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Martina Raue · Eva Lermer
Bernhard Streicher Editors
Psychological
Perspectives on
Risk and Risk
Analysis
Theory, Models, and Applications
Foreword by
Paul Slovic
Psychological Perspectives on Risk and Risk
Analysis
Martina Raue • Eva Lermer • Bernhard Streicher
Editors
Psychological Perspectives
on Risk and Risk Analysis
Theory, Models, and Applications
Foreword by Paul Slovic

Editors
Martina Raue Eva Lermer
AgeLab Department of Experimental Psychology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology University of Regensburg
Cambridge, MA, USA Regensburg, Germany
Bernhard Streicher FOM University of Applied Sciences

Institute of Psychology for Economics and Management
UMIT - Private University for Health Munich, Germany
Sciences, Medical Informatics and
Technology
Hall in Tyrol, Austria
ISBN 978-3-319-92476-2 ISBN 978-3-319-92478-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92478-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018951412
© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
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Foreword
I have been fortunate to study psychological aspects of risk since 1959. At that time,
this was a topic of interest to only a handful of researchers, far from the mainstream
of psychological inquiry. Risk and decision making then was the province of econo-
mists and mathematicians, building on a rich intellectual heritage going back centu-
ries and based around formal models such as utility theory.
Only a few years earlier, in 1954, a psychologist named Ward Edwards, son of an
economist, had written a brilliant review that eventually sparked a revolution. Titled
“The Theory of Decision Making,” it sought to educate psychologists about eco-
nomic theories and concepts, e.g., “utility,” and the potentially rich psychological
issues underlying them. Edwards used his own research on probability and variance
preferences among gambles as an example of how experimental psychology could
be brought to bear on understanding human behavior in the face of risk. A few phi-
losophers and mathematical psychologists joined the effort and a new field of study
was born.
Now, more than half a century later, many hundreds of researchers have created
a legacy of thousands of articles contributing to a complex, multifaceted, and fasci-
nating portrait of risk perception, risk communication, and risk management. Even
economists, long resistant to psychological approaches, have now joined the parade
as champions of “behavioral economics.”
Readers of this book have, in one place, an up-to-date and authoritative overview
of the important ideas and findings generated by these decades of empirical and
theoretical research. Employing this knowledge won’t rid the world of risk, but it
will make the world a safer place.
Decision Research and University of Oregon Paul Slovic

Eugene, OR, USA
v
Preface
Risk is not out there, waiting to be measured! Risk is subjective, danger is real.
—Paul Slovic
A firefighter can make a life-or-death decision under time pressure without thinking
much about it. A child can cross a busy street without knowing facts about velocity
or braking distances. Some people decide to go base jumping or free climbing,
while others—or even the same people—get nightmares from the thought of having
to fly in an airplane. Most people agree that measles pose a much greater risk than
the vaccination against them, but a minority still refuses to have their children vac-
cinated. People fear terrorist attacks, but not heart attacks, despite the fact that more
people die from heart attacks than terrorist attacks. Some companies grow and
expand in the face of changing markets, new technologies, and emerging regula-
tions, while their competitors fall into bankruptcy around them. These examples
demonstrate that people, either for themselves or as members of an organization, are
good at judging risk in certain situations, but fail in other situations. Different peo-
ple judge risks differently than others, and some seem to take more risks than others.
Psychology offers explanations for these observations, strategies to communicate
risk effectively, and practical implications for industry and policy. This volume
bundles many of these insights.
“Risk is subjective, danger is real,” but nevertheless, risk is often stated in num-
bers, mostly probabilities. How likely is it to die from an airplane crash? How likely
are complications from a measles infection? How likely is a terrorist attack? How
likely is it to die from a heart attack? How likely is it to win the lottery? How likely
is heads over tails? Every decision situation that can be expressed in probabilities is
a decision under risk. When I choose heads over tails, there is the “risk” of being
wrong or losing when the coin flips to tails. The odds of the coin flip are clear; the
chance of heads or tails is 50%. The chance of winning the lottery is about 1 in
175,000,000. But what are the chances of death or serious injury while base jump-
ing? While experts can provide us with probabilities based on mathematical models
or research data for some situations, high uncertainty still reigns in many others.
How should I weigh the pros and cons of one medical treatment over another? How
vii
viii Preface
do I make investment decisions without knowledge of future developments on the

stock market? How threatening is climate change? Can I trust genetically modified
food or additives? In the real world, we usually deal with situations of high uncer-
tainty. But even when people are given numbers such as the likelihood of side effects
for a medical treatment or of winning in a gambling situation, some uncertainty
remains, and one’s reasoning may not be “rational” in a mathematical sense.
Psychological aspects of risk and risk analysis were first systematically studied
in the 1950s and 1960s, a time when economists treated people as rational decision-
makers or “economic men” who make choices based on cost-benefit analyses. For
decades, economic theories on human risk taking behavior were based on the
assumption that human beings behave logically. However, most people do not
engage in statistical analyses when they judge risks in their daily lives, instead rely-
ing on more “human tools.” From the experienced firefighter who trusts his intuition
based on years of learning to the child who is able to cross a busy street by using a
simple rule of thumb, human beings have amazing abilities which guide them
through the uncertainties of life. Consider the development of self-driving cars. This
technology can make our streets safer and dispense with human cognitive limita-
tions that are often the cause of accidents. At the same time, however, it is extremely
challenging for the developers to integrate all possibilities inherent to the road envi-
ronment and teach the car what to do in unusual situations. While a machine can
easily learn how to judge the speed of approaching cars or to remain alert for bikes
and pedestrians, it fails to make judgments in unclear situations that may ask for a
small violation of traffic rules (e.g., in construction zones). In situations of uncer-
tainty, humans have developed adaptive strategies that are sometimes better than
machine-based algorithms—but may in other instances lead them astray.
When investigating human risk judgments, it makes a difference whether one
looks at subjective risk perception or risk taking behavior. A base jumper might
judge the risk of the activity at hand as high, but still jump; a person who is afraid
of flying might judge the risk of flying as low, but not enter an airplane. Likewise,
most smokers are well aware that smoking can cause cancer, but this awareness
does not seem to prevent them from smoking. Psychological research has identified
several factors that influence the perception and judgment of risks as well as risk
taking behavior. This volume highlights how individual differences (Part I) and situ-
ational circumstances (Part II) influence risk perception and risk taking behavior.
Behavioral models of human decision making under risk and the challenge of inte-
grating different approaches and theories are discussed in Part III. This volume also
gives an overview of practical implications for risk communication (Part IV) and in
the areas of industry, policy, and research (Part V). This book aims at a broader audi-
ence beyond the field of scientific psychology; therefore, the chapters include many
vivid examples to illustrate theoretical concepts. Each chapter also gives practical
implications.
Individuals or groups of people differ in the way they perceive risk and in their
willingness to take risk, which is the focus of Part I. The authors of Chap. 1, Marco
Lauriola and Joshua Weller, review numerous studies on the relationship between
risk taking and personality traits. This chapter gives a systematic overview on why
Preface ix
some people take more risks than others. The authors discuss different approaches
of measuring risk taking, from self-reported behaviors to choice-based tasks. They
also distinguish between risk-related personality traits such as sensation-seeking or
impulsivity and general personality traits such as those included in the Big 5 person-
ality inventories. They further include different domains such as recreational risks,
social risks, ethical risks, health and safety risks, and gambling and financial risk
taking. The chapter concludes with the argument that there is no single risk taking
personality trait, but rather risk taking can be explained by the interplay of various
traits and emotional states. The author of Chap. 2, Bruno Chauvin, reviews studies
on the influence of sociodemographic characteristics, cultural orientation, and level
of expertise on the judgment of risks. Based on a large body of research, he dis-
cusses the influence of sex and race, phenomena such as “the white male effect,”
and the role of power in decision making. Further, Chauvin introduces studies on
culture and risk perception, which has especially received attention in the literature
within the cultural cognition theory of risk, and differences between experts and
laypeople’s risk judgments. In Chap. 3, Vivianne Visschers and Michael Siegrist
also look at the perceptions of experts versus laypeople, but focus specifically on
differences between hazards as laid out in a psychometric paradigm. The authors
discuss how potential hazards are sometimes perceived as more dangerous by the
public than experts and how the public’s risk perception is often shaped by factors
such as perceived benefit, trust, knowledge, affective associations, values, and fair-
ness. Based on studies in various areas such as gene modification or climate change,
they offer practical implications for risk management and communication.
In Part II, cognitive, emotional and social influences on human risk perception
and risk taking are considered. In Chap. 4, Rebecca Helm and Valerie Reyna take a
cognitive perspective on risk taking and also consider developmental and neurobio-
logical research. The authors discuss Prospect Theory, dual process theories, Fuzzy
Trace Theory, and Construal Level Theory. They point out how framing and mental
representations of risk influence judgment and behavior and consider neural under-
pinnings of risk taking. Chapter 5, by Mary Kate Tompkins, Pär Bjälkebring, and
Ellen Peters, gives an overview of current research on the role of affect and emotion
in risk perception. The risk perception literature makes a primary distinction
between risk as feelings and risk as analysis, and psychologists have pointed out the
importance of feelings when judging risks. The authors thereby focus on the affect
heuristic and the appraisal-tendency framework. Chapter 6, by Eric Eller and Dieter
Frey, is centered around social influences on risk perception and risk behavior.
Group influences, which have long been studied in social psychology, also affect
decisions under risk, especially in professional contexts such as teamwork. The
chapter points out how groups may hinder adequate risk identification, risk analysis,
and decision making. The authors end the chapter with a set of recommendations to
overcome these group barriers.
Part III especially focuses on observed human behavior, which is described in
behavioral models of risk taking. In Chap. 7, Martina Raue and Sabine Scholl point
to the challenges of considering many pieces of information or deciding under time
pressure. As a result of these limitations, people simplify decision processes and use
x Preface
rules of thumb or heuristics. The authors thereby focus on two approaches: the heu-
ristics and biases program and the fast and frugal heuristics. In Chap. 8, Michael
Birnbaum gives a systematic overview of behavioral models of risk taking, which
are theories that describe human behavior in decisions that involve risk. While a
normative model describes behavior as it ought to be in relation to an observed risk,
a behavioral model describes behavior as it has been observed. In Chap. 9, Cvetomir
Dimov and Julian Marewski discuss the challenges of theory integration. The
authors argue that psychological researchers often aim at explaining the human
mind without crossing the borders of their individual subdisciplines. They therefore
call for more attention to theory integration. Readers may become aware of this
issue when reading through the chapters of this volume that discuss sometimes
competing approaches and theories. In this chapter, a method—cognitive architec-
tures—is introduced to systematically integrate existing theories and empirical find-
ings. The authors use two competing theoretical approaches of decision making
under uncertainty—the heuristics and biases program and fast and frugal heuristics
(introduced in Chap. 7)—to demonstrate how cognitive architectures work. In Chap.
10, Bernhard Streicher, Eric Eller, and Sonja Zimmermann point out limitations of
existing approaches to handling risk and uncertainty. To overcome these limitations,
they introduce a model of risk culture, which serves as an integrative framework for
different theories of risk perception and behavior, as a reference point for holistic
measurements, and as a starting point for evidence-based interventions.
Part IV is centered around risk communication and starts with Chap. 11, in which
Ann Bostrom, Gisela Böhm, and Robert O’Connor discuss principles and chal-
lenges of communicating risks. They describe key components of risk information
processing, including exposure and attention, understanding, evaluation, and behav-
ioral response. The authors explore influences on each of these components and
focus on the roles of uncertainty, mental models, choice architecture, and habits. In
Chap. 12, Ulrich Hoffrage and Rocio Garcia-Retamero note that “risks are unavoid-
able, but poor risk communication and misunderstanding are really unnecessary.”
The authors make several suggestions on how to improve risk communication in the
health sector and focus on the interpretation of test results, the use of natural fre-
quencies and visual aids, the difference between relative and absolute risk reduc-
tion, and the meaning of survival rates. In Chap. 13, Tamar Krishnamurti and Wändi
Bruine de Bruin also focus on health risks and summarize four lessons learned for
effective health risk communication on an organizational level. The four lessons
include accessibility, appropriate delivery methods, pre-tests of communication
practices, and the collaboration of interdisciplinary teams. All chapters in Part IV
point to the importance of matching the risk communication strategy to the target
audience’s goals, attributes, and mental model of the world they live in.
While all the chapters include a section on practical implications, the chapters in
Part V are specifically centered around this aspect. In Chap. 14, Eva Lermer,
Bernhard Streicher, and Martina Raue give an overview of recent research on mea-
suring subjective risk estimates. It is of high practical importance for both research-
ers and practitioners to understand how risk perception can be measured and
especially how it may vary depending on the measurement used. In Chap. 15,
Preface xi
insights on risk and uncertainty in the insurance industry are given by Rainer Sachs.
This chapter is an overview of the professional work of risk managers. The author
outlines how their methods and tools have developed historically from experience-
based methods to mathematical models. He describes the limits of these models and
challenges in the face of emerging risks and uncertainty. This volume closes with
Chap. 16, in which Ortwin Renn summarizes implications of psychological aspects
of risk perception for policy and government. He stresses that human risk percep-
tion may differ from statistical assessment of risks, but needs to be valued as an
indicator for individual and societal concerns that require attention.
Theory integration is often challenging in scientific research (see Chap. 9 for a
discussion), but the reader will notice that the chapters of this volume often overlap,
demonstrating that various aspects, findings, and theories in the field of risk are
integrated and acknowledged by the authors. The chapters also nicely complement
one another. In that line, most chapters include cross-references within the book that
can be used to gain a deeper understanding of concepts, models, and research
findings.
It was a pleasure for us to work with outstanding authors who have shared their
excitement about this book. All of them have been extremely motivated, dedicated,
and open-minded. We cannot thank our contributors enough for making this book a
very rewarding and successful project. We would also like to thank our wonderful
editor at Springer, Morgan Ryan, who was exceptionally supportive during every
step of this project.
Cambridge, MA, USA Martina Raue

Munich, Germany Eva Lermer
Hall in Tyrol, Austria Bernhard Streicher
Contents
Part I Individual Differences in Risk Perception

and Risk Taking Behavior
1 Personality and Risk: Beyond Daredevils— Risk Taking
from a Temperament Perspective�� 3
Marco Lauriola and Joshua Weller
2 Individual Differences in the Judgment of Risks:
Sociodemographic Characteristics, Cultural Orientation,
and Level of Expertise �� 37
Bruno Chauvin
3 Differences in Risk Perception Between Hazards
and Between Individuals �� 63
Vivianne H. M. Visschers and Michael Siegrist
Part II Cognitive, Emotional and Social Perspectives on Risk

4 Cognitive, Developmental, and Neurobiological
Aspects of Risk Judgments�� 83
Rebecca K. Helm and Valerie F. Reyna
5 Emotional Aspects of Risk Perceptions�� 109
Mary Kate Tompkins, Pär Bjälkebring, and Ellen Peters
6 The Group Effect: Social Influences on Risk Identification,
Analysis, and Decision Making�� 131
Eric Eller and Dieter Frey
Part III Modeling Decision Making under Risk

7 The Use of Heuristics in Decision Making Under Risk
and Uncertainty�� 153
Martina Raue and Sabine G. Scholl
xiii
xiv Contents
8 Behavioral Models of Decision Making Under Risk�� 181

Michael H. Birnbaum
9 Cognitive Architectures as Scaffolding for Risky Choice Models �� 201
Cvetomir M. Dimov and Julian N. Marewski
10 Risk Culture: An Alternative Approach to Handling Risks�� 217
Bernhard Streicher, Eric Eller, and Sonja Zimmermann
Part IV Communicating Risks to the Public

11 Communicating Risks: Principles and Challenges �� 251
Ann Bostrom, Gisela Böhm, and Robert E. O’Connor
12 Improving Understanding of Health-Relevant
Numerical Information�� 279
Ulrich Hoffrage and Rocio Garcia-Retamero
13 Developing Health Risk Communications:
Four Lessons Learned �� 299
Tamar Krishnamurti and Wändi Bruine de Bruin
Part V Practical Implications for Industry, Policy and Research

14 Measuring Subjective Risk Estimates�� 313
Eva Lermer, Bernhard Streicher, and Martina Raue
15 Risk and Uncertainty in the Insurance Industry�� 329
Rainer Sachs
16 Implications for Risk Governance�� 345
Ortwin Renn
Index�� 371
Contributors
Michael H. Birnbaum Decision Research Center, California State University,

Fullerton, CA, USA
Gisela Böhm Department of Psychosocial Science, Faculty of Psychology,
University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
Department of Psychology, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences,
Lillehammer, Norway
Pär Bjälkebring Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg,
Sweden
Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
Ann Bostrom Daniel J. Evans School of Public Policy & Governance, University
of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
Wändi Bruine de Bruin Centre for Decision Research, Leeds University Business
School, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Bruno Chauvin University of Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France
Cvetomir M. Dimov Department of Organizational Behavior, Faculty of Business
and Economics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Eric Eller Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilian University Munich,
Munich, Germany
Dieter Frey Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilian University Munich,
Munich, Germany
xv
xvi Contributors
Rocio Garcia-Retamero Department of Experimental Psychology, University of

Granada, Granada, Spain
Rebecca K. Helm University of Exeter Law School, Exeter, UK
Ulrich Hoffrage Department of Organizational Behavior, Faculty of Business and
Economics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Tamar Krishnamurti Division of General Internal Medicine, University of
Pittsburgh School of Medicine, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Marco Lauriola Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, University
of Rome “Sapienza”, Rome, Italy
Eva Lermer Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Regensburg,
Regensburg, Germany
FOM University of Applied Sciences for Economics and Management, Munich,
Germany
Julian N. Marewski Department of Organizational Behavior, Faculty of Business
and Economics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Robert E. O’Connor Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences Directorate,
National Science Foundation, Alexandria, VA, USA
Ellen Peters Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University, Columbus,
OH, USA
Martina Raue AgeLab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA,
USA
Ortwin Renn Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies, Potsdam, Germany
Valerie F. Reyna Human Neuroscience Institute, Cornell Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Facility, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
Rainer Sachs Munich Reinsurance Company, Integrated Risk Management,
Munich, Germany
Sabine G. Scholl School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, Mannheim,
Germany
Michael Siegrist Institute for Environmental Decision Making, Consumer
Behavior, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Bernhard Streicher Institute of Psychology, UMIT - Private University for Health
Sciences, Medical Informatics and Technology, Hall in Tyrol, Austria
Contributors xvii
Mary Kate Tompkins Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University,

Columbus, OH, USA
Vivianne H. M. Visschers School of Applied Psychology, University of Applied
Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland (FHNW), Olten, Switzerland
Joshua Weller Department of Developmental Psychology, Tilburg University,
Tilburg, Netherlands
Sonja Zimmermann Institute of Psychology, UMIT - Private University for
Health Sciences, Medical Informatics and Technology, Hall in Tyrol, Austria
About the Editors
Martina Raue is a Research Scientist at the MIT AgeLab in Cambridge,

Massachusetts and an Instructor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard
University. She studies risk perception and decision making over the lifespan, with
a focus on the roles of time and emotion. She applies theories from social psychol-
ogy to challenges and risks of longevity and examines ways to improve planning
and preparing for later life. Dr. Raue received her Ph.D. in social psychology from
the Ludwig-Maximilian University Munich in Germany and her master’s degree in
psychology from the University of Basel in Switzerland.
Eva Lermer is a Professor of Business Psychology at the FOM University of

Applied Sciences for Economics and Management in Munich, Germany, and a
Research Scientist at the Department of Experimental Psychology at the University
of Regensburg, Germany. Her research interests include subjective risk assessment,
decision making, and de-biasing strategies. In addition to her scientific research,
Professor Lermer works as a consultant for profit and nonprofit organizations. She
received her academic degrees from the University of Salzburg in Austria and the
Ludwig-Maximilian University Munich in Germany.
Bernhard Streicher is a Full Professor of Social and Personality Psychology and

Head of the Department of Psychology and Medical Sciences at the University for
Health Sciences—UMIT in Hall, Tyrol, Austria. His research interests include the
psychological mechanisms of decision making under risk and uncertainty and the
question of how to enhance the risk competencies of people and organizations. In
addition to his scientific research, Professor Streicher works as a lecturer and con-
sultant regarding the topic of “risk” for profit and nonprofit organizations. Professor
Streicher received his academic titles from the Ludwig-Maximilian University
Munich in Germany.
xix
xx About the Editors
Martina Raue, Eva Lermer, and Bernhard Streicher jointly founded the
Risikolabor (risk lab) at the Ludwig-Maximilian University Munich in 2011. While
currently based at different institutions, they continue to collaborate on various
research projects investigating human perception of risk and influences on risk tak-
ing behavior. In addition, they offer consulting and workshops on the topic. More
about their work can be found at www.risikolabor.org.
Part I
Individual Differences in Risk Perception
and Risk Taking Behavior
Chapter 1
Personality and Risk: Beyond Daredevils—
Risk Taking from a Temperament Perspective
Marco Lauriola and Joshua Weller
Abstract We reviewed studies relating risk taking to personality traits. This search
long has been elusive due to the large number of definitions of risk and to the variety
of personality traits associated with risk taking in different forms and domains. In
order to reconcile inconsistent findings, we categorized risk taking measures into
self-report behavior inventories, self-report trait-based scales, and choice-based
tasks. Likewise, we made a distinction between specific risk-related traits (e.g., sen-
sation seeking, impulsivity) and more general traits (e.g., the Big Five). Sensation
seeking aspects like thrill and experience seeking were more strongly associated
with recreational and social risks that trigger emotional arousal. Impulsivity was
associated with ethical, health safety, gambling, and financial risk taking, due to
disregard of future consequences and to lack of self-control. Among the Big Five,
extraversion and openness to experience were associated with risk seeking; whereas
conscientiousness and agreeableness had more established links with risk aversion.
Neuroticism facets, like anxiety and worry, had negative relationships with risk
seeking; other facets, like anger and depression, promoted risk seeking. We con-
cluded that the notion of a unidimensional “risk taking” trait seems misleading. The
interplay of many traits encompassed in an overarching temperament model best
represented personality-risk relations. Positive emotionality traits promoted risky
behaviors that confer an emotionally rewarding experience to the person. Negative
emotionality traits lead to heightened perceptions of danger, primarily motivating
the avoidance of risk. The last disinhibition affected risk taking as a result of differ-
ences in self-control control acting upon momentary feelings and in self-interest.
Potential applications for practitioners are also discussed.
M. Lauriola (*)
Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, University of Rome “Sapienza”,
Rome, Italy
e-mail: [email protected]
J. Weller
Department of Developmental Psychology, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 3

M. Raue et al. (eds.), Psychological Perspectives on Risk and Risk Analysis,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92478-6_1
4 M. Lauriola and J. Weller
For decades, the construct of risk taking has captured the attention of researchers
from a multitude of disciplines, including clinicians, psychologists, and economists.
Understanding who is more likely to take a risk has clear implications for one’s
financial, social, and personal well-being, as well as society in general. For instance,
conceptualizing how individuals who engage in risky behaviors arrive at decisions
can help to pinpoint identifying the underlying mechanisms that mediate maladap-
tive decision making processes. Additionally, identifying who is more likely to take
a risk can improve risk communication efforts by means of tailored messages high-
lighting goals and values that are important to them.
However, the notion of a “risk taker” appears to be more complex than a singular
category that can apply to behaviors spanning across a variety of different contexts.
In fact, there has been some disagreement reflecting the degree to which risk taking
tendencies are dispositional in nature. For those who indeed consider it to be dispo-
sitional, scholars have been divided about whether risk taking is better conceptual-
ized as a unitary trait or as a domain-specific phenomenon. On the one hand, traits
like sensation seeking and impulsivity were long thought to represent the personal-
ity basis of risk taking across different types of behaviors and situations (e.g.,
Enticott & Ogloff, 2006; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). On the other hand, sup-
porters of a domain-specific approach suggest that risk behaviors may be qualita-
tively different from one another (e.g., Anderson & Mellor, 2009; Hanoch, Johnson,
& Wilke, 2006; Soane & Chmiel, 2005; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). Subsequently,
different personality variables may uniquely account for variance across specific
risk domains. For instance, Weller and Tikir (2011) found that dispositional hon-
esty/humility predicted ethical and health risk taking, but not social or recreational
risk taking. From this lens, a domain-specificity account of risk neither precludes
the possibility that broader dispositional factors are associated with specific risk
domains, nor does it necessarily rule out that stable overarching preferences for risk
taking exist. Domain-specific risk taking studies often yield positive intercorrela-
tions among risk propensity in different domains, as well as significant correlations
between risk propensity and personality (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011; Highhouse,
Nye, Zhang, & Rada, 2016; Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O’Creevy, & Willman, 2005;
Weber et al., 2002; Weller, Ceschi, & Randolph, 2015a; Weller & Tikir, 2011).
Additionally, test-retest correlations for risk taking demonstrate considerable tem-
poral stability, up to 2 years (e.g., Chuang & Schechter, 2015, Table 1). These find-
ings suggest that not only do stable individual differences in risk behaviors exists
but also that broader personality traits may be associated with these behaviors.
Acknowledging that risk behaviors may be both domain-specific and multiply-
determined, the current chapter proposes that individual differences in risk propen-
sity can be best understood within the context of a broader, hierarchical personality
framework, with each broad personality trait influencing some aspect of risk taking.
Based on its theoretical ties to emotional and cognitive control processes, we orga-
nize our discussion around a “Big Three,” or temperament-based, framework (e.g.,
Clark & Watson, 2008; Tellegen & Waller, 2008). Adult temperament models stress
that the broadest dimensions, extraversion/positive emotionality (extraversion),
neuroticism/negative emotionality (neuroticism), and disinhibition vs. constraint
1 Personality and Risk: Beyond Daredevils–Risk Taking from a Temperament… 5
(disinhibition), are affect-relevant traits. Because of this theoretical link, tempera-

ment models converge with advances in the behavioral decision literature that high-
lights the interplay between affective and cognitive processes, in the appraisal of
risk and decision making in general (e.g., Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch,
2001; Rusting, 2001; Slovic & Peters, 2006; Weber & Johnson, 2009).
The aims of this chapter are threefold. First, we address the issue of differences
in conceptual definitions of risk taking and their corresponding operational defini-
tions across disciplines, we believe, have hindered reaching common ground in this
area (cf. Fox & Tannenbaum, 2011). Second, we briefly review the literature on
traits that has demonstrated a link between personality and risk taking. Specifically,
we examine the constructs of sensation seeking and impulsivity, as well as broad,
higher-order trait dimensions (i.e., Big Five). Finally, we propose that these findings
might be partly reconciled by framing the reviewed studies in terms of a Big Three
model, linking personality traits to risk behaviors.
efinitions of Risk and Construct Validity of Risk-Related

D
Traits
Like many constructs, the risk taking literature is no stranger to numerous theoreti-
cal and, therefore, operational definitions. Many different measures may exist, but it
is unclear whether they assess the same construct. At best, research would yield
moderate to strong correlations across different assessments; at worst, there would
be no convergence across the different paradigms, suggesting that these variables
may all assess different processes and perhaps constructs.
Choice-Based Experimental Tasks
One straightforward definition of risk taking, from an economic and financial per-
spective, is the tendency to choose an option that has a greater outcome variance
than another option. From this perspective, a risky choice may not necessarily be
associated with a negative outcome or a problem behavior. One of the first methods
to quantify risk taking involved using one-shot, hypothetical gambles, eliciting a
choice between a small number of options – usually between an uncertain, or risky,
option (50% chance to win $10, otherwise win $0) and a certain option (100%
chance to win $5 for sure). Proponents of this method assert that it provides an ana-
logue for how individuals use and integrate specific contextual information about a
risky decision (e.g., the magnitude of the outcome and the probability that the out-
come will be realized. These studies have been instrumental in demonstrating a gap
between how people actually approach risky choices (e.g., prospect theory) and how
a normatively rational actor would approach them (cf., Goldstein & Weber, 1995;
Lopes, 1995, see also Birnbaum, Chap. 8).
Hypothetical gambles still are common in behavioral economics, based on the

assumption that financial risk taking, and risk taking in general, can be modeled
almost exclusively as maximizing the expectation of some individual utility func-
tion that maps on a cardinal scale the subjective value of each available choice
option (cf., Friedman, Isaac, James, & Sunder, 2014; Takemura, 2014). Unfortunately,
however, expected utility assessments of risk attitude have demonstrated limited
predictive validity outside the laboratory or field context in which they were elicited
(Anderson & Mellor, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2011; Friedman et al., 2014; Schonberg,
Fox, & Poldrack, 2011; Weber et al., 2002). Moreover, the average risk taking pat-
tern elicited by hypothetical gambles for which outcomes and probabilities are
clearly stated before making a decision (i.e., a description-based decision) can differ
from the pattern resulting from situations for which outcomes and probabilities are
learned by experience (e.g., offering the decision makers a probability sampling or
providing them with a feedback on their choices; Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig,
Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Schonberg et al., 2011). This
knowledge has motivated researchers to develop behavioral paradigms that more
adequately capture the psychological experience of risk. New paradigms have
become increasingly popular, especially within the clinical neuropsychological lit-
erature (Schonberg et al., 2011; Weber & Johnson, 2009). Though not an exhaustive
list, representative examples include the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara,
Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART;
Lejuez et al., 2002), and the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner, Mackinlay,
Wilkening, & Weber, 2009).
Tasks like IGT, BART, and CCT involve making repeated decisions in the face of
uncertainty and directly experiencing the consequences of their choices. For
instance, participants taking the IGT are asked to draw cards from four available
decks differing in payoff size and structure. Two risk disadvantageous decks confer
higher rewards on most trials but also very big losses on some trials, with a negative
long-term expected value. The other two decks are risk advantageous, conferring
lower rewards on most trials but only occasional small losses, with a positive long-
term expected value. In order to perform well on this task, the participants must
learn which decks are more advantageous, indeed drawing more cards for them than
from disadvantageous decks. Another prominent task used to assess risk taking ten-
dencies is BART. On this task participants are asked to inflate a virtual balloon
displayed on a computer screen by pressing a pump button. Each click inflates the
balloon and transfers $0.05 to a temporary account. Participants are informed that
the balloon can explode after each pump, erasing the money earned on the trial.
However, if they stop pumping, they earn all of the points accrued for that balloon.
As each pump is a gamble, which confers an additional reward but also involves
increased risk (i.e., the chance of the balloon popping becomes greater), participants
must learn about the stochastic structure of the task in order to perform well. The
last risk task that we briefly review is the CCT. On this task participants take repeated
trials in which they are presented with 32 cards presented face down and they are
instructed to sequentially turn over them. Like BART pumps, every choice is
rewarded, unless one turns a loss card. Different from IGT and BART, the CCT
offers to the decision precise information about the magnitude of gains, losses, and
the associated probabilities. Indeed, the effect of learning is more limited for this
task, and this perhaps makes the CCT a more refined and decomposable measure of
risk taking tendencies than IGT and BART.
Although such paradigms differ in the types of decisions that are made, they col-
lectively represent a major step toward developing a body of literature that appreci-
ates the nuanced processes that may operate in guiding decision making across
different risk contexts. Inspired by the pioneering work using the IGT to explicate
decision making deficits in patients with neurological damage to the prefrontal cor-
tex and amygdala, researchers have demonstrated the promise of showing differ-
ences between individuals with clinical diagnoses (e.g., substance use disorder) and
healthy comparisons, as well as age-related differences in decision making (e.g.,
Bornovalova, Daughters, Hernandez, Richards, & Lejuez, 2005; Brevers, Bechara,
Cleeremans, & Noël, 2013; Coffey, Schumacher, Baschnagel, Hawk, & Holloman,
2011; Kräplin et al., 2014). Specifically, these tasks also have led to insights into the
neural correlates of risk behavior and how the development of these systems may
impact risk taking tendencies over the lifespan (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio,
& Lee, 1999; Gladwin, Figner, Crone, & Wiers, 2011; Paulsen, Carter, Platt, Huettel,
& Brannon, 2011).
Self-Report Behavior Approaches
In contrast to a financial-based definition of risk taking based on variance, self-

report methods define risk taking largely as problem behaviors that have the poten-
tial for negative consequences for the person (e.g., externalizing, addiction,
gambling, unhealthy habits, etc.). One method involves directly asking individuals
about their present or past risk behaviors, perceptions of risks, or the likelihood
that one would engage in a behavior in the future. Some researchers have used a
single survey question, asking about risk taking globally (e.g., “Are you generally
a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks?”;
Dohmen et al., 2011), or have included global assessments across risk taking
domains, such as recreation or health (e.g., “Please could you tell us if any of the
following risks have ever applied to you, now or in your adult past?”; Dohmen
et al., 2011; Nicholson et al., 2005). More refined measures have expanded on the
behavioral self-report approach, including multi-item scales that are designed to
provide more precision in the measurement of domain-specific risk taking. For
instance, the domain-specific risk taking (DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 2006; Weber
et al., 2002,) provides a multidimensional measure across six broad risk domains:
social (e.g., asking an employer for a raise), recreation (e.g., skydiving), invest-
ment (e.g., investing in a speculative stock), gambling (e.g., betting a portion of
income on a sporting event), health/safety (e.g., drinking too much alcohol at a
party), and ethics (e.g., cheating on a tax return). Another domain-specific inven-
tory, the passive risk taking scale (PRT; Keinan & Bereby-Meyer, 2012), assesses
one’s acceptance of risk due to inaction or omission of control across three domains:
resource inaction (e.g., checking the credit card statements monthly), medical
(e.g., flu vaccinations), and ethical domains (e.g., not say anything when receiving
too much change at the store). Although these self-report measures tend to better
predict outcomes than do one-shot experimental gambles, some skepticism remains
on whether this difference reflects common method variance and redundancy
between scale and outcomes in survey research (e.g., Anderson & Mellor, 2009;
Charness, Gneezy, & Imas, 2013; Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, Walkowitz, & Wichardt,
2015; Nicholson et al., 2005).
Self-Report Trait-Based Approaches
Personality researchers interested in better understanding individual differences in

risk taking have developed constructs, and corresponding scales, that are believed to
represent the affective, cognitive, and behavioral indicators that predispose one to
engage in risk behaviors. These indicators often include elements of preferences
toward uncertainty, thrill and excitement seeking, harm avoidance, impulsiveness,
and even the engagement in specific risk behaviors. For example, risk taking scales
from the Jackson Personality Inventory (JPI; Jackson, 1994) and the Personality
Inventory for DSM-5 (PID-5; Krueger, Derringer, Markon, Watson, & Skodol,
2012) provide a total score that assumes variation on a single underlying factor. In
contrast, scales like the Stimulating-Instrumental Risk Inventory (SIRI; Zaleskiewicz,
2001) or the RT-18 (de Haan et al., 2011) are based on personality items akin to
existing sensation seeking and impulsivity measures and consider risk taking ten-
dencies as a multidimensional phenomenon.
It should be noted that personality-like items are sometimes included in risk tak-
ing inventories, and risk-related trait scales elicit endorsements of engaging in spe-
cific risk behaviors (e.g., “I have tried marijuana, or would like to”; “I would like to
go scuba diving”; Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978), or conversely, some
items ask whether a person likes to take risks but does not clearly define what a risk
is. Nonetheless, no current broad-based personality model considers risk taking as
a broad, orthogonal dimension, per se. Rather, several lower-order traits presumably
related to risk taking appear in larger-scale personality inventories, like the NEO-
PI-R (i.e., excitement seeking, impulsiveness, anxiety, anger, openness to actions;
Costa & McCrae, 2008), the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (i.e.,
harm avoidance; Tellegen & Waller, 2008), the Temperament and Character
Inventory (i.e., exploratory excitability, impulsiveness, harm avoidance; Cloninger,
Przybeck, Svakic, & Wetzel, 1994), and the Hogan Personality Inventory (i.e., thrill
seeking, experience seeking, impulse control; Hogan & Hogan, 1995). Additionally,
items related to sensation seeking, impulsiveness, and risk taking also appear in the
extraversion scale on the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck, Eysenck, &
Barrett, 1985). Other personality inventories like the HEXACO-PI (Lee & Ashton,
2004) also include facets, such as unconventionality, social boldness, prudence, or
anxiety, along with the higher-order honesty-humility dimension, which may also
contribute to risk taking, especially in the social, ethical, and health risk taking
domains (e.g., Weller & Tikir, 2011).
Risk-related traits like impulsivity or sensation seeking have been long and
extensively studied as predictors of a variety of real-world problem behaviors, such
as reckless driving, health-risking sexual behaviors, gambling, alcoholism, and
unethical behaviors (e.g., Chambers & Potenza, 2003; DeAndrea, Carpenter,
Shulman, & Levine, 2009; Dahlen, Martin, Ragan, & Kuhlman, 2005; De Wit,
2009; Gullone & Moore, 2000; Hittner & Swickert, 2006; Hoyle, Fejfar, & Miller,
2000; Nelson, Lust, Story, & Ehlinger, 2008). Likewise, the degree to which differ-
ent traits are associated with risk taking as a function of domains has recently been
addressed using the DOSPERT or other multidimensional domain-specific mea-
sures (e.g., Gullone & Moore, 2000; Romero, Villar, Gómez-Fraguela, & López-
Romero, 2012; Soane, Dewberry, & Narendran, 2010; Weller & Tikir, 2011;
Zaleskiewicz, 2001).
Personality and Risk Taking
Because economists and psychologists from different subdisciplines have defined

and measured risk in varied ways, mixed findings have arisen from using the same
label (i.e., risk) for entirely different variables assessed in empirical studies (i.e.,
behavioral decision paradigms, behavioral self-report, or trait-based approaches).
However, emerging from this lack of consensus is an increasing awareness that a
unidimensional risk taking trait may not adequately explain individual differences
in risk taking. As we will demonstrate in the following sections, research has
strongly provided evidence that suggests that personality traits are correlated with
specific types of risks. Moreover, these findings provide the foundation for consid-
ering risk taking within the context of a broader personality framework.
In this section, we briefly review some of the most commonly used personality
indicators of risk behaviors. Specifically, we focus on two constructs, sensation
seeking and impulsivity, as well as broader personality dimensions. Both sensation
seeking and impulsivity are often deemed the traits that best represent a generalized
latent disposition capable to motivate risk taking across domains and situations
(e.g., Enticott & Ogloff, 2006; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). Though often treated
as unidimensional constructs, the multidimensional nature of these constructs can
help to better place dispositional risk taking tendencies within the context of a tem-
perament model of personality. For instance, facets of both sensation seeking and
impulsivity are similar to other narrow traits in commonly used personality invento-
ries and belong to broader and relatively orthogonal personality dimensions (Anusic,
Schimmack, Pinkus, & Lockwood, 2009; Markon, Krueger, & Watson, 2005;
Sharma, Markon, & Clark, 2014).
A temperament approach offers researchers several advantages. First, research
has increasingly recognized that self-reports in temperament reflect underlying neu-
robiological mechanisms that are responsible for an individual’s experience of

positive and negative affect (e.g., Derringer et al., 2010; DeYoung, 2010; Munafo,
Clark, & Flint, 2005; Reuter, Schmitz, Corr, & Hennig, 2007). Second, tempera-
ment is proposed to have a developmental history. Research has suggested that
childhood temperament is linked to individual differences in temperament as an
adult (e.g., Rothbart & Ahadi, 1994). Last, self-reported adult temperament has
been found to be stable over time (Bazana, Stelmack, & Stelmack, 2004, for a meta-
analysis of the stability of temperament traits). Thus, the temperament dimensions
can be said to be enduring, stable dispositions, a feature that matches nicely with the
search for stable risk preferences (cf. Fox & Tannenbaum, 2011).
Sensation Seeking and Risk Taking
Personality psychologists’ interest in risk taking dispositions has grown due to the
seminal work of Zuckerman and colleagues, who defined the sensation seeking trait
as individual differences “in the seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense sen-
sations and experiences, and the willingness to take physical, social, legal, and
financial risks for the sake of such experience” (Zuckerman, 1994, p. 27). From this
perspective, risk taking is not a primary trait characteristic, but rather a reflection of
seeking situations that satisfy one’s need for arousal, excitement, novelty, and
change, which often, but not necessarily, involve elements of risk.
Versions of the Sensation Seeking Scale (currently SSS-V is the most popular;
Zuckerman et al., 1978) have been extensively used in personality-risk research (see
Roberti, 2004 for a review). The SSS-V not only provides a global score that char-
acterizes relative levels of overall sensation seeking but also includes four subscales:
thrill and adventure seeking (e.g., involvement in risky sports), disinhibition (e.g.,
involvement in wild parties or uncontrolled situations), experience seeking (e.g.,
involvement in novel, strange, or unusual activities), and boredom susceptibility
(e.g., constant need for arousal).
Before reviewing specific facets of sensation seeking, it is worth noting that peo-
ple scoring high on the SSS-V total score typically approach risky situations with
more self-confidence and good feelings compared to people who report lower scores
on these scales (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993; Zuckerman, 1994). Thus, beyond the
popular view that sensation seekers are involved in risk taking for the mere sake of
stimulating experiences, the literature also suggests that they place greater hedonic
value on exciting activities. Consistent with an “affect heuristic” account, those who
have good feelings toward a hazard or activity situation tend to perceive it as safer
and expect greater benefits from it, thus increasing the likelihood of engaging in risk
taking (e.g., Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Hanoch et al., 2006;
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Weber et al., 2002). According to
Zuckerman (2007), sensation seekers are likely to take risks across different domains
(e.g., physical, social, legal, and financial risks). In one study, Zuckerman and
Kuhlman (2000) tested the generality of sensation seeking-risk relations across six
types of behaviors (smoking, drinking, drugs, sex, driving, and gambling), each
assessed by self-reported direct measures of risk taking. Higher overall sensation
seeking scores were significantly correlated with all risky behaviors, except gam-
bling and risky driving. In terms of construct validity, the study showed that a com-
mon personality factor linked sensation seeking tendencies to different types of risk.
Roberti (2004) carried out a comprehensive review of the risky behaviors for which
sensation seekers typically engage. Effect sizes tended to be medium to large for
overall sensation seeking scores with substance use, gambling, reckless driving, and
risky sexual experiences (e.g., multiple partners, unprotected sex, younger age for
the first sexual intercourse, etc.), though were only considered medium in size for
involvement in risky sports (e.g., extreme sports).
Because the need for arousal and stimulating experiences is a linchpin of the
construct, risky choices that are more emotionally engaging are believed to demon-
strate stronger correlations with sensation seeking. Supporting this assertion,
Zaleskiewicz (2001) found that sensation seeking predicted self-reported “stimulat-
ing” risk behaviors (i.e., motivated by the need for arousal, e.g., skydiving, bungee
jumping, or scuba diving), but “instrumental” risk behaviors (i.e., risks needed to
reach some important future goal, e.g., business or financial decisions) were less
strongly associated with sensation seeking. Similarly, decisions from description
(e.g., hypothetical one-shot gambles, no experience of consequences) might lack
the necessary element of arousal that rewards the decision maker and, thus, lower
observed correlations between risk taking and sensation seeking (Zuckerman,
2007). However, as the activity or task becomes more of a decision from experience
(e.g., BART, the affective or “hot” version of the CCT), sensation seeking would be
predicted to demonstrate stronger correlations with behavior, corresponding with
increases in autonomic arousal (Schonberg et al., 2011). Consistent with this view,
Figner et al. (2009) found that the need for arousal scores, a construct closely related
to sensation seeking, predicted risky choices on the affectively laden, experiential
version of the CCT, but not on the more deliberative, non-feedback version of the
task. In keeping with the view that sensation seeking tendencies are more related to
risk taking on behavioral risk tasks that provide immediate feedback and trigger
emotional arousal, de Haan et al. (2011) found that the risk taking subscale of the
RT-18, which included items ostensibly related to sensation seeking, was more
strongly associated with risk taking on the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT, Rogers
et al., 1999), an experienced-based risk taking task, than was the risk assessment
subscale of the RT-18 (de Haan et al., 2011), which included more items ostensibly
related to impulsiveness (vs. deliberation).
Sensation Seeking from a Temperament Perspective
Although these findings suggest that sensation seeking is broadly related to risk tak-
ing across a number of domains, only considering sensation seeking total scores
may obfuscate specific contributions of unique facets specifically related to tem-
perament. In this regard, Glicksohn and Abulafia (1998) reconsidered sensation
seeking as a trait that spans across the Eysenckian temperament dimensions of

extraversion and psychoticism and, hence, proposed two major components. First,
the non-impulsive, socialized mode of sensation seeking is most likely involved in
seeking stimulating situations characterized by minimal or no risk; when risk is
present, premeditation, intense training, or careful planning may be required (e.g.,
travel to exotic or unusual new places, perform in front of a big audience, sky or
cycle downhill at high speed; see also Hansen & Breivik, 2001). For example, a
mountaineer or a scuba diver might deliberately take risk facing variable conditions
or hostile environments and yet adopt precautions to control the risk, such as check-
ing weather forecasts or up-keeping air cylinders and equipments (Woodman,
Barlow, Bandura, Hill, Kupciw, & MacGregor, 2013). Furthermore, sensation seek-
ing is only one of the motives that drive people to engage in high-risk sport activi-
ties, and not all risky sports are equally appealing for sensation seekers (e.g.,
skydiving vs. mountaineering; Barlow, Woodman, & Hardy, 2013). In terms of
SSS-V subscales, thrill and adventure seeking may be more strongly aligned with
this component. In contrast, a second dimension, the impulsive, unsocialized mode,
is most likely involved in engaging in stimulating experiences for which the risk of
personal and social harm is high (e.g., gambling, bullying others, attending “wild”
parties). Disinhibition and boredom susceptibility subscales may be especially
strong markers of this component. Accordingly, Glicksohn and Abulafia (1998) sug-
gest that the former component is more strongly associated with extraversion,
whereas the latter component is more strongly tied to psychoticism, a construct
similar to disinhibition in a Big Three temperament framework.
As anticipated, de Haan et al. (2011) developed a brief risk taking measure that
included items tapping into sensation seeking tendencies from different personality
inventories. The analysis yielded a first factor, labeled risk taking, characterized
largely by items describing enjoyment or involvement in a variety of stimulating
risky situations; whereas a second factor labeled risk assessment included items
reflecting the tendency to deliberate over choices compared to acting impulsively.
Furthermore, the two factors were moderately intercorrelated, and the group of
people scoring higher on the risk taking subscale and lower on the risk assessment
ones included more risk takers, such as recreational drug users, that not only sought
for stimulating experiences but also, but less so, were less likely to approach deci-
sions in a reasoned, deliberative manner. Likewise, Woodman et al. (2013) devel-
oped a Risk Taking Inventory for high-risk sport participants.
Given these insights, we can reconsider Zuckerman and Kuhlman’s (2000) find-
ings that overall sensation seeking did not correlate with risky driving and gam-
bling. In fact, if only some facets of a multifaceted trait can predict a specific target
variable, using the total trait score for prediction can be misleading because non-
predictive facets might dilute the predictive relationship of other facets more closely
tied to the target variable of interest. In keeping with this view, research has sug-
gested that separate SSS domains may more or less strongly be associated with
specific types of risk behavior, which may attenuate total score correlations with the
criterion. For instance, Jonah (2001) found that the thrill and adventure seeking
subscale showed stronger correlations with risky driving than did the other sub-
scales. Conversely, Fortune and Goodie (2010) found mean-level differences
between pathological and non-pathological gamblers for the disinhibition and bore-
dom susceptibility subscales, but not the experience seeking or thrill and adventure
seeking subscales.
More broadly, we can consider these results within a temperament perspective.
Specifically, thrill and adventure seeking involves seeking and positively appraising
arousing and stimulating events, which may be more strongly associated with posi-
tive emotionality. By contrast, disinhibition and boredom susceptibility, relate to the
impulsive, unsocialized mode, may be more strongly aligned with disinhibition (vs.
constraint). As we will explain in a later section, this distinction may have important
implications for understanding the personality antecedents of domain-specific risks.
Impulsivity and Risk Taking
Like sensation seeking, impulsivity is a trait that has been extensively associated
with real-world risk taking (e.g., Chambers & Potenza, 2003; Dahlen et al., 2005;
De Wit, 2009; Hoyle et al., 2000). Real-world risky behaviors often involve a choice
between an immediate reward associated with a bad habit (e.g., taking drugs, gam-
bling, or smoking) and a delayed greater reward that might be obtained by ending
that habit (cf., Chapman, 2005; Critchfield & Kollins, 2001). Therefore, it has been
hypothesized that impulsive individuals are inclined to engage in maladaptive risky
behaviors to the extent that they value the immediate positive consequences of their
actions (e.g., the exhilaration of gambling) to be larger than delayed advantages
deriving from abstaining from those actions.
Impulsivity is a construct that has been conceptualized in a multitude of ways,
including present time orientation, inability to delay gratification, reward sensitiv-
ity, impaired cognitive control, quick decision making, lack of premeditation and
planning, and even behavioral disinhibition, sensation seeking, and risk taking (Bari
& Robbins, 2013; Enticott & Ogloff, 2006). For purposes of the current chapter, we
follow a recent definition offered by Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, and
Swann (2001), who argue that a description of impulsivity needs to incorporate an
individual’s tendency to demonstrate decreased sensitivity to less favorable behav-
ioral consequences both in the short- and long-term and fast responses based on
incomplete information processing. Moeller et al. (2001) also note that, based on
these definitional components, impulsivity involves risks but suggest that impulsive
risk taking may be distinguished from sensation seeking risks.
The impulsivity literature is voluminous, and a full review of methodologies
span beyond the scope of the chapter. However, we describe several methods by
which impulsivity is measured, both from self-report and behavioral perspectives,
to highlight personality processes linking impulsivity with risk taking.
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The unhappy Battle of Preston soon put several in motion who till
then were quiet. The Lord Pitsligo[335] who had also been engaged
in the Rebellion in the 1715, and had received both his life and
fortune from the Government, still retained his old affection for that
cause, and never qualified to the present Government. He was justly
esteemed a polite and learned gentleman, and of great integrity and
honour in private life, but entirely enthusiastic on the Jacobite
principles. As the Young Pretender had wrote letters soon after his
landing to most of those whom he thought would favour his design,
Lord Pitsligo was not neglected; and though he was now old and
might have had merit enough from the party for former services, yet
he could not withstand this address, but immediately began to stir
and rouse the friends of the Cause. In his letters on that subject he
usually called the young Pretender by the name of the Amiable
young Stranger. It was not however imagined that in such an infirm
state, as he then was, he would have thought of undergoing the
fatigues of a Winter Campaign, especially as he had a very small
estate, and no Vassalages or Following to his Family, and so could
not in that way make any considerable accession to the Party. But
now that the family of Marischall was out of the country, and the Earl
of Kintore, the next representative of that family, was in the interest
of the Government, the gentlemen of Buchan who were friends of
the cause and used formerly to follow Marischall, immediately had
their eyes fixed on Lord Pitsligo to head them. But all these that
appeared in Buchan would not probably have been of consideration
enough to have determined him, if soon after Preston, a set of
gentlemen in Boyne and Enzie[336] set agog by this victory had not
made this an express condition to their going out, that Lord Pitsligo
should go as their head. It was generally believed that this condition
was insisted on by one or two of them who had been rash enough to
be always speaking of their going out if they had an opportunity, and
now that it came to the push, repented of it and thought still of
getting off and some honour, by offering to go only if Lord Pitsligo
went at their head, which they reckoned themselves sure one of his
age never would; and if he did not they might then pretend they had
no confidence in any attempt of this kind for which Lord Pitsligo
would not venture all. But if this was their view they were
disappointed in it, for the rest of these gentlemen consenting to join
them in making the same proposal to Lord Pitsligo, he accepted of it
and so there was no retracting. The gentlemen who from this country
joined his Lordship, or who were in concert with them, were Sir
William Gordon of Park, Gordon of Carnusy, Gordon of Cupbairdy,
Mr. Hay, Younger of Ranas, Forbes of Brucehill, Gordon of
Glastirrum, Abernethy, brother to Mayen, and several other
gentlemen of lesser note. Carnusy and Cupbairdy’s journey was a
great surprise. The latter had no manner of tincture that way, but
being a rambling young lad was determined mostly by comradeship
and something too by the high regard he had for Lord Pitsligo.
Carnusy was esteemed a wise, solid man and some one not at all
wedded to Kingscraft. But as many debts of his never heard of
formerly are appearing, this somewhat unravels the mystery.
Joined by Buchan Gentlemen, and Aberdeen’s etc.
Immediately on Lord Pitsligo’s resolution being known there
appeared also to join him, Sir William Dunbar of Durn, from Boyne,
Mr. Gordon of Hallhead and Mr. Mercer, gentlemen of considerable
note that resided usually in the town of Aberdeen: Mr. Gordon of Mill
of Kinkardine, Mr. Petrie, Sheriff Depute, Mr. Sandilands and several
gentlemen of the lower class from that place; from Buchan, Mr. More
of Lonmay,[337] Factor to the Countess of Errol,[338] Cuming,
younger, of Pitully, Gordon younger, of Logie, Cuming of Kinninmuth,
Ogilvie of Achirris, (all gentlemen of considerable estates), Thomson
elder and younger of Fachfield, Turner younger of Turnerhall, Fraser
brother to Inveralachy and some others of less note; also from the
country about Aberdeen, Mr. Irvin of Drum, two sons of Menzies of
Pitfodels, [Charles] More brother to Stonnywood, etc. But none of
these gentlemen raised any number of men, but all rendevous’d at
Aberdeen on horseback, with their servants, and made a pretty
enough appearance. Mr. Sandilands only raised a Company of Foot
which joined them there, as also did two companies raised by
Stonnywood, the one commanded by himself, and the other by his
brother; the whole not amounting to 200 men. These did indeed
march south with Lord Pitsligo, but were afterwards incorporated in
the Duke of Perth’s second Battalion. Lord Pitsligo and his friends
were but short time in Aberdeen, but while they stayed, conducted
with great discretion.
Rebels favoured by Commons
Hitherto the Rebellion was favoured by almost all the common
people. The promise of freeing them from the Malt Tax had a
surprising influence upon them, this being a tax the Farmers are
especially sensible of, as they themselves pay out the money in the
first instance being all Maltsters, at least for their own use. The
Rebels therefore hitherto behaving civilly, listing only volunteers,
paying freely, taking but some few good horses and arms as they
met with them, and freeing the country people from the eternal dread
they were under of the Malt Gaugers, were looked on by them as the
deliverers of their country.
Why no Opposition made by the Friends of the Government
It may at first seem surprising that no steps were taken in two
such countys by the friends of the Government to stop this
procedure. But let it be considered that after Preston people were
really in a consternation for some time, and nobody knew (as the
intelligence from the south, meeting with so many interruptions, was
very uncertain) how soon the Government might be in a situation to
force the Rebels from Edinburgh so that they might have had leisure
enough to have sent north Detachments and destroyed all that would
attempt to disturb their friends.
Besides it was requisite to have a man of rank and quality at the
head of such a thing (as the Government thought not fit to give
anybody the authority of a Lord Lieutenant) to give a proper weight
to it. But such was the situation of the Nobility of these countys, that
no such thing could have been expected of any of them except the
Earl of Aberdeen, whose undoubted attachment to the Government
as well as his large estate and high rank might indeed have made
him very serviceable had he thought it prudent to have tried to raise
the friends of the Government.[339] The Duke of Gordon, had it not
been prevented by his indisposition, might have been of great use
not only in keeping these Counties quiet, but even in suppressing the
Rebellion altogether. The Earl of Findlater’s[340] sickly constitution
quite disabled him, and though the Earl of Kintore[341] had had a
greater relish for military matters than he has, yet the incumbrances
on his fortune would have been a drawback on him. The Lord
Forbes[342] had by no means an Estate suited to his ability though
he had inclined to appear. The Lord Salton[343] had no weight in the
county, and the Lord Braco[344] had a great estate, yet the newness
of his family would have marred any project of his forming.
Gentry
Had the gentry that did not engage been all hearty, they might
indeed have come together without any of the nobility’s appearing to
head them, but undoubtedly a third of them were dissaffected though
they were wise enough not to embark in so desperate an enterprise;
and of those that were not so, many were selfish, many were
careless who governed, and many were timid and fearful, so that the
few who were resolute had not sufficient strength nor influence to
make a stand. The most remarkable of these in Buchan and
Fortmartine[345] were Lord Strichen, Mr. Maitland of Pitrichy, Mr.
Forbes of Shevis, Mr. Garden of Troup and Mr. Buchan of
Achmacoy. On Don side, Mr. Middleton of Seaton, Mr. Patan,
Grandam, Sir Arthur Forbes, Mr. Burnet of Kemnay, Sir Archibald
Grant and Mr. Leith of Glenkindy. In Garrioch, Mr. Horn of Westhall,
Mr. Leith of Freefield, Sir Alexander Reed of Barra and Mr. Forbes of
Blackfoord. On Deeside, the family of Leys[346] with Mr. Duff of
Premnay. (N.B. a great part of Deeside is in the shire of Mearns.) As
to the towns, Banff and the Seaport towns betwixt it and Aberdeen
were mostly all dissaffected. Full two-thirds of the two towns of
Aberdeen were very well-affected to the Government. All the
Magistrates, or rather those who had been such, before Hamilton
came to town, and all the old Provosts and Bailies (which makes a
considerable number of the principal merchants), and both the
colleges behaved in an exemplary, steady manner. The Clergy of the
Church of Scotland were to a man firm in the interest of the
Government in these counties and indeed everywhere else, and
neither force nor flattery could alter them. The Rebels at the
beginning were at great pains to coax them, and to see if possible to
make the face of a party among them, and would have been
excessively fond of the least compliance, had it been only the not
praying for the King by name, however minutely he should have
been described otherways, well-knowing that if any would go into a
different way from their brethren in any thing however trifling at first,
that difference might be blown up to make a more considerable
opposition. They had particularly hopes of the young Clergy, as they
had used to keep company with them more freely in times of peace,
and not carry with so much reserve as their elder brethren, and so
they thought they should have much influence with them. But they
were excessively baulked when they saw them maintain with vigour
and zeal those principles of liberty which formerly they thought they
spoke of only for amusement, when they saw them at such
extraordinary pains to raise worthy sentiments in the people, and
sparing neither purse nor persons in the service of the Government
as far as they had opportunity; and by how much they expected
more friendship from them than from the old folks, so much the more
were they incensed against them than against the others from whom
they expected nothing.
Synod meets
The Synod met as usual in October in Old Meldrum, and though
in the 1715 they would venture to do nothing, but immediately
adjourned, yet now amidst no less danger they acted with much
more vigour. They ordered a very dutiful and warm address to his
Majesty which was afterwards very highly resented by the Jacobites,
not only as it showed the loyalty of the Clergy, but confuted the lies
published by the Rebels in their Edinburgh Courant, that the whole
gentlemen in the county except four had engaged in the Rebellion,
whereas the Clergy thought themselves obliged not only to vindicate
the county in general, but particularly to do justice to the gentlemen
of the Church of Scotland, by asserting that few or none of them had
engaged in this wicked Rebellion. And indeed some gentlemen then
in London owned themselves very happy in this Address, that came
very seasonably, and had a very good effect, not only in taking off
the bad impressions the friends of the Government had of these
counties, but also in discouraging the Jacobites by undeceiving them
of the vain expectations they had from there. The Synod also had a
public diet for Prayer to Almighty God to put a speedy stop to the
Rebellion, which had a good effect not only on such of the laiety as
were near enough to be present at it, but also tended to confirm and
spirit up several that only heard of it. They also resolved, that
whereas some ministers in their public prayers used formerly to think
his Majesty sufficiently distinguished from the Pretender by calling
him our Protestant Sovereign or some such other appellation, but as
the omitting to name him expressly even though thus characterised
was looked on as a compliance by the Rebels, who deluded many of
the people with a story of their pretended Prince being a Protestant,
that therefore all in time coming should pray for him by name, as
they would be answerable. They also appointed that Presbyteries
should meet often, and members be sent as correspondents betwixt
neighbouring Presbyteries that they might advise with one another at
this critical time and act with the greatest harmony. All this was
punctually executed.
Nonjurant Clergy
There were but two Clergy of the Church of England in all these
Counties who were qualified to the Government, both at Aberdeen,
but here was a very considerable number of that persuasion who
were Nonjurants, which is to be sure the same thing with avowed
Jacobites, and though most of them had the address to keep
themselves free from open acts of Rebellion yet they were
excessively instrumental by every sly act to poison the people and
debauch them to rebellion, and accordingly all their hearers, almost
without exception, were rank Jacobites, and the being so, was by
them esteemed so very essential to salvation, that even before the
Rebellion they have been known to refuse to admit some of their
hearers to the Communion not only if by going to a Presbyterian
Church, but even if by going to a qualified meeting of the Church of
England they had heard King George prayed for, unless they
solemnly professed their repentance for this crime. After the
Rebellion broke out, several of them turned so insolent as to pray for
the Pretender by name. All of this persuasion as they all along had a
most unaccountable enmity against the Church of Scotland, so they
failed not to show it with a deal of rancour during the Rebellion, to all
of that persuasion.
Papists
It was but natural to expect that the Papists should favour the
Rebellion to their utmost, but they are but inconsiderable in these
Counties. Their meetings were quite barefaced, the Pretender
openly prayed for, and a very great and good understanding there
was betwixt the Nonjurants and them, so that Seaton, a priest, and
Law, a Nonjurant minister,[347] were very commonly joined together
among Lord Lewis Gordon’s council, who was made Governor of
these counties by the Pretender. The Papists however generally had
the cunning to be rather more tolerable in conversation with the
friends of the Government than the Nonjurants were.
Lord Lewis Gordon joins the Rebels
Before the Rebels marched from Edinburgh to England they very
wisely thought of means of retaining these counties under their
subjection, while they should be marching south and of having
reinforcements from thence ready for them against any emergence.
For this purpose they wheedled over to their party Lord Lewis
Gordon,[348] a younger brother to his Grace the Duke of Gordon,
imagining that the very name of one so nearly connected to the Duke
would have a great influence on the tenants and dependants of that
family, and they well knew that His Grace’s indisposition at that time
would prevent any effectual measures being taken to stop this
procedure. Lord Lewis was a Lieutenant in the Fleet, and had
unhappily come down at that time to visit his Mother, the Duchess
Dowager, who stayed near Edinburgh.[349] There he met so many
old friends and acquaintances engaged in the Rebellion, who laid all
oars in the water to gain him; and this indeed was no hard matter to
a forward young lad like him, especially as he was to have a Feather
in his cap, and to be made Lord Lieutenant of Aberdeenshire and
Governor of the Towns of Aberdeen and Banff, with power of
disposing of all places in them. Along with him is set down More of
Lonmay, More of Stonnywood, Gordon of Avachy and Sheriff Petrie
to assist him in his Government and Levys. There were also a
number of Towns Burgesses named as a Council with them for the
Town of Aberdeen and to manage under him in his absence but they
all refused to accept; on which Mr. Moir of Lonmay was made
Deputy Governor of Aberdeen, much indeed against his own
inclination. He was a sensible man, but turned out very positive and
arbitrary in his Government, which he had frequent opportunities of
showing as Lord Lewis did not reside much at Aberdeen, and when
he did, was always much advised by Lonmay. Mr. Bairde of
Achmeden[350] was at the same time made Depute Governor of
Banff. This gentleman had shown his affection to the cause so far as
to wait for the Young Pretender at Edinburgh with his white cockade,
but it seems was not so far militarily disposed as to think of marching
with them into England, but having a considerable estate in
Banffshire, they thought he might be of service to them in this
sphere; but though he at first accepted of this commission, yet he
seldom if ever acted in consequence of it, and very rarely made any
public appearance.
Men Raised by Force
The Lord Lieutenant began with his recruiting about Strathboggy,
but as the waifest kind of people had mostly gone off in the first
Levys, this was not so successful as he expected. Nay, on his first
coming there, his summonses to his brother’s tenants to rise were so
slighted, and volunteers so backward, that he was obliged to write to
Blelack[351] and some of the gentlemen of Deeside who had a
number of men with them, begging of them for God’s sake to send
him a command of their men that he might not be affronted. How
soon he got these, then he went to work quartering on the tenants
about Strathboggy till they either rose or furnished men according to
the proportions he had settled. But this was tedious, as he had but a
small party to quarter with, and therefore he soon took a more
expeditious way, threatening to burn the houses and farmyards of
such as stood out. This soon had the desired effect, for the burning a
single house or farm stack in a Parish terrified the whole, so that
they would quickly send in their proportion, and by this means, with
the few that joined as volunteers, he raised near 300 men called the
Strathboggy Battalion in the country thereabouts. The same method
of military execution (a discipline till then unknown in these counties)
was used in most of the high parts of the shire for forcing out men,
especially on Deeside, where a great many were raised in this
manner. Stonnywood however found people enough about the town
of Aberdeen and places adjacent without force, to form another
corps for Lord Lewis called the Aberdeen Battallion consisting of
about 200 men, which with the Strathboggy Batallion formed what
was properly Lord Lewis’ own Regiment; Avachy being Lieutenant of
the latter; Stonnywood of the former.
Auchengaul raises a Company
About the same time Crichton of Auchengaul, a Popish
gentleman of a very small estate, but representative of the Viscount
Frendraught, raised a company and joined Lord Lewis. There were
also several little people in Banffshire and Buchan, etc., who raised a
few men each, and joined the Lord Lieutenant and all got
commissions of one kind or other, which was by no means hard to
be obtained. And thus the whole of this second Levy in the Counties
of Aberdeen and Banff, under Lord Lewis would have amounted to
near 800 men.
Comparison with 1715
As the above is a view of the whole course of the Rebels from
these Counties, it may not be amiss to compare it with what it was in
the 1715, from which it will be evident that for all the noise they
made about their strength in these parts it was nothing now in
comparison with what it was then.
In the 1715 they were supported by most of the Nobility. The
Duke of Gordon (then Marquis of Huntly), the Earls of Mar,
Marischall, Panmure, and Kintore, and the Lords Fraser and Pitsligo,
who had all great estates, connections and dependencies in these
Counties, raised their whole force and exerted themselves to the
utmost in favour of the Rebellion. Whereas now Lord Pitsligo was the
only nobleman that joined them unless Lord Lewis be reckoned. As
to the landed gentry the difference is full as considerable. Though
the most be from Banffshire and Buchan, yet even there they are not
one fourth of what they were in the 1715. Not one gentleman from
Fortmartine unless Mr. Smith of Menie be to be reckoned, who
indeed appeared with them at Edinburgh, but left them or they
entered England. Not one gentleman that resided in Garrioch,[352]
though in the 1715 most of them were concerned. Only five on
Deeside from the head to the foot. And though there were several
gentlemen of small estates on Deeside, yet all of them put together
were not equal to the Laird of Invercauld who engaged in the former
Rebellion. The Commons must always bear Proportion to the
interests of the Gentry engaged, and though indeed this rule failed in
so far at this time as that considerable numbers were raised from the
estates of the Duke of Gordon, Earl of Aboyne, and Laird of
Invercauld, where the Rebels had properly no interest, yet as almost
none of the gentlemen that went with Lord Pitsligo raised so much as
the men on their own estates, this will in good measure balance the
other. There were several merchants of note appeared from the
towns in the 1715, but now none but a few smugglers, and a very
few tradesmen.
As the Rebels had thus a considerable number of men in these
Counties, they next fell to work to raise money for their maintenance.
And first of all they resolved to levy the Cess that was due for the
current year, and all arrears, and accordingly the Lord Lieutenant
named a collector, and without further intimation ordered partys to
quarter for it. As it was soon moving from one house to another in
the towns and country about them, as the quartering money was
very exorbitant, their partys numerous and costly to maintain, and
the Cess being levied only according to the valued rent, and not
being anything considerable in comparison of the real rent and few
being willing to bear the stress any time for a small sum, it was
quickly levied in the towns of Aberdeen and from the adjacent
estates. But in the country it necessarily took up longer time so that
they never got parties sent to some estates that were most out of the
way, and some gentlemen, particularly Mr. Burnet, Kemnay, and Mr.
Horn, Westhall, bore the stress with great firmness and wearied
them out of it at this time, as indeed Mr. Horn at length did
altogether.
The French Land
In the month of December there arrived six transports at
Peterhead, Aberdeen, Stonehaven, and Montrose with Lord John
Drummond’s Regiment on board and the Piquets from the Irish
Brigade in the French Service; all under the command of Lord John
Drummond.[353] This greatly elevated the Rebels, was magnified
hugely to their friends in other places, and looked upon by them all
as the certain prelude of a great invasion from France. The two Lord
Drummonds[354] and the Lord Lieutenant had an interview at
Aberdeen, the great result of which, seemed to be the forging a letter
from Lord Martial commanding his friends to join Lord John
Drummond (vid. printed Copy) and a Proclamation in which his
Lordship, also to show him how well he was acquainted to the
French Government, threatens to punish those who did not join him
according to their intentions. The letter from Lord Martial was soon
suspected to be forged, from its being altered while a-printing, and
from the style of it, it being very unlike Lord Martial to speak of
Commanding his Friends, but after Culloden it was put out of doubt
by one Mr. Halyburton, who had been sent from France by Lord
Martial, how soon he knew of it, to disclaim the thing entirely, to let
Lord John know how much he took it amiss, and to warn his friends
not to be seduced by it.[355] The Rebels were on the other Speyside
before this gentleman reached them, and how soon he informed
Lord John of his errand, he was either closely confined or then
discharged on the severest penalty from speaking of it, so that it was
but little known, till the Flight, when he acquainted several gentlemen
of it, who after that made it no secret. The French that landed at
Peterhead, Aberdeen, and Stonehaven, stayed not above a week or
so to refresh themselves, but marched south to the Camp at Perth.
Levy Money
The Cess went but a short way to answer their demands, next
therefore they resolved to demand what was called Levy Money, or
Militia money; accordingly Stonnywood by order of the Lord
Lieutenant wrote Circular letters to the several gentlemen or their
factors, demanding an able bodied man sufficiently accoutred in the
Highland Dress[356] for each £100 Scots of valued rent, or then £5
Sterling to raise one. The man was but a pretext, it was the money
they wanted. This indeed would have amounted to a very
considerable sum; no less than about £12,000 Sterling for the
County of Aberdeen alone, which will be 5s. Ster. in the pound off
the real rack’d rent, which exorbitant demand would at any time have
been very hard upon Lairds and Tenants but after two bad crops and
so many other losses, was indeed more than they could bear.
However these reasons availed nothing to the Lord Lieutenant, or his
Depute (who was by no means ignorant of the state of the counties)
but to work they went, how soon they had got in most of the Cess, to
quarter for it. This began at length to open the eyes of many of the
people, who had been formerly cheated by promises of freedom
from taxes, especially the Malt Tax, but now they saw how delusive
these were, and this not a little confirmed the few who had all along
wished well to the Government. Even the selfish among the gentry
who professed not to care who reigned, were not now quite so
indifferent, and even many secret Jacobites were disgusted.
Lord Loudon Invited
The friends of the Government seeing no end of this oppression,
while the Rebels were their masters, sent several messages to the
President and Lord Loudon[357] to send some men to their relief.
They were especially instant from the town of Aberdeen, this being
the seat of their Government, and consequently most exposed to
their tyranny, which was so great that the usual freedom of
conversation was entirely banished, at least none could promise how
long they could call anything their own, and even already they were
speaking of imposing a Loan, how soon the Militia money was
levied. But their keenness to obtain relief and to persuade Lord
Loudon to undertake it, probably made them represent the strength
of the Rebels as more insignificant than it really was, which no doubt
has been one reason why the party sent was not more numerous.
Burning Order
The Levy money coming in but slowly, for all the stress of
quartering, which stress alone induced some to pay it, but some few
that were such hearty friends as to need only the pretence of force,
the Lord Lieutenant grew quite impatient and issued what was called
the Fire Ordinance (vid. Gent. Mag. for January 1746, p. 29th).[358]
Party’s were sent to several Districts of the country, with orders to
quarter on the gentlemen’s houses (not on the tenants’ as usual) and
if against such a time the money was not payed, to begin with
burning the gentleman’s house and Planting, then the tenants’
houses and cornyards and so on through the district. But
notwithstanding of these dreadful threatenings, none but some very
timourous people paid, till they should at least see what would be the
consequences of the Northern aid which now began to be spoke of
and pretty confidently expected.
Old Aberdeen Distressed
As the old town of Aberdeen had in proportion to such a place
discovered a more than ordinary zeal for the Government so that the
Rebel Governors distinguished it accordingly by a demand of £215
Ster. of Levy money, a very great sum for so small a village, and by
beginning with them these new methods of raising it. They
impudently proposed it among the Whigs without ever regarding
whether or not they had any property in Lands or houses and
particularly the Masters of the Kings College had their small stipends
very severely cessed. But when they could not even thus get their
full demand answered, Lonmay ordered about £40 Ster. of it to be
taken from the Poor’s Box and from some small funds that belonged
to an hospital for poor widows and some other such charitable funds.
Large parties were quartered through the town in the gentlemen’s
houses for several days, but even this severe stress not proving
effectual, intimation was made by Tuke of Drum, that if the money
was not paid against a certain hour the Town was to be burnt. This
indeed alarmed them and the gentlemen were forced to seem in so
far to comply as to beg only delays till the money should be got, and
this they had the art to obtain from time to time for two or three days,
till at length they had pretty certain information that McLeod and
Culcairn’s men were come the length of Banff and Strathboggy, on
which most of the gentlemen of note in the place, slipped out of town
or concealed themselves, without paying a farthing, and leaving the
Rebels to do with the town what they pleased. But as they too were
sensible by this time of the enemy’s approach they would not
venture on such a severity till they should see the event.
McLeod Marches
As for McLeod’s March (vid. Gents. Mag., Jan. 1746, p. 23). It
was Gordon of Avachy and Gordon of Aberlour that opposed them at
the passage of the Spey, but they quickly retreated. They had the
Strathboggy Batallion under their command and had been quartering
for Cess and Levy money about Strathboggy and Banff. They
marched to Aberdeen the day appointed for the Public Fast by his
Majesty, December 17th, which however was very punctually
observed even where they passed and in general was so both by
Clergy and people both in town and country, though the Clergy
indeed did meet with some insults in a few places. Immediately on
McLeod’s passing the Spey, the Rebels called in all their Quartering
parties, and the Deeside men to the town of Aberdeen and sent
expresses to their friends in Angus and Mearns to send them
assistance.
The McLeods joined the two companies under Culkairn,[359] at
Inverury, upon Saturday, December 20th, the whole body being 700
men complete. 400 of those under McLeod were quartered in the
town of Inverury, the rest of that name and Culkairn’s two companies
were cantonned in farmers’ houses along the Ury to the north west
of the town, many of them more than a mile and a half’s distance
though there was no worldly necessity for this, as the town of
Inverury contained two regiments of the Duke’s army for some
weeks without a man of them going a stone cast from it. Against
night the Rebel Reinforcements were come to Aberdeen consisting
of about 150 of the French Picquets who had remained at Montrose
and more than 200 Angus and Mearns Militia, so that there would
have been in whole about 1200 men at Aberdeen. All the Saturday
the Rebels were exceeding careful to prevent any intelligence
coming to the McLeods, securing as far as possible all the Avenues
coming from the town, and sending out scouts to scour between
Kintore and Inverury to the very water-side, these seized Mr. Bartlet
an Aberdeen writer who had come along with McLeod and had
ventured to Kintore (2 miles from Inverury), where also Mr. Dingwall,
an Aberdeen merchant and some others coming with intelligence
from Aberdeen were snapt up and carried in prisoners. The McLeods
had immediate notice of this, but Culcairn (by whom McLeod was
directed as he himself did not pretend to understand military matters)
could not be prevailed on to allow any men to come over and drive
them off, no doubt fearing as they were strangers in the country lest
they should be surprised. But as by this means at length all
intelligence stopt, this proved their ruin in the end. Whereas by
keeping some advance guards, or at least sending out patroles now
and then, for a mile or two, they might indeed possibly have lost a
man or two in Rencountres with the enemy’s parties, and possibly
the reverse might have happened, but still they’d have secured the
main chance and prevented the whole being surprised. However by
this conduct though frequently things of considerable importance
were known at Kintore, it was impossible to send the intelligence the
remaining two miles. Nevertheless Sir Archibald Grant[360] who had
come over the hill from the south, without touching at Aberdeen, and
was certainly informed on his way that a reinforcement of French
would that night be in town, fell on a way late that night to let McLeod
know so much, and this intelligence probably prevented their
marching to attack the Rebels the next morning, till they should know
their situation more exactly. There was no body more alert or
serviceable in getting exact intelligence to the Rebels than
Stonnywood, as he knew the country and the people exactly, and as
his estate lay betwixt Aberdeen and Inverury, he had all his tenants
employed on the same service, so that on Saturday night they had
perfect intelligence of everything that concerned the McLeods.
Volunteers
There were some Aberdeen gentlemen who had been either
driven from town by the tyranny of the Rebels, or they had been sent
on messages to the President, that came all along from Inverness as
Volunteers in this expedition: among these were Mr. Forbes of Echt,
Mr. Logie a merchant, and Mr. Thomson, General Superviser of
Excise, which last gentleman especially was exceeding serviceable
both on this, and several other occasions to the Government. The
number of volunteers was increased at Inverury by Mr. Maitland,
Pitrichy, Mr. Forbes of Shieves, Forbes of Echt, Mr. Chalmers, the
now Principal of the King’s College, Mr. Gordon, Professor of
Humanity in the College, some merchants and tradesmen, several
students of Divinity and Philosophy and Prentices from both towns of
Aberdeen, and many more would have come if it had not been the
difficulty of getting out of town. But as McLeod had no spare arms,
and the volunteers could get nothing but pistols they proved of no
service. Mr. Horn, of Westhall, by promises of great rewards and
encouragement, had got his tenants to engage to follow him and join
the McLeods, and as he foresaw he could not get fire-arms, had
caused make a number of spears with iron heads, for them. But
when it came to the push, they all drew back, their hearts failed them
and they refused to rise. On which, on Monday he was sending an
Express to McLeod for a party to force them out, but his express met
them retreating.
A Detachment sent out
On Sunday McLeod was prevailed on to send a large detachment
of his own company over the water for three miles, which had a very
happy effect, driving off all the enemy’s Scouts and facilitating their
intelligence, so that they met with no less than three persons from
town that had come out in disguises and by byeways who brought
letters giving an exact account of the enemy’s numbers and
situation, which people otherways would all have been intercepted
by their Scouts. This so entirely convinced the Lieutenant that
commanded the detachment, of the necessity either of constant
patroles, or then of an advance Guard at Kintore, that he had
everything settled for one or other, never doubting but his
representation would prevail, but there was no convincing Culkairn,
so that next day there came not a man over the water at all.
The Enemy Alarmed
The Enemy’s Scouts on being thus driven off, having seen the
party but imperfectly, alarmed their friends in town with an account
that the whole of the McLeods were marching to attack them, on
which they drew together, but were soon undeceived. The same
night after it was dark they convened their men and marched three
miles out of town, as if to surprise the enemy, but whether it was only
a feint to see if their men would stand by them, or if it was owing to
any wrong notion that the McLeods were apprised of them, they
returned to town again without doing anything.
Rebels’ Artifice
This day too, they had tried a strategem to raise a mutiny among
the McLeods by bribing a tenant’s son of McLeod’s (who had been
staying with a Nonjurant Minister, teaching his children Latin and so
had imbibed all the Jacobite notions) to go to Inverury and see to
persuade the men that they were engaged in an unjust cause, that
their enemies were very numerous and powerful, and that Lord
Loudon had purposely sent them up to be cut off in a strange
country. As this fellow had their language, was their namesake and
countryman, they readily listened to him and it was taking among
them like lightening, till the fellow was found out and apprehended,
but the impression still stuck to them, till McLeod drew them all out,
and very particularly showed them the roguery.
The Rebels march
On Monday the 23rd, about 9 of clock in the morning, the Rebels
marched from Aberdeen, in order to surprise the McLeods in two
columns. The main body being about 900 was commanded by Lord
Lewis (though one Major Cuthbert,[361] a French Officer, did all the
business), crossed the Bridge of Don, and took a round about and
indirect road on the North side of the Don. The other column
consisting of their Strathboggy Battallion, and commanded by Major
Gordon, a French Officer, and Avachy, took the high road on the
south side of the river. As they had all along guarded the avenues
from the town very carefully, they did it now so effectually that there
was no possibility of sending any intelligence of their march, till they
were actually gone. When they were marching they all along kept
advance parties before their main bodies came in sight, so that when
they were observed, these parties prevented any persons getting
past with information. As the body that marched the high road had by
far the nearest way, they halted and concealed themselves in the
Church and church-yard of Kinellar about three miles from Inverury,
till the corps on the other side were suitably advanced, and
meantime had their advanced party concealed in some houses in a
low part of the road near Kintore.
This party seized the minister of Kintore, who had got some
confused notice of their march, and going out for more certain
intelligence, and observing nothing on the road, had come that
length where he was made prisoner, as also at the very same time
were no less than three people with intelligence of the Rebels’ march
from the town, who had got out when their Guards were taken off,
and escaped the main body by byeways, till being so near Inverury
they had (to shorten the way) come in there to the high road, never
doubting but they’d have met with some of the McLeods advanced
parties to protect them, as those had done that came out the former
day. The column that marched on the north side of Don had Scouts
concealed among Planting of the Earl of Kintore’s on a rising ground
that overlooked Inverury, and though some while before the enemy
came up they were observed going backwards and forwards from
the Park, and pointed out to McLeod and Culkairn as looking very
suspicious, yet by some fatality they neglected to send up and see
what they were doing. Immediately as they marched, the minister of
Rayne, who happened to be in town, rode out by the Deeside Road,
the only one left unguarded, to see if it was possible this way to get
before them; but this was so greatly about, and the road when he
came to cross the country so excessively bad that the firing was
begun or he reached Kintore. So that the first intelligence they got of
them was the Main Body being observed by their sentry, marching
down by the Earl of Kintore’s parks within a quarter of a mile of
Inverury.
McLeods draw out
McLeod, Culkairn, and all the officers with the few men they had
in town got together very resolutely, and all of them discovered a
great deal of courage on this occasion, nay, to think at all of standing
against such superior numbers bespoke no little bravery. And indeed
had they thought of sending down a party to line the Church yard of
Inverury, and had others rightly posted on a little hull, called the
Bass, both which were within a pistol shot of the Boat and Ford of
Ury where the Main body behoved to pass, and also on the Ford of
Don where Avachy, etc., passed, they certainly had done great
execution among them in their passages, and if they had not
stopped them altogether, would at least have retarded them till the
men that were canton’d at a distance had got up to their assistance,
for the Rebels had no cannon, but two old rusty ones they had taken
from ships, which got not up till long after the skirmish was over, and
though they had, would not probably have done great execution. But
the confusion and surprise of the McLeods at the unexpected
coming of the enemy made them neglect all these advantages, and
stand on the Rigs on the east side at the south end of the town, at
almost an equal distance from the Foords of Don and Ury, but at so
great a distance as to be able to do execution at neither; and their
standing here too was probably not a little owing to their then
discovering the other body of the enemy coming upon the other side
of Don, which made them irresolute how to dispose of themselves till
so many of the Rebels crossed the Ury as put it out of their power to
stop their passage there. It was also a vast loss to these
Highlanders, who were none of them disciplined, that they had only
firelocks and bayonets, and wanted their darling weapon, the
Broadsword, which is always their chief confidence.
Rebels pass the Foords
The van of the Rebels’ main body consisted of the French and
some picked men and was lead only by Major Cuthbert, these with
all the gentlemen, the volunteers, and some of the common men
crossed the Ury, very alertly, and as they passed, drew up behind the
Bass, and the Churchyard. But many of their common men ran off
and skulked by dike-sides till the action was over and could neither
be brought out by threats nor entreaties till then. Major Gordon and
Avachy with about 50 or 60 of their men crossed the Don very
briskly, and behaved well, but the rest of the Corps took shelter
among the Broom, till they saw the event.
The action began near an hour after sunset with a clear
moonshine, by some passing shots from some ten or twelve of the
McLeods who advanced so far, some to the one Foord and some to
the other, and fired on the enemy as they were passing and killed
two or three men in the water, and immediately retired. The Body
that crossed Ury moved up first to attack, but were received with two
or three fires from the McLeods, which they returned indeed two for
one, but both were at too great a distance to do great execution. But
as the party from Don was by this time coming to attack them in
flanks, and as the French were advancing with a close regular fire
and like to bear very hard on them, the McLeods found themselves
unable to stand this shock, and accordingly gave way; yet not so but
that a party of them loaded their pieces retiring, and finding some of
their men, especially the wounded, like to fall in the enemy’s hands,
they wheeled about before they were half way up the town, and
made another fire, but immediately ran off. On this the French
advanced through the town with an incessant street fire, and the rest
divided themselves and went firing up each side of it, being too by
this time joined by most of their skulking companions. After this, as
some of the McLeods were running off on the stubble ground on the
North end of the town, some person gave a cry that McLeod was
taken, on which they turned about again and made another fire but
immediately marched off. The Rebels meanwhile being at a
considerable distance and not observing them so exactly going off,
but seeing a ridge with a few furrows in it, amidst a great deal of
unploughed stubble ground, and taking it by the moonlight for a row
of men, they fired once or twice into it very successfully. And thus in
whole the firing continued for more than twenty minutes. The
companies of McLeods and Monroes that were cantonn’d out of the
town, had unluckily no Officers with them; these happened to be with
McLeod in Inverury, and went out to engage along with the men that
were there (which by the bye as there were thirty of them on guard,
and many straggling through the country seeking provisions did not
much exceed three hundred), these therefore having no body to
draw them together, ran up different ways on hearing the firing till
they met some of their friends flying, or were informed of the event,
and then they ran off. But had their officers been with them to bring
them together, and lead them up in a body to meet their friends at
the north end of the town and support them, they very possibly might
have turned the scale in their favours.
Loss on both sides

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Psychological Perspectives on Risk

and Risk Analysis Theory Models and

International Perspectives on Cyberbullying:

Transdisciplinary Perspectives on Risk Management and

Risk and Reliability Analysis Theory and Applications

Understanding Modern Dive Computers and Operation

Derivatives and Internal Models: Modern Risk Management

Mind Body and Morality New Perspectives on Descartes

Risk Return Analysis The Theory and Practice of

Game Theory for Security and Risk Management From

Foreword by Paul Slovic

Bernhard Streicher FOM University of Applied Sciences

ISBN 978-3-319-92476-2 ISBN 978-3-319-92478-6 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018951412

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Decision Research and University of Oregon Paul Slovic

do I make investment decisions without knowledge of future developments on the

Cambridge, MA, USA Martina Raue

Part I Individual Differences in Risk Perception

Part II Cognitive, Emotional and Social Perspectives on Risk

Part III Modeling Decision Making under Risk

8 Behavioral Models of Decision Making Under Risk���������������������������� 181

Part IV Communicating Risks to the Public

Part V Practical Implications for Industry, Policy and Research

Michael H. Birnbaum Decision Research Center, California State University,

Rocio Garcia-Retamero Department of Experimental Psychology, University of

Mary Kate Tompkins Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University,

Martina Raue is a Research Scientist at the MIT AgeLab in Cambridge,

Eva Lermer is a Professor of Business Psychology at the FOM University of

Bernhard Streicher is a Full Professor of Social and Personality Psychology and

Marco Lauriola and Joshua Weller

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 3

(disinhibition), are affect-relevant traits. Because of this theoretical link, tempera-

 efinitions of Risk and Construct Validity of Risk-Related

Choice-Based Experimental Tasks

Hypothetical gambles still are common in behavioral economics, based on the

Self-Report Behavior Approaches

In contrast to a financial-based definition of risk taking based on variance, self-­

Self-Report Trait-Based Approaches

Personality researchers interested in better understanding individual differences in

Personality and Risk Taking

Because economists and psychologists from different subdisciplines have defined

robiological mechanisms that are responsible for an individual’s experience of

Sensation Seeking and Risk Taking

Sensation Seeking from a Temperament Perspective

seeking as a trait that spans across the Eysenckian temperament dimensions of

Impulsivity and Risk Taking

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Decision Research and University of Oregon Paul Slovic

Cambridge, MA, USA Martina Raue

Part I Individual Differences in Risk Perception

Part II Cognitive, Emotional and Social Perspectives on Risk

Part III Modeling Decision Making under Risk

8 Behavioral Models of Decision Making Under Risk�� 181

Part IV Communicating Risks to the Public

Part V Practical Implications for Industry, Policy and Research

efinitions of Risk and Construct Validity of Risk-Related

Choice-Based Experimental Tasks

Self-Report Behavior Approaches

In contrast to a financial-based definition of risk taking based on variance, self-

Self-Report Trait-Based Approaches

Personality and Risk Taking

Sensation Seeking and Risk Taking

Sensation Seeking from a Temperament Perspective

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