DRAFTING, PLEADINGAND CONVEYANCING

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DRAFTING AND PLEADING:

Drafting: Drafting refers to the act of preparing the legal document like agreements, contracts and
deeds. In drafting besides seeking right
words, the draftsman seeks the right concepts.
Drafting, in legal sense, means an act of preparing the legal documents like agreements, contracts,
deeds etc.
Drafting is a science and can be acquired only by long practice. In simple terms, drafting refers to
the act of writing legal documents. The key feature of drafting is that it presents a brief knowledge
about the significant facts of the situation or issue. Drafting demands a lot of skills combined with
patience from the advocates. A properly drafted document aims at accuracy and truth.

The whole process of drafting should follow three drafts before it is ready to be presented before the
authority. These drafts and their purposes are:-

• The first draft:- Aims at the comprehensiveness and fullness of the facts.

• The second draft:- Aims at the improving of the first draft by the correction of the form and
the language by a considerable amount of trimming.

• The final draft:- As the name suggests, it aims at giving a final touch and the finish up to
make the document authoritative and able to convince.
A proper understanding of drafting cannot be realised unless the nexus between the law, the facts,
and the language is fully understood and accepted. Drafting of legal documents requires, as a pre-
requisite, the skills of a draftsman, the knowledge of facts and law so as to put facts in a
systematised sequence to give a correct presentation of legal status, privileges, rights and duties of
the parties, and obligations arising out of mutual understanding or prevalent customs or usages or
social norms or business conventions, as the case may be, terms and conditions, breaches and
remedies etc. in a self-contained and self-explanatory form without any patent or latent ambiguity
or doubtful connotation. To collect, consolidate and co-ordinate the above facts in the
form of a document, it requires serious thinking followed by prompt action to reduce the available
information into writing with a legal meaning, open for judicial interpretation to derive the same
sense and intentions of the parties with which and for which it has been prepared, adopted and
signed.

Pleading: The art of drafting the pleading has not yet fully developed in spite of the
increase in the civil litigation. Many dead sure win cases drag on for years in
the Courts only because of the faulty drafting. Hence it is important to
understand that pleading is an art, of course, and art which requires not only
technical and linguistic skill but also an expert knowledge of the law on the
given point brought before a lawyer. Even the experienced lawyers and attorneys are not infallible
and sometimes they also make mistakes.
However, in the matter of pleading longer experience and great linguistic acumen are both essential
ingredients and ultimately what matters is how clearly and systematically have the facts been
presented before the court of law.
Fundamental rules of pleading:
(1) Pleadings shall contain only statement of facts and not law.
(2) Pleadings shall contain material facts and material facts only.
(3) Pleadings shall state only facts on which the party pleadings relies and
not the evidence by which they are to be proved.
(4) Pleadings shall state such material facts concisely, but with precision
and certainty.

PART PERFORMANCE OF SUIT:

The doctrine of part performance in India is recognized under Section 53A of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882. The doctrine simply means that where two people enter into an agreement and
one of the parties acts in consonance with the agreement, it creates equity, presuming that the other
party will also perform its obligations. So, if the other party later denies or acts fraudulently by
refusing to fulfil his duties as mentioned in the agreement, the doctrine of part performance is
applied to safeguard the interest of the party who performed acts in furtherance of the agreement.
Thus, the doctrine is embodied to protect the interests of transferees who take possession of the
property but are not able to obtain the title after paying the consideration in part or whole and where
the transferor later denies such an agreement or sues him for the possession. This doctrine prevents
such instances and provides justice to genuine and innocent transferees.
Illustration: X enters into a contract with Y regarding the transfer of a flat on payment of
consideration. The contract also provided that on partial payment of consideration, Y could take
possession, and so he did. Later, X denies transferring the title to the property, stating that he does
not want to sell the flat. The doctrine of part performance will be applied here to protect the interest
of Y, either by asking X to repay the consideration paid or by performing the contract and
transferring the title of the property to Y.

Objective of the doctrine of part performance

Based on the maxim that one who seeks equity must do it, the doctrine has the following objectives:

• It ensures that both parties to a contract, i.e., the transferor and transferee, perform their
parts and fulfill their obligations as mentioned in the contract.

• It preserves and protects the rights of the transferee towards ownership of the property.

• It prevents fraudulent acts by transferors who try to take advantage of innocent transferees.

• By virtue of this doctrine, the transferor or any other person under his name is barred from
enforcing any right on the said property against the transferee except those mentioned in the
contract.

Case: The application of the doctrine in India can be traced back to the case of Mahomed Musa v.
Aghore Kumar Ganguly (1914), wherein the Privy Council held that the law of India and the
Law of England is the same and follow the same rule and so the Indian Law is not
inconsistent with the principles of part performance In this case, there was a written
compromise deed that was not registered and stated that the land was to be divided among
the parties. The deed was, however, challenged because it was not registered. The Privy
Council applied the doctrine of part performance in this case and held that since the deed
was made in writing, it is a legal document.

SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF MONEY:

Mentioned in module 2
SUIT FOR MAINTENANCE:

Mentioned in module 2

DIVORCE SUIT/ DIVORCE BY MUTUAL CONSENT:

Divorce – (Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955)

Etymologically, the term “divorce” which is derived from the Latin word “dovortium” is a mixture
of two words, namely, “dis” which means “apart” and “vertere” which means “to turn.” The term
“divorce” denotes the separation of the parties to the marriage, i.e., husband and wife. It is the
dissolution of the marital relationship. By breaking the marital ties, the husband and wife are
released from the responsibilities and obligations that they would otherwise be bound to perform
together.

In the case of divorce, the marriage is brought to a permanent end. All marital obligations are lifted,
and the parties are free to remarry. The parties no longer remain husband and wife.

The parties are free to choose whether they want a decree of judicial separation or divorce, and the
court may grant the decree if satisfied.

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, was the first legislation that granted a divorce under Hindu law, as
the same concept found no place in Hindu Shastric Law. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955, provides for the circumstances in which either of the spouses can opt for divorce. It is
important to note that, as enumerated in Section 14, parties cannot file a petition for divorce within
one year of their marriage. However, Section 14(1) states that parties can seek divorce within one
year if the petitioner faces exceptional hardships or otherwise if it becomes a case of exceptional
depravity on the part of the respondent. The court, under the same sub-section, also has the power to
dismiss such a petition of divorce presented before a period of one year if it finds out that the
petition was filed under any misrepresentation or if there is any concealment of facts by the
petitioner. Presently, the term “exceptional depravity” is not defined under any Indian Act, however,
the same in layman’s language can be termed as a situation when a person is deprived of something
that he or she extremely desires, or in a normal situation, cannot be expected to live without or
suffer.

Clause (2) of the Section mandates that the court while dismissing a petition due to the non-
completion of a period of one year, shall try all possible efforts of reconciliation when a similar
petition is filed after the expiry of one year, looking into the interests of children, if any, or if there
exists any probability of reconciliation in marriage.

The concept of divorce as enshrined under the HMA, 1955, is based on the “fault theory,” which
means that the Act provides the grant of divorce to the parties, based on the faults or sins that one of
the parties has committed. These fault grounds on which a party can seek a decree of divorce or
judicial separation are mentioned in Section 13 of the Act.

• Section 13(1) of the Act provides that either of the parties can seek divorce by way of filing
a petition on the following grounds, namely, sexual intercourse with any person other than
spouse, cruelty, desertation, conversion of religion, unsound mind or mental disorder, either
of the party is suffering from leprosy or venereal disease in a communicable form, if one of
the spouse has renounced the world by entering into any religious order, or if any one of the
spouse has not been heard alive for a period of 7 years or more. The petitioner can seek a
decree of divorce on any of the above mentioned grounds. The Section further provides for
the explanation of terms “mental disorder”, “psychopathic disorder” and “desertation”.

• Section 13(1A) of the Act further talks about two additional grounds, which were inserted
after an amendment made in 1976. These two additional grounds are;
1. If the parties have not cohabited for two years or more after the passing of decree of judicial
separation, or

2. If there has been no restitution of conjugal rights for a period of one year or more after the
passing of decree for the restitution of conjugal rights.
• Clause (2) of the Section mentions additional grounds on which the wife can seek a decree
of divorce. The additional grounds are:
 3. Section 13(2)(i))– when the husband already had a wife at the time of his marriage; or

4. Section 13(2)(ii)– A wife can seek a decree of judicial separation or divorce if the husband is
found guilty of rape, sodomy, or bestiality; or

5. Section 13(2)(iv)– The third additional ground provided to the wife is that if she was
married before the age of puberty (15 years), she can apply for divorce or judicial separation
after attaining majority.
In the case of Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kuma (1977), the Apex Court, while dealing with a
petition for divorce on the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act, granted divorce to
the wife. In this case, the wife applied for the grant of a divorce decree after around two years of a
decree of restitution of conjugal rights in her favour. In reply to the petition, the husband contended
that the wife refused to entertain, receive, or reply to any of his letters wherein a request was made
by him to live with her. The Court stated that even if the above allegations are true, this does not
disentitle the wife to ask for a divorce decree.

In the case of Sirajmohmedkhan Janmohamadkhan v. Hafizunnisa Yasin Khan (1981), the wife
(respondent in present case) filed an application for grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, stating that her husband is unable to fulfil his obligations under
a marriage, and is guilty of wilful neglect. It was contended by the wife that her husband was
incapable of carrying on a physical relationship, and that even her husband accepted the said fact.
She also said that her husband treated her cruelly, and that she was driven out of her husband’s
house. The learned lower court, stating that mere impotency cannot be a ground for maintenance,
dismissed the petition of the wife. Being aggrieved by the decision, the wife filed an appeal against
the judgement before the High Court of Gujarat, wherein her appeal was allowed. Thereafter, the
appellant-husband filed an appeal seeking special leave before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The
Apex Court after looking into the facts and circumstances of the case, held that if the husband is
impotent and is not able to discharge his marital obligations, and the same has been proved to the
Court, then this would amount to both mental and legal cruelty, as contemplated under Section 13.
The Court further stated that this would be a just ground to seek maintenance and for the wife’s
refusal to live with her husband.
In the case of Durga Prasanna Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy (2005), the wife deserted the husband
after seven months of marriage, and both of them had been living separately for the past 14 years.
Since the wife was not ready to lead a conjugal life with her husband and all the efforts of
reconciliation went in vain, the Court granted the decree of divorce under Section 13(1) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on the ground of cruelty and desertion.

Grounds for judicial separation and divorce – Section 13(1)

Adultery: If the spouse has sexual intercourse with any person other than their spouse, then the
other party can seek divorce or judicial separation by way of filing a petition before the concerned
family court. Adultery as a ground for judicial separation or divorce occurs when either of the
spouse engages in sexual intercourse with another person, in such a condition the other party can
file a petition and seek divorce or judicial separation, as the case may be. It is important to note that
for a party to establish adultery before the court, he or she has to rely mainly on the ancillary facts,
for instance;

1. Circumstantial evidence; or

2. When no evidence of contact between the parties has happened and the wife is pregnant; or

3. A clear confession by the other party who was involved in extramarital intercourse, or a
confession of the same in some other parallel proceedings; or

4. Any letters or other proof of a conversation between the parties involved in the affair which
suggest any sexual relationship between the two.
In the case of Mrs. Pragati Varghese v. Cyril George Varghese (1997), it was held that in order to
prove adultery, circumstantial evidence can be used by the plaintiff, however, it shall be such that it
entirely wipes out the possibility of innocence of the respondent. It is to be noted that illicit
intercourse that happened before the marriage cannot be a ground for seeking a judicial decree.

Wherein a person has married within the prohibited degrees of relationship as provided under
Hindu law, and after some time when he realises that the marriage is invalid as per law and hence
remarries, intercourse with the previous wife would amount to adultery. The wife in such a case can
obtain a decree of judicial separation or divorce.
Cruelty: In a simple language, cruelty connotes a situation when the spouse treats the other spouse
with cruel behaviour. Section 13(1)(i)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with cruelty. The Act
does not provide for any specific definition of the term “cruelty”, however, after looking into
various judicial pronouncements, it can be said to include, physical violence, mental agony, affairs,
toxic behaviour, etc. There is no specific scope or ambit of the definition, it is on the courts to
determine, after looking into the facts and circumstances of the case, whether a particular conduct
amounts to cruelty or not. The term is not restricted to the english doctrine of danger, nor limited to
any particular definition or scope under the statutory limits.

In the case of A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (2005), the Supreme Court held that the term “cruelty”,
as a ground of divorce and judicial separation, is used in relation to human conduct and/or human
behaviour. Also, the Court stated that the conduct that has been complained about should be grave
and weighty so as to lead to the conclusion that the spouse can no longer reside together with the
other spouse. In the present case, the respondent wife used to ask her husband to do certain things,
casting doubt on her husband’s reputation, character, and fidelity. The Court, looking into the facts
and circumstances, held that what the wife used to ask her husband amounts to cruelty, as against
the contentions of the respondent’s wife, who stated that those things were just simple advice. It was
further stated that, though irreversible breakdown of marriage is not a specified ground of divorce
under the HMA, 1955, under certain circumstances to shorten the agony of the parties and in the
interest of justice, a court can grant the decree of divorce.

Desertion: Section 13(1)(i)(ib) of the HMA, 1955 deals with the provision of desertion, meaning
that the spouse has left the other spouse for a period of at least two years without any reasonable
grounds. The term “desertion” basically means the act of leaving or quitting without an intention to
return back to live with the spouse. Put simply, it is an act of forsaking or abandoning. It is
important to note that to seek divorce on the ground of desertion it is essential that the parties have
not cohabited and that the party has wilfully left the house. In various instances, it happens that
there may be separation without desertion, and desertion without separation, hence, mere severance
of a relationship is not a sufficient and a valid ground for divorce. It is the wilful abandonment of
one spouse by the other with any relevant or reasonable cause. In such a case, the consent of the
affected party is not there. It is the total denial of the obligations of marriage.
In the case of Usharani Pradhan v. Brajkishore Pradhan (2005), the Orissa High Court held that the
conduct of the respondent-wife of leaving her husband and children for such a prolonged time (7
years) to pursue her so-called ambition amounts to desertion. While upholding the divorce decree
granted by the learned Family Court’s judge, the Court, while commenting on the respondent wife’s
act, stated that “this case depicts the sordid episode of the life of a woman who spoiled her homely
environment and family relationships running after the politics and politicians forgetting her
solemn duties and responsibilities of a matrimonial life and neglecting her husband and children.”

In the case of Santosh Singh v. Sumita Singh (2022), the Chhattisgarh High Court granted divorce to
the petitioner husband in a case where the wife did not return to her matrimonial house while
waiting for shubh muhurat for almost 10 years. The Court stated that this act by the wife amounts to
desertion under Section 13(1)(i)(ib) of the HMA, 1955.

Conversion: If one of the spouses has converted to some other religion. By virtue of Section 13(1)
(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, if any of the spouse ceases to be a hindu by conversion, then
the other spouse can ask for the decree of divorce or judicial separation. Prior to the Amendment
Act of 1976, conversion was only the ground for seeking divorce, but after the amendment it is a
ground for judicial separation too. However, the petitioner himself or herself cannot seek a decree
of judicial separation or divorce on the ground of his or her conversion.

In the case of Madanam Seetha Ramulu v. Madanam Vimala (2014), the wife was Hindu by birth,
however, later on, she got herself converted to Christianity after the solemnization of her marriage.
The husband filed a petition seeking divorce on the grounds of his wife’s conversion to another
religion. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the husband is entitled to get divorce on the
ground of his wife’s conversion to another religion. This Section does not cover marriages that are
solemnised under special statutes, and thus they cannot be dissolved under this section.

Insanity: An incurable unsoundness of mind or mental disorder in either of the parties to the
marriage is a valid ground for seeking divorce or judicial separation under Section 13(1)(iii) the
Hindu Marriage Act suffers from any mental disorder. Incurable unsoundness of either of the
spouses is a reasonable ground for seeking a decree of divorce or judicial separation. After the
Amendment made in the year 1976, it is no longer essential to establish the unsoundness of the
other party for a period of not less than two years immediately before filing of the petition of
divorce or judicial separation. The petitioner is required to establish that the respondent has been
suffering from such a kind of mental disorder or unsoundness of mind continuously or
intermittently that it is not possible for the petitioner to live with him or her. The meaning and scope
of the terms “mental disorder” and “psychopathic disorder” have been provided in the explanation
clause of Section 13.

In the case of Utpal Hazari v. Maya Hazari (2018), the Jharkhand High Court held that marriage
cannot be dissolved on the ground of mental disorder, which was caused by the sudden death of a
sixteen-year-old son of the wife. In the present case, the wife lost her 16-year-old son, which
traumatised and broke her, resulting in various mental disorders and unusual behaviour. The High
Court stated that the learned lower court erred in looking into the facts and, especially, the
circumstances of the case and that this is not the case of incurable unsoundness or insanity.

Leprosy: It is a kind of bacterial infection, which is a contagious disease. Prior to the amendment
made in the year 2019, Section 13(1)(iv) of the Hindu Marriage Act provided leprosy as a ground of
divorce and judicial separation. The Personal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019, removed the disease of
leprosy, as a ground for seeking decree of divorce. Before the passing of this amendment, the 20th
Law Commission of India in its 256th Report titled as “Eliminating Discrimination Against Persons
Affected by Leprosy”, recommended the removal of leprosy as a ground of divorce. The Law
Commission Report stated that, since there have been a great advancement in the medical facilities,
and medicinal treatment, such diseases have now up to a large extent have become curable. Thus, to
still have such provisions in the various personal laws will be discriminatory to the person suffering
from the disease.

The Apex Court in the case Pankaj Sinha v. Union of India (2018), issued similar guidelines. In the
case of Pankaj Sinha, a writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, in which
it was prayed that the Union of India and other respondents be issued directions to conduct regular
national surveys in determining the cases of leprosy, and to bring the reports in the public domain. It
was also sought by the petitioner that regular awareness camps be conducted to raise awareness and
curb the fear of such diseases. In light of the relief sought by the petitioners, the Apex Court
released certain guidelines to formulate and adopt measures to eradicate leprosy.
To get a decree of judicial separation or divorce (when this ground is available), the petitioner has to
establish that the respondent has been suffering from leprosy for a period that is not less than a year
immediately before the filing of the petition. However, after the amendment made in 1976 the
statutory period of one has been deleted, and the term “incurable” has been inserted. The petitioner
is now required to establish that the other spouse is suffering from a virulent and incurable form of
leprosy.

Venereal disease: The petitioner can file a petition seeking a decree of divorce or judicial separation
on the ground that the other spouse is suffering from venereal disease (a disease that can be
transmitted through sexual intercourse) in a communicable form. Prior to the amendment, the
suffering of the spouse from a venereal disease for at least three years was an essential requirement.
In the case of Prasanna Krishanji Musale v. Mrs. Neelam Prasanna Musale (2022), the Bombay
High Court while dismissing the husband’s appeal against the judgement of the trial court for grant
of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia), 13(1)(ib), and 13(v) of the HMA, 1955, wherein he falsely
accused his wife of having HIV Positive, and had refused to cohabit with her.

Renunciation of the world: Section 13(1)(vi) of the HMA, 1955, lays down that if any of the party
to the marriage has renounced the world to unite with God or for the search of the truth, the other
spouse can seek divorce or judicial separation. Renunciation from the world was the ground
available only for getting a decree of divorce and not judicial separation before the amendment
done in the year 1976. In the case of Shital Das v. Sitaram (1954), the Supreme Court held that, the
renunciation announced by the spouse infers to a religious order, which works or implies civil
death, and this is the reason why the other party has been provided with the right to seek decree of
divorce or judicial separation. It is important that the petitioner establishes the fact that the other
spouse has joined some religious order contrary to the concept of marriage. A mere declaration that
the other spouse has renounced the world does not prove to be a sufficient ground.

Presumptive death: Under Section 13(1)(vii) of the HMA, 1955, if one party to the marriage has not
been heard alive for seven years, then the other spouse can seek divorce or judicial separation on the
ground of presumptive death. Presumption of death of the other spouse, if the person has not heard
of being alive for a period of seven years or more, is a ground available to seek divorce or judicial
separation. In order to prove this ground, it is required that the petitioner establishes that no person
who would have naturally heard from the respondent knows about him or her being alive. In the
case of Nirmoo v. Nikka Ram (1968), the Delhi High Court held that, if the spouse presumes the
death of the other spouse, and without getting a divorce in such a case, remarries to the other
person, then, the person that has returned after the span of seven years or more can contest the
validity of the second marriage.

Divorce by mutual consent – (Section 13B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955)

In a case where none of the aforementioned grounds is available but the parties decide they do not
want to remain married to each other or cannot live with one another, they can seek divorce by
mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act.

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 enshrines the right to divorce by way of mutual consent under
Section 13B. The spouses can jointly file a petition seeking divorce under Section 13B before the
family court, which possesses the jurisdiction to pass such a decree of divorce under Section 13B.
The Section expressly mentions the conditions under which the spouses can file a petition for the
grant of divorce by mutual consent.

In order to seek divorce on the grounds of mutual consent, the parties must have been living
separately for a period of at least one year. The term living separately connotes that the parties must
not live together as husband and wife, however, it does not say that the parties cannot live under the
same roof if they are filing a petition for divorce by mutual consent. The important factor that is to
be addressed is that there is no possibility of them living together as husband and wife. Another
essential ingredient is that the parties are not able to live together and have mutually agreed that
their marriage has no chance of reconciliation and that in no way can the dispute between the
parties be resolved.

The judiciary has conflicting opinions regarding the waiting period that is prescribed in the
provision of Section 13B. There have been clashes while considering the period of waiting as
directory or mandatory. In the case of Gandhi Venkata Chitti Abbai v. Unknown (1988), the
Allahabad High Court held that the waiting period was mandatory. However, in the case of Dinesh
Kumar Shukla v. Neeta (2005), the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the period prescribed
under Section 13B is directory in nature and can be brought down below 6 months if the
circumstances of the case demand so. Putting an end to this question, the Apex Court, as discussed
in the later part of the article, has held that the waiting period under Section 13 B can be waived if
the circumstances demand it.

The parties at the time of filing the petition for divorce must mutually agree on the same, however,
the consent can be withdrawn unilaterally if one of the spouses in the waiting period is of the
opinion that he or she does not want a divorce. It is pertinent to note that the decree for divorce by
mutual consent cannot be passed ex parte, i.e., both parties must be present at the time of the
passing of the final decree.

Essentials of divorce by mutual consent

Parties should be living separately

Section 13(B) of the Act prescribes that in order to mutually dissolve a marriage, the spouses should
be living separately for a period of at least 1 year before filing the petition.

This period of one year where the parties have lived separately must be immediately before the
filing of the petition. “Living Separately” in the context of Section 13B does not necessarily mean
physically living in different places. The parties could be living in the same house, sharing the same
roof but there can still be a distance between the two.

If that is the case then they are not considered to be living as husband and wife, which qualifies as
living separately.

The same was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash.
Wherein it was made clear that living separately does not necessarily mean living in different
places. The parties can be living together but not as spouses.
Parties have not been able to live together

It is said that relationships are made in heaven, however sometimes the holy relationships do not
work for long on Earth. These days divorce is taken very lightly and people go for it as a first resort
whereas the intention behind the law of divorce was to make it a last resort. Many times, in a
marriage it so happens that the spouses can’t stand each other and can no longer live together
happily. That is when they opt for divorce by mutual consent.

Sadly enough, it often happens that the parties are not able to live together even after trying
mediation and reconciliation and putting multiple efforts, before filing a divorce petition by mutual
consent.

In Pradeep Pant & anr v. Govt of NCT Delhi, the parties were married and had a daughter from
their wedlock. However, due to temperamental differences between them, they were not able to live
together and decided to live separately. Despite putting their best efforts they were unable to
reconcile their marriage and could not see themselves living together as husband and wife ever
again. A divorce petition was jointly filed and issues such as maintenance and custody of their child
were decided and agreed upon by both.

The wife would get custody of their daughter and the husband would reserve visitation rights, it was
mutually agreed upon by both of them. Both parties gave their free consent without any undue
influence. The court observed that there was no scope of reconciliation and granted a decree of
divorce.

After filing a petition for divorce by mutual consent, the parties are given a waiting period of 6
months, also known as a cooling period and it may extend up to 18 months. During this time the
parties must introspect and think about their decision.

If the parties are still not able to live together after the cooling period, then the divorce petition shall
be passed by the district judge.

They have mutually agreed that marriage should be resolved

In some situations – the parties may choose to give their marriage another chance and mutually
resolve their marriage. During the waiting period, the parties may sometimes be able to reconcile
and make their relationship work.

After the first motion has been passed, the parties have a total of 18 months to file for second
motion and if they fail to do so within those 18 months, both parties are deemed to have withdrawn
their consent mutually.

WRIT:

Mentioned in module 2

DRAFT A BAIL APPLICATION AND AN ANTICIPATORY BAIL:

Mentioned in the notebook

DRAFT A SALE DEED:

DRAFT A SUIT UNDER SECTION OF 138 OF NI ACT:

PDF

KEY ELEMENTS OF A WELL STRUCTURED PLAINT:

A plaint is a legal document that contains a lot of necessary contents in the absence of which, it
cannot be considered as a plaint. The contents necessary for a plaint are mentioned in Rules 1 to 8
of Order VII of CPC. These are mentioned below:

• Plaint should contain the name of the commercial or civil court where a suit will be
initiated.

• Plaint should contain details of the plaintiff such as the name, address, and description.

• Plaint should contain the name, residence, and description of the defendant.

• When a plaintiff has some defects or problems in health or any type of disability, the Plaint
should contain a statement of these effects.

• Plaint should contain the facts due to which cause of action arises and where the cause of
action arises it should also be mentioned.

• Plaint should not only mention facts due to which cause of action arises but also those facts
which help in recognizing the jurisdiction.

• Plaint should also contain about that relief which the plaintiff seeks from the court.

• When the plaintiff is ready to set off a portion of his claim, the Plaint should contain that
amount which has been so allowed.

• Plaint should contain a statement of the value of the subject-matter of suit not only for the
purpose of jurisdiction but also for the purpose of court-fees.

• At last, the content that should be on plaint is the plaintiff verification on oath.
This shows that the plaint is a necessary component for the successful initiation of suits in
commercial or civil courts and plays a very important role throughout the suit. Some additional
particulars which were not mentioned above include the following: Plaintiff shall state the exact
amount of money to be obtained from the defendant as given under Rule 2 of order VII whereas
Rule 3 of order VII of CPC states that when the plaint contains subject matter of immovable
property, then the property must be duly described.

HOW DOES A WRITTEN STATEMENT RESPOND TO THE CLAIMS MADE IN THE

PLAINT?:

PDF

DRAFT A SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION:

Mentioned in the notebook and Module 3.