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J.J. Woo
Business and
Politics in Asia's
Key Financial
Centres
Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai
Business and Politics in Asia’s Key Financial
Centres
J.J. Woo
123
J.J. Woo
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
Singapore
The (re)emergence of Asia as an economic power has been accompanied by the rise
of Asian cities as the hubs of financial activity. This book focuses on three of these
cities: Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai. Ranked among the world’s most
competitive financial centres, these three cities have established themselves as
Asia’s leading International Financial Centres (IFCs). In acting as intermediaries for
global flows of capital, these three cities have effectively become the nexuses of
power and finance. This book represents an attempt to understand the ways in
which the political-economic context impacts financial sector development and
policy-making.
In this book, I argue that each city is characterised by its unique policy subsystem
configuration, with financial sector development and policy-making “nested”
within the political-economic context of the IFC’s policy subsystem. In order to
provide a conceptual understanding of how the policy subsystem configuration
impacts policy-making, I introduce the “nested instrumental approach”. As an
integrative framework of analysis that draws on the insights of both the policy
subsystems and the policy instruments approaches, the nested instrumental
approach allows for a more integrated understanding of both political context and
policy considerations in the financial policy process. In doing so, it elucidates the
causal linkages between context and policy.
This focus on context answers an important question that has driven the research
behind this book: How have Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai achieved
comparable levels of success despite differences in their political-economic con-
ditions? While much of the existing analysis tends to focus on economic structural
variables of IFC development and hence compare and rank the three cities on the
assumption of their similarity, the reality is that IFCs differ in many respects.
Specifically, Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai are characterised by their unique
and different political systems, models of financial governance and comparative
advantages. Such differences affect the development trajectory of each IFC and
determine the policy options available to its policy-makers.
vii
viii Preface
With Asian IFCs becoming increasingly influential and powerful, there is a need
to understand the political-economic mechanisms that make these cities “tick”.
Hopefully, this book provides a useful way for more research into these cities.
It also seeks to contribute to ongoing scholarly efforts at theorising the public policy
process. Given the increasingly complex policy environment of today, there is an
ever-greater need for more integrative and context-sensitive frameworks of policy
analysis. The nested instrumental approach presents one such possibility. In
addressing the “nested instrumentality” that is inherent in the financial policy
process, this book addresses the politics of finance, examining the inter-relations
between business and finance in three of the Asia’s top financial centres.
Acknowledgments
This book could not have been possible without the support of the Lee Kuan Yew
School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, where it was first
developed as my doctoral thesis. I am therefore immensely grateful to the School’s
Dean, Professor Kishore Mahbubani for his support and encouragement. My thesis
advisers, M. Ramesh and Michael Howlett, have also been instrumental in their
guidance, having read and commented extensively on earlier versions of this book.
I am also indebted to Darryl Jarvis, for having introduced me to the world of
financial centres and encouraging my interest in international political economy.
Throughout my research and conception of this book, I have had the privilege of
being mentored and guided by a stellar cast of academics. They include Kenneth
Paul Tan, Suzaina Kadir, Dodo J. Thampapillai, John Ravenhill and Richard
Carney. Their work continues to inspire me in my sojourn into the world of public
policy and international political economy, and I am grateful for having had the
opportunity to learn from them. I truly stand on the shoulders of giants.
Last but not least, I am extremely thankful to my family and friends for their love
and support. To my parents and my sister Huiwen, for their constant presence in my
life and the familial love that only they could provide. To Debbie, who has been a
wonderful companion and source of inspiration. I am also thankful to Leong Ching
and G. Nandhakumar for their friendship and hours of intellectually stimulating
conversations. I hope my work does justice to all the support and encouragement I
have received from all of you.
ix
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Determinants of Competitive Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Financial Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Regulatory Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Financial Policy Mix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Financial Policy Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
xi
xii Contents
5 Singapore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Sources of Competitive Advantage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Financial Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Regulatory Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Financial Policy Mix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Financial Policy Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6 Shanghai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Determinants of Competitive Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Financial Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Regulatory Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Financial Policy Mix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Financial Policy Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Contributions to Literature and Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Implications for Policy-Makers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Going Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
About the Author
J.J. Woo is an assistant professor in the Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme
of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University.
He holds a Ph.D. from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National
University of Singapore, and a Master of Science in International Political Economy
from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological
University. His research interests include Singapore politics, international financial
centres and the political economy of finance.
xiii
List of Figures
xv
List of Tables
xvii
Acronyms
xix
Chapter 1
Introduction
Asia has been experiencing rapid economic growth for the past few decades. This
rapid economic expansion has been accompanied by an equally precipitous growth
in the region’s financial markets. As a consequence of this widespread financial-
ization, Asian cities have grown in prominence as International Financial Centres
(IFCs). According to the Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI) 17 that was
released in March 2015, Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo were, respectively,
ranked the third, fourth and fifth most competitive financial centres in the world
(Yeandle 2015). In other words, three of the world’s top five financial centres are
from Asia. Other Asian cities ranked within the GFCI’s top twenty most compet-
itive financial centres include Seoul (seventh) and Shanghai (sixteenth).
It is also impossible to talk about economic development in Asia without
mentioning the rise of China. Asia’s economic development has largely been a
beneficiary of China and its emergence as an economic superpower. Beginning with
the opening up of its economy in 1979 and leveraging on its ample workforce,
China has established itself as the world’s leading producer of goods and services.
With rapid urbanization and an increasingly affluent population, China has also
become a burgeoning consumer market for firms, with China’s growing domestic
demand strengthening Asian supply chains (The Economist 2015). This systematic
significance of China’s economy is even more pronounced in global finance.
China’s financial markets have deepened and grown over the past two decades.
Based on its high savings rate and inward foreign direct investments, China has
accumulated the world’s largest reserves, while outward capital flows have been
growing due to foreign direct investments and global lending by its sovereign
wealth fund Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC) and Chinese companies, both
state-owned and privately held (Dobbs et al. 2013). The Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China Limited (ICBC), a state-owned bank, has also been recognized as a
global systematically important bank by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) (ICBC
2013).
Among the GFCI’s top twenty global financial centres, three cities are strongly
affected by and involved in China’s financial growth. These three cities are Hong
Kong, Singapore and Shanghai. These three cities have experienced economic and
financial growth on the back of China’s economic rise. More importantly, all three
cities are important nodes in China’s ongoing efforts to internationalize its currency,
© Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016 1
J.J. Woo, Business and Politics in Asia’s Key Financial Centres,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-985-1_1
2 1 Introduction
the Renminbi (RMB). While Hong Kong and Singapore are leading offshore RMB
centres, Shanghai is generally recognized as China’s main domestic financial centre
and hence onshore RMB centre.
Given their systematic significance to Asian financial development, this book
focuses on the three IFCs of Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai. It addresses the
political-economic conditions which have contributed to the success of the three
IFCs and emphasizes the importance of sociopolitical context in informing financial
policy processes. This contributes to existing studies of IFC development that tend
to be based solely on the analysis of economic variables and preconditions for
financial sector development. This existing IFC literature is reviewed in the next
chapter. Based on case studies of the three IFCs, I argue that political contextual
variables are important in determining an IFC’s success and defining the nature of
its development.
Based on these existing economic studies of IFC development, financial centre
rankings such as the GFCI tend to be relatively simplistic and overly reliant on
quantifiable measures of competitiveness and connectivity that overstate the
homogeneity of factors contributing to IFC success and development. These factors
typically include strategic location and time zone, clustering and agglomeration of
economic and financial activity, and the presence of transparent and robust regu-
latory and legal infrastructures. Hierarchies of IFCs have been built based on the
prevalence of these factors as well as the size of the financial sector in different
IFCs, implying a convergence among financial centres based on the development of
these common success factors. These hierarchies continue to inform the IFC
rankings that currently hold sway over policy-makers and public opinion on IFC
development and success.
In reality, IFCs are vastly differentiated from each other. Each IFC is involved in
a unique set of financial activities and follows variegated paths of historical and
policy developments. Expectations of regulatory and IFC convergence in the
existing literature provide an inadequate basis for understanding IFC development
and result in an insufficiently comprehensive understanding of the types of policies
required for IFC success. Furthermore, there has been insufficient emphasis on the
political-economic context and set within this context, the policy preferences of
policy-makers underpinning each IFC’s development.
As a result, the existing literature paints an overly homogenous picture of IFC
development, without adequately addressing the political-economic and policy
differences across different IFCs. This is an important point to note, given that
differences exist across the three cases of Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai in
terms of their political systems and context, models of financial governance, the
types of financial markets that each IFC is comparatively advantaged in, and the
financial policies used by their respective governments in IFC development.
Singapore’s rise as a leading IFC has been driven by its strategic geographic
location, political and economic stability, efficient and reliable infrastructure, high
regulatory standards and robust legal system. While offering a broad range of
financial services, Singapore’s financial centre is characterized by its formative role
in the Asian Dollar Market, its deep and liquid capital markets, and its emerging
1 Introduction 3
role as a leading hub for wealth management and insurance (Monetary Authority of
Singapore 2014). Although Singapore’s development as an IFC was initially
state-driven, with the financial sector recognized by the government as a priority
sector contributing to overall economic development, subsequent involvement of
the private sector in financial policy through extensive consultation and dialogues
has resulted in state–industry “co-creation” of financial policies.
Similarly, Hong Kong’s success as an IFC is based on its low taxes, sound legal
system and efficient infrastructure. Furthermore, it benefits from its economic and
political proximity to rising China. This availability of a Chinese “economic hin-
terland” has allowed Hong Kong to become China’s main offshore financial centre
and constitutes the Special Administrative Region’s (SAR) main advantage (Wilson
2012). Hong Kong has since capitalized on this “China advantage” by leveraging
on the ongoing liberalization of the RMB and positioning itself as the leading
offshore RMB centre (Ng 2012).
In contrast to the Singapore government’s more proactive financial policy role,
Hong Kong largely operates according to free market principles, with state inter-
vention kept to a minimum. However, this means that state–industry linkages are
less dense, since the government’s non-interventionist stance does not require as
much feedback from the industry. While industry consultation does take place, it
does not contribute significantly to financial policy-making. Nonetheless, the Hong
Kong government has recently played a more active role in developing a market for
trade in RMB and RMB-denominated investment products, vigorously promoting
itself as the leading offshore RMB centre.
Despite being a relative late comer, Shanghai’s rapid rise over the past decade
has made it the “domestic financial hub of mainland China” and a centre for a
diverse variety of Chinese financial activities (Laurenceson and Tang 2005). It is
also slated to become a full IFC by 2020 (Lim 2013) and aims to become a global
centre for RMB trading by 2015 (Bloomberg 2012). All this is intricately linked to
China’s overall national development, with the state “determining the timing, pace
and economic and spatial configuration of Shanghai’s development” (Lai 2006b).
Shanghai’s economic reforms are thus linked to national goals of economic
development and financialization.
Financial sector development in Shanghai is heavily state-driven, with both
central and municipal government agencies actively involved in financial
policy-making. Like Hong Kong, financial policy-making lies within the control of
the state. However, Shanghai exhibits a much larger extent of state intervention in
financial markets than Hong Kong. Given that a majority of the financial institu-
tions operating in Shanghai are state-owned or joint ventures with state-owned
enterprises, financial market participation in Shanghai is also state-dominated.
Unlike the case of Singapore, there is very little space for private sector industry
actors to influence financial policy-making in Shanghai.
In short, Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai are each driven by their unique
political-economic circumstances, which further feeds into each IFC’s unique
financial policy practices and preferences. Observers have noted that “Asia’s
multiple and varied financial centres reflect not only the region’s vast geography but
4 1 Introduction
also its different economic realities” (The Economist 2007). Despite such distinct
differences in political-economic circumstances, all three cities have rapidly risen
up the ranks to become the fastest growing IFCs in Asia. A core argument of this
book is that such success was achieved through the respective governments’ roles in
formulating and implementing financial policies that are tailored to each IFC’s
political-economic circumstances.
This means that each IFC’s success is underpinned by a unique set or mix of
financial policies. Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai have thus attained com-
parable levels of success as the fastest growing IFCs in Asia based on the imple-
mentation of different mixes of financial policies that reflect their unique individual
political-economic contexts. This extends the analysis beyond the existing litera-
ture’s focus on IFC convergence, which does not adequately take into account such
differences in political-economic context and the types of financial policies
implemented within each IFC but instead overemphasizes commonality in eco-
nomic structural variables.
In short, this book seeks to provide a clearer understanding of how Hong Kong,
Singapore and Shanghai have each risen to their positions as leading Asian IFCs,
focusing in particular on the interactions between the political exigencies of policy
subsystems and policy considerations in the form of policy instruments and mixes.
Given that the existing literature does not provide the analytical tools that allow for
such an undertaking, this book develops an analytical framework termed the
“nested instrumental approach”, which combines the policy subsystem and policy
instruments approaches for a more integrated and nuanced analysis of IFC devel-
opment. This approach is briefly described in the next section and further discussed
in Chap. 3.
In combining the policy subsystem and policy instruments approaches, the
nested instrumental approach provides an integrated framework for analysis that
melds both political context and policy considerations in understanding IFC
development and success. While Chap. 3 provides a deeper discussion of the
approach by delineating its component parts and describing its inherent logic of
“nested instrumentality”, this section briefly introduces the nested instrumental
approach. Figure 1.1 provides a general illustration of the nested instrumental
approach.
As Fig. 1.1 shows, the nested instrumental approach takes the policy subsystem
as its basic unit of analysis. A policy subsystem is essentially a set of “actors with
sufficient knowledge of a problem area, or a resource at stake, to allow them to
Nested Instrumentality
Subsystem
Policy Mix Policy Output
Configuration
design, by combining and integrating the policy instruments and policy subsystems
approaches. While the nested instrumental approach contributes theoretically to
public policy theory, this book is also an empirical study of Hong Kong, Singapore
and Shanghai as IFCs. These three cases are also highly suited for a comparative
IFC study, given their similarities and differences.
The three IFCs are highly comparable. Consistently ranked among the top five
most competitive IFCs globally, Hong Kong and Singapore are the most successful
IFCs to have emerged from Asia. While Shanghai’s position in global rankings has
fluctuated, it remains ranked among the top IFCs in Asia. Furthermore, the Chinese
central government has made clear its intentions to establish Shanghai as a leading
IFC by 2020. Taken together, Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai are the fastest
growing IFCs in Asia. Furthermore, all three IFCs have emerged from similar
historical roles as trading entrepot. While Hong Kong and Singapore first started off
as trading ports for their British colonial masters, Shanghai has a long history of
being a key port for Chinese trade with the rest of the world.
In all three cases, the emergence and development of early financial institutions
was predicated upon the presence of substantial trade activity. As a consequence of
their positions as global trade and finance hubs, Hong Kong, Singapore and
Shanghai are all considered major or “Alpha+” global cities (Sassen 2001; GaWC
Research Network 2011). The three cities also share a similar colonial history. Both
Hong Kong and Singapore started off as British colonies, while Shanghai experi-
enced occupation by Britain, France, the USA and Japan between the Opium War
and the Second World War. The presence of foreign powers in all three cases had
stimulated increased cross-border trading activities and the emergence of financial
services related to foreign trade.
In terms of governance, all three IFCs are run by highly capable and autonomous
governments.1 Since its independence in 1965, Singapore’s People’s Action Party
(PAP) has retained one-party rule. Given continued popular support for the PAP,
the Singapore government possesses an extraordinary amount of policy autonomy
and capacity. Although Hong Kong was returned to Chinese rule in 1997, its status
as a Special Autonomous Region (SAR) has allowed the Hong Kong government to
retain a high level of autonomy in economic policy-making. While Shanghai is
neither an independent state nor an autonomous region but a municipality under
Chinese central government rule, the Shanghai municipal government enjoys sig-
nificant autonomy from the centre (Wu 2000; Lai 2006a), bolstered by the presence
of a pro-growth coalition led by the local government (Zhang 2002).
However, the three cases are also different in two important ways. These dif-
ferences provide a useful basis for comparative study. First, political and policy
arrangements differ across the three IFCs. The Hong Kong government operates
within a highly liberal political environment and plays a minimal role in financial
1
Hong Kong and Singapore are both ranked highly on government effectiveness by the World
Bank’s Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports; for
the effectiveness and autonomy of the Shanghai government, see (Wu 2000).
1 Introduction 7
sector development due to its belief in the free markets. In contrast, the Singapore
government is much more hands-on in its approach to financial sector development,
although industry actors are also heavily involved and influential in the formulation
of financial policies. While Shanghai is similarly state-driven in its financial sector
development, it does not feature private sector actors in financial policy-making due
to the dominance of state-owned banks and financial institutions in its financial
markets.
As such, financial policy-making in Shanghai is almost completely
state-dominated, while that in Singapore is state-led with strong private sector
participation and Hong Kong’s laissez-faire approach features minimal government
intervention that allows private sector actors to drive financial sector development
within the boundaries of the legal and regulatory infrastructure. These differences in
political-economic context flow into differences in the types of policies enacted to
develop the respective financial sectors. This linkage between political context and
the policy process is further discussed in later chapters.
Second, the three IFCs feature distinctly different types of financial markets and
activities. This has resulted in the formation of different comparative advantages
across the three IFCs. Hong Kong’s deep and liquid securities market and proximity
to China have allowed it to establish itself as a loan syndication and offshore RMB
centre. Based on its first mover advantage in establishing the Asian Development
Market and the government’s successful efforts at attracting private banking and
fund management activities, Singapore is well-established as a Foreign Exchange
(Forex) and Wealth Management Centre. Owing to the Chinese government’s fiscal
policies and the size of Shanghai’s primary and secondary sectors, Shanghai has
relatively large and active markets for debt and commodities futures (Jao 2003).
While similarities across the three cases make Hong Kong, Singapore and
Shanghai comparable as case studies, differences in the three cities’ political sys-
tems and financial governance models provide useful independent variables for
studying IFC success in the three cities. Such differences in political context and
financial policy practices are important for illustrating how different financial policy
regimes can lead to comparable levels of IFC development and success. Drawing
on the example of Hong Kong and Singapore, Tan and Lim note that similar levels
of IFC success may be driven by “different philosophies” and different extents of
government intervention (Tan and Lim 2007).
Importantly, differences in the financial sector specializations of the three IFCs
refute the existing literature’s expectations of IFC convergence and suggest the
need for a deeper study of how unique comparative advantages are developed as a
consequence of different policy instruments and mixes used in IFC development.
By delving into the subsystem configurations and policy mixes of each IFC and
how these have driven their individual successes, this book addresses existing gaps
in current understandings of IFC development and success.
The remainder of this book serve to further elucidate and explicate the points
introduced above. A review of the relevant literature is provided in Chap. 2. In this
chapter, I first review the literature on financial policy and financial sector regu-
lation in general, followed by the more specialized IFC literature. However, these
8 1 Introduction
literatures do not adequately explain the exact means through which governments
of IFCs attain success nor do they address the impact of the political-economic
context on IFC development. Hence, there is a need for a new theoretical frame-
work based on an amalgamation of the existing work on policy subsystems and
policy instruments.
This is provided in Chap. 3, which delves into the theoretical framework and
research methodology underlying this book. The theoretical framework that will
guide the analysis in the rest of this book is the “nested instrumental approach”.
This is based on a combination of the policy instruments and policy subsystems
approaches, both of which are discussed in this chapter by way of a brief literature
review. Having provided an overview of the policy instruments and policy sub-
systems literature, this chapter will then discuss the theoretical and conceptual
foundations of the nested instrumental approach. This is followed by a discussion of
the methodology that has informed and guided the research behind this book.
Chapters 4–6 delve into the actual cases, with Chap. 4 focusing on Hong Kong,
Chap. 5 on Singapore, and Chap. 6 on Shanghai. These chapters provide a
descriptive introduction to each IFC, focusing on aspects related to the components
of the nested instrumental approach. Each chapter briefly introduces the IFC and its
historical background and describes its unique comparative advantage, model of
financial governance, regulatory regime, policy mix and policy subsystem config-
uration. Taken together, Chaps. 4–6 provide in-depth descriptions of the cases, with
an emphasis on the political-economic context of each IFC and the policies enacted
to build and develop these IFCs.
Description is naturally followed by analysis. Chapter 7 provides a comparative
analysis of the three cases, explaining similarities and differences across the cases in
terms of their comparative advantages, financial governance models, regulatory
agencies, financial policy mixes and financial policy subsystems. The “nested
instrumental approach” is then applied to the analysis of the three cases, providing
an integrated comparison that combines both political and policy variables.
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings, insights and core arguments of this book,
highlighting in particular its theoretical and empirical contributions to existing IFC
studies. Policy implications and recommendations associated with these findings
are also discussed, along with other potential avenues for research on IFCs. This
chapter will serve as a conclusion for the book.
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University, Leicestershire, UK
Howlett M (2009) Governance modes, policy regimes and operational plans: a multi-level nested
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Chapter 2
IFC Studies and the Politics of Finance
The agglomeration and clustering of financial sector activity within cities has
resulted in the establishment of the IFC as a subject of research and academic
inquiry. IFC studies have also drawn from an existing literature on financial sector
development and policy. Policy-makers seeking to develop their cities as financial
hubs have long recognized the importance of understanding the nature of financial
sector development as well as the financial policies that underpin an IFC’s success.
A well-established literature on financial sector policy and development provides
the analytical tools required for understanding how government policies facilitate or
affect IFC development.
Yet, this literature does not adequately take into account contextual and spatial
variables, focusing instead on financial policy only at a general level and within the
domestic economy. The recognition of these flaws prompted the development of a
more specific literature on IFCs that sought to document and understand the rise and
success of leading IFCs such as London and New York. Predominantly driven by
the work of economists and geographers, these studies contributed to the formation
of a specific literature on IFCs that accounts for spatiality and temporality in
financial policy. Taken together, the literatures on financial policy and IFCs provide
the background information and conceptual knowledge necessary for studying the
success of Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai as IFCs.
Furthermore, there has been a growing interest in the “politics of finance” among
economists and financial experts, with a focus on the influence and implications of
politics on financial sector development. However, this emerging strand of research
remains at a relatively nascent stage. The remainder of this chapter will provide a
critical review of the existing literature on IFCs, financial sector policy and
development, as well as emerging studies on the politics of finance. In providing an
overview of these literatures, this chapter situates the rest of the book within
existing IFC studies and points out the ways in which it contributes to this literature.
Given the financial sector’s role in generating revenues and supporting real eco-
nomic growth, research and scholarly work on financial policy have long been
related to the impact of the financial sector on the real economy. Financial sector
development has been shown to be an important driving force for economic growth
through what is known as a “finance–growth nexus” (De Gregorio and Guidotti
1995; Jayaratne and Strahan 1996; Levine 1997; Beck et al. 2000; Levine et al.
2000; Rajan and Zingales 2001a; Calderón and Liu 2003; Demirguc-Kunt and
Levine 2008; Zhang and Chen 2013), with financial depth identified as a significant
contributing variable to real economic growth (King and Levine 1993). Financial
sector development also stimulates growth less directly by boosting manufacturing
activities and stimulating trade (Beck 2002). Conversely, real economic growth
may also stimulate financial sector expansion via increased savings, suggesting a
“reciprocal externality” between the financial and real sectors within an overall
process of endogenous growth (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996).
Given this important contribution of financial sector development to economic
growth, scholarly work in the fields of economics and IPE has largely been focused
on understanding how states promote economic growth and competitiveness
through financial sector development. However, economists have tended to view
financial sector development as a market-driven consequence of burgeoning supply
and demand for financial services, while IPE scholars have focused on the active,
targeted and often strategic government interventions that drive financial sector
development (Cerny 1993a). Nonetheless, economists have since taken a greater
interest in the stabilizing role of government interventions in financial markets,
especially after the 2008 GFC. This brought a renewed focus on financial policies
as both the cause of and potential solution to financial crises (Krugman 2009;
Claessens et al. 2010; Stiglitz 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt and Servén 2010; Rötheli
2010; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011; Rajan 2011; Roubini and Mihm
2011; Peters et al. 2011; Gertler et al. 2012).
However, these studies remained focused on crisis management measures rather
than measures geared towards building up and developing new financial markets or
sectors. This more developmental focus would be taken up by scholars of IPE, who
in the 1990s focused on the role of the state in promulgating policies aimed at
financial sector development. This state-centric approach has yielded key theoret-
ical innovations such as the developmental state and competition state models
(Cerny 1993a, b; Leftwich 1995; Palan et al. 1996). Other IPE scholars have sought
to understand financial sector development in the context of the international sys-
tem by identifying liberal, realist, pluralist and cognitive models for understanding
global finance (Cohen 1996; Dombrowski 1998). However, these IPE studies did
not as yet provide a sufficiently clear understanding of the precise measures used by
the state to facilitate financial sector development.
This lacuna would be addressed by researchers who focused specifically on the
study of financial policies. At the heart of financial sector development is financial
Financial Sector Policy and Development 13
policy. According to Polak, financial policies relate to both the domestic financial
structure of the economy and the external financial structure, with the latter
including exchange rates, and the rules and institutions that guide capital flows
(Polak 1989). Polak reaffirms the “finance–growth nexus” by noting that economic
development is the “yardstick by which financial flows and financial policies can be
made commensurate” (Polak 1989). This necessitates a strong regulatory role of the
state, with government interventions focused on reducing market failure (Stiglitz
et al. 1993).
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine have emphasized the importance of financial policies
in shaping the “structure and functioning of financial systems” by ensuring political
and macroeconomic stability, establishing the legal and information infrastructure
necessary for financial transactions to take place as well as a regulatory and
supervisory infrastructure that “enables” and empowers markets by encouraging
financial market competition, liberalization and access (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
2008). Similarly, the World Bank’s recent GFDR report emphasizes the role of the
state in better aligning private incentives to private interests, establishing sound
regulatory and supervisory frameworks, encouraging financial market contestability
and competition, promoting transparency of information and strengthening the
governance of state-owned banks (The World Bank 2013).
Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz have also suggested that a set of “financial
restraint” policies form the core of government efforts at financial deepening and
financial sector development (Hellman et al. 1997). Financial restraint policies aim
to create rents in the financial sector through selective government interventions
such as deposit rate controls, regulations on entry and restrictions on competition, in
the process reducing opportunistic behaviour and inducing efficiency among private
market actors (Hellman et al. 1997; Hellman and Murdock 1997). Financial restraint
policies also contribute towards the build-up of ‘reputational capital’ among
private agents and the development of strong governance mechanisms in financial
institutions (Hellman and Murdock 1997).
Of particular importance is the policy instruments that contribute to the man-
agement and governance of the financial sector. Seen from this instrumental per-
spective, financial policy involves seeking the “right balance among policy
instruments”, with financial regulation being part of a set of “complementary
financial policy instruments” (OECD 2006). Financial policy involves a wide array
of government interventions, with financial regulation representing merely one
aspect or type of financial policy. This is particularly the case in East Asia, where
the state’s role in financial markets has involved creating, regulating and even
directing credit to financial institutions, with financial policies serving to both
ensure market stability and encourage financial sector growth (Stiglitz et al. 1993).
Similarly, Carmichael notes that the public sector participates in the financial sector
through its various roles as a regulator of financial institutions, owner of financial
institutions, market participant, fiduciary agent and through direct intervention in
market operations (Carmichael 2002).
This focus on financial policy instruments has culminated in more recent
attempts to provide a typology of financial policy instruments, differentiating
14 2 IFC Studies and the Politics of Finance
between the following: (i) market-developing policies that focus on the long-term
building of institutions and infrastructure; (ii) market-enabling policies that involve
regulatory reforms and encouraging greater competition and (iii) market-stabilizing
policies such as regulatory oversight and macro-prudential management (Barajas
et al. 2013). Much of the existing literature has thus far focused on
market-stabilizing policies, with efforts at understanding market-developing and
market-enabling policies at a relatively nascent stage.
According to mainstream conceptions of financial policy, the raison d’être of
financial policy is essentially the maintenance of market stability and the prevention
of crises. This stabilizing aspect and its inherent objectives of market stability and
investor protection remain the most commonly held view of financial policy. Under
this view, the “core goals” of financial policy are basically the maintenance of
financial system stability and integrity, protection of depositors and investors, as
well as ensuring that financial intermediaries perform their fiduciary duties to their
clients and shareholders (OECD 2006). Financial regulation is a particularly
important stabilizing financial policy that exploits the coercive power of the state to
ensure market stability and protect investors (Stigler 1988).
However, this exercise of coercive state power is founded on an “essential faith
in capitalism” that precludes direct government intervention in markets (Snider
2011). Rather, financial regulation is focused on establishing the systems and rules
that ensure the efficient functioning of markets and prevent the occurrence of any
market failure that may arise from market distortions or information asymmetry
(Vittas 1991).
However, this commonly accepted stabilizing view of financial policy does not
take into account the more active and direct roles of financial policy-makers in
financial sector development. Due to distributional concerns inherent in the political
process, financial regulation has often been used by governments to achieve
objectives that may not be related to market stability and consumer protection, such
as protecting domestic financial institutions or “supporting specific industrial or
regional policies by channelling funds to particular sectors” (OECD 2006). In
conflating financial sector development with industrial policy, financial policy may
also be “strategic” or “developmental” in nature (Cerny 1993). Such
development-oriented financial policies can further be separated into enabling and
developmental policies.
Financial policies can be used to build markets through “enablement—the cre-
ation not merely of incentives but of those conditions that allow activities to take
place” (Baldwin et al. 1998). This often involves the allocation of financial
resources to targeted sectors (Haggard and Lee 1993). Enabling policies also allow
for the establishment and maintenance of “national comparative advantages”, by
constructing conditions and resources that are favourable or necessary for the
efficient functioning of financial markets (Arndt et al. 1988; Porter 1998). In such a
way, enabling policies can be used to reach economic and social policy objectives
by stimulating growth and productivity as well as enhancing competitiveness
through “sectoral liberalization” (International Finance Corporation 2010).
Financial Sector Policy and Development 15
Financial policy also plays a developmental role in ensuring that the financial
system and infrastructure is geared towards the attainment of developmental goals.
Such “development-oriented financial regulation” typically involves the allocation
of financial resources towards developmental goals or the appropriate investment
projects that contribute towards sustainable and equitable economic development
(Chang and Grabel 2004; Murinde and Mlambo 2011). Strategies and policy
instruments for doing so include influencing bank lending to key sectors, long-term
financing by development banks and managing financial firms’ asset holdings
through “variable asset-based reserve requirements” (Chang and Grabel 2004).
Such developmental financial policies are therefore used by states in “devel-
opmentalist fashion” to favour desired market outcomes (Hira 2006). According to
Stiglitz and Uy, financial regulation as a form of development-oriented government
intervention contributed to the rapid growth of emerging Asian nations during the
“East Asian Miracle” (Stiglitz and Uy 1996). Gordon and Li further note that the
Chinese government tends to choose regulations that maximize social welfare
objectives and facilitate the collection of revenue from both foreign and domestic
investors, by using regulation in place of taxes to extract rents (Gordon and
Li 2003).
In short, financial policy comprises three types of policy instruments, namely
stabilizing, enabling and developmental instruments. Stabilizing instruments largely
include financial regulations that are geared towards ensuring financial sector sta-
bility and investor protection; these have traditionally formed the bulk of a financial
policy-maker’s toolkit. Enabling instruments are typically used to establish or
develop the market conditions necessary for financial institutions to operate and
thrive and are closely related to industrial policy. Lastly, developmental instruments
refer to financial policies that allow policy-makers to directly channel resources
towards financial sectors or markets which in turn contribute to the overall eco-
nomic development of the IFC. As later chapters will show, stabilizing, enabling
and developmental instruments are used in varying extents by financial
policy-makers in Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai, based on the sociopolitical
contexts within which these policy-makers are enmeshed.
However, the existing scholarly work on financial sector policy is limited by its
assumption of a unitary monolithic state. Almost all the studies reviewed in this
section take the “state” or “government” as the basic unit of analysis and agency. In
reality, the formulation and implementation of financial policies are carried out by a
wide variety of state and non-state actors. These typically include public agencies at
all levels of government as well as industry actors, whether exerting their influence
over the financial policy process directly or working through industry associations.
Litan et al. (2002) provide a more nuanced approach to understanding financial
policy by including the entire “range of institutions and practices by which
authority is exercised”, terming such an approach financial sector governance rather
than policy. This book takes a similar approach by emphasizing financial gover-
nance in its totality of policy subsystems and instruments over a narrow focus on
financial policy.
16 2 IFC Studies and the Politics of Finance
The origins of the IFC literature can be traced back to early studies by economists on
financial centres, which were largely based on a desire to understand the emergence
of financial centres as centralized locations of financial and economic activity in the
1950s. These studies allowed scholars to establish clear definitions of what a financial
centre is and understand the factors which have contributed to the emergence of
major successful IFCs such as London and New York. An oft-cited and succinct
definition of a financial centre is provided by Kindleberger, who defines a financial
centre as “a single worldwide center with the highly specialized functions of lending
abroad and serving as a clearinghouse for payments among countries” (Kindleberger
1974). This means that financial centres typically perform “medium-of-exchange”
and “interspatial store-of-value” functions (Kindleberger 1974).
According to Reed (1981), a “financial center is an urban area which contains a
concentration of specialized institutions that possess, at least marginally, the
international skills and capabilities necessary to facilitate the flow of goods, ser-
vices, information and capital between its own national economy and the other
national economies of the world”. Park (1982) provides a more nuanced approach
by differentiating between “primary, booking, funding and collecting” financial
centres, with each type of centre based on the range and type of international
financial transactions that take place within it.
Aside from providing broad general definitions of financial centres, these early
IFC scholars also sought to delve deeper into the exact characteristics which make a
particular location a financial centre. An important characteristic is the size, liquidity
and complexity of financial markets as measured by the number of financial insti-
tutions and mobility of capital or funds (Kindleberger 1974; Giddy 1983; Choi et al.
1986; Pagano et al. 1990). Reflecting the international nature of financial centres, a
related characteristic is the presence of foreign financial institutions and non-resident
market participants (Dufey and Giddy 1978; Choi et al. 1986; O’Brien 1992).
Another random document with
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Aconteció una vez que se alzó un muchacho; y después de haber
estado cerca de un cuarto de hora en la susodicha forma de
interrogante, sin obtener respuesta, díjole don Bernabé:
—¡Corre, que te pillan!
Y el chico apretó á correr hacia la puerta.
—¿Adónde va, candonga?—le gritó el dómine.—¡Vuelva, vuelva, y
póngamelo en latín!
Volvió el muchacho, y, torpe y atarugado, comenzó á decir:
—Curre... quod... pillant...
—¡No estás tú mal pillo, calabaza!—Y deslomóle de un bastonazo.
—¡Á ver, el otro!
Y como el otro no estuviese más acertado que su antecesor,
continuó el de más allá, y luego el que le seguía, y después el otro,
y, por último, los mayoristas, que tampoco supieron vencer la
dificultad, con lo que don Bernabé fué entrando en calor, y la
bromita del «corre, que te pillan» acabó en tragedia.
Tal era el lado cómico de este personaje. Fiar en sus chistes,
equivalía á retozar con el tigre. Al fin, siempre había zarpada.
IV
Y ahora quisiera tener yo á mi lado á los más sutiles fisiólogos del
mundo, para que me explicaran el fenómeno de aquella singular
naturaleza; cómo podía ser á un mismo tiempo el más empedernido
y sanguinario de los maestros, y el mejor de los hombres. Porque es
de saberse que don Bernabé Sáinz, fuera de su cátedra, lo era de
pies á cabeza. Jamás he conocido persona más inofensiva, más
sencilla, más bondadosa. Un niño le engañaba en la calle, un
juguete le entretenía, el menor acontecimiento le asombraba. Su
integridad rayaba en manía.
Tenía pupilos, ordinariamente. Cuando se trataba de repasarles la
lección, era el tigre del Instituto; pero en la mesa, en el paseo, en la
intimidad del hogar, era un amigo, un padre cariñosísimo para ellos,
como lo era para todos sus discípulos en cuanto dejaban de serlo.
Á mi modo de ver, era un pobre hombre poseído de un demonio: el
demonio del fanatismo, el fanatismo de la enseñanza. Si castigaba á
un discípulo con un día de calabozo, dejaba de comer para ir á
tomarle la lección de la tarde en el calabozo mismo. Iba á clase
hasta con calentura á cumplir con su deber, y su deber era enseñar
latín, porque creía haber nacido para eso. Si una consulta sobre la
traducción pendiente le robaba el sueño, tanto mejor: ningún hecho
más digno, en su concepto, de consignarse en la hoja de servicios
de sus alumnos. Presentaba los buenos en un examen con el
orgullo y el amor de un general que ve desfilar, en ostentosa parada,
á sus valientes veteranos cargados de cruces; y hablaba de ellos en
todas partes, y los seguía con la atención á la Universidad, y aunque
allí claudicasen, jamás los apartaba ya de su memoria. Llena de
esos nombres la tuvo hasta la hora de su muerte. Muchas veces me
los citó conmovido y entusiasmado, y por el menos brillante de
aquellos «chicos» hubiera dado él, sin titubear, á ser preciso, la
diestra con que tantas veces le deslomó á varazos.
En una ocasión, después de haber oído la razón que le dió un
discípulo de haber faltado á la clase el día antes, le oí decir:
—Candonga, ¿y por eso no vino? ¿Sabe cómo vengo yo todos los
días y cómo vivo? Pues óigalo, calabaza. Hace veinte años que
estoy enseñando latín, y quince que la mujer no sale de la cama; me
consume cuanto gano, y no tengo más que lo puesto; los únicos
ahorros que había hecho se los presté á un compañero que no me
los ha de pagar en los días de su vida, y lo mejor de cada noche me
lo paso en claro velando á la enferma. ¿Les parece poco? ¡Ah,
candonga! ¡Si os cogieran los tiempos que á mí me cogieron para
aprender latín, ya os darían confites en estos lances, y os
guardarían los miramientos que yo os guardo! Enfermo, y con la
nieve á la rodilla, fuí yo una noche á casa de un compañero que
tenía Calepino; para sacar un significado de la traducción del día
siguiente... Y ¡pobre de mí, candonga, si llego á ir al aula sin
sacarle!... Y sepan, calabaza, que para entonces ya había servido
yo al rey seis años en una compañía de fusileros: dos de soldado
raso, uno de furriel y tres de sargento.
He aquí algo á que se agarrarían los fisiólogos llamados á explicar
las crueldades profesionales de un hombre tan manso y apacible.
Don Bernabé enseñaba como le habían enseñado á él: á estacazos.
La costumbre fué haciéndose naturaleza poco á poco. La escasez
de entendimiento, lo extremado del amor al oficio, los resabios del
cuartel y las tradiciones del sistema, hicieron lo demás. No era á sus
ojos mayor delito que echar malè en una lección, faltar con palabras
un soldado raso á un triste cabo segundo; y, sin embargo, la
Ordenanza militar castiga estas faltas con el presidio, si no con la
muerte, ¡y él se conformaba con apalear á los delincuentes de su
cátedra!
Hasta dónde llegaban su sencillez y su puntillo de hombre de cuenta
y razón, muéstralo el hecho siguiente, que no fué el único en su
género:
Llegóse una vez á cobrar la paga del mes á secretaría, y diéronsela
con la merma de cierta cantidad que le correspondía pagar por no
sé qué gastos hechos por todo el Claustro de profesores.
—Venga mi paga entera,—dijo don Bernabé negándose á recoger lo
que le entregaban.
—Pues ahí la tiene usted—le replicaron.—Tanto que usted debe, y
tanto que le entrego, hacen lo que le corresponde.
—¡Venga mi paga entera, candonga!—insistió.
Diéronle lo que le faltaba.
—¿Cuánto debo yo?—preguntó al tener todo el dinero en la mano.
—Tanto.
—Pues ahí va,—dijo entregándolo y guardándose el resto después
de contarlo.
—¿Cuánto le queda á usted ahora?
—Tanto.
—Lo mismo que yo entregaba á usted antes.
—Nunca lo negué, candonga; pero yo soy hombre de cuenta y
razón, y para tan cortos caudales no necesito mayordomos; y como
pago de lo mío, quiero pagar con mi mano, ¡calabaza!
El nuevo plan de estudios le transformó radicalmente. Continuó
siendo en la cátedra una fiera, pero con bozal y sin uñas. Perdió así
lo mejor de sus bríos, y se entibió su entusiasmo por la enseñanza.
No la comprendía sin palos y sin sangre. Andaba triste y
desperdigado; y como ya era viudo y sin hijos, se casó con la criada.
Le dieron una cencerrada espantosa: tres noches duró; y no duró
más, porque habiéndole insultado groseramente los actores, los
dispersó á tiros desde el balcón, en lo cual obró como un sabio y en
justicia.
Murió el año de 1865, víctima del cólera que diezmó la población de
Santander; y es de advertir que ni este espantoso azote pudo doblar
aquel rígido carácter antes de romperle, puesto que don Bernabé
fué á cátedra invadido ya por la enfermedad, salió á la hora
reglamentaria, y sólo se metió en el lecho para rendir cristianamente
el alma á Dios.
En resumen, lector: en mi sentir, las crueldades del dómine, aunque
lamentables, é hijas, más que del corazón, del tiempo, de las
costumbres y de las leyes que las toleraban y hasta las aplaudían,
no hacen al íntegro y virtuosísimo personaje indigno de la
estimación de las gentes hidalgas. Me complazco en declararlo así,
en honra del hombre que más me ha hecho padecer en menos
tiempo. Pero no me arrepiento de haber pintado á Filipo por los dos
lados; pues si el vivir bajo el imperio de su barbarie me acongojaba
entonces, hoy, que tengo hijos, me espanta el pensar que puede
quedar todavía algo de ella en los centros de enseñanza...
Obra es, pues, de caridad sacar esa barbarie al rollo, para lección
de incautos y castigo de verdugos.
1878.
LAS TRES INFANCIAS[7]