Shaping Peace in Kosovo : The Politics

of Peacebuilding and Statehood 1st

Edition Gëzim Visoka (Auth.)
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/shaping-peace-in-kosovo-the-politics-of-peacebuildin
g-and-statehood-1st-edition-gezim-visoka-auth/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Peace and Resistance in Youth Cultures: Reading the

Politics of Peacebuilding from Harry Potter to The
Hunger Games 1st Edition Siobhan Mcevoy-Levy (Auth.)

https://textbookfull.com/product/peace-and-resistance-in-youth-
cultures-reading-the-politics-of-peacebuilding-from-harry-potter-
to-the-hunger-games-1st-edition-siobhan-mcevoy-levy-auth/

Liberal Peace and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa

1st Edition Patrick Tom (Auth.)

https://textbookfull.com/product/liberal-peace-and-post-conflict-
peacebuilding-in-africa-1st-edition-patrick-tom-auth/

The International Element Statehood and Democratic

Nation building Exploring the Role of the EU and
International Community in Kosovo s State formation and
State building Dren Doli
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-international-element-
statehood-and-democratic-nation-building-exploring-the-role-of-
the-eu-and-international-community-in-kosovo-s-state-formation-
and-state-building-dren-doli/

Building Sustainable Peace: Timing and Sequencing of

Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding 1st
Edition Brown

https://textbookfull.com/product/building-sustainable-peace-
timing-and-sequencing-of-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-
peacebuilding-1st-edition-brown/
Fighting Over Peace : Spoilers, Peace Agreements, and
the Strategic Use of Violence 1st Edition Andrew G.
Reiter (Auth.)

https://textbookfull.com/product/fighting-over-peace-spoilers-
peace-agreements-and-the-strategic-use-of-violence-1st-edition-
andrew-g-reiter-auth/

The Interaction Between Local and International

Peacebuilding Actors : Partners for Peace 1st Edition
Sara Hellmüller (Auth.)

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-interaction-between-local-
and-international-peacebuilding-actors-partners-for-peace-1st-
edition-sara-hellmuller-auth/

Gender, UN peacebuilding, and the politics of space :

locating legitimacy Laura J. Shepherd

https://textbookfull.com/product/gender-un-peacebuilding-and-the-
politics-of-space-locating-legitimacy-laura-j-shepherd/

Chocolate, Politics and Peace-Building: An Ethnography

of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó,
Colombia 1st Edition Gwen Burnyeat (Auth.)

https://textbookfull.com/product/chocolate-politics-and-peace-
building-an-ethnography-of-the-peace-community-of-san-jose-de-
apartado-colombia-1st-edition-gwen-burnyeat-auth/

The Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace in the

International System 1st Edition Gary Goertz

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-puzzle-of-peace-the-
evolution-of-peace-in-the-international-system-1st-edition-gary-
goertz/
Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies

Series Editor
Oliver P. Richmond
University of Manchester
United Kingdom
This agenda-setting series of research monographs, now more than a
decade old, provides an interdisciplinary forum aimed at advancing inno-
vative new agendas for approaches to, and understandings of, peace and
conflict studies and International Relations. Many of the critical volumes
the series has so far hosted have contributed to new avenues of analysis
directly or indirectly related to the search for positive, emancipatory,
and hybrid forms of peace. New perspectives on peacemaking in practice
and in theory, their implications for the international peace architecture, and
different conflict-affected regions around the world, remain crucial. This
series’ contributions offers both theoretical and empirical insights into many
of the world’s most intractable conflicts and any subsequent attempts to
build a new and more sustainable peace, responsive to the needs and norms
of those who are its subjects.

More information about this series at

http://www.springer.com/series/14500
 Gëzim Visoka

Shaping Peace
in Kosovo
The Politics of Peacebuilding and Statehood
Gëzim Visoka
School of Law and Government
Dublin City University
Dublin, Ireland

Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies

ISBN 978-3-319-51000-2 ISBN 978-3-319-51001-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-51001-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017930928

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-
tional affiliations.

Cover illustration: Photo by Gëzim Visoka

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To my parents, Tahir and Nexhmije Visoka, for surviving the violent
conflict and enduring the ungovernable peace.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am in debt to the many people who have helped me in different ways

while writing this book. Special thanks go to Oliver P. Richmond for
inspiring me to pursue this research and for providing continuous support
throughout the process. My wife, Grace Bolton-Visoka, deserves special
recognition for her eternal patience, understanding, support and insightful
comments on this book. While preparing this manuscript, I greatly bene-
fited from conversations with colleagues at Dublin City University, and
elsewhere, who provided me with the support and space to complete this
intense project on time. I am, in particular, grateful to Professor John
Doyle, DCU’s Institute for International Conflict Resolution and
Reconstruction (IICRR), the School of Law and Government, and the
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences for providing financial support.
Writing a book on peacebuilding and statehood in Kosovo from a local
critical perspective requires extensive engagement with a broad range of
interlocutors working with civil society groups, government and public
institutions, international missions and organisations, and public univer-
sities. I am grateful to many of you, whom I cannot list exhaustively here,
for their thoughtful and engaging conversations, and for their assistance
during my many visits to Kosovo, which shaped this book. I dedicate this
book to my parents, Tahir and Nexhmije Visoka, for surviving the violent
conflict and enduring the ungovernable peace in Kosovo.

vii
 CONTENTS

1 Intervention, Peace, and the State 1

2 Fluid Interventionism and the Politics of Peacebuilding 33

3 The Politics of Statehood and the Ungovernability of Peace 71

4 Local Resistance and the Politics of Self-Determination 113

5 Civil Society and Peace Formation 147

6 Peace as Normalisation 183

7 The Quest for an Emancipatory Peace 221

Index 255

ix
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAK Alliance for the Future of Kosovo

CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy
EEAS European External Action Service
EU European Union
EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
ICO International Civilian Office
ICR International Civilian Representative
KFOR Kosovo Force (NATO)
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo
LVV Lëvizja Vetëvendosje
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo
PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SITF Special Investigative Task Force
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN United Nations
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNOSEK United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for the Future Status
Process for Kosovo

xi
 CHAPTER 1

Intervention, Peace, and the State

OVERVIEW
This book explores the prospects of building peace after violent con-
flict in an ethnically divided society, which has struggled to form an
independent state under protracted and fluid international intervention
and tutelage. While international attention is currently focused on
transnational terrorism and hybrid security threats emanating from
intensified rivalry among global and regional powers, civil wars and
ethnic conflicts remain an important feature of the international secur-
ity agenda. International attention remains especially significant for
societies that have experienced international mediation, intervention,
and post-conflict reconstruction while struggling to overcome the
legacies of conflict and establish a sustainable peace. There is no better
case than Kosovo to evaluate the suitability of peacebuilding interven-
tions, the unintended outcomes of statebuilding efforts, and the local
backlash to international interventions. Kosovo has attracted unprece-
dented international attention over the past two decades. Kosovo has
also been cited as an example of ethnic cleansing, international inter-
vention, post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding, and contested
statehood. Kosovo has become the place where humanitarian interven-
tion gained its peak international support, where state sovereignty
changed its meaning, and where the doctrine of the responsibility to
protect took precedence over territorial integrity. Most significantly,
Kosovo has challenged the limits of liberal internationalism and has

© The Author(s) 2017 1

G. Visoka, Shaping Peace in Kosovo, Rethinking Peace
and Conflict Studies, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-51001-9_1
2 SHAPING PEACE IN KOSOVO

become a location of experimentation for global governance, interna-

tional supervision, and neo-trusteeship. Finally, Kosovo has also
become the arena where great power rivalry has remerged after the
Cold War and the rules of state formation and membership in inter-
national society have been altered.
Since the end of conflict in 1999, Kosovo has struggled to build a
stable peace and consolidate statehood. The main source of contention
after the conflict was between Kosovo Albanian claims for statehood
and Serbian opposition to an independent Kosovo. The modern roots
of the conflict started during 1980s when the Milošević regime revoked
Kosovo’s autonomy and initiated a systematic violence against ethnic
Albanians, which initially triggered civil resistance, then later escalated
into an armed struggle after several diplomatic failures to resolve the
conflict in Kosovo. NATO’s military intervention ended the conflict but
did not resolve the problem of peace in the Kosovo. Similarly, the place-
ment of Kosovo under UN administration compensated for the absence
of a state, but did not resolve the problem of statehood. As a conflict
management strategy, the international community has deployed multi-
ple fluid missions, which have utilised ambiguously peacebuilding to
appease the Serb minority while applying statebuilding to satisfy the
Albanian majoritarian quest for statehood. To appease Serbia and Russia
after NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, the international
community had to delay the definition of Kosovo’s future political status.
In the absence of a peace agreement and functioning state, they decided
to deploy armed peacekeepers and place Kosovo under UN transitional
administration – to justify the delay of independence, a fluid agenda for
peacebuilding emerged as an appeasement strategy for the Serb commu-
nity. Kosovo Albanians half-heartedly accepted the imposed peace as it
delayed prospects for independence. In response, the majoritarian
Albanian community utilised international statebuilding to consolidate
the political, legal, and factual attributes of independent statehood.
Conversely, ethnic Serbs in Kosovo rejected participation in the state-
building process to deliberately undermine independence. Both sides
exploited this ethnic disagreement and invoked their critical, subaltern,
and resistant agencies to pursue their ethnic peace agendas.
Consequently, these tensions prolonged international missions, justify-
ing the deployment of assertive, supervisory, and covert forms of inter-
vention, best described as fluid interventionism. While international
intervention was a by-product of local conflict, its ineffective and
 1 INTERVENTION, PEACE, AND THE STATE 3

undemocratic performance played a part in delaying inter-ethnic recon-

ciliation and state consolidation. Under these conditions of ambiva-
lence, prospects for an emancipatory peace vanished, particularly in
addressing conflict legacies and uplifting local communities from
ethno-nationalist entanglements, rebuilding ethnic relations, and for-
ging a new social contract on progressive grounds for justice, equality,
civic citizenry, and inclusive democracy.
This book explores the contradictions that shaped peace in Kosovo.
It focuses on the intractable relationship between peace and statehood
in Kosovo. On the one hand, the book seeks to explore the defining
features and dynamics of protracted international interventions and the
extent to which peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies have been
accepted, resisted, and distorted. By doing this, the book offers a
critique of international fluid interventionism and failure-driven policies
of peacebuilding and statebuilding, the parapolitics and after-politics of
ethnic power-sharing, the dubious forms of local resistance, the role of
civil society for peace formation, and the prospects for an emancipatory
peace in Kosovo. The book provides a critical account of the interna-
tional missions in Kosovo and traces the effectiveness of administrative,
supervisory, and diplomatic forms of interventionism. It demonstrates
the prospects and limits of international intervention in building peace
and creating a new state in an ethnically divided society and fragmented
international order. It also explores the co-optation of peace by ethno-
nationalist groups and explores how their contradictory perception of
peace produced an ungovernable peace, which has been manifested with
intractable ethnic antagonisms, state capture, and ignorance of the root
causes, drivers, and consequences of the conflict. Under these condi-
tions, prospects for emancipatory peace have not come from external
actors, ethno-nationalist elite, and critical resistance movements, but
from local and everyday acts of peace formation and agnostic forms for
reconciliation. The book proposes an emancipatory agenda for peace
embedded on post-ethnic politics and joint commitments to peace, a
comprehensive agenda for reconciliation, people-centred security, and
peace-enabling external assistance.
In this regard, this book provides a critical review of international and
local efforts for shaping peace in Kosovo. The chapters in this book
deconstruct the nature and politics of international intervention in
Kosovo as well as exploring the unevenness of peace in Kosovo by high-
lighting the structural, normative, and agential blockages to the
4 SHAPING PEACE IN KOSOVO

formation of an emancipatory peace in Kosovo. Certain segments of this

book are purposefully normative, while others provide a more reflective
critique of the actors and processes that have shaped peace in Kosovo.
The book develops a critical local epistemology of peace which tries to
decolonise peace knowledge from dominant frameworks, as well as inter-
rogate the promise and pitfalls of subjugated knowledge. In this sense,
the book contributes to uncovering the features of a context-specific
peace, which in Kosovo has manifested as fluid forms of intervention,
peace, governance, resistance, and emancipation, which have contently
changed and adjusted to the circumstances producing both intended and
unintended consequences while promoting simultaneously emancipatory
and exclusionary politics. This introduction presents the key themes and
arguments of the book.

THE AGE OF FLUID INTERVENTIONISM

In the past two decades, scholars have struggled to develop conceptual
frameworks for understanding international efforts for building peace
and reconstructing state institutions in conflict-affected societies. The
majority of scholars have used notions such as liberal peacebuilding,
liberal internationalism, and liberal interventionism to describe the
normative and performative dimensions of international engagement
in post-conflict societies (see Pugh 2012). With certain nuances, all
these notions indicate “the application of liberal principles and prac-
tices” in foreign countries, especially those affected by violent conflict
(Jahn 2013: 13). These liberal principles and practices stipulate the
prospects for sustainable peace on the grounds of promoting political
liberalism, power-sharing democracy, protection of human rights, and
market economy, which encourage political accommodation, peaceful
restraint, and structural interdependence within and between societies
(Doyle 2012; Paris 2010). However, there are two major problems
with such existing liberal peace and intervention theses. Firstly, the
concept has become solid and universal, which is not congruent with
the reality. Over the years, the catalogue of peacebuilding activities
and their sequencing has become fairly standardised among the UN
and regional organisations (see UN General Assembly and Security
Council 2009). The UN itself admitted in their 2015 review of
peace operations that their standardised responses to conflicts do not
respond “to evolving needs on the ground” (UN General Assembly
 1 INTERVENTION, PEACE, AND THE STATE 5

and Security Council 2015: 95). Secondly, peacebuilding interventions

are inadequately affiliated with political liberalism. Studies that have
explored the intentions, performance, and impact interventionism
show that they are not as liberal as it is often assumed (Richmond
2011; Joshi et al. 2014; Visoka 2016). On the contrary, interventions
and peacebuilding strategies embed undemocratic, illiberal, and coer-
cive discourses and practices.
Understanding post-conflict societies with multiple international mis-
sions with constantly changing peace policies, principles, and practices
requires new more reality-adequate conceptualisations. This book sug-
gests dissecting liberalism from current interventions, especially when we
refer to those external interventions that have multiple purposes and
undergo reconfiguration over time. Although the normative substance
of international missions in Kosovo is often affiliated with liberal peace-
building, their practices speak more of a situational approach to peace-
building. It seems that contemporary interventions are profoundly fluid
interventions. Using fluidity as a concept not only provides semantical
accuracy, but also helps us dissect the features of existing practices of
interventionism. In sociology, the notion of fluidity is affiliated with
Zygmunt Bauman (2000), whose work illustrates the fluid forms of gov-
erning contemporary social, political, and economic affairs, evident with
the “increased transience, uncertainty, and insecurity of all social forms”
(Gane 2004: 9). Fluid ontologies conceive social structures, identities,
agencies, and relationships as “constantly being made, undone and
remade” (Blackshaw 2005: 48). This helps us reconceptualise social and
political interactions, identities, and power relations as open and perfor-
mative processes subject to constant changes. Although the notion of
hybridity in peacebuilding debates is quite similar to fluidity, it has come
to see actors, processes, and relations as more or less embedded, static, and
fixed (see Richmond 2005: 198; Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond and
Mitchell 2012; Visoka 2017). Fluidity might be better suited to capture
the ambivalence and disembeddedness of peace. As each international
intervention is context-specific – influenced by endogenous and exogen-
ous processes, actors, and structures – this book will explore how fluid
interventionism has emerged and evolved in Kosovo, especially looking at
its defining features and impact on peacebuilding in Kosovo. This con-
ceptual shift has major implications on how we understand peacebuilding
interventions and their limits for building a sustainable peace, which will
hopefully trigger new research in international studies.
6 SHAPING PEACE IN KOSOVO

International missions in Kosovo have asserted their fluid interven-

tionism, and have constantly changed their features and technologies
of intervention. The substance of fluid interventionism in Kosovo was
not entirely based on external blueprints and routines, but predomi-
nantly on situational improvisation, personalities, and emplaced rela-
tions with international and local stakeholders. This study elaborates in
detail three distinct figurations of fluid interventionism in post-conflict
Kosovo. The first of these is administrative interventionism, which took
place between 1999 and 2007 under UN’s Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It represents the most significant and
well-known form of intervention in post-conflict Kosovo, and consisted
of extensive powers vested in the international administrators to shape
peace in Kosovo and build state institutions. During this period, the
international community directly governed the territory and imposed a
particular legal and institutional framework centred around the forma-
tion of a democratic and multi-ethnic society with special institutional
privileges for minorities. Intervention was justified as a necessary con-
dition for creating local capacities for maintaining order and building
peace. As Chapter 2 illustrates, it seems that the fluid international
policy of peacebuilding and statebuilding in Kosovo was more about
managing and governing the present and future crisis and exploiting
local resources, than resolving the root causes and drivers of conflict
and building state institutions that promote peace endurance. Fluid
interventionism runs after unintended consequences of their actions
and ignores resolving the causes of the conflict in the first place (see
Aoi et al. 2007; Chandler 2016; Visoka 2016).
In many ways, peacebuilding appeared to be a damage-control
mechanism for the international military intervention. It has been a
flexible policy of conflict management brought about by the failure to
adequately understand local political sociology of identity, agents, and
interests (Jabri 2010: 49). Initially, the international community utilised
peacebuilding to pacify Serbia’s dissatisfaction with NATO’s intervention
and the UN’s administration of Kosovo. Peacebuilding took the shape of
accommodating the rights and interests of Serbian community through
decentralisation of power, special political status and reserved seats in the
parliament and government, and the collective return of refugees. On the
other hand, an agenda for statebuilding was devised to satisfy the Kosovo
Albanians’ quest for independent statehood. Statebuilding and the entire
power-sharing arrangements were designed to moderate political conflict
 1 INTERVENTION, PEACE, AND THE STATE 7

between pacifist and armed factions of Albanian resistance in Kosovo.

Over time, prosecutions in the name of transitional justice and the rule of
law were more about disciplining and controlling the local elite than
dealing with the past, serving justice to victims, and building a functional
and democratic state in Kosovo. While in other cases peacebuilding and
statebuilding might go hand in hand, in Kosovo they became conflated
with negative repercussions for durable peace in this conflict-affected
society. Progress in one policy area meant stagnation and resistance on
the other. Hence, the scope of local hostilities to a large extent deter-
mined the scale of international intervention, and the local resistance
shaped the modes of interventionism.
While the coordinated declaration of independence after the failure
of UN mediation was portrayed as being about transferring sovereignty
from international missions to Kosovo institutions, it actually ended up
shifting one mode of interventionism to another. Supervisory interven-
tionism, which took place between 2008 and 2012 following Kosovo’s
independence, focused on supervising the implementation of the UN
special envoy’s proposal for comprehensive status settlement, resolving
the negative legacies of UNMIK, as well as strengthening the state-
hood of Kosovo to make it compatible for self-sufficiency and regional
integration. Moreover, the rationale behind supervised independence
was to convince the neutral states and opponents of Kosovo’s inde-
pendence that the fledgling country had agreed to temporarily share its
sovereignty with an international entity and immediately offered special
institutional arrangements to accommodate the rights and interests of
the Serb community. At the heart of supervisory interventionism was
the international will for non-intervention in Kosovo’s domestic affairs,
not driven by the political maturity of Kosovo institutions, but an
external will to mask their inability to control local political processes.
After independence, statebuilding became increasingly concerned with
institutional reform, Europeanisation, and membership in international
society, which provided strong opportunities for supervisory and dip-
lomatic interventionism to implement their foreign policy goals in
Kosovo without much local resistance. Consequently, during super-
visory interventionism the international community lost interest in
building peace and promoting reconciliation in Kosovo. They were
more preoccupied with policing the consequences of their dissever-
ments, namely corruption, elite predation, and instability, than addres-
sing the root causes and drivers of conflict.
8 SHAPING PEACE IN KOSOVO

As the power relations significantly changed in favour of local actors,

new fluid forms of international intervention started to emerge. With the
end of supervised independence for Kosovo in 2012, a new phase of
diplomatic interventionism started to emerge, which consisted of dis-
guised forms of international intervention, which tried to control and
reform the state. The more Kosovo strengthened its domestic and inter-
national sovereignty and the more international missions lost their local
legitimacy, the more obvious it became that the orchestrators of interna-
tional rule in Kosovo are foreign diplomats representing powerful states
that backed independence. During this period, the intervention was justi-
fied on the grounds of making the local elite act responsibly. Diplomatic
intervention through declaratory pressure and more covert forms of sabo-
tage and pressure was justified on the grounds that local ownership is not
being translated into local responsible governance and local compliance
with external conditionality. The significance of diplomatic intervention-
ism has been particularly evident in the organising of elections and the
forming of government coalitions. The dysfunctionalities of ethnic power-
sharing arrangements and persistence of corruption signify the failure of
previous rounds of interventionism and the overall failure of statebuilding
models imposed on Kosovo. However, paradoxically, failure triggered
more intervention, intervention necessitated more intervention, and
more intervention meant more dependency, more fragility, more resis-
tance, and ultimately more open and covert conflict.
Hence, this book illustrates that the entire process of peacebuilding and
statebuilding was driven by failure and shaped by unintended conse-
quences.Three phases of fluid interventionism illustrate that international
missions moved from one peacebuilding priority to another – not based on
the accomplishments but based on failures. This failure-driven approach has
been the key factor behind protracted international missions in Kosovo.
Failure to reach a mutually consensual settlement between Kosovo and
Serbia in 1998 opened the path for administrative interventionism in 1999.
Similarly, the failure of the UN special envoy to convince the Security Council
to accept the comprehensive settlement proposal in 2008 necessitated launch-
ing a supervisory interventionism largely to mitigate the consequences of
UNMIK’s failures, manage Serbia’s contestation of independence, and de-
politicise the state in Kosovo. During supervisory interventionism, the
fragmented position of different international organisations on Kosovo’s
independence significantly undermined efforts for an effective implementa-
tion of a peace settlement alongside the semi-authoritarian governance of
 1 INTERVENTION, PEACE, AND THE STATE 9

ethno-nationalist elites backed by the international community. These

failures later became a pretext for renewed interventionism in the form
of diplomatic and covert intervention in fighting corruption and miti-
gating regional security threats. Diplomatic interventionism tried to
strengthen the state not because of any empathy for Kosovo, but to
avoid another security backlash against the EU and wider region. The
discourse of “responsibilisation” of local elites during the diplomatic
interventionism enabled external forces to constantly dislocate and
attribute their failures to local actors, structures, and processes –
once again preserving the fake moral superiority of the international
community.
All these policy failures have had a performative function; they legit-
imised new waves of interventionism, and the displacement of the ratio-
nales of legitimation. Embracing failure as an enabling force for
international intervention made success an unattractive and irrelevant
criterion for justifying and legitimating governmentality over post-conflict
and troubled societies. Consequently, genuine efforts for peacebuilding
and reconciliation disappeared in an endless struggle of priority diffusion,
mission reconfiguration, and adaptation to changing local circumstances.
Governing while avoiding taking responsibility for the outcomes not only
brewed local resentment but also encouraged similar authoritarian prac-
tices among the local protagonists thirsty for power. Accordingly, both
statebuilding and peacebuilding managed to establish an undemocratic
political culture, whereby local elites and governments would place more
value on external legitimation than legitimacy derived from the people of
Kosovo, and also prioritised external neo-liberal conditionality over local
socio-economic needs for better education, healthcare, and public ser-
vices. In support of fluid interventionism, Dziedzic et al. (2016: 196)
argue that “this transition, rather than exit strategy is one of the main
reasons peace between Kosovo and Serbia is largely assured.” Despite
these claims, fluid interventionism has neither established the conditions
for long-term peace in Kosovo nor created local structures to promote
more emancipatory forms of peace beyond the existing ethno-nationalist
entanglements.
In the lifespan of all international missions in Kosovo we have seen
the transformation of the discourses and techniques of fluid interven-
tionism, which offer valuable observations for the present and possible
future modes of interventionism in a transitional world order. From
the perspective of liberal peacebuilding, international administration of
10 SHAPING PEACE IN KOSOVO

post-conflict societies is conceptualised as set of static, well-defined insti-

tutional mechanisms, policies and practices adhering to the international
institutions, rules and norms (see Zaum 2007). Richard Caplan (2005:
159), for instance, argues that “international administration . . . can be
effective only if there is a well-planned operation” and “an appropriate
exit strategy.” Over time, ambiguity and fluid operations on the ground
and assessments of progress became the defining features of international
interventionism in Kosovo. In the age of fluid interventionism there is no
permanent attachment to a cause, intention, or a policy. The rule is to
develop the ability for instant sentimental and strategic attachment and
detachment from one crisis to another. While it is true that we are
experiencing a shift from reactionary to preventing interventions, from
external assistance to local resilience, it might be too early to describe
these shifts and failed statebuilding as post-interventionary paradigms.
The fluid interventions represent a renewed modernity of international
biopolitics and governmentality of security, risks, and difference.
Humanitarian interventions and the doctrine of the responsibility to
protect have normalised the possibility of intervention and non-inter-
vention in world politics. Fluid interventions now represent simulta-
neous choice of invoking both of them without calling interventions by
their true name. They are heavily engaged in paternalistic practices but
disguise such impositions and superiority through “responsibilising”
the local actors and avoiding heavy-handedness in public’s eye (see
Barnett 2016).
Accordingly, the history of international interventionism is a history of
fluid and unfinished peace initiatives that adapt to new emerging local,
regional, and global circumstances. Strategic peacebuilding is not only
comprehensive, interdependent, and integrative (see Philpott and
Powers 2010), but above all fluid in its transformative, non-committal,
and hallowed discourses and practices. Fluid interventionism is becoming
an adaptive practice applicable not only to post-conflict societies but to
any fragile situation as interpreted by global power-holders. Fluid inter-
ventions address the consequences of their actions more than the root
causes and drivers of conflicts. The longevity of fluid interventionism is
disguised by the constant reconfiguration of their mandate and organisa-
tional structure. Fluid interventions do not exit, but they endure by being
rebranded as instantaneous and short-term involvements (see Caplan
2012). When possible, physical detachment is replaced by remote inter-
ventions in the shape of diplomatic pressure, drones, surveillance
 1 INTERVENTION, PEACE, AND THE STATE 11

techniques, and big data that seek to provide accuracy and precision in
pre-emptively guiding governance of the unknown. The fluid and unpre-
dictable nature of post-conflict peace is increasingly alerting policy-makers
to search for new forms of interventions.
In the current shape, fluid interventions are embedded on the princi-
ples of adaptability, flexibility, contextualisation, and liminality. Often the
exit of peacebuilding operations does not represent the end of interna-
tional intervention in these societies. From direct and shared governance
of these societies the modes of interventionism are becoming more
hidden, structural, and fluid in nature. Failures of one mode of inter-
ventionism and its derivative policies become an inspiration for other
modes of intervention. Fluid interventions disguise instability by making
it untraceable, changing the way in which the success or failure of
international interventions is measured, and evading the question of
who ought to be responsible for the consequences. Therefore, fluid
interventionism represents the contemporary liminality of international
society evident with continuous ambiguities of how to deal with conflict
zones, as well as constant changes in peacebuilding approaches. Beyond
this, fluid interventionism has spread to other societies not affected by
conflict, but which are either exposed to instable regions or undergo
domestic security challenges and stalled political reforms.

NORMALISING AN UNGOVERNABLE PEACE

In Kosovo, paradoxically, international efforts for peacebuilding have taken
place without a mutually agreed peace agreement, while the legacies of
conflict remained resolved and efforts for genuine ethnic reconciliation
were ignored. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 62) argues that “a stable
peace can be established only when the sides to a peace process are satisfied
with the peace agreement.” The lack of a consensual peace settlement at the
end of the conflict in Kosovo and the disagreements over the post-conflict
direction have resulted in the development of conflictive goals among ethnic
groups and sustained efforts to de-legitimate the opponents of ethnic groups
and resist the possibility for the peaceful resolution of differences. The main
challenge in post-war Kosovo was the prevalence of a significant incompat-
ibility between Kosovo Albanians’ claims for independence and Serbia’s
claims to preserve their fictive control over the territory. After NATO’s
intervention and the subsequent UN civilian deployment, Kosovo
Albanians acted as victors in relation to the defeated Serbs. For
12 SHAPING PEACE IN KOSOVO

the majoritarian Albanian community, peace was affiliated with indepen-

dence and sovereign statehood. It represented a historical opportunity to
break away from Serbia and their collectively supressed past. In this regard,
the Kosovo Albanians accepted fluid interventionism and a fluid policy of
peacebuilding in exchange for independence. The international statebuild-
ing and the normative and economic conditionality that followed was
perceived by Kosovo Albanians as contributing to a state formation pro-
ject, namely the consolidation of all the attributes of a sovereign state. For
Kosovo Albanians, peacebuilding was perceived as an integral part of the
state formation process, as appeasement of the Serb minority, and key to
secure international support for independence. A viable peace for Kosovo
Albanians entailed establishing an independent state, fully integrated in the
international system, including UN membership.
On the other hand, Kosovo Serbs under Belgrade’s direct tutelage
perceived peace in Kosovo quite differently. The ‘loser’s’ peace tried to
use peacebuilding as a strategy to mitigate prospects for independence
through reincorporating Kosovo within Serbia proper, and governing the
territory through the formation of internal mono-ethnic political spaces,
institutional privileges, and ethnic decentralisation and territorial auton-
omy. In service of this policy, peacebuilding took the shape of ethnic
power-sharing, expansion of local mono-ethnic self-governance, and the
collective return of minority refugees to Kosovo to reinstate demographic
balance. In obstructing and obscuring the Kosovo Albanian project for
statehood, Kosovo Serbs boycotted international statebuilding and
instead established parallel institutions. The Serbian approach was mainly
to accumulate more power in Kosovo through institutional arrangements
and shifting ethnic geographies to obstruct and sabotage sovereign state-
hood and impede the international acceptance of an independent Kosovo.
For other non-dominant minorities, peacebuilding represented an oppor-
tunity for emancipation, equality, and co-existence with the majority
communities, but also a golden opportunity for over-representation in
political institutions. However, these divergent visions of peace in Kosovo
have constantly clashed in practice leading to hybrid outcomes, where a
negative peace prevailed, semi-democratic governance ruled, and an infor-
mal economy dominated. These monolithic positionalities established an
intractable tension between peacebuilding and state formation. Between
these two versions of peace, non-dominant minorities pursued a policy of
peace as co-existence as a beneficiary space for their ethnic identity and
wellbeing.
 1 INTERVENTION, PEACE, AND THE STATE 13

In trying to reconcile incompatible ethnic agendas for peace, the inter-

national community imposed over Kosovo power-sharing democracy as an
institutional arrangement to reduce the domination of the majoritarian
community and to provide institutional safeguards to minorities, while
promoting peacebuilding and reconciliation. Power-sharing provided
reserved seats for minorities in parliament and designated places in govern-
ment coalitions, including special consultative mechanisms at the municipal
councils and special laws for promoting the rights and representation of
minorities in the public sphere. Along with power-sharing, local protago-
nists have constantly pushed for more local ownership of the statebuilding
process. Initially, local ownership was used by UNMIK as a mechanism to
buy the compliance of local power-holders who used it not to expand local
agency but to capture power and in turn resist international missions. After
independence, the discourse of local ownership was used as a discursive
framework to move from supervisory to diplomatic interventionism.
Demystifying local ownership shows that the concept has nothing to do
with popular representation and democratic legitimacy as often promoted in
academic and policy discourses; rather it is purely an instrument for grab-
bing and disguising power as well as reducing local resistance and prolong-
ing interventionism through reconfiguration. The struggle for power and
domination ignored the interests of ethnic communities and set a societal
climate more prone to populism and ethnic fragmentation than conducive
to justice, equality, progress, and emancipation.
Contrary to what was expected, power-sharing strategies did not result
in political moderation; rather it ended up accommodating the parapoli-
tical structures and existing ethno-nationalist groups. While the ethnic
power-sharing arrangement was intended to accommodate all ethnic
groups, build consensus, and promote political moderation, in reality it
led to the encapsulation and capture of institutions by a handful of ethno-
nationalist protagonists who continue to rule the country and use the
reserved seats for minorities as convenient threshold for government for-
mation, thereby incapacitating political change in the country. Under these
conditions, political moderation on both sides was policed by ethno-
nationalist conglomerates and either side-lined or incorporated within
their political realms. Therefore, power-sharing institutions ended up
becoming spaces of ethnic confrontation and promotion of exclusionary
visions of peace and society. The institutions became a battlefield where
Kosovo Albanians pursued their agenda of peace as statehood, Serbs pur-
sued their agenda of peace as autonomy, and other minorities pursued
14 SHAPING PEACE IN KOSOVO

the agenda of peace as co-existence. Each ethnic group subsequently

developed their narratives and circumstantial tactics of institutional resis-
tance to advance incompatible visions of peacebuilding and statebuilding
in Kosovo.
Under these circumstances, the Kosovo Albanian elite driven by their
perception of representing the majoritarian population in Kosovo and acting
as victors of the war and peace sought appropriate political institutions to
promote peace as statehood – conceiving of any move towards peacebuilding
and reconciliation as a trade-off in exchange for international support for
state consolidation and international recognition. In making peace an instru-
ment of statehood rather than a cherished intrinsic value, the priority given
to Kosovo’s political status set a dangerous precedent. Any internal and
external blockages to statehood resulted in the retaliatory denigration of
peace and ethnic relations through institutional and discursive means. On
the other hand, Serbian political elites in Kosovo chose the politics of
boycott to resist the internationally mediated statebuilding, and avoid the
exploitation of power-sharing mechanisms as pretext for ethnic peace and
reconciliation in Kosovo. Accordingly, the Serbian Government and local
Serbs in Kosovo were more willing to endure an uncertain peace in Kosovo,
sacrifice the entrapped local Serb population, and use them as assets for
political bargaining than to legitimate an independent state of Kosovo and
accept a peace which would make Serbs a minority in Kosovo. These
incompatibilities promoted the politics of blockage, whereby change did
not happen through dialogue and diplomacy, but through threats of vio-
lence and sabotage, which in turn increased hostilities and political distrust,
and negatively affected the social environment for peace and reconciliation.
To a large extent, the conflict in Kosovo was about self-determination
and statehood. The international community delayed for nearly a decade
the definition of Kosovo’s political status. Such delays contributed to the
emergence of a local diplomatic counterinsurgency based on nationalism
and patronage politics. If the international community could have resolved
the statehood question much earlier, and then pursued peacebuilding and
statebuilding after independence, it is highly likely that a more moderate
political elite would have emerged, because the political cleavages would
have not been on nationalist grounds, but on who governs better and who
best represents the interests of the citizens. The delay in defining Kosovo’s
independence provided solid grounds for both Albanian and Serb elites to
develop nationalist platforms upon which they won elections and main-
tained their political power. The same is happening now; by delaying the
 1 INTERVENTION, PEACE, AND THE STATE 15

recognition of Kosovo it is permitting the existing elite to dominate

politics in Kosovo. In 2008, Kosovo became an independent but unfin-
ished state – internally challenged by Serb parallel structures and inter-
national supervisions and externally lacking diplomatic recognition and
a seat at the UN. Under these conditions, the Kosovo Albanian elite
embarked on a three-tier strategy: (1) implement the UNOSEK propo-
sal in its entirety so that international supervision would end; (2)
consolidate its empirical and domestic sovereignty, especially remove
Serbia’s institutional parallelism; and (3) secure international recogni-
tion and membership of international society. The unfinished nature of
Kosovo’s statehood meant that local elites had to continue the battle of
trading their compliance with international policy while making con-
cessions for minorities in exchange for substantiating Kosovo’s sover-
eignty internally and legitimating it externally. In this political economy
of statehood, peace and reconciliation, and minority protection become
commodities to be traded in exchange for strengthening domestic
sovereignty and completing international recognition. Hence, the inter-
national community, by delaying Kosovo’s independence, harmed the
prospects for peacebuilding and delayed the emergence of a functioning
democracy, and by supporting independence they undermined the
prospects for peacebuilding and reconciliation in Kosovo.
Paradoxically, while ethnic elites have constantly challenged interna-
tional missions, their very existence was perpetuated by the prolongation
of fluid interventionism. External support for ethno-nationalist elites in
Kosovo supported criminalised power structures through political, eco-
nomic, and security assistance, which in turn granted concessions to fluid
interventions and enhanced their international hegemony by subordinat-
ing to foreign agendas, economic dispossession, and hallow sovereignty.
Fluid interventionism in Kosovo has constantly corresponded to the local
fluid demands for intervention. During 1990s, the entire efforts of Kosovo
Albanian political and military resistance were oriented towards the inter-
nationalisation of the Kosovo issue and calling for international interven-
tion. When NATO’s military intervention opened the path for the UN to
establish a transitional administration, Kosovo’s political elite rejected
extensive UN intervention and called for local ownership and a withdrawal
of international administration. During the supervised independence,
Kosovo institutions demanded that EULEX and KFOR intervene in the
north of Kosovo to establish the authority of Kosovo institutions there.
The premature end of supervised independence came as a result of local
16 SHAPING PEACE IN KOSOVO

demands for full sovereignty and non-interference in Kosovo. After poli-

tical deadlocks and the inability of political parties to form a government
following Kosovo’s legislative elections in 2014, Kosovo’s political elite
and civil society called for international diplomatic intervention to over-
come the political stalemate and help consolidate institutions. Hence,
political uncertainty, disputes over sovereignty, and the partially unrecog-
nised statehood of Kosovo were convenient for the ruling elite in Kosovo.
Placing ethnic antagonisms at the heart of institutional interactions
provided grounds for ethnic elites to disguise their failure to reduce
poverty, tackle corruption and organised crime, and improve the quality
of education, healthcare, and public services in Kosovo. Delaying peace
suited ethnic elites as they continued to secure popular legitimacy not
based on the quality of their democratic performance but on the extent to
which they oppose political compromise and moderation under the flag-
ship of promoting ethnic nationalism. It is much easier to rule based on
ethnic cleavages than on other socio-economic and conventional ideolo-
gical divides. The political longevity of ethno-nationalist elites was main-
tained by: tactical subordination towards international missions; ruling
over local subjects through externally imposed conditionality; neopatri-
monialism; misusing peaceful and armed resistance; corruption and coer-
cion; and threatening to destabilise the fragile peace and undermine the
credibility of international missions. The neo-liberal agenda for economic
reforms has served both external forces and local ethno-political factions
who have used the privatisation of publically owned enterprises for their
own benefit and directed public investments in sectors beneficial to parti-
cular regions affiliated with ruling elite. The justice and the rule of law
sectors failed to provide fair and timely justice to thousands of unresolved
court cases deepening the distrust in public institutions and prolonging
traditional dispute resolution practices. In this sense, fluid interventionism
and ungovernable peace served ethnic elites to facilitate corruption, bad
governance, and undemocratic practices.
Consequently, peace as governance has resulted in an ungovernable
peace, namely the failure of institutional efforts to build peace in Kosovo.
Accordingly, what has come out of elite statebuilding and divergent peace
agendas is an ungovernable peace in Kosovo, whereby existing political elite
structures in Kosovo are not capable of transforming the conflict and con-
tributing to a positive, sustainable peace. The ungovernability of peace has
been a by-product of incompatible and conflicting perceptions of peace
among key ethnic protagonists manifested through institutional, obvious,
 1 INTERVENTION, PEACE, AND THE STATE 17

and covert forms of resistance and confrontation. The domination of poli-

tical institutions by ethno-nationalist groups meant that peace and reconci-
liation were affiliated with political defeatism and collective subordination
towards other ethnic groups. In a context, where peacebuilding and recon-
ciliation serve as means to accelerate or block claims for statehood it means
that neither side pursued peace for the sake of peace. This left core root
causes and drivers of conflict unresolved and contributed to the emergence
of new political and ethnic problems which complicated further the pro-
spects for historical reconciliation between dominant ethnic groups in
Kosovo.
In an attempt to move from ungovernable peace to a normal peace, in
2011 the EU initiated the facilitation of the normalisation of relations
between Serbia and Kosovo through a structured and open-ended technical
and political dialogue. Using its comprehensive approach, the EU managed
to partially resolve intractable issues such as contested sovereignty, bilateral
outstanding issues, and minority self-governance in Kosovo. It replaced the
discourse of peacebuilding with normalisation to dissociate it from the
negative legacies of top-down peacebuilding in Kosovo. Despite its
encouraging start, the dialogue experienced problems as a result of disputes
that arose during the implementation stage. While the dialogue was
designed to find pragmatic solutions to many outstanding problems in
Kosovo accumulated from the failures of fluid interventions, it ended up
empowering ethno-nationalist elites on both sides and excluding the ben-
eficiary communities. Under these circumstances, the passage from normal-
ised relations to sustainable peace is premised on the prospects for reaching
a peace treaty between Serbia and Kosovo that would establish a common
framework for building peace and reconciliation and overcome the past
legacies of the conflict. While hopes remain that this peace agreement
would take place within the EU integration framework, there are many
uncertainties along the road that could derail its fragile achievements.

LOCAL RESISTANCE, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE QUEST

FOR EMANCIPATORY PEACE

The failed promise that Kosovo would gain independence after NATO’s
intervention set the path for local disappointment and distrust towards
international missions. Suddenly, foreign liberators became neo-colonisers.
The protracted international governance and the ambivalent policy of
18 SHAPING PEACE IN KOSOVO

peacebuilding and statebuilding increased local dissatisfaction and resis-

tance who insisted on exercising the right to self-determination and an
end to fluid interventionism in Kosovo. Moreover, enduring failures of
local institutions to provide security, jobs, and welfare after the conflict
increased citizen indifference, which was articulated via contentious pol-
itics. Local resistance to international interventions has recently emerged
as one of the key themes within peace and conflict studies. It has largely
been studied as part of critical interrogation of peacebuilding interven-
tions to reveal the dynamics and limits that foreign actors face in conflict-
affected societies (Richmond 2010; Mac Ginty 2011; Visoka 2011). For
many, “resistance can lead to hope – that is, to an openness to the
indefinite possibility that things could be different, even if one does not
know exactly how” (see Hoy 2004: 10). Oliver P. Richmond allocates
significant importance to resistance and its transformative potential for
good, arguing that “resistance at the local level provides a site from which
a new peace begins to be imagined in contextual and everyday terms,
perhaps reconstituting a social contract and a state, or even moving
beyond Westphalia” ( 2010: 686).
Contentious politics in Kosovo are manifested through open protests
and boycotts, de-legitimisation campaigns, mobilisation of social move-
ments outside mainstream civil society, and the generation of popular
antipathy against the fluid interventionism and local power structures in
Kosovo. Critical populist movements, such as Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (LVV)
(Movement for Self-determination), have launched the most organised
and sustained resistance against international peacebuilding and state-
building strategy, demanding first independence through self-determina-
tion and the end of international rule over Kosovo before discussing terms
of peace and reconciliation with Serbia and the local Serb community in
Kosovo. Critical local agencies in Kosovo via liberal and illiberal practices
have shaped peace through resistance, defiance, and exclusion while trying
to represent the excluded social groups, tackling sensitive ethnic issues,
reshaping the peace agenda, and changing the flow of events, discourses,
and practices. The logic of local resistance in Kosovo has operated on the
premise of adjusting and approximating the methods of contention to the
structures of power in Kosovo. LVV has launched fluid forms of resistance,
within and outside institutions to mobilise local critical agency for realis-
ing their political project of self-determination. Practising bottom-up
approaches to social mobilisation in Kosovo, LVV has tried to generate
local critical mass and manpower to oppose fluid interventionism and
 1 INTERVENTION, PEACE, AND THE STATE 19

reclaim sovereign control over the statebuilding process. In generating

popularity, LVV performed contention through discursive de-legitima-
tion of international missions in Kosovo and street actions ranging from
symbolic and peaceful protests, sit-ins, enacted performances to more
massive and confrontational demonstrations.
In defaming fluid interventionism, LVV has portrayed UNMIK as a
neo-colonial entity whose role was not the emancipation of Kosovo society
but the suppression of the democratic will for statehood and the preserva-
tion of Serbia’s continuity in Kosovo. Similarly, they criticised NATO
peacekeepers for tolerating post-conflict violence and maintaining ethnic
division in Kosovo. LVV has placed strong emphasis on the paternalistic,
undemocratic, and suppressive nature of fluid interventionism in Kosovo
and its political, economic, and social damage in Kosovo. While operating
outside of institutional politics, LVV developed a fierce anti-peacebuilding
campaign, considering fluid interventionism and their peacebuilding and
statebuilding agenda in Kosovo as an effort to suppress the will of the
majority of Kosovo citizens to proclaim independence through self-deter-
mination. In this regard, LVV considered international missions as colo-
nial regimes; power-sharing as an attempt to form a dysfunctional state;
elections as forms for appointing local political pawns; decentralisation as
an attempt for ethnic partition; reconciliation as abandoning past suffer-
ings without retributive justice; the return of refugees and displaced
persons as tactical re-colonisation; dialogue and peace-making as harmful
to Kosovo’s fragmented sovereignty; civil society as local agents serving
foreign interests; and economic reforms and privatisation as sources of
corruption and neo-liberal exploitation. In a nutshell, they have consid-
ered the entire international policies in post-conflict Kosovo as tools for
undermining democracy, self-determination, and social emancipation.
After independence, LVV expanded its political activity by its entry into
the institutional politics while still maintaining some features of a critical
populist social movement. Within institutions, they continued their resis-
tance by promoting parliamentary politics to limit the role and impact of
supervisory and diplomatic interventionism and unchain public institu-
tions from criminalised political structures and ethno-nationalist elites.
However, when they realised that they cannot make an instant impact
within institutions, LVV turned to street resistance to launch regular
protests against bad governance and corruption, neo-liberal privatisation,
and dialogue with Serbia. In normalising their fluid resistance, LVV
gradually occupied and monopolised the public sphere and the politics
20 SHAPING PEACE IN KOSOVO

of protest in Kosovo while paralysing and fragmenting the work of the

Kosovo parliament through outlawed means.
Local resistance in Kosovo actively defied international missions,
objecting to externally imposed peacebuilding. Driven by fear and anger,
they did not commit to non-violent disobedience nor to pacifism, which
undermined their political project. Moreover, when exploring in detail
their discourse and performative contention, it becomes clear that they
promoted a complex militancy for accumulating political and social power
in the name of emancipation, resistance, and self-determination. As illu-
strated in Chapter 4, local resistance has the potential to counter-balance
and challenge the power of fluid interventionism and reduce the popular-
ity of ethno-nationalist structurers; it can also trigger peace-breaking and
counter-emancipatory dynamics, thus unintentionally prolonging the
ungovernability of peace. In this regard, as much as speaking truth to
power it is essential to speak truth to resistance. While power triggers
resistance, resistance triggers not only emancipation but also subordina-
tion and exclusion. LVV’s case for emancipation and resistance was
grounded on mono-ethnic criteria and exclusionary practices which ran
against the very idea of emancipation as equality and liberation, and the
idea of peace, dialogue, and reconciliation as first-order political values as
opposed to domination, violence, and resistance. Undoubtedly, they have
profoundly hallowed the prospects for peace and reconciliation in Kosovo
and in turn have encouraged the rise of populism and nationalism, which
has expanded the gap of ethnic disagreement and intra-ethnic sectarianism
in the region. LVV has occupied the public sphere and has entrenched
identity politics in Kosovo. The exclusionary method of local resistance as
well as the use of violence and harmful practices have undermined their
ability for becoming true agents of positive, transformative and inclusive
peace in Kosovo. Hence the very foundation which permitted their poli-
tical rise – the cause for self-determination – has debilitated their potential
for emancipation in Kosovo.
By far, the most promising agents of peace in Kosovo came from civil
society. Civil society organisations and initiatives are considered one of the
key agents of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. In the absence of
effective cooperation with ethnic elites, civil society was used by interna-
tional missions as a subcontractor for implementing their peacebuilding
and statebuilding agenda in Kosovo. In this sense, civil society in Kosovo
has served as a hegemonic project to secure local consensus for fluid
interventionism by non-violent methods. Despite being dependent on
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Propelling Charges. Up to the present time nitrocellulose powder
has complied better with the requirements of a suitable, smokeless
powder than any other that has been proposed and is used in our
service for propelling charges in guns. The danger of manufacture is
also less than that of nitroglycerine powders. Moreover the latter,
which was formerly used in our service and still is in the British and
some others, causes too much erosion of the tubes due to the
greater heat of explosion. It has the advantage of requiring a smaller
charge for the same muzzle velocity and therefore a smaller powder
space and consequent lighter weight of gun.
Shell Fillers. High explosives for shell fillers. Up to the present
explosive “D,” trinitrotoluol and picric acid are the principal high
explosives which fulfill the requirements as shell fillers. Explosive “D”
on account of its great insensitiveness to shock is used in armor
piercing projectiles and also in field gun and howitzer shell. It is
detonated by a fuze. Trinitrotoluol is used in submarine mines and in
general demolition work as it is much easier to explode than
explosive “D.”
Table of Explosives. The following table gives a good idea of the
principal explosives in use in our service and the characteristics of
each:
High or
Purpose. Name.
Low.
Propelling charge in
L Nitrocellulose, smokeless powder.
guns.
Bursting charge, Picric acid, explosive “D” (powder
H
projectiles. form) Trinitrotoluol.
Blank, saluting
L Black Powder.
charges.
Re-inforce charges,
L Black Powder.
primers.
Base charge,
L Black Powder.
shrapnel.
Time trains, fuzes. L Black Powder.
Igniting charges, L Black Powder.
 cannon.
Charges, submarine
H Trinitrotoluol wet guncotton.
mines.
Igniting elements,
Fulminate of mercury, chlorate of
fuzes and H
potash (potassium chlorate).
primers.

High Explosives. The principal high explosives used as shell

fillers in our service are: picric acid, explosive “D” and trinitrotoluol, or
more popularly known at TNT. The picric acid and picrates used as
shell fillers are secret compositions. Mellinite, essentially picric acid
alone or with some other substance is used as a shell filler by the
French. It is poured into the shell in a fused state and allowed to
harden, thus giving a very compact charge and one easily handled. It
has the disadvantage however of forming unstable compounds with
the metal of the shell and great care must be exercised in coating
the interior of the shell with a protective coat before pouring in the
fused mellinite. Lyddite is the English equivalent of mellinite. Picric
acid was also used by the Japanese or it may be a mixture of picric
acid and some nitro compound. The most successful explosive of
this type is explosive “D” invented by Colonel Dunn of our Ordnance
Department and sometimes known as “Dunnite.” It is not fusible and
must be compressed for use as a shell filler, being forced into the
shell by compression. This is a disadvantage as compared to
mellinite as the density of loading is less and weight for weight
therefore less efficient. It is little sensitive to shock and therefore not
very dangerous to load even under great pressure. Trinitrotoluol is
also used as a shell filler but its chief use is in demolition work and
as the charge for submarine mines.
Nitrogen Compounds. It may be interesting to note that all of the
principal explosives with which we have been dealing are
compounds containing nitrogen. In fact the war has been fought with
fixed nitrogen which explains the great interest taken in the various
attempts to fix the free nitrogen of the air which is the world’s great
storehouse of free nitrogen. As nitrogen is also a necessary
ingredient in the various fertilizers, the result to the world of a
commercial process for speeding up the cycle of changes through
which nitrogen passes in its life giving mission from free nitrogen in
the air to its various compounds in the nitrogeneous animal and
vegetable tissues is almost limitless and as usual war has been the
incentive to speed up a process which will result in incalculable value
to mankind.
Classification. Guns are loaded with three kinds of ammunition:
fixed, semi-fixed and separate loading ammunition. In fixed
ammunition the round is complete and projectile and powder loaded
into the chamber at the same time. In semi-fixed the projectile is
separate from the powder charge, which however is put up and
loaded into the chamber in a container. In separate loading
ammunition the powder is loaded into the chamber in bags. In the
first two cases the cartridge case furnishes the means for sealing the
rear of the powder chamber against escape to the rear of the powder
gases. In the last case some form of obturating device is made a
part of the breechblock furnishing a gas check to seal the rear of the
powder chamber.
Fixed Ammunition. All of our field guns below 5 inches in calibre
use fixed ammunition. The powder is placed loose in the cartridge
case, the space not filled with powder being stuffed with packing
paper, excelsior, or felt wadding next to the projectile so as to hold
the powder in contact with the primer, in some fixed ammunition a
brass diaphragm is soldered to the inside of the case for the same
purpose and to keep out moisture, (4.7” Gun). An igniting charge of
black powder is a part of the primer and in some cases an additional
charge is placed at the forward end of the powder space in the
cartridge case to insure rapid ignition of the smokeless powder. In
this case it is held in place between two quilted disks of crinoline.
Semi-fixed ammunition is employed in our 6” and 4.7” field
howitzers. The cartridge case contains three weights of propelling
charge for firing in the three zones designed to give a high angle of
all with these weapons. Access to the charge is had by tearing off
the brass diaphragm closing the forward end of the cartridge case.
By removing the first charge the remaining charge is that prescribed
for the second zone, and by removing the top two charges the
remaining charge is that of the first zone. The three charges are tied
together and the middle charge has an igniting charge of black
powder attached. The removal of charges is facilitated by the
separate container for the powder charge and the round is more
easily handled in the two parts especially in the case of the six-inch
howitzer, where the projectile weighs 120 lbs. The same primer is
used as in fixed ammunition, the cartridge case performing the
function of an obturator.
 BREECH MECHANISM OF 155 GUN SHOWING
DE BANGE OBTURATOR.

Separate Ammunition.—Obturation. The 155-mm Filloux gun

and 155-mm howitzer use separate ammunition. In such guns there
must be provided some form of a gas check which will prevent the
powder gases from rushing to the rear into the threaded portion of
the breechblock, as this would soon erode the thread sectors and
render the gun useless beside losing a large amount of pressure in
the bore. The device used as a gas check is called an obturator.
There are two systems of obturation in use, named after their
inventors:
The DeBange and the Freyre. The former is used in the 155’s. It
consists of a steel mushroom head closing the rear of the powder
chamber, the spindle of which passes through a central hole in the
breechblock. Between the mushroom head and the face of the
breechblock is a pad of asbestos, paraffine and tallow, pressed into
shape by a hydraulic press and covered by canvas or asbestos
wirecloth. Split rings having hardened outer surfaces are fitted, one
just behind the mushroom head and one just in front of the face of
the breechblock. Their diameter is slightly greater in the free state
than the conical surface of the bore where they bear when the
breech is closed so that they always close the rear of the powder
chamber. The pressure of the powder gases forces the mushroom
head to the rear and this compresses the asbestos pad which in turn
forces the split rings to bear with greater force against the walls of
the powder chamber thus securely closing the rear opening of the
powder chamber. For more details of this device see pages 302 to
306 Tschappat’s O & G.
Powder Bags. Cartridge bags for separate loading are made of
raw silk, and are sewed with silk thread. Other materials are apt to
produce flare-backs or premature explosions because they are not
entirely consumed in the bore or continue to burn if not consumed.
The raw silk however either is entirely consumed or if not, the parts
ignited immediately go out as soon as the flame is removed and do
not smoulder. Specially treated cotton fibre bags have been tried but
so far as I know have not as yet superseded the raw silk for the
purpose. The gases remaining in the bore after the discharge of a
charge of smokeless powder are explosive and with air form an
explosive mixture, hence the danger upon opening the breech if any
smouldering particles remain in the bore.
 21 GRAIN PERCUSSION PRIMER MARK II-A

Primers. The devices for initiating explosions of propelling

charges in military guns are called primers. With fixed and semi-fixed
ammunition the primers are seated in the base of the cartridge case.
In the case of separate loading ammunition the primers are inserted
separately in the breechblock, the expanding gases of the detonated
primer forcing the walls of the primer case tightly against the bore
through the breechblock and thus sealing this channel of escape for
the gases from the powder chamber. This necessitates a much
larger and stronger case for separate loading primers than for those
inserted in the base of a cartridge case.
Classes of primers. Primers are divided into three classes
according to the method by which they are fired: (a) friction primers,
(2) electric primers, (3) percussion primers. Combination primers are
made which may be fired by any two of these methods, usually
electric and one of the others. The characteristics of a good primer
are, certainty of action, safety in handling, no deterioration in
storage, simplicity in construction and be cheap to manufacture.
They are also divided into obturating and non-obturating depending
upon whether they close the vent during discharge or not.
 Primer pressing. Primers for fixed ammunition are inserted in the
base of the cartridge cases by means of a special press for this
purpose. The primer body is a trifle larger than the seat in the
cartridge case provided. This seat is rough bored to a diameter less
than the finished size and then mandreled to finished dimensions
with a steel tapered plug. This process toughens the material of the
case around the primer seat and prevents the expansion of the
primer seat under pressure of the expanding gases.
Percussion primers. Except for very heavy siege guns and
railroad artillery the guns handled by the Field Artillery use
percussion primers. The 110-grain percussion primer is the one in
use in our service and as typical will be described. The charge
consisting of 110 grains of compressed black powder makes the
charge burn like a torch rather than explode, which facilitates the
ignition of the charge of smokeless powder, with which the flame
comes in contact. The diametral holes spray the flame in several
directions thus insuring ignition at many points simultaneously. The
percussion element consists of a percussion primer cup, the
percussion composition and an anvil, all of which are assembled
together in a cup in the rear face of the primer case. The percussion
composition is made up of chlorate of potash, sulphide of antimony,
ground glass and sulphur. A blow upon the cap by the firing pin
detonates the percussion composition and the flame from this
detonation ignites the black powder which in turn explodes the
charge of smokeless powder.

The General Shape and Nomenclature of

Projectiles.
The reason for the particular shape of shells may not be clear to
all. In the first place all matter has the property known as inertia,
which we may define as that tendency of matter to remain in a state
of rest or to continue at a uniform velocity if in motion. It offers a
resistance to any change in the state of either rest or motion whether
of amount or direction. Consequently when we apply a sudden and
tremendous force to the base of a projectile by means of the
expansive force of exploding powder gases, there will be set up in
the metal a resistance to this force in which every particle of the
projectile will resist by an amount proportional to the mass of
particles beyond the point of application of the force to itself. The
actual force will be proportional to the weight and acceleration
produced by the applied force in the projectile. This explains the
reason why the walls of the projectile are thicker near the base. It
also explains the method of calculating the thickness of walls, for if
we know the weight at any cross section and the co-efficient of
strength of the metal we may calculate the thickness of walls
necessary to withstand the pressure for any given muzzle velocity
which is fixed by other considerations. It explains also the preference
for steel in projectiles as for the same weight the steel is much
stronger making it possible to throw a greater amount of shrapnel or
high explosives in shell.

155-MM COMMON STEEL SHELL MK IV

The necessity for compact loading, especially in the case of high

explosive shell is also noted as otherwise the shock due to inertia
would break up the charge and perhaps cause a premature
explosion. Hence it is very necessary to guard against airholes in
filling shell cavities.
In order to secure regular and uninterrupted movement of the
projectile through the bore it is necessary that the projectile and bore
have the same geometric axis. Also the projectile must be seated
exactly and uniformly for succeeding rounds in its seating in the
bore. This latter is necessary in order that the powder chamber may
not vary as this would give irregular pressures. The liability of
strapping the rotating bands or setting off the fuze in certain kinds of
fuzes are also explained by inertia. It might even cause sufficient
shock to detonate the charge in the shell. The remedy is accurate
seating of each projectile by reason of trained gun crews using the
same amount of force at each ramming. The first condition,
coincidence of axes, is obtained by means of the ogival head which
has a diameter some tenths of a millimeter smaller than the diameter
of the bore, and serves as a front support for the projectile while the
rotating bands center it in rear. Were it not for the bell the projectile,
held only by the soft material of the rotating band, would wabble in
its travel through the bore and tumble soon after leaving it. It is also
necessary that the center of gravity of the projectile be on its
geometric axis. Otherwise it will travel on a spiral of the same pitch
as the grooves and knock the tube walls as it travels through the
bore and without the support of the bell might cause a premature
explosion by actuating the fuze.

155m/m SHRAPNEL—95 LBS.—MARK-I.

 COMMON STEEL SHELL MARK I.
COMMON STEEL SHELL MODEL OF 1905.
SHRAPNEL.
CARTRIDGE CASE.
4.7” Gun Ammunition.

Three-inch Ammunition.
Fixed ammunition is used in the 3” field guns, and is made up
with either common shrapnel, high explosive shrapnel, or common
steel shell. The rounds as made up vary in length with the type of
projectile used. The ammunition chests of the battery are of sufficient
size to take any one of the rounds furnished, so that the number of
each kind to be carried is a matter for regulation by proper authority.
Each round is issued with projectile filled and fused. The weight of
the projectile is 15 pounds, and the total weight of one round is 18.75
pounds. The components of one round are the cartridge case with
primer, the powder charge, igniter, projectile and fuze.
The cartridge case.—The cartridge case is a solid drawn-brass
case 10.8 inches long; it has a capacity of 66.5 cubic inches, and
weighs, with primer, 2.25 pounds. A circular groove is cut in the base
of the cartridge case and the groove is painted red for high explosive
shrapnel, yellow for common shrapnel, and black for high explosive
shell.
The primer.—The percussion primer, known as the “110-grain
percussion primer,” contains an igniting charge of 110 grains of black
powder in addition to the essential elements of a percussion primer.
The purpose of the black powder is to insure the ignition of the
smokeless powder charge in cartridge case.
 Common Steel Shell.
Common Shrapnel.
Cartridge Case.
Semple Tracer.
High Explosive Shrapnel.
3” AMMUNITION

The powder charge.—The powder is a nitrocellulose powder

composed of multiperforated (7 perforations) cylindrical grains, each
0.35” long and 0.195” in diameter. The charge varies slightly for
different lots of powder, but is approximately 24 ounces. The charge
gives a muzzle velocity for shrapnel of 1,700 feet per second (1600
f/s for shell) with a maximum pressure in the bore not exceeding
33,000 pounds per square inch. At the front end of the cartridge case
there is an igniter of black powder weighing about ¼ oz. which
assists in the uniform ignition of the smokeless powder charge.
The projectiles.—All projectiles have a copper rotating band 1.2”
from the base. This band engages in the rifling of the bore of the
piece, and gives the projectile a rapid rotation about its long axis
during flight. This causes it to travel straight, point on, without
tumbling.
Common shrapnel.—The common shrapnel is a base-charged
shrapnel fitted with a combination fuze. The case is of steel with
solid base. The shrapnel filling is composed of 252 balls, each
approximately 167 grains in weight (42 to the pound). The balls are
approximately 0.5” in diameter. The balls are poured around a
central tube and rest upon a steel diaphragm, the interstices
containing a smoke-producing matrix. The bursting charge consisting
of 2¾ oz. of black powder is in the base and is covered by the
diaphragm which supports the central tube, affording a conduit to the
flame leading from the fuze to the bursting charge.
In action the case is not ruptured upon the explosion of the
bursting charge; the head is stripped and the balls are shot out of the
case with an increase of velocity of about 274 feet per second. The
remaining velocity of the shrapnel at 6,500 yards is approximately
724 feet per second and the time of flight 22 seconds, so that at that
extreme range, with the increase of velocity due to the bursting
charge, this shrapnel with 21-second fuze will be effective. The
weight of the shrapnel with fuze is 15 pounds.
Shrapnel is a projectile containing a great number of hardened
steel balls, each approximately ½” diameter, which may be projected
from a point in the air (called the point of burst) close to but short of
the target. Each ball is capable of killing a man or horse at a distance
up to 250 or 300 yards from the point of burst. Taken collectively, the
paths of these balls form a cone, called the cone of dispersion. The
ground section of this cone is elliptical in shape with its longer axis
approximately in the plane of fire. At mid-range when burst at normal
height of burst (H. B. = 3 mils), the dimensions of this area are
approximately 20 yards wide by 250 yards deep. These dimensions
will however vary with the angle of fall, the height of burst, the slope
of the ground at the target, and the relation between the linear and
the rotational velocities of the shrapnel at instant of burst in the air. A
3-mil H. B. is chosen because this gives an average density of 1 hit
per square yard of vertical target area. An infantry skirmisher
(standing) with his interval occupies approximately 1 square yard.
Shrapnel has very little effect upon material objects. It is very
effective against personnel not protected by cover, or to search an
area which is known to be occupied, or which must be traversed, by
hostile troops.
Ehrhardt High-explosive shrapnel.—The Ehrhardt high-explosive
shrapnel is fitted with a combination fuze and a high explosive head.
The case is drawn steel with solid base. The shrapnel filling is
composed of 285 balls, each approximately 138 grains in weight (50
to the pound). The balls are poured around the central tube and rest
upon the steel diaphragm, the interstices containing a matrix of high
explosive.
In time action (burst in air), the case is not ruptured upon the
explosion of the bursting charge, but the head is forced out and the
balls are shot out of the case with an increase of velocity of from 250
to 300 feet per second. In the meantime the head continues its flight,
detonating on impact.
If the fuze be set at “safety” or for a time greater than the actual
time of flight, this shrapnel may be used in lieu of high-explosive
shell. Upon impact a high-explosive shrapnel is detonated by means
of the percussion element of the combination fuze, the head being
detonated first, which detonation causes the sympathetic detonation
of high-explosive matrix surrounding the balls.
Common steel shell.—This steel shell is high-explosive and fitted
with a base detonating fuze. The case is hollow and made of drawn
steel. It is provided with an ogival head. The steel shell contains a
bursting charge of 13.12 ounces of Explosive D. The weight of the
shell with bursting charge and fuze is 15 pounds. The shell is always
issued filled and fuzed.
This shell bursts on impact and with great force exerted in all
directions. It is a powerful instrument for the destruction of material
objects such as guns, intrenchments, houses, stone walls, etc. The
effect, however, is very local.
Frankford Arsenal combination fuzes.—These fuzes are point
fuzes with combination time and percussion elements for use with
common shrapnel. They are of the type known as the ring or “dial”
fuze, in which the time train is set by turning a graduated ring which
carries part of the train. These fuzes may be reset as often as
desired.
Ehrhardt combination fuze for high explosive shrapnel.—This
fuze is similar to the Frankford Arsenal Combination time and
percussion fuze but in addition contains a high explosive head and
detonating element. Due to this arrangement, both the projectile and
the high explosive head have a high-explosive shell effect when
striking on impact.
The service base detonating fuze.—The details of the
detonating fuze and the composition of the detonator are kept secret.
A detonating fuze is necessary in order to produce a higher order of
explosion by causing an instantaneous conversion of the high
explosive compound called “Explosive D” with which the shell is
charged. If an ordinary percussion fuze were used only an ordinary
explosion would be produced as in the explosion of black powder.
Preparation of blank metallic ammunition.—Blank metallic
ammunition will always be assembled under the personal
supervision of a commissioned officer, who will be held responsible
that it is prepared in the manner prescribed. (G. O. 9, War Dept.,
Jan. 11, 1908.)
For this purpose there are issued blank-cartridge cases, black
powder in bulk, tight-fitting felt wads, rubberine, or other quick-drying
paint, primers, etc.
Before assembling, the cartridge cases should be carefully
inspected to see that they are in sound condition and thoroughly
clean and dry. They should also be tested by trying them in the gun,
to determine whether they have become deformed. Any cases that
do not readily enter the chamber in the gun or that are otherwise
seriously deformed should be laid aside for resizing. After inspecting
the cartridge cases the blank ammunition should be prepared as
follows:
(a) Insert the primers with the primer-inserting press.
(b) Pour into the cartridge case the proper weight of black powder
and shake it down well.
(c) Insert the felt wad and press it down hard until it rests squarely
on the powder charge.
(d) Give the upper surface of the felt wad and the inside of the
cartridge case just above the wad a good coat of the rubberine or
other quick-drying paint furnished for the purpose, using a brush,
and allow the case to stand until this coat is dry. Then apply another
coat of rubberine paint in a similar manner. The object of using
rubberine paint, which is strongly adhesive, is to thoroughly seal the
joint between the wad and the case to prevent any powder grains
from leaking out, and at the same time to firmly hold the wad in
place.
 The reloading and cleaning outfit.—This outfit consists of the
following parts, and is furnished to each battery:
Primer-inserting press, small
Bushing
Powder measure, saluting
Decapping tool, with guide
Cleaning brush
Hammer
Case holder
Case-holder stand
Storage chest

The bushing is used in the primer-inserting press for the insertion

of new primers.
The decapping tool and case holder and stand are used for
removing exploded primers from the cartridge cases. A light blow on
the rod with a piece of wood or the bronze hammer generally
removes the primer.
A powder measure to suit the saluting charge for the gun is
furnished, and when level full holds the required charge.
The cleaning brush is furnished for cleaning the cartridge cases
after they have been used and should be ordered to suit the size of
case for which intended.
Care of Cartridge Cases.—As soon after firing as practicable the
exploded primers should be removed from the cartridge case by
means of the decapping tools furnished with the reloading outfit. The
case should then be thoroughly washed in a strong solution of soft
soap and soda to remove all powder residue. It should then be
thoroughly dried.
If the cartridge cases are carefully cleaned and washed
immediately after firing, not only will less labor be required but the
life of the cartridge case will be greatly prolonged.
A good solution for washing cartridge cases may be prepared by
using ingredients in the following proportions: 1 gallon of water, 2½
ounces of soft soap, 5½ ounces soda. The mixture should be boiled
and stirred until the ingredients are entirely dissolved.
In washing cartridge cases this solution should be used hot and in
sufficient quantity to completely immerse the cases.
Neither acids nor solutions of acids will be used for cleaning
cartridge cases.

Precautions to be Observed with Fixed

Ammunition.
(a) Do not unnecessarily expose ammunition to the sun or load it
into a warm gun before time for firing; if this is done, erratic shooting
will result.
(b) Handle carefully, otherwise cartridges may become deformed
and cause jams.
(c) Never use force or any implements on the base of the cartridge
in loading.
(d) See that fuzes set at safety or are provided with waterproof
brass cover for transport.
(e) Do not fire ammunition which has been under water with the
waterproof brass cover removed.
(f) Both service and blank ammunition should never be carried in
the battery at the same time. If conditions are such that both may be
used in exercises, only one kind should be in the firing battery; the
other should be under lock and key outside the firing position.
(g) Misfires and hangfires are of exceedingly rare occurrence. In
case of a failure to fire, the firing handle should be pulled again in
order to snap the trigger. If this fails to fire, the breech should not be
opened until after the expiration of at least one minute, when the
round or cartridge should be removed and placed to one side.
Defective ammunition, cartridges and primers should be reported.
 With Blank Ammunition.
Firing with blank ammunition will be greatly facilitated by a careful
observance of the following:
(a) Before firing, a careful examination should be made of the
assembled rounds to see that the felt wads have not become
displaced or the cartridge cases dented or deformed by careless
handling. If the cartridge cases have been properly resized and are
clean, no difficulty should be experienced in inserting them in the
gun, provided the chamber of the latter is clean. The continued
insertion of cartridge cases that are not clean causes an
accumulation in the gun chamber which may make the insertion of
subsequent rounds difficult or impossible.
(b) In firing blank ammunition the gun chamber will be sponged
after each round with a damp sponge, to extinguish sparks and
remove powder residue resulting from the previous round, before the
insertion of another round.
(c) Care will be taken to see that the sponges are not worn and
that they thoroughly fit the chamber. The interval between rounds in
firing blank ammunition should be sufficient to allow thorough
sponging of the chamber and examination to ascertain that all sparks
have been extinguished.
(d) Wads for the preparation of blank metallic ammunition are
made to tightly fit in the cartridge case. No wads should be used that
are not a tight fit in the case.

FUZES.
Principle of operation.—We have just learned something of the
force of inertia in connection with a projectile. Most fuzes are
actuated by this force. From our knowledge of the trajectory we know
that usually a projectile does not strike on its nose. Therefore we
cannot devise our fuzes to work like the driving of a nail into a board.
The striking element is the anvil and is a fixed pointed spur against