Section 14

o Criminal Due Process

Alonte v Savellano (Procedural due process is right of the accused)

An information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, and Buenaventura
Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan.

The case, re-docketed to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding. Following the
arraignment, the prosecution presented private complainant Juvielyn Punongbayan followed by her parents. During this hearing,
Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance.

Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private complainant and her parents not
to pursue the case, the State had no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved for
the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.

Respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision.

Petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.

Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.

Petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his application for
bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano.

The promulgation, of the decision proceeded in absentia. Petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner contends that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo on the basis of two (2) affidavits which were neither marked nor offered into
evidence by the prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the affiants thereof, which in total
disregard of the Revised Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, violative of petitioner's right to due process

While Judge Savellano has claimed during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective counsel of choice. None of their
counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to
respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits — one detailing the rape and the other
detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the
right to confront and cross-examine a witness "is a personal one and may be waived."

WON the respondent judge violated Alonte’s right to due process

Due process in criminal proceedings require:

(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. Procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.

Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court – Order of trial:

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.

(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any provisional
remedy in the case.

(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them
to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.

(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs the parties to
argue orally or to submit memoranda.

(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful
defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly.

Procedural due process cannot be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial.”

The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."

Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver.

Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the
purpose.

The parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for
the purpose.
Petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial

The assailed judgment convicting petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and thereby SET ASIDE for failure of due process, the
case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

o Presumption of Innocence
1. PP v Dramayo (reasonable doubt is based on moral certainty)
Accused, now appellants, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin committed robbery in the house of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza
five days before by being available as witnesses. They were in the house of their co-accused Priolo Billona, the accused Dramayo
invited all those present including the other accused Francisco Billons, Modesto Ronquilla, , for a drinking session at a place at the
back of the school house.

Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case, Dramayo and Ecubin to
ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby.

Estelito Nogaliza was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette, then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side
of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation consisted of repeated stabs with a short, pointed bolo as he lay prostrate
from the blow of Ecubin.

Dramayo warned the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. Dramayo went to the house of
the deceased and informed Corazon, wife of the deceased, that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito.

The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police asked Dramayo upon noticing blood stains on his trousers, and he answer that it was a
skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof.

The lower court reached its Decision, found the accused, now appellant Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder but Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the
others three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Roquilla acquitted.

Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro, stressing the absence of evidence sufficient to convict, there still being a reasonable doubt to be implied
from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged.

WON there is guilt beyond reasonable doubt to convict the appellant

Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.

Reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.

Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty.

The element of conspiracy being allegedly present did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime
charged.

The two appellants were duly convicted of robbery, with the deceased as the offended party. It was understandable that there was
a strong inducement for the appellants to have committed this crime of murder concerning the manner in which the deceased was
killed and the motive that prompted appellants to put an end to his life. The judgment is AFFIRMED.
,

2. Dumlao v COMELEC (reasonable doubt in a statute is resolved in favor of constitutionality)

Patricio Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya filed certificate of candidacy for Governor in the forthcoming elections,
questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and
due process guarantees of the Constitution.

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based
on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.”

Petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of political parties by respondent COMELEC on the ground that
it is contrary to section 9(1) Art. XIIC of the Constitution which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it.
from any form of harassment and discrimination.

Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the
Constitution.

WON Section 4 of BP 22 is unconstitutional

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel.

All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality.

The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for
public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. The disqualification
condemns before one is fully heard.

No distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such
acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same
category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence.

There is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts
of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of
such fact", for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused, is NULL and VOID.

Right to be Heard by Himself and Counsel

o PP v Holgado (the court should inform the accused of his right to counsel)
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because being a private
person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado
for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.

Appellant Frisco Holgado plead guilty without a presence of a counsel and maintain that he was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.

The trial court rendered the offense charged, named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment "stands
charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

WON the plea of an accused without a presence of a counsel is valid

No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law which includes that all accused shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.

Rule 112, section 3 Rules of Court: If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is
his right to have attorney being arraigned and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.

The court has four important duties to comply with:

1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;
2) After giving him such information, the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3) If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and
4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.

The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?"

The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure or
assign an attorney de oficio.

The judgment is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the lower court.

Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation

o PP v Quitlong (an accused must be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation by allegations
on the Information filed against him)
From the commotion, the police officers brought accused-appellants Salvador Quitlong, Ronnie Quitlong, Emilio Senoto, Jr., and
several other unidentified persons to the police station. SPO4 Gerardo Tumbaga prepared Form 1 of the National Crime Reporting
System indicating that accused appellants were arrested and that a certain Mendoza escaped and went into hiding.

An Information for murder filed against accused appellants following the killing of Jonathan Calpito. Accused appellants, shortly
after the filing of the information, submitted a motion for reinvestigation alleging that "it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who stabbed
the victim after getting irked when the latter urinated near and in front" of his wife.

The trial court acted favorably on the motion. The City Prosecutor filed a motion to admit an Amended Information that it was Jesus
Mendoza who had been responsible for the death of the victim.

Unlike accused appellants who were immediately arrested after the commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza remained at large. At
their arraignment, the detained accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

The defense gave no alibi and admitted the presence of accused appellants at the vicinity of the crime scene; however, it
interposed denial by appellants of any participation in the commission of the crime.

Appellant Salvador Quitlong denied having had any participation in the stabbing incident nor having been acquainted with Jesus
Mendoza. Appellant Ronnie Quitlong maintained that when he and his brother responded, Mendoza had by then already stabbed
Calpito.

The trial court rendered its Decision, declares the accused RONNIE QUITLONG Y FRIAS, SALVADOR QUITLONG Y FRIAS and
EMILIO SENOTO, JR. Y PASCUA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

Appellant Senoto argues that the crime committed is homicide, not murder and it failed in finding conspiracy among the accused.

WON the charged against the accused must be qualified by conspiracy even not alleged in the Information
Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution: No person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due
process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

The right to be informed of any indictment is likewise informing an accused in writing of the charges against him.

In order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is
not violated, an Information must:

1) state the name of the accused

2) the designation given to the offense by the statute; a
3) statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense;
4) the name of the offended party;
5) the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and
6) the place where the offense has been committed.

Conspiracy must be alleged in the information, not just inferred.

Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a
criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.

The information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community
of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the
absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly
appear in the Information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy.

The opinion of the trial court to the effect that conspiracy may be inferred from the allegation of abuse of superior strength and with
the aid of armed men is difficult to accept.

The above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill . . . and taking advantage of their numerical superiority
and combined strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y
CASTRO.

In this case, the absence of conspiracy, an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and this criminal
responsibility is individual and not collective.

o Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial

1. PP v Tee (G.R. Nos. 140546-47)
Accused,

2. Flores v PP ([G.R. No. L-25769)

Accused,