Indo-Pacific Security: Us-China Rivalry

and Regional States' Responses

Nicholas Kay Siang Khoo
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Names: Khoo, Nicholas, editor. | Nicklin, Germana, editor. | Tan, Alexander C., editor.
Title: Indo-Pacific security : US–China rivalry and regional states’ responses / edited by
Nicholas Khoo, University of Otago, New Zealand; Germana Nicklin, Massey University,
New Zealand; Alexander C. Tan, University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
Other titles: US–China rivalry and regional states’ responses
Description: New Jersey : World Scientific, [2024] | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2023028653 | ISBN 9781800614840 (hardcover) |
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Subjects: LCSH: Indo-Pacific Region--Foreign relations--United States. |
United States--Foreign relations--Indo-Pacific Region. | United States--Foreign relations--China. |
China--Foreign relations--United States. | Indo-Pacific Region--Strategic aspects. |
Competition--United States. | Competition--China.
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About the Editors

Nicholas Khoo is an associate professor in the poli-

tics programme at the University of Otago. His
research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Asian
security, great power politics, and international
relations theory, with a focus on alliances and coer-
cive diplomacy. Nicholas has been a visiting fellow
at the School of International Studies at Peking
University and a visiting professor at the Foreign
Affairs College, both in Beijing, China. In addition,
he has held positions at the Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies in Singapore, the Council of Foreign Relations in
Washington, DC, and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies
in Washington, DC. Nicholas’s single-authored publications include
Collateral Damage: Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino-
Vietnamese Alliance (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011)
and Return to Power: China and East Asia Since 1978 (Edward Elgar,
2020). His co-authored publications include Asian Security and the Rise
of China: International Relations in an Age of Volatility (Edward Elgar,
2013), Security at a Price: The International Politics of U.S. Missile
Defense (Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), and Chinese Foreign Policy
Since 1949: The Emergence of a Great Power (Routledge, 2022).

vii
viii About the Editors

Germana Nicklin is an honorary research associate

for the School of People, Environment and Planning,
Massey University, Wellington, New Zealand. From
2016 to 2023, she was a senior lecturer at the Centre
for Defence and Security Studies at Massey
University, teaching border security and resource
security. She researches and has published on
Trans-Tasman borders, Antarctic borders, supply
chain disruptions, maritime security, and public
policy. She is the only researcher in New Zealand
focusing on border security. She has presented her work at various New
Zealand and international conferences and seminars, including to the
Royal Geographical Society as part of an Antarctic panel and to the inau-
gural Maldives border agency conference. She has a PhD in public policy
from Victoria University of Wellington, for which she was granted an EU
Erasmus grant and a Deans Award. Prior to joining Massey University,
Germana worked in the New Zealand and Australian public services for
over 30 years, 17 of which were with the New Zealand Customs Service.

Alexander C. Tan is a professor of political science

and international relations at the University of
Canterbury, a university chair professor of political
science at the National Chengchi University in
Taiwan, and an honorary professor of the New
Zealand Defence Force Command and Staff
College. He is also a fellow of the John Goodwin
Tower Center for Political Studies in Dallas, US,
and the founder and principal research fellow at the
Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs. He was a visiting
scholar at universities in the US, UK, Germany, Japan, and Taiwan and
represented New Zealand in Track II security/economic dialogues. Alex
writes extensively in the areas of parties and elections, political economy,
Taiwan and Asian politics, and international relations in the Asia-Pacific,
and his recent publications include Asia Pacific Small States: The Political
Economies of Resilience (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2023). Alex is an
editor of Frontiers in Political Economy and an editorial board member of
several international academic journals, such as Political Behavior, Asian
Survey, Political Science, Politics and Governance, Issues and Studies,
Journal of Asian Security & International Affairs, Politicka Misao:
Croatian Political Science Review, and the Journal of Electoral Studies.
© 2024 World Scientific Publishing Europe Ltd.
https://doi.org/10.1142/9781800614857_fmatter

List of Contributors

Prashanth Parameswaran is a fellow at the Asia Program, Wilson

Center, Washington, DC, USA.
Kanghee Park is a research fellow at the National Bureau of Asian
Research, Washington, DC, USA.
Bhubhindar Singh is an associate professor at the Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Rebecca Strating is the director of La Trobe Asia and an associate profes-
sor of politics and international relations at La Trobe University,
Melbourne, Australia.
John Tai is a professorial lecturer at the Elliott School of International
Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA.
Neel Vanvari is a research fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs,
Christchurch, New Zealand.
T. Y. Wang is a university professor at the Department of Politics and
Government, Illinois State University, USA.
Nutthathirataa Withitwinyuchon is the associate dean at the Institute of
Diplomacy and International Studies, Rangsit University, Thailand.

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Acknowledgements

This book is the outgrowth of a regional security workshop held

in Wellington on October 2021 with the generous support of a
New Zealand–Taiwan lecture series grant awarded to Alexander Tan and
the Research Initiative on Taiwan Studies at the University of Canterbury
by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in New Zealand. The
one-day workshop was sponsored by the University of Canterbury and
co-hosted by the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey
University in Wellington. The editors thank Representative Bill K. M.
Chen and Ms. Claire Chin of TECO-NZ for their support of this work-
shop, Dr. Natalie Watson at World Scientific Publishing for her support of
this book project, and Massey University for hosting the workshop.

xi
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Contents

About the Editors vii

List of Contributors ix
Acknowledgements xi

Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Nicholas Khoo, Germana Nicklin, and
Alexander C. Tan

Chapter 2 The Trump Administration and the Unravelling

of the United States’ China Engagement Policy 9
Nicholas Khoo

Chapter 3 How Japan Is Managing US–China Competition 27

Bhubhindar Singh

Chapter 4 Negotiating the Challenges of Asymmetry:

South Korea and US−China Rivalry 45
John W. Tai and Kanghee Park

Chapter 5 Thailand’s Alignment Policy in US–China Competition:

From Cold War to Present 61
Nutthathirataa Withitwinyuchon

xiii
xiv Contents

Chapter 6 Taiwan’s Strategic Choices in the Era of a Rising

China75
T. Y. Wang and Alexander C. Tan

Chapter 7 Reliable, Reticent, or Reluctant? India and US–China

Rivalry99
Neel Vanvari

Chapter 8 Southeast Asia and US–China Competition:

Realities, Responses, and Regional Futures 115
Prashanth Parameswaran

Chapter 9 Spatialities of Power in the Antarctic Ross Sea

Region: New Zealand, the United States, and China 131
Germana Nicklin

Chapter 10 Maritime Insecurity and the Changing Regional

Order: Australia as an ‘Indo-Pacific Power’ 149
Rebecca Strating

Chapter 11 Conclusions: Lessons Learned 167

Alexander C. Tan, Nicholas Khoo, and
Germana Nicklin

Index171

© 2024 World Scientific Publishing Europe Ltd.
https://doi.org/10.1142/9781800614857_0001

Chapter 1

Introduction
Nicholas Khoo, Germana Nicklin, and Alexander C. Tan

The Origins of This Book

This book has its origins in a tour of Hawaii sponsored by the
United States Department of State for New Zealand-based academics in
December 2019. Unsurprisingly, the well-selected on-site locations,
weather, and overall environment in Hawaii made for an enjoyable experi-
ence. But as academics, what really gave the trip an invaluable quality
were the insights that we were able to garner from the well-honed brief-
ings at the various institutions we visited and, it must be added, the
equally compelling informal discussions with staff whom we interacted
with.
Towards the end of the trip, we reached a consensus to formalize our
excellent discussion in a special issue of a journal. Given its status as one
of the leading international security journals in New Zealand, the National
Security Journal struck us as a natural venue for this endeavour. Follow­
ing a workshop on regional security co-hosted by Canterbury University
and Massey University in Wellington in 2021, the editors of this volume
decided to increase the number of countries by expanding the project into
book format. While many of the authors of the chapters in this volume
presented at the workshop, a number of additional chapter contributors
have been invited to capture the perspectives of a range of states in the
Indo-Pacific.

1
2 N. Khoo et al.

Indo-Pacific Security: US–China Rivalry and

Regional States’ Responses
A qualitative change in China’s foreign policy towards a more assertive
stance emerged soon after the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008–2009. But it is during the tenure of
China’s leader Xi Jinping (2012–present) that this policy change has
effected a systematic deterioration in US–China relations. The Trump
administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) openly acknowl-
edged a fundamental change in the US’ China policy from that of ‘engage-
ment’ to ‘strategic competition.’ The US policy of strategic competition
has been affirmed by the Biden administration.
This structural change in US–China relations has had important
regional effects. States in the Indo-Pacific region have had to adjust to the
reality of increasing great power rivalry. This book explores these devel-
opments. In the process, it fills a gap in the literature on regional studies,
international relations, and security studies, seeking to provide a compel-
ling account of the trajectory of US–China relations, even while illuminat-
ing the varied responses of states in the Indo-Pacific on or close to the
Asian continent, including Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South
Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and the states in Southeast Asia and the Pacific
Island region. The choice of states is significant and merits comment.
While the authors recognize that the ongoing strategic competition
between the US and China is a major structural development in world
politics, a full understanding of that development necessarily requires an
investigation into its varying effects on regional states. Accordingly, this
book examines Indo-Pacific security principally from the perspective of
the regional states, from India in the west to the US in the east, China in
the north, and Antarctica in the south.

Great Power Competition in the Indo-Pacific

When Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping launched the reform era in late
1978, few would have doubted China’s potential. But most observers
would have had some reservations about the country’s ability to deliver
economic growth as quickly as has occurred, with simultaneous and com-
plex effects across a myriad of areas stretching from the environment to
health, wealth, political development, and the regional and global military
balance. After more than four decades of rising Chinese economic power,
 Introduction 3

we now have a Chinese challenge to the US’ strategic position in the Indo-
Pacific region. The chapters that follow seek to provide insight into the
international effects of China’s rise and, more precisely, the varying
responses of actors in the region to the structural change in US–China
rivalry. More specifically, this development has simultaneously increased
regional actors’ appreciation of the need to balance Chinese power, cata-
lyzing a degree of ambivalence towards Beijing and Washington, even
while increasing their value in this new era of strategic competition.

About the Chapters in the Book

Chapter 2: The Trump Administration and the Unravelling
of the United States’ China Engagement Policy
Nicholas Khoo sets the scene with his discussion of how power politics
drives US–China relations. Khoo contends that the era characterized by a
broad-based US engagement policy (1972–2016) has passed. He begins
with the observation that, while US–China relations from 1972 to 2011
were never completely smooth, they nevertheless contributed to an era of
heightened regional stability, even while meeting basic US and Chinese
economic and military interests. That said, during the tenure of Chinese
leader Xi Jinping (2012–present), the consensus in the US supporting
engagement with China was seriously eroded by increasing dissatisfaction
with developments in China’s domestic and foreign policies. As a conse-
quence, a policy of near-full-spectrum US engagement has been replaced
with one of strategic competition, in which conflict increasingly out-
weighs cooperation. More specifically, the chapter describes the relation-
ship’s breakdown during the Trump administration. Two major competing
explanations for the deterioration are evaluated, emphasizing either the
role of identity or aspects of power politics, specifically state interests and
the distribution of capabilities.

Chapter 3: How Japan Is Managing US–China Competition

Bhubhindar Singh begins with the observation that intensifying US–
China strategic competition presents Japan with a strategic dilemma. On
the one hand, Tokyo supports the maintenance of the status quo order
defined by US hegemony and liberal internationalism. This has brought
peace, stability, and prosperity to Japan, even while deterring China. On
4 N. Khoo et al.

the other hand, with China’s emergence as a peer competitor to the US,
Japan simultaneously recognizes and is concerned by the relative weaken-
ing of US influence and power in the Indo-Pacific. This potentially
weakens the stability provided by the US–Japan alliance and raises the
likelihood of the emergence of a Chinese-led order in East Asia and
the uncertainties associated with it. For Tokyo, it is critical that it manages
its strategic dilemma effectively. In practice, this translates into a Japanese
policy of actively seeking to preserve the US-led regional order while
preparing for a relative weakening of US power and influence in the Indo-
Pacific. Bhubhindar’s chapter poses two questions. First, how is Japan
managing the intensification of US–China competition? Second, what
type of foreign policy is Japan pursuing? The chapter explores Japan’s
pursuit of a ‘smart power-based’ foreign policy, reflected in the use of
hard and soft power tools. The argument is illustrated by reference to three
areas of Japanese policy: preserving the regional balance of power, rein-
forcing multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, and stabilizing Japan–China
relations.

Chapter 4: Negotiating the Challenges of Asymmetry:

South Korea and US–China Rivalry
John Tai and Kanghee Park take as their point of departure the idea that
asymmetry is a structural factor in South Korean foreign policy. Seoul’s
management of asymmetry takes on an added layer of complexity as its
longstanding alliance partner, the US, and its top trade partner, China, are
in competition with each other. As the power balance between Beijing and
Washington has shifted in the former’s favour, these structural constraints
have been magnified. This has compelled South Korea to expend increas-
ing efforts to seek balance in its relationship with the US and China.
Events over the past decade have accentuated these asymmetrical dynam-
ics. The persistent threat from North Korea and China’s use of economics
as a tool in an overall policy of coercive diplomacy have compelled Seoul
to strengthen its security and political ties with the US. Tai and Park note
that, despite the challenges posed to it by US–China rivalry, South Korea
can leverage its economic strength and the shared security interests of the
two great powers on the Korean Peninsula. By doing so, it can mitigate
the negative effects of this rivalry in service of its foreign policy objec-
tives and national interests.
 Introduction 5

Chapter 5: Thailand’s Alignment Policy in US–China

Competition: From Cold War to Present
Nutthathirataa Withitwinyuchon traces Thailand’s security relationships
with the US and China from the Cold War to the present. The chapter
highlights an important dynamic in Thailand’s foreign policy. When com-
petition between great powers is low or moderate, secondary states, such
as Thailand, have more space to manoeuvre. Accordingly, Bangkok has
adopted a policy stance of hedging. However, when great power competi-
tion is high, smaller states experience more constrained alignment options
and are compelled to balance against the imminent threat. The case of
Thailand’s foreign policy, set against the backdrop of US–China competi-
tion from the Cold War until the present, is used to illustrate this
argument.

Chapter 6: Taiwan’s Strategic Choices in the Era of a

Rising China
T. Y. Wang and Alexander C. Tan emphasize the central role of domestic
politics in Taiwan’s strategic responses to a rising China. Their data dem-
onstrate a clear association between public opinion and Taipei’s cross-
Strait policy. Wang and Tan show that Taiwanese citizens’ risk-averse
attitude supports a hedging strategy. That said, high-profile developments
in Beijing’s Hong Kong policy and the Trump administration’s policies
have contributed to a shift in citizens’ policy preferences, which is mir-
rored in Taipei’s approach towards China. As Beijing is expected to con-
tinue its assertive stand and the Biden administration has adopted a more
competitive approach towards China, the chapter concludes that, in
accordance with their argument highlighting the centrality of domestic
politics in Taipei’s cross-Strait policy, there is a prediction of a stronger
balancing component.

Chapter 7: Reliable, Reticent, or Reluctant? India and

US–China Rivalry
Neel Vanvari explains how India’s post–Cold War era foreign policy has
been shaped by two imperatives. The first is a shared concern with the US
over aspects of China’s foreign policy, reflected in India’s increasingly
6 N. Khoo et al.

close cooperation with the US during the Trump and Biden presidencies.
At the same time, a second and often overlooked imperative sets limits on
its relationship with Washington. Specifically, New Delhi’s longstanding
preference for strategic autonomy reflects India’s own interests and ambi-
tions of becoming a great power. This accounts for New Delhi’s strategy
of multi-alignment and its preference for multipolarity in an age of
increased US–China strategic competition.

Chapter 8: Southeast Asia and US–China Competition:

Realities, Responses, and Regional Futures
Prashanth Parameswaran investigates the Southeast Asian perspective on
US–China rivalry. Three arguments are advanced. First, the current phase
of this rivalry and Southeast Asia’s responses must be understood with
reference to the multiple uncertainties faced by Southeast Asian states,
which include, but are not limited to, the US–China competition and pre-
vious phases of adjustment to the dynamics between the two countries.
Second, the responses of Southeast Asian states can be profitably viewed
through the prism of the following major components that extend beyond
their ties with Beijing or Washington: the management of bilateral equi-
ties with the US and China, the domestic environment, regional processes,
and the wider alignment mixes in foreign policy. Third, looking ahead,
assessing Southeast Asian regional responses to evolving US–China
dynamics will involve a focus on the shifting ties between the two and a
variety of other factors. These include the respective Southeast Asian
states’ independent assessments of the US and China; wider domestic,
regional, and international factors that affect Southeast Asia; the range of
tools available to these states to manage intensifying geopolitical compe-
tition; and the ability of these states to subtly and flexibly adjust their
approaches amid increasingly granular engagement by Washington and
Beijing, and growing public scrutiny of their positions.

Chapter 9: Spatialities of Power in the Antarctic Ross Sea

Region: New Zealand, the United States, and China
Germana Nicklin’s chapter is the first of two covering Oceanic states. Her
chapter proceeds from the vantage point that Antarctica is a space where
smaller states have more influence than in other regions and where the
 Introduction 7

influence of the collective interests of the Antarctic Treaty System is the

distinguishing feature. Accordingly, the chapter re-examines the interac-
tions among the US, China, and New Zealand in the Ross Sea region
using a political geography lens to explore the dynamics of intersecting
maritime and other activities. The alternate reality of collective Antarctic
governance, plus the actual activities of these states in the Ross Sea
region, tells stories of state interrelations in time-space that are connected
with relations elsewhere. This examination shows how actions in the Ross
Sea are affected by the mutual mistrust of the great powers in the
Indo-Pacific.

Chapter 10: Maritime Insecurity and the Changing Regional

Order: Australia as an ‘Indo-Pacific Power’
Rebecca Strating’s chapter examines Australia’s redeveloped role concep-
tion as an ‘Indo-Pacific’ regional power. While historically taking a
­pragmatic approach to its relations with the US and China, it has now
effectively ‘chosen’ Washington. Australia’s reinforced commitment to
the US alliance as the backbone of its security policy has been apparent in
its approach to maritime security, including in its shift to minilateralism
through membership in the Quad and AUKUS and its ambitious defence
procurement plans. As a corollary, a high-level freeze on diplomatic rela-
tions between Australia and China lasted over two years, even though —
unlike some other US allies — they have no territorial or maritime
disputes. The shift from conceptualizing an Asia-Pacific region to an
Indo-Pacific region has been driven by two key concerns: first, China’s
rise and implications for regional order; and second, the credibility and
endurance of the US’ commitment to Asia. The chapter seeks to answer
the question of how governments and elites have viewed ‘seapower’ as
best serving and securing Australia’s interests in this shifting geopolitical
landscape. Ultimately, this chapter argues that Australia’s approach to its
vast range of maritime security issues remains fragmented and incoherent.
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Chapter 2

The Trump Administration and

the Unravelling of the United States’
China Engagement Policy
Nicholas Khoo*

Introduction
US–China relations have faced many challenges since Richard Nixon and
Mao Zedong brokered a dramatic diplomatic rapprochement in 1972, but
none as serious as the present. Contention is now the dominant character-
istic in issue areas ranging from trade and military affairs to human rights
and democracy. Indeed, even before the Trump administration came
to power, a consensus had developed among US–China specialists that US
engagement policy with China had failed, even as debate existed on what
policy to replace it with. Thus, in 2015, Harry Harding, a leading China
expert, lamented the poor state of the US–China relations. According to
Harding, the US’ ‘present [China] policy is widely believed to have failed’
(Harding, 2015: p. 95). Looking to the future, his concern was that the
US–China relations would become ‘essentially competitive or even
degenerate into open rivalry’ (Harding, 2015: p. 119). That time has come.

*Nicholas Khoo acknowledges the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey
University (and specifically, Managing Editor John Battersby) for granting permission to
reuse his article from the 2021 issue ‘The Trump administration and the United States’
China engagement policy,’ National Security Journal 3(2): 1–19.

9
10 N. Khoo

Since 2017, there has been open acknowledgement in the US of ‘geopo-

litical competition’ and ‘strategic competition’ with China and serious dis-
cussion of how to ‘decouple’ the relationship (OPUS, 2017: p. 45).
Meanwhile, the Chinese perspective is that policies pursued by the US,
particularly during the Trump presidency, are responsible for the present
state of the relationship (State Council, 2019). This chapter describes and
analyses the Trump administration’s abrogation of a near-full-spectrum US
policy of engagement with China and its replacement with a more condi-
tional posture that reflects a greater US tolerance for conflict, reflected in
the concept of ‘strategic competition’ (OPUS, 2020: p. 16). It then proceeds
to evaluate two major competing explanations for this policy change. These
emphasize either the role of the concept of identity, or aspects of power
politics — specifically, state interests and the distribution of capabilities.

A Policy Unravelled
The unravelling of the US policy of engagement with China occurred over
a sustained period in the post–Cold War era, culminating in the Trump
administration’s adoption of a policy designed to actively seek changes in
Chinese behaviour in multiple spheres, both domestic and international. The
first major document outlining this change was the administration’s
December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS). In an interview to intro-
duce the NSS, National Security Adviser Herbert McMaster commented
that China was a ‘revisionist power’ that ‘was undermining the international
order’ (Donnan and Sevastopulo, 2017). In a significant departure, the NSS
questioned the fundamental premise of engagement that had underpinned
US’ China policy since 1972 (OPUS, 2017: pp. 2–3). The NSS opined that
‘China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region,’ a
region where Beijing is ‘using economic inducements and penalties, influ-
ence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed
its political and security agenda’ (OPUS, 2017: pp. 25, 46). While critical of
aspects of Chinese policy, the three previous NSS documents (in 2002,
2010, and 2015) had not adopted such stark language. These reports refer-
enced ‘managing competition from a position of strength’ (OPUS, 2015:
p. 24), underlined that ‘a pragmatic and effective relationship between the
United States and China is essential to address the major challenges of
the 21st century’ (OPUS, 2010: p. 43), and emphasized cooperation even
while acknowledging differences (OPUS, 2022: pp. 27–28).
The administration’s January 2018 National Defense Strategy reas-
serted the new line, noting that ‘the central challenge to US prosperity and
 The Trump Administration and the United States’ China Engagement Policy 11

security is the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition by […]

revisionist powers,’ a category which it identified as including, among
others, China and Russia (DOD, 2018: p. 2). The document reverted to
describing China as a ‘strategic competitor’ of the US (DOD, 2018:
p. 2) — a description previously used in 2000 by then presidential candi-
date George W. Bush (Lippman, 1999). The 2019 Department of Defense
Indo-Pacific Strategy report buttressed this perspective, cataloguing
China’s revisionist policy practices even while highlighting the erosion of
the US’ regional deterrence posture (DOD, 2019: pp. 7–10, 16). This was
followed by the February 2020 United States’ Strategic Approach to the
People’s Republic of China report, which called for a ‘clear-eyed assess-
ment of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) intentions and actions, a
reappraisal of the United States’ many strategic advantages and shortfalls,
and a tolerance of greater bilateral friction’ (OPUS, 2020: p. 1).
Given that China’s post-1978 economic growth model has been predi-
cated on a robust relationship with the US, the unravelling of US engage-
ment policy is a disastrous outcome.1 Nonetheless, at the same time, this
development is also a confirmation of a longstanding Chinese worldview.
To be specific, there has been a persistent assertion by both official and
non-official Chinese sources of the US’ alleged malign view of China’s
rise. As early as the 1990s, references were being made by Chinese ana-
lysts to a US intent to ‘contain’ China’s rise (State Council, 1998;
Pillsbury, 2000). This feature of Chinese commentary has strengthened
over time. In a not-so-veiled reference to the US, a Chinese government
Defence White Paper declared in October 2000 that: ‘No fundamental
change has been made in the old, unfair and irrational international
­political and economic order. Certain big powers are pursuing “neo-­
interventionism,” “neo-gunboat diplomacy,” and “neo-economic colonial-
ism,” which are seriously damaging the sovereignty, independence, and
developmental interests of many countries, and threatening world peace
and security’ (cited in Pomfret, 2000). Undoubtedly, this stance reflected the
incoming George W. Bush administration’s more robust stance towards

1This is reflected in the reality that the US has been China’s top export trading partner
on a country basis for much of the post-1978 reform era. See US Census Bureau foreign
trade figures from 2004–2019. Available at https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/
highlights/top/index.html. See also the entry for China in the World Bank’s database. World
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), China Trade Statistics, 18 February 2021. Available at
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/CHN https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/
en/Country/CHN/Year/2018/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/USA/Product/All-Groups.
12 N. Khoo

China during that year’s presidential campaign. Despite a contentious

start that was marked by the EP-3 crisis of April 2001, the imperative of
prosecuting the Global War on Terror after 9/11 focused US attention on
maintaining a stable relationship with China throughout Bush’s two-term
tenure, even as his administration kept its eye on balancing China’s rising
power (Silove, 2016). Frictions intensified as the Obama administration
responded to China’s growing post-2008 Global Financial Crisis power
position by articulating a ‘rebalancing’ of Indo-Pacific policy over the
course of the 2010–2011 period. And it was not uncommon to hear repeated
claims from Chinese academics that the US was adopting a policy ‘posture
[that is] seemingly intent to contain China’ (Jiang, 2013: p. 159).
Chinese grievances escalated with the Trump administration’s adop-
tion of a more robust China policy, exemplified by US trade policy since
early 2018 (Khoo, 2020: pp. 82–85, 135–137). This watershed develop-
ment was underpinned by longstanding and specific complaints from the
US Trade Representative’s Office (USTR, 2019). In the face of these
developments, an authoritative 2019 Chinese government White Paper on
China’s role in the world counselled that ‘cooperation is the only correct
choice for the two countries’ (SCIO, 2019: p. 44) before advising that ‘the
US should abandon the Cold War mentality’ (SCIO, 2019: p. 45) and dis-
associate itself from a ‘surging’ trend in world politics of ‘hegemonism
and power politics’ (SCIO, 2019: p. 32). It quickly became clear to the
Chinese leadership that the US was not going to back down on its demand
for a renegotiation of the economic relationship. Accordingly, a Phase
One agreement was reached in late 2019, taking effect on 15 January 2020
(Swanson, 2019). In an ironic twist, Trump’s signature achievement on
China was torpedoed by a combination of idiosyncrasies. Specifically, the
CCP leadership’s historically well-established proclivity to place the party’s
image and interests before their citizens’ health interacted with President
Trump’s bizarre decision-making on the COVID-19 pandemic with cata-
strophic consequences. Despite having been directly and repeatedly noti-
fied of the pandemic in January 2020, Trump took what is manifestly
insufficient action. And, to compound matters, rather than cooperate to
solve the most pressing international health crisis in a century, Beijing2 and
Washington have politicized the issue.3

2 China’s embassies and diplomats have encouraged countries and international organiza-
tions to make positive statements about China’s response, and regardless of whether such
a positive response has been received, they have portrayed the response as positive.
3 President Trump repeatedly focused on the World Health Organization’s failure to more

aggressively confront China over its handling of the outbreak in Wuhan.

 The Trump Administration and the United States’ China Engagement Policy 13

In the meantime, the Trump administration hardened its stance on

China, laying out its critique of China in a systematic quartet of public
speeches over the June–July 2020 period. These involved the national
security advisor, the FBI director, the attorney general, and the secretary
of state (Barr, 2020; O’Brian, 2020; Pompeo, 2020a; Wray, 2020). Indeed,
it is difficult to think of a sphere in the relationship that has not been tar-
geted by the administration. US sanctions on China have ranged from
adding Chinese entities4 to two separate blacklists, the first list overseen
by the Commerce Department, and the second managed by the Department
of Defense; requiring Chinese news agencies operating in the US to regis-
ter as foreign government operatives, thus subjecting them to the same
rules governing Chinese diplomats (Khoo, 2020: pp. 84–85); barring spe-
cific Chinese officials responsible for implementing its widely criticized
national security law on Hong Kong from entry into the US (Jacobs and
Wadhams, 2020); enacting legislation against US investments in compa-
nies owned or operated by the Chinese military (Ali et al., 2020); finding
that China is pursuing a policy of genocide towards its Uighur minority
in Xinjiang (Buckley and Wong, 2021); tightening visa rules for visiting
CCP members (Mozur and Zhong, 2020); launching a vast investigation of
Chinese efforts to acquire research by scientists employed by US universi-
ties and research institutes (Kolata, 2019), even as the administration pub-
licly warned of China’s efforts to exploit US universities in various ways
(Pompeo, 2020a); and targeting Beijing’s strategic neuralgia by deepening
US relations with Taiwan (Kuo and Shih, 2021).
These actions prompted a furious Chinese response. On 25 May 2020,
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared that American politicians ‘are
taking China–US relations hostage and pushing us to the brink of a new
Cold War’ (Fifield, 2020). On 9 July, Wang opined that the China–US
relationship ‘is faced with the most severe challenge since the establish-
ment of diplomatic ties’ (Shepherd, 2020). In his view, the US’ China
policy has reached a ‘point of paranoia,’ where ‘it seems as if every
Chinese investment is politically driven, every Chinese student is a spy,
and every cooperation initiative is a scheme with hidden agenda’ (Myers
and Mozur, 2020). Tensions culminated on 24 July, with the Trump
administration’s decision to order the closure of China’s consulate in
Houston, the charge being that it was serving as a hub for espionage
activities (Fifield et al., 2020).

Defined as including businesses, companies, research institutes, individuals, govern-

4

ments, private organizations, and other types of legal persons.

14 N. Khoo

Explaining the Unravelling

How can we explain the unravelling of the US engagement policy with
China and the accompanying tolerance for a relationship where aspects of
conflict prevail over cooperation? Space considerations limit our review
to what are arguably the two most influential explanations: identity theory
and neorealist theory.
There is a burgeoning research programme on the concept of identity
in great power politics, in which the China–US relationship is promi-
nently featured (Allan et al., 2018; Brands, 2018; Friedberg, 2019; Haas,
2012; Kagan, 2019). In addition, identity-related dynamics serving as a
source of intense conflict in US–China relations comport with the rhetoric
of some of the major participants in the relationship (Pompeo, 2020b; Xi,
2017). On the US side, various official reports since 2017 have juxtaposed
ideological regime differences with standard inter-state power struggles
to explain the deterioration in relations.5 Thus, the 2017 NSS report
described the China–US relations as one of the ‘power contests’ facing the
US in world politics, which it characterized as ‘fundamentally political
contests between those who favour repressive systems and those who
favour free societies’ (OPUS, 2017: p. 25). In his introductory statement
for the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy report, Defense
Secretary Patrick Shanahan singled out the CCP-led China as typifying
the phenomenon of ‘inter-state strategic competition,’ where ‘geopolitical
rivalry between free and oppressive world order visions’ is ‘the primary
concern for US national security’ (DOD, 2019, Foreword). The February
2020 United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China
report added specificity to this, acknowledging ‘long-term strategic com-
petition between our two systems’ (OPUS, 2020: p. 16), ‘a system rooted
in Beijing’s interpretation of Marxism–Leninism ideology’ (OPUS, 2020:
p. 5), and calling for ‘a competitive approach to the People’s Republic
of China’ (OPUS, 2020: p. 1). Finally, the State Department Policy
Planning Staff’s November 2020 report on China noted that ‘the Chinese
Communist Party has triggered a new era of great power competition’
(DOS, 2020: p. 1), stating that ‘in the face of the China challenge, the
United States must secure freedom’ (DOS, 2020: p. 1).

5In theoretical terms, such an explanation is consistent with either liberal democratic peace
theory or the identity strand of constructivist theory.
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