979: 27).
2001
A very critical function of the BLCA is its role as representative of the

community in legal transactions, including the signing of contracts and
agreements. BLCA officers are signatories to vital agreements, e.g. loan
agreements, committing the entire community for extended periods of time.
Construction of BLISS structures was funded from loans granted by

government lending institutions such as the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). The BLCA, not the MHS nor the individual beneficiaries,
was the borrower. The loan agreement was usually entered into by the
institution as lender and the BLCA as borrower at the very start of the
awarding and occupancy of the BLISS units to beneficiaries. Therefore, the
first duly-elected President of the BLCA was usually the signatory to this vital
document. The BLCA was responsible for collecting the monthly occupancy
dues from the beneficiaries which it remitted to the appropriate agency as
amortization for the loan. In effect, the BLCA members are jointly accountable
for this collective indebtedness which is usually payable in 25 years.
In addition to the loan agreement for the housing units, BLCAs could also
enter into other loan agreements for livelihood projects. Again, the BLCA
officers signed for and in behalf of the beneficiaries who were held jointly
accountable for this liability.
BLCA officers therefore had to be persons of integrity with the genuine

interest of the community at heart. They had to be likewise judicious and fair
in deciding matters affecting the lives and welfare of all the beneficiaries.
Besides fulfilling their duties and obligations to the BLCA, beneficiaries had to
be actively involved in community affairs and to be vigilant in safeguarding the
interest of the majority.
Urban BLISS
Main Features
The Urban BLISS Program (UBP) was intended not only to ease the
housing shortage in Metro Manila but "to create model urban communities
which are self-reliant, self-managing, and free from want of man's eleven basic
needs" (MHS n.d.d: 1). It was envisioned to provide a complete package of
services to the BLISS community such as water, electricity, health, education,
recreation, and livelihood. The benefits were expected to spill over to
neighboring communities and to the nation as a whole.
There were two approaches to Urban BLISS development. One was

through the renewal and revitalization of slums or blighted areas. Examples of
these are the Tondo Accelerated BLISS Project and the Tatalon I Project. The
July
other approach was the creation of new communities, e.g., the U.P. BLISS I
(San Vicente) in Quezon City.
Urban BLISS projects were directly implemented by the MHS through an

Estate Management Office (EMO). The EMO maintained a presence in the site
through an Estate Manager who lived in the site itself to be more responsive to
the needs and problems of the beneficiaries.
Unlike Rural BLISS which was provided seed money of P1 million per site
by the national government, with counterpart funds from local governments, a
different financing scheme was adopted for Urban BLISS. First, the MHS,
through the NHMFC, identified a suitable site for housing and assured its
availability for the project. When the site was secured, the MHS negotiated a
materials loan from DBP using the site as collateral. As construction went on,
prospective beneficiaries were simultaneously being screened and chosen based
on their demonstrated ability to pay, among other criteria. Qualified
beneficiaries were made to undergo orientation seminars on BLCA membership.
As soon as the site was developed, the NHMFC, backed by the HFC, would
"take out" the loan from DBP in the form of a secondary mortgage (see Endnote
6). This dissolved the obligation of the MHS to the DBP. The BLCA, in turn,
assumed the loan and amortized it out of the monthly occupancy dues of its
members.
While the Rural BLISS structures are low-level, single or duplex units, the
UBPs shelter component are medium-sized, i.e., four-storey buildings usually
consisting of 16 to 32 units each.
The BLISS Development Corporation (BDC) was established to speed up

the operation of Urban BLISS projects, among others. It is a subsidiary of the
HSDC and is mainly responsible for handling the remittances of beneficiaries.
Effective 1990, however, the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation
(HIGC) took over the accounts handled by the BDC. Today, BLISS beneficiaries
remit their occupancy dues to the NHMFC, which had "taken out" or secured
the original mortgage.'"
The essential features of the UBP (MHS n.d.d: 1) are as follows:
1. Economic Viability - The objective of the program is to uplift the

lot of urban dwellers not through dole outs but through a system of
self-liquidating projects.
2. Provision of Livelihood Opportunities - To augment family

income, the Program includes the provision of employment
opportunities for non-working members of the community.
2001
3. Organization of Beneficiaries into BLISS Community

Associations - Membership in the BLCA is a prerequisite for all
beneficiaries. These BLCAs were envisioned to serve as the venue
for individual and group participation.
4. Integrated Delivery of Basic Services - Various agencies were

tapped to meet the eleven basic needs of man through an integrated
and synchronized delivery system.
Beneficiariesof the Program
The opportunity to avail themselves of housing facilities within Metro

Manila encouraged many citizens to file applications for BLISS housing. Only
those who met the following standards were, however, allowed to apply:
* Filipino residents of Metro Manila for at least three consecutive

years prior to application;
* Family size must not be less than three and not more than six, and
total household size must not exceed eight;
* Applicant must be the head of the family and not an owner or an

installment buyer of a house or lot in Metro Manila or elsewhere;
* The gross family income per month must not be less than P500 or
more than P5,000;
* The applicant must be residing and/or working within a three

kilometer radius of the BLISS site;
• The applicant or any member of his family must not have a pending
application in any other housing project;
The applicant must be willing to abide by all the rules and

regulations of the BLCA and/or the Estate Management Office of the
MHS and all other requirements or procedures that may be adopted
later on; and
* The applicant must be of good moral character (MHS n.d.d: 2).
Applicants who fulfilled all the above requirements were interviewed by an

MHS field officer. Qualified applicants were grouped according to the following
income levels:
July
Level Gross Monthly Income
Low P500 to P1,500

Middle - P1,501 to P2,500
High - P2,501 to P5,000
Prospective awardees for each income group were determined through a

raffle conducted in public. Raffle winners were then subjected to background
investigation and beneficiaries were chosen from among them. Those who did
not win in the raffles were given the option of being included in the waiting list
or transferring their applications to another BLISS site.
The U.P. BLISS San Vicente Experience
Twenty-three high-rise buildings clustered over almost seven hectares of

prime land comprise the U.P. BLISS San Vicente (Phases 1 and 2). Situated in
Barangay San Vicente in Quezon City, just before the main entrance to the
University of the Philippines (U.P.) campus, this Urban BLISS project houses a
total of 496 families or approximately 3,500 residents.
The land is owned by the U.P. which granted usufruct rights to the MHS to
45,957 square meters on 23 September 1980. The usufruct agreement between
the U.P. and MHS is for 50 years with a token cost of one peso a year. In
return, the MHS agreed to allocate 30 percent of the dwelling units (or 150
units) to the faculty and staff of the University, provided the beneficiaries met
MHS requirements and screening.
A Supplemental Usufruct Agreement between the U.P. and MHS was

inked in December 1980 where the former granted usufruct rights to an
additional 28,128 square meters of land in front of the original usufruct site.
This brought the total land area for the project to 74,085 square meters.
Part of the land where U.P. BLISS now stands used to be occupied by
squatters. To clear the area for development, the squatters had to be relocated.
A survey and screening process was undertaken to determine who among the
squatters could afford to pay for housing units on a socialized scheme. Those
who qualified were counted among the U.P. BLISS awardees; the rest were
relocated elsewhere.
Classificationof Beneficiariesfor Phase I
Except for the qualified squatter families and the U.P. faculty and
employees who qualified for the U.P. quota, awardees for most of the units at
2001
the U.P. BLISS San Vicente site were chosen from among the thousands who
filed applications. Awardees received a certificate of occupancy for a designated
unit. Assignment of units was done by drawing of lots. Majority of the units
were awarded in this manner. Many other units, however, mostly found in
choice buildings and floors, were excluded from the lot. These were reserved for
special awards to government officials or their relatives and protdg6s who were
practically exempted from procedural and even documentary requirements as
well as deadlines.
U.P. BLISS was developed in two phases. Phase 1 consists of Buildings 1

to 11 with a total of 176 units, including that of the Estate Manager. These are
classified into three levels. A number of buildings in Phase 1 were allocated to
the squatter families who qualified for BLISS housing. Except for a few who
were found to have greater ability to pay (e.g., a family member was an
overseas worker), the qualified squatter families were assigned to Level 1 units.
These were the lowest-priced units with monthly occupancy rates starting at
P150 a month escalating by ten percent annually. These were basic shell units
which consisted of living space, a kitchen, toilet and bath, and a laundry area.
There were no improvements in the interior. The lease for these units was for a
maximum period of 25 years. Those who had greater paying capacity were
assigned to Level 2 units in the same buildings. Units located on the fourth
floor of other buildings were also classified as Level 1 units. These were
awarded to non-squatter applicants.
Level 2 units were priced at initial rate of F275 monthly. These were
mostly on the third floor. Level 3 units were mostly on the first and second
floors although a few were located on upper floors. Improvements such as
divisions and cabinets were part of Level 3 units. These units were more
expensive and awardees were chosen mainly on the basis of their ability to pay.
The initial monthly rate was P550. This socialized scheme was a societal
redistribution process: those with more resources subsidize those with less
means. Leases for Levels 2 and 3 ran for 25 years, renewable for another 25
years free of charge. The escalation rate of ten percent annually is until the
14th year after which the occupancy rate levels off. The payment scheme for
the various levels in Phase 1 are summarized below:
Income Unit Starting Length of

Bracket Type Monthly Dues Payment Occupancy
Low Level 1* P150 25 years 25 years

Middle Level 2* P275 25 years 50 years
High Level 3** P550 25 years 50 years
* Bare units; 1 toilet and bath, plain cement flooring
** 1 toilet and bath; Danarra partitions for 2 bedrooms, vinyl floors
July
Phase 1 beneficiaries started moving in during the latter part of 1979. By the
following year, all units were occupied. An initial payment consisting of one month
deposit and one month advance rental was imposed on the beneficiaries.
Classificationof Beneficiariesfor Phase 2
Phase 2 is composed of Buildings 12 to 23: four 16-unit and eight 32-unit

buildings, or a total of 320 units. Unlike Phase 1 where membership in the Pag-
IBIG (Pagtutulungan sa Kinabukasan: Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at Gobyerno)
Fund was not necessary, Phase 2 beneficiaries were required to be Pag-IBIG Fund
members. Each had to execute a Pag-IBIG loan to finance the cost of the unit. All
Phase 2 units were awarded as shell units, i.e., without any improvements at all.
Nonetheless, there were also different options based on affordability.
All four 16-unit buildings were classified as Level 3 units regardless of floor.
These were slightly bigger than the rest and were thus more expensive. Level 1
units were those on the third and fourth floors of 32-unit buildings, while those on
the first and second floors were classified as Level 2. The monthly occupancy rates
for Phase 2 are as follows:
Year Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
1 P400 P430 F1500

2 440 473 550
3 480 516 600
4 520 559 650
5 560 602 700
6 600 645 750
7 640 688 800
8 680 737 850
9 720 774 900
10 760 817 950
11 800 860 1,000
12 840 903 1,050
13 880 946 1,100
14 920 989 1,150
15 960 1,032 1,200
16 1,000 1,075 1,250
17 1,040 1,118 1,300
18 1,080 1,161 1,350
19 1,120 1,204 1,400
20 1,160 1,247 1,450
21 1,200 1,290 1,500
22 1,240 1,333 1,550
23 1,280 1,376 1,600
24 1,320 1,419 1,650
25 1,360 1,462 1,700
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The rates reflect an escalation of ten percent annually based on the first
year occupancy rate. The paying period is for 25 years but the lease is
renewable for another 25 years without charge.
Units turned over to beneficiaries were in poor condition: floors were

rough and not even level; no coat of paint was on the walls; doors and windows
were jammed; a single electric wire in the middle of the unit served as source of
electricity; there was no water service. The sight of the unit and the prospect of
coughing up a rather considerable sum to make it habitable scared many
beneficiaries into giving up their awards. But there was no want of applicants
who were willing to take over.
Phase 2 beneficiaries started to fix up their units and move in 1981. They
were levied an entry fee of -P3,900 for Level I, P3,930 for Level 2, and P4,000 for
Level 3. In addition to this, they had to pay for their respective electric and
water meters.
Two Community Associations: UBLCA and UPBCA
Phase 1 beneficiaries were organized into the University Bagong Lipunan

Community Association, Inc., or UBLCA. The UBLCA was formally issued its
"Certificate of Incorporation" by the HFC on 8 September 1981. Prior to this,
however, on 24 June 1981, the UBLCA President and the presidents of other
Urban BLISS BLCAs were herded to the University of Life for a signing
ceremony. They were made to sign contracts of lease for their respective sites.
This was obviously for political propaganda. There was no time for the UBLCA
President to review the contract, much less to consult the beneficiaries and seek
authority from them to agree to the terms of the contract.
This Contract of Lease between the MHS as lessor and the UBLCA as
lessee, was later to bear the date of 9 September 1981, a day after the UBLCA
received its legal recognition as a community association from the HFC. The
Contract provided for the lease of the land, including the improvements thereon
valued at F14,338,165.81, by the MHS to the UBLCA. The same Contract
authorized the MHS to secure a loan and apply the proceeds in full payment of
this amount.
Also on the same date, the UBLCA (again represented by its first
President) as "Borrower" entered into a Loan and Mortgage Agreement with
DBP as "Originating Bank." In this agreement, the DBP agreed to extend an
"MHS BLISS Housing Loan" in the amount of P14,338,165.81 to the UBLCA.
The interest on the loan was nine percent annually. The agreement included a
provision which indicated the intention of subsequently assigning/transferring
all of the DBP's rights and title to as well as its interest in the loan and its
July
collateral to the NHMFC. A Promissory Note signed by the UPBCA President is

attached to the agreement which specifies the schedule of payment of the loan
beginning July 1981, or earlier than the date of the document itself, until March
2005. It will be noted that the starting date for the amortization of the loan is
not only more than a month earlier than the formal incorporation of the
UPBLCA but even earlier than the date of the Loan and Mortgage Agreement
between the DBP and the MHS and the date of the Contract of Lease between
the MHS and the UBLCA.
Phase 2 beneficiaries were not integrated into the UBLCA. A separate

BLCA was organized much later for Phase 2 which received its "Certificate of
Incorporation" from the HFC on 25 October 1983. It is known as the U.P.
BLISS (San Vicente) Community Association, Inc. or UPBCA.
A year earlier, however, on 22 September 1982, a Supplement to the

Contract of Lease was signed by the MHS and a BLCA supposedly representing
Phase II. This Supplement governed the development of Phase II but was not
signed by either the UBLCA or the UPBCA President. Rather, it was the MHS-
appointed Estate Manager who signed for Phase 2 beneficiaries. Without their
knowledge and consent therefore, Phase 2 beneficiaries became parties to a
contract binding them for 25 years. This appeared to be an established modus
operandi of the MHS that was replicated in other Urban BLISS sites.
Membership in the BLCA was a requirement for housing awards and

beneficiaries were made to sign up as BLCA members during the orientation
seminars conducted by the MHS. The MHS even provided the pro forma
constitution and by-laws for BLCAs and the rules and regulations that were
supposed to be considered ratified by the members. Thus, even before they
moved into their units, the beneficiaries were already considered members of
the BLCA, a homeowners association organized not by the homeowners
themselves but by the MHS. Technically, however, the BLCA of a BLISS site
did not officially exist until it was registered with and recognized by the HFC.
The BLCA by-laws prepared by the MHS provided that the Building
Administrators and Building Representatives of the different buildings in an
Urban BLISS Project (UBP) site were the officers and members of the Board of
BLCA. At the San Vicente site, residents of 16-unit buildings elect a Building
Administrator among themselves while the 32-unit buildings elect a Building
Administrator and a Building Representative. BLCA officers are elected by and
from among the members of the Board. All these leaders have a term of one
year.
The registration of BLCAs with the HFC normally takes place many
months after the beneficiaries move in. It also takes time for beneficiaries to
get to know one another and thus be able to identify leaders of their choice,
2001
those who could effectively represent them and safeguard their interests. The
BLISS strategy of making beneficiaries collectively accountable for the financial
requirements of their housing needs, however, did not allow the luxury of time.
Financing for the cost of site development and building construction had to be
secured and loan agreements had to be entered into as soon as possible. There
was then an urgency in designating BLCA officers who would be signatories to
such agreements, even before the BLCA was officially registered and despite
the absence of consultation and consensus of the affected parties. This is what
happened at the San Vicente site.
To facilitate the signing of the loan agreements, the MHS simply assumed
the responsibility of designating Building Administrators and Representatives
and other officers for the Ad Interim BLCA of newly-established UBPs. Basis of
selection was purely subjective or by stroke of fate. This was how the first
officers of the Phase 1 UBLCA were chosen.
Collection of Occupancy Dues
The loan incurred by the BLCA is a community or collective accountability

of all the beneficiaries in the UBP site concerned. This loan is amortized
through the lease payments of the beneficiaries. These monthly lease payments
are referred to as occupancy dues. The MHS initially designated "BLCA
Collectors" to collect these dues. Although these Collectors were responsible for
collecting occupancy dues which would in turn be used to amortize the BLCA
loans, they were not accountable to the BLCA but to the MHS. However they
were neither MHS employees, nor were they bonded. They were provided with
housing units but were exempted from paying occupancy dues. The receipts
they issued to residents who paid occupancy dues were not official government
receipts but mimeographed sheets of paper. They were very strict in imposing
penalties and surcharges on late payments (interest was computed on a daily
basis). These collectors were neither chosen by nor had the confidence of
beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the beneficiaries complied with all MHS orders for
fear of losing their new homes. Payment of dues was almost 100 percent for the
first two years of occupancy.
Beneficiaries started getting suspicious when the collectors began refusing

check payments. All hell broke loose one day when duplicate copies of the
mimeographed receipts were found in the garbage dump. This implied that
these duplicates were not submitted to competent authorities for proper
acquittal and audit. Beneficiaries also discovered that collections were remitted
to the DBP two or three months after they were received by the collector. Those
who paid by check found out that their payments were deposited in private
banks and to personal accounts. Thus, beneficiaries immediately ceased
payments. The scandal became news and investigations were demanded. They
July
asked the MHS and were granted a moratorium on payments which lasted for
almost a year. It was later discovered that the fund mess was not confined to
the U.P. BLISS San Vicente site but was also happening in other sites. There
were many telltale signs that the BLISS program was a milking cow for
unscrupulous public officials and employees. A number of MHS officials also
fled the country at this time fueling more serious doubts not only about the
integrity of those responsible for the BLISS program but whether the program
itself was going to survive and prosper.
At the end of the moratorium on payments, the BLCAs instituted their

own collection scheme, i.e., payment through a bank nearby for subsequent
direct remittance to the DBP. However, only a few resumed payment of dues.
Other collections schemes were introduced by the MHS-bonded collectors who
were MHS (or BDC) employees, opening a field extension office of the BDC in
the site just to receive payments, and subsequently through direct payment to
the BDC office in Makati. Despite these changes, the number of active accounts
remained small. This put the issue of joint liability into serious jeopardy.
Instead of working out a way to fulfill their joint obligation to the DBP,
there was a strong campaign among the beneficiaries to withhold further
payments. This was a situation where the recovery of the investments of one
government institution, the DBP, was held in jeopardy because of the lapses of
another government institution, the MHS and its subsidiaries.
After the EDSA Revolution in 1986, the Commission on Audit (COA)

conducted an audit of payments made by beneficiaries in all BLISS sites to
protect the interest of these beneficiaries and to ascertain the accountability of
involved parties. Despite a subpoena issued by the COA Task Force to all
accountable persons, many BLCA Treasurers/Collectors failed or refused to turn
over all used or unused receipts. Some even continued to use them (BDC 1986:
1). Beneficiaries issued these kinds of receipts were given a month to present
them to the BDC for validation. After the deadline, these receipts were
invalidated. The BDC also urged those who had reason to do so, to file
complaints against former Estate Managers, BLCA Treasurers, and BLCA
officers who were not validly elected or were promoting non-payment of
occupancy dues. In the case of U.P. BLISS, no known case filed seems to have
prospered.
Use of BLCA receipts was suspended effective June 1986. Bonded

collectors were instead fielded to BLISS sites to accept payments.
Despite these reforms, collection of dues was never the same again. The
MHS instituted various schemes to make beneficiaries pay. But the cloud of
doubt was difficult to erase. Scarred by their unfortunate experience,
beneficiaries became suspicious of other schemes and were reluctant to try
2001
them. The beneficiaries lost confidence not only in officials but worse, in the
institutions themselves.
Majority of the beneficiaries have incurred arrearages equivalent to

several years of occupancy dues payments. Some arrears amount to
P300,000.00 or even more made up of about P120,000.00 actual dues and the
rest representing penalties and surcharges. But the BDC could not force
beneficiaries to pay. First, the beneficiaries demanded individualization of
accounts and the dissolution of the joint liability for the BLCA loan. That way,
each beneficiary would be responsible only for his/her particular account. The
implementation of this proposal was difficult. The officers of the UBLCA who
signed the original Contract of Lease were not enthusiastic about the proposal
because of some legal issues they raised, e.g., ownership of common facilities.
It was during this time that the BLCAs of both phases began to be more
active and assertive. The existence of two BLCAs posed serious problems and
difficulties in the community. It was necessary to integrate the Phase 1 and
Phase 2 BLCAs into a common community association. Amidst the resistance
posted by some quarters, mostly from the UBLCA, the HIGC ordered the
conduct of a referendum-plebiscite to determine which BLCA would be allowed
to remain. The UBLCA contested this order. The Supreme Court, however,
upheld the HIGC order paving the way for the referendum-plebiscite which was
held in the middle of 1988. The results indicated that majority preferred the
UPBCA. Consequently, the HIGC issued an order granting recognition to the
UPBCA and ordered the UBLCA to cease existence. Unfortunately, the HIGC
did not exercise any further initiative to implement its decision.
Many buildings, including those from Phase 1 send representatives to the

UPBCA (or the integrated association) which is supposed to be the one and only
duly-recognized community association for the entire U.P. BLISS San Vicente.
The UPBCA conducts an election of officers yearly. On the other hand, the
UPBCA (or the original Phase 1 associates) has not held any election for many
years now and officers are merely on a holdover capacity. The holdover officers
also continue to claim jurisdiction and control over some common facilities such
as the BLISSMART and the Multipurpose Hall. They hold the view that being
the signatories to the original loan agreement which covers the cost of
construction of such common facilities, it should follow that they have control of
these facilities. Thus, when beneficiaries need the Multipurpose Hall for
community activities, they have to seek the permission of the UBLCA, which
keeps the hall padlocked. Either it escapes their thinking, or they prefer to
ignore the fact, that these facilities were intended for community use and
that although they signed the legal papers governing the cost of these facilities,
they did so in behalf of the beneficiaries whom they represent, not in their
capacity as individuals. Issues like these are irritants that have prevented a
full integration of beneficiaries into one BLCA. Thus, the development of a
July
sense of community and unity continues to elude the residents. Attempts to

integrate the two BLCAs have not succeeded but a great number of Phase 1
beneficiaries acknowledge the UPBCA as the officially recognized association
and send their building representatives to meetings.
Collection of occupancy dues continues to be a problem until today. Among

all the Folio 1 UBPs cited in pages 15-16 only six sites have been remitting
payments. Valle Verde 1 and 3 posted the highest percentage payment rate of
90 percent and 80 percent of beneficiaries, respectively. Only 40 percent of U.P.
BLISS Phase 1 beneficiaries are paying while the rate in Phase 2 is slightly
higher at 50 percent. Mandaluyong and Guadalupe 1 are both in the 40 percent
range. As regards other BLISS sites, either just a handful are paying their
dues or none of them at all.
The Urban BLISS BLCAs have organized themselves into a Metro Manila
BLISS Federation to address their common problems, most of which have to do
with individualization of accounts, payment of occupancy dues and arrearages,
and related issues. The Federation as well as the individual BLCAs have been
knocking on the doors of various government institutions to ventilate their
concerns. Foremost among their concerns are: (1) conferment of proprietary
right and ownership of housing units and (2) a realistic scheme to settle their
financial obligations. Executive support and legislative assistance have also
been attempted. In 1988, Senator Jose Lina filed Bill No. 627 providing for an
amortization scheme for arrearages. All beneficiaries would have to resume
immediate payment of current dues and then pay their arrears in equal
installments within two years. Penalties, fines, and surcharges would be
waived. Another bill was filed by Senator Wigberto Tafiada in 1989. Bill No.
1004 provided for a liberal amortization scheme for arrearages. Beneficiaries
had to pay only ten percent of their arrears, without any penalties, then
restructure the balance. Neither bill was passed into law. Nonetheless, a loan
restructuring scheme was introduced by the BDC and NHMFC along the
Tafiada proposal. Quite a number restructured their loans. For most, however,
raising the amount equivalent to ten percent of their arrears is a major setback.
Social Development Approaches and Strategies
The preceding parts of this study are purely descriptive of facts and events
that transpired. The approach to the BLISS program and the implementation
process are presented in as objective manner as possible to provide the bases for
making an assessment of the program.
It is important to draw a clear distinction between approaches/strategies

on one hand, and their implementation, on the other. Government projects are
commonly criticized for their defects and failures during implementation. The
objectives and plans are often well-thought out, valid, and appropriate.
2001
The questions raised at the beginning of this article are tackled in this
section. Two levels of analysis will be undertaken. The first will deal with the
approaches/strategies per se adopted for the BLISS program. Were these
effective and appropriate? The second level will touch upon implementation
issues.
Approaches and Strategies
The notion of social development has focused on the questions of the

satisfaction of human needs and improvement in the quality of life. It goes
beyond the attainment of economic objectives towards the more comprehensive
social goals and ideals that will ensure the full development of man (Dube 1988:
48). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human
Development Reports succinctly but meaningfully capsulize it as the
"development of the people, for the people and by the people" the ideal of total
human development. The 1994 Report defines the "new development paradigm"
as one that "puts people at the center of development, regards economic growth
as a means and not an end, protects the life opportunities of future generations
and respects the natural systems on which all life depends." It "enables all
individuals to enlarge their human capabilities to the full and to put those
capabilities to their best use in all fields..." (UNDP 1994: 4). The challenge lies
in how vision can be translated into process and action.
The human settlements approach and the consequent strategies adopted by

the government from the 1970s to the early 80s in the area of housing was one
such attempt. It aimed to develop communities where the human potential
could be fully achieved. This was the major framework within which the BLISS
program was planned and implemented. It sought to integrate the knowledge
and experience of various agencies towards the emergence of self-reliant
communities that would allow for the fullest development of man.
Several social development approaches and strategies are easily

discernible from the description of the BLISS program and related events
presented earlier. The human settlements concept refers to a people-centered
approach, i.e., it puts man in the center of development, "man as the primary
resource and the primary beneficiary."
The basic needs theory is also incorporated in the BLISS program. The
theory of basic needs identifies certain basic human requirements necessary for
survival and development. These may be classified into three categories.
Deficiency needs refer to those which have to be satisfied to make a human
being reach a defined level of adequacy, e.g. physiological needs. Sufficiency
needs are those which will allow the attainment of a desired standard. Growth
needs extend beyond material sufficiency to the broader social goals that will
July
allow the individual to develop (McHale and McHale 1977: 223). The BLISS
program aimed to address these three categories of needs. This is reflected in
the efforts to deliver the "eleven basic needs of man" which are repeatedly
hammered into all phases of the program.
Teamwork, coordination, and collaboration among various agencies of the

government and even the private sector were a feature of the program.
Implementation processes involved multilateral and multisectoral
collaboration. Various agencies were tasked to provide the services necessary
to develop BLISS communities. The CCC was the central coordinating body for
policy formulation and decisionmaking while the MHS and its attached agencies
implemented the programs and projects.
The concept of convergence is defined as "the coming together of different

services/efforts.., towards specific targets... in order to maximize the utilization
of limited resources... to come up with greater impact" (IIRR n.d.: 16).
Multilateral and multisectoral collaboration in the BLISS program was
supposed to result in a convergence of efforts focused on a specific target
clientele-the beneficiaries in specific BLISS sites. The provision of basic
needs would enable communities to become self-reliant.
The targeted beneficiaries were also expected to actively participate in

community activities. Thus, the BLISS program was envisioned to be
community-based. The beneficiaries, through the BLCA, are supposed to plan
and decide on issues concerning the community.
Social mobilization efforts to empower the beneficiaries were also

undertaken. This was mainly through their involvement in all BLCA activities.
Capability-building exercises to improve the skills of the beneficiaries are
undertaken as part of the mobilization efforts.
Economic uplift is also a major consideration of the program which

emphasized the livelihood component.
These appear to be the main concepts, approaches, and strategies that are
idealized in the BLISS program. These are summarized in Table 1.
Were the strategies chosen to translate the vision of creating self-reliant

communities effective and appropriate? Were they feasible?
Social empowerment, self-reliance, social mobilization, and economic

independence towards the full development of man were sought to be achieved
mainly through the HOWA concept. The BLCA was identified as the vehicle for
attaining the social development goals of the program. This article shows that
many of the implementation problems spring from the adoption of this strategy.
2001
Table 1. BLISS Approaches to Development
Approach Indicators
Objectives 1. Total human - all dimensions of development
development are present
a. people-centered - man as primary
resource/primary beneficiary
2. Social empowerment - actively involved beneficiaries
in BLCA and other community
programs
3. Economic uplift - better homes; livelihood
projects; increased income
Features 1. Community-based - initiatives/decisionmaking by
beneficiaries
a. Participatory - beneficiaries are involved from
planning to evaluation; BLCA
as focal point for harnessing
people's participation
2. Self-reliant communities - use of own resources and efforts
after initial MHS support
3. Coordination of efforts - Cabinet Coordinating
Committee; the MHS
4. Socialized Financing - Subsidy to low- and middle-
groups; income joint liability for BLCA
loan
Strategies 1. Focused targets - BLISS beneficiaries
2. Social mobilization
a. capability-building - Management training and
skills improvement of
3. Multilateral/multi- beneficiaries
sectoral - Various agencies of government
4. Convergence of efforts participating
- Joint and sequential delivery of
5. Provision of Basic Needs services
- Delivery of "eleven basic needs
of man"
Community associations are traditionally conceived as an aggregation of

residents pursuing common interests. They may engage in civic, business, or
even political ventures. But on the whole, these are voluntary organizations or
cooperatives that work for their own specific interests, i.e. the common good of
the community. There is nothing wrong with this view. As a matter of fact,
BLISS communities are certain to benefit from associations like these.
July
The case of the BLCA is a different matter altogether. In addition to its

"traditional" role as a community association, the BLCA is tasked to perform
financial, administrative and other functions imposed upon it by a third party,
the MHS. The BLCA is also supervised by this third party which makes the
decisions for them. Pro-forma by-laws and membership rules were already
formulated by program planner, the MHS. The contracts, loans, and other
agreements entered into by the BLCA were pre-determined by the MHS, not by
the members of the BLCA themselves. The needs and preferences of the
members of the community were not factored in. This can hardly be considered
the community-based/participatorystrategy envisioned for BLISS communities.
To a certain extent, this HOWA approach may probably work in a rural

setting where people have common traditions and beliefs, have lived together
for years, knowing each others' life circumstances, and having shared interests,
experiences, and aspirations, even similar problems and concerns. In brief, the
people are homogeneous and have developed a sense of belbnging to a
community. The organization of a community association in a rural setting may
thus be relatively easier."
Transporting the HOWA concept to an urban setting is fraught with

greater difficulties. This is further compounded when applied to newly-
established communities where residents do not share a community history.
Thus, the BLCA strategy, i.e., with the features designed by the MHS,
especially when applied in urban areas, is flawed and inappropriate. This may
be due to several reasons.
1. Artificial Sense of Oneness - People of different backgrounds and

who hardly know each other are made to forge an artificial sense of oneness and
unity from the very start. It should be noted that these new BLISS
communities are composed of a heterogeneous mass of individuals whose only
commolA need may be a housing unit. They cannot be expected to develop a
community spirit and to evolve a truly participatory, community-based decision-
making process soon after they move in. They need time to get to know each
other and to develop their own programs and priorities. They need time to
identify and choose their leaders who can truly represent their common
interests.
The experience of U.P. BLISS San Vicente reveals that the leaders were in
fact designated not by the beneficiaries themselves but by the MHS officials.
Hence, the early BLCA officers were not really representatives of the
beneficiaries nor even known or acceptable to a majority of them. Nevertheless,
all MHS policies and decisions were channeled through these officers. This did
not augur well for developing a sense of unity and oneness. The legal issues
that would arise later can be traced to this.
2001
2. Joint Liability for Infrastructure Loans - Even before they were

able to organize themselves and to choose their own leaders, the community
was already faced with the need to enter into a loan and mortgage agreement
involving a huge sum of money. Despite the absence of a valid mandate from
the beneficiaries whom they were supposed to represent, BLCA officers
committed these beneficiaries to a long-term loan agreement. This might have
been politically expedient. Nonetheless, the legal documents were valid and
binding.
Since there is joint liability among all the members of the BLCA, those
who pay their dues are equally liable as those who do not if the loan is not paid.
There is therefore no incentive on the part of beneficiaries to fulfill their
financial obligations. This is a fertile source of tension that serves as further
deterrent in forging unity among the beneficiaries.
Soon after the U.P. BLISS project was implemented, beneficiaries were
already demanding individualization of accounts. Those who religiously paid
their dues did not want to be jointly responsible for the delinquency of others.
Moreover, since it was a joint liability, they had no protection against
foreclosure proceedings. This is a clear indication that BLCA strategy with this
joint-liability feature is defective.
Individualization of accounts, however, is not all that easy to implement.

First, the contracts and agreements could be unilaterally nullified.
Beneficiaries must first have to formally waive their BLCA membership rights
and joint responsibilities. Inasmuch as this joint-liability is detrimental only to
those who are paying their dues, there is, therefore, no incentive or urgency on
the others to waive any of their rights. This observation must be viewed in the
context of the Phase 1-Phase 2 controversy described earlier. Among all the 15
UBPs, the BDC has succeeded in securing this waiver from only one project site,
before the transfer of its collection function to the NHMFC. Today, the NHMC
treats beneficiaries as individually rather than jointly liable.
3. Duties and Responsibilities without Concomitant Power and

Authority - Members of a cooperative enjoy certain benefits and services, e.g.
warehousing or marketing facilities for grains cooperatives or discounted rates
for cooperative stores, which can be withheld from them if they become
delinquent members. For BLISS beneficiaries, however, there are no such
stakes. Only the housing unit can be taken away. The pro-forma rules on
BLCA membership provide that members who are not in good standing
automatically lose their right of occupancy. A detailed evaluation sheet was
prepared for rating beneficiaries to be in good standing or not. This rating
system was not implemented. First it was too tedious a process for the BLCA
to bother with. Second, even if the BLCA identifies beneficiaries who are not in
good standing and withdraw their membership, it could not eject them from
July
BLISS HOUSING PROGRAM
their units because it does not have the power and the capability to effectively
do so. The BLCA is thus nothing more than a paper tiger. It is required to
secure a loan, collect occupancy dues, remit payments, and enforce rules. Yet it
does not have the effective means to make the members toe the line. To this
writer's knowledge, through all the twenty-five years since the launching of the
UBP, there has not been a single case of a successful ejection. The HIGC, BDC,
or NHMFC could not simply eject delinquent beneficiaries as the latter have
2
contracts with the BLCA and not with these agencies.
4. Limited Participation of Members - Experience at the U.P. BLISS

San Vicente reveals that urban dwellers do not actively participate in
community efforts. This could be attributed to the lack of time to do so.
Majority of3 the residents have full-time jobs and do not have time to spare for
the BLCA.1
The very mechanism by which the objectives of the BLISS program were
supposed to be attained, actually backfired. The hands of the implementors
were tied by legal complexities which the planners did not foresee.
Violators of rules could not be effectively sanctioned by the implementors

because the contract of lease of beneficiaries is with the BLCA, which in turn
does not have the capability to implement rules. For instance, there is rampant
violation as regards altering the external parts of the buildings and common
areas or constructing extensions. In the beginning, the implementors were very
strict about this. Even window grills had to conform to certain dimensions.
However, monitoring was not sustained. Extensions that tamper with the
aesthetics and uniform design of the buildings are commonplace. There are even
a few detached units and some fire hazards. Yet, no violator has ever been
penalized.
The University of the Philippines, as owner of the land, has likewise been
lax in enforcing the Usufruct Agreement which provides that no vertical
structures other than those put up by the MHS shall be allowed. In recent
years, however, the University Anti-Squatting Task Force has included the U.P.
BLISS San Vicente site in its regular monitoring. The Task Force has been able
to stop a few unauthorized constructions but the effort is not regular nor
sustained.
As described earlier, U.P. BLISS is composed of families from different

socioeconomic classes. A socialized financing scheme was introduced
presumably so that higher income groups would subsidize those who could less
afford to pay. This scheme is, however, another factor which impedes
community integration. Comparison of occupancy rates among the beneficiaries
has brought up the issues of equity, fairness, and justifiability. The difference
between Phase 1 and Phase 2 beneficiaries is very striking: (1) no
2001
PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
improvements in Phase 2 regardless of income level; (2) entry fees for Phase 2
were almost 300 percent more than for Phase 1; (3) the occupancy rates for
Phase 2 are much higher despite the absence of finishing touches and
improvements on the units.
It should be noted that Phase 2 was constructed within a year of Phase 1.

Beneficiaries believe that the cost of construction materials could not have
increased drastically during this short time. Yet the cost of Phase 2 is more
than double that of Phase 1: P30 million against PF14 million! There is also the
issue of Pag-IBIG Fund membership requirements for Phase 2 alone.
Too many variations were introduced in this single community in the area
of financing alone. This reflects a project plan that is not properly designed nor
well-thought out.
The BLISS Program was implemented on a massive scale all over the
country within a brief period of time. It did not have the benefit of pilot-testing
which could have avoided many of the problems encountered during
implementation. Refinements and adjustments of major strategies could have
been effected. It would also have given lead time for the agencies responsible
for implementation to develop coping mechanisms and creative procedures for
quick response. It may be argued that an effective monitoring and evaluation
system is the answer. The fact is that there were too many BLISS sites to
monitor such that the institution of immediate corrective measures was
realistically impossible.
The MHS was simply swamped with a variety of problems in very many
sites. It had more than it could properly handle. The Estate Manager was
practically helpless without the necessary institutional support. There was a
host of unforeseen variables, mostly stemming from the deficiency in the
approaches and strategies adopted.
Transforming Vision to Action: Implementation Issues
At the level of implementation, a different set of issues surfaced. Foremost

among these were administrative and financial issues that were mainly an
offshoot of the community association concept adopted by the Program.
The designation of BLCA officers by the MHS short-circuited the

participatory process vital to any community-based effort. The adoption of pro-
forma BLCA by-laws and membership rules prepared by the MHS resulted in
pre-designed, pre-packaged plans to which the community did not fully
subscribe. The signing of contracts and loan agreements even before the BLCAs
were formally and popularly constituted demonstrates that the BLCA was only
July
a dummy of the MHS. It could not be viewed as an organization of, by, and for
the beneficiaries. Having been treated initially as an MHS rubber stamp by
the MHS itself, the BLCA could not command respect from its members. The
BLCAs would eventually rise up against the MHS and its implementing
agencies.
The appointment of BLCA collectors, again by the MHS, was another

major blunder. Accountability was not ensured. The collectors had everything
to gain and nothing to lose. (Not a few beneficiaries entertain the idea that this
was a devious design dreamed up by certain officials to have personal access to
government funds.) This is not to say that all BLCA collectors were guilty of
misappropriating their collections. The fact is that there were too many
loopholes in the collections process which could be easily exploited for personal
gain. Among these are: 1) the designation of non-MHS employees as collectors
who were also non-bonded; 2) the issuance of non-accountable receipts for
payments received; 3) the absence of effective sanctions on collectors for late
remittance of collections to the DBP; and 4) toleration of the practice of
depositing collections in private accounts. There was very great temptation to
exploit these loopholes as the amounts involved were large. For instance, if all
U.P. BLISS San Vicente beneficiaries in Phase 2 alone paid their monthly dues
using first year rates, the collection for one month would be about P154,880.00.
In 1982, this was ahuge sum of money.
The U.P. BLISS San Vicente case also shows that the collection mess
triggered a series of other problems which continue to plague most UBPs today.
Regardless of the collection scheme adopted, the officials involved, or the
agency concerned, confidence in the system has not been fully restored. Most of
the beneficiaries withheld payments resulting in arrearages which they now
find difficult to pay even if they wanted to.
A practical payment scheme needs to be developed or even invented to

enable government to collect its investment. A proposal which is very popular
in almost all UBP sites calls for: (a) the condonation of all surcharges and
penalties; (b) the resumption of payments based on the original rates; and
(c) exclusion of the period when payments were withheld from the reckoning of
the 25 years total paying period by "sliding back" the deadline for the final
payment. In other words, a majority of the beneficiaries are not in favor of
restructuring their payments. They simply want to resume payment where
they left off years ago. And all these without any fines, penalties, or
surcharges.
The beneficiaries claim that they stopped payment because the

institutional arrangement for collections proved to be defective and they were
merely safeguarding not only their hard-earned money but the funds of
government as well. They argue that had they continued to pay through the
2001
nose despite the collection anomalies, government funds would have been
dissipated by unscrupulous individuals. Therefore, since government is mainly
responsible for the problem, the beneficiaries should not be penalized for it.
Beneficiaries in most UBPs admit that it is impossible for them to raise the full
amount of their arrears or even the ten percent downpayment required for
restructuring. However, if the terms are more liberal, they will be able to
resume payment of their dues.
This may appear to be a practical and realistic solution. To insist on

collecting from a willing but financially unable beneficiary may be futile. A
more liberal arrangement will enable government to collect from the
beneficiaries and at the same time avoid costly and protracted litigation.
Collections can then be plowed back for other development activities.
Whatever measure is adopted, however, the issue of fairness and justice

must always prevail. It should consider the implications for those who have
been paying their dues religiously. The proposed scheme actually rewards
those who have been remiss in their obligations. Furthermore, this may be a
bad precedent as regards other collection schemes of government. A delicate
balancing act is called for-between being fair and being realistic.
There are 496 units for shelter in the U.P. BLISS San Vicente site.
Basketball, volleyball, and tennis courts were put up to satisfy sports and
recreationneeds. A park was also provided. Medical services were supposed to
be available at the BLISSMART which was intended for a grocery, office space,
library, conference hall, and a Multipurpose Hall attached to it. A big water
tank was installed to provide water for domestic use as well as for the fishpond
which was going to be a livelihood project.
The fishpond, together with the orchard and vegetable gardens were to be
sources of food for the community. Food would also be available from the
grocery at the BLISSMART. Power was provided through a direct hook-up
with the MERALCO. Clothing needs were to be addressed by a mini-garment
industry. A private plant nursery was envisioned in the site to provide seedlings
and cuttings to be planted around the area. This was supposed to respond to
the need for ecological balance. Mobility needs were addressed through the
provision of clean and well-paved roads, a waiting shed along the highway, and
open parking spaces around the community. The Multipurpose Hall was to be
the venue for training programs and other education and technology efforts.
Pre-schools for children aged 3-6 were to be established too. The operation of
the BLISSMART, orchard, vegetable gardens, ornamental plants gardens, and
home industries would be the economic base of the community (MHS n.d.b).
The MHS as developer was to initiate these efforts which would eventually
be taken over by the BLCA.
July
Except for housing, water, power, and sports and recreation, the delivery
of "the eleven basic needs of man" was, however, superficial.
Housing was indeed provided. However, structural problems, e.g. leaking

roofs and pipes, were never corrected. The buildings were accepted from the
contractor and the ten percent retention fee was released despite the structural
defects. Furthermore, there was no maintenance work at all, contrary to the
original plan that the MHS would undertake these services for a fee to be
shouldered by the beneficiaries. The ningas cogon syndrome seemed to have
cast its spell upon the project implementors. As soon as the project got
underway and the problems began to mount, government interest faltered and
waned.
Constrained by lack of funds, the BLCA could not repair the buildings.
The beneficiaries just had to live with what they got. Maintenance work had to
be done by the residents themselves. Many buildings are in a state of disrepair
either because of financial difficulties or simply due to the indifference of
building residents.
The strategic location of U.P. BLISS San Vicente has increased the market
value of the units. This has resulted in a lot of turnover of residents who "sell"
their rights to others. New residents do not easily get assimilated into the
community. This makes it all the more difficult to integrate and forge unity in
the community.
U.P. BLISS residents are fortunate because they live near the Balara
Filter Station. Water pressure is strong and supply is adequate even to fourth
floor residents. But problems arise during interruptions in water service
because the water tank which was supposed to provide an alternative supply
source was diverted to another BLISS site. There used to be only one artesian
well in the community. Today, there are almost ten of them provided by the
Barangay Council through the efforts of the UPBCA.
Being connected to the MERALCO power service, U.P. BLISS San Vicente
also has adequate power supply. But the streets and pathways are now dark
and dangerous. Pathways were lighted through the efforts of the UPBCA, but
MERALCO discovered illegal tapping and cut off power supply.
As regards the BLISSMART Building, the residents never got to use it for
their own purposes. The BDC preempted the beneficiaries and the BLCA from
operating a cooperative to supply the food and other needs of the community.
The BDC leased the premises to a private group which operated a grocery.
Rental rates collected by the BDC were not remitted to the DBP to amortize the
loan despite the fact that the cost of the building was part of the loan. Neither
did the grocery satisfy the food needs of the residents. Variety, quality, and
2001
'quantity of stocks were so limited. This led to its bankruptcy. Even after the
grocery ceased to operate, the building was not turned over to the BLCA.
Meanwhile, its electric bills soared to over P100,000.00 which the BDC did not
pay. The structure has since deteriorated and is practically useless. The
adjacent Multipurpose Hall is still serviceable but is in bad shape. A hefty sum
would be needed to rehabilitate it. Thus, when the BDC offered to turn over the
building to the UPBCA in 1990, the latter demurred. In addition to the huge
MERALCO bill and the state of the building, there were legal issues raised by
the UBLCA that had to be cleared first.
The front part of U.P. BLISS San Vicente was also leased by the BDC to
private garden operators. The area wasenvisioned to respond to the need for
ecological balance in the community. The gardens did make the area green but
some operators subsequently extended their area beyond their leased space and
encroached upon common grounds. This became another irritant in the
relations of the residents with the BDC.
Residents still enjoy the use of the sports and recreation facilities although
these have since deteriorated due to lack of proper maintenance. After the
University took back the front portion of the site for commercial development,
the playground where children used to ride bikes or frolic disappeared.
Mobility needs were addressed through the construction of a waiting shed

along the University Avenue and parking spaces all around the community.
But the parking space allocated is insufficient. There is a big gap between the
number of housing units and the space allocated. This seems to be a common
oversight in the Philippines. When buildings are planned and constructed there
is a wide gap between the parking space provided and the number of people
that a building or cluster of buildings can hold. Considering that the selection
of BLISS beneficiaries was based mainly on ability to pay, it is not surprising
that many are able to afford to buy vehicles. At U.P. BLISS there is a mad
scramble for parking space every evening when residents come home from work.
Double and illegal parking is resorted to and this could lead to serious problems
in case of fire or an emergency. Fire trucks may not be able to access the
buildings in time to save them. This is also another cause of friction among
residents who are delayed from leaving when their vehicles are blocked.
Residents use every available space behind or beside the buildings as

parking areas but of late, U.P. has refused to grant permission for the
construction of car shelters or garages.
The roads have not been maintained. When repairs are undertaken by the
telephone and water companies, they do not pave back the spot where diggings
are made.. Despite representations with the Quezon City Government,
maintenance and repair work is difficult to secure.
July
Both Rural and Urban BLISS projects underscore the livelihood

component. In most UBPs, however, this is sorely lacking. To be fair, there
were efforts undertaken during the early years of the U.P. BLISS project which
addressed this component. A variety of skills training workshops were
sponsored by the MHS for the beneficiaries. However, no survey was made to
determine the needs and preferences of the beneficiaries. They were simply
invited and encouraged to attend these sessions. It is then difficult to say
whether these efforts had any impact on the community at all. The small
businesses within the community may be largely a reflection of the
entrepreneurial spirit of a few residents rather than a direct result of the
livelihood intervention schemes introduced by the program.
The orchards and gardens did not become the economic base as planned.
The UBLCA did receive a livelihood loan for a goat raising project somewhere in
San Mateo, Rizal. Whether or not the goats were acquired and what eventually
happened to them, the beneficiaries never found out for sure.
Delivery of services in BLISS sites was mainly sectoral rather than

integrated. The agencies concerned merely added BLISS sites to their regular
sectoral delivery system. Even at U.P. BLISS which was the showcase for the
Urban BLISS program, there was hardly any integration of services. While the
Cabinet Coordinating Committee provided overall coordination for the BLISS
program, with the MHS and its attached agencies as implementors, there were
no composite teams in each BLISS site. Implementors did not get a real feel of
the community. Since each community has peculiar needs and resources,
treating all BLISS sites uniformly according to one master plan can be
problematic. This is further compounded by leadership changes and
reorganizations in the coordinating bodies and implementing agencies.
Following the framework presented in Table 1 which identified the

approaches envisioned for UBPs, Table 2 below summarizes how these same
strategies were actually implemented in the site.
Conclusion
The issues revolving around the BLISS program are too complex to cover in
this article. And although the study focuses mainly on the Urban BLISS
program and cites one specific case, the issues do not get less complicated. The
study attempted to highlight just the essential features of the program - the
vision, the strategies adopted to realize the vision, and the implementation
process.
Social development approaches and strategies adopted by the program

were identified and analyzed. Two levels of analysis were used. First is an
2001
Table 2. BLISS Strategies: Plan vs. Implementation
Plan Implementation Indicators
Objectives 1. Total human development - No visible indicators except

housing units
2. Social empowerment - minimum, not meaningful
participation
3. Economic uplift - roof over one's head; very
limited livelihood projects
and only in the beginning;
increased income cannot be
directly attributed to
intervention
Features 1. Community-based - only community-oriented;

no meaningful participation
from beneficiaries
a. participatory - pre-packaged programs
2. Self-reliant communities - showcase effect;
implementing agency
syndrome
3. Coordination of efforts - sectoral; not evident
4. Socialized Financing - many non-paying
beneficiaries; instead of
collecting dues to settle
joint liability, BCLA
encouraged withholding of
payments
Strategies 1. Focused targets - BLISS beneficiaries;

difficulty in responding to
problems immediately
because of too many sites
and too many problems
2. Social mobilization - ningas cogon syndrome; not
sustained
a. capability-building - only during the early years
3. Multilateral/multisectoral - hardly any impact; but
divided attention to several
sites
4. Convergence of efforts - independent; sectoral; not
sequential
5. Provision of basic needs - delivery of "eleven basic
I_ needs of man" superficial.
July
assessment of whether these strategies were the right ones to achieve program
vision. Second was an assessment of the implementation process using the
strategies chosen.
The article shows that the major strategy used, the community association
concept with the added feature of joint financial obligation of members, is faulty
and defective. Most of the problems encountered in the implementation process
stemmed from the adoption of such strategies which were not effective,
appropriate, and feasible. This is particularly true when applied to urban areas.
The BLCAs are artificial community associations which were granted

rights that even the implementing agency later found difficult to unilaterally
withdraw. Although the BLCA does not have the teeth to implement rules on
disqualification of members or withdrawal of rights to occupy a unit, neither
can the implementing agency effect the ejection of residents without getting
mired in legal problems. The BLCAs can, therefore, effectively subvert the
efforts of the implementing agency in this regard. Thus, there have been no
successful cases of ejection at all.
The study reveals that the strategies were sophisticated formulations that
failed to consider realities in implementation. The planners must have
proceeded on the assumption that the BLCAs could always be counted upon to
comply with the requirements of the implementing agency. This will explain
why the BLCAs were made signatories to -vital loan and mortgage agreements
and were given certain control over the rights of beneficiaries to occupy units.
The planners did not consider a scenario where the BLCAs would in fact make
certain demands on the implementing agency and be able to successfully resist
the latter's efforts. The efforts of government have been effectively stymied by
the very same mechanism it created to realize the goals of the program. This is
a classic case where the best laid plans of mice and men did go awry.
The BLISS program must be viewed in the context of the political

environment prevailing at that time it was undertaken. The program was a
priority project of the Marcos administration. The Minister for Human
Settlements was no less than the First Lady who was also the Governor of
Metro Manila. Full financial and administrative support was provided.
Implementation was backed by the power and authority necessary to assure its
success. Sadly, however, problems of implementation were not easily resolved.
The study clearly shows that the vision of creating self-reliant

communities where people can develop their full potential has not been
achieved by the program. BLISS sites are not much different from other
housing projects of government which provide mainly a roof over one's head.
They have-not metamorphosed into the vibrant and self-sustaining communities
they were intended to be. As the physical structures deteriorate, so does the
2001
vision slowly fade. It was a painful and costly experiment on the part of
government. To this day government continues to seek ways of recovering its
investment and to resolve the legal issues it got itself into. The beneficiaries,
on the other hand, are saddled with organizational, financial, structural, and
other community problems which the program has not responded to or may not
even have foreseen.
The government, through the BLISS program, was able to respond to the
need for housing only to a limited extent. Likewise, it did not achieve the social
goals it set forth for the program. Furthermore, in undertaking the program, it
got severely burned. This sprang from major flaws in the strategies adopted,
from the planning to the implementation stage.
On the other hand, beneficiaries were pursuing a dream when they

participated in the BLISS program. They looked forward to a blissful life in a
model community where housing units would be accompanied by basic
amenities and opportunities for growth and development. They are slowly
waking up from a bad dream and are finding themselves, perhaps slightly
better off than they were before, but, definitely beset with problems that have
no easy answers.
On the part of government as well as the beneficiaries, therefore, the

BLISS program was less of a blissful and more of a blistering experience.
Endnotes
'This is subsequently referred to in this article as the Ministry of Human Settlements or

MHS. All government Departments were converted into Ministries in 1978 by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 1397. The MHS was abolished after the 1986 EDSA Revolution.
2The HSRC was created as the regulatory arm of the MHS by virtue of P.D. 1396, out of the
renamed Human Settlements Commission. It was further renamed as the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) by Executive Order No. 90 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on
17 December 1986. The HLURB is charged with "encouraging private sector participation in low-
cost housing through liberalization of development standards, simplification of regulations and
decentralization of approvals for permits and licenses" (E.O. 90, Sec. 1 [c]).
'Lack of time prevented the writer from making a positive determination whether the NHC
is one and the same as the present National Housing Authority (NHA). Despite the lack of
confirmatory documents, there is a strong reason to believe they are one and the same agency
because at one time, the NHA used to be called the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) which may have been the precursor of the NHC.
4P.D. 1396 established the HSDC as the corporate arm of the MHS especially in the latter's
discharge of its functions relative to urban renewal and New Town and estate development in
Bagong Lipunan sites. Section 6 of the decree states the purposes of the HSDC, thus: 1) the
"development of new communities that are economically viable and environmentally sound,
through innovative urban land mechanisms and self-financing arrangements;" and 2) the
July
.renewal of urban communities or parts thereof, through housing and other urban improvement
projects" (MHS 1984: 27).
'The HFC was established in 1956 by Republic Act No. 580. It has the mandate to operate
a mortgage insurance program and to "encourage, aid or initiate the organization or incorporation
of building and loan associations" (Valen 1993: 39). Its powers were enlarged through various
laws and issuances such as Executive Order No. 535 issued in 1979 which granted it the power to
register, regulate, and supervise homeowners associations. Thus, homeowners associations are no
longer encouraged to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission, although they still
may, but with the HFC. Executive Order No. 90 issued in 1986 renamed the HFC as the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). In 1988 HIGC was tasked to identify and dispose of
the properties of the BLISS Development Corporation (BDC). It is the only government agency
authorized to issue mortgage guarantees and credit insurance to lending institutions. As of 1993,
there were over 4,000 homeowners associations registered with the HIGC. The HIGC is a
member of a closed group of government housing finance institutions in the Asia-Pacific, and is
recognized for its excellence in the field of housing finance (PhilippinesFree Press 1994: 40). In
2000, the HIGC became the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) and the function of registering
community and homeowners associations was transferred to the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
6
Established on 21 December 1977, the NHMFC is a government non-bank financial
institution created to increase the availability of home financing loans. This is done through the
development of an active secondary market for home mortgages (Focus 1983: 12). The NHMFC
administers the savings generated for shelter and serves as the principal resource center for the
shelter program (MHS 1978 c: 57). The operation of a secondary market system is simply the
buying and selling of home mortgages. The cycle begins with the grant of a housing loan to a
borrower by an 'originator" or lending institution. This is referred to as the "origination of
mortgage" which constitutes the primary mortgage. The mortgage may then be purchased or
"taken out" by another institution, such as the NHMFC, to secure the originator's investment.
This is done through the issuance of government securities, e.g. the Bahayan Mortgage
Participation Certificates. Lending institutions are assured that the funds they lend to
homeowners are liquidated or replaced so they can accommodate other borrowers. The liquidity
level of the originator is thus maintained and it is able to rollover its funds for subsequent loans.
The purchase of the primary mortgage is referred to as the secondary mortgage (Focus 1983: 24;
MHS 1984: 29). Secondary mortgages bought by the NHMFC are guaranteed by the HIGC.
'The HDMF is essentially a provident fund for housing. Created by P.D. 1530 in June 1978,
and later amended by P.D. 1752 in December 1980, it is more popularly known as the Pag-IBIG
Fund which stands for Pagtutulungan - Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at Gobyerno. It is a long-term
mass savings program with housing loan features. It is a nationwide savings program for both
private and government workers. The Pag-IBIG Fund is generated through the employees'
contribution of a fixed percentage of their salaries and the equal contribution of their respective
employers.
8
The Manila Electric Company or MERALCO, was taken over by the government during
martial law and operated under the supervision of appointed military personnel. Before then, the
MERALCO was owned by the Meralco Securities Corporation (MSC) whose majority shares were
in turn owned by the Lopez family.
9
These included the following (MHS 1978c: 2-3):
Ministry of Agriculture Food

Ministry of Budget Funds
Ministry of Education and Culture Education
Ministry of Energy Power
Ministry of Health Medical Services
2001
Ministry of Industry Economic Base (Cottage Industries)

Ministry of Local Government and
Community Development Water, Local Planning, Administration
Ministry of National Defense Peace and Order
Ministry of Natural Resources Ecological Balance
Ministry of Public Highways Mobility
Ministry of Public Works, Transportation
and Communications Water, Mobility
Ministry of Trade Economic Base
Ministry of Youth and Sports Development Sports and Recreation
National Cottage Industries Development
Administration Clothing, Cottage Industries
10 The following are the first Urban BLISS projects of BDC (classified as Folio 1), which
were "taken out" by the NHMFC:
Site No. of Units*
Valle Verde 1
Valle Verde 2
U.P. San Vicente 1
U.P. San Vicente 2
Mandaluyong 1 and 2
Pasig
Paco
Muntinlupa
Makati
PNR
Guadalupe
Sikatuna 1
Teheros
*Only the number of units awarded to beneficiaries is reflected here. The

total number of units in each site may actually be more. Some units, however,
are used as offices of the Estate Managers or the BLCA and are not awarded to
beneficiaries.
"A survey conducted by the Social Weather Stations reveals, however, that rural Filipinos
have no predilection for joining organizations (Arroyo 1992: 3).
2
The beneficiaries entered into an Occupancy Agreement with the BLCA. They signed the
contract forms but have no copies of the perfected Agreement to this day. A few beneficiaries
have photocopies of their contracts but these are not notarized.
DAn interesting study conducted in a community of high-rise buildings in the United States
found out that there is a certain correlation between the level (floor) of the unit and the degree of
participation in community activities. It revealed that the higher the unit, the less likely does an
occupant participate in community activities; that there is a tendency to be more individualistic
as one's unit level rises. This may partly explain the apparent lack of interest of U.P. BLISS
beneficiaries in getting involved with BLCA activities.
July
References
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Arroyo, Dennis M.
1992 The SWS 1990 Survey of Rural Welfare. Social Weather Bulletin 92-9/10. May.
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Benitez, Jose Conrado

1980 BLISS: A Way of Life. The Fookien Times Philippines Yearbook: 44, 54.
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International Institute for Rural Reconstruction

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Macpherson, Stewart
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Mc Hale, John and Magda Cordell Mc Hale

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1982b The National Shelter Program. In Philippine Shelter System and Human
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n.d. a The Concepts of Human Settlements. Manila: Ministry of Human Settlements:

5-6, 30, 32-35.
n.d. b The Shelter Cum Livelihood Experience of U.P. San Vicente BLISS. Ministry of
Human Settlements (Brochure).
n.d. Rules and Regulations Governing Membership in the Association. Ministry of

Human Settlements. (mimeographed).
n.d. Urban BLISS Program Factbook. Ministry of Human Settlements.

(mimeographed).
Office of the President of the Philippines

1986 Executive Order No. 90. Identifying the Government Agencies Essential for the
National Shelter Program and Defining Their Mandates, Creating the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council, Rationalizing Funding Sources
and Lending Mechanisms for Home Mortgages and For Other Purposes. (17
December).
Official Gazette
1987 Executive Order No. 85. Abolishing the Office of Media Affairs and the Ministry
of Human Settlements and For Other Purposes. 83: 6: 467-468.
Philippine Development
1979 Creating BLISS Communities. Philippine Development. 6 (21). (31 March):
22-29.
PhilippinesFree Press
1994 HIGC: Testing Corporate Limits. (10 April): 40-41.
United Nations Center for Regional Development (UNCRD)

1988 Training Modules. Local Social Development Planning. Vol. One:
Perspectives. Japan: UNCRD.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

1994 Human Development Report 1994. New York: Oxford University Press.
Valen, Edmund
1993 HIGC Continues to Address People's Shelter Needs. Philippine Graphic. (26
November): 38-39.
July

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Bluebook 21st ed.

ALWD 7th ed.

APA 7th ed.

Chicago 17th ed.

McGill Guide 9th ed.

AGLC 4th ed.

MLA 9th ed.

OSCOLA 4th ed.

The BLISS Housing Program:

The Bagong Lipunan Sites and Services Program more popularly

Social Development is broadly defined as the "enhancement of the well-

*Assistant Professor, National College of Public Administration and Governance,

development for it covers an array of social development issues, concepts,

The study takes a look at the social development strategies and

The BLISS Program

The National Shelter Plan

The Philippines proudly claims that it is one of the first countries to

The MHS had the task of preparing a National Multi-Year Human

The four basic components of the shelter system-regulation, production,

Regulatory powers were vested upon the Human Settlements Regulatory

The BLISS Concept

The BLISS program is a component of the National Shelter Program.

Rural BLISS was designed to upgrade the living conditions in the

Level III is an ecological community of 500 or more families located near a

BLISS sites were expected to stimulate the growth and development of

Establishment of BLISS communities was done in three stages. The pre-

Prospective beneficiaries were subsequently organized into a community

At the launching of the program in 1979, mayors of municipalities that had

these were to be addressed normally preceded the formulation of an LDP. Thus,

Phase 3 called for the participation of residents in income-generating

1. Shelter and Livelihood - Indigenous materials and local

2. Reorientation of Attitudes on Land Ownership, Use, and

3. Community Resource Management - The resources of the

4. Self-Reliance - Through the integrated delivery of the eleven

5. Technology Transfer - Appropriate labor-intensive technologies

6. Countryside Mobilization - Government agencies, both national

7. Institutional Development - Beneficiaries were encouraged to

As more BLISS sites were developed, more agencies became involved in

The Metro Manila Commission (now the Metro Manila Development

Together, therefore, these agencies shared in the social development

The Bagong Lipunan Community Association

The homeowners' association concept, or HOWA, was adopted in all BLISS

Membership in the BLCA is a requisite for all BLISS beneficiaries. Soon

The BLCA Board formulates rules and regulations governing BLCA

The BLCA is a multipurpose cooperative which must be registered either

A very critical function of the BLCA is its role as representative of the

Construction of BLISS structures was funded from loans granted by

BLCA officers therefore had to be persons of integrity with the genuine

There were two approaches to Urban BLISS development. One was

Urban BLISS projects were directly implemented by the MHS through an

The BLISS Development Corporation (BDC) was established to speed up

The essential features of the UBP (MHS n.d.d: 1) are as follows:

1. Economic Viability - The objective of the program is to uplift the

2. Provision of Livelihood Opportunities - To augment family

3. Organization of Beneficiaries into BLISS Community

4. Integrated Delivery of Basic Services - Various agencies were

Beneficiariesof the Program

The opportunity to avail themselves of housing facilities within Metro