25 Bardaisan and Origin

Bardaisan and Origen on Fate and the Power of the Stars
Ute Possekel
Journal of Early Christian Studies, Volume 20, Number 4, Winter 2012, pp.
515-541 (Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/earl.2012.0032
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https://muse.jhu.edu/article/492358
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Bardaisan and Origen on Fate
and the Power of the Stars
UTE POSSEKEL
Bardaisan of Edessa (d. 222) is one of the earliest theologians to reflect on the
proper place of the heavenly bodies within a Christian cosmology. Bardaisan
draws on both biblical texts and contemporary philosophical notions to argue
that planets and stars are created by God and are subject to the divine com-
mandment, yet are also endowed with a certain freedom on account of which
they will be judged on the last day. Bardaisan, wishing to maintain the oneness
and goodness of God against Marcionite dualism, regards the heavenly
bodies as responsible for undesirable events that are beyond the control of
human will or natural law. This paper compares and contrasts Bardaisan’s
understanding of fate and astral power with that of his younger contemporary
Origen. It argues that Bardaisan’s cosmology is not an isolated phenomenon
at the margins of the Christian world, but is part of a larger trajectory of
speculative thought within third-century Christianity.
The belief that the stars can have a powerful influence over life on earth was
current in the ancient Near East, where Babylonian astrologers first began
to cast horoscopes, and in the Greek world, where Ptolemy of Alexandria
in the second century c.e. systematized and advanced both astronomy and
astrology.1 The extent to which astral beliefs impacted ancient society is
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Lund University, Sweden in March
2008 and at the Providence Patristics Group in May 2010. I would like to thank Dr.
Samuel Rubenson (Lund University) and Dr. Susan Harvey (Brown University) for the
invitations to present, and all the participants for their comments. Part of this research
was conducted during my time as Resident Research Fellow at the Pappas Patristic
Institute in Brookline, MA, which I would like to thank for its generous support.
1. For general studies on ancient astrology and astronomy, see Franz Boll, Carl
Bezold, and Wilhelm Gundel, Sternglaube und Sterndeutung: Die Geschichte und das
Wesen der Astrologie, 6th ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974);
S. J. Tester, A History of Western Astrology (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1987); Tamsyn
Barton, Ancient Astrology (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); Wilhelm Gun-
del, “Astrologie,” RAC 1 (1950), 817–25; H. Gundel, “Planeten,” RE 20.2 (1950),
Journal of Early Christian Studies 20:4, 515–541 © 2012 The Johns Hopkins University Press
516 JOURNAL OF EARLY CHRISTIAN STUDIES
illustrated, for example, by the prevalence of zodiacal symbolism in reli-

gious art and cultus. Pagan temples as well as Jewish synagogues in the
Near East incorporated the circle of the zodiac into their iconographic
program, and astral phenomena were the organizing principle of the popu-
lar cult of Mithraism.2 The philosophers and theologians of antiquity had
to come to terms with the pervasiveness of astral beliefs and needed to
articulate their positions on the relation between astral power, fate, and
free will. While Christian thinkers generally rejected astral determinism,3
some Christians incorporated astrological concepts into their theologies.4
2017–185; David Pingree, “Astrologie.II.1,” TRE 4 (1979), 281–88; W. Hübner,

“Astrologie,” Der neue Pauly 2 (1997), 123–26; Kocku von Stuckrad, Geschichte
der Astrologie: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (München: Beck, 2003); David
Pingree, “Astronomy and Astrology in India and Iran,” Isis 54 (1963): 229–46.
2. Günther Stemberger, “Die Bedeutung des Tierkreises auf Mosaikfussböden
spätantiker Synagogen,” in Studien zum rabbinischen Judentum, ed. Günther Stem-
berger (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1990), 177–228, but originally published in
Kairos 17 (1975): 23–56. The Temple of Bel in Palmyra shows a carved relief of the
signs of the zodiac. The astral dimensions of Mithraism are outlined by David Ulan-
sey, The Origins of the Mithraic Mysteries: Cosmology and Salvation in the Ancient
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
3. On the early Christian response to astrology, see Utto Riedinger, Die Heilige Schrift
im Kampf der griechischen Kirche gegen die Astrologie von Origenes bis Johannes von
Damaskos: Studien zur Dogmengeschichte und zur Geschichte der Astrologie (Inns-
bruck: Wagner, 1956); David Amand, Fatalisme et liberté dans l’antiquité grecque:
Recherches sur la survivance de l’argumentation morale antifataliste de Carnéade chez
les philosophes grecs et les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles (Lou-
vain: Bibliothèque de Louvain, 1945); Albrecht Dihle, “Die griechische Astrologie
und ihre Gegner,” in Antike und Abendland. Beiträge zum Verständnis der Griechen
und Römer und ihres Nachlebens, ed. W. Harms, W. von Koppenfels, H. Krasser,
et al., vol. 43, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997), 90–108; Nicola Denzey, “A New Star on
the Horizon: Astral Christologies and Stellar Debates in Early Christian Discourse,”
in Prayer, Magic, and the Stars in the Ancient and Late Antique World, ed. Scott
Noegel, Joel Walker, and Brannon M. Wheeler, Magic in History (University Park,
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 207–21. For the Jewish response,
see, e.g., Kocku von Stuckrad, Frömmigkeit und Wissenschaft: Astrologie in Tanach,
Qumran und frührabbinischer Literatur, Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe 23
Theologie, vol. 572 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996); James H. Charlesworth,
“Jewish Interest in Astrology during the Hellenistic and Roman Period,” ANRW II
20.2 (1987): 926–50.
4. Bishop Zeno of Verona (d. ca. 380), for example, offered a Christian interpreta-
tion of the signs of the zodiac in Tractate 1.38. See W. Hübner, “Das Horoskop der
Christen (Zeno 1,38L.),” VC 29 (1975): 120–37, and Zodiacus Christianus: Jüdisch-
chrisliche Adaptionen des Tierkreises von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Beiträge zur
klassischen Philologie 144 (Königstein: Verlag Anton Hain, 1983). The fourth-century
Latin apologist Firmicus Maternus wrote an astrological treatise, the Mathesis, which
may have been composed prior to his conversion. The Priscillianists, a sect promi-
nent in fifth- and sixth-century Spain, maintained that different human body parts
POSSEKEL / BARDAISAN AND ORIGEN 517
In the early third century, Bardaisan of Edessa (d. 222) was among the
first Christian theologians who attempted to define the proper place of the
stars within their cosmologies. Bardaisan concedes to the stars a certain
influence over life on earth, and he later came to be criticized severely for
his position. Bardaisan’s prior involvement with astrology and his situa-
tion in a milieu rich in astral cults might suggest his was a fairly isolated
attempt within the early Christian intellectual tradition to reconcile astral
beliefs with Christian faith. However, as this article demonstrates, there are
substantial similarities between Bardaisan’s and Origen’s beliefs concerning
astral power, which support a different interpretation. Both authors regard
the heavenly bodies, which they situate within a larger cosmological frame-
work, as rational beings endowed with free will, who will in the end be
judged based on the use they made of their freedom. Although flourishing
in different geographical locations, Bardaisan and Origen pursued similar
theological goals in their discussions of astral power. Both attempted to
refute astral determinism and to uphold human freedom. Both worked
within an intellectual milieu shaped by Middle Platonism. Finally, both
of them based their views on biblical texts, sometimes on the very same
passages. This paper will argue that Bardaisan should not be seen as an
outsider on the margins of the Christian oikoumene\, but rather as part
of a larger phenomenon in early Christian discourse. The late second and
early third centuries saw a broad flourishing of speculative theology that
reflected critically on the extent to which heavenly bodies impact life on
earth. Bardaisan is best understood in the context of this tendency, of
which Origen is the most prominent representative.
BARDAISAN
Life and Works

Bardaisan, about a generation older than Origen and less well known than
the Alexandrian exegete, deserves a brief introduction. Syriac chronicles
inform us that he lived from 154 to 222 c.e.,5 and since his name is derived
were ruled by the signs of the zodiac, a belief for which the sect was condemned at
the Council of Braga in 561. See J. Fontaine, “Priszillian/Priszillianismus,” TRE 27
(1997), 449–54, esp. 453; Henry Chadwick, Priscillian of Avila: The Occult and the
Charismatic in the Early Church (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 191–201; Sylvain J. G.
Sanchez, Priscillien, un chrétien non conformiste: Doctrine et pratique du Priscillian-
isme du ive au vIe siècle (Paris: Beauchesne, 2009), 217–39.
5. The date of Bardaisan’s birth is given in the Chronicle of Edessa (ed. I. Guidi,
Chronica minora, CSCO 1, Syr. 1, repr. [Louvain: Peeters, 1960], 3:24–25); the date of
his death is recorded by Michael the Syrian, Chronicle 6.6 (ed. J.-B. Chabot, Chronique
from the river Daisan that flows through Edessa, we can deduce that he
was a native of this city.6 Later biographical sketches contain little his-
torical information, so that our knowledge of Bardaisan’s intellectual and
religious background is sketchy, dependent upon what we can cull from
the few remaining fragments of his writings. Some of the Greek patristic
authors who refer to him consider him a convert from Valentinianism,
but others maintain he joined this Gnostic sect later in his life.7 Bardai-
san himself, however, remarks in the Book of the Laws of the Countries
that he used to be an astrologer, and his writings reveal familiarity with
astrological beliefs when he refutes at length the teachings of the so-called
“Chaldeans.”8 For an understanding of Bardaisan’s thought, it is para-
mount to take into full consideration not only his past as an adherent of
astrology, but also his scientific knowledge of astronomy, which was still
appreciated centuries later by Syriac intellectuals such as Severus Sebokht,
the seventh-century bishop of Kenneshrin, and George, the eighth-century
bishop of the Arabs.9
de Michel le Syrien, 4 vols., repr. [Brussels: Culture et Civilisation, 1963], 4:111b,23–24

[text], 1:185 [trans.]); cf. Bar Hebraeus, Chronicon ecclesiasticum (ed. J. B. Abbeloos
and T. J. Lamy, Gregorii Barhebraei Chronicon ecclesiasticum, 3 vols. [Louvain:
Peeters, 1872–77], 1:47).
6. Later biographical sketches record that his parents fled from Persia and make
him an apprentice of a pagan priest in Hierapolis; other late sources also claim that,
when Bardaisan was sent on an errand to Edessa, he was enticed to convert to Chris-
tianity by the local bishop’s preaching. How much of this story is true is difficult to
assess. See Agapius of Mabbug, Kitab al ‘unwan (ed. A. Vasiliev, Kitab al-‘Unwan:
Histoire universelle écrite par Agapius (Mahboug) de Menbidj, PO 7.4 [1908], 518–
21); Michael the Syrian, Chron. 6.6 (Chabot 4:109c–110a); Bar Hebraeus, Chron.
eccl. 1.10 (Abbeloos and Lamy 1:47).
7. Eusebius claims Bardaisan converted to mainline Christianity from Valentini-
anism in H. e. 4.30.3. See also Theodore bar Konai (9c.), Liber scholiorum 2 (ed.
Addai Scher, Theodorus bar Ko\nı\, Liber scholiorum, CSCO 69, Syr. 26, repr. [Lou-
vain: Peeters, 1954], 307). Epiphanius, Panarion 56.2.1 (ed. Karl Holl, Epiphanius
(Ancoratus und Panarion), vol. 2, GCS [Leipzig: Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1922],
340), on the other hand, maintains that Bardaisan “fell in with the Valentinians” later,
which led him to introduce into his theology first principles and emanations, and to
deny the resurrection of the dead.
8. This refutation occupies the second half of the Book of the Laws of Countries,
in which Bardaisan enumerates and rejects many astrological doctrines. Editions are
listed below in n. 19.
9. Severus Sebokht, Letter to the Priest Basilius (ed. François Nau, “Notes
d’astronomie syrienne,” Journal Asiatique, 10th series, vol. 16 [1910]: 209–28). The
relevant texts by George the Bishop of the Arabs are edited with a German translation
in Victor Ryssel, “Die astronomischen Briefe Georgs des Araberbischofs,” Zeitschrift
für Assyriologie 8 (1893): 1–55; the relevant section is also edited by François Nau,
Bardesanes, Liber Legum Regionum, Patrologia Syriaca 1.2, repr. (Paris: Didot, 1993),
612–15. See also Edgar Reich, “Ein Brief des Severus Se\b_o\k_t,” in Sic itur ad astra.
If Bardaisan’s intellectual and religious background is somewhat dif-

ficult to determine, his social position is not. He flourished at the court
of King Abgar VIII (177–212), where Julius Africanus encountered him
among the king’s nobles during a visit to Edessa. Africanus did not com-
ment on Bardaisan’s philosophical or theological contributions, but he
did take note of his remarkable skill as an archer, high social status, and
ability to entertain guests.10 Furthermore, Bardaisan was an accomplished
musician who composed madrashe, poems set to music. Apparently, Bar-
daisan was one of the first Syriac authors who developed this particular
musical genre.11 His later adversary Ephrem—whose own production of
Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften: Festschrift für den
Arabisten Paul Kunitzsch zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Menso Folkers and Richard Lorch
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000), 478–89; Gerrit J. Reinink, “Severus Sebokts Brief
an den Periodeutes Johan. Einige Fragen zur aristotelischen Logik,” in III Symposium
Syriacum: Les contacts du monde syriaque avec les autres cultures: Goslar 7–11 Sep-
tembre 1980, ed. René Lavenant, OCA 221 (Rome: PISO, 1983), 97–107. A short
Syriac text that lists the names of the signs of the zodiac according to the Bardai-
sanites has also come down to us, and is edited by Eduard Sachau, Inedita syriaca:
Eine Sammlung syrischer Übersetzungen von Schriften griechischer Profanliteratur.
Mit einem Anhang. Aus den Handschriften des Britischen Museums herausgegeben,
repr. (Hildesheim: Olms, 1968), 126. On Bardaisan’s knowledge of astrology and
astronomy, cf. Albrecht Dihle, “Astrology in the Doctrine of Bardesanes,” in Papers
Presented to the Tenth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford,
1987, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, Studia Patristica 20 (Louvain: Peeters, 1989), 160–
68; Albrecht Dihle, “Zur Schicksalslehre des Bardesanes,” in Kerygma und Logos:
Beiträge zu den geistesgeschichtlichen Beziehungen zwischen Antike und Christentum.
Festschrift für Carl Andresen zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Adolf Martin Ritter (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 123–35; Amand, Fatalisme et liberté, 228–57; F. S.
Jones, “The Astrological Trajectory in Ancient Syriac-Speaking Christianity (Elchasai,
Bardaisan, and Mani),” in Atti del Terzo Congresso Internazionale di Studi “Mani-
cheismo e Oriente Christiano Antico.” Arcavacata di Rende—Amantea. 31 agosto–5
settembre 1993, ed. Luigi Cirillo and Alois van Tongerloo, Manichaean Studies 3
(Louvain: Brepols, 1997), 183–200; Paul-Hubert Poirier, “Deux doxographies sur le
destin et le gouvernement du monde. Le Livre des lois des pays et Eugnoste (NH III,3
et V,1),” in Coptica—Gnostica—Manichaica: Melanges offerts a Wolf-Peter Funk,
ed. Louis Painchaud and Paul-Hubert Poirier, Bibliotheque copte de Nag Hammadi,
Section “Etudes” 7 (Louvain: Peeters, 2006), 761–86.
10. Julius Africanus, Kestoi 1.20.28–53, (ed. with French tr. Jean René Viellefond,
Les “Cestes” de Julius Africanus [Paris: Didier, 1070], 182–85). On Africanus’s visit
to Edessa, see William Adler, “Sextus Julius Africanus and the Roman Near East in
the Third Century,” JTS n.s. 55 (2004): 530–39. On the Kestoi, see the essays in Die
Kestoi des Julius Africanus und ihre Überlieferung, ed. Martin Wallraff and Laura
Mecella, TU 165 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009).
11. Cf. Kathleen E. McVey, “Were the Earliest Madraše Songs or Recitations?” in
After Bardaisan: Studies on Continuity and Change in Syriac Christianity in Honour
of Professor Han J. W. Drijvers, ed. G. J. Reinink and A. C. Klugkist, Orientalia
Lovaniensia Analecta 89 (Louvain: Peeters, 1999), 185–98.
madrashe was intended to counter the popularity of Bardaisan’s chants—

noted with dismay that Bardaisan, like David, had composed 150 hymns,
but lamented that, unlike David, Bardaisan had not stayed on the path
of truth.12 Bardaisan was a polymath, a talented and capable man who
incorporated the many aspects of his secular learning into his theology.
In Bardaisan’s time, Edessa was still an independent kingdom, located
between the superpowers Rome and Parthia.13 Roman influence in the
region was on the rise, but the clever policy of King Abgar VIII allowed
Edessa to retain its political independence while at the same time becom-
ing a city friendly to Rome.14 In this age, Edessan culture flourished, as is
evident from the dozen or so beautiful mosaics that have come down to us,
most of them originating from funerary settings. They show that Edessan
society drew on Roman as well as Parthian culture, yet was able to produce
unique works of art that gave expression to the local cultural identity.15
With regard to religion, Edessa was home to both a Jewish and a Christian
community. Pagan cults, however, continued to flourish throughout late
antiquity: the great pagan altar still stood in the city’s center in the fourth
century.16 For the subject under discussion, it is important to note that a
12. Ephrem, Hymns against Heresies (= CH) 53.5–6, 54.1 (ed. and trans. Edmund
Beck, Ephraem des Syrers Hymnen Contra Haereses, CSCO 169–70, Syr. 76–77 [Lou-
vain: Imprimerie Orientaliste, 1957]).
13. Edessa’s political history in the time of Bardaisan is outlined by J. B. Segal,
Edessa “The Blessed City” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970; repr. Piscataway,
NJ: Gorgias Press, 2001); Steven K. Ross, Roman Edessa: Politics and Culture on
the Eastern Fringes of the Roman Empire, 114–242 CE (London: Routledge, 2001).
14. Abgar’s father, King Ma‘nu, minted coins on which he identified himself as
Βασιλεύς Μαννός φιλορῶμαιος; see George Francis Hill, Catalogue of the Greek Coins
of Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Persia, A Catalogue of Greek Coins in the British
Museum 28 (Bologna: Arnaldo Forni, 1965), 92–93 (hereafter cited as BMC Arabia).
Relations between Rome and its client kings are described in David Braund, Rome
and the Friendly King: The Character of Client Kingship (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1984).
15. The artistic accomplishment of Edessan society in the early third century has
recently been emphasized by Janine Balty and Françoise Briquel Chatonnet, “Nouvelles
mosaïques inscrites d’Osrhoène,” Fondation Eugène Piot: Monuments et mémoires pub-
liés par l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 79 (2000): 31–72. See also Jutta
Rumscheid, “Familienbilder im Haus der Ewigkeit. Zu Grabmosaiken aus Edessa,”
in Edessa in hellenistisch-römischer Zeit: Religion, Kultur und Politik zwischen Ost
und West. Beiträge des internationalen Edessa-Symposiums in Halle an der Saale,
14.–17. Juli 2005, ed. Lutz Greisiger, Claudia Rammelt, and Jürgen Tubach (Beirut:
Ergon, 2009), 255–65, 372–74 (Pl. 2–4).
16. On Edessa’s religious traditions, see Segal, Edessa; H. J. W. Drijvers, Cults
and Beliefs at Edessa, Etudes préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l’Empire
romain 82 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980). The great altar is mentioned in the Doctrina
Addai (ed. George Howard, The Teaching of Addai, Texts and Translations 16, Early
number of astral cults flourished in Edessa and its vicinity. Sin, the moon
god, was venerated, as was the sun. In nearby Sumatar-Harabesi, archeo-
logical remains of an astral cultic site have been recovered.17
Of Bardaisan’s writings—which include dialogues against Marcionites
and “other heretics,” a treatise On Fate, a book To Domnus, hymns, a
book on India, and a Book of Mysteries—none has survived in its entirety,
since at some point after his death Bardaisan was denounced as a heretic.18
Our knowledge of his thought thus depends largely on the one continuous
piece of literature from his school, the Book of the Laws of the Coun-
tries, a dialogue written in Syriac by Bardaisan’s disciple Philip, in which
Bardaisan is the main interlocutor. It dates probably from the early third
century, the time shortly after Bardaisan’s death.19 Further information on
Christian Literature Series 4 [Ann Arbor, MI: Scholars Press, 1981], 52); see also the
Acts of Sharbil (ed. W. Cureton, Ancient Syriac Documents Relative to the Earliest
Establishment of Christianity in Edessa and the Neighbouring Countries [London:
Williams and Norgate, 1864], 45,23 [text], 45 [trans.]). It is probably this monu-
ment that is depicted on Edessan coins from the second century, cf. Hill, BMC Ara-
bia, 91–92 (Pl. XIII.7–8).
17. J. B. Segal, “Pagan Syriac Monuments in the Vilayet of Urfa,” Anatolian Stud-
ies 3 (1953): 97–119.
18. The anti-Marcionite writings and those against unidentified heretics are men-
tioned by Eusebius, H. e. 4.30, as is the treatise against fate, quoted by Eusebius, P.e.
6.10. Our source for the treatise on India is Porphyry, De abst. 4.17 and De Styge
(= Stobaeus, Flor. 1.3.56), in which he quotes excerpts. These texts are edited and
interpreted in Franz Winter, Bardesanes von Edessa über Indien: Ein früher syrischer
Theologe schreibt über ein fremdes Land (Thaur: Druck- und Verlagshaus Thaur,
1999). Ephrem testifies to the other titles mentioned in his CH and Prose Refuta-
tions (ed. and trans. C. W. Mitchell, A. A. Bevan, and F. C. Burkitt, S. Ephraim’s
Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion, and Bardaisan, 2 vols. [London: Williams and
Norgate, 1912–21]; = PR). See PR (ed. Mitchell et al. 1:1, 6) for “Book of Domnus”
(‫)�ܬܒܐ ܕܕ��ܘܣ‬, CH 56.9 (ed. Beck) for “Book of Mysteries” (‫)��ܪ �ܐܙܐ‬, and
CH 54.5–6, 54.1 (ed. Beck) for hymns.
19. Ed. and trans. H. J. W. Drijvers, The Book of the Laws of Countries: Dialogue
on Fate of Bardaisăn of Edessa (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1965); also ed. François Nau,
PS 1.2 (1907; reprint 1993). Hereafter cited as BLC from the Drijvers edition. The
BLC is usually dated to the early third century, since scholars accept it as a work of
one of Bardaisan’s immediate disciples, e.g., H. J. W. Drijvers, Bardaisăn of Edessa,
Studia Semitica Neerlandica 6 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1966), esp. 67, 72, 75; Javier
Teixidor, Bardesane d’Edesse: La première philosophie syriaque, Patrimoines chris-
tianisme (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1992), 86. This dating is confirmed by the BLC
being cited in the pseudo-Clementine Recognitiones 9.17.19–29 (ed. Bernhard Rehm
and Georg Strecker, Die Pseudokomentinen II. Rekognitionen in Rufins Übersetzung,
2nd rev. ed., GCS [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994], 270–317). Cf. Bernhard Rehm,
“Bardesanes in den Pseudoclementinen,” Philologus 93 (1938): 219–47; F. S. Jones,
“The Pseudo-Clementines: A History of Research,” Second Century 2 (1982): 1–33,
63–96; A. Schneider and L. Cirillo, Les Reconnaissances du pseudo-Clément: Traduc-
tion, introduction, et notes (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999).
his teachings can be derived from fragments cited in the writings of his
opponents and from short summaries of his teachings in the heresiological
literature. Besides the Book of the Laws our richest source on Bardaisan
are the various refutations by Ephrem, the famous fourth-century poet-
theologian of the Syriac church.20 In addition, we have references to Bar-
daisan in Greek and Latin writings,21 many of which favorably mention his
defense of free will against astral determinism. There are also a substantial
number of Syriac and Arabic heresiological summaries of Bardaisan’s teach-
ings, dating from the sixth century onwards; these are primarily concerned
with Bardaisan’s cosmology, which became particularly objectionable to
the later normative church.22 Before we turn to Bardaisan’s understanding
of planetary powers, a few methodological remarks are in order.
Methodological Considerations
A reconstruction of Bardaisan’s thought is complicated by the fragmen-
tary and contradictory nature of the sources. It is therefore necessary to
establish a methodological framework within which the sources can be
interpreted, so that the guiding principle of his theology can be discerned.
A careful reading of all the available sources reveals that two major apolo-
getic concerns underlie his thought: first, his intention to refute the Mar-
cionites who were prominent in second-century Edessa, and second, his
20. Ephrem’s counterarguments—although they must be interpreted with care—

allow us glimpses into Bardaisan’s thought. The works most relevant in this regard
are the CH and PR, the latter of which are—to make things even more complicated—
preserved only as the underwriting of a palimpsest, and therefore lacunae remain in
many decisive passages.
21. E.g., in the writings of Julius Africanus, Hippolytus, the Ps.-Clementines,
Eusebius, Jerome, the Adamantius Dialogue, Epiphanius, and the Life of Abercius.
22. These sources on Bardaisan include Philoxenus (sixth century), Barhadbešabba
‘Arbaia (sixth century, head of the school of Nisibis), Theodore bar Konai (late eighth
century), Moses bar Kepha (d. 903), John of Dara (ninth century), Theodore Abu Qurra
(born in Edessa and later bishop of Harran, d. ca. 825), al-Jahiz (d. 869), and Ibn al-
Nadim’s Fihrist. The statements on Bardaisan are summarized by Drijvers, Bardaisăn
of Edessa; Ilaria Ramelli, Bardaisan of Edessa: A Reassessment of the Evidence and
a New Interpretation (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2009). On the Arabic authors,
see Wilferd Madelung, “Abu\ ‘I |sa\ al-Warra\q über die Bardesaniten, Marcioniten und
Kantäer,” in Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Vorderen Orients. Festschrift
für Berthold Spuler zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, ed. Hans R. Roemer and Albrecht
Noth (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 210–24; G. Vajda, “Le témoigne de al-Ma\turidı \ sur la
doctrine des Manichéens, des Daisă\nites et des Marcionites,” Arabica 13 (1966):
1–38; Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra:
Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam, 6 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1990–95), 1:426–30.
desire to distance himself as a Christian from the astral determinism, so

widespread in antiquity, which he himself formerly had embraced.
Bardaisan’s stance against the teachings of Marcion, who distinguished
between the creator God of whom the Hebrew Bible speaks and the good
God who sent Jesus, is extremely well testified by almost all of the sources,
be they Greek accounts of his teachings, the Book of the Laws, Ephrem,
or other treatises in which Bardaisanites make an appearance such as the
Adamantius Dialogue or the Life of Abercius.23 This surprising agree-
ment among the rather disparate sources provides us with an important
hermeneutical insight regarding Bardaisan’s thought: clearly, he wished to
refute Marcionite concepts. Bardaisan’s rejection of Marcionism excludes
the possibility that Bardaisan himself held a dualist theology, as some of
the ancient sources claim.24
Theology of Creation
A proper understanding of Bardaisan’s view of planetary power neces-
sitates a brief discussion of his theology of creation.25 In the Book of the
Laws, he stresses repeatedly that God created the world and humankind,
and that God’s creation is good, an emphasis obviously directed against
the Marcionites. In the dialogue, the question of a certain Awida, a man
who only recently joined the group of disciples, introduces the topic.
Awida, apparently puzzled about the group’s beliefs, inquires, “If God
is one, as you [pl.] are saying, and (God) constituted humankind, and
desires by this that what you are charged you should do, why did (God)
not constitute human beings such that they are not able to go astray, but
23. Adamantius, De recta in Deum fide (ed. W. H. van de Sande Bakhuyzen, Der
Dialog des Adamantius, GCS 4 [Leipzig: Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1901]; trans.
Robert A. Pretty, Adamantius: Dialogue on the True Faith in God, De Recta in Deum
Fide [Louvain: Peeters, 1997]). Life of Abercius 69–70 (ed. Theodor Nissen, S. Abercii
Vita [Leipzig: Teubner, 1912], 48,17–50,8). On the date of the vita, see David Bundy,
“The Life of Abercius: Its Significance for Early Syriac Christianity,” Second Century
7 (1989–90): 163–76.
24. This point will be further developed in my forthcoming monograph on Bardaisan.
25. Bardaisan’s cosmology is discussed in Drijvers, Bardaisăn of Edessa; Taeke
Jansma, “La notice de Barhădbešabba ‘Arbaïa sur l’hérésie des Daisă\nites,” in Mémo-
rial Mgr Gabriel Khouri-Sarkis (1898–1968) (Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste, 1969),
91–106; Alberto Camplani, “Note bardesanitiche,” Miscellanea Marciana 12 (1997):
11–43; Alberto Camplani, “Rivisitando Bardesane: Note sulle fonti siriache del barde-
sanismo e sulla sua collocazione storico-religiosa,” Cristianesimo nella storia 19 (1998):
519–96; J. M. F. van Reeth, “La cosmologie de Bardaysăn,” Parole de l’Orient 31
(2006): 133–44; Ute Possekel, “Die Schöpfungstheologie des Bardaisan von Edessa,”
in Edessa in hellenistisch-römischer Zeit, ed. Greisiger, Rammelt, and Tubach, 219–29.
are always doing good? For by this his will would be fulfilled.”26 In the
course of the conversation it becomes clear that Bardaisan believes God
created the entire world, angels and humans, sun and moon, the stars, the
water and the wind.27 Yet God, Bardaisan explains, did not wish to create
all things as equal, but destined some things to serve. “For if everything
were serving entirely, who is being served? But if everything were entirely
being served, who serves? And nothing would be distinct from anything
(else).”28 In the background of this passage stands the Genesis account of
creation, according to which God designed the heavenly bodies to rule
over day and night (Gen 1.17) and commanded humankind to rule over
the earth (Gen 1.26, 28). Bardaisan’s claim that there is a certain stratifica-
tion and hierarchical structure within creation thus has a biblical basis.29
One can also note in passing that Bardaisan is here in agreement with
the Stoic view that the world exists to serve humankind. Epictetus in his
discourses stresses that animals exist not for their own sake, but in order
to serve humankind.30 Similarly, Cicero asks in his treatise De natura
deorum for whose sake the world was created and answers “that all the
things in this world which human beings employ have been created and
provided for the sake of human beings.”31 In particular, Cicero affirms
that sun, moon, and the other heavenly bodies have been created so that
humankind should be able to behold their beauty and to determine the
times and seasons.32 In the second century, Celsus maintains that every-
thing was made for the irrational animals as well as for humankind, a
view that Origen will reject in his Contra Celsum.33
The Freedom of Human Beings

Regarding human beings, Bardaisan makes it clear to Awida that if people
could only do good, this would have been completely against God’s plan
of creation, for God desired people not to be like mere instruments, like
26. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 4).

27. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 10–12).
28. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 12). See Bardaisan’s explanations on the hierarchical struc-
ture of the cosmos in BLC (ed. Drijvers, 28–30).
29. Middle Platonist philosophers also regarded the world order as hierarchically
structured; see Dihle, “Astrology,” 163.
30. Epictetus, Discourses 2.8.6–8, 2.10.1–3.
31. Cicero, De natura deorum 2.154 (ed. and trans. H. Rackham, Cicero, De natura
deorum. Academica, LCL [London: Heinemann, 1951], 270; translation modified).
See also Cicero, De natura deorum, 2.37, 2.133, 2.154–62.
32. Cicero, De natura deorum 2.155.
33. Origen, Cels. 4.74.
a cither played by a musician or a chariot driven by another person. As

free beings, people can make ethical choices and can thereby either earn
the heavenly reward, or not earn it.
And it was given to (the human being) that he should lead his life according
to his own will, and that everything he is able to do, if he so wishes, that he
might do it, and if he does not wish (to do it), that he would not do it, and
that he might justify himself or become guilty. For if he were made such
that he could not do evil, so that he would not become guilty by it, then
also the good which he is doing would not be his own, and he would not
be able to justify (himself) by it.34
Quoting Gen 1.27, Bardaisan notes that humanity is created in the imago
Dei (‫—)�ܨ�ܡ ܐ�ܘܗ�ܡ‬it is remarkable that he here uses the Hebrew
term for God, ’elohim, rather than the Syriac term ’allaha that occurs in
the Peshitta version35—and he affirms that human beings are set over cre-
ation.36 By giving them freedom, God made the human beings “greater
than many things and equal to the angels,”37 an idea that has parallels in
the rabbinic literature of the age.38 This somewhat surprising equality of
angels and humans is intended to indicate that both angels and humans
have freedom over themselves. Bardaisan explains a little later on in the
dialogue that God endowed people with free will in order to give them
the opportunity to “justify themselves” by keeping the divine command-
ments. This, he explains, shows the great kindness of the creator towards
humankind: “Because of this it should be evident to you [pl.] that God’s
grace towards the human person is immense, and more freedom was given
to him than to all those elements (’estokse) of which we spoke, so that
through freedom he might justify himself and lead his life divinely, and
should have company with the angels, who also possess freedom over
themselves (‫)�ܐܪܘܬܐ ܕ��ܗܘܢ‬.”39
Bardaisan maintains that human beings are charged to follow the divine

35. We do not know what biblical version Bardaisan may have used. On the
Syriac versions, see Sebastian Brock, The Bible in the Syriac Tradition, Gorgias
Handbooks 7 (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006). Bardaisan’s employment of the
Hebrew term ’elohim suggests that he may have been in conversation with Jewish or
Jewish-Christian groups.
38. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 10). For Jewish discussions of the question in what ways
humans resemble angels, see the statements of Midrash Genesis Rabbah 8.11, which
are repeated at Gen. Rab. 14.3.
commandment—which he sums up in the Golden Rule40—and that in fact

it is easy for people to do so. Drawing on ideas regarding the discern-
ment of spirits, which were popular in ancient philosophy and are also
found in Origen’s writings,41 he argues that doing good comes naturally
to humankind because it evokes feelings of joy and peace, whereas evil
deeds give rise to emotions of sadness, confusion, and anger.42 Awida, the
interlocutor, challenges Bardaisan’s view and asserts that doing good is
not natural for humankind.43 Moreover, Awida even holds that people go
astray because of nature,44 an opinion that Bardaisan vehemently rejects
in a long discourse on the relation of nature, human freedom, and fate.
The Angels and Planetary Powers

In the surviving works, Bardaisan only occasionally refers to the angels.
Like human beings, angels have freedom, as he illustrates with an allusion
to Genesis 6: “For we understand that unless the angels possessed free-
dom over themselves, they would not have associated with the daughters
of men and would not have sinned, and would not have fallen from their
places. And likewise, therefore, other ones who did the will of their Lord
were lifted up by their own power, and were made holy and received great
gifts.”45 The angels, just like human beings, are either rewarded for or suf-
fer negative consequences from their ethical choices.46
Whereas human beings and angels were endowed with freedom over
themselves, other entities were not. In order to illustrate the point, Bar-
40. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 14–16). On the Golden Rule in antiquity, see Albrecht Dihle,
Die goldene Regel: Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der antiken und frühchristli-
chen Vulgärethik, Studienhefte zur Altertumswissenschaft 7 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 1962).
41. Pierre Hadot and Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life. Spiritual
Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); Pierre Hadot, What
is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002).
45. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 14). On the exegesis of Genesis 6, see Loren T. Stucken-
bruck, “The Origins of Evil in Jewish Apocalyptic Tradition: The Interpretation of
Genesis 6:1–4 in the Second and Third Centuries b.c.e.,” in The Fall of the Angels, ed.
Christoph Auffarth and Loren T. Stuckenbruck, Themes in Biblical Narrative: Jewish
and Christian Traditions 6 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 87–118. On the theology of angels in
Jewish literature, see Peter Schäfer, Rivalität zwischen Engeln und Menschen: Unter-
suchungen zur rabbinischen Engelvorstellung, Studia Judaica 8 (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1975); Michael Mach, Entwicklungsstadien des jüdischen Engelglaubens in vorrab-
binischer Zeit, Texte und Studien zum Antiken Judentum 34 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1992).
46. Angels are also mentioned in BLC (ed. Drijvers, 28).
daisan lists various planetary and elemental powers and shows that these
do not possess the same kind of freedom.
For look [pl.] at the sun and at the moon and at the zodiac circle and
at the rest of things: they are mightier than we in some way, but they
were not given freedom over themselves, but all of them were set up
with a commandment, so that they only may do the thing that they were
commanded, and nothing else. For the sun, from everlasting, has not said,
“I will not rise at my time,” nor the moon, “I will not change and will
neither wane nor wax,” nor has one of the stars said, “I will not rise and
will not set,” nor the water, “I will not carry the ships and will not stay
within my boundaries,” nor the mountains, “We will not remain in the
places onto which we were put,” nor have the winds said, “We will not
blow,” nor the earth, “I will not carry and bear everything that is on me.”
But all things are laboring and subjected to one commandment. For they are
instruments of the wisdom of God, which does not err.47
A number of observations can be made. First, most of the entities listed

here (sun, moon, stars, sea, winds, earth) occur in the creation account of
Genesis; this shows that Bardaisan’s cosmology was—to a certain extent—
based on an exegesis of the beginning chapters of Genesis. A second note-
worthy point in this passage is his comment that the planetary powers
(sun, moon, zodiac) are “mightier than we in some way” (��‫ܗܝܘܢ ܕܪܘ��ܝ‬
‫)ܐ�ܘܢ �� ܕܡ‬, yet they are subservient to the divine commandment
and do not have freedom over themselves; they cannot move as they wish.
Yet the planets are powerful entities, able to exert influence over human
life. For example, as Bardaisan notes elsewhere in the dialogue, the plan-
etary powers impact the human soul as it descends through the heavenly
spheres.48 The idea of the soul’s descent was quite widespread among late
antique philosophers and, Jerome claims, embraced also by Origen.49
Next in the narrative comes a somewhat surprising turn, for Bardaisan
maintains that also the planetary and elemental powers, although they are

48. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 32); cf. Ephrem, CH 53.4. The descent of soul is discussed
already by Plato, Tim. 41d–42e, and was much debated in Middle Platonist circles.
Various views on the subject are summarized by Iamblichus, De anima (ed. Heinrich
Dörrie, Der Platonismus in der Antike, vol. 6.2 [Stuttgart: Frommann, 2002], 16–26).
See also John Dillon, “The Descent of the Soul in Middle Platonic and Gnostic The-
ory,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the International Conference
on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28–31, 1978, Vol. 1: The
School of Valentinus, ed. Bentley Layton (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 357–64.
49. Jerome ascribes this view to Origen in Contra Ioannem Hierosolymitanum 16
(PL 23:384B [= Princ. 1.4.1 in Origenes Werke V. De principiis, ed. Paul Koetschau,
GCS (Leipzig: Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1913), 64]).
subjected to a commandment, are not completely deprived of all freedom

and will be judged on the last day.50 Philip, the redactor of the dialogue,
inquires, reasoning quite logically, how things that are fixed could be
judged,51 upon which Bardaisan clarifies:
The elemental powers (’estokse) are not being judged in that in which they
are fixed, oh Philip, but in that in which they are given power. For the
elements (’itye) were not deprived of their natures when they were formed,
but they decreased in the energy of their essential quality in the conjunction
of one with the other, and they were subjected to the power of their maker.
And they are not being judged in what (aspects) they are subjected, but in
the thing that is their own.52
Without going into further details of Bardaisan’s cosmogony, we can note

that this passage illustrates his view that the planets and other elements
have been created from some kind of primordial substance and have lost
some, but not all, of their initial energy.53 Matter thus is thought of as
having an inherent spiritual quality, which during the process of creation
was changed. The planets are on the one hand subject to the divine com-
mandment, on the other hand they have a certain freedom on account of
which they ultimately will be judged. And although Bardaisan—unlike
his younger contemporary Origen—does not explicitly say that the plan-
ets are rational creatures, this does appear to be the logical conclusion.
Nature, Freedom, and Fate

What power, then, have the heavenly bodies according to Bardaisan? He
argues that nature, freedom, and fate each have their largely separate
spheres of influence, but do overlap to a certain extent. Nature, for which

52. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 14). Bardaisan calls the preexisting elements “beings” (’itye),
a term which by the fourth century came to be used exclusively in the singular to
designate God; hence Ephrem objects strongly not only to Bardaisan’s creation theol-
ogy, but also to his terminology.
53. It should be stressed that Bardaisan’s conviction that the world is created from
preexisting substances is not unique among second-century theologians, cf. Justin,
1 Apol. 10.2, 59.5; Athenagoras, Legatio 10.1 (cf. 10.2). Hermogenes’ theology of
creation quite resembles that of Bardaisan; see Possekel, “Schöpfungstheologie.” On
Hermogenes, see Katharina Greschat, Apelles und Hermogenes: Zwei theologische
Lehrer des zweiten Jahrhunderts, Vigiliae Christianae Supplements 48 (Leiden: Brill,
2000). On the development of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, see Gerhard May,
Creatio ex nihilo: The Doctrine of “Creation out of Nothing” in Early Christian
Thought, trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994). Literature on Bardai-
san’s cosmogony is listed above in n. 25.
he repeatedly uses the Greek word physis rather than the Syriac kyana,
governs processes like being born, growing up, getting old and dying;
eating, sleeping, drinking, and having children. Physis is, for Bardaisan,
a force that, much like the stars, follows a commandment.54 Physis also
governs what we might call the instinctive behavior of animals.55 Regard-
ing human beings, however, nature only rules over those bodily processes
just mentioned, whereas human freedom controls ethical choices, including
diet, doing good, living a moral life, or yielding to evil and the passions.56
But, the disciples interrupt, can behavior not also be determined by fate,
as the Chaldeans say? Bardaisan rejects this view firmly and upholds the
freedom of all human action. Nonetheless, he does concede some power
to the stars, maintaining that different entities in the cosmos have vari-
ous degrees of power, all according to how God, who alone is omnipo-
tent, arranged the universe. Against astrological determinism, Bardaisan
states that
there is a power for God and for the angels and for the rulers [i.e. the
planets] and for the courses and for the elements (’estokse) and for people
and for animals. And all of these classes that I mentioned is not given
power over everything—for it is the One who has power over everything—
but they are given power over some things, and they are not given power
over other things.57
It is thus a well-ordered universe, in which angels and planets, elementary

forces and people all have their own, distinctive kind of freedom. And once
again, in the background of Bardaisan’s belief about the power of these
elements is the Genesis account of creation (Gen 1.17, 28).
The planetary forces, according to Bardaisan, are responsible for those
events and circumstances that are neither controlled by physis nor desired
by human free will. For instance, most people desire to be rich, powerful,
and healthy, but only some attain these goals, whereas others do not. It is
for Bardaisan out of the question to attribute the origin of negative events
to a divine power, yet he also explicitly rejects the Epicurean doctrine
that events occur by chance.58 He thus concludes that the occurrence of
unwanted events, such as sickness, poverty, or unruly children, is caused
by fate (‫ܚ��ܐ‬, h˘elqa).59 Fate, however, is not a power independent of

58. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 28), without explicit attribution to the Epicureans.
God, but, as was noted already, one subject to the divine commandments.
Bardaisan’s view of fate as an entity subservient to God is thus similar to
the Platonic concept that there are some areas of life control over which
God has delegated to lower entities.60 Bardaisan then sums up the impact
of nature, fate, and freedom onto humankind as follows: “We human
beings are found to be equally led by nature, and separately by fate, and
each as he wants by our freedom.”61 It is thus on account of fate, and
not as divine punishment or reward that individuals attain their goals of
health, wealth, and a happy family life, or fail to attain them. While Bar-
daisan thus concedes some power to the planets, he strictly limits their
sphere of influence and maintains that the planets never can limit human
freedom in ethical matters. The planetary constellations at birth do not
determine a person’s action, and neither do they determine the customs
of people in the various regions (or klimata) of the earth, as he reasons at
length in the second half of the Book of the Laws, making brilliant use of
the arguments first articulated by Carneades (21/3–129/8 b.c.e.).62 While
Bardaisan’s treatment of the stars and their influence upon terrestrial
affairs has unique elements, many of his ideas have parallels not only in
the philosophical literature of his age, but also in the writings of Origen.63
ORIGEN
At the outset, we can observe that Origen’s theology emerged in a context

similar to that of Bardaisan, for he too asked: How can one maintain that
the world was created by a good God in the face of life’s misfortunes?
What is the extent of free will? Do the stars have influence over earthly
affairs?64 Both Origen and Bardaisan affirm against Marcionites and Gnos-
60. For instance, the “young gods” are entrusted with the creation of human bod-
ies (Plato, Tim. 41a–47e).
62. Carneades’ arguments and their impact upon later intellectuals are discussed in
Amand, Fatalisme et liberté. On Carneades, see Gisela Striker, “Carneades,” OCD,
3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 293–94; J. Barnes, “Carneades,”
in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2 (London: Routledge, 1998), 215–20. A
detailed discussion of the doctrine of klimata can be found in Ernst Honigmann, Die
sieben Klimata und die ΠΟΛΕΙΣ ΕΠΙΣΗΜΟΙ: Eine Untersuchung zur Geschichte der
Geographie und Astrologie im Altertum und Mittelalter (Heidelberg: Carl Winter’s
Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1929).
63. For a comparison of these two authors see also Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen,
Bardaisăn, and the Origin of Universal Salvation,” HTR 102 (2009): 135–68.
64. The subsequent discussion of Origen’s view of astral power is indebted to Alan
Scott, Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea, Oxford Early Christian
Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
tics that there is one God, good and just, who created the world;65 they
refute positions of astral determinism current in antiquity and uphold
human freedom.66 Origen notes that, even among Christians, belief in
fate is not uncommon.67
The “Apostolic Teaching” on the Soul

Origen is well aware that in his discussion of the nature and power of the
stars he is entering new territory and that ultimately any human effort to
comprehend such issues remains limited. “When the saints have reached
the heavenly places, then they will see clearly the nature of the stars, one
by one, and will understand whether they are living creatures or whatever
may be truth about them.”68 Before embarking upon this speculative dis-
course, he therefore lays out what he considers to be the basic Christian
truths, transmitted by the apostolic teaching, regarding God the creator,
Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the soul. Since the nature of the soul will play
an important part in his discussion of planetary powers, what he consid-
ers to be the apostolic teaching on the soul deserves attention.
Origen speaks of “souls” quite generally, without specifying which beings
possess souls. Souls, he explains, are rational creatures and incorporeal,
but nonetheless created.69 The apostles taught that souls are endowed
with free will and will be rewarded or punished according to their deeds.70
The freedom of the human soul is such that no one ought to think that
fate, the conjunction of the stars, could cause good or evil deeds: “We
are not . . . compelled by necessity to act either rightly or wrongly, as is
65. Origen, Princ. 1.pref.4 (ed. Koetschau, 9): Primo, quod unus est deus, qui
omnia creavit atque composuit, quique, cum nihil esset, esse fecit universa. The anti-
Marcionite aspect also becomes clear in Philoc. 23.2.
66. Origen, Princ. 1.pref.5 (ed. Koetschau, 12): Est et illud definitum in ecclesiastica
praedicatione, omnem animam rationabilem esse liberi arbitrii et voluntatis. On Ori-
gen’s anthropology, see Christoph Markschies, Origenes und sein Erbe: Gesammelte
Studien (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), chap. 5, entitled “Gott und Mensch nach
Origenes: Einige wenige Beobachtungen zu einem grossen Thema” (originally pub-
lished in Weg und Weite: Festschrift für Karl Lehmann, ed. Albert Raffelt [Freiburg:
Herder, 2001], 97–111).
67. In Philoc. 23.1, he draws out the philosophical and theological consequences
of astral determinism: it leads to the destruction of freedom; Christ would have come
in vain; God would be blamed for evil deeds of people, such as murder or piracy. In
Philoc. 23.2, he demonstrates the pastoral dangers of fatalism, in that prayer would
seem to be superfluous.
68. Princ. 2.11.7 (ed. Koetschau, 191; trans. G. W. Butterworth, Origen, On First
Principles [Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973], 153).
69. Princ. 1.7.1 (ed. Koetschau, 86): Omnes animae atque omnes rationabiles
naturae factae sunt vel creatae.
70. Princ. 1.pref.5 (ed. Koetschau, 11–12).
thought to be the case by those who say that human events are due to
the course and motion of the stars, not only those events that fall outside
the sphere of our freedom of will but even those that lie within our own
power.”71 Like Bardaisan, Origen objects to astral determinism and draws
the same distinction between matters that are subject to human free will
and those that are not.
Sun, Moon, and Stars are Rational Beings

Having such laid out the basic presuppositions in the preface to De princi-
piis, Origen embarks on the more speculative discourse, and in Princ. 1.7,
he treats of the stars. But first, he reminds his audience that “all souls and
all rational creatures, whether holy or wicked, were made or created. All
these are incorporeal in respect of their proper nature, but though incor-
poreal they were nevertheless made.”72 He thereby excludes a priori the
possibility that they might be considered as not subject to God. Origen’s
main question is whether sun, moon, and stars ought to be considered
among the rational beings. Are they, he wonders, “‘principalities’ by rea-
son of the fact that they are said to have been made to exercise rulership,
that is principality, over day and night; or whether we must suppose that
they possess only that ‘rule over day and night’ which is involved in their
office of giving light and are not princes belonging to the order and office
of the ‘principalities.’”73 The question thus is, are sun, moon, and stars
“principalities”? That is, do they belong to the same class of celestial beings
as do the angels? Origen will argue, both by speculative reasoning and by
reference to Scripture, that sun, moon, and stars are free, rational crea-
tures just like the angels. Consequently, he must oppose the view, appar-
ently voiced by some members of his own Christian community, that the
heavenly bodies are unchangeable—and by inference not ensouled and
rational beings.74
Origen divides the topic into three subquestions. First, “is it right to
think of the sun, moon, and stars as living and rational beings”?75 Sec-
ond, did their souls come into existence at the same time as their bodies,
71. Princ. 1.pref.5 (ed. Koetschau, 12–13; trans. Butterworth, 4).

72. Princ. 1.7.1 (ed. Koetschau, 86; trans. Butterworth, 59): Omnes animae atque
omnes rationabiles naturae factae sunt vel creatae, sive sanctae illae sint, sive nequam;
quae omnes secundum propriam naturam incorporeae sunt, sed et per hoc ipsum,
quod incorporeae sunt, nihilominus factae sunt.
73. Princ.1.7.2 (ed. Koetschau, 86; trans. Butterworth, 59–60).
74. Princ. 1.7.2 (ed. Koetschau, 87).
75. Princ. 1.7.3 (ed. Koetschau, 87–88): primo debemus inquirere, si animantia
haec esse et rationabilia intellegi fas est.
or did they pre-exist?76 And third, will the souls of the stars eventually
part from their bodies?77 Origen is quite aware of the speculative nature
of the subject at hand, but as this is not defined by Scripture or tradition,
he feels free to embark on its discussion.78
Origen supports his claim that sun, moon, and stars are indeed living and
rational beings by exegetical, philosophical, and theological arguments.
His primary scriptural proof is based on Gen 1.16–18, a passage that, as
we have seen, also played a role in Bardaisan’s theology, and reasons that
only rational beings would receive commandments.79 Origen adduces other
passages from the Hebrew Bible, such as Isa 45.12, where God exclaims,
“I have given commandments to all the stars,”80 and Jer 44.17–19 (LXX
51.17–19), where the moon is called “queen of heaven.”81 The command-
ments that were given to the heavenly bodies, he explains, are that they
ought to shine brilliantly and move in their appointed courses.82 In his
Homilies on Genesis, Origen gives a further, exegetical explanation of the
exalted position of planets in the cosmological order, for he notes that
Scripture states that only heaven and earth, sun, moon, stars, and human-
kind were made by God, whereas all other things were made by God’s
command. “From this, therefore, consider how great is man’s greatness,
who is made equal to such great and distinguished elements.”83 And in
On Prayer he notes, much like Bardaisan does, that “the sun has a certain
76. Princ. 1.7.3 (ed. Koetschau, 88): tum deinde utrum animae ipsarum pariter
cum ipsis corporibus extiterint, an anteriores corporibus videantur.
77. Princ. 1.7.3 (ed. Koetschau, 88): sed et post consummationem saeculi si intel-
legendum est eas relaxandas esse corporibus, et sicut nos cessamus ab hac vita, ita
etiam ipsae a mundi inluminatione cessabunt.
78. Cf. Princ. 1.7.3.
79. Princ. 1.7.3 (ed. Koetschau, 88): Putamus ergo posse ea per hoc animantia
designari, quod et mandata dicuntur accipere a deo, quod utique non nisi rationabili-
bus animantibus fieri solet.
80. Princ. 1.7.3 (ed. Koetschau, 88): “Ego autem omnibus stellis praecepi” (quot-
ing LXX Isa 45.12: ἐγὼ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄστροις ἐνετειλάμην).
81. Princ. 1.7.3 (ed. Koetschau, 89): Apud Hieremiam sane etiam “regina caeli”
luna esse nominatur. The passage does not actually mention the moon, but refers by
the phrase “queen of heaven” to a goddess associated with Ishtar; see Jack R. Lund-
bom, Jeremiah 37–52: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The
Anchor Bible 21C (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 163.
82. Princ. 1.7.3.
83. Hom in Gen. 1.12 (ed. Louis Doutreleau, Origène, Homélies sur la Genèse.
Nouvelle édition, SC 7bis [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1976], 56; trans. Ronald E. Heine,
Origen, Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, FC 71 [Washington, DC: Catholic Univer-
sity of America Press, 1982], 62–63): Ex hoc ergo considera quanta sit magnitudo
hominis, qui tam magnis elementis tamque praecipuis adaequatur.
kind of freedom, since it praises God along with the moon. . . . And it
is clear that the same conclusion must be reached about . . . the stars.”84
The regular course of the celestial bodies gives rise to a philosophical
argument in favor of the stars’ rationality. Origen lays out the philosophi-
cal background in his treatise On Prayer, where he distinguishes between
three types of motion. First, motion can occur in lifeless things when they
are moved from without, such as a stone being carried. A second type of
motion occurs when plants are growing: these are moved “by the nature
or animating principle that exists within them.” Now the third type of
motion is self-motion, something possible only for rational creatures.
Indeed, Origen here equates rationality with the power to move oneself.85
In De principiis, he applies this observation to the heavenly bodies:
No movement can take place in any body which does not possess life, nor
can living beings exist at any time without movement. And since the stars
move with such majestic order and plan (cum tanto ordine ac tanta ratione)
that never have we seen their course deflected in the slightest degree, is it
not the height of stupidity to say that such order, such exact observance of
rule and plan, is accomplished by things without reason?86
The perfect and never-digressing movement of the stars certainly indicates,

Origen maintains, that they are free and rational creatures. In making this
philosophical argument from motion, Origen stands in a long intellectual
tradition, for already Plato in the Laws had suggested that the perfect
motions of the heavenly bodies implied they had a soul.87
Origen’s third line of argument in support of his hypothesis that the
stars are rational creatures is theological: rational and free beings should
be able to make moral progress or have relapses. That this is the case, he
deduces from Job 25.5 “the stars are also not clean in his sight.”88 This
verse cannot possibly refer to the actual brightness of the stars, for this
84. Or. 7 (ed. Paul Koetschau, Origenes Werke II. Buch V–VIII Gegen Celsus,
Die Schrift vom Gebet, GCS 3 [Leipzig: Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1899], 315–16;
trans. Rowan A. Greer, Origen, CWS [New York: Paulist Press, 1979], 96): ἔστι τι
καὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτοῦ αἰνοῦντος μετὰ τῆς σελήνης τὸν θεὸν . . . δῆλον δ’ ὅτι
καὶ τῆς σελήνης καὶ ἀκολοὺθως πάντων τῶν ἀστέρων. Origen’s considerations here are
based upon Ps 148.3.
85. Or. 6.1.
86. Princ. 1.7.3 (ed. Koetschau, 89; trans. Butterworth, 61).
87. Plato, Laws 10, 898d–899b. On Plato’s understanding of the motion of stars
and of the planets, see Scott, Origen and the Life of the Stars, 7–12.
88. Princ. 1.7.2 (ed. Koetschau, 87): Iob namque ita videtur ostendere, quod non
solum stellae possint subditae esse peccatis, verum etiam quod “mundae non sint”
a contagione peccati.
would imply that God created them with an unclean body; hence the verse
must be understood as a reference to the sin of the stars. Consequently,
the stars, like all other created things—inanimate objects are apparently
not considered here—are capable of moral choices that will either purify
or stain them.89
After having established that the sun, moon, and stars are indeed rational
beings with free will, Origen moves on to his next point, namely whether
their souls preexisted or were created together with the heavenly bodies.
His answer is that the souls of the stars preexisted and were joined to the
ethereal bodies that now clothe them. Once again, his view is substanti-
ated by philosophical and exegetical considerations.90
Regarding the great diversity among the bodies with which the celestial
beings were endowed, Origen explains that these depend upon the merit of
their preexistent souls. Just like those angels who only fell a little received
a high status in the angelic world, whereas those who sinned more were
cast down lower, so also it is with the stars.91 In order to give biblical
support to his claim that based on each soul’s merits it received a more,
or less, shining heavenly body, he elsewhere quotes 1 Cor 15.41 “there is
one glory of the sun, another glory of the moon, and another glory of the
stars, for one star differs from another star in glory.”92
Lastly, he addresses the eschatological fate of the stars’ souls. He inter-
prets Paul’s words in Rom 8.22 about the groaning of the whole creation
as an indication that all creation hopes and looks forward to the fulfillment
of the promise; that is, in the eschaton, those planetary and elementary
forces may be redeemed and may be in the presence of God.93 He says it
quite clearly in a homily on Ezekiel: “On the day of judgment not only the
human person, but also the entire creation will be judged.”94
This brief overview reveals astonishing similarities between Origen’s
cosmology and that of Bardaisan: both theologians believe that sun, moon,
and stars are rational beings endowed with free will, that they follow the
89. Princ. 1.7.2. Moreover, at Or. 7, Origen points out that Ps 148.3 (“Praise him,
sun and moon. Praise him, all you stars and light”) illustrates that sun, moon, and
stars have freedom. The stars worship God and hence must not themselves be vener-
ated (cf. Cels. 5.13, 8.67).
90. Princ. 1.7.4.
91. Princ. 1.8 discusses the ranks of angels.
93. Princ. 1.7.5. The subject is discussed also at some length in Hom. in Ezech. 4.1.
94. Hom. in Ezech. 4.1 (ed. Marcel Borret, Origène. Homélies sur Ézéchiel, SC 352
[Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1989], 160): Et futurum est ut in iudicii die non solum homo,
sed etiam universa conditio iudicetur. Origen in this homily also discusses Rom 8.22.
divine commandment under which they are put, and that planetary pow-
ers will be judged according to the usage they made of their free will.
However, Bardaisan and Origen differ regarding the influence of heavenly
bodies upon life on earth.
Misfortunes in the World

As we have already seen, Bardaisan, although he refutes astral determin-
ism, does concede a certain influence to the planets in order to explain
the occurrence of misfortune, sickness, and injustice. Origen also is well
aware of the great discrepancy among human lives: “Some have healthy
bodies, others from their earliest years are invalids; some are defective in
sight, others in hearing and speech; some are born in such a condition,
others lose the use of one faculty or another soon after birth or else suffer
a like misfortune when fully grown.”95
The Marcionites and Valentinians, Origen’s theological opponents,
deduced from such diversity that the souls themselves are of different
kinds.96 They argued against Origen’s Christian community that if one
does not assign the different conditions of birth to diversity among the
souls—for no one chooses where one is born—it must be attributed to
chance.97 Like Bardaisan and most patristic theologians, Origen wants to
exclude from his theology any notion of chance; he therefore answers this
challenge to divine providence by asserting that in the beginning all crea-
tures were made equal, and that differentiation occurred only as a result
of the different degrees to which they fell on account of their freedom.98
Illnesses or congenital deformities—which Bardaisan attributes to fate
rather than explaining them as the result of sin99—Origen explains as the
consequence of a preexistent sin.100 He finds a biblical example for this in
the story of Esau and Jacob, for even prior to their birth it was determined
95. Princ. 2.9.3. Origen goes on to observe that also among the spiritual powers
there are great differences in status.
96. Princ. 2.9.5, where Origen alludes to the Gnostic teaching that there are
pneumatic, psychic, and earthly humans. See also Clement of Alexandria, Excerpta
ex Theodoto 54.
97. Princ. 2.9.5.
98. Origen maintains that only Christ did not fall and that a person’s position in
this world, or a spiritual being’s location, is entirely the result of how they exercised
their freedom (Princ. 2.9.6). See R. M. M. Tuschling, Angels and Orthodoxy: A Study
in their Development in Syria and Palestine from the Qumran texts to Ephrem the
Syrian (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007).
99. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 26, 34).
100. Princ. 2.9.1–7.
that one would serve the other.101 The same, Origen asserts, is true for the
realm of spiritual beings.102 He concludes his discussion of this topic by
noting that all souls will be judged by God on the last day, based on their
merits. And since, as we have seen, for Origen the planetary powers are
ensouled, these too will be subjected to judgment, just as humans, angels,
and demons will be.
The Influence of Spiritual Beings on Humankind

and the Customs of the Nations
Despite attributing all differences among beings to their individual mer-
its earned through freedom, Origen concedes that spiritual powers have
a certain influence over human affairs. His discussion focuses on angels
and demons; we shall ask if he attributed such spiritual power also to
the planets. He states that “there are also certain invisible powers, to
which the management of things upon earth is entrusted,”103 yet does
not here define clearly who these invisibiles virtutes are. Origen’s convic-
tion that the angels rule over earthly matters emerges particularly in his
discussions of the “angels of the nations.” In his Against Celsus, Origen
debates Celsus’s claim that the regions of the world have been allotted to
certain governing spirits from the beginning, and that those spirits insti-
tuted the laws of the nations—and Origen proceeds to give a list of the
“laws of the countries” that strongly resembles Bardaisan’s.104 Origen in
principle agrees with Celsus, although he regards the diversity of nations
as an arrangement divinely instituted after the building of the Tower of
Babel. In consequence of human sin, Origen asserts, God dispersed peo-
ple into various nations and appointed angels to govern these. As Jean
Daniélou has shown, Origen’s teaching of the angels of the nations draws
on ideas widespread in ancient Judaism.105 In the Testament of Naph-
tali, for example, we find the notion that God divided up the world into
seventy nations, over each of which an angel presides.106 The same idea
101. Princ. 2.9.7. Origen here draws on Paul’s interpretation of the story in Rom
9.11–14. He discusses the matter again in Princ. 3.3.5, where he focuses on the topic
of divine providence and preexistent causes.
102. Princ. 2.9.7.
103. Princ. 2.9.3 (ed. Koetschau, 167; trans. Butterworth, 131): sunt etiam quaedam
invisibiles virtutes, quibus quae super terram sunt, dispensanda commissa sunt.
104. Cels. 5.27. Origen also discusses the customs of nations in Princ. 2.9.5.
105. Jean Daniélou, “Les sources juives de la doctrine des anges des nations chez
Origène,” Recherches de science religieuse 38 (1951): 132–37.
106. Daniélou, “Sources juives,” 133f., quoting the Testament. In Jub 4.15, we
find the related idea that the watchers came down to earth to teach the sons of man
and to perform judgment.
also occurs in the Nag Hammadi literature107 and features prominently

in the Pseudo-Clementines.108
Origen claims that, in addition to the angelic powers, elementary forces
impact human life. In his refutation of Celsus, he addresses his opponent’s
claim that whenever one breathes, drinks, or eats, one has companionship
with those demons who are given charge over the air, springs, and plants.
While Origen agrees with Celsus that plants, water, and air are adminis-
tered by “invisible farmers,” Origen argues that they are angels. Demons,
he states, are the cause of the occasional failure of natural processes, such
as famines, barren fruit-trees, droughts, or air pollution:109 “Of all these
things daemons are the direct creators; like public executioners, they have
received power by a divine appointment to bring about these catastrophes
at certain times.”110 What Origen here attributes to the activity of demons,
Bardaisan in the Book of the Laws assigns simply to another kind of spiri-
tual force, namely the planetary powers.
We saw earlier that for Origen the planets are, just like angels and
demons, spiritual powers endowed with freedom, and we must ask if the
Alexandrian believes, as does Bardaisan, that they can have influence on
terrestrial affairs. In the highly speculative work De principiis, it almost
appears that Origen would have conceded this, for he does hold that the
sun, moon, and stars are spiritual powers who belong to the “principali-
ties” on account of their rulership.111 And while he never explicitly spells
out how exactly heavenly bodies exercise their autonomy, he once remarks
that even if the heavenly bodies do not compel people to act, they may
“urge us on.”112 Origen’s references to the influence of spiritual powers
107. E.g., On the Origin of the World 32 (105,10–19).

108. Ps.-Clement, Recogn. 2.42.3–8, claims that every nation has an angel to
whom God has committed government of that nation. God divided the nations of
earth into seventy-two parts. In Ps.-Clement, Hom. 18.4.3–4, the author argues that
the nations have seventy different languages and types of law. The powers instituted
the laws for each nation.
109. Cels. 8.31 (ed. Marcel Borret, Origène, Contre Celse, SC 150 [Paris: Éditions
du Cerf, 1969], 240–42; trans. Henry Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1980], 474f.). In Philoc. 23.21 (ed. Éric Junod, Origène.
Philocalie 21–27 sur le libre arbitre, SC 226 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1976], 202;
trans. George Lewis, The Philocalia of Origen [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1911], 194,
slightly modified), he makes the same point: “. . . the opposing powers, though God
foreknows the wickedness of the people and powers who devise the detestable results,
bring things to pass of their own shameful free choice.”
110. Cels. 8.31 (SC 150:242; trans. Chadwick, 475).
111. Princ. 1.7.2.
112. Princ. 1.pref.5 (ed. Koetschau, 12–13; trans. Butterworth, 4): si enim nostri
arbitrii sumus, inpugnare nos fortasse possint aliquae virtutes ad peccatum et aliae
iuvare ad salutem.
over human matters do not usually qualify what kind of powers are envi-
sioned, so that one may wonder if astral powers could be included in such
statements. For instance, in De principiis 3, Origen concedes that special
gifts and talents, such as poetry, geometry, or other arts, are inspired by
“special energies of this world” (quondam mundi humus energiae, id
est virtutes aliquae spiritales), but he does not further characterize these
energiae.113 Thus while in the highly speculative work De principiis, writ-
ten during the earlier part of his career,114 Origen seems to leave room for
planetary influence upon the world, he elsewhere objects to the idea that
the stars can impact human life. In his Commentary on Genesis, partly
preserved in the Philocalia, he vehemently upholds human freedom over
against astral determinism by employing exegetical and theological argu-
ments, in addition to philosophical reasoning in the tradition of Carneades
and the New Academy. He here concedes to the stars the power to signify
future events, but not to cause them,115 thereby taking the same position
as Plotinus, his fellow-student in the classroom of Ammonius.116 Human
beings, however, are not usually able to interpret what the stars signify, for
this far transcends their capability. Origen argues that only “the powers”
(αἱ δυνάμεις) can read the meaning of the stars; these angelic or demonic
δυνάμεις function as intermediaries and transfer their insights to chosen
human beings.117
CONCLUSION
Both Bardaisan and Origen strive to maintain the goodness and justice
of God the creator against theological challenges posed by Marcionites
and Gnostics. Against astrologers and Chaldeans, they affirm that human
beings were created free, so that they may justify themselves by keeping
the commandments. Were human beings not free, their good deeds could

114. De principiis was written in Alexandria.
115. E.g., Philoc. 23.16. Origen also notes that the stars can signify future events
in Cels 5.12.
116. Plotinus, Enn. 2.3.3, 2.3.7, 2.3.10. That Plotinus as well as Origen studied
with Ammonius in Alexandria is stated by Porphyry, Life of Plotinus 3. Porphyry
does not say they studied at the same time. The question whether the Origen who
studied with Ammonius is the same as the church father has been discussed at length
in the scholarly literature.
117. Philoc. 23.6 (SC 226:148–50); cf. 23.16. Sometimes, he states, people are
being misled as to what the stars signify by angels who lost their proper rank (Philoc.
23.6). Sometimes, wise men are taught by God how to interpret what the stars sig-
nify, as was the case with Jacob who “read the pages of the sky” (Philoc. 23.19 [SC
226:194–96]).
not be considered their own merits. Regarding the planets, both theolo-
gians believe that they are rational beings, endowed with freedom and
subject to a final judgment. Ontologically, for Origen the stars seem to
be in the same category as the angels, whereas for Bardaisan both angels
and humans are ontologically higher than the stars, which are bound by
the divine command to stay in their courses.
A major difference emerges in their view of the exact extent of planetary
powers. Bardaisan concedes that matters entirely beyond human control
(such as illness or health, poverty or wealth) are caused by the planetary
powers, which exert influence upon the human soul as it descends towards
the body, an explanation that makes good sense within a cosmological
system that considers planets as free, rational beings. His readiness and
willingness to concede such power to the stars, however, might also be a
consequence of his familiarity and ease with astral notions (many of which
he certainly regarded as scientific data), though we can note that Origen,
too, was sufficiently interested in astronomy to add it to the curriculum
at his school in Caesarea.118 Bardaisan’s position also shows that, in early
third-century Edessa, it was an acceptable view within the Christian com-
munity, or at least within part of the community, to accept direct planetary
influence—though limited by nature and human free will. Origen, on the
other hand, is more ambivalent in his understanding of planetary power.
Whereas in De principiis he considers sun, moon, and stars as rational
beings endowed with free will and counts them among the “principalities,”
in his Commentary on Genesis he denies that these exert direct influence
upon human life and claims that the planetary powers merely signify,
but do not cause events. This shift in his position might either be due to
a development within his theological thought, or to the different literary
genres of these two works. The spiritual force that Bardaisan attributes
predominantly to the planets, Origen assigns to angels and demons, the
only spiritual beings that can directly impact the human soul. He also
includes in his system the relative merits or demerits of preexisting souls,
a thought not found in the extant fragments of Bardaisan’s oeuvre.
Not withstanding these differences, the comparison between the views
of Bardaisan and Origen on astral power has shown that there is substan-
tial agreement in the way both of these authors approach the subject. We
can therefore no longer understand Bardaisan’s cosmology as an isolated
phenomenon at the margins of the Christian world, but must regard it as
part of a larger trajectory of speculative thought within early Christianity.
118. Gregory Thaumaturgus, Panegyric on Origen 8.

One might wonder whether Origen could have been familiar with Bar-
daisan’s system, and perhaps this is the case, but the similarities in their
understanding of the stars as living things can equally well be explained
otherwise. First, both authors base their complex cosmologies on Scrip-
ture; in particular, they allude to the Genesis account of creation according
to which the stars are given power. Second, both authors draw on broad
cultural currents in antiquity that attribute authority, influence, and even
divine status to the heavenly bodies. Third, the views expressed by both
authors on the spiritual powers, and particularly angels, stand within the
larger Jewish tradition on angels and heavenly beings. What is striking
about the systems of Bardaisan and Origen is that both of them set forth
elaborate cosmological systems within which they locate humankind,
angels, planets, and elements, all of which have their proper powers. The
entire cosmos is thus permeated by spiritual beings. Such cosmological
speculation reaches a high point in the early decades of the third century
and does not flourish again to this degree until the high Middle Ages, when
Christian intellectuals once again reflect on the topic, at least in the West,
within the institutional context of a theological school. Later patristic
authors become more cautious and begin to separate theology and phys-
ics much more strongly. Moreover, as the doctrine of demons and angels
becomes more fully articulated, especially in ascetic circles, theologians
from Origen onwards no longer attribute the occurrence of negative events
to planetary powers but to the workings of such maleficent spirits.119 Even
exegetes in the Origenist tradition, such as Didymus the Blind, do not fol-
low these earlier thinkers in their claim that the stars are alive.
Ute Possekel is Adjunct Professor of History at

Gordon College in Wenham, Massachusetts
119. On demons, see David Brakke, Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiri-
tual Combat in Early Christianity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

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Bardaisan and Origen on Fate and the Power of the Stars

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

For additional information about this article

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illustrated, for example, by the prevalence of zodiacal symbolism in reli-

2017–185; David Pingree, “Astrologie.II.1,” TRE 4 (1979), 281–88; W. Hübner,

Life and Works

de Michel le Syrien, 4 vols., repr. [Brussels: Culture et Civilisation, 1963], 4:111b,23–24

If Bardaisan’s intellectual and religious background is somewhat dif-

madrashe was intended to counter the popularity of Bardaisan’s chants—

20. Ephrem’s counterarguments—although they must be interpreted with care—

desire to distance himself as a Christian from the astral determinism, so

The Freedom of Human Beings

26. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 4).

a cither played by a musician or a chariot driven by another person. As

34. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 12).

commandment—which he sums up in the Golden Rule40—and that in fact

The Angels and Planetary Powers

A number of observations can be made. First, most of the entities listed

47. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 10–12).

subjected to a commandment, are not completely deprived of all freedom

Without going into further details of Bardaisan’s cosmogony, we can note

Nature, Freedom, and Fate

50. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 14).

It is thus a well-ordered universe, in which angels and planets, elementary

54. BLC (ed. Drijvers, 22).

At the outset, we can observe that Origen’s theology emerged in a context

The “Apostolic Teaching” on the Soul

Sun, Moon, and Stars are Rational Beings

71. Princ. 1.pref.5 (ed. Koetschau, 12–13; trans. Butterworth, 4).

The perfect and never-digressing movement of the stars certainly indicates,

Misfortunes in the World

The Influence of Spiritual Beings on Humankind

also occurs in the Nag Hammadi literature107 and features prominently

107. E.g., On the Origin of the World 32 (105,10–19).

113. Princ. 3.3.3 (ed. Koetschau, 259).

118. Gregory Thaumaturgus, Panegyric on Origen 8.

Ute Possekel is Adjunct Professor of History at

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