Kilusang Mayo Uno v.

Aquino
GR No. 210500 | April 2, 2019

FACTS:
 Petitioners herein filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying to annul the resolutions
issued by the Social Security Commission with regard to the premium hike which increases the
contribution of its members from 10.4% to 11% subject to the approval of the President.
 They contended that such resolutions constitute unlawful delegation of power for having vague
and unclear standards.
 They added that it also violates their rights as workers protected by the Constitution because
such increase is grossly unfair and detrimental to the employees.
 They prayed that a TRO be issued by the Court to stop the implementation of the subject
resolutions.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the Court can exercise judicial review.
2. W/N the assailed issuances were issued in violation of laws and with grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:
1. YES. The Court first laid down the expanded concept of judicial review under the Art. VIII Sec. 1
of the 1987 Constitution, where the Court’s power is not only limited to settle actual
controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable, but also determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in any government branch and instrumentality.

In exercise of judicial review, these 4 requisites must be complied with – (1) there must be an
actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court, (2) the question before the Court must be
ripe for adjudication, (3) the person challenging the act must be the proper party, (4) the issue of
Constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very lis mota of the
case.

In the first requisite, the actual case or controversy requires that right must be enforceable and
demandable. In this case, the petitioner’s only asserted their constitutional right to be protected
as workers, but failed to prove how the assailed resolutions affect their rights as it would warrant
judicial review.

The Court further enumerated the requirements for the exercise of judicial power: (1) the issues
of ripeness and prematurity, (2) the moot and academic principle, and (3) the party’s standing.

On the issues of ripeness and prematurity, it must be necessary that all administrative remedies
be exhausted and that the challenged government act is a completed action such that there is a
direct, concrete and adverse effect on the petitioner. Under the Social Security Act, it grants
Social Security Commission a jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the law regarding the
 coverage, benefits, contribution and penalties. But since the petitioners did not even file a case
before the Commission, they failed to comply with ripeness requirement.

As for mootness, while the general rule is that Courts cannot render judgement after the issue
has been resolved by or through external developments, all circumstances when exceptions to
the general rule on moot issues are present: (1) petitioners raise violations of Constitutional
rights, (2) the situation is of paramount public interest, (3) there is a need to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public on the power of the respondent Social Security Commission to increase the
contributions, and (4) the matter is capable of repetition yet evading review, as it involves
question of law that can recur. THUS, THE COURT MAY RULE ON THIS CASE.

2. NO. Respondents were only complying with their duties under the Social Security Act when they
issued the assailed issuances. There is no showing that respondents went beyond the powers
under the law that amounts to lack of or in excess of their jurisdiction. Petitioner’s claims are
unsubstantiated and, as such, merit no finding of grave abuse of discretion.
In the Matter of Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta
GR No. 68635 | March 12, 1987

FACTS:
 Eva Maravilla-Ilustre wrote a letter to Supreme Court Justices regarding the dismissal of her
cases involving the estate of her Aunt Digna Maravilla.
 According to the letter, she was claiming that the Justices of the First Division knowingly
rendered an unjust decision 3 times on her case through unsigned minute resolutions they
issued.
 She also threatened that the failure of the Justices to answer her letter, she would call the
attention of media and conduct press conferences. And such failure, she would resort to
Ombudsman through the help of some lawyers who shared same sentiments with her.
 She also questioned the integrity of Justice Yap with regards to his close association with Atty.
Ordonez, who was the respondent’s counsel.
 The SC answered her letter defending Justice Yao.
 Thereafter, Ilustre, through her counsel Atty. Laureta, filed a complaint before the Ombudsman
against those Justices and likewise called the attention of the media. The Ombudsman dismissed
the complaint.
 Ilustre and Atty. Laureta were ordered by the SC to show cause why they should not be punished
for contempt and why Atty. Laureta should not be held administratively liable for destroying the
integrity of the Court.
 Ilustre contended that those letters were sent to Justices as private in character, while Atty.
Laureta denied that he was her counsel before the Ombudsman and that he was not the one
who prepared the letter of Ilustre.

ISSUE:
W/N the filing a complaint before the Ombudsman against the Justices undermines the separation of
powers and the independence of Judiciary.

HELD:
YES. It is elementary that the Supreme Court is the third great department of the government
entrusted exclusively with judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes both public
and private. No department or agency can declare “unjust” the act of the Court. To prosecute a member
of the Supreme Court for the act done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty
undermines the independence of the Judiciary and subordinates it to the executive. To allow litigants
to go beyond the Supreme Court resolution just because they believe it to be “unjust” undermines the
authority of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.
In re: Joaquin T. Borromeo
AM No. 93-7-696-0 | February 21, 1995

FACTS:
 Joaquin T. Borromeo is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books and possesses
superficial awareness of a few substantive and procedural laws.
 In a span of 16 years, he had been instituting and prosecuting numerous legal proceedings in
various courts, most of them involving the errors of the courts including the SC. This is for that
reason that those decisions and resolutions by the courts are not favorable to him.
 Most of those cases were about his complaints filed against Traders Royal Bank, UCPB, Security
Bank, and other banking institutions with regards to his loan secured by a REM which was
eventually foreclosed due to his non-payment.
 Since all of his complaints were dismissed either because of lack of merit, res judicata or he did
not use the proper legal remedies, he, then, filed numerous complaints against judges,
prosecutors, clerk of court, as well as the Justices of CA and SC.
 He also filed petitions and complaint before the RTC and the Ombudsman against the Justices of
the SC for their “unjust” decisions.
 Due to these circumstances, he circulated an open letter to the Supreme Court about the
“injustices” he had suffered from. He likewise circulated flyers containing his accusations against
on the CJ and the Justices for being corrupt, tyrants, and violators of law.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the decisions of the Court become final and executory are subject to modifications.
2. W/N SC may be reviewed by another agency, branch, or department of Government.
3. W/N judges may be held administratively liable for the decisions they rendered in good faith.

HELD:
1. NO. Should the judgements of the lower courts become final and executory, they may no longer
be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly by a higher Court, not even the
Supreme Court, much less by other official, branch, or department of Government.

2. NO. The Court ruled that our judicial system allows for several levels of litigation. For instance,
the presentation of evidence by parties before the trial court as well as review of judgements
and final orders of the lower court. But once the Supreme Court has spoken, its decision should
not and cannot be reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or modified just because its
findings are tainted by error.

3. NO. The Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively
liable for every erroneous order or decisions he render. Judges must be free to judge, without
pressure or influence from external forces or factors.

DOCTRINE:
(Reason for Courts; Judicial Hierarchy) - Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of
controversies. In every country there is a more or less established hierarchical organization of courts, and
a more or less comprehensive system of review of judgements and final orders of lower courts. The
judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence
by the parties – a trial or hearing in the first instance – as well as a review of the judgements of lower
Courts by higher tribunals generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and legal issues
through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by law, and is in the very nature of
things, exclusive to the Courts.

Judgements of Supreme Court, Not Reviewable – The sound, salutary and self-evident principle
prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that judgements of the highest tribunal of the land may not
be reviewed by any other agency, branch, department or official of Government. Once the Supreme
Court has spoken, there the matter must rest. xxx This is indisputable and unshakeable foundation of
public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
GR No. 132601 | January 19, 1999

FACTS:
 Leo Echegaray was convicted of raping his common-law spouse’s ten-year old daughter and was
sentenced to death penalty.
 He filed a Motion for Reconsideration challenging the constitutionality of RA No. 7659, also
known as “The Death Penalty Law” by raising Sec. 19 Art. III of the Constitution, and the
imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape.
 The motion was denied.
 Subsequently, RA No. 8177 was enacted amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code changing
the method of execution from electrocution to lethal injection.
 Petitioner filed a petition to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections from carrying out the execution. The Executive Judge of RTC QC issued a Temporary
Restraining Order temporarily restraining the execution of Echegaray.
 Echagaray contended that:
o The issued TRO is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on
executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives;
o The exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable;
o The Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from
the petition; and
o There is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified
until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
 OSG filed a comment dismissing the claim.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the Court has jurisdiction to issue a TRO.
2. W/N the decision in this case having become final and executory enters the exclusive ambit of
authority of the executive department.

HELD:
1. YES. The Court has jurisdiction to issue a TRO because the Congress would re-examine the death
penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the government,
to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after
deliberation, a limited time for the purpose. The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control
over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgement conformably with established legal
processes.

2. NO. The provision that the President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgement CANNOT be interpreted as denying the
power of Courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgement still possesses collateral rights and these
rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. The temporary suspension of the execution is
not a usurpation of the Presidential power of reprieve.
Quarto v. Marcelo
GR No. 169042 | October 5, 2011

FACTS:
 The Secretary of the DPWH established a Committee to investigate reported irregular
transactions related to the repair and/or procurement of spare parts for service vehicles.
 The Internal Audit of DPWH found that numerous emergency repairs and spare parts purchases
for hundreds of service vehicles, that were supposedly officially approved and funded by the
Government did not occur. As a result, this discrepancy led to Government losses amounting to
approximately P143mn within the 10-month period.
 The Committee initiated before the Office of the Ombudsman, accusing the petitioner, as well as
the respondents, which were official and employees of DPWH, and other private individuals who
allegedly benefited from the questionable transactions.
 The Ombudsman, in turn, filed multiple charges with the Sandiganbayan, accusing the
implicated DPWH officials and employees of plunder, estafa through falsification of documents
etc.
 However, the Ombudsman accededto the respondent’s plea for immunity, agreeing to grant
protection in exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in supporting the prosecution of
the filed cases.
 The petitioner now seeks to nullify the immunity granted to the respondents and to compel the
Ombudsman to include them as accused in the information for estafa through falsification of
public documents.

ISSUE:
W/N the Ombudsman has the power and discretion to grant immunity to witnesses.

HELD:
YES. Pursuant to Ombudsman Act of 1, the Ombudsman has the power and discretion to grant
immunity to the witness.

The Court ruled that in order to enable effective fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for
accountability of public officers, Congress granted the Ombudsman the authority to directly confer
immunity. Additionally, in accordance with Sec. 1 (2) Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court
reiterated the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and
prosecution powers and noted that among them is the power to grant immunity and respects the
initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman – who is beholden to no one, and acts as the
champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.

Hence, the Court deemed it inappropriate and inadvisable to interfere with the Ombudsman’s
grant of immunity to the respondents, especially in this case, wherein the petitioner failed to
convincingly show the grave abuse of discretion that would call for the intervention of the Court.
Manila Electric Company vs. Pasay Transportation Company, Inc.
GR No. L-37878 | November 25, 1932

FACTS:
 The basic question presented by petitioner in this case requesting the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board or arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company, and the
compensation to be paid by the transportation companies to the petitioner.
 Such right is conferred to the petitioner by Sec. 11 of Act No. 1446, which provides that -
 “Whenever any franchise or right of way granted to any other person or corporation,
now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein,
the terms on which said other persons or corporations shall use right of way, and the
compensation to be paid to the grantee therein, shall be fixed by members of the
Supreme Court, as a board of arbitrators, the decision of majority of whom shall be
final.”
 Petitioner relies on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner’s Court, which held that
an Act of a state legislature authorizing Commissioner’s court to fix the rate of toll to be charged
is not unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
W/N the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board or arbitrator, has the legal right to
act in such capacity.

HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court of the Philippines represents one of the three division of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions.
The exercise of “jurisdiction” by the Supreme Court could only mean the exercise of jurisdiction
by the Supreme Court acting as a Court, and could hardly mean the exercise of jurisdiction by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbiters. A board of arbiters is not a “court” in any
proper sense of term.
Following such principles, the Supreme Court holds that sec. 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the
maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it
would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court to act on the petition of Manila
Electric Company. Thus, the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.
Presidential Commission on Good Governance vs. Desierto
GR No. 132120 | February 23, 2003

FACTS:
 Petitioner Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) filed a petition for certiorari
seeking the reversal of the Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman Desierto exonerating
private respondent Herminio Disini of the crimes of corruption of public officials in relation to
bribery and of violation of the Anti-Graft Law.
 The assailed resolution dismissed the charges against Disini for “lack of prima facie evidence”,
while the assailed Order denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
 The PCGG charged Disini with bribing the late President Ferdinand Marcos as a means to induce
him to assist and favor individuals and corporate entities.
 The charge pertained to the “negotiation, award, signing, amendment and implementation of
the main and related contracts for the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) project of the
National Power Corporation, as a result of which the late President Marcos accumulated and
benefited from unlawful acquisition of income or profits.

ISSUE:
W/N the Office of the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the criminal charge against the private respondent Disini.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court reversed and set aside the Resolution
and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against Disini and ordered the
Ombudsman to file in the proper court the appropriate criminal charges against him.
As a general rule, the Office of the Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal
complaints. However, such authority is not absolute; it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.
Verily, the Constitution has tasked the Court “to determine whether or not has been grave of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government”, including the Office of the Ombudsman.
Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction; or to violations of
the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It refers also to cases in which, for various reasons, there
has been a gross misapprehension of facts.
Here, the Ombudsman ruled that there was no testimonial evidence on record showing that
Disini had actually intervened as a special sales representative in negotiations for the PNPP project. This
finding was belied by various records and documents of the case. Considering such, the Ombudsman
acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously in disregarding the evidence and attestations, to say the
least.
Director of Prisons vs. Ang Cho Kio
GR No. L-30001| June 23, 1970

FACTS:
 The respondent Ang Cho Kio and Ang Ming Huy had been charged, tried and convicted of
various offense committed in the Philippines and was sentenced to suffer several penalties such
as imprisonment, moral damages and indemnity. After serving 6 ½ years of his sentence, said
respondent was granted conditional pardon by the President on July 4, 1959, wherein it
provides that the unexecuted portion of the prison terms of the respondents is remitted on a
condition that he will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his release and never to return to
this country. Should the respondents refuse to accept said condition, he shall continue serving
the sentence.
 Ang Cho Koi duly accepted the conditions of his pardon and left the Philippines for Taipei in July
1959.
 In evening of July 1966, Ang Cho Kio arrived at the Manila International Airport on a Philippine
Air Lines from Taipei under the name of “Ang Ming Huy”. Ang Cho Kio was identified by
inspector Mariano Cristi of the Immigration Bureau as Ang Cho Kio. His identity having
established, he was arrested. The Executive Secretary ordered him recommitted to prison to
serve the unexpired portion of the sentence that was imposed on him for having violated the
condition of his pardon.
 Respondent petitioned for habeas corpus which was dismissed by CFI Rizal and affirmed by CA.
The decision stated that respondent should be deported instead of serving his sentence in the
Philippines. The OSG filed with the CA to remove the portion in the decision stating that
respondent be deported. CA denied thus this appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in its decision allowing the respondent to be deported.

HELD:
YES. The Court of Appeals erred in its decision. The case before the CA was for habeas corpus.
The only question to be resolved by CA was whether or not the CFI – Rizal had rightly dismissed the
petition of Ang Cho Kio for habeas corpus. The CA was not called upon to review any sentence imposed
upon Ang Cho Kio. It was simply called upon to determine whether Ang Cho Kio was illegally confined, or
not, in the insular penitentiary under the Director of Prisons.
The Supreme Court found it not proper that the majority of the justices in the special division of
CA to make a recommendation that would suggest a modification or correction of the act of Executive.
For the Court to suggest to the Chief Executive to modify his decision to recommit Ang Cho Kio to prison
by allowing him to leave the country instead is indeed an interference with the functions of the Chief
Executive.
The matter of whether an alien who violated the laws in this country may remain or be deported
is a political question should be left entirely to the Chief Executive to decide. Under the principle of
separation of powers, it is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or express a
suggestion, that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on
matters purely political in nature. After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of
laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the law.
Garcia vs. Board of Investments
GR No. 92024 | November 9, 1990

FACTS:
 There were Taiwanese investors who formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation and applied
with the BOI for its registration as a petrochemical producer located in Limay, Bataan.
 The BOI subsequently approved its application, granting them some fiscal and some other
incentives such as tax exemption from raw materials.
 After a year, the BPC Chairman proposed amendments to its application concerning their
increase of investment amount, change of fuel feedstock from naphtha to LPG. And more
notably, the transfer of site from Bataan to Batangas.
 The BOI later approved the amendment despite the Government’s preference that the site be
located in Bataan, acknowledging that they have the final choice.
 The petitioner herein, as the author of RA No. 6767 that exempts naphtha from ad valorem tax,
filed a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the BOI approving the amendment of the
BPC.

ISSUE:
W/N the BOI committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of petrochemical
plant from Bataan to Batangas.

HELD:
YES. The Court ruled pursuant to Sec. 1 Art. 8 of the Constitution, citing that it has a
Constitutional mandate to step into this controversy.
Firstly, Bataan was the original choice of the BPC to which they agreed. That is why it was named
Bataan.
Secondly, the PNOC is located in Bataan, where it shall be a partner of the BPC in the venture to
the great benefit and advantage of the Government.
Thirdly, it is more economical if the BPC would limit its feedstock to naphtha rather than shifting
to LPG, having no need to import.
Fourthly, the Bataan Refining Corporation, A Filipino corporation, produces 60% of the national
output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the p investments pursuant to national goals and
policies plant in Bataan.
Lastly, it is the Constitutional mandate of the Government to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments.
Hence, such decision of the BOI is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government.
In the Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy vs. Abolition of
JDF and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy
UDK- 15143 | January 21, 2015

FACTS:
 This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and replacing it
with Judiciary Support Fund. Wherein funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund
shall be remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be
used.
 Petitioner Rolly Mijares prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this
Court to exercise its Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy against the perceived hostility
of Congress.
 In the letter petition, Mijares alleges that he is a Filipino Citizen and a taxpayer, and that he filed
this petition as part of his “continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution”.
 Essentially, Mijares asks the Court to strike down the proposed bills abolishing the JDF.
 Petitioner argued that Congress gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:
1. W/N Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this Court to grant the petition and issue a
writ of mandamus.
2. W/N Congress gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence
and fiscal autonomy of the SC.
3. W/N the Court may judicially review proposed bills.

HELD:
1. NO. The Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, the Court
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result”.

Here, the petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the
proposed bill is passed into a law. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial
review before this Court may take cognizance of the case.

2. NO. Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law,
or from setting into motion the legislative bill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following
acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative power are not subject to judicial restraint: the
filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each member of Congress, the
reconciliation by the Bicameral Conference Committee of approved bills, and the eventual
approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation
of Court of specific constitutional limitations, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial
review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress.

3. NO. The Court must act only within its powers granted under the Constitution. This Court is not
empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right
and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. The Court has no power to declare a
proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of
rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress.
Mantruste Systems Inc. v. CA
GR No. 86540-41 | November 6, 1989

FACTS:
 In the original case of Mantruste Systems, Inc. v. DBP Asset Privatization Trust, Makati Agro-
Trading, Inc. and La Filipino Uy Gongco Corporation, RTC Manila Judge Madayag issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against the defendants which the CA nullified for being violative of Sec.
31 of Proclamation No. 50-A which provides:
o “No Court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against
the Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it
… Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchases or assets sold by
the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets sold by the
Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by
him.”
 Judge Madayag contended that the above provision of Proclamation No. 50-A is
unconstitutional because it impinges upon the judicial power as defined in Sec. 1 Art. VIII of the
1987 Constitution.
 The CA denied this stating that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the lower
court against APT may not be justified as a valid exercise judicial power - i.e., the power to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable for
MSI does not have a legally demandable and enforceable right of retention over the hotel.
 In any case, judicial power is “not unqualified”. It may be regulated and defined by the
Constitution and by law, and the law in this case, provides that judicial power may not be
exercised in the form of an injunction against the acts of the APT in pursuance of its mandate.

ISSUE:
W/N the provision of Proclamation No. 50-A is unconstitutional because it impinges upon the
judicial power.

HELD:
NO. Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision in the Constitution. It does
not impair the inherent power of the Courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amount to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, issued
the subject proclamation prohibiting the Courts from issuing restraining orders and writs of injunction
against the APT and the purchasers of any assets sold by it, to prevent Courts from interfering in the
discharge by this instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, absent any grave abuse of
discretion on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having
been repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained operative (under Sec. 3 Art. 18 of the 1987
Constitution).
Under the power of separation of powers, the power of the Courts over the other branches and
instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to the determination of whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” in the exercise of their
authority.
 There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency,
except when it violates a citizen’s constitutional rights, or commits grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council
GR No. 191002 | March 17, 2010

FACTS:
 Considering that Chief Justice Reynato Puno is about to retire as the Chief Justice, petitioners
Arturo De Castro filed a petition for mandamus urging JBC to submit a list of at least 3 nominees
as the next Chief Justice to the incumbent President.
 Intervenors Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN, Corvera etc. take the position that De Castro’s petition was
bereft of any legal basis, because under Sec. 15 Art. VII, the outgoing President is constitutionally
banned from making appointments from March 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010, including the
appointment of the successor of Chief Justice.
 The Office of the Solicitor General contended that the incumbent President was empowered to
appoint the next Chief Justice. It argued that the Judicial and Bar Council’s function to
recommend appointees in the Judiciary was a continuous process, and that the JBC was acting
within its jurisdiction in commencing the process of selecting nominees for the Chief Justice
position. OSG also emphasized that Art. VII Sec. 15 does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court and there is a need to fill the vacancy within 90 days as mandated under Sec. 4
(1) Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
W/N the incumbent President has the authority to make such appointments in the Supreme
Court during the prohibited specified period.

HELD:
YES. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. As can be seen, Article 7 is devoted to
Executive Department and among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President.
The Presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Secs. 14, 15 and 16 of Art. VII. Sec. 16 covers the
presidential appointment that requires confirmation by the Commission of Appointments but such
requirement did not include appointments to the Judiciary.

On the other hand, Art. 8 is dedicated to Judiciary Department and defines duties and
qualifications of members of the Supreme Court. Sec. 4 (1) and Sec. 9 of Art. VIII provide for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices.

Such prohibition for the President to appoint Chief Justices was not done by framers of the
Constitution. The prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within 2
months before the next Presidential elections does not refer to the members of the Supreme Court.
Fortich vs. Corona
GR No. 131457 | August 19, 1999

FACTS:
 The Supreme Court ruled on a MATTER of local government units required to ask for approval of
the Dept. of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural
use.
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondents in which the votes tied 2-2 affirming
the decision.
 As a result, respondents argue that the motion, having reached a tie and not a majority vote,
should have been referred to the Court sitting en banc as stated in Art. VIII Sec. 4 (3) of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
W/N the matter should have been referred to the Court en banc provided that the matter did
not reach a majority.

HELD:
The Court states that the framers of the Constitution intended to establish a distinction between
cases and matters. The provision of Sec. 4 (3) separates “cases and matters” and in the following
sentence, the words “decided” and “resolved” are used separately.

Hence, the words are to be construed respectively from each other. Cases are to be decided
while matters are to be resolved. Here, the motion was merely a matter. Moreover, the provisions
clearly exclude matters from being remanded to the Court en banc when not resolved.

Hence, the motion for reconsideration was denied, the previous resolution on the motions were
affirmed.
Republic of the Philippines v. Garcia
GR No. 167741 | July 12, 2007

FACTS:
 A civil case was filed for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties was filed against Maj. Gen.
Carlos Garcia.
 A resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was issued against the
properties of the Gracias and an attachment bond of 1mn against the Republic.
 The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the Republic, when a party to an
action is exempt from filing an attachment bond, as cited in the Tolentino v. Carlos case.
 Sandiganbayan denied the motion stating that the Tolentino case was decided more than a
century ago and was based on the old Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:
W/N Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of exemption of
the Republic.

HELD:
YES. The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion by disregarding the rule on
Tolentino Case. Under Art. VIII Sec. 4 (3) of the Constitution, only the Supreme Court sitting en banc
may modify or reverse a prior decision laid down. It is not the power of the Sandiganbayan to
“reexamine” or reverse the jurisdiction by the Supreme Court.

Under Secs. 3 and 4 of the 1964 ROC, the filing of the attachment bond and writ of preliminary
attachment were necessary. However, in the Tolentino case, if one of the parties is the government, it is
exempt from filing an attachment bond.
Macasiano v. National Housing Authority
GR No. 107921 | July 1, 1993

FACTS:
 A civil case was filed for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties was filed against Maj. Gen.
Carlos Garcia.

ISSUE:
W/N Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of exemption of
the Republic.

HELD:
YES. The Sandiganbayan