CASE 55

Cruz vs. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 144464
Facts:
The Chairperson of the CSC received a letter from a private individual, Carmelita B. Esteban,
claiming that, during the examinations for non-professional in the career civil service, Zenaida
C. Paitim, the Municipal Treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan, falsely pretending to be the
examinee, Gilda Cruz, a co-employee. Carmelita Esteban requested the CSC to investigate the
matter, attaching to said letter, pictures purporting to be those of Gilda Cruz and Zenaida Paitim.
Based on said memorandum, a fact-finding investigation was conducted. On March 31, 1995, a
"Formal Charge" for "Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service" signed by Bella Amilhasan, Director IV of the Civil Service Commission
Regional Office No. 3 was filed against Gilda Cruz and Zenaida C. Paitim, with the Civil Service
Commission.
The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material
averments of the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal
investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that
if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the
Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same
time.
On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and Recommendation"
finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government
service. On July 1, 1998, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 981695 finding the
petitioners guilty of the charges and ordered their dismissal from the government service.
Petitioners then went up to the Court of Appeals assailing the resolution of the CSC. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition before it. The motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied on
August 9, 2000. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether the CSC had jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case against the
petitioners.
2. Whether there was a denial of due process in the proceedings.
Ruling:
YES. The CSC has appellate jurisdiction over all administrative cases involving removal or
dismissal from office, filed by a private citizen. However, this jurisdiction does not extend to
cases where the acts complained of were committed against the Commission itself, such as
irregularities or anomalies in the conduct of its examinations. In this case, the impersonation of
Cruz in the civil service examination falls under the jurisdiction of the CSC. The CSC has
jurisdiction over cases involving irregularities or anomalies in the conduct of its examinations.
Factual findings of administrative bodies, like the CSC, are binding on the Supreme Court if
supported by substantial evidence. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does
not mean it could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based
on substantial findings, and the Court must defer to its expertise.
The petitioners were not denied due process as they were formally charged, given the
opportunity to answer the charges, and defend themselves. They were properly informed of the
charges and were able to submit an answer. Therefore, there was no denial of due process.
CASE 57
DR. MANUEL CAMACHO vs. HON. RICARDO GLORIA(2003)

Facts:
Dean Camacho of the University of the Southeastern Philippines, College of Education
received complaints from doctorate students about ghost students receiving passing grades.
The Board of Regents upheld the grades, leading to a complaint against Dr. Daleon for gross
incompetence and subordination, later amended to include the BOR, Capinpin and three
ghost students.
Meanwhile, an administrative case was filed against petitioner for grave misconduct, conduct
unbecoming of a dean and falsification of public documents. Ladesma alleged that petitioner
rigged the results of the performance evaluation test taken by her students in order to justify
petitioner in not giving her any teaching assignment.
Subsequently, defendant created a Special Investigation Committee (SIC). Petitioner moved
for the inhibition of the committee members on the ground that the ones who formed the
committee were parties of the case he filed. He further prayed that the SIC be restrained from
hearing the administrative case as its creation violated his right to due process.
Issue:
1) WON the BOR through the SIC has jurisdiction over the administrative case against
Camacho. 2) WON Camacho's right to due process was violated by the SIC.
Ruling:
1) Yes. The BOR's authority to create the investigating committee emanates from the law
creating USP. In addition to its general powes of administration, its Charter also accords the
BOR the power of appointment. Consonant to its power to hire is the power to discipline its
personnel. It is, therefore, in line with th BOR's power of governance to create the SIC to
probe into administrative complaints filed against its officers.
2) No. Camacho's allegations are mere speculations. It was not established that the Education
Secretary and the Committee members had an interest in the prosecution of the case against
petitioner. Therefore, Secretary Gloria and the committee could not be presumed to be
incapable of acting regularly in the performance of official functions. They must be accorded
the benefit of the presumption that they would act in a manner benefitting their sworn duties,
particularly, with the cold neutrality or an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due
process.
Title CASE 58
Lozada vs. Arranz
Case
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1741
Ponente
PUNO, J
Decision Date
Nov 27, 2003
Judge Luis J. Arranz is found guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law
for actively participating in questioning witnesses and tampering with evidence during a
drug case, resulting in a fine of P25,000.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1741)

Facts:
This case involves an administrative complaint against Judge Luis J. Arranz, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. The complainants, SPO4 Norberto
Lozada and SPO1 Charlie Co Sam of the Philippine National Police, were among the arresting
officers in a drug case against Ruben Dy. They allege that during the presentation of evidence,
the respondent judge actively participated in questioning the witness and tampering with
evidence. The respondent judge allegedly confused the witness by substituting the original
unmarked envelope containing the marked money with another envelope, repeatedly
transferring the marked money between the two envelopes, and ultimately causing the witness
to be unable to identify the original envelope. The complainants also allege that the respondent
judge made remarks that gave the impression of collusion with the defense counsel.
Furthermore, they claim that the respondent judge compelled the prosecution to present a
witness despite the prosecutor's plea for a continuance. The complainants also accuse the
respondent judge of consistently acquitting individuals accused of selling large quantities of
shabu.

Issue:
The main issues raised in this case are as follows:

1. Whether or not Judge Luis J. Arranz is guilty of gross partiality, gross misconduct, and
gross ignorance of the law.
2. Whether or not the respondent judge's subsequent decision to inhibit himself from the
case renders the complaint moot.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found Judge Luis J. Arranz guilty of serious misconduct and manifest
partiality. The Court ordered the respondent judge to pay a fine of P25,000 and issued a stern
warning. The Court emphasized that judges should avoid interrupting the direct examination of
witnesses and should only intervene to clarify or promote justice. The Court also criticized the
respondent judge for his handling of the tampering of evidence and his failure to maintain order
in the courtroom during heated arguments between counsels. The Court found the
complainants' reference to other cases irrelevant and concluded that the respondent judge's
subsequent decision to inhibit himself from the case did not render the complaint moot.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court based its decision on the evidence presented and the findings of the
Investigating Justice. The Court agreed with the Investigating Justice's conclusion that the
respondent judge's actions during the presentation of evidence showed serious misconduct and
manifest partiality. The respondent judge's active participation in questioning the witness and
tampering with evidence undermined the integrity of the proceedings and violated the principles
of fairness and impartiality. The Court emphasized that judges should exercise restraint and
avoid interfering with the direct examination of witnesses, as their role is to ensure a fair and
orderly trial. The Court also highlighted the importance of maintaining order in the courtroom
and criticized the respondent judge for failing to do so during heated arguments between
counsels. The Court imposed a fine of P25,000 and issued a stern warning to the respondent
judge, emphasizing that more severe penalties would be imposed for future offenses. The Court
also clarified that the complainants' reference to other cases was irrelevant to the present case
and that the respondent judge's subsequent decision to inhibit himself did not render the
complaint moot.
Case #59
People vs Tee

Facts:
Chinese businessman Modesto Tee, also known as Estoy Tee, was convicted of illegal possession
of marijuana in the Philippines. The raid was conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) and the Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at Tee's
premises and residence yielded a large quantity of marijuana. Tee was charged with illegal
possession of marijuana in two separate cases. In one case, the trial court found Tee guilty and
sentenced him to death, while in the other case, Tee was acquitted due to an illegal search and
seizure. Tee appealed the decision.

Issue:
WON there is a validity on the search warrant?
WON there is violation of Tee's right to a speedy trial?

Ruling:
Validity of the search warrant upheld, The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the search
warrant, stating that the description of the items to be seized, "an undetermined amount of
marijuana," was sufficiently particular. The court found that the judge who issued the warrant
had personally examined the complainant and his witness, as required by the Constitution and
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Alleged violation of Tee's right to a speedy trial rejected, Regarding the alleged violation of Tee's
right to a speedy trial, the court held that the delay of two months in the trial was not
unreasonably lengthy and did not amount to a violation of Tee's rights. The court noted that the
prosecution had made efforts to produce the witness and had obtained warrants of arrest when
the witness failed to appear
Case 60

G.R. No. 157684. April 27, 2005

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Petitioners,

vs.
PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ, and IMELDA Q.
AGUSTIN, Respondents.

FACTS:

Respondents were former DOH-NCR employees, including Finance and Management Officer II
Priscilla B. Camposano, Accountant I Imelda Q. Agusin, and Acting Supply Officer III Enrique L.
Perez. In 1996, DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against Dir. IV
Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and others for an
alleged anomalous purchase of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex
and Folic Acid capsules worth ₱330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory. The
Resident Ombudsman recommended the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty
and Grave Misconduct. The Secretary of Health filed a formal charge for Grave Misconduct,
Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. The Administrative Order No. 298 was issued to
investigate the case.

The Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) investigated a corruption
case in the Department of Health – National Capital Region (DOH-NCR) in 1996. The PCAGC
found the respondents guilty and recommended dismissal from the government service.
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 390, remanding the case to Secretary
Carmencita N. Reodica for appropriate action. On May 8, 1998, the Secretary of Health issued
an order dismissing the case against the respondents and Horacio Cabrera, stating that they
were dismissed from the service as per the PCAGC's resolution. The records of the case were
remanded to Secretary Carmencita

In 1998, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of an order, which was denied by the
Secretary of Health. They then filed a Notice of Appeal, which was denied by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) in 1999. Horacio Cabrera also filed an appeal, which was denied in 1999. The
CSC's resolutions were later denied by the CA, leading to Cabrera's petition being granted by the
CA in 2001. The CA ordered the reinstatement of Cabrera without loss of seniority rights and
payment of his back salaries from the time of his suspension. The respondents were not satisfied
with the CSC's denial of their appeal and brought the matter to the CA.
The CA annulled the CSC's Resolution against respondents, stating that the PCAGC's
jurisdiction only applies to presidential appointees, and the secretary of health failed to comply
with administrative due process by relying solely on the PCAGC's findings. This petition was
filed.

ISSUE:

Petitioner raises the following grounds for our consideration:

The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC) did not have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous transaction
involving respondents.

The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the authority to investigate and decide was
relinquished by the Secretary of Health and that the Secretary of Health merely performed a
mechanical act when she ordered the dismissal of respondents from government service.

The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that an exhaustive investigation was already
conducted by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) which
resulted in the finding that the anomalous contract for the purchase of medicines without the
required public bidding is patently illegal."9
RULING:

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue: Jurisdiction to Investigate

The court ruled that respondents were not investigated under EO 151, but under Administrative
Order No. 298 dated October 25, 1996, which created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate
administrative charges against Director Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Horacio
D. Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin, and Enrique L. Perez. The Investigating Committee was
composed of all members of the PCAGC, and was directed to follow the procedure prescribed
under Section 38 to 40 of the Civil Service Law. The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad
Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted, as the President has the obligation to ensure
all executive officials and employees comply with the law. The perceived vacuum in EO 151
regarding cases involving non-presidential appointees was rectified in Executive Order No. 12,
which created the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), allowing investigation of non-
presidential appointees suspected of conspiracy or involvement with a presidential appointee.

Second and Third Issues: Validity of Health Secretary’s Decision

The Administrative Code of 1987 grants department secretaries the power to investigate and
decide disciplinary actions for officers and employees under their jurisdiction. In this case, the
health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents, as she was a presidential
appointee. The Chief Executive dismissed her, but recognized the health secretary's authority.
The secretary delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC, but they did not have the power
to impose sanctions directly. The disciplining authority had to observe due process before
imposing penalties.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires the respondents' right to a hearing,

considering the evidence presented, having a basis to support its decision, having substantial
evidence, rendering the decision based on the evidence presented, acting independently, and
ensuring the decision is made transparently. The CA correctly ruled that administrative due
process had not been observed in this case, and noncompliance with the sixth requisite is
evident from the health secretary's order dismissing the respondents.

The health secretary has the authority to decide on actions against officials and employees who
have been administratively charged and investigated. However, this requires a prior
independent consideration of the law and facts. Failure to comply with this requirement results
in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not rely solely on an investigator's
recommendation but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered.

In the present case, the health secretary's two-page Order dismissing respondents pales in
comparison to the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. President Fidel V. Ramos
conducted a restudy of the doctor's case before issuance of his seven-page decision, while Health
Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the
Commission's Resolution. The order of Secretary Reodica denying respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration also failed to correct the deficiency in the initial Order.

The President's endorsement of the records of the case for the "appropriate action" of the health
secretary did not constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of respondents. The
petitioner cites American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, which authorized the delegation of
the power to investigate, but not the authority to impose sanctions.

The Constitution grants the Supreme Court disciplinary authority over all lower court justices,
judges, judicial employees, and lawyers. While the investigation of administrative complaints is
usually to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), the Court makes its own judgments of the cases when sanctions are imposed.

In representation of the petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that respondents
are guilty of the charges and deserve dismissal from the service. The Court reiterates the
aphorism that the end does not justify the means, and the Petition is partially granted.
CASE # 61
G.R. No. 150732 August 31, 2004

TOMAS G. VELASQUEZ, Officer-In-Charge, Office of the School Superintendent,

DECS – Division of Abra; MARIETTA BERSALONA, Chairperson, DECS – Fact
Finding Committee; EDUARDO RUPERTO, JOAQUIN PILIEN and LUZ CURBI,
Members, DECS – Fact Finding Committee, petitioners
vs.
HELEN B. HERNANDEZ, respondent.

FACTS:

In September 1996, the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS-CAR sent a
letter to petitioner Tomas G. Velasquez, informing him of the alleged infractions committed by
respondent Hernandez. It was alleged that Hernandez solicited, accepted, and received money
in exchange for transfer or promotion of teachers. Acting on the letter, petitioner Velasquez
convened a fact-finding committee to determine the veracity of the alleged violations of
respondents. The committee summoned the teachers who had grievances against Hernandez
and based on their sworn statements, it was found that Hernandez demanded and/or received
money from the teachers for appointment, promotion, and transfer. In November 1996, an
investigation report was issued by the committee recommending the filing of administrative and
criminal complaints against Hernandez. A formal charge for grave misconduct and other
offenses was filed against Hernandez in March 1997.
Hernandez filed her answer to the charges, denying the allegations and claiming that they were
fabricated. Meanwhile, a criminal case was filed against Hernandez and another individual for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The criminal case was initially affirmed
but later withdrawn upon motion by Hernandez and her co-accused.
After due proceedings, the CSC issued a resolution finding the respondent guilty of the charges
against her and ordering her dismissal from the service. The motion for reconsideration filed by
the respondent was denied by the CSC. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the resolutions of the CSC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CSC erred in rendering judgment against her in violation of her right to due
process in administrative proceedings.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The Court found that Hernandez was not
denied due process. The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense or
simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action of ruling complained of. In this case, respondent had been
amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. She was given the opportunity to answer the
charges, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. The fact-finding committee conducted
an investigation and based its findings on the sworn statements of the complainant teachers.
Hernandez was also given the chance to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Therefore, there was no violation of due process.
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." A finding of guilt in
an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge.
As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the quantum of proof required in
criminal proceedings, which necessitates a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The Ombudsman, in ordering the withdrawal of the criminal complaints against
respondent was simply saying that there is no evidence su fficient to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, which is a condition sine qua non for conviction. Ergo, the dismissal of the
criminal case will not foreclose administrative action against the respondent.
In terms of the sufficiency of evidence, the Court held that the evidence presented by the
petitioners, including the sworn statements of the complainant teachers, was sufficient to
establish Hernandez's guilt. The sworn statements provided detailed accounts of Hernandez's
solicitation and receipt of money in exchange for transfer or promotion of teachers. These
statements were corroborated by the fact-finding committee's investigation report. Therefore,
the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Hernandez's dismissal from the
service.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and upheld the
dismissal of Hernandez from the service. The Court found no violation of due process and
determined that the evidence presented was sufficient to establish Hernandez's guilt
Case #62
G.R. Nos. 95358-59, July 5, 1993
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO
MORATO alias "BOYANG" and EMMANUEL CACATIAN alias "BOY", accused. ERNESTO
MORATO alias "BOYANG", appellant.
Facts:
On February 7, 1989, Andrew de los Santos and Gabby Burgos arrived at Franco's Chicken
House in Puerto Princesa City. They saw Pat. Jose Ponce de Leon sitting on a stool at the bar
counter. At midnight, accused-appellant and Emmanuel Cacatian arrived and ordered beer.
Andrew noticed that Pat De Leon and Cacaitan were arguing and Walfrido Ponce de Leon, the
owner of the establishment, was summoned by his wife to try to pacify the group. Andrew
approached Cacatian and asked him what the problem was but Wilfredo de Leon answered that
everything was fine and led Andrew aside. Suddenly, Walfrido heard a gunshot and saw the
accused-appellant holding a gun, shooting Pat. de Leon twice until he fell, then fled.
Morato and Cacatian were accused of conspiring and confederating together to assault and
shoot Pat. Jose Ponce de Leon, resulting in his death. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded
not guilty, but after the prosecution had rested its case, accused Emmanuel Cacatian filed a
demurrer to evidence, which was granted, leading to the dismissal of the case against him. The
trial proceeded for Ernesto Morato, who pleaded not guilty. On June 21, 1990, the trial court
rendered its decision, finding Morato guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and illegal
possession of firearms. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for illegal possession of firearms
and an indeterminate sentence of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 18 years, 8 months, and
1 day of reclusion temporal for murder. Morato was also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
the sum of P59,000.00 for actual damages and P30,000.00 for moral damages.
Issue/s:
The main issues raised in the case are as follows:
Whether the law penalizing illegal possession of firearms, Presidential Decree No. 1866, is
unconstitutional due to vagueness.
Whether the accused was placed in double jeopardy by being charged with two offenses arising
from the same act.
Whether the accused's claim of self-defense and defense of a stranger is valid.
Ruling:
The court made the following rulings:
The law penalizing illegal possession of firearms, Presidential Decree No. 1866, is not
unconstitutional due to vagueness. The court found no vagueness in the law and upheld its
constitutionality. The court found that the law clearly defines the elements of the offense and
provides for the penalties. There was no ambiguity or uncertainty in the law that would render it
vague and unconstitutional.
The offenses of murder and illegal possession of firearms are different and, therefore, the
accused was not placed in double jeopardy. The court explained that double jeopardy applies
when a person is charged with the same offense after a valid acquittal or conviction. In this case,
the accused was charged with two distinct offenses arising from the same act, and thus, the
prohibition against double jeopardy was not violated.
The accused's claim of self-defense and defense of a stranger is not valid. The court found that
the accused failed to establish the elements of self-defense and defense of a stranger. There was
no evidence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, and the accused's claim that he
grabbed the gun from another person was contradicted by the testimony and evidence
presented. The court emphasized that self-defense and defense of a stranger are justifications
for the use of force, but they require the presence of certain elements. In this case, the evidence
showed that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, and the accused's claim
that he grabbed the gun from another person was contradicted by the testimony and evidence
presented. Therefore, the accused failed to establish the elements of self-defense and defense of
a stranger.
Based on these arguments and legal basis, the court concluded that the accused, Ernesto
Morato, was guilty of murder and illegal possession of firearms. The court modified the decision,
sentencing Morato to reclusion perpetua for illegal possession of firearms and an indeterminate
sentence of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 18 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion
temporal for murder. The amount of moral damages awarded was reduced to P30,000.00.
CASE # 63
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EUSEBIO NAZARIO
G.R. No. L-44143 | August 31, 1988
Sarmiento, J.

Doctrine:A statute is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that “men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”

FACTS

The present case is an appeal assailing the decision of the trial Court which found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No.
4.Appellant Nazario was charged with various violations of municipal ordinances in
Pagbilao, Quezon Province which mandates that any owner or manager of fishponds should pay
a municipal tax amounting to 3 pesos per hectare after the lapse of 3 years following the
approval of the fishponds by the Bureau of Fisheries. Initially, the respondent admitted to the
said violations but would later argue that such ordinances were unconstitutional or do not
apply to his case on the ground that the assailed ordinances are vague. He contends that
he is a mere lessee of the fish pond hence he is not contemplated in the does not fall within
those who are “owners” or “manager”. He also imputes such vagueness on the date of
payment because while Ordinance 4 provides that parties shall commence payment 3
years after lapse of 3 years following the approval of the fishpond, Ordinance 12 states that
liability for the tax will begin on 1964 if the fishpond started operating before said year.

ISSUES AND HOLDING

1.W/N the assailed ordinances are null and void for being ambiguous?

-NO. It is a well-settled rule that the statute may be vague if it lacks comprehensible
standards as to men of common intelligence would necessarily guess its meaning and differ to
its application. It is said to be repugnant to the Constitution because it violates the due process
for failing to accord the parties of fair notice of what conduct to avoid and because it grants law
makers unbridled discretion in enforcing the statute. But in order to be declared utterly
vague, the assailed statute must not be able to be clarified by a saving clause of through
construction. In the present case, the Court held that assailed ordinances are not vague
and ambiguous. As an operator of a fish pond, the appellant falls within the term manager. In
fact, he never denied the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish
fries and had employed laborers to maintain them. Moreover, there is also no merit to the other
contention that Ordinance 12 and 15 are applied retroactively for they are in the nature of
curative measures intended to facilitate the collection Ordinance 4 has prescribed (May 14,
1955).
Title CASE 64
Montemayor vs. Araneta University Foundation
Case
G.R. No. L-44251
Ponente
FERNANDO, J
Decision Date
May 31, 1977
University professor Felix Montemayor challenges his dismissal for alleged
immorality, claiming a failure to observe procedural due process, leading to a
court ruling that the first investigation satisfied due process but the second
investigation lacked procedural fairness.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-44251)

Facts:
The case of Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation involves the dismissal of
university professor Felix Montemayor for alleged immorality. The case was decided on
May 31, 1977, by the Second Division of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, with
Justice Fernando as the ponente. Felix Montemayor was a full-time professor at Araneta
University Foundation and served as the head of its Humanities and Psychology
Department. On April 17, 1974, a complaint for immorality was filed against him by the
Chaplain of the university. The university's president, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., formed a
committee to investigate the charge. The first hearing was held on April 24, 1974, where
Montemayor, the complainant, and two witnesses were present. The accusation revolved
around conversations on sex and immoral advances made against one of the witnesses.
Montemayor requested a postponement of the investigation, which was granted. On
May 3, 1974, he received a copy of the affidavit of the other witness. Montemayor cross-
examined the witnesses against him and filed a motion to dismiss or hold the hearing in
abeyance. He also submitted an affidavit to support his defense. The investigating
committee released its report on July 8, 1974, finding Montemayor morally responsible
for the alleged act and recommending his demotion. The university president adopted
the recommendation on August 5, 1974, and referred it to the Board of Trustees for
appropriate action. Subsequently, on November 8, 1974, new charges were filed against
Montemayor for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member. Another committee was
appointed, and Montemayor was placed under preventive suspension until the
administrative investigation was concluded. Montemayor requested a postponement of
the hearing set for November 18 and 19, 1974, but it was denied. The hearing proceeded
without him, and the committee submitted its report on December 5, 1974, finding the
charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and recommending
his separation from the university. Montemayor's dismissal was ordered on December
10, 1974, effective November 15, 1974, the date of his preventive suspension. The
university filed a report of his suspension and an application for clearance to terminate
his employment with the National Labor Relations Commission. Montemayor, on the
other hand, filed a complaint with the Commission against the university for
reinstatement and payment of back wages and salaries. The labor arbiter and the
Commission ruled in favor of Montemayor, ordering his reinstatement. However, the
Secretary of Labor set aside the Commission's order and found Montemayor's dismissal
justified.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether Montemayor's dismissal for alleged
immorality complied with procedural due process.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the first investigation conducted in June 1974 satisfied the
procedural due process requirement. However, the second investigation conducted in
November 1974 lacked procedural fairness. The court found that Montemayor's motion
for postponement of the hearing was denied, and the hearing proceeded without him.
The committee quickly submitted its report, recommending his removal. Despite this
deficiency, the court noted that Montemayor was able to present his case before the
Labor Commission, which remedied the lack of procedural fairness. Therefore, the court
dismissed the petition for certiorari, upholding the Secretary of Labor's decision.

Ratio:
The court held that the first investigation conducted in June 1974 complied with
procedural due process. Montemayor was given the opportunity to present his defense,
cross-examine the witnesses against him, and file a motion to dismiss or hold the
hearing in abeyance. The investigating committee released its report, and the university
president adopted the recommendation, referring it to the Board of Trustees for
appropriate action. However, the court found that the second investigation conducted in
November 1974 lacked procedural fairness. Montemayor's motion for postponement of
the hearing was denied, and the hearing proceeded without him. The committee quickly
submitted its report, recommending his removal. Despite this deficiency, the court
noted that Montemayor was able to present his case before the Labor Commission,
which remedied the lack of procedural fairness. The Labor Commission ruled in favor of
Montemayor, ordering his reinstatement. However, the Secretary of Labor set aside the
Commission's order and found Montemayor's dismissal justified. The court upheld the
Secretary of Labor's decision, dismissing the petition for certiorari.
Title CASE 69
Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 121867
Ponente
DAVIDE, JR., J
Decision Date
Jul 24, 1997
The court upholds the grant of a compulsory license to Doctors Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. to manufacture and sell a patented pharmaceutical product, ruling that it is
valid under the grounds for compulsory licensing provided in the law and does
not violate international law, while also affirming the government's power to
promote public health and safety.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 121867)

Facts:
This case involves a dispute between Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Ltd.
(petitioner) and Doctors Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (respondent) over the grant of a
compulsory license to manufacture and sell a patented pharmaceutical product. The
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) granted the license to
Doctors Pharmaceuticals, Inc. despite opposition from Smith Kline & French
Laboratories, Ltd. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the decision of the
BPTTT was affirmed. Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether the grant of a compulsory license to Doctors
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is valid under the grounds for compulsory licensing provided in
the law and whether it violates international law.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Doctors Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and affirmed the
grant of the compulsory license. The Court held that the grant of a compulsory license is
valid under the grounds provided in the law and does not violate international law. The
Court also upheld the government's power to promote public health and safety.

Ratio:
The Court based its decision on the provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property, which allows member countries to adopt legislative measures to
provide for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses of patent rights. The
Court also cited the provisions of Republic Act No. 165, which provides for a system of
compulsory licensing under a particular patent. The Court found that the grant of the
compulsory license to Doctors Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was justified under the grounds
provided in the law.

The Court also rejected petitioner's argument that the grant of the compulsory license
violated its property rights. The Court held that the patent holder is given a protective
period of two years to enjoy its exclusive rights and that just compensation in the form
of royalties is provided for in the law.
Finally, the Court held that petitioner cannot raise the issue of jurisdiction for the first
time on appeal and that it is barred on the ground of laches or estoppel. The Court found
that petitioner failed to provide any cogent reason to depart from this rule.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the grant of the compulsory license to Doctors
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled
that the grant of the license is valid under the grounds provided in the law and does not
violate international law. The Court also upheld the government's power to promote
public health and safety.

CASE #70
PILIPINAS KAO INC. v. CA and BOARD OF INVESTMENTS G.R. No. 105014, December 18,
2001
FACTS
Petitioner, Pilipinas Kao Inc. is a corporation engaged in multiple areas of registered activity
which has a number of projects that were registered with the respondent Board of Investments
(BOI) where each registered project is entitled to certain set of incentives depending upon the
law, status, and type of registration. Article 48 of P.D. No. 1789 offers tax incentives to
registered export producers expanding their operations, including tax credits on net value
earned and net local contents of exports. New or expanding export producers are eligible for a
ten percent (10%) tax credit on net local content for the first five (5) years, while registered
domestic producers receive a five percent (5%) tax credit on net value earned and ten percent
(10%) for those engaged in pioneer projects. The controversy involving the tax incentives
applied to project nos. 3 and 4 of the petitioner with Certificate of Registration No. 87-1247 for
an expanding export producer and Certificate of Registration No. 87-1476 for a new export
producer, respectively. The respondent granted the petitioner’s application for tax credit but
reduced for NVE P1,512,758.00 and for NLC P2,631,018.00 for a total of P4,223,776.00. The
petitioner requested for a reconsideration but before the respondent could act, the petitioner
filed again its applications for 1989 tax credits. The respondent denied the petitioner’s request
for reconsideration in its 1988 tax credit twice. The respondent also granted the 1989
application of tax credit but also reduced. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court for motion for
extension of time but was referred to the Court of Appeals. The CA considered the petitioner’s
contention that BOI’s failure to explain the basis for reducing the credits. The “base figure”
adoption and application of the BOI was against the purpose of investment incentive laws and
violated the policy to encourage private domestic and foreign investments.

ISSUE Whether the BOI’s base figure violated the due process

RULING Yes. The base figure was not valid and the Manual of Operations, which introduced the
based figure was not published, rendering it void and no effect. It had diminish the incentives
intended to be granted by law. The BOI failed to comply with the statutory mandate that
administrative rules and regulations implementing the law must be published for their
effectivity. The tax credits due to the petitioner was

71. Montesclaros V COMELEC

GR NO. 152295

FACTS:
Petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros (("Montesclaros" for brevity) sent a letter8 to the
Comelec, demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. Montesclaros
also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter,
otherwise, she will seek judicial relief.
Alfredo L. Benipayo ("Chairman Benipayo" for brevity), then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical
letters to the Speaker of the House and the Senate President about the status of pending bills on
the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was
"operationally very difficult" to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the
Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to
hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002.
Ten days have passed without the respond from COMELEC, the petitioner received a copy of
Comelec En Banc Resolution recommending the Congress to postponed the SK Elections, but
holding the barangay elections.
The Senate and the House came out with a report recommending the approval of the reconciled
bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 205014 and House Bill No. 4456. The Bicameral Committee's
consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the
membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age.
Senate approved the Bicameral Committee's consolidated bill and on March 13, 2002, the House
of Representatives approved the same. The President signed the approved bill into law on March
19, 2002.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
imputable to respondents.

RULING:
The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise
of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK
elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not
later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date
acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age requirement in
PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the
SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of
the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK
elections was held to be applicable on the July 15 2002 election. It’s constitutionality not having
been assailed in the first place.
The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this
suit, that the petition presented no actual justiciable controversy, that petitioners did not cite
any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondents.

Title CASE 72
Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations
Case
G.R. No. 46496
Ponente
LAUREL, J
Decision Date
Feb 27, 1940
In the Philippine Jurisprudence case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, the
Court grants a new trial to allow the presentation of additional evidence, emphasizing
the importance of due process and the right to a fair hearing in administrative
proceedings.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 46496)

Facts:
The case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations involves a dispute between Ang Tibay,
represented by Toribio Teodoro, and the National Workers' Brotherhood, against the Court of
Industrial Relations and the National Labor Union, Inc. The case was decided on February 27,
1940, by the En Banc of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, with Justice Laurel as the
ponente.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether the Court of Industrial Relations violated the
fundamental requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character.

Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of the respondent and granted a new trial. The case was remanded to
the Court of Industrial Relations with instructions to reopen the case, receive all relevant
evidence, and proceed in accordance with the requirements of due process.

Ratio:
The Court emphasized that the Court of Industrial Relations, although a special court with broad
powers, is not exempt from the fundamental requirements of due process. The Court must
respect cardinal primary rights, including the right to a hearing and the right to present
evidence. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented and render a decision based on the
evidence presented at the hearing or contained in the record. The decision must be supported by
substantial evidence.

In this case, the Court found that the record was barren and did not provide a factual basis for a
rational conclusion of law, except for the alleged agreement between Ang Tibay and the National
Workers' Brotherhood. However, the respondent requested the opportunity to present evidence
to prove their allegations, including records from the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather.

The Court concluded that the interest of justice would be better served by granting a new trial
and allowing the respondent to present the relevant evidence. The legislation that created the
Court of Industrial Relations is new, and the parties may not have fully understood the
fundamental issue involved. Therefore, the case was remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations with instructions to reopen the case, receive all relevant evidence, and proceed in
accordance with the requirements of due process.

The decision was concurred by Chief Justice Avancea and Justices Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz,
Concepcion, and Moran.

Title CASE 73
 Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc. vs. Albayda, Jr.
Case
G.R. No. 172724
Ponente
PERALTA, J
Decision Date
Aug 23, 2010
A Supreme Court ruling validates the reassignment and subsequent dismissal of
an employee, emphasizing the company's management prerogative and due
process requirements, while also recognizing the grant of separation pay as
equitable.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 172724)

Facts:
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc.
(now Pfizer Philippines, Inc.) and its employees against Ricardo P. Albayda, Jr. Albayda
was an employee of Upjohn, Inc. and continued working there until 1996 when a merger
between Pharmacia and Upjohn was created. After the merger, Albayda was designated
as District Sales Manager assigned to District XI in the Western Visayas area. However,
in December 1999, Albayda received a memorandum announcing his reassignment as
District Sales Manager to District XII in the Northern Mindanao area. Albayda
questioned his transfer and expressed his concerns about being assigned to an
unfamiliar territory. He also speculated that the transfer was a way for his managers to
dismiss him from employment. Despite his objections, the company insisted on his
transfer.

Albayda filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against Pharmacia, its employees,
and its president. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case, ruling that the reassignment
was a valid exercise of management prerogative. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Albayda then filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled in his favor and
remanded the case to the NLRC for the proper determination of his claims. The CA held
that the reassignment was arbitrary and unreasonable, and that Albayda was denied due
process.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether the reassignment and subsequent dismissal
of Albayda were valid exercises of management prerogative and in accordance with due
process.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled in favor of
Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc. The Court held that the reassignment of Albayda was a
valid exercise of management prerogative, as long as there was no demotion in rank or
diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges. The Court also ruled that Albayda's
refusal to accept the transfer constituted insubordination, which was a valid ground for
dismissal. The Court further held that Albayda was given ample opportunity to be heard,
satisfying the requirements of due process.

Ratio:
The Court based its decision on the principle of management prerogative, which allows
employers to manage their business operations, including the assignment and transfer
of employees. As long as there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits,
and other privileges, the employer has the right to reassign employees to different
positions or locations. In this case, the Court found that there was no demotion or
diminution of Albayda's rights and privileges.

The Court also emphasized that Albayda's refusal to accept the transfer constituted
insubordination, which is a valid ground for dismissal. Insubordination undermines the
employer's authority and disrupts the smooth operation of the business. Therefore, the
Court held that Albayda's dismissal was justified.

Furthermore, the Court found that Albayda was given ample opportunity to be heard,
satisfying the requirements of due process. He was able to express his objections and
concerns regarding the transfer, and the company considered his arguments before
making a final decision. Therefore, the Court concluded that Albayda's right to due
process was not violated.

While the Court upheld Albayda's dismissal, it recognized the equitable principle of
granting separation pay to a lawfully dismissed employee. The Court awarded Albayda
separation pay by way of financial assistance, equivalent to one-half month's pay for
every year of service. The Court considered Albayda's long years of service and the fact
that it was his first offense in determining the amount of separation pay.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruled that the reassignment and subsequent dismissal
of Albayda were valid exercises of management prerogative and in accordance with due
process. The Court also awarded Albayda separation pay as a measure of social justice.

CASE NO. 74
PUSE VS PUSE, G.R. NO. 183678
G.R. No. 183678 March 15, 2010 [Administrative Case; Concurrent Jurisdiction]

FACTS:
Rene V. Puse, a registered Professional Teacher, married Ligaya Delos-Santos on January 10,
1992. He had two children with her.

When Ligaya learned of Rene's deception regarding his marital status, she filed a criminal case
for bigamy against her husband before the MTC of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. On
August 2, 2005, she filed a letter-complaint with the Director of the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC), National Capital Region, Manila, through the Director, PRC, Lucena City,
seeking assistance regarding her husband against whom she had filed a criminal case for
“Bigamy” and “Abandonment.”

Rene reiterated the arguments in his Answer and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that it was not verified and for failure of the respondent to attach a valid certification
against forum-shopping. He argued that the proper forum to hear and decide the complaint was
either the CSC pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 991936 (Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service) or the DepEd pursuant to Rep. Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers). Since the charge was for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, the complaint should have been brought before the CSC.

On 16 February 2007, the Board of Professional Teachers (Board), PRC, Manila, found Rene
administratively liable of the charges and revoked his license as a Professional Teacher. Rene
moved for reconsideration of motion but was denied by the Board. He then filed a petition for
review before the CA. CA denied the Rene's appeal. CA held that the applicable law was Rep. Act
No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers because he is a Teacher I. Under Rep.
Act No. 4670, the one (1) tasked to investigate the complaint was the Board of Professional
Teachers. It was the Board of Professional Teachers that had jurisdiction over the administrative
case and not the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Department of Education (DepEd) as
contended by Rene.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Board of Professional Teachers have jurisdiction to hear and decide the
complaint filed by respondent against petitioner.

RULING:
Yes. An administrative case against a public school teacher may be filed before the Board of
Professional Teachers-PRC, the DepEd or the CSC, which have concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases such as for immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. Concurrent
jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time
by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same
jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. The
authority to hear and decide administrative cases by the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC,
DepEd and the CSC comes from Rep. Act No. 7836, Rep. Act No. 4670 and Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 807, respectively.

Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board is given the power, after due notice and
hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes
enumerated therein. Among the causes is immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable
conduct. Thus, if a complaint is filed under Rep. Act No. 7836, the jurisdiction to hear the same
falls with the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC.

If the complaint against a public school teacher is filed with the DepEd, then under Section 9 of
Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the jurisdiction over
administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the investigating committee created
pursuant to said section, now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No.
33, S. 1999, also known as the DECS Rules of Procedure. A complaint filed under Rep. Act No.
4670 shall be heard by the investigating committee which is under the DepEd.
The CSC has jurisdiction to supervise and discipline all government employees including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
Consequently, if civil service rules and regulations are violated, complaints for said violations
may be filed with the CSC.

However, where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body or agency that first
takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Here,
it was the Board of Professional Teachers, before which respondent filed the complaint, that
acquired jurisdiction over the case and which had the authority to proceed and decide the case
to the exclusion of the DepEd and the CSC.

CASE 75
JOSE L. ATIENZA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010

Facts:

The case is a petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court involving a
leadership dispute within a political party. In this case, the petitioners question their expulsion
from that party and assail the validity of the election of new party leaders conducted by the
respondents.

On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal
Party (LP), announced his party’s withdrawal of support for the administration of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a
number of party members denounced Drilon’s move, claiming that he made the announcement
without consulting his party.

On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local
autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all
positions in the LP’s ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president.
Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies,
the National Executive Council
(NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon
also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, party officers were elected to a fixed
three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.

The COMELEC held that the election of Atienza and others was invalid since the electing
assembly did not convene in accordance with the LP Constitution. Moreover, the COMELEC
ruled that since the said Constitution was not ratified, Drilon was only sitting in a hold-over
capacity since his term has been ended already.Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to
elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilon’s term expired which resulted to the election of Roxas as the new LP
president. Atienza et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP
questioning the validity of the quorum. The COMELEC issued resolution denying
petitioners Atienza et al.’s petition. As for the validity of petitioners Atienza,et al.’s expulsion as
LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to
disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party
matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Roxas, et al. violated Atienza, et al.’s constitutional right to due process
by the latter’s expulsion from the party.

Ruling:

No.

The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political
parties. The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state’s powers are found in Article
III of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the
taking of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on
the state’s powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to
protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by
private individuals or entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from
such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by
the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private
controversies involving private parties.23

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The
discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property
within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the
state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that
party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may
have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract
among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated
have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement

To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas’ election
as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the party.
While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELEC’s performance of its
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue
pertaining to Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue
of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited
scope of its power over political parties.

Title CASE 76
Flores vs. Pascasio
Case
A.M. No. P-06-2130
Ponente
BRION, J
Decision Date
Jun 13, 2011
A sheriff in a municipal trial court is found guilty of manipulating the bidding
process during an auction sale, resulting in the sale of personal properties for a
lower amount than the highest bid, and is imposed a fine equivalent to his three-
month salary.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (A.M. No. P-06-2130)

Facts:
The case involves an administrative complaint filed by Susana E. Flores against Ariel R.
Pascasio, Sheriff III in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 5, Olongapo
City, for Grave Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Authority. The complainant alleged that
during an auction sale conducted by the respondent, he manipulated the bidding
process to make it appear that she submitted a lower bid than she actually did. The
complainant claimed that she submitted a bid of Ten Thousand Two Hundred Pesos
(P10,200.00) for a JVC DVD player and a Sony TV set, but the respondent sold the
items separately for lower amounts. The respondent denied discriminating against the
complainant and explained that her bid was disregarded because it was not itemized.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether or not the respondent, Ariel R. Pascasio, is
guilty of Grave Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Authority for manipulating the bidding
process during an auction sale.

Ruling:
The Court found the respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposed a fine equivalent to
his three-month salary. The Court agreed with the Office of the Court Administrator's
(OCA) findings that the respondent's conduct in disregarding the highest bid and
making a false entry in the minutes of the auction sale constituted an act of dishonesty.
The Court also considered the respondent's arrogant behavior during the auction sale as
a violation of the rules of conduct for judicial employees.

Ratio:
The Court defined misconduct as any unlawful conduct prejudicial to the rights of the
parties or to the right determination of the cause, and dishonesty as a disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud. In this case, the Court found that the respondent's actions of
disregarding the complainant's bid, which was the highest submitted bid, and violating
the Rules of Civil Procedure constituted dishonesty. The respondent's manipulation of
the bidding process and making a false entry in the minutes of the auction sale were
clear acts of dishonesty.

Furthermore, the respondent's arrogant behavior during the auction sale was
considered a violation of the rules of conduct for judicial employees. Judicial employees
are expected to conduct themselves with utmost professionalism and respect for the
parties involved in the proceedings. The respondent's arrogant behavior demonstrated a
lack of respect and professionalism, which is unacceptable.
Considering the gravity of the respondent's misconduct and dishonesty, the Court
imposed a fine equivalent to his three-month salary. Suspension was no longer feasible
as the respondent had already been dismissed from the service. The fine serves as a
penalty for the respondent's actions and serves as a deterrent for future similar
misconduct by other court employees.

In conclusion, the Court found the respondent guilty of dishonesty for disregarding the
complainant's bid, manipulating the bidding process, and violating the rules of conduct
for judicial employees. The imposed fine serves as a penalty for the respondent's actions
and upholds the integrity and professionalism expected from court employees.

Case 77
Pichay jr vs Office of the deputy executive secretary for legal

Facts:
Petition filed by Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. seeking to declare Executive Order No. 13 as
unconstitutional.
Executive Order No. 13 abolished the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and
transferred its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA).
Pichay argues that the executive order usurps legislative powers, violates due process and equal
protection, and encroaches upon the powers of the Ombudsman.
Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against
Pichay, who is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA).
Pichay received an order from Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him to
submit a written explanation under oath.
Pichay filed a motion to dismiss, stating that a similar case was already pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping legislative powers,
violating due process and equal protection, and encroaching upon the powers of the
Ombudsman.
Whether or not the IAD-ODESLA, the office to which the functions of the PAGC were
transferred, has quasi-judicial powers.
Whether or not the reorganization violated Pichay's right to due process and equal protection.

Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of the respondents and dismissed the petition. The court based its
decision on the President's authority to reorganize the executive department under Section 31 of
Executive Order No. 292. The court emphasized that the reorganization did not entail the
creation of a new, separate and distinct office, but rather a mere alteration of the administrative
structure of the ODESLA.
The court held that Executive Order No. 13 is constitutional and within the President's authority
to reorganize the executive department. The court based its decision on the President's authority
to reorganize the executive department under Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292.
The court also found that the IAD-ODESLA does not have quasi-judicial powers and did not
encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.
The court further held that the reorganization was pursued in good faith and did not violate
Pichay's right to due process and equal protection.

Case #79
G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

Facts:
The case of Jardeleza v. Sereno involves a motion for reconsideration filed by Chief Justice
Sereno and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The motion challenges the Court's decision to
include Solicitor General Jardeleza in the shortlist for Supreme Court Associate Justice. The
respondents argue that the Court's decision undermines the JBC's power to recommend
appointees to the President. They also argue that the Court does not have the authority to
overturn the JBC's decision or to order a review of its rules. The respondents further contend
that there was no actual case or controversy that would merit the Court's exercise of judicial
review. They argue that the JBC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza
from the shortlist and that the Court erred in making a factual conclusion on what constitutes an
integrity issue.

Issue/s:
The main issues raised in the case are as follows:
Whether or not Court's decision to include Jardeleza in the shortlist undermine the JBC's power
to recommend appointees to the President.
Whether or not the Court have the authority to overturn the JBC's decision or to order a review
of its rules.
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy that would merit the Court's exercise of
judicial review.
Whether or not JBC commit grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza from the shortlist.
Whether or not the Court err in making a factual conclusion on what constitutes an integrity
issue.

Ruling:
The Court denies the motion for reconsideration. It states that the motion does not present a
justiciable controversy as far as Jardeleza is concerned. The Court also maintains that the JBC
should revisit and revise its internal rules, particularly the "unanimity rule," which can be
misused or abused. The Court clarifies that its power over the JBC is merely supervisory and
that the revisions in the JBC's internal rules do not need to be submitted to the Court for
approval. Justice Brion concurs with the denial of the motion for reconsideration but disagrees
with the majority's statement that the Court's jurisdiction over the JBC is merely supervisory.
He argues that the Court exercised its expanded jurisdiction over the JBC's acts of grave abuse
of discretion. Justice Leonen concurs with the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration but
maintains his dissenting opinion on the extent of the Court's power of judicial review in relation
to the JBC's power to promulgate its own rules and procedures.

Ratio:
The Court denies the motion for reconsideration because it does not present a justiciable
controversy as far as Jardeleza is concerned. The Court's power over the JBC is merely
supervisory, and it does not have the authority to overturn the JBC's decision or to order a
review of its rules. However, the Court maintains that the JBC should revisit and revise its
internal rules, particularly the "unanimity rule," which can be misused or abused. The revisions
in the JBC's internal rules do not need to be submitted to the Court for approval. Justice Brion
disagrees with the majority's statement and argues that the Court exercised its expanded
jurisdiction over the JBC's acts of grave abuse of discretion. Justice Leonen concurs with the
dismissal of the motion for reconsideration but maintains his dissenting opinion on the extent of
the Court's power of judicial review in relation to the JBC's power to promulgate its own rules
and procedures.
CASE # 80
AVON PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING, INC., PETITIONER,

VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

G.R. Nos. 201418 -
October 3, 2018

FACTS
Avon filed its VAT Returns and Monthly Remittance Returns of Income Tax Withheld for the
taxable year 1999. Avon signed 2 waivers of the defense of prescription, on July 14, 2004, Avon
was served a Collection Letter. It was required to pay Php 80,246,459.15.The Commissioner
prepared the Formal Letter of Demand and Final Assessment Notices all dated 28 February
2003, received by Avon on April 11, 2003. Avon filed a letter protesting against the Final
Assessment Notice. A Conference was held where the revenue officers allegedly expressed that
they would cancel the assessments resulting from the alleged discrepancy in sales if Avon would
pay part of the assessments. Thus, on January 30, 2004, Avon paid the Fringe Benefit Tax
and Withholding Tax on Compensation portions of the Final Assessment Notices.
However, the BIR officers still recommended the enforcement and collection of the
assessments.

ISSUE
First, whether or not the Commissioner of Internal Revenue failed to observe administrative
due process, and consequently, whether or not the assessments are void;
Second, whether or not Avon Products Manufacturing, Inc., by paying the other tax assessments
covered by the Waivers of the Defense of Prescription, is estopped from assailing their validity;
Finally, whether or not Avon Products Manufacturing, Inc. is liable for deficiency income
tax, excise tax, value-added tax, withholding tax on compensation, and expanded
withholding tax for the taxable year 1999.
RULING
The facts demonstrate that Avon was deprived of due process. It was not fully apprised of
the legal and factual bases of the assessments issued against it. The details of Discrepancy
attached to the Preliminary Assessment Notice, as well as the Formal Letter of Demand with
the Final Assessment Notices, did not even comment or address the defenses and
documents submitted by Avon. Thus, Avon was left unaware on how the Commissioner or her
authorized representatives appreciated the explanations or defenses raised in connection with
the assessments. There was clear inaction of the Commissioner at every stage of the
proceedings. Here, Avon claimed that it did not receive any benefit from the
waivers.[158]On the contrary, there was even a drastic increase in the assessed deficiency taxes
when the Commissioner increased the alleged sales discrepancy from P15,700,000.00
in the preliminary findings to P62,900,000.00 in the Preliminary Assessment Notice and
Final Assessment Notices.
Furthermore, Avon was compelled to pay a portion of the deficiency assessments "in
compliance with the Revenue Officer's condition in the hope of cancelling the
assessments on the non-existent sales discrepancy. Under these circumstances, Avon's
payment of an insignificant portion of the assessment cannot be deemed an admission or
recognition of the validity of the waivers. Taxpayers cannot be left in quandary by the
Commissioner's inaction on the protested assessment. It is imperative that the taxpayers are
informed of the Commissioner's action for them to take proper recourse to the Court of Tax
Appeals at the opportune time. Furthermore, this Court had time and again expressed the
dictum that "the Commissioner should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and
unequivocal language what constitutes his [or her] final determination of the disputed
assessment. That procedure is demanded by the pressing need for fair play, regularity
and orderliness in administrative action. While indeed the government has an interest in the
swift collection of taxes, its assessment and collection should be exercised justly and fairly,
and always in strict adherence to the requirements of the law and of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue's own rules
Title CASE 82
Cudia vs. Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy
Case
G.R. No. 211362
Ponente
PERALTA, J
Decision Date
Feb 24, 2015
Cadet 1CL Cudia seeks to challenge his dismissal from the Philippine Military Academy
for violating the Honor Code, but the Supreme Court denies his petition and upholds the
decision of the PMA.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 211362)

Facts:
Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, a student at the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), was
dismissed from the academy for violating the Honor Code. He was found guilty of providing
untruthful statements in his explanation for being tardy to a class. The PMA followed proper
procedures in the investigation and dismissal of Cadet Cudia.

Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether Cadet Cudia was afforded due process in the dismissal
proceedings.

Ruling:
The court ruled that Cadet Cudia was not entitled to the relief sought in the petition for
mandamus and that he was afforded due process in the dismissal proceedings. The court held
that a petition for mandamus is improper in this case and that the President's decision on Cadet
Cudia's appeal must be awaited before invoking judicial redress. The court also ruled that the
PMA has the regulatory authority to administratively terminate cadets, even without statutory
authority. The court found that Cadet Cudia violated the Honor Code and that the PMA had
followed proper procedures in the dismissal proceedings. The court emphasized that the PMA
has the authority to impose disciplinary measures and that Cadet Cudia had voluntarily
relinquished certain civil liberties by entering the academy. The court concluded that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the PMA and affirmed the dismissal of Cadet Cudia.

Ratio:
The court held that Cadet Cudia was not denied due process in the dismissal proceedings. It
stated that due process requires a fair hearing, where the accused is apprised of the charges
against him and given an opportunity to present his defense. The court found that the
proceedings in the PMA followed this requirement, as Cadet Cudia was notified of the charges
against him, given the opportunity to explain his side, and allowed to present evidence in his
behalf. The court also addressed other issues raised by the petitioners, such as the right to be
represented by counsel, the confidentiality of records, the alleged ostracism of Cadet Cudia, and
the alleged irregularities in the proceedings. It ruled that the right to counsel is not imperative in
administrative investigations, the confidentiality of records is not a violation of due process,
there was no evidence of ostracism, and the alleged irregularities were either unsubstantiated or
harmless procedural errors. The court emphasized that the PMA's Honor Code and System are
designed to instill discipline and maintain the integrity of the institution, and that the
proceedings followed the established procedures and practices in the PMA. The court also
recognized the PMA's academic freedom and its authority to impose disciplinary measures. It
stated that while academic freedom is not absolute, the PMA has the right to determine who
may be admitted to study and who may be expelled. The court concluded that Cadet Cudia's
dismissal did not deprive him of a future, as he can still pursue a military or civilian career
elsewhere.

Title CASE 83
Zabal vs. Duterte
Case
G.R. No. 238467
Ponente
DEL CASTILLO, J
Decision Date
Feb 12, 2019
The Supreme Court of the Philippines upholds the constitutionality of the closure of
Boracay Island, ruling that it was a valid exercise of police power to address
environmental degradation and protect natural resources, dismissing the petitioners'
claims of violation of their right to travel and right to work and earn a living.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 238467)

Facts:
In the case of Zabal v. Duterte, the petitioners, Mark Anthony Zabal, Thiting Estoso Jacosalem,
and Odon Bandiola, filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against President Rodrigo
Duterte, Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea, and Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government Eduardo Año. The petitioners, who were residents or occasional
visitors of Boracay, claimed that the closure of the island violated their right to travel and their
right to work and earn a living.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether the closure of Boracay Island for six months is a
violation of the petitioners' right to livelihood and their right to enjoy the natural beauty of the
island.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court, in a majority decision, upheld the constitutionality of Proclamation No.
475. The Court held that the closure of Boracay was a valid exercise of police power, which is the
state's authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare.

Ratio:
The Court found that the closure of Boracay was reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
The island was facing environmental degradation and destruction of its ecological balance,
aggravated by the influx of tourists. The closure allowed for the necessary rehabilitation works
to be carried out, including inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and construction.

The Court rejected the argument that the closure violated the right to travel. It held that the
closure did not directly restrict the right to travel, but rather had a consequential impact on it.
The Court also emphasized that the closure was not a restriction imposed by law, but rather a
valid exercise of police power.

The Court further rejected the argument that the closure violated the right to due process. It
held that the closure did not deprive the petitioners of their right to work and earn a living, as
they were free to work and practice their trade elsewhere. The Court also noted that the closure
was necessary to protect the environment, the health of the people, and the general welfare.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 475, finding
that it was a valid exercise of police power. The Court held that the closure of Boracay was
reasonably necessary and did not violate the right to travel or the right to due process.

Title CASE 84
Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines vs.
Department of Labor and Employment
Case
G.R. No. 202275
Ponente
LEONEN, J
Decision Date
Jul 17, 2018
The Supreme Court dismisses the petition challenging the constitutionality of
Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001, ruling
that the petitioners lacked legal standing and did not present an actual
controversy, while upholding the constitutionality of the said orders.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 202275)

Facts:
The case of Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of
Labor and Employment involves a challenge to the constitutionality of Department
Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001. The petitioners, which
include various bus operators associations, argue that these orders violate their
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of obligation
of contracts. The Department Order and Memorandum Circular were issued by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to regulate the employment and working
conditions of drivers and conductors in the public utility bus transport industry. The
orders require bus operators to adopt a part-fixed-part-performance-based
compensation scheme for their drivers and conductors, as well as comply with certain
labor standards and provide mandatory benefits. The petitioners argue that these orders
infringe on their contractual agreements with their drivers and conductors, and that the
implementation of the orders may result in a decrease in their income.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether Department Order No. 118-12 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 violate the petitioners' right to non-impairment of
contracts and equal protection under the law.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the petitioners lacked legal
standing and did not present an actual controversy. The Court also upheld the
constitutionality of Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-
001, stating that they were valid exercises of the DOLE and LTFRB's quasi-legislative
powers. The Court emphasized that policy questions are not within its purview and that
it will not interfere with government-created policies aimed at promoting the welfare of
workers and ensuring road safety.
Ratio:
The court explains that labor contracts are subject to the police power of the state and
can be regulated by special laws on wages, working conditions, and similar subjects. The
court also notes that certificates of public convenience granted to bus operators are
subject to amendment. The non-impairment clause does not protect all contracts,
especially those related to the public welfare or rights not considered property. The
court emphasizes that the police power of the state can justify the regulation of labor
contracts and public utility operations. The court also upholds the validity of
classifications made by the legislature as long as they have a reasonable basis.

In summary, the court dismisses the petition and upholds the constitutionality of
Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001. The court finds
that the petitioners lacked legal standing and did not present an actual controversy. The
court also determines that the orders do not violate the non-impairment clause or the
equal protection clause. The court emphasizes the importance of government policies
aimed at promoting the welfare of workers and ensuring road safety.
Case 86

G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982

RUFINO V. NUÑEZ petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner is challenging the validity of the Presidential Decree 1486 creating the
Sandiganbayan Court. Petitioner was accused of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials,
in several cases. He filed multiple complaints and filed a motion to quash on constitutional and
jurisdictional grounds. The respondent Court denied his motions, and a subsequent
reconsideration was denied. The petitioner claims that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as
amended, violates due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would
be concerned.

RULING:

The SC ruled against Nuñez.

The Constitution's concern to combat dishonesty and abuse of trust in public service cannot
justify disregarding constitutional rights. However, the Court, recognizing the counsel of
petitioner and scholarly research, finds that Presidential Decree No, 1486, creating the
respondent Court, has not been invalidated. The petition cannot be granted and the
unconstitutionality of the Decree cannot be determined. The court's vigor and diligence in
studying the issues raised by the Solicitor General's memorandum are acknowledged.

The Constitution specifically mentions the creation of the Sandiganbayan court to address
dishonesty in public service. The petitioner should be aware of the constitutional amendments
that allow different procedures for accused individuals, regardless of their status as a private
citizen or public official.

The court ruled that the petitioner cannot declare Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1606 unconstitutional. The decision does not affect the petitioner's right
to a trial with constitutional safeguards. The court believes that the Decree must be interpreted
to prevent any erosion of the Court's powers, which is too clear to contest. The court also
emphasized the importance of the constitutional presumption of innocence in a review by
certiorari of a conviction by the Sandiganbayan. The petition is dismissed without costs.
CASE 87

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner, vs. CSC, NIA and DBM, respondents.

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

Facts:
Lydia O. Chua, the petitioner, sought to avail herself of the benefits provided by RA No. 6683,
enacted on December 2, 1988. The law aimed to streamline and trim the bureaucracy by offering
benefits for early retirement, voluntary separation, and involuntary separation due to
reorganization. The Act covered all appointive officials and employees of the National
Government, GOCC, and personnel of LGU, excluding uniformed personnel of the Armed
Forces. To qualify, employees needed at least two consecutive years of government service as of
the separation date.
Petitioner, believing she qualified, applied for benefits with the NIA on January 30, 1989. The
NIA denied her application, offering instead separation benefits equivalent to half a month's
basic pay for each year of service starting from 1980. Petitioner's subsequent appeal to the CSC
was also rejected, based on the interpretation that her status as a co-terminous employee with a
contractual project did not meet the Act's requirements.
Petitioner contended that she met the Act's criteria as a full-time NIA employee, holding a
permanent position as Personnel Assistant A, and having rendered almost 15 years of
continuous service. She argued that if casual and emergency employees were entitled to benefits,
she, as a permanent employee, should be similarly rewarded.
The NIA and CSC maintained that petitioner was excluded from the benefits of RA No. 6683 due
to her co-terminous employment with a project funded by the World Bank. They argued that the
Act aimed at reorganizing the government, and special projects like the one petitioner was
involved in did not require early retirement benefits for reorganization purposes. Additionally,
they contended that the Act's application was limited to regular, temporary, casual, and
emergency employees.

Issue:

WoN petitioner is entitled of the benefit under RA 6683.

Ruling:

Yes. Co-terminous or project personnel who have rendered years of continuous service should
be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application
prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations
promulgated for such purpose.
The Court believes that the denial by the NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early
retirement benefits under RA No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as
petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is
entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed after expiration of her term,
we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the
assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after
all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the
law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.
CASE 88

CONRADO L. TIU, JUAN T. MONTELIBANO JR. and ISAGANI M.

JUNGCO, petitioners, vs. CA, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA JR., BCDA, SBMA,
BIR, CITY TREASURER OF OLONGAPO and MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF SUBIC,
ZAMBALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 127410 January 20, 1999

Facts:

On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227
entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive
Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."
On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO 97),
clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives.
Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A),
specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative.
On October 26, 1994, the petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-
A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws. In a Resolution dated
June 27, 1995, this Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95.
On February 1, 1995, Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated the
exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section
12 of RA 7227.

Issue:

WoN EO No. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Ruling:
No. Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses
(1) the City of Olongapo,
(2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and
(3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base.

However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area within which the special
privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present "fenced-in former Subic Naval
Base" only. It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from
enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against them without
reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
We rule in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the assailed EO. Said Order is not
violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. Rather, than we find real
and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the
Subic

Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification.

Classification, to be valid, must

(1) rest on substantial distinctions,

(2) be germane to the purpose of the law,
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court holds that no undue favor or privilege was extended. The classification occasioned by
EO 97-A was not unreasonable, capricious or unfounded. To repeat, it was based, rather, on fair
and substantive considerations that were germane to the legislative purpose.

CASE 89
De Guzman vs Comelec
G.R. No. 129118

Facts:
The case is regarding a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voter’s Registration
Act of 1996".

SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular
city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of
the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a
particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new
station outside the original congressional district."

Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal protection clause" of the
1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the
COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four
(4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other
COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the
provision of law under attack.

Issue:
Whether or Not section 44 of RA 8189 is unconstitutional and violates the equal protection
clause

Ruling:
No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not unconstitutional. It has not violated the equal protection clause. It is
intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing
familiarity with the people of their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration
of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highest
representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality. Section 44 does not infringe on security of
tenure. The court determines that the reassignment of election officers under Section 44 does
not violate their security of tenure. The provision does not remove them from their positions or
terminate their employment. It only transfers them to different assignments within the same
agency. The court also concluded that Section 44 does not undermine the appointing authority
of COMELEC. The provision does not interfere with the power of the COMELEC to appoint
election officers. It only provides for the reassignment of election officers, which is within the
scope of COMELEC's authority.
CASE # 90

G.R. No. 134740 October 23, 2001

IRENE V. CRUZ, LILIA H. GUNGON, LOURDES C. FERNANDEZ, CAROLINNE A.

PANALIGAN, and CONCEPCION C. RUBY, in their own behalf and in
representation of their co-employees, numbering three hundred thirty, in the
Sugar Regulatory Administration, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

Facts:

The case of Cruz v. Commission on Audit involves employees of the Sugar Regulatory
Administration (SRA) who were denied social amelioration benefits by the Commission on
Audit (COA). The COA based its denial on the date of hiring, stating that only employees hired
before October 31, 1989, were entitled to the benefits. The employees filed a petition, arguing
that the COA's distinction based solely on the date of hiring was discriminatory and contrary to
the progressive and social policy of the law.

The SRA is a government-owned corporation that has adopted resolutions granting social
amelioration benefits to all its employees since 1963. In 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 was
enacted, which implemented standardized rates for compensation. The COA, through its
Resident Auditor, questioned the legality of the payment of social amelioration benefits to all
SRA employees. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) ruled that the grant of
benefits had no legal basis and was in violation of RA 6758. The COA then suspended the
payment of benefits to SRA employees. The SRA Administrator requested the lifting of the
suspension, and the employees appealed to the Office of the President. The COA denied the
request, stating that the grant of benefits was no longer allowed under RA 6758 unless there was
prior authority from the DBM, Office of the President, or a legislative issuance. The Office of the
President later granted post facto approval/ratification of the benefits to SRA employees.
However, the COA set aside its previous decision and allowed the payment of benefits only to
employees hired before October 31, 1989. The SRA filed a motion for partial reconsideration,
claiming that the authority granted by the Office of the President covered all employees
regardless of the date of hiring. The COA denied the motion, and the SRA implemented a payroll
deduction for employees hired after October 31, 1989.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent COA gravely abused its discretion in denying social amelioration
benefits to SRA employees hired after October 31, 1989.
Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the employees and granted the petition. The Court held
that the COA's distinction based solely on the date of hiring had no legal basis. The date of hiring
cannot be considered a substantial distinction, as employees with different hiring dates were
exposed to the same type of work. The Court cited RA 6758, which provides for equal pay for
substantially equal work and bases differences in pay on substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities. Any distinction among employees must be based on substantial differences,
such as level or rank, degree of difficulty, and amount of work. To discriminate against
employees based solely on the date of hiring goes against the progressive and social policy of the
law. The Court also noted that neither RA 6758 nor the implementing rules and regulations
made any distinction between employees hired before and after October 31, 1989. The Court
applied the legal maxim that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court.
Therefore, the COA's denial of benefits to employees hired after October 31, 1989, was deemed
to be without legal basis.

The Supreme Court's decision was based on the principle that the COA's distinction based solely
on the date of hiring was discriminatory and contrary to the progressive and social policy of the
law. The Court emphasized that the date of hiring cannot be considered a substantial distinction,
as employees with different hiring dates were exposed to the same type of work. The Court cited
RA 6758, which provides for equal pay for substantially equal work and bases differences in pay
on substantive differences in duties and responsibilities. Any distinction among employees must
be based on substantial differences, such as level or rank, degree of difficulty, and amount of
work. The Court also noted that neither RA 6758 nor the implementing rules and regulations
made any distinction between employees hired before and after October 31, 1989. The Court
applied the legal maxim that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court.
Therefore, the COA's denial of benefits to employees hired after October 31, 1989, was deemed
to be without legal basis.

In its ruling, the Supreme Court set aside the COA's decision and ordered the Sugar Regulatory
Administration to cease implementing the payroll deduction for social amelioration benefits.
The deductions made since September 1998 were to be reimbursed to the petitioners.
Title CASE 91
Lopez vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 144573
Ponente
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Decision Date
Sep 24, 2002
A government employee appeals his suspension after being found guilty of
misconduct, leading to a court granting a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to halt the execution of the suspension pending appeal.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 144573)

Facts:
This case involves a petition for certiorari filed by Rosario N. Lopez, Ricardo G. Golpeo,
Maria Paz A. Magsalin, Atty. Villamin Lam, and the PCSO Board of Directors
(petitioners) against the Court of Appeals and Romeo A. Liggayu (respondents). The
case was decided by the First Division of the Supreme Court on September 24, 2002,
with Justice Ynares-Santiago as the ponente.

The facts of the case are as follows: Romeo A. Liggayu, the Manager of the Legal
Department and Resident Ombudsman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO), was charged with violation of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and complicity in
anomalous contracts entered into by PCSO and Golden Lion Films. The Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the charge related to the contracts but found Liggayu guilty of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for issuing a subpoena without
authority. Liggayu was initially imposed a penalty of one year suspension without pay,
which was later modified to six months and one day suspension without pay.

Liggayu filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a petition
for review before the Court of Appeals, seeking a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of his suspension. The Court of
Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, and later granted Liggayu's prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to halt the execution of his
suspension pending final determination of his appeal.

Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the
penalty of suspension without pay are immediately executory pending appeal.

Ruling:
The ruling of the Supreme Court is that only decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the
penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine not equivalent to one month salary are final and unappealable, and therefore
immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is
other than those mentioned, the respondent has the right to appeal, and the decision
becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal or after the
denial of the appeal.

Ratio:
The Court held that the provisions of the Ombudsman Act and the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman regarding the finality and execution of decisions are not
affected by the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, which declared certain provisions of the
Ombudsman Act unconstitutional. The Court also rejected the claim of the petitioners
that the stay of execution pending appeal violates the equal protection clause, as the
legislature has the power to grant a stay of execution in certain cases.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to halt the execution of Liggayu's suspension
pending appeal. The Court also upheld the Court of Appeals' order directing the
petitioners to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for
failing to implement the temporary restraining order. The petition was dismissed, and
the resolution of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Title CASE 93
Fariñas vs. Executive Secretary
Case
G.R. No. 147387 & 152161
Ponente
CALLEJO, SR., J
Decision Date
Dec 10, 2003
The Court dismisses petitions challenging the constitutionality of the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, upholding the constitutionality of the
repeal but finding the "Effectivity" clause of Republic Act No. 9006 to be
defective.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 147387 & 152161)

Facts:
This case involves two petitions challenging the constitutionality of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), which repeals Section 67 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code). The petitioners argue that the repeal
of Section 67 is unconstitutional because it violates the requirement that every law
should have only one subject expressed in its title. They also claim that the repeal of
Section 67 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
discriminates against appointive officials. The petitioners further argue that Rep. Act
No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety due to irregularities in its enactment. They also
contend that the "Effectivity" clause of the law violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. Finally, the petitioners assert that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code is a good law and should not have been repealed.

The respondents argue that the petitioners do not have legal standing to file the
petitions. They also invoke the "enrolled bill" doctrine, which holds that the signing of a
bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President, as well as the certification of
the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress, are conclusive of its due enactment. The
respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 is not a proscribed rider and
does not violate the one subject-one title rule. They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is
germane to the general subject of the law, which is to enhance the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections through fair election practices. The
respondents also assert that the repeal of Section 67 does not violate the equal
protection clause because there are substantial distinctions between elective officials
and appointive officials. They further argue that the "Effectivity" clause of the law does
not violate the due process clause as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life,
liberty, and property.

Issue:
The main issues raised in this case are:

1. Whether the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions.

 2. Whether the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code violates the
requirement that every law should have only one subject expressed in its title.
3. Whether the repeal of Section 67 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
4. Whether Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void due to irregularities in its enactment.
5. Whether the "Effectivity" clause of the law violates the due process clause of the
Constitution.
6. Whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law and should not
have been repealed.

Ruling:
The Court rules as follows:

1. The petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions due to the overarching
significance of the issues raised.
2. The Court applies the "enrolled bill" doctrine and upholds the validity of Section
14 of Rep. Act No. 9006. The title and objectives of the law are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
3. The repeal of Section 67 does not violate the equal protection clause as there are
substantial distinctions between elective officials and appointive officials.
4. Rep. Act No. 9006 is not null and void due to irregularities in its enactment.
5. The "Effectivity" clause of the law is defective, but this does not render the entire
law invalid. The law took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
6. Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is repealed and is no longer in effect.

Ratio:
The Court finds that the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions because the
issues raised have overarching significance and affect the rights and interests of the
general public. The Court also applies the "enrolled bill" doctrine, which holds that the
signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President, as well as the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress, are conclusive of its due
enactment. The Court upholds the validity of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, finding
that the title and objectives of the law are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. The Court also rules that the repeal of Section
67 does not violate the equal protection clause as there are substantial distinctions
between elective officials and appointive officials. The Court further holds that Rep. Act
No. 9006 is not null and void due to irregularities in its enactment. However, the Court
finds the "Effectivity" clause of the law defective, but this does not render the entire law
invalid. The law took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation. Therefore, the Court dismisses the petitions.
Title CASE 94
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas
Case
G.R. No. 148208
Ponente
PUNO, J
Decision Date
Dec 15, 2004
The Central Bank Employees Association challenges the constitutionality of a
provision in Republic Act No. 7653, initially deemed valid by the Supreme Court
under the equal protection clause, but later ruled unconstitutional due to
subsequent laws exempting other rank-and-file employees from the Salary
Standardization Act.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 148208)

Facts:
The case of Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
involves a challenge to the constitutionality of a provision in Republic Act No. 7653, also
known as the New Central Bank Act. The petitioner, Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP) and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, seeking to restrain
them from implementing a proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653. The petitioner
argues that the proviso is unconstitutional because it creates an unreasonable and
arbitrary classification of BSP employees, violating the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether the classification of BSP employees under
the proviso is unconstitutional. The petitioner argues that the classification is a classic
case of class legislation, as it distinguishes between BSP officers who are exempt from
the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) and the rank-and-file employees who are not
exempt. The petitioner contends that the classification is not based on substantial
distinctions and is therefore violative of the equal protection clause.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and declared the proviso
unconstitutional. The Court held that the subsequent laws exempting other rank-and-
file employees of government financial institutions from the SSL, while denying the
same exemption to BSP rank-and-file employees, constituted invidious discrimination.
The Court emphasized that the equal protection clause requires that all persons shall be
treated alike under like circumstances and conditions. The Court found that there were
no substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the rank-
and-file of BSP and the rank-and-file of the other government financial institutions. The
Court concluded that the continued application of the proviso was anathema to the
equal protection of the law and should be declared as an outlaw.

Ratio:
The Court's ruling was based on the principle that equal protection and security should
be given to every person under circumstances that are analogous. The Court found that
the disparate treatment of BSP rank-and-file employees from the other government
financial institutions was discriminatory and lacked a rational basis. The Court also
noted that the subsequent exemptions granted to other GFIs were based on a policy
determination by the legislature, but this policy determination could not justify the
unequal treatment between BSP rank-and-file employees and other GFIs' rank-and-file
employees who were similarly situated.

The Court's decision was in line with the trend in other jurisdictions and international
law, which recognize that discrimination may occur indirectly and that laws allowing
invidious discrimination are unconstitutional. The Court emphasized that it was not
encroaching on the legislative power of Congress but was fulfilling its duty as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties.

In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Chico-Nazario argued that the classification

between salary grades 19 and 20 in the proviso was arbitrary and lacked a reasonable or
rational foundation. Justice Panganiban, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the Court
should respect the prerogative of Congress to provide a solution to the issue and that the
majority opinion was an exercise of legislative power.

Overall, the Court's ruling in this case declared the proviso in Section 15(c) of RA 7653
unconstitutional due to its discriminatory nature and lack of rational basis. The Court
emphasized the importance of equal protection under the law and the need to eliminate
irrational discrimination in society.
Title CASS 95
Quinto vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 189698
Ponente
NACHURA, J
Decision Date
Dec 1, 2009
The Supreme Court of the Philippines declares a provision of the Commission on Elections
unconstitutional, as it violated the equal protection clause by treating appointive officials
differently from elected officials in terms of resignation upon filing of candidacy.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 189698)

Facts:
The case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections involves a petition to declare Section 4 (a) of Resolution
No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) unconstitutional. The provision states that any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from their office upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy. The
petitioners, Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, argue that this provision violates the equal
protection clause and is discriminatory because it treats appointive officials differently from elected
officials. They contend that they should only be considered resigned from their positions at the start of the
campaign period, when they are already considered as candidates by law. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), representing the COMELEC, argues that the petitioners do not have legal standing to file
the suit because they have not yet filed their certificates of candidacy. The OSG also claims that the
petition is premature and that certiorari is an improper remedy. The Court finds that the petitioners have
standing to raise the constitutional challenge because they are qualified voters and the provision affects
their right to choose their public officials. The Court also finds that there is an actual case or controversy
between the petitioners and the COMELEC. The Court then delves into the constitutional challenge and
determines that the provision violates the equal protection clause and is overbroad. The Court declares
the provision unconstitutional and grants the petition.

Issue:
The main issue raised in this case is whether Section 4 (a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Ruling:
The court declares Section 4 (a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
unconstitutional and grants the petition.

Ratio:
The court finds that Section 4 (a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The court explains that the equal protection clause
requires that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike, unless there is a valid reason for
treating them differently. In this case, the court finds that there is no valid reason for treating appointive
officials differently from elected officials in terms of their resignation upon filing their certificates of
candidacy. The court notes that both appointive and elected officials have the potential to use their
positions for political gain, and there is no rational basis for treating them differently in this regard. The
court also finds that the provision is overbroad because it applies to all appointive officials, regardless of
their level of influence or the type of position they hold. The court concludes that the provision does not
meet the test of being germane to the purposes of the law and that Congress has not shown a compelling
state interest to justify such sweeping restrictions on the fundamental right to seek public elective office.
Therefore, the court declares the provision unconstitutional and grants the petition.

CASE 96
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL

Facts:
NPC Circular No. 99-75 set the guidelines in the "disposal of scrap aluminum conductor
steel-reinforced or ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good housekeeping in NPC
installations and to generate additional income for NPC." Items 3 and 3.1 of the circular
provided for the qualification of its bidders. NPC published an invitation for the pre-
qualification of bidders for the public sale of its scrap ACR cables.

Respondent Pinatubo Commercial (Pinatubo) submitted a pre-qualification form to NPC, but

was subsequently denied. Respondent Pinatubo filed a petition before the RTC for the
annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75 as it violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the constitution because it was not published.The RTC upheld Pinatubo’s position
and declared items 3 and 3.1 unconstitutional.

Petitioner NPC insists that there was no need to publish the circular since it was not of
general application. It was addressed only to particular persons or class of persons, namely
the disposal committees, heads of offices, regional and all other officials involved in the
disposition of ACSRs.

Issue:
WON NPC Circular No. 99-75 needs to be published to take effect.

Ruling:
No. In the case of Tanada vs Tuvera, the SC held that the interpretative regulaions and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning of their duties.

In this case, the NPC Circular did not have to be published since it was merely an internal
rule or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely
a directive issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and
efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, it defined the responsibilities of
the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and award of scrap
ACSRS. These guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and
award of scrap ACRS. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general or of any
other person not involved in the biddingh process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it
did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally.
CASE #97
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
FACTS
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBT). Ang Ladlad applied for
registration with the COMELEC but was denied on the ground that they had no substantial
membership base. Ang Ladlad applied again and argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector due to discrimination and violence, and because of
societal attitudes they were forced to conceal their true sexual orientation. COMELEC dismissed
the petitioner’s case on moral grounds that they tolerate immorality which offends religious
beliefs because of the petitioner’s definition of sexual orientation. Ang Ladlad filed a petition
praying the Court to annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant their
applications for accreditation. They also sought the issuance of ex parte of a preliminary
mandatory injunction against COMELEC which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots. The OSG was ordered to submit a comment for COMELEC but instead
file an extension. Surprisingly, the OSG later supported the petitioner. Due to the urgency of the
petition, a TRO was issued directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the
Assailed Resolution. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a motion to intervene,
attaching its comment-in-intervention where they stated that the denial of the petitioner’s
petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the constitution the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).
ISSUE
Whether the denial of Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration by COMELEC based
on a moral grounds violated the equal protection clause.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ang Ladlad, granting their petition. The COMELEC’s denial
of registration based on moral grounds violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution
that the Ang Ladlad deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
maginalized and under-represented sectors.
CASE 98. Louis ”Barok” Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010/
Lagman vs. Ochoa, et. al., GR Nos. 192935/193036, Dec. 7, 2010

FACTS:

After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. 1) on
July 30, 2010 creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). The PTC was tasked to conduct
a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving third
level public officers during the administration of Aquino's predecessor Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. All it can do is gather, collect, and assess evidence of graft and corruption and thereafter
submit its findings and make recommendations to the Office of the President,
Congress, and the Ombudsman. It cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative
penalties or sanctions. Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of congressmen led by
Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep. Edcel Lagman filed in the Supreme Court separate petitions
for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 1 based on their belief that
the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the legislative power to create public office,
threatens the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and violates the equal protection
clause of the Philippine Constitution for specifically targeting certain officials of the Arroyo
administration. Biraogo, the petitioner, asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and
not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the President may
create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization
vested in him by law and such power cannot be presumed.

The petitioner adds that the President is only authorized by law (Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987) to reorganize his office, thus, his cannot serve as the basis for the
creation of the PTC.

ISSUES:

1.Whether the president can create public office such as the PTC without usurping the powers of
Congress;

2.Whether the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws.

RULING:

1.The President has the authority to create the PTC, not a public office. Majority of the
members of the Supreme Court rejected the justification of the Solicitor General (OSG)
that the creation of the PTC finds basis on the president’s power of control over all
executive offices. The Decision stressed that “control” is essentially the power to alter,
modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control
is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The majority also rejected the OSG’s
claim that the E.O. finds basis under sec. 31 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes the
president to restructure the Office of the President. Clearly, “restructure” under the said
provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation or abolition of offices by reason of
economy or redundancy. This presupposes an already existing office. The creation of an office is
nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.

2.The majority members of the Supreme Court held that E.O. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. Laying down a long line of precedents, the
ponencia reiterated that equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination.

The Decision stressed that the clear mandate of the PTC is to investigate and findout the truth
“concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only.
The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it
has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. The Arroyo
administration, according to the ponencia, is just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation gave the majority an impression that the PTC is just being used
“as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution” and that E.O. 1 is only an “adventure in
partisan hostility.” While the Court recognized that the creation of the PTC was inspired with
noble intentions, the ponencia nonetheless reminded the government of the ethical principle
that “the end does not justify the means.” It emphatically closed by stressing that the search for
the truth must be within constitutional bounds, for “ours is still a government of laws and not of
men.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Title CASE 99
Disini, Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice
Case
G.R. No. 203335, 203299, 203306, 203359, 203378, 203391, 203407,
203440, 203453, 203454, 203469, 203501, 203509, 203515 & 203518
Ponente
ABAD, J
Decision Date
Apr 22, 2014
The case involves the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, with the Supreme Court ruling that the use of ICT should
only refer to devices connected to the internet and that the regulation of
unsolicited commercial communications is valid.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 203335, 203299, 203306, 203359, 203378,

203391, 203407, 203440, 203453, 203454, 203469, 203501,
203509, 203515 & 203518)

Facts:
The case of Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice involves the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. The petitioners in this case include
Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral, and
Ernesto Sonido, Jr. They filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
the Department of the Interior and Local Government, the Executive Director of the
Information and Communications Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine
National Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. The main
issue raised in this case is the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, specifically Section 6 which imposes higher penalties for crimes
committed with the use of ICT, and Section 4 (c) (3) which regulates unsolicited
commercial communications.

Issue:
The main issue raised in this case is the constitutionality of certain provisions of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, specifically Section 6 which imposes higher
penalties for crimes committed with the use of ICT, and Section 4 (c) (3) which regulates
unsolicited commercial communications.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 6 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act is
constitutional. They argued that the use of ICT as a qualifying circumstance for higher
penalties is justified because cybercrimes have a greater impact and reach more victims
compared to traditional crimes. They also emphasized that the use of ICT allows
cybercriminals to evade identification and cause greater harm. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court declared Section 4 (c) (3) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
unconstitutional. They argued that the regulation of unsolicited commercial
communications does not unduly burden free speech and is a valid exercise of the state's
power to protect individuals from harmful conduct.

Ratio:
The court first discusses the use of aggravating circumstances in criminal cases and
emphasizes that the use of a vehicle or ICT alone does not automatically qualify as an
aggravating circumstance. The use of these means must be purposely sought to facilitate
the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his
apprehension more difficult. The court argues that the same principle should be applied
to ICT, and that its use must be purposely sought to facilitate the crime, maximize
damage, or ensure impunity in order for it to be considered aggravating.

The court then criticizes the lack of specificity in the law regarding the intent to use ICT
for the commission of a crime. It argues that the law should have specified that ICT
must be taken advantage of and abused with intent in order to facilitate the crime,
ensure impunity, or maximize damage. The court states that the failure to do so creates
a chilling effect on free speech and scares the public from using ICT.

The court also discusses the distinction between ICT connected to the internet and
stand-alone devices. It argues that the use of ICT in Section 6 of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act should only refer to devices connected to the internet, as these devices
have the potential to reach far more victims and cause greater harm. The court
emphasizes that stand-alone devices do not have the same consequences and should not
be penalized under the law.

The court then addresses the validity of regulating unsolicited commercial

communications under Section 4 (c) (3) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act. It argues that
this provision is not burdensome to commercial speech as it allows the sending of
unsolicited e-mails, provided certain conditions are met. The court also notes that
online transmission of unsolicited commercial communications is not of the same level
as unsolicited advertisements by mail, as it can interfere with an e-mail user's
enjoyment of their account and be used for malicious attacks such as phishing.

In conclusion, the court declares Section 6 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act

unconstitutional insofar as it applies to libel, as it unduly curtails freedom of speech.
The court also declares Section 4 (c) (4) unconstitutional and Section 4 (c) (3) not
unconstitutional. The court emphasizes the need for vigilance in protecting freedom of
speech and urges the clarification of the law to avoid unnecessary fear and chilling
effects on free speech.
Title CASE 101
Garcia vs. Drilon
Case
G.R. No. 179267
Ponente
PERLAS-BERNABE, J
Decision Date
Jun 25, 2013
A challenge to the constitutionality of the "Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004" is brought before the Supreme Court, which
ultimately upholds the law as constitutional, recognizing the need to protect
women and children from violence and abuse.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 179267)

Facts:
The case of Garcia v. Drilon involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" (R.A. 9262). The petitioner,
Jesus C. Garcia, argues that the law violates the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution, as well as constitutes an undue delegation of judicial power
to barangay officials. The petitioner's wife, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia, filed a petition for a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against him, alleging physical abuse, emotional and
psychological violence, and economic violence. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City issued a TPO, which Garcia opposed, arguing that R.A. 9262 is
unconstitutional.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether R.A. 9262 is constitutional.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court rules that R.A. 9262 is constitutional.

Ratio:
The Court recognizes the need to protect women and children from violence and abuse.
It upholds the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, stating that the law does not violate the
equal protection clause. The Court acknowledges the unequal power relationship
between men and women, the fact that women are more likely to be victims of violence,
and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women. These factors justify the
classification under the law and do not violate the equal protection clause.
The Court also rejects the argument that R.A. 9262 constitutes an undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials. It finds that the law provides sufficient safeguards
and procedures to protect the rights of the parties involved.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of R.A. 9262,

recognizing the need to protect women and children from violence and abuse. The Court
finds that the law is based on substantial distinctions and does not violate the equal
protection clause. The Court also rejects the argument that the law constitutes an undue
delegation of judicial power.

Title CASE 102

Villanueva vs. Judicial and Bar Council
Case
G.R. No. 211833
Ponente
REYES, J
Decision Date
Apr 7, 2015
The Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of the Judicial and Bar
Council's policy requiring five years of experience as judges of first-level courts
for qualification as applicants to the Regional Trial Court, while also emphasizing
the importance of publishing the JBC's policies and guidelines for transparency
and informing potential applicants of the requirements for judicial positions.
ParagraphOutline

Case Digest (G.R. No. 211833)

Facts:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva filed a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus,
Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief to challenge the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before qualifying as
applicants to second-level courts. Villanueva, who was appointed as the Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Compostela Valley Province, applied for vacant
positions in the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) but was not included in the list of
candidates. The JBC informed him that his non-inclusion was due to their policy of
promoting incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five
years. Villanueva argued that the JBC's policy violates the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution, as well as the constitutional provision on Social
Justice and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. He also claimed that
the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by law should be fully
implemented.

Issue:
The main issues raised in the case are:

1. Whether the JBC's policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before qualifying as applicants to second-level courts is unconstitutional
and issued with grave abuse of discretion.
2. Whether the JBC's policy violates the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Constitution, as well as the constitutional provision on Social Justice and
Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment.
 3. Whether the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by law should
be fully implemented.

Ruling:
The Court dismissed the petition but directed the JBC to publish its policies and
guidelines for transparency and compliance with the Constitution.

Ratio:
The Court first determined the procedural issues in the case. It held that the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are tenable, as the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial function. The Court also recognized its supervisory authority over the
JBC, which includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures.
However, the remedy of mandamus was not available to Villanueva as it only applies to
compel the performance of a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. The Court also
ruled that the petition for declaratory relief was improper as it did not involve an
unsound policy but sought a judicial declaration of the petitioner's right to be included
in the list of applicants.

Moving on to the substantive issues, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the JBC's
policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before qualifying as
applicants to second-level courts. It held that the JBC has the authority to set the
standards and criteria in choosing its nominees for judicial vacancies, as long as they
meet the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law. The Court also
ruled that the policy does not violate the equal protection clause, as it is based on
reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants.
The Court further held that the policy does not violate due process, as it is merely
internal in nature and the petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of
nominees.

However, the Court emphasized the importance of publishing the JBC's policies and
guidelines for transparency and informing potential applicants of the requirements for
judicial positions. It directed the JBC to comply with the publication requirement of the
policy requiring five years of experience as judges of first-level courts before qualifying
as applicants to the Regional Trial Court, as well as other special guidelines that the JBC
is or will be implementing.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the petition but directed the JBC to publish its
policies and guidelines for transparency and compliance with the Constitution. The
Court clarified its supervisory authority over the JBC and upheld the constitutionality of
the JBC's policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before
qualifying as applicants to second-level courts.
CASE NO. 103
G.R. No. 221697. March 08, 2016

Title: “Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections and Estrella C.
Elamparo”

FACTS:
The case involves Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner), a foundling discovered
in a church in Iloilo City, Philippines, who later became the adopted daughter of celebrity couple
Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces. Having pursued further studies and settled in the United
States, she eventually returned to the Philippines and pursued a career in public service,
culminating in her intention to run for the Philippine presidency. Her candidacy was challenged
on grounds of citizenship (being a foundling and her subsequent acquisition of American
citizenship which she later renounced under RA 9225) and residency requirements as
prescribed by law for presidential candidates.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) canceled Poe’s candidacy on the grounds that she
failed to meet the natural-born citizenship and ten-year residency requirements – she claimed a
residency period longer than what was stated in a previous Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
her senate run. Poe contested the COMELEC’s resolutions, asserting errors and grave abuse of
discretion on their part.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in canceling Poe’s COC
based on the grounds of not being a natural-born Filipino citizen and not meeting the ten-year
residency requirement.

2. Whether or not foundlings, like Poe, can be considered as natural-born Filipino citizens.

3. Whether or not Poe’s filing of her candidacy for president and her declaration of residency
period constituted false material representation.

COURT’S DECISION:

The Supreme Court GRANTED Poe’s petition, ANNULLING and SETTING ASIDE COMELEC’s
resolutions. The Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its
jurisdiction in disqualifying Poe based on her citizenship and residency.

1. On Citizenship – The Court declared that foundlings are presumed to be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines, following both the 1935 Constitution (in effect at the time of Poe’s birth) and
international law principles.

2. On Residency – The Court found that Poe was able to establish her intent to return and reside
permanently in the Philippines as of May 24, 2005. Even the discrepancy in her declared
residency in her COC for senator was not enough to misrepresent her qualification to run for
president.
Doctrine:
Foundlings are presumed to be natural-born citizens of the country where they are found,
applying the principle of jus soli or law of the soil as a generally accepted principle under
international law. This presumption is consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1935
Philippine Constitution and the country’s commitment under international covenants to ensure
the right of every child to acquire a nationality.

ClassNotes:
– **Natural-born citizen**: A person who is a citizen from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.

– **Residency Requirement**: In election law, it refers to the period a candidate must have
resided in the country before the day of the election. The Court clarified that actual physical
presence, intent to remain in the country, and intent to abandon the previous domicile are key
elements in establishing residency for electoral purposes.

– **Grave Abuse of Discretion**: An arbitrary or despotic manner by which judgment is

exercised, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC, in this case, was seen to
have exceeded its mandate when it disqualified Poe based on questioned citizenship and
residency requirements.
Historical Background:

The case of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections and Estrella
C. Elamparo is historically significant as it emphasized the rights of foundlings in the
Philippines regarding their citizenship status. It also underscores the nuances of election laws
on residency requirements, demonstrating the intersection of law, humanitarian considerations,
and the principles of justice and fairness in determining qualification for public office. This
decision mirrored the Supreme Court’s role in interpreting the constitution and laws as they
pertain to complex issues of citizenship and eligibility for public service.