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Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics
Edited by: Michelle Egan, American University, USA, Neill Nugent, Emeritus Professor, Manchester
Metropolitan University, UK and William Paterson OBE, University of Aston, UK
Editorial Board: Christopher Hill, Cambridge, UK, Simon Hix, London School of Economics, UK,
Mark Pollack, Temple University, USA, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Oxford, UK, Morten Egeberg, Univer-
sity of Oslo, Norway, Amy Verdun, University of Victoria, Canada, Claudio M. Radaelli, University
of Exeter, UK, Frank Schimmelfennig, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Switzerland
Following on the sustained success of the acclaimed European Union Series, which essentially pub-
lishes research-based textbooks, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics publishes cutting edge
research-driven monographs.
The remit of the series is broadly defined, both in terms of subject and academic discipline. All
topics of significance concerning the nature and operation of the European Union potentially fall
within the scope of the series. The series is multidisciplinary to reflect the growing importance of
the EU as a political, economic and social phenomenon.
Titles include:
Carolyn Ban
MANAGEMENT AND CULTURE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMISSION
From Diversity to Unity?
Gijs Jan Brandsma
CONTROLLING COMITOLOGY
Accountability in a Multi-Level System
Edoardo Bressanelli
EUROPARTIES AFTER ENLARGEMENT
Organization, Ideology and Competition
Ramona Coman, Thomas Kostera and Luca Tomini (editors)
EUROPEANIZATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
From Incremental to Structural Change
Véronique Dimier
THE INVENTION OF A EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT AID BUREAUCRACY
Recycling Empire
Helene Dyrhauge
EU RAILWAY POLICY-MAKING
On Track?
Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio M. Radaelli (editors)
RESEARCH DESIGN IN EUROPEAN STUDIES
Establishing Causality in Europeanization
Jack Hayward and Rüdiger Wurzel (editors)
EUROPEAN DISUNION
Between Sovereignty and Solidarity
Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik Meyer (editors)
SOCIETAL ACTORS IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Christian Kaunert and Sarah Leonard (editors)
EUROPEAN SECURITY, TERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Tackling New Security Challenges in Europe
Christian Kaunert and Kamil Zwolski
The EU AS A GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR
A Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA
Marina Kolb
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
Finn Laursen (editor)
DESIGNING THE EUROPEAN UNION
From Paris to Lisbon
Cathal McCall
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND PEACEBUILDING
Pontus Odmalm
THE PARTY POLITICS OF THE EU AND IMMIGRATION
Dimitris Papadimitriou and Paul Copeland (editors)
THE EU’s LISBON STRATEGY
Evaluating Success, Understanding Failure
David Phinnemore
THE TREATY OF LISBON
Origins and Negotiation
Evangelia Psychogiopoulou
CULTURAL GOVERNANCE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Protecting and Promoting Cultural Diversity in Europe
Ariadna Ripoll Servent
INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Claudia Sternberg
THE STRUGGLE FOR EU LEGITIMACY
Public Contestation, 1950–2005
Yves Tiberghien (editor)
LEADERSHIP IN GLOBAL INSTITUTION BUILDING
Minerva’s Rule
Liubomir K. Topaloff
POLITICAL PARTIES AND EUROSCEPTICISM
Amy Verdun and Alfred Tovias (editors)
MAPPING EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff (editors)
THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE
Context, Implementation and Impact
Sarah Wolff
THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INTERNAL SECURITY
Jan Wouters, Hans Bruyninckx, Sudeshna Basu and Simon Schunz (editors)
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE
Assessing EU Participation in United Nations Human Rights and Environmental Fora
Ozge Zihnioglu
EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SOCIETY POLICY AND TURKEY
A Bridge Too Far?
You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please
contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and
address, the title of the series and one of the ISBNs quoted above.
Edited by
Evangelia Psychogiopoulou
Department of International and European Law, Faculty of Law,
Maastricht University, The Netherlands
Selection, introduction, conclusion and editorial matter © Evangelia
Psychogiopoulou 2015
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2015
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
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save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
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work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
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DOI 10.1057/9781137453754
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Contents
Acknowledgements viii
Notes on Contributors ix
Introduction 1
Evangelia Psychogiopoulou
v
vi Contents
References 247
Index 283
Tables
vii
Acknowledgements
The idea for this book arose shortly before the start of my Marie Curie
fellowship at Maastricht University. Special thanks should go first to the
contributors to this volume for their enthusiastic support throughout
its preparation. The bulk of the editorial and writing work on my behalf
took place at Maastricht University, which provided a highly stimulating
environment and an ideal place for research and writing. I am grate-
ful to Bruno de Witte for thoughtful comments, Sara Crowley-Vigneau
and her team at Palgrave Macmillan for their friendly cooperation,
the anonymous reviewer of the book proposal for providing helpful
advice and the series’ editors for useful suggestions in putting this
book together. I am also grateful for the funding received from the
People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Sev-
enth Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under grant agreement
PIEF-GA-2012-327091. The book reflects only the authors’ views. The
European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the
information contained therein.
Evangelia Psychogiopoulou
viii
Contributors
Mira Burri is a senior research fellow and a lecturer at the World Trade
Institute of the University of Bern. She leads a project on digital tech-
nologies and trade governance and teaches courses in international
media, intellectual property and trade law. She is the co-editor of the
publications Free Trade versus Cultural Diversity (2004); Digital Rights
Management: The End of Collecting Societies? (Staempfli et al., 2005);
Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural Expressions in a Digital Envi-
ronment (2008); Governance of Digital Game Environments and Cultural
Diversity (2010); and Trade Governance in the Digital Age (2012). She
recently published Public Service Broadcasting 3.0: Legal Design for the
Digital Present (2015). Her publications are available at: http://ssrn.com/
author=483457.
ix
x Notes on Contributors
and the mass media. She recently published with Barendt, Bosland and
Hitchens, Media Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2014), and is a founding
editor of The Journal of Media Law.
Juris Doctor degree (2001) from the University of Perugia and a Master of
Research (2003) and a PhD in Law (2007) from the European University
Institute in Florence.
Tim Raats is a senior researcher for the Centre for Studies on Media,
Information and Telecommunication (iMinds-SMIT). He holds a PhD
xiv Notes on Contributors
1
2 Introduction
key questions about the EU’s ability to ensure intercultural and cohe-
sive societies based on mutual understanding, tolerance and respect for
shared values. Significantly, the recent economic crisis and the period of
austerity that it triggered, with growing disparities between and within
the member states, and harsh budget cuts, including in the field of cul-
ture (Bonet and Donato, 2011), have also had a profound impact on EU
cultural action. Culture has been seen as a major source of employment
and a facilitator of social cohesion, becoming intrinsically connected
to the EU’s industrial, economic and social policies (Council, 2011a).
Such developments have been complemented by the strengthening and
consolidation of the EU’s involvement in fundamental rights. The entry
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has given treaty status to the Charter
of Fundamental Rights (CFR) of the EU, which contains various culture-
related provisions. EU legislation that sets fundamental rights standards
has, in turn, significantly expanded, and some of these standards have
important cultural repercussions.1
This book seeks to explore how the EU adapts to changing paradigms
in its confrontation with culture. In what ways does the EU intervene
in the field of culture and through what policies and processes? How
are cultural issues framed at EU level and in the pursuit of what objec-
tives? What are the instruments and tools to which they give vent and
what is the latter’s rationale? Further, have changes in global governance
affected the ways in which the EU engages with culture? How does the
EU intersect with various international organisations that have a remit
or interest in the cultural field? These are the main questions that this
book sets out to address. In doing so, it aspires to work towards a better
understanding of the contribution of the EU to cultural governance.
Cultural governance is not yet recognised as a distinguished research
field (Čopič and Srakar, 2012). According to the Council of the EU
(Council), ‘[it] should be understood both as a method for delivering
cultural policies . . . [and] as a tool for deepening the integration of cul-
ture into the public policy agenda by coordinating cultural policies with
other sectoral policies’ (Council, 2012a: para. 6). Hence, for the Coun-
cil, cultural governance encompasses cultural policies in the strict sense,
that is, the policies concerned with culture as such, and the processes
through which these are formed as well as the whole range of policies
that relate one way or the other to culture. Cultural governance then
naturally extends to the instruments that such ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’
cultural policies involve, in the form of regulatory tools but also finan-
cial instruments and soft law or coordinating mechanisms. Bearing in
mind that a diversity of ‘culture’ terms exists (Bennett and Frow, 2008)
Evangelia Psychogiopoulou 3
both in academic and public discourse, Schmitt (2011) argues that both
‘narrower’ and ‘wider’ concepts of cultural governance are conceivable,
in line with the actual field of governance. Cultural governance may
concern policies on the arts, literature and tangible and intangible her-
itage. It may concern media policies or policies on a wider variety
of cultural and creative forms of expression, ranging from contempo-
rary music to design. It may also pertain to such issues as religion,
language and identity and therefore be closely associated with the recog-
nition and safeguarding of rights, such as equality rights or minority
rights.
In order to probe the contribution of the EU to cultural governance,
this book explores EU policies and instruments, which are of direct or
indirect relevance and importance to culture. It also sheds light on the
cultural dimension of the EU system of protection of fundamental rights.
The analysis is structured in four parts. The first part is devoted to the
EU’s cultural policy proper. Chapter 1 by Rachael Craufurd Smith traces
the early forays of EU institutions into the field of culture and discusses
the progressive development of a distinct EU cultural policy. Chapter 2
by Annabelle Littoz-Monnet explores the influence that the economic
rationale which underlies much of the EU’s activity has exerted on EU
cultural policy. Chapters 3 and 4 by Evangelia Psychogiopoulou and
Anna Kandyla address, respectively, key instruments of EU cultural pol-
icy: the newly launched cultural open method of coordination and the
Creative Europe programme (European Parliament and Council, 2013a).
The second, third and fourth parts of the book extend beyond the
EU’s cultural policy stricto sensu, probing the connections between cul-
ture and other fields of EU action (as well as their limits). Part II inquires
into the ways culture interconnects with a number of EU internal poli-
cies that have a predominant economic and market-oriented focus.
Chapter 5 by Tania Kyriakou focuses on the EU legal measures that
seek to reconcile the free movement of goods with the protection of
member states’ cultural treasures. Chapter 6 by Kristina Irion and Peggy
Valcke addresses the EU’s audiovisual media and electronic communica-
tion policies. Chapters 7 and 8 examine EU copyright law and policies:
Giuseppe Mazziotti discusses a broad range of copyright harmonisation
instruments, whereas Katherine Sarikakis deals specifically with collec-
tive rights management for the online exploitation of musical works.
Chapters 9 and 10 elaborate on the application of EU competition rules
in the field of culture. Delia Ferri studies the EU treatment of state
funding for the audiovisual sector, publishing, heritage protection and
cultural content more broadly. Karen Donders and Tim Raats delve into
4 Introduction
the application of EU state aid rules to state support for public service
media, which are commonly entrusted with cultural tasks.
Part III considers whether or not stronger EU commitment to fun-
damental rights has affected how cultural issues are characterised and
addressed at EU level. Chapter 11 by John Morijn examines the CFR and
the potential for its provisions to influence the way in which cultural
and economic concerns are balanced in the EU. Chapter 12 by Céline
Romainville discusses the CFR’s non-recognition of a right for every-
one to access culture. Chapter 13 by Tawhida Ahmed analyses minority
rights protection in the EU.
Part IV is concerned with the EU’s external policies and their cul-
tural dimension, their nesting with the policies prescribed by inter-
national organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO), and the EU cultural relations with partner countries
and regions. Chapter 14 by Mira Burri engages in a study of the cul-
tural discourse employed by the EU in the WTO, discussing moves
from a defensive ‘cultural exception’ towards a more proactive ‘cul-
tural diversity’ agenda. Chapters 15 and 16 examine different models
of EU cultural cooperation with third countries. Jan Loisen focuses on
the incorporation of cultural cooperation protocols in EU trade and
economic agreements, as well as the conclusion of stand-alone cultural
cooperation agreements with third countries, as a means to implement
the UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diver-
sity of cultural expressions (UNESCO, 2005), to which the EU is party
(Council, 2006). Selecting the Latin America and Mediterranean regions
as case studies, Carmina Crusafon points to the variety of policies,
instruments and processes upon which EU cultural cooperation with
partner countries is based.
Building on the previous chapters, the analysis ends with some con-
cluding observations by Evangelia Psychogiopoulou on EU treatment of
culture.
Note
1. See for instance Council (2000a, 2000b).
Part I
EU Cultural Policy
1
The Cultural Logic of Economic
Integration
Rachael Craufurd Smith
Introduction
I would like to thank James Buchan for his help with the editing of this chapter.
7
8 EU Cultural Policy
traditional ‘elite’ cultural expressions could all fall within the scope
of the Treaty, along with measures designed to ensure funding for the
cultural and creative sectors.
Subsequent state and judicial practice confirmed this view. Thus, a
specific derogation for performing artists and musicians from the free
movement of workers provisions during the transitional period was
adopted in order to protect domestic performers from being undercut
by foreign labour (Haase, 1975: 33). If any doubts remained, these were
removed by the Court of Justice of the EU (former European Court of
Justice, ECJ) in its 1968 Commission v. Italy art treasures ruling.1 This con-
firmed that the TEEC covered all products that could be the subject of
commercial transactions, including the art treasures at issue in the case.2
If the TEEC was culturally blind in terms of its scope, it was not cultur-
ally agnostic in terms of its application. Its primary target was cultural
chauvinism, in that for economic integration to be effective, member
states would have to dismantle their exclusionary trade and employ-
ment rules, opening the way to a new culture of exposure, tolerance
and accommodation. In particular, Articles 7 and 119 TEEC prohibited,
within the scope of the TEEC, all discrimination on grounds of national-
ity and required equal pay for men and women for equal work. Products
and workers could no longer be excluded from domestic markets simply
on the basis that they originated in another member state or, in certain
contexts, be discriminated against on the basis of their sex.
Three cultural aspects of economic integration merit particular atten-
tion here. The first is the extent to which the free movement and
competition rules in the TEEC restricted the capacity of member states
to steer cultural developments within their territories. Not only did the
TEEC prohibit explicit forms of discrimination based on nationality or
sex, it also put in place mechanisms by which even apparently non-
discriminatory measures could be monitored to ensure that they did not
operate indirectly to perpetuate discrimination. In an important line of
cases, finding its roots in Dassonville,3 and Cassis de Dijon,4 the ECJ held
that the free movement provisions of the TEEC could apply to domestic
rules that indirectly impede access to foreign goods, services and work-
ers. As a result, a range of culturally motivated regulations that many
states would have expected to fall outside the scope of the TEEC were
brought under judicial scrutiny. The ECJ, however, also acknowledged
that ‘indistinctly applicable measures’ of this type could potentially be
justified on a range of public interest grounds, which subsequent cases
have confirmed include cultural concerns, such as the maintenance of
media pluralism,5 and linguistic diversity.6
10 EU Cultural Policy
Evidence suggests that the faith the founders placed in the cultural logic
of economic integration may not have been misplaced, in that individ-
ual interaction with different groups can increase appreciation of living
in a multicultural society. Citizens who engage in cultural exchanges
have been found, for example, to be far more likely to consider that
diversity highly enriches the culture of their own country than those
who do not (27 percent v. 15 percent – The Gallup Organisation, 2007:
7),16 while those who report that they have had recent contact with
a representative of a non-mainstream culture have been found twice
as likely to express ‘cosmopolitan’ views as those who did not (30
percent v. 16 percent (ibid.: 9)). Nevertheless, the number of individ-
uals with an open, cosmopolitan mindset varies considerably within
and across member states. In a recent Eurobarometer study, two-thirds
of Europeans (67 percent) were ranked ‘low’ on the study’s ‘openness
index’, assessing Europeans’ openness to other EU countries (European
Commission, 2013a: 43–44).17 There has also been a downward trend
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proved ever fertile soil for plots and rebellions. Had the latter
depended for their source only on race hatred, Muley Hacen,
prompt, cunning, and pitiless, might have proved their match. It was
that curse of Eastern politics, the quarrels of the harem, that acting
on his sensual nature betrayed his statesmanship.
When well advanced in middle age, the Sultan had fallen a victim
to a slave girl of Christian origin and had raised her to the position of
his favourite wife, the Arabs calling her for her beauty “Zoraya,” or
“Light of the Morning.” This woman, who was as ambitious and
unscrupulous as she was fair, made common cause with a certain
Emir, Cacim Venegas, a descendant of an old Cordovan family, to
ruin all who opposed their power; and to their machinations had
been due the horrible massacre of the Abencerrages in the Alhambra,
whose name still marks the scene of the crime.
Chief of Zoraya’s enemies was the deposed favourite of the harem,
“Aixa,” “the Pure,” a Moorish lady of high birth and spotless
character, whose son, Abu Abdallah, more often alluded to by the
chroniclers as “Boabdil,” was universally regarded as his father’s
heir. To bring about his death and thus prevent his accession was the
main object of Zoraya’s life; but her rival was well aware of this and,
taking advantage of the fall of Alhama and the consequent loss of
Muley Hacen’s reputation as a general, she laid her schemes for
placing the sceptre in Boabdil’s hands.
The Sultan learnt of the plot on his return to Granada; and,
determining to exact vengeance at his leisure, he imprisoned his wife
and son in one of the strong towers of the Alhambra. All seemed lost;
but Aixa, inspired by the courage of despair, knotted together the
gaily coloured scarves that she and her ladies were wont to wear, and
by this rope let down Boabdil from her window to the banks of the
Darro. Here some attendants, who had been secretly warned,
awaited him; and the Moorish prince, setting spurs to his horse, went
swiftly to Guadix, a town perched amid the mountains of the
Alpujarras.
ARMS BELONGING TO BOABDIL
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY
ANDERSON, ROME
This defeat [says the Curate of Los Palacios] was marvellous for the small band
of Moors by whom it was inflicted. It would seem that Our Lord consented,
because robbery or merchandise rather than His service had been the thought of
the majority. For many of the same acknowledged that they went not to fight
against the Infidels, as good Christians who had confessed their sins and received
the Sacrament, and made their will, and wished to fight against their enemies and
conquer them for the sake of the Holy Catholic Faith;—for but few of them had this
desire.
The shame and sorrow, aroused by the retreat from Loja, was as
nothing to the lamentations over this new disaster. There was
scarcely a man or a woman in Andalusia, it was said, who had not
cause to weep; but Castilian fortunes had touched their lowest depth.
“The good are punished for a time,” says the Curate of Los
Palacios, “because they have neglected God; but always He returns to
succour and console them.”
The victory of Ajarquia had redounded to the credit of Muley
Hacen, and still more to that of his brother “El Zagal,” with the result
that the popularity of Boabdil began to wane. Necessity demanded
that the young Sultan should take some steps to show his ability as a
general; and, since he was neither devoid of courage nor ambition, in
April, 1483, the gates of Granada were opened to permit the exodus
of himself and the flower of his nobility at the head of a picked army
of horse and foot. His plan of campaign was, marching through the
vega, to cross the Genil near Loja, where he would be reinforced by
his father-in-law, Aliator, and then on again beyond the Christian
frontier, till he arrived at Lucena in Andalusia, the object of his
attack.
So much he achieved without difficulty; but the more superstitious
of his following shook their heads. Had not the King’s horse
stumbled in the very gateway of Granada, causing his master to
shiver his lance against the arch above? Had not a fox, also, rushed
scatheless through the army, almost in front of Boabdil himself,
without suffering hurt from the many arrows aimed at her? These
were ill omens.
More disconcerting for military minds was the bold defiance of
Don Diego Fernandez de Cordova, the youthful Governor of Lucena.
The Moors had hoped to surprise the town, but it was obvious news
of their coming had preceded them; for hardly had they spread
through the immediate neighbourhood, burning and pillaging, than
Don Diego and a small force of Christians flung open the gates and
began to attack them. This they would hardly have dared to do, had
they believed themselves unsupported; and Boabdil and Aliator,
looking behind them to account for this temerity, saw to their horror
the sun glittering on Christian spears and banners.
It was the Count of Cabra, uncle of Don Fernandez, with a troop of
not more than two hundred horse and double that number of foot;
but the sound of his trumpets re-echoing in the hills, and the curve of
the road by which he came, as it descended to the plain, lent to his
host a phantom size. The Moors at any rate believed it the whole
Christian army, and at the first onslaught their infantry broke and
fled. The cavalry still continued the battle fiercely, till the arrival of
Don Alonso de Aguilar with reinforcements from Antequera, and the
death of Aliator deprived them of the last hope of victory. Then
defeat became a rout; and some, surrendering, begged for mercy,
while others, missing the ford across the river in their hurry to
escape, were drowned in the heavy flood. A few returned to Loja, but
their king was not amongst them. Crouching amongst the low bushes
by the waterside, his scimitar struck from his hand, Boabdil, “the
Unfortunate” as astrologers had proclaimed him at his birth, was
forced to surrender, and led a captive to the city he had meant to
conquer.
The question of his fate was a matter for profound discussion in
Castilian councils. At first it was suggested that he should be placed
under lock and key in some inaccessible fortress; but the Marquis of
Cadiz pointed out that no decision could give Muley Hacen greater
pleasure. Better far than to remove Boabdil from Granada was to
send him back to his kingdom as a vassal of the Christian sovereigns,
that he might continue to foment discord amongst his own nation.
This advice pleased Ferdinand and Isabel, and soon the
humiliating terms, on which the Prince should receive his liberty,
were drawn up and signed. Boabdil did homage to the rulers of
Castile, consenting to pay an annual tribute of twelve thousand
doblas of gold, and to surrender four hundred Christian captives.
Most galling of all, he publicly promised to appear at the Castilian
Court, whenever summoned, and to allow the Christian armies free
passage through his territory, in their campaigns against Muley
Hacen and “El Zagal.” Having surrendered his own son and those of
his principal nobles as hostages for his good faith, he returned to his
own kingdom, free; yet bound by chains that were to cost him his
kingdom and hold him in perpetual bondage.
CHAPTER VII
THE FALL OF GRANADA: THE MOORISH
WAR
1484–1492
The kingdom of Granada had been cut off by land and sea from
outward assistance, her plains and valleys had been ravaged by a
foreign foe, her principal towns were torn by the factions of her
ruling family, yet she turned a defiant, almost mocking gaze on those
who had pledged themselves to her downfall. The thought of this
defiance rankled with the Queen as bitterly as had the contempt
shown for her commands by the young Enriquez.
There was nothing in her nature of the Oriental acceptance of ill-
fortune as the will of a far-seeing Providence. Disaster to her spelt
rather divine wrath visited on human incompetency; and Isabel
looked on even temporary failure as something unclean and
abhorrent, that could only be purified and overcome by perseverance
ending in success. So sincere was her conviction, so wholehearted
and untiring her share in whatever plan of action was laid down, that
she could not but inspire her generals and councillors with
something of her own enthusiasm.
At times her will clashed with Ferdinand’s ambitions, as when in
1484 he urged her to leave the weary struggle against Granada and
help him regain the counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne; but though
in later years the foreign policy of Aragon was to assume
predominance, on this occasion the interests of Castile were jealously
maintained.
Ferdinand argued his cause with no little truth and ability. The
death of Louis XI. in the previous summer had left his son Charles
VIII., a mere boy, as the figurehead of France, to the natural
weakening of the government. Now was the time, before the child
developed into a man, to win back Aragon’s lawful possessions, the
Pyrenean counties, whose sympathies were Spanish rather than
French. Isabel did not attempt to controvert these views. She even
admitted that had it been a question of making war on Granada for
the first time, or recovering Roussillon or Cerdagne, the latter policy
would have been undoubtedly the best.
“But,” she continued, “seeing that it is now two years since we
began our war against the Moors, and that during that time we have
been put to great trouble and expense, I hold it as ill-advised that we
should burden ourselves with a fresh campaign elsewhere.”
She then departed southwards with the Cardinal of Spain to
arrange for a renewed invasion of Moorish territory, leaving the King
with some Castilian troops to settle his own projects in the north
according to his fancy. The result was, after due reflection, to bring
him back to her, with his designs on Roussillon and Cerdagne
temporarily shelved. There was nothing petty in the relation of either
husband or wife; and it is probable that the secret of their unanimity
of action lay in their mutual readiness to respond to reason.
It was about this date that their military policy developed a new
and more modern trend. The surprise of Alhama, the expedition to
Ajarquia, and the hasty march to Loja had all been in keeping with
the tactics of earlier crusades. That two out of the three expeditions
had failed showed either a lack of judgment or of courage; and the
reckless daring of the Castilian race forbade even the momentary
consideration of the latter suggestion. Where then did the error lie?
Experience showed that, in spite of her isolation, the kingdom of
Granada would not succumb to ordinary measures of ravage and
blockade. Even in the districts trampled underfoot, and burned and
pillaged by Christian armies, the vegetation hardly awaited the
departure of the invaders to spring up in fresh luxuriance. Ravages
that would have made the plains of Castile a desert were quickly
effaced in this land of sunshine, both by the help of nature and of the
industrious inhabitants. There were, moreover, hidden vegas and
tracts of seaboard, protected on the north both from cold winds and
foreign armies by high mountain ranges, whose southern slopes,
with the land stretching beyond them, were a veritable paradise of
fruits and crops. Granada might soon find her luxury curtailed, but
to starve her into submission would be a Herculean task.
Another lesson learned was the futility of a campaign of midnight
assaults and surprises. These were well enough for a single
expedition that aimed at no more than intimidating the enemy, or
establishing a reputation for heroism amongst the leaders, though it
has been shown such glory could be dearly bought. In scaling walls
or planting an ambush the Castilian had not anything to teach his
foe; while the majority of Moorish fortresses were built in
commanding positions by the entrance to ravines, or were perched
on almost inaccessible heights that gave to the defender with his
javelin and cross-bow an enormous advantage over those scrambling
up to the attack from below.
The reduction of such strongholds was a necessary part of the
conquest of Granada; but eight more years were to pass before the
task was completed, and the capital, whose ramparts were a series of
fortresses, was to surrender, subdued not so much by wild valour as
by untiring patience.
During these years the Castilian army lost much of its feudal
character, a transformation to be completed later, on the battlefields
of Italy under the supervision of Gonsalvo de Cordova. The levies of
the principal nobles had been the backbone of the war against the
Portuguese, and still supplied no mean contribution to the Christian
forces in the kingdom of Granada. The military retainers of the
Cardinal of Spain numbered some two thousand men, while, as we
have already seen, a combination of the vassals of the Duke of
Medina-Sidonia and Marquis of Cadiz was sufficient to make Muley
Hacen raise the siege of Alhama. This same Duke, in addition to his
land forces, was able, in 1487, to dispatch a private fleet and convoy
of provisions to the royal camp at Malaga, then suffering from
famine; but the wealth and power that could give these substantial
proofs of loyalty were not without their drawbacks. The patriotic
Duke, when touched in his vanity, did not hesitate to refuse
Ferdinand’s commands as to the disposal of his troops, exclaiming
touchily: “I have brought them to his service, but they shall go
nowhere save under my command.”
The sovereigns dealt with such aristocratic independence by their
usual policy of creating a counter-balance. They had established a
permanent troop of soldiers in Galicia, paid by their treasury, to
enforce the sentences of the royal judges in that unruly province;
while the natural sequence of their employment of the Santa
Hermandad for the restoration of order was the dispatch of its well-
armed bands to the seat of war.
The royal forces were further recruited by numbers of the robbers
and evildoers, who had created such havoc in Castile in the early
years of the reign. It had been impossible to punish them all, as was
shown in the case of Seville; and now a free pardon was offered to
those who would take their share in the great crusade and turn their
love of violence to patriotic use. Strict regulations prevented them
from yielding to their old habits; for the work of pillage and plunder
was kept within the bounds then considered legitimate, the women
and the camp followers who preyed upon the troops were banished;
and even gambling, a customary pastime of the soldiery and ever-
fruitful source of quarrels, was suppressed.
In addition to the troops already mentioned Ferdinand also
possessed what might be called his own private army, amounting to
three thousand men, personally pledged to his service. It consisted of
vassals of the royal demesnes led by their adelantados; an escort of
young nobles and knights and a royal guard of some five hundred
ginetes, or light horse, with an equal number of heavily armed
cavalry.
As the war grew more serious the purely Spanish troops were
augmented by mercenaries, principally Swiss mountaineers. “Hardy
warriors who fight on foot,” Pulgar describes them, “so resolved
never to turn their back on the enemy that they wear defensive
armour only in front, and are thus able to move with the greater
ease.” The Swiss had won their laurels against Charles the Bold on
the fields of Granson and Nanci; but even farther reaching than their
vindication of national independence had been the triumph in their
persons of infantry over cavalry; another blow struck at the old
feudal ideas. In the war of Granada, it is still the cavalry who hold
sway; but the presence of the Swiss foot-soldiers was not without its
influence in the history of Spain, whose infantry, drilled and
disciplined after their method by Gonsalvo de Ayora in the latter
years of Ferdinand’s reign, was to become the admiration and fear of
Europe.
More immediate in its effects was the improvement of the artillery,
a department of war that came under the Queen’s special
supervision, and on which she expended her usual vivid interest and
energy. A study of the almost barren results of the first two years of
fighting had made it obvious that future campaigns must resolve
themselves into a war of sieges, a war whose ultimate issue depended
not so much on cavalry or infantry as on gunners and engineers.
Isabel had already summoned from Germany and Flanders the men
most gifted in this particular branch of military science, placing at
their head Francisco Ramirez, a knight of Madrid, whose knowledge
and experience was to win him the nickname “El Artillero.”
It is well worth while [he adds] to see the four large hospital tents that her
goodness of heart has designed, not only for the succour and cure of the wounded,
but for every imaginable illness. Such is the number of doctors, chemists, surgeons,
and their assistants; such the organization and energy; such the quantity of
supplies that it is in no way inferior to your Hospital of the Holy Ghost outside the
city, or to the great one in your Milan.
And the King [we are told] commanded justice to be executed on those Moors
who were within; and there were put to the sword, or hung, one hundred and eight
of the principal men, and he commanded the rest with the women and children to
be made captive, and that the town should be burnt and its walls razed to the
ground.
Its walls [says a modern traveller, impressed by the grandeur even of its ruins]
are built on the very edge of the cliff and look as weather-beaten and as solid.
Indeed one could hardly tell where wall begins and rock ends but for the Moresque
arches that span the rents in the face of the cliff to afford a firm basis for the
continuous fortification.
RONDA, THE TAJO OR CHASM
To this stronghold Hamet “El Zegri” had retired after his crushing
defeat at Lopera; but, being informed that the Christians were
meditating a second attack on Loja, he hastily sent part of his
garrison to assist “El Zagal” in its defence. This did not, however,
satisfy his own desire for vengeance, and believing that his enemies
were occupied elsewhere he sallied out with a contingent of his
fiercest troops to lay waste the Duchy of Medina-Sidonia. His
immediate mission was successful; but Hamet “El Zegri” soon found
his joy turned to ashes. His cunning had been overreached.
A portion of the Christian army had in truth set out in the
direction of Loja; but the main body, under the command of
Ferdinand himself, the Marquis-Duke of Cadiz, and other great
Castilian generals, only waited till this subterfuge should take effect
to march on Ronda. With them went their deadly train of artillery;
and soon the walls and towers were battered from three sides,