Contemporary Issues in African Society Historical Analysis and Perspective 1St Edition George Klay Kieh Full Chapter
Contemporary Issues in African Society Historical Analysis and Perspective 1St Edition George Klay Kieh Full Chapter
Contemporary Issues in African Society Historical Analysis and Perspective 1St Edition George Klay Kieh Full Chapter
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
AFRICAN SOCIETY
Historical Analysis and Perspective
Edited by
George Klay Kieh, Jr.
African Histories and Modernities
Series editors
Toyin Falola
University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX, USA
Matthew M. Heaton
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, USA
This book series serves as a scholarly forum on African contributions
to and negotiations of diverse modernities over time and space, with a
particular emphasis on historical developments. Specifically, it aims to
refute the hegemonic conception of a singular modernity, Western in ori-
gin, spreading out to encompass the globe over the last several decades.
Indeed, rather than reinforcing conceptual boundaries or parameters, the
series instead looks to receive and respond to changing perspectives on
an important but inherently nebulous idea, deliberately creating a space
in which multiple modernities can interact, overlap, and conflict. While
privileging works that emphasize historical change over time, the series
will also feature scholarship that blurs the lines between the histori-
cal and the contemporary, recognizing the ways in which our changing
understandings of modernity in the present have the capacity to affect
the way we think about African and global histories.
Editorial Board
Aderonke Adesanya, Art History, James Madison University
Kwabena Akurang-Parry, History, Shippensburg University
Samuel O. Oloruntoba, History, University of North Carolina, Wilmington
Tyler Fleming, History, University of Louisville
Barbara Harlow, English and Comparative Literature, University of
Texas at Austin
Emmanuel Mbah, History, College of Staten Island
Akin Ogundiran, Africana Studies, University of North Carolina, Charlotte
Contemporary Issues
in African Society
Historical Analysis and Perspective
Editor
George Klay Kieh, Jr.
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA, USA
Like other regions of the world, there are some major frontier issues
facing Africa as we enter the latter half of the second decade of the
twenty-first century. Among these major issues are: the troubling
practice of some African states abdicating the responsibility for their citi-
zens’ material well-being to non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
and the resulting contestation for power between the state and NGOs,
democratization, the growing influence of Evangelical Christian
churches, civil conflicts and the efforts to resolve them, and Africa’s
international relations. Collectively, these issues have serious ramifica-
tions for stability and human-centered development and democracy,
especially, the linkages between political democracy and human well-
being. As the evidence shows, since the 1990s, the African Continent has
made laudable strides in terms of political democracy, but has faltered in
terms of addressing the material conditions of the majority of their citi-
zens. Importantly, the failure of the state has led to the erosion of state
legitimacy and in some cases—Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Mali—the result-
ing collapse of the state has reached its terminal phase; implosion and
violence in the form of civil wars and other types of militarism.
Against this backdrop, this book seeks to examine some of the major
frontier issues that are currently facing the African Continent. The cen-
tral purpose is to problematize them, and proffer some suggestions for
addressing them. This is because the role of scholarship is not simply to
catalog the African Continent’s challenges with the twin processes of
v
vi Preface
vii
Contents
ix
x Contents
Index 259
Editor and Contributors
Contributors
xi
xii Editor and Contributors
xv
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The vagaries of colonialism—the suppression of political rights, mass
abject poverty and social malaise, among others—provided the major
causes that galvanized Africans from across the broad ethnic, class, gen-
der, ideological, regional and religious divide into organizing various
anti-colonial movements. In other words, the pedigree of colonialism
was uniformly unacceptable to Africans to the extent that they were pre-
pared to set aside their various differences, and join forces in struggling
against it. Amid the anti-colonial struggles, Africans entertained the hope
that the end of colonialism would usher in a new dispensation in which
their cultural, economic, political, religious and social rights, among oth-
ers, would be respected and promoted by the emergent post-colonial
state. Hence, when the wave of independence began to sweep across
the African Continent in the 1950s, the collective hope of Africans for a
The times were electric. In country after country, the flags of Britain,
Belgium, and France were replaced by the banners of the new states,
whose leaders offered idealistic promises to remake the continent and the
world. Hopes were high, and the most ambitious goals [seemed] obtain-
able. Even non-Africans spoke of the resource-rich continent as being on
the verge of a development take-off. Some of the old, racist myths about
Africa were [at] last being questioned.
Regrettably, while Africans were singing the requiem for the demise of
colonialism and demonstrating exuberance over the prospects of a new
beginning for the continent, the reality began to set in that the post-
colonial era would not be fundamentally different from its progenitor.
The overarching evidence was that the first generation of African lead-
ers—with few exceptions (Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Julius Nyerere
(Tanzania), Modibo Keita (Mali), and Seewoosagur Ramgoolam
(Mauritius)—failed to provide the requisite leadership for the disman-
tling, rethinking and democratic reconstitution of the “Berlinist state”,
which had been bequeathed to the continent by the colonialists (Kieh
2007, 2014). Clearly, the state is important because it sets the parame-
ters within which all societal activities occur. Hence, a state that is of the
wrong type cannot shepherd the process of constructing a human-cen-
tered democratic and developed society. In other words, the “Berlinist
state” was intrinsically anti-people, anti-democracy and anti-development.
Hence, it was incapable of serving as the foundation on which human-
centered development could be promoted, and holistic democracy (one
that transcends the political realm, and includes the cultural, economic,
environmental, religious, and social as well) could be championed.
Consequently, over the past six decades, the African peoples’ hopes
for a democratic and prosperous continent has been betrayed by the sub-
sequent generations of African leaders, with few exceptions (Longman
1998). Rather than focus on the needs of the African peoples, every
regime in every African state, with few exceptions, has made the primi-
tive accumulation of wealth through the instrumentality of the state
its preoccupation. Accordingly, the state in Africa has become akin
to a buffet service in which the members of the faction or fraction of
the ruling class that has control over state power at a particular histor-
ical juncture and their relations “eat all the can eat” (Kieh 2009: 10).
1 INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE AFRICAN CONDITION 3
One of the major resulting effects was the serious deterioration of the
material conditions of ordinary Africans in the 1980s—the pervasiveness
of mass abject poverty, high unemployment, food insecurity, etc. This led
to the characterization of the decade of the 1980s as “Africa’s lost dec-
ade” (Meredith 2010).
Against this background, this chapter has several purposes. First, it
will examine some of the major dimensions of the African condition,
especially the challenges that need to be addressed in order for human-
centered democracy and development to take place on the continent.
Second, the chapter lays out the purposes of the book. Third, the the-
oretical framework that provides the analytical compass for the book is
articulated. Fourth, the chapter provides a summary of the key points of
the various constituent chapters of the book.
Background
As has been discussed, Africa has faced multiple cultural, economic, envi-
ronmental, gender, political, regional, religious, security and social prob-
lems over the past six decades of the post-colonial or post-independence
era. However, it is not possible to discuss all of these problems in either a
single chapter or a volume. Accordingly, only some of the dimensions—
ethnicity, religion, democratization, civil conflicts, conflict resolution,
non-governmental organizations, and international cooperation with the
European Union (EU) and the rest of the “Global South”—which are
reflections of the topics that are covered in the various chapters, will be
examined.
The Dimensions
Ethnicity is the most demonized social identity in the study of African
societies. This is reflected in two major ways. Some scholars and prac-
titioners portray ethnicity in Africa in a manner that suggests that it is
inherently bad (Reynolds 1985; Angstrom 2000). The other way is that
ethnicity is blamed by some scholars and practitioners as well as the prin-
cipal culprit for virtually every dimension of the multifaceted crises of
underdevelopment that has bedeviled the African Continent since the
post-colonial era (Lian and Oneal 1997; Adesina et al. 1999). For exam-
ple, the ethno-communal paradigm, the dominant perspective on the
4 G.K. Kieh, Jr.
root causes of civil conflicts and the resulting wars in the continent, iden-
tifies ethnicity as the major causal factor (Horowitz 2000; Sriskandarajah
2005; Denny and Walter 2014). This has led Mkandawire (2012: 107–
108) to observe, “In some essentialist (and often poorly veiled racist)
accounts, it is suggested there is something fundamentally wrong with
African cultures—and that senseless violence is an undisavowable excres-
cence of that culture.” So, the question is what is distinctively wrong
with ethnicity in Africa that makes it the cardinal source of the conti-
nent’s problems? Is ethnicity in Asia, Europe and the Americas of a dif-
ferent type that makes it inherently different? In the case of Europe,
how do we explain the implosion of ethnic conflicts and the resulting
wars with the associated deaths, injuries and destruction that rocked the
Balkans region, especially the former Yugoslavia, in the 1990s? Did these
wars also mean that ethnicity in Europe, like in Africa, is intrinsically
conflictual? Or were these ethnic conflicts aberrations?
Undoubtedly, ethnicity, in the post-colonial era, has contributed to
civil conflicts and other problems in various states in Africa. However,
on the other hand, ethnicity has also made major contributions to both
nation-building (the efforts to create nations out of the various ethnic
groups) and state-building on the continent (the efforts to construct the
governance multiplex and its associated values, institutions, rules and
processes). So, there is the need for a balanced approach to the examina-
tion of the role of ethnicity in African society. Such an approach must
begin with the historicization of the ethnicity-state-building nexus.
During the pre-colonial era, ethnicity was the central pillar of the vari-
ous indigenous polities that adorned the African landscape (Deng 1997;
Martin 2012). As Deng (1997: 1) notes,
This meant that ethnicity was both the overarching tapestry of traditional
African societies, and a positive force for cultural, economic, political
and social development. And this was reflected in the major contribu-
tions that were made by several African polities in these areas. For exam-
ple, in the political domain, traditional African states made invaluable
1 INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE AFRICAN CONDITION 5
contributions to the development of the rule of law and “checks and bal-
ances,” among others. In Pharaonic Egypt, for example, the rule of law
was reflected in the fact that the law applied to all citizens and foreign-
ers, irrespective of gender, class, and other forms of identities (Martin,
2012).
However, colonialism aborted the process of indigenous development
in Africa, as well as transformed ethnicity and intra- and inter-ethnic
relations. One major way was the division of ethnic groups into various
sections (Deng 1997). The other was the spreading of various ethnic
groups over several colonies (Deng 1997). In both cases, there was “lit-
tle or no regard for [the various ethnic groups’] common characteristics
or distinctive attributes” (Deng 1997: 1). The reason for the transfor-
mation was to subordinate ethnicity to the imperatives of the colonial
project, including its core pillar of external domination. The resulting
effects were the loss of sovereignty by the various ethnic groups, and the
establishment of the “Berlinist state as the pivot of the colonial govern-
ance architecture” (Kieh 2008: 3). To make matters worse, the hitherto
sovereign and autonomous ethnically-based African polities were subju-
gated by the colonialists and placed under the control of “outsider[s],
foreigner[s]” (Deng 1997: 1).
Importantly, the various colonial powers used ethnicity in various
negative ways in order to achieve their goals of political domination and
economic exploitation. For example, the colonial powers constructed the
mythology of so-called “superior” and “subordinate” ethnic groups. In
Rwanda, for instance, Belgian colonialism designated the Tutsis as the
so-called “superior” ethnic group and the Hutus as the “subordinate
one” (Mamdani 2001). The rationale for the Tutsis status was their so-
called European ancestry (Mamdani 2001). Accordingly, the Belgian
colonialists privileged the Tutsis by, among other things, giving them
access to education and mid-level positions in the colonial bureaucracy.
This laid the foundation for the polarization that developed between
the Tutsis and the Hutus, culminating in the 1994 genocide, in which
almost one million people were killed by genocidaires under the auspices
of the Interhamwe, a Hutu-based militia.
At independence, the colonizers continued the twin processes of
dividing and combining ethnic groups as the centerpiece of the pro-
cess of the construction of the post-colonial state. Since then, following
the footsteps of the colonialists, the first and subsequent generations of
African leaders in some of the states have continued to use ethnicity as
6 G.K. Kieh, Jr.
various colonial powers. For example, the British imposed their parlia-
mentary model on their colonies such as Nigeria, while France forced
its mixed model (the combination of the parliamentary and presidential
models) on its colonies, like Senegal. One of the central issues was that
the various African societies had no understanding of the operations of
these models of government. Hence, they were destined to fail. In addi-
tion, in the majority of the cases, the departing colonial powers hand-
picked Africa’s “first generation of leaders.” Essentially, these new leaders
were compradors, who had been socialized in the ways of the various
colonial powers, and were thus subservient to these imperialist powers’
interests. However, Portugal refused to give up its colonies in Angola,
Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, until 1975.
Africans greeted the end of European colonialism with great relief
and expectation for the construction of human-centered democratic and
developed states. However, just a few years later the horrendous perfor-
mance of most of the continent’s post-colonial first generation regimes
brought Africans to the realization that the colonial state was still intact,
howbeit, with fellow Africans as the rulers. This was because the first
generation regimes, with few exceptions, continued the colonial poli-
cies of political repression, the manipulation of ethno-communal iden-
tities, and the neglect of basic human needs, among others. Thus, the
post-independence era became more of a “struggle for survival” (Ramsay
1993: 3).
Disappointed by this outcome, various pro-democracy movements
emerged throughout the continent with the primary goal of waging
struggles against these emergent authoritarian regimes that had simul-
taneously failed to promote the material well-being of the majority of
Africans. Amid the “tugs and pulls” between the pro-democracy forces
and the continent’s various authoritarian regimes, putschits and other
militarists hijacked the democratic struggles by staging military coups,
and instigating rebellions that eventually led to civil wars (Japhet 1978;
Mwakikagile 2001; Kandeh 2004; Kieh 2002, 2004; Keller 2014). For
example, in the 1960s, there were 23 successful military coups on the
continent (Kieh 2004, 2008). Also during the same period, civil wars
broke out in the countries like Sudan, Senegal, Nigeria and Chad. Coup-
making and war-making continued throughout the decades of the 1970s
and 1980s. Similarly, the support received by some of the continent’s
various authoritarian regimes from the United States and its allies and
1 INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE AFRICAN CONDITION 11
the Soviet Union and its allies undermined the success of the various
pro-democracy struggles as well.
The dawn of the decade of the 1990s witnessed an upsurge in pro-
democratic activities throughout the continent (Bratton and Van de
Walle 1997; Nzongola-Ntalaja 1998; Kieh 2008). This led Africa News
(1992: 1) to proclaim, “Africa is experiencing a revolution as profound
as the wave of independence that began to sweep through the conti-
nent three decades ago.” This development was caused by several major
factors. A major one was the collapse of the Soviet Union and Stalinist
socialism in Central and Eastern Europe, and the resulting end of the
Cold War. Importantly, this development adversely affected some of the
continent’s authoritarian regimes that were client states of the Soviet
Union and its allies. Similarly, with the end of the Cold War, the United
States and its allies also determined that some of their client regimes on
the continent were also disposable. In turn, these client African regimes
lost their supply of the “economic, political and military oxygen” that
enabled them to rule. Another factor was the success of the various pro-
democracy movements in Central and Eastern Europe in forcing the
removal of various Stalinist regimes from power, and the resulting setting
into motion the process of democratization.
Interestingly, the “third wave” on the African Continent has focused
primarily on the attainment of liberal democracy and its attendant bat-
tery of political rights and civil liberties. This means that very little
attention has been paid to the centrality of the material well-being of
the majority of Africans. This is quite unfortunate, because the clamor
for democracy on the continent was caused by the ardent desire of the
majority of Africans to democratically reconstitute the postcolonial
African state, so that it could adequately address their cultural, economic,
environmental, political, security and social needs. To make matters
worse, the suzerains of the world capitalist system—the United States,
its allies and the international economic institutions (the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank)—have imposed on African states
a neoliberal development strategy that has led to the deterioration of
human material well-being throughout the continent (Harrison 2005;
Mensah 2008; Harrison 2010).
So, after more than two decades, what is the current state of democ-
ratization on the African continent? In order to address this important
question, two major sets of variables are examined: political democ-
ratization (political rights and civil liberties), and socioeconomic
12 G.K. Kieh, Jr.
that came to power after these coups, by and large, failed to perform
better than their civilian predecessors (Agbese 2004; Brooker 2013;
Houngnikpo 2013). Furthermore, in some cases, the military regimes
disengaged from politics as rulers, and were replaced by civilian regimes.
That is, the military regimes presided over the process of returning the
affected countries to civilian rule, and then transferred power to the
newly elected civilian leaders, for example, Nigeria in 1979 and 1999.
But, in other cases, the military regimes consolidated their rule through
a process of civilianization—the military rulers simply replaced their uni-
forms with civilian regalia. Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the
Congo), Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger provide excellent cases. Yet, in
other cases, the military re-intervened in the political process and seized
power: Ghana, Congo, the Central African Republic and Nigeria are
noteworthy examples.
Civil wars constitute another major dimension of civil conflicts on
the continent. Like military coups, civil wars were, and remain the by-
products of the failure of the neocolonial state in Africa to address the
cultural, economic, political, security and social needs of the major-
ity of Africans. The resulting crisis of legitimacy and the erosion of
mass support have made the various affected countries ripe for implo-
sion. For example, in the case of the Sudan, the country degener-
ated into civil war months after it declared its independence from the
United Kingdom in 1956. This was followed by civil wars in Senegal
and Nigeria in the 1960s; Chad, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique,
among others, witnessed the eruption of civil war in the 1970s; Somalia
and Liberia, among others, were gripped by civil war in the 1980s; while
in the 1990s, Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as several other African states
were ravaged by internecine war, and in the first decade and half of the
twenty-first century, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Mali, and the newly independent state of South Sudan joined the list of
civil war-affected countries on the continent.
In addition, terrorism is the other important dimension of the civil
conflict grid. Although, it is not a new phenomenon in Africa or else-
where in the world, it has become the frontier global security issue ever
since Al Qaeda carried out its terrorist attacks against the American
homeland on September 11, 2001(Kieh and Kalu 2012). Particularly,
the emergent focus is on private terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and its
various affiliates such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
1 INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE AFRICAN CONDITION 17
Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. There is no doubt that these groups have
carried out horrendous terrorists attacks against various African states,
and American interests on the continent. However, the current discourse
on terrorism woefully neglects state-sponsored terrorism: the inflicting
of physical violence on citizens by various authoritarian states in Africa.
For example, an authoritarian state such as Equatorial Guinea has sub-
jected its citizens to various acts of terror (Human Rights Watch 2015).
In short, there are two major dimensions of terrorism in Africa: privately-
sponsored terrorism by groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL), and state-sponsored terrorism by vari-
ous authoritarian regimes on the continent. Clearly, attention needs to
be given to both genres of terrorism, especially the domestic and global
forces and factors that contribute to creating the conditions that lead to
them.
Various methods have been employed by the African Union (AU),
African regional organizations such as the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development
Community (SACC), the United Nations, the International Criminal
Court (ICC), various African states, the European Union (EU), and the
United States to resolve the various civil conflicts on the continent. In
the case of military coups, the African Union has developed an anti-coup
regime that is ostensibly designed to discourage the military from inter-
vening in politics, and imposing itself as the ruler. The centerpiece of the
regime is not to recognize governments that come to power through
coups. For example, the anti-coup regime was applied, when the mili-
tary staged a coup in Togo in 2005, and installed Faure Gnassingbé, as
the country’s new president (Levitt 2008), and in Mali in 2012 (Arieff
2013).
In the area of civil wars, the African Union, African regional organi-
zations such as ECOWAS, and the United Nations have employed two
major methods: peacekeeping and peacemaking. The former is designed
to create an enabling environment, such as the implementation of a
ceasefire, so that peaceful means can be sought to end a civil war. The
latter consists of an array of methods, including mediation, which is
intended to peacefully end a civil war. Both methods have succeeded in
ending various civil wars, but without addressing the underlying causes
of these wars. Even the various post-conflict peace-building projects
that have been developed as ancillaries have not fully addressed the root
causes of the continent’s various civil wars.
18 G.K. Kieh, Jr.
Several major factors gave rise to these NGOs. One key one is the
unwillingness and/or the lack of the capacity of various African states to
address basic human needs such as education, healthcare and food secu-
rity. Thus, these NGOs have tried to fill the vacuum. Another major rea-
son is that NGO work can be personally and economically profitable for
some of the founders and leaders. That is, given the fact that govern-
ments, groups and individuals in the “global north” are often willing to
contribute to development causes in Africa as a demonstration of their
compassion, NGOs have available sources of funding. So, in the case of
some NGOs, their leaders also have the opportunity to enrich themselves
from these donations. This is particularly the case for most domestic
development-oriented NGOs on the African Continent. Furthermore,
an appreciable number of domestic NGOs are donor-driven; that is, they
were organized in response to the interests of externally-based donors,
and the resulting linking of funding.
Undoubtedly, some NGOs are engaged in meaningful development
activities on the continent that are helping to address some of the basic
needs of Africans, against the background of neglect by the government.
However, some of these organizations are basically what Tandon (1996:
293) calls “functional NGOs.” That is, as he argues,
these NGOs do not sit back and reflect on what they are doing, and how
their particular activity is related to the broader issues related to state, soci-
ety and development in the present international conjecture. [Instead,
these] mainly purely functional NGOs act as mere palliatives to reduce the
effects of the deteriorating social conditions in Africa. (Tandon 1995: 3)
been imposed by the suzerains of the global system led by the United
States on post-conflict African states. Alternatively, he suggests that the
precondition for addressing the conflict that underpins the continent’s
various civil wars is the democratic reconstitution of the state.
Jack Mangala probes the travails of the relations between Africa and
the European Union (EU) in Chap. 8. He begins by historicizing the
relationship, which is then followed by the examination of the vari-
ous changes that have undergirded the relationship, including probing
the forces and factors that have shaped and conditioned these develop-
ments. Then, using the current phase as the basis, he examines some of
the major dimensions of the relationship spanning from governance to
peace and security. He observes that the relationship has been mediated
by fragmentation, the dominant-dominated context, the dynamics of
the EU’s quest for regional integration, and the broader “North-South”
relationship, including the latter’s clamor for the establishment of a just
global political economy.
In Chap. 9, George Kieh concludes the volume with the mapping of
some of the ways in which the African condition could be addressed.
Using the democratic reconstitution of the state as the pivot, he argues
that since the state in Africa is the arena of struggle, its portrait has a
serious impact on the various activities that occur within an African
country. Hence, a human-centered state that is anchored on real democ-
racy that entails such things as popular empowerment, and the restruc-
turing of power relations within the government, and the broader society
and its various forces—class, gender, ethnic, region, and religion—would
provide a firm foundation for tackling the various challenges that are
confronting the continent.
Conclusion
The chapter has attempted to address several major issues that are col-
lectively designed that provide the context for the book, and its constitu-
ent chapters. First, the chapter mapped out the key dimensions of the
African condition that are the foci of the chapters in the book. Second,
the major objectives of the book were discussed. Third, the contours
of the mixed theoretical framework that serve as the analytical compass
for the book were laid out. Fourth, the chapter summarized the constit-
uent chapters by laying out their major arguments.
26 G.K. Kieh, Jr.
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CHAPTER 2
Non-Governmental Organizations
and the African State
Johnson W. Makoba
Introduction
The rapid growth and expansion of NGOs worldwide attests to their
growing critical role in the development process. At the international
level, NGOs are perceived as vehicles for promoting democratization
and economic growth in Third World countries. And within Third World
countries, NGOs are involved in relief, rehabilitation, community devel-
opment and sundry other activities that are aimed at complementing
weak states and markets in the promotion of economic growth and pro-
vision of basic services to most people in these countries.
Increasingly, both international and indigenous development-oriented
NGOs are making up for the failure or neglect of states and markets in
countries in Africa and other Third World countries to deliver economic
development. Because of pervasive government corruption and inef-
ficiency in Africa, the international donor community prefers to chan-
nel development aid through developmental NGOs, thus avoiding or
bypassing the African state. This raises the twin issues of the relevance of
the African state in the development process and the nature of emergent
NGO-state relations. The first issue has been discussed elsewhere,1 while
the second one is the concern of this chapter. The central question raised
and discussed in this chapter is whether current and future NGO-state
relations in Africa will be characterized by cooperation or confrontation.
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