Stephen Mugume V Uganda (Criminal Appeal No 20 of 1995) 1995 UGSC 13 (28 November 1995)
Stephen Mugume V Uganda (Criminal Appeal No 20 of 1995) 1995 UGSC 13 (28 November 1995)
Stephen Mugume V Uganda (Criminal Appeal No 20 of 1995) 1995 UGSC 13 (28 November 1995)
The particulars of the offence laid against the appellant state that Stephen Mugume and Fred
Mutumba on the 21st day of July, 1992 at Bunga Trading Center in the Kampala District
robbed Semakula Charles of Motor Vehicle Reg. No. UPM 443 Toyota Carina valued at about
7,000,000/= and at or immediately after the time of the said robbery, threatened to use actual
violence on the said Semakula Charles.
On the material day at 8.10a.m. Charles Semakula (PW1) accompanied by his wife, gave a
lift to a friend of his as he (PW1) drove his children to school in his car. He dropped the
friend at Bunga Township ( a suburb of Kampala). He then saw a crowd of people ahead. He
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drove the car at a slow speed to get a view of the situation. Two people, who looked like
members of a local Defence Unit (LDU), approached him. One of them was tall, slender and
armed with a gun. The other was short. The short one asked PW1 for help. As PW1 wondered
what help it was, the armed man pointed his gun at PW1 and ordered him and the family to
surrender the car. PW1 obeyed and he, his wife and the children, as they wept, abandoned the
car with children’s school requirements inside. The shorter man drove the vehicle away with
the tall- armed man sitting beside him. Some members of the public watched this drama.
Edward Serwanga (PW8) was among the members of the public who witnessed this robbery.
In his evidence PW8 supported PW1 about the occurrence of the robbery. According to PW8
‘s evidence the appellant wore a hat. It appears PW1 did not note the hat. PW1 reported the
robbery to D/I.P. Obuk Julius (PW9) of Kabalagala Police Post. After the preliminaries PW9
handed the robbery case to M. Balimoyo (PW14), the C.I.D. Officer in charge of Kampala
Region.
On the same day at 9.00a.m. Nalubwama Kasifa (PW3) saw the same car being driven past
her near Nakandi’s home (in Seguku village) along Kampala Entebbe road. The same vehicle
returned 5 minutes later and stopped about 40 metres away. A light skinned tall slender man
wearing a brown hat, a stripped brown shirt and carrying a small brown bag got out of the
vehicle and walked away. At 7.00p.m. PW3 learnt that in fact that car had been robbed. She
reported her morning experience to PW2 (Jane Mary Nalunkuma) the LC.1 chairman. PW3
was virtually supported by PW4, (Francis N. Muyomba) about the events, which occurred at
9.00a.m.
No witnesses could identify the appellant during the identification parades held twice at
Central Police Station, Kampala on 5/9/1992 and 24/9/92. But on 27/9/92, PW8 identified the
appellant and his co-accused at a parade held at the same Central Police Station. The learned
trial Judge discounted this evidence because of procedural irregularities in the conduct of the
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identification parade. We shall revert to this letter.
Presumably on the strength of that identification parade the appellant was on 28/9/1993
charged in Court and remanded in Luzira prison from where he and his co-accused were
identified by PW3 an PW4 on 30/10/1992 during the last identification parade.
PW1 did not participate at any identification parade because he could not identify the two
people who robbed the car from him on 21/7/1992.
In his sworn testimony the appellant raised an alibi to the effect that he was not at the scene
of the crime because on the material day (21/7/1992) he was away in Fort Portal, having gone
there on 19/7/1992 to see his sick mother, Faith Mukindi (DW1).
The learned trial Judge believed the prosecution evidence in part as regards the appellant and
rejected his alibi. Consequently, he convicted the appellant. Hence this appeal which contains
three grounds of appeal.
At the start of the hearing this appeal Mr. Micheal Wamasebu, the learned Principal State
Attorney, intimated to Court that he did not seek to support the conviction. His principal
reason was that the identification parade had been irregularly conducted and this rendered the
exercise of no evidential value arid that without the evidence of identification there was no
evidence to support the conviction.
The first ground of appeal complains that the learned trial Judge erred both in law and in fact
in failing to properly evaluate the evidence as a whole and in particular PW8’s evidence
which occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
We understood this ground to be a general criticism of the evaluation by the Judge of all the
evidence in the case. However, Mr. Nsubuga-Mubiru, learned Counsel for the appellant,
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based his criticism on two findings by the Judge which findings in our view were proper in
the context. The learned judge made these findings in the following words in the course of his
scrutiny of evidence of PW8.
“In my judgment, it is safe to hold that PW8 Serwanga was at the material time at
the scene of the robbery’
And that
The learned Judge first summarised the evidence of the prosecution and of the defence. He
then subjected the evidence of PW8 to scrutiny including a reference to Exh. D2 a Police
statement by PW8 which was introduced in evidence by defence before the learned Judge
made the findings quoted above.
There is no dispute whatsoever that PW8 was at the scene. There is no evidence to support
any suggestion that PW8 was unable U see participants in the robbery. Therefore, the findings
by the Judge in this regard cannot be faulted. That is far from saying that the people PW8 saw
robbing the car were the appellant and his co-accused. Ground one fails.
The second ground which is substantial complains that the learned judge erred in law and fact
when he chose to disregard the law and practice and thereby failed to. consider the serious
irregularities at the identification parades at all or in favour of the appellant.
Mr. Mubiru-Nsubuga criticised the conduct of the identification parades at which PW3, PW4
and PW8 purported to identify the appellant and his co-accused. Counsel contended that in as
much as PW1, PW3, PW4 and PW8 did not give particular descriptions of the robbers whom
the saw during the robbery at Bunga and in the case of PW3 later at Seguku from where a
man seen by PW3 disappeared after abandoning the car, there could be no meaningful
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identification parade. He submitted that since some other witnesses who were at Bunga
during the robbery and at Seguku could not have identified the appellant during identification
parades, PW3, PW4, and PW8 could not identify the appellant. The last argument is too
simplistic. Different people have different capacities of perception of events. As regards the
descriptions, we think that PW3 and PW8 gave some descriptions of the person or persons
whom each witness claimed to have seen. Learned Counsel would have been on sounder
ground if he had argued that the descriptions given by these witnesses were not so peculiar to
the appellant or so detailed as to make him easily identifiable.
The criticism, which we think is valid is that these key witnesses, i.e. PW3, PW4 and PW8
were not invited at the earliest opportunity to participate in the identification exercise. Thus
PW8 appeared only on Sunday 27/9/1992. But the learned Judge rejected his evidence of that
identification parade because the Judge’s view the exercise was done on a Sunday. Although
we think PW8’s evidence on identification is objectionable we cannot agree that no
identification parade can be held on a Sunday as the learned trial Judge observed. The police
are supposed to be on duty 24 hours, every day of the week. Moreover, the prosecution
explained that the parade had to be held on 27/9/1992 because PW8, a driver, was due to go
to Nairobi.
This aspect of the explanation looks plausible. But as we have said there was not sound
explanation given by the prosecution as to why PW8 was not available much earlier than
27/9/1992. Overall therefore, the criticism of the act of holding the identification against
protestations by the appellant was justified and the Judge acted wisely in rejecting that
portion of the evidence though for reasons different from what we have stated.
The learned Judge rejected the evidence of PW4 and therefore we need no labour on the
submission critical of his evidence.
In convicting the appellant the learned Judge relied on the evidence of PW3 and of that PW8.
This is clear from the following passage:
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“As I have said earlier in this judgment I accept that PW8 Serwanga was at the
scene of robbery. There he saw two men robbing a vehicle the subject of the charge.
Of the men he was one was tall and brownish. He was putting on a hat, and
wearing a stripped shirt. A few hours later Kasifa PW3 saw a man getting out of the
robbed vehicle. He was a slender tall and a bit brown man. He was dressed in a
brown stripped shirt. lie had a hat on his head. Both these witnesses identified A1 in
Court as the man they were referring to. There is no doubt left in my mind that the
man PW8 saw at Bunga robbing a vehicle is the very man Kasifa PW3 saw at
Seguku getting out of the robbed vehicle. Is it by coincidence that the height and
facial color of the accused fit in the description given by the two witnesses”?
With respect we think that the learned Judge misdirected himself on evidence. In her
examination in chief PW3 described the man who abandoned the vehicle in the following
words:
“I then saw a man getting out of the vehicle. He was walking towards me. He
walked about 10 meters from me and then crossed the road and continued facing
Entebbe side. That is when I last saw him. He was a slender tall man. He was a bit
brown. He was dressed in a brown- stripped shirt with a brown hat on his head He
was carrying a brown bag”.
“The man was putting on a hat. The whole face was exposed. I saw the man getting
out of the vehicle. He had his hat on as he moved out of the vehicle. He had his hat
on as he drove past me.”
Clearly this evidence is just general and far from giving the height and facial colour of the
person PW3 saw in a manner that precisely answers the height and facial colour of the
appellant. Many other men could answer to such description. Moreover, the man who drove
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the car from the scene of robbery was short and not tall. The tall man seen at the by PWI and
PW8 had no brown bag. He only had a gun. Further PW 3 who was a stranger to the tall man
never saw his face closer than 10 meters away with a hat on.
In evidence in chief PW8 testified as follows in the relevant parts:
“After about 15 minutes or after five to 10 minutes lapse I saw two men coming
while running. One was short and the other tall. The tall man was holding a gun.”
“When the two men first appeared they were running, but not very fact- almost
trotting - running slowly. I first saw them clearly when they were about 40 metres
away from me... I had not seen them before.”
The evidence is extremely general in description and does not give proper or approximate
height and facial features of the appellant. Indeed, the description given by PW3 and PW8 is
not on all fours.
The learned Judge correctly observed that identification parades are held as a means of
corroborating the identification claim made by a witness. But we think with respect that the
learned Judge fell into error in this case when he asserted that:
“Where there is overwhelming evidence that the accused was properly identified at
the scene, it would be an affront to justice to acquit him. The duty of the Court is to
protect the community against wrong elements in society and not to follow on a
matter of practice the lure of the rules of logic in order to produce unreasonable
results which would hinder the course of justice”
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It is, we think, common sense that a witness would normally not be required to identify a
suspect at a parade if the witness knows the suspect whom he/she saw commit an offence.
Identification parades are, as a practice, held in cases where the suspect is a stranger to the
witness or possibly where the witness does not know the name of the suspect. In such a case
the identification parade is held, as correctly stated by the learned Judge, to enable the
identifying witness confirm that the person he has identified at the parade is the same person
he had seen commit an offence. Once the Judge disregarded the evidence of the parade of
27/9/1992 there could be no basis for his conclusion that the stranger whom PW8 saw at
Bunga on 21/7/1992 for 4 minutes is the same person Al whom PW8 saw in Court during
trial. On the facts and considering that the trial was held nearly 2 years later, that conclusion
cannot be supported.
Further, in his controverted statement to police PW8 claimed that the tall man wore a cap.
Although during the trial PW8 appears to have been made to draw a diagram of what he
called cap, we think that in fact the person whom PW8 saw wore a cap as PW8 stated in his
statement but not a hat as stated in evidence. PW8’s statement (exhibit D2) was recorded by
an Inspector of police who must know what a cap is. Alterations of dates on the same PW8’s
statement from 26/9/1992 to 26/7/1992 raised serious doubts about the motive behind the
alteration of dates particularly so since the date below the signature of the police Inspector
who recorded the statement is 26/9/1992 and not 26/7/1992. In short evidence of PW8 is
unreliable.
As regards PW3 her evidence could only be accepted if the identification parade had
conformed to established practice. It is clear from the evidence of PW4 and DW2 that the
establishment practice as correctly set out in case of R. vs. Mwango s/o Manaa (1936) 3
E.A.C.A 29 and affirmed in Ssentale v. Uganda (1988) E.A. 365 was not followed. In the
present case it is glaringly clear that in parade held on 30/10/1992 when PW3 purported to
pick the appellant, the appellant was the only one prominently taller than other participants
and it appears his skin appearance was equally conspicuous.
For these reasons, we cannot say that the identification parade was conducted with due
scrupule and fairness, and we think that the learned Principal Attorney acted properly in not
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supporting the conviction.
In view of our holding on ground two which disposes of this appeal we find no need to
consider ground three. In the result we allow the appeal, quash the conviction and set aside
the sentence and order. The appellant is set free.