Ontology and Phenomenology of Speech An Existential Theory of Speech Marklen E Konurbaev Full Chapter
Ontology and Phenomenology of Speech An Existential Theory of Speech Marklen E Konurbaev Full Chapter
Ontology and Phenomenology of Speech An Existential Theory of Speech Marklen E Konurbaev Full Chapter
ONTOLOGY AND
PHENOMENOLOGY
OF SPEECH
An Existential Theory
of Speech
Ontology and Phenomenology of Speech
Marklen E. Konurbaev
Ontology and
Phenomenology of
Speech
An Existential Theory of Speech
Marklen E. Konurbaev
English Linguistics
The Lomonosov Moscow State University
Moscow, Russia
Words of our language have the same power. They are capable of
switching on the codes of our brain that we perceive as reality—not an
abstraction. If it hadn’t been so, why are we so hurt by the words that
insult us, why do we cry and suffer while listening to the romantic story
of love? Only because our brain translates the spoken or written word
into life. Most of the time, our natural human communication is not an
abstraction, but a vision, where we ourselves are an integral part.
A spoken or a written word is a gateway to the reality of somebody’s
life. I remember during one of our first phenomenology classes at univer-
sity, I asked one of my students to read a sentence from a famous book by
Kate Fox, Watching the English (2004), and then interrupted her at the
end of the first line (‘I am sitting in a pub near Paddington station,
clutching a small brandy.’). The girl had never been to England before
and I was wondering what sort of vision this sentence was evoking in her
mind. This student’s reaction was for me the most authentic verification
of her understanding. It could be that she had never seen Paddington sta-
tion in her life or tasted brandy, it is all right. But is it fair to say that she
had no understanding of this simple sentence? I think, no. When I asked
her about her mental vision at that moment, she felt shy and blushed
scarlet. After a few seconds, she recovered herself and said that while read-
ing it aloud, she imagined herself drinking a glass of fresh orange juice
together with her boyfriend in a cafeteria in Moscow, off Kazan railway
station that she often used when going home for holidays.
Is this not understanding? Well, it might be that the mental vision of
this student was too remote from what Kate Fox had actually meant. But
it could well be that while reading the context further on, this picture will
be repeatedly corrected by herself, subconsciously, while accumulating
more and more facts and information and getting an expanding vision of
the life presented in the book.
Our reading or listening is never linear and is rarely immediately fac-
tual. The brain starts generating a vision of life from the very first word
we hear. The word we hear and read triggers the neural zones that were in
action when we habitually used it. Our understanding of words is often
situational, rarely purely semantic, because semantic analysis is in fact
generalization that comes only after real experience. We read or listen
with hindsight—piling up associations until we get the vision of the
x Preface
digestible form for my colleagues and students, to all my friends and col-
leagues at the Faculty of Philology who supported me in my studies and
experiments.
My vision of the infinite richness of oral speech is rooted entirely in my
dialogues with Mikhail Davydov (1984) and further supported by the
works of David Crystal and John Laver (1994).
My understanding of syntax as a speech-oriented discipline, its poten-
tial to mould the expressive shape of oral intercourse rests on the works
of Olga Alexandrova (Dolgova, 1980).
My vision and understanding of vertical context and the varieties of
contextual meanings of words, the depth of their semantic and metasemi-
otic realization in speech was formed in communication with Irina
Gyubbenet, a colleague and a brilliant Russian translator of Modern
English Literature.
My vision of the mechanisms of speech and its neural basis derives
from the invaluable research works by Nikolai Zhinkin (1958), Alexander
Sokolov (2007) and more recently from a stunning and highly perspec-
tive research on connectome by Olaf Sporns (2011) and the exposition of
the language of thought hypothesis by Jerry Fodor and Stephen Pinker
(2013).
My views of the semiotics of speech and the intrinsic symbolism of
oral expression rest on the works of Olga Akhmanova (Akhmanova et al.,
1986), Tamara Nazarova (1994), Mikhail Davydov (1984).
My judgement and analysis rest on the evidence of linguistic examples,
many of which come from my discussions with my colleagues, students
and friends.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
xvii
xviii Contents
9 Conclusion 219
Bibliography 223
Index 231
List of Figures
xix
1
Introduction
A thought mirrors the world and is rarely clear in representing its true
essence. Being dark, obscure and blurry, it often resembles hallucination,
which every person prefers to keep to oneself. And when, through one
reason or another, one is forced to share this vision with the world by
means of language, there is always an excuse that follows, ‘That’s the way
I see it’. However, language does not make this vision any clearer either,
but disguises the thought even further and hence, the world that this
particular thought represents. The only choice left to us is to contemplate
the speaker’s own world—the vast vacuity spanning in the murky recesses
of his or her mind. But this is all we need. Objectivity is not an aim, but
rather, the experience and perception that leaves us totally at peace with
the world, irrespective of the veracity of our representation.
Behold, this is the ‘rule of the perception mirror’ in speech: the speaker
conceives an idea and then says, ‘I was a hidden treasure and I desired to
be known; and I spake and made myself known to the multitudes and
they harkened unto the manner of my speech and then unto the matter
thereof; and then spake in return and while beholding how I felt about
their speech they knew me, and I, in beholding their reaction unto what
I ere said—knew them; and, finally, I began to know myself through the
contemplation of these people’s reaction unto my words and, alas, gained
but little satisfaction in this pursuit, but am still struggling in good ear-
nest to understand if I actually live and have the enthralling vigour of life
in my veins or have already evaporated into the thin air of ephemeral
illusions of the multitude’.
This book is about the phenomenon of ‘the genesis of life’ in our
minds during speech perception. It explores connected animated,
visual and aural images that are actualized in our brain during the
course of our interpersonal communication. Following al-Ghazali
(2008), a Persian philosopher of the twelfth century (to whom we are
grateful for the revealing comments of Aristotle and his Organon), we
call this process ( احياءihya) [´ɪʰ´ja], that is, reviving the content of
speech, awakening the pictures in your imagination triggered by the
language we use, vivifying or breathing life into the world that we per-
ceive in our minds while reading and speaking. The main purpose of
the phenomenology of speech therefore, as of every other phenomeno-
logical research, actually, is, according to Taylor Carman, ‘an attempt
to describe the basic structures of human experience and understand-
ing from a first person point of view, in contrast to the reflective, third
person perspective that tends to dominate scientific knowledge and
common sense’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2013). The experience of life awaken-
ing in our minds in response to natural human speech as an organized
linguistic material is one of the most intricate, unusual and mysterious
phenomena that forms the basis of all interpersonal communication
and surely deserves a special study within the framework of phenome-
nology as a philosophical study. Phenomenology is ‘a philosophy that
places essences back within existence and thinks that the only way to
understand man and the world is by beginning from their “facticity”’
(Merleau-Ponty, 2013). This stance is much in keeping with Husserl’s
call to return ‘back to facts’, rather than opinions, and to proceed from
observations, rather than abstract reasoning. ‘Now to pass rational or
scientific judgment upon facts (Sachen) means being guided by the
facts themselves, getting away from talk and opinion back to the facts,
questioning them in their self-givenness, and laying aside all prejudices
alien to their nature’ (Husserl, 2012).
Introduction 3
a certain age, every child does it most fervently, as if his or her whole life
depends on it. And when a child fails to achieve a certain level of success
in this direction by the age, let us say, of three or four, we, adults, may
suspect that something is wrong with the child’s development and some-
times may even worry about his or her mental health. So great is the
power and place of the language in our lives that every effort is now being
made in the education system and further on, during our professional
activities, aiming to secure normal intellectual development and protect
our mental or psychological health.
Mental representation of the world in which we live seems to be so
natural that we often forget that the perception of speech is an attempt
at representing the already perceived world delivered to us in a new,
linear linguistic form. In fact, we are trying to identify the world pre-
sented to us in speech through the ‘curved mirror’ of our intuition
and the generalized vision of the world—our Weltanschauung.
Curiously, a speaker addressing another speech agent wishes him or
her to perceive this reflection in the first place and not the source-
reality that actually caused such reflection. Failure to experience this
type of representation (even when the vision of the original reality is
correct) ruins the whole of the communication process and causes
quarrels and misunderstanding.
Paradoxically, in this modern world of people, we are less interested in
perceiving the real world of material objects than the world of the inter-
connected and interdependent visions belonging to the socially inte-
grated personalities expressed in their speech. Oddly enough, this ‘reality’
is never stable, but changes with the way people ‘feel the world’ of other
people in their hearts and minds. We are considerably more interested in
adequately representing this virtual world of people’s representations,
than in the perception of the actual trees, grass, flowers, insects and ani-
mals. Here comes one of the greatest phenomenological challenges of the
modern world: your five senses will always mislead you, because instead
of contemplating the world, you will have to interpret reflections. And
however adequate your perception may be, your interlocutor will always
have the right to say that his or her world was misrepresented in your
head because your own ‘mirror’ was too dark or abnormally curved or,
which is even more important, the real moving world of the speech
Introduction 5
And he said, Go, and tell this people, Hear ye indeed, but understand not;
and see ye indeed, but perceive not. Make the heart of this people fat, and
make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and
hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and convert, and be
healed.
this initial setting or schema also includes the idealized expressive tone or
an attitude that we call the timbre lead, circling around an idea represented
by a key word, a phrase or, possibly, a poetic line that best expresses the
intention of the speaker.
In deciphering this initial communicative setting, we decode the lin-
guistic message at least eight times: first, at the level of lexical-syntactic
relations we comprehend complete sentences with predication (we call
this the base structural level ); then we test these sentences and their parts
for logical integrity with fact (Wittgenstein calls it Gedanke); then we per-
ceive sentences as utterances with expressive peaks through the prism of the
overall style and foregrounding (the resulting pattern of foregrounded or
stylistically marked elements eventually forms into timbre or the overall
feeling of the manner of representation); after that, based on the analysis
of the anaphoric relations we test the perceivable speech event for the
overall meaning integrity and possible message or a vision of the reality (prop-
osition) communicated to us (at this level, that we call after Edmund
Husserl, ‘wax phenomenology’ [Husserl, 1970; Hopp, 2008], the per-
ceived reality is yet unrelated to us; it has recognizable forms but no ‘vigor
of life’ in them that can be mentally represented); at the fifth level we
determine the key points of emotional tension in speech that are related to us
personally, to our life experience and start ‘quickening’ and holding together
in our mind’s eye the images or concepts from our memory related to
those generated by the speech addressed to us and recognized at the previ-
ous level; at the sixth level we induce the power of development to the
emotionally treated mental reality based on our force of predictive vision
of the mentally vivified objects in the imaginative environment and,
finally, we switch on the mechanisms of retrospective correction of the over-
all mental representation based on the updated vision of the phenomeno-
logically quickened reality, enforced by the appearance of the new
elements in speech while it unravels in the course of verbal communica-
tion. The eighth level of the genesis of life in speech permeates and encap-
sulates all the previous ones through mental audition, the chief function
of which is to support one of the main constituents of life balance and
hierarchy of the key reference points of speech.
Any sudden disbalance in a single element in speech triggers the effect
of semantic magnetism when elements of speech ‘line up’ to circle around
8 M. E. Konurbaev
7. Our bodies will return to the dust of 7. Then shall the dust return to the
the earth, and the breath of life will earth as it was: and the spirit shall
go back to God, who gave it to us. return unto God who gave it.
8. Useless, useless, said the 8. Vanity of vanities, saith the
Philosopher. It is all useless. preacher; all is vanity.
(KJV, Ecclesiastes 12)
The base structural analysis will reveal the pattern of syntactic stresses in
the fragment, subordinated to the laws of parallelism in the KJV. Analysis
in terms of logical integrity will reveal a three-part Gedanke where the
young age is opposed to the old age for a certain reason which explains
the contextual meaning of the word ‘vanity’ at the end of the piece.
Consideration of the foregrounded metaphoric elements coupled with
the rhythmical structure will enhance the feeling of importance and
impart a touch of mysteriousness to the metaphoric concepts. Once rec-
ognized and generally felt, the features of the old age in the extended
allegory then need to be awakened in the mind of the reader based on his
or her vision of the significance of this part of life. This Ihya will cause the
logically and stylistically marked elements to form into a mentally per-
ceived reality and the mind will fill it up with details based on the back-
ground of the speech agent and his or her life experience. In order to
avoid any disbalance in the representation of the syntactically, logically,
conceptually and stylistically marked elements of the fragment, the reader
will fill these contexts with mental audition caused by the alternations of
speeding up and slowing down in reading, mental pausation and balanc-
ing the tone movements at the end of syntagms (Konurbaev, 2015).
A relatively slow tempo of the KJV and a series of rising tones on the
metaphoric parts set off the final recursive wisdom (‘vanity of vanities’) that
appears to be the main token of timbre (Konurbaev, 2015) preconditioning
the balance of all other phenomenologically marked elements. The ending
of the extract from the Good News Bible is much less powerful in ‘control-
ling’ the genesis of life in the rest of the fragment and falls short of a true
control of the whole vision. As a result, the focus of the extract is scattered
between a relatively unrelated beginning and the loose ending. The reader
may recognize and remember a rather plain, flat and unmotivated vision of
the old age, but the true meaning and feeling of it in the context of the
Bible will escape him or her. Although being quite clearly felt and visual-
ized within this fragment, this description of the old age in the broader
context of the Bible in Good News Bible will remain unawakened.
The process of life awakening investigated in this monograph is pre-
sented with the idea of working out generative patterns that can be
Introduction 11
Bibliography
Buehl, J. (2016). Assembling Arguments: Multimodal Rhetoric and Scientific
Discourse (Studies in Rhetoric/Communication). University of South
Carolina Press.
al-Ghazali, I. A. H. M. (2008). Ihya Ulum Ad Din New English Complete
Translation (M. M. al-Sharif, Trans.). Beirut Lebanon: Dar Al Kotob Al
Ilmiyah.
Hopp, W. (2008). Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38(2), 219–246.
Husserl, E. (1970). Logical Investigations (J. N. Findlay, Trans.). New York:
Humanities Press.
Husserl, E. (2012). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (D. Moran,
Foreword). London and New York: Routledge Classics.
Konurbaev, M. (2015). The Style and Timbre of English Speech and Literature (1st
ed.). Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2013). Phenomenology of Perception (D. Landes, Trans., &
T. Carman, Foreword) (1st ed.). London and New York: Routledge.
Russell, B. (2007). The Analysis of Mind. Kessinger Publishing, LLC. (Orignal
work published 1922)
Sporns, O. (2011). Networks of the Brain. Cambridge, MA and London,
England: The MIT Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1998). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (C. K. Ogden, Trans., &
B. Russell, Introduction) (471st ed.). Dover Publications.
2
Preliminary Methodological
Divagations: In the Circle
of the Philosophers
There are four relatively young people—two of them are males, and two
females. Then, the telephone in the office rings, and the host runs back to
pick up the phone. On his way he meets his assistant, a lady of about 65
years of age, and orders her to serve the new guests who have just arrived—
to accommodate them and help them establish a contact with the local
university. When the instruction is over he nearly rushes on, but then stops
short, beckons his assistant to come closer to him and says in a low voice
to a surprised old lady, ‘Don’t make a mistake in choosing the right rooms
for them; they are, sort of special, I hope you understand me, Ms Bean?
Well, you will see for yourself ’, and then rushes on. Then again stops and
cries to the surprised assistant who is still standing speechless, trying to
understand what this instruction could mean, ‘But don’t worry, Ms Bean!
After all, they are Europeans and they all work in a university’. In a state of
complete perplexity and bewilderment, she comes out into the yard to
meet the guests, only to discover, a quarter of an hour later, that the host
had made a mistake—these were two young heterogeneous couples. There
was a lot of mess in the dialogues, fumbling and fussing about the ‘right’
words to choose, a moment of discovery of a mistake, blushing scarlet,
perplexed excuses and so on—all due to the fact that the external, unre-
lated information was not properly put beyond the brackets in the situa-
tion, using as a foothold wrong, unobvious information, and as a result,
creating a disaster in the course of communication. Every word, every
intonation, every pause and gesture that was used by the host’s assistant
was relying on what the host had said to her minutes before the meeting,
instead of allowing her to make whatever discoveries were necessary for
herself and react then and there accordingly.
It is one thing to comprehend a mountain with your eyes; it is another
thing to comprehend the same mountain through the speech of a com-
munication agent. The least transparent is speech, of course. Not because
it does not allow the perception of the world directly through one of our
senses, but because it takes place primarily due to a host of assumptions
surrounding literally every item of our world—assumptions that block
objective perception almost entirely, substituting it by the horde of cul-
tural visions, traditions, accepted norms, superstitions and so on.
There is a wonderful parable by a Persian Sufi and poet Maulana
Jalaluddin Rumi in which he described a roaming scholar who happened
16 M. E. Konurbaev
to stay for a night in a dervish’s desert abode. In the evening, the scholar
heard the dervish’s prayer in which he called to God to come to him so
that the dervish could wash His hands and His feet and His eyes. Angrily,
the scholar rushed into the dervish’s tent and demanded that he stop this
blasphemy, ‘What feet?! What eyes?! What hands?! Who are you praying
to?! Stop this blasphemy!’ The same night the scholar had a vision in
which God was sore displeased with him, and said, ‘For years this dervish
has been praying to me day and night, the way he could, and there was
no interruption in his practices. And now came you and the dervish
became so frightened that he stopped worshipping me completely’.
In essence, this parable is about clear vision, unencumbered by any
conditional statements, theoretical restrictions, assumptions, cultural and
civilizational constraints. Likewise, in speech. When it is addressed to us,
we may begin simply by deconstructing its sense and general validity,
much the way suggested by Jacque Derrida (1967a, b, 2011). We may
render it totally inappropriate on the grounds of the fallacy of the speak-
er’s assumptions that have never been a part of our own lives and that
remain lifeless, motionless, unconsidered, inert. On perceiving it, we
divest it of all currently irrelevant ‘decorations’ until the moment when
we cannot ignore this background any more, for reasons of our own inad-
vertent reaction to something in its content that had really taken place in
our lives and is, one way or another, familiar to us—but not as an item in
an encyclopaedia, but as life, an experience.
In some cases, deconstruction or phenomenological reduction that is
performed in search of a foothold may bring the meaning of speech to
‘ground zero’, to a complete annulment of any perceivable content—not
in the semantic, but in the phenomenological sense. There will be neither
vision nor life awakening, but merely a collection of semantic and gram-
matical items that are brought together solely by the rules of structure—
generally recognizable on an abstract level, but basically dead to us,
unawakened, and consequently, nonexistent in our minds as phenomena.
There are other cases, when at a certain point of phenomenological reduc-
tion, we feel that we cannot go any further down the slope and have to
stop, being unable to resist the ‘evoking force’ of language that stirs our
memories and makes us live through the situations described by it again.
Thus, the basic principle of phenomenological reduction in speech runs as
Preliminary Methodological Divagations: In the Circle… 17
follows: it moves; therefore, it lives. It moves imagination and stirs the mem-
ory; it also moves in the mind of a speech agent by changing its form,
dimension and essence in a recognizable and a relatively predictable fash-
ion. It moves because the scope of its movement is determined by the laws
familiar to us and the experience that we formerly had. And finally, it
moves continuously from start to finish in the whole of speech, unceas-
ingly realizing itself, sometimes as an active agent of action, and sometimes
as a factor of movement for other objects in the reader’s or listener’s mental
vision of speech. It lives while moving. And speech without this movement
is a lifeless collection of words and unrelated facts, a nothing, emptiness,
vanity, The Kunstkamera—a roaming ghost without body and essence.
Hence, the first premise of the phenomenology of speech: it cannot
exist without a feedback that becomes its foothold, that gives our speech
a lasting impetus until the occurrence of the next collision with another
feedback in our mind that corrects its course. This foothold is the ground
that should be responding to it continuously, without any interrup-
tion—as life itself is. Once there is a break in the feedback, there is a
phenomenological hole, an interruption that inevitably throws you ‘off-
piste’ and you start day-dreaming or switch to another reality. This cre-
ates another dimension of meaning for the Cartesian Cogito ergo sum
(Descartes, 1999).
Je pense is a mirror capable of reflecting speech. It cannot help reflect-
ing. It is the entirety of organized memories that fertilizes the speech
addressed to a communication agent. Anything that is falling by the way-
side of your memory or stony places of uncertain references may spring
up semantically within the narrow context, but will be ‘scorched’ by the
broad awakened context in the general perception of speech.
Je suis is a life that is running along the trails of memory, but living its
own, new life—in the context of new relations, transformations and
development. Every new, relatively familiar item matched with the speech
agent’s memory forms a new foothold that may bounce against a bunch
of other linguistic matter already organized in a ‘living mass’, and may
eventually set it in a new direction, down the forking paths of the garden
of speech comprehension.
In this sense, a text that ends in a full stop or a pause may suddenly
acquire a totally new aspect or light if a comma replaces the full stop at
18 M. E. Konurbaev
the end of speech and more linguistic material of any sort appears there,
or if the terminal tone marking completion of expression starts suddenly
rising, suggesting a continuation. If we strive to determine the generative
phenomenological minimum of the speech addressed to a recipient, we
need to follow the arduous tracks of its emancipation, freeing speech
from anything that looks valid, but in reality, does not reflect anything,
being void of any expressive potential or awakening capacity. These ele-
ments are fake mirrors, distracting a communication agent from the cur-
rent scope of linguistic material chosen by a speaker or writer to represent
not an abstract thought, but a vision of life. Surprisingly, they could be
presented in a text or speech as gems of wisdom, but being much too
abstract and unrelated to the current experience of the reader or listener,
they may only destroy the frail scaffolding of a yet incomplete Gestalt.
Phenomenological reduction of speech is not exactly bracketing
(epoché) (Husserl, 1970, 2012), because once a linguistic element appears
along the way of a speech recipient, it cannot be either fully ignored or
immediately incorporated in a life-awakening process (ihya) due to its
irrelevance. An intelligent and inquisitive reader or listener will have to
keep it in his or her short-term memory for some time, returning to it
again and again in the course of speech in the hope of finally tying up
loose semantic ends. This process may continue for some time, at the
same time affecting the whole comprehension of speech and the dynamic
phenomenological vision of speech.
Reduction in speech can therefore develop along two ways: a ‘snowball
perception’ and a ‘stone-ball perception’. Both processes develop down
the slope of speech. However, the former grows in matter but reduces in
essence, while the latter gradually lessens and eventually disappears or
falls apart completely. The former is phenomenologically productive; the
latter destructive. The snowball perception easily finds ways to synthesize
a large amount of material ‘on the slope’ into a system, a vision that is
complete and expanding in the mind of a speech recipient at the expense
of the internal resources of speech. The stone-ball perception crushes
everything in its way, loses integrity and memory trails. Elements of
speech collide, smash against each other, throwing an unproductive dust
into the air, only to increase its opacity and end up in an unproductive
phenomenological chaos.
Preliminary Methodological Divagations: In the Circle… 19
differ in many aspects, but our sureness of their drastic difference moti-
vates us to unfold the representation of the world in the form of the
recursive patterns of speech. We transpose reality into the form of a par-
ticular language (as a vision of the relationship between denotation and
signification, sign and reality that is available to us through our senses),
then hold this experience in our memory as patterns of language use in
various situations of life, fraught with our emotions, and then, finally,
relatively automatically transpose these patterns in Parole, addressed to a
communication agent in the hope that it will be thus perceived. Not as
an inventory of relatively abstract facts and data, but again, as a medium
of life. More often than not, this attempt is a failure.
Speech is always existential, whether we agree with this premise or not.
We live by it when we ‘live it through’ (either cry or laugh, act or procras-
tinate, persist in idleness or develop), and we even shamefully live by it
when we ignore its existential nature, choosing some other ‘reality
instead’, which is often the reality of hypocrisy, when we claim the accep-
tance of a certain worded principle, and then, refrain from acting by it.
We often stand up sluggishly only to be seen by people, wavering between
this and that and belonging neither to these nor to those (Koran, 2004).
But even then, our words and verbal representations make the essence of
our real condition. Existentially, our language will betray us as the smell
of onion we ate at dinner and no seasoning will be able to hide its real
nature.
‘The world is precisely the one that we represent to ourselves’ (Merleau-
Ponty, 2013), always real, whether hypocritical or sincere. And the so-
called objectivity is, probably, the last thing on our list of the priorities in
life. For what we need is only happiness, safety and stability among the
people we live and we choose the language to work as our ‘torch’, leading
us through this jungle of linguistic self-expressions. ‘The real is a tightly
woven fabric; it does not wait for our judgements and only reacts to our
verbal address to it’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2013). Objectively, we see faces and
gestures. Indeed. But, ‘nothing is hidden behind these faces or these ges-
tures, and there are no landscapes that remain inaccessible to me’ as long
as I am capable of representing it through the means that are available to
me (Merleau-Ponty, 2013). ‘…there is but a touch of shadow that owes
its existence to the light’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2013), the shadow as an aspect
22 M. E. Konurbaev
of existence that makes the real different from its supposedly objective
source.
Speech is our biological necessity. It is our unique supplementary sen-
sory system, an organ (Chomsky, 2015) typical only of man—a relatively
easy way and tool to explore the reality we live in, which is often repre-
sented by people and their actions. What is the use of measuring a man’s
temperature or his or her blood pressure if this gives next to nothing in
obtaining a vision serving as a key to how we should co-exist peacefully
and productively? Speech is our sole instrument for exploring this social
reality and for our self-identification for the other members of the human
society to perceive. The act of relegating speech to the dole of a digital
storage of the facts of life is the same as holding a gulp of air that we
breathed in, and then, refusing to exhale for reasons of its importance for
our organisms.
Existentially, speech is like a magic rod that can change the whole of
your life if you can only accept it and make it a powerful vision mixed
with your own experience. Very often (not always though), speech is an
act, rather than a passive representation. Standing in front of the altar
hand in hand with a bride whom you intend to marry and answering ‘I
do’ to a priest’s question changes the whole of your life within the moment
allocated for the pronunciation of these same words. Faith makes these
words act (Austin, 1975). The vision of everything, the whole life that is
in these words, makes them real. These are the words that mould life,
instead of merely describing it through the opaque glass of general
description.
In the past two centuries, we got accustomed to such levels of safety
that even words of the natural human language are subconsciously per-
ceived as a dangerous encroachment into our lives. Instead of ‘going
straight through us’, leaving emotional and intellectual traces in our
hearts and minds, words ‘lazily flow around us’, barely touching our souls
and leaving us totally cold or in a condition of unhurrying observers in a
zoo. We barely commit ourselves to the speech that is addressed to us. It
is, indeed, safer not to. For it can change lives and render unexpected
emotions that may hurt you. We are afraid of this type of experience and
feel it is sufficient to make merely superficial judgements of the overall
‘essences’, and then, act by them.
Preliminary Methodological Divagations: In the Circle… 23
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3
Prolegomena to the Phenomenology
of Speech: Definition of ‘Life’
Causes: traumatic; calculus; grains; barley and other beards; infecting microbes.
Symptoms: fever, dullness, buccal heat, salivation, difficult mastication, swelling of
gland and duct, protruded nose, stiff neck, fœtor, dyspnœa, facial paralysis,
induration of gland, abcess. Diagnosis from pharyngitis, abcess of guttural pouch
or pharyngeal glands; from tumors. Treatment: avoidance of causes; derivation;
astringent, antiseptic washes; wet antiseptic bandages to throat; cool pultaceous
diet. Open abscess and disinfect. For induration deobstruents. For sloughing
antiseptics.
Diagnosis and treatment of tonsillar calculi; spud; acid dressings. Trauma of soft
palate by stick, probang, file, molar. Abscess of palate. Treatment; laxative;
expectorant; antiseptic; lancing. Cleft palate and hare lip.