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Rethinking Shakespeare
Source Study
This book asks new questions about how and why Shakespeare engages
with source material and about what should be counted as sources in Shake-
speare studies. The essays demonstrate that source study remains an indis-
pensable mode of inquiry for understanding Shakespeare, his authorship
and audiences, and early modern gender, racial, and class relations, as well
as for considering how new technologies have and will continue to redefine
our understanding of the materials Shakespeare used to compose his plays.
Although source study has been used in the past to construct a conservative
view of Shakespeare and his genius, the volume argues that a rethought
Shakespeare source study provides opportunities to examine models and
practices of cultural exchange and memory and to value specific cultures and
difference. Informed by contemporary approaches to literature and culture,
the essays revise conceptions of sources and intertextuality to include terms
like “haunting,” “sustainability,” “microscopic sources,” “contamination,”
“fragmentary circulation,” and “cultural conservation.” They maintain an
awareness of the heterogeneity of cultures along lines of class, religious affil-
iation, and race, seeking to enhance the opportunity to register diverse ideas
and frameworks imported from foreign material and distant sources. The
volume examines not only print culture, but also material culture, t heatrical
paradigms, generic assumptions, and oral narratives. It considers how digi-
tal technologies alter how we find sources and see connections among texts.
This book asserts that how critics assess and acknowledge Shakespeare’s
sources remains interpretively and politically significant; source study and
its legacy continue to shape the image of Shakespeare and his authorship.
The collection will be valuable to those interested in the relationships be-
tween Shakespeare’s work and other texts, those seeking to understand how
the legacy of source study has shaped S hakespeare as a cultural phenome-
non, and those studying source study, early modern authorship, implications
of digital tools in early modern studies, and early modern literary culture.
26 Shakespeare’s Suicides
Dead Bodies That Matter
Marlena Tronicke
30 Casual Shakespeare
Three Centuries of Verbal Echoes
Regula Hohl Trillini
31 Shakespearean Temporalities
History on the Early Modern Stage
Lukas Lammers
Edited by
Dennis Austin Britton and
Melissa Walter
First published 2018
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an
informa business
© 2018 Taylor & Francis
The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the
editorial material, and of the authors for their individual
chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections
77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted
or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from
the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be
trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for
identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
CIP data has been applied for.
Acknowledgments vii
Notes on Contributors ix
Part I
Source Study, Sustainability, and Cultural Diversity 17
Part II
Sources and Audiences 125
Part III
Authorship and Transmission 181
Part IV
Source Study in the Digital Age 251
Afterword 317
J ohn D rakakis
Index 327
Acknowledgments
The Bible, its stories, and its language passed into common currency
of knowing, thinking, speaking, and writing by ubiquitous refer-
ence, allusion, quotation, proverb, ballad, hymn, broadside, treatise,
polemic, pictorial representation (in tapestry, stained glass, paint-
ing, and sculpture), mediation, and circulation. 38
8 Rethinking Shakespeare Source Study
But we might also wish to consider the import of claiming that a text
like the Bible is one of Shakespeare’s sources for the way it either may
include or exclude potential readers and audiences—relevant when we
acknowledge that the language of the Bible is not universally shared
among present-day readers and audiences of Shakespeare’s plays. It is at
this point that the explication of Biblical links in Shakespeare becomes
informative yet nevertheless politically charged.
Contemporary source study does not assume that the meaning of
Shakespeare’s text is determined in a quasi-allegorical manner by its
sources. It is wise to consider types of relationships between texts as
well as instances where one author draws on another.39 Nevertheless,
different interpretative and political effects result from identifying the
Bible, or Virgil, or Boccaccio, for instance, as a source for a play rather
than, say, identifying a broadsheet ballad as a source. Popular forms
of culture, such as ballads and pamphlets that early modern audiences
would have been familiar with, need to be recognized as important
sources. Source study thus might also consider the intracultural and in-
terclass relations that are imbedded in the relationship between source
texts and Shakespeare plays. Doing so likely also means acknowledging
that early modern “high” and “low” culture often were not separate (for
instance, consider the reading of jestbooks by elite men and women) and
abandoning—once and for all—the assumption that Shakespeare drew
only on “high” culture.40
Source study also requires intercultural analysis, whether to under-
stand ways in which early modern theater is “foreign” or to better under-
stand the context of Shakespeare’s sources. As Susanne L. Wofford has
argued, “transportation of intercultural knowledge” can occur without
authorial agency or knowledge; as well, sometimes audiences may receive
foreign cultural practices without recognizing them as such, contributing
to the ways in which theater is both foreign and local or of the self.41 In-
tercultural analysis can also change our understanding of S hakespeare’s
authorship, as understanding sources in their own contexts can help us
avoid misrepresenting both their significance and Shakespeare’s act of
authorship. For instance, as Karina F. Attar points out, many an edition
and article has mentioned or included the tale of Disdemona and the
Moor, tale 3.7 of the Hecatommithi by Giambattista Giraldi (known
as Cinthio) as a source for Othello; yet the general consensus of many
studies is that Shakespeare rewrites “a vicious morality tale into a trag-
edy that acknowledges the issues of race, place, and gender.”42 By read-
ing Cinthio’s tale in the context of the novella tradition, especially the
representation of Moors and of interracial couples, and by acknowledg-
ing the interplay between the story, its introductory narrative, and its
framing letter, Attar arrives at quite a different conclusion; she shows
how the novella is already subverting expectations about race and gen-
der. When we understand Cinthio’s tale in context, we see Shakespeare’s
Rethinking Shakespeare Source Study 9
authorship differently; we see it as building incrementally on the novella
rather than as a radically more complex act of social and psychological
characterization. Close and careful reading of sources means reading
with understanding of their original contexts, which may themselves be
multilayered, as well as with awareness of potential gaps in transmissions
of contexts.43 The authors of this collection are most certainly interested
in Shakespeare, but believe that attempts to understand Shakespeare can
proceed in a way that decolonizes source texts and Shakespeare’s au-
thorship from the hegemony of Shakespeare-as-unique-genius.
Source study, then, has the potential to help foster the sustainability
of early modern literary and cultural diversity. Thomas R. Adams and
Nicolas Barker ask us to consider that “work that does not survive will
not be read again and thus will not be written again”—and it will be
lost to human understanding.44 Or, using the terminology popularized
by Richard Dawkins and embraced by several authors in this volume,
“memes” (“complex ideas that form themselves into distinct memorable
units”) depend on “the existence of a continuous chain of physical
vehicles…. As with genes, immortality is more a matter of replication than
of the longevity of individual vehicles.”45 Source study can actually be
used to ensure that a diverse array of early modern texts remain acces-
sible, especially in our teaching and in the image of Shakespeare that
scholars translate for popular consumption. As scholars and teachers,
we make an important contribution when we make available a source
that has not been acknowledged and that provides a more complex pic-
ture of early modern culture. At the same time, since source study can
function to appropriate and elide or to preserve cultural diversity, it is
important for scholars to theorize an ethical practice. The point is not
to displace Shakespeare—both because of the genuine pleasure so many
receive from his works, and also because many of our paychecks depend
upon his continued popularity within and without the academy—but
rather to use Shakespeare to resist the shrinking and narrowing of the
humanities. Shakespeare can be used to help assure that various types
of stories and understandings of the world—some other than his own—
continue to have a place.
A perfect source study may be impossible at the end of the day. Like
fully accounting for the intertextuality that gives meaning to any text
or utterance, identifying sources is an enterprise that disperses into dif-
férance, spreading genealogies, and the silences of history.46 Yet, like
translation, and with affinities to that practice, which likewise may
seem impossible but happens all the time, source study is something that
people do.47 A rethought source study acknowledges that describing a
source is an interpretive act. It is not enough for us now to say that a
source contributes to Shakespeare’s vision, as if the whole point of all
other cultures and texts was to create his genius. Nonetheless, because
Shakespeare still stands as a great author/genius that wider publics still
10 Rethinking Shakespeare Source Study
deem “necessary” reading, it is valuable to trace the indebtedness of his
works to texts and cultural processes, and to think carefully about how
we conceptualize his relations to them.
Notes
1 See James, “Shakespeare, the Classics, and the Forms of Authorship.” James
describes the survival of imitation studies in scholarship on lyric and epic
during the rise of the New Historicism (81–84). For scholarship on epic that
combines source study with considerations of gender and/or politics, see,
for example, Krier, Gazing on Secret Sights, Quint, Epic and Empire, and
Watkins, The Specter of Dido.
2 For example, see the 2015 Shakespeare Survey, “Origins and Originality,”
especially Maguire and Smith’s “What is a Source” and Belsey’s “Revisit-
ing the Elephant’s Graveyard.” Other works that evince a revival of source
study include Gillespie, Shakespeare’s Books; Martindale and Taylor eds.,
Shakespeare and the Classics; Sheen, “‘Why Should a Dog, a Horse, a Rat,
Have Life”’; Logan, Shakespeare’s Marlowe; Marrapodi, Italian Culture
in the Drama and Shakespeare, Italy, and Intertextuality, and particularly
the latter’s first essay by Miola, “Seven Types of Intertextuality” (13–25);
Lopez, “Eating Richard II”; the essays under “How To Do Things with
Sources,” in How to Do Things with Shakespeare, ed. Laurie Maguire;
Perry and Watkin, eds., Shakespeare and the Middle Ages; Hillman, French
Origins of English Tragedy, as well as his French Reflections in the Shake-
spearean Tragic; Hamlin, The Bible in Shakespeare; Guy-Bray, “Sources”;
Houlahan, “Shakespeare and the Sea of Stories”; and Clare, Shakespeare’s
Stage Traffic. A need for a reframed approach to source study is signaled
by the 2007 edition of PMLA dedicated to “Polyphony,” which includes
Macachek’s article on “Allusion.”
3 For instance, Macachek proposes more specific terminology for different
types of allusion and argues for the need to use such terms and textual anal-
ysis (which has been frequently associated with a decontextualized literary
history) in a historically and culturally contextualized practice (“Allusion,”
534). In discussions of “intertheatricality,” West emphasizes “analogue”
over “allusion” (“Intertheatricality,” 157). And Maguire and Smith discuss
efforts to rename sources that do not get beyond “our limited practical un-
derstanding of what a source might be” (“What is a source?” 16–17).
4 For an example of a recent work that applies digital tools to questions of
authorship and source, see Shakespeare, Computers, and the Mystery of
Authorship, ed. Hugh Craig and Arthur Kinney.
5 See for example Greenhalgh, “Love, Chastity, and Woman’s Erotic Power”;
Chaudhury, “Circumscribed by Words”; Robinson’s discussion of Othello in
his Islam and Early Modern English Literature; Nicholson, “Ophelia Sings
like a Prima Donna Innamorata”; Skura, “Reading Othello’s Skin”; Wof-
ford, “Foreign Emotions on the Stage of Twelfth Night”; Fox, Ovid and the
Politics of Emotion; Newcomb, “The Sources of Romance”; Tylus, “Imitat-
ing Othello”; Lupton, “Paul Shakespeare”; and Britton, “From the Knight’s
Tale to The Two Noble Kinsmen.”
6 Maguire and Smith make a similar suggestion regarding the need for scrutiny
of the relationship between the Shakespearean text and potential sources in
“What is a Source,” 16; their theoretical intervention focuses on authorial
processes and memory.
Rethinking Shakespeare Source Study 11
7 Shakespeare, King Lear, ed, Foakes, 1.1.90.
8 Belsey, “Revisiting the Elephant’s Graveyard,” 62.
9 Greenblatt, “Shakespeare and the Exorcist”; Bloom, The Map of Misread-
ing, 17. To be fair to Greenblatt, it appears he realized he went too far. He
removed the statement about the elephant’s graveyard when “Shakespeare
and the Exorcist” was incorporated into Shakespearean Negotiations. Ad-
ditionally, Bloom, who is not discussing Shakespearean source study, is de-
scribing anxiety surrounding source study rather than calling scholars who
do source study “carrion eaters.”
10 Bruster, 31. Hamlin also notices that Greenblatt and Bloom were doing
source study without acknowledging it in The Bible in Shakespeare, 82.
11 Loomba, “Shakespeare’s Sources,” 131–32.
12 Bruster provides an extensive discussion of reasons why new historicists re-
jected source study; see Quoting Shakespeare, 27–36.
13 See Doody, “Shakespeare’s Novels.”
14 See also Guy-Bray, who examines Shakespearean sources alongside those of
Marlowe and Jonson, and emphasizes that “the sources from which these
playwrights adapted their plays are not replaced by the plays they inspired”
(“Sources,” 149).
15 Bloom, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human, 3. Additionally, Shake-
speare’s texts have themselves at times been treated as offering the kind of
“single, timeless, originary truth” that, as Quint argues, was associated by
Renaissance writers with the kind of “source” (such as a scripture or a clas-
sical text) that could (seem to) fix meaning transhistorically and obviate
historically contextualized reading (Origin and Originality, 23)—or with
carrying this type of meaning forward from the Bible or classical literature.
16 Again, see Bloom, Shakespeare, 2–14.
17 See Loomba and Orkin’s introduction to Post-colonial Shakespeares (esp.
1–3) for a pithy summary of these issues.
18 For the latter, see for instance Adelman, Suffocating Mothers and Stone,
Crossing Gender in Shakespeare.
19 Schalkwyk, Hamlet’s Dreams, 12–25, and his “Foreword” to South African
Essays. Also see Distiller, South Africa.
20 See Belsey, “The Elephant’s Graveyard Revisited,” esp. 63, and the forum in
Shakespeare Studies 36 (2008), “The Return of the Author,” and especially
James’s “Shakespeare, the Classics, and the Forms of Authorship.”
21 See Drakakis’s “Intention and Editing,” 365–67.
22 Schalkwyk, “Giving Intention its Due,” 323.
23 Enterline, Shakespeare’s Schoolroom; and Clare, Shakespeare’s Stage
Traffic.
24 James describes the survival of imitation studies in scholarship on lyric and
epic during the rise of the New Historicism (“Shakespeare, the Classics, and
the Forms of Authorship,” 81–84).
25 Hamlin, The Bible, 82–83.
26 Bullough, “General Introduction,” in v. 8, 345. Here, Bullough is expand-
ing on Kenneth Muir’s hopes for source study in Shakespeare’s Sources.
Comedies and Tragedies, 1957. It is important to note, however, that both
Bullough and Muir, unlike the authors in this collection, were interested in
uncovering the composition processes in order to understand “the mystery
of his artistic genius” (Bullough, 346).
27 Henke, Pastoral Transformations, 33.
28 Artese, Shakespeare’s Folktale Sources, 99. A further question might be how
many audience members could have connected the story of the pound of
12 Rethinking Shakespeare Source Study
flesh and the caskets to Buddhist narrative—one might wonder if a J esuit or
a merchant who had come in contact with Buddhist narratives while in In-
dia could have found himself in the audience. The Golden Legend, a widely
known compendium of Saint’s lives, included the story of Barlaam and Josa-
phat, a Christianized life of the Buddha. See Voragine, The Golden Legend:
Readings on the Saints, trans. William Granger Ryan. The stories of the
caskets and of the pound of flesh also have affinities to a story told about
King Asoka, who told a counselor to try to sell a human head in the market
place, instigating an exploration of different kinds of value. See Burnouf,
Introduction à l’histoire du Buddhisme Indien, 333–35.
29 Material traces of Kemp’s travels appear in the pamphlet “An Almond for
Parrat,” which refers to Will Kemp as “Signor Chiarlatano,” or in the 1607
play, The Travels of Three English Brothers, which shows Kemp and Italian
actors performing together. It is not that the information about travelling ac-
tors is brand new: Chambers discusses the relevant records (see Elizabethan
Stage, 2:261–65 and 273–75), and Cartwright’s essay in this volume pro-
vides a useful overview of evidence of contact between English and Italian
actors and dramatic traditions. But the comparative readings of Clubb (in
Italian Drama In Shakespeare’s Time) and others have led to renewed at-
tention to and exploration of these connections. See, for instance, Henke’s,
“Transporting Tragicomedy” and Pastoral Transformations.
30 West, “Intertheatricality,” 154.
31 Miola, “Seven Types,” 20.
32 Gillespie, Shakespeare’s Books, 3. Gillespie quotes from Miola’s “Shake-
speare and his Sources,” 71.
33 On other plays as sources for Shakespeare’s plays, see Kay’s essay in this
collection and Maguire and Smith’s “What is a Source.”
34 See Bruster’s rebuttal to the New Historicist disclaiming of source study and
Newcomb’s essay in this collection.
35 And in fact, attention to sources is a basic interpretive move that critics
made in relation to Shakespeare’s plays from the plays’ first performances.
As Houlahan points out in this collection, early commentary on Twelfth
Night took the form of a kind of source study, as John Manningham com-
pared the play to Gl’Inganni.
36 See Houlahan’s amusing comparison to the hunt for the real source of the
Nile (“Shakespeare and the Sea of Stories,” 157).
37 Macacheck, “Allusion,” 534.
38 Miola, “Shakespeare and the Bible,” 124.
39 Guy Bray, “Source,” 133; Strier, “Another ‘Source,’” 226; and Quint, Ori-
gin and Originality. Quint discusses a Renaissance shift away from a quasi-
allegorical tracing of the meaning fixed by a source text like the Bible or a
classical author, towards a more historicized, contextualized understanding
(21–31).
40 See for instance Brown, “Jesting Rights: Women Players in the Manuscript
Jestbook of Sir Nicholas Le Strange.”
41 Wofford, “Foreign,” 481. And see Wofford’s essay in this volume, 90–123.
42 Hadfield, William Shakespeare’s Othello, 7; quoted in Attar, “Genealogy of
the Character,” 48.
43 Following Attar, Britton’s essay in this collection close reads sources for
Othello and considers them in their local generic context.
44 Adams and Barker, “A New Model for the Study of the Book,” 60n, quoted
by Newcomb in this collection.
45 Dennett, “Memes and the Exploitation of Imagination,” 127 and 131.
Rethinking Shakespeare Source Study 13
46 For helpful discussions of intertextuality, including an explanation of Kriste-
va’s strong sense of the term as well as later uses, see Macachek, “Allusion,”
523. See also Miola, “Seven Types of Intertextuality,” 13–21.
47 See Ricoeur, On Translation, 13. Ricoeur links translation to “say[ing]
the same thing in another way” (25), while also suggesting that translation
highlights the “indefinite diversity” of language (24).
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Chapter VII. Music and Plastic. (1) The Arts of Form 217
Music one of the arts of form, p. 219. Classification of the arts impossible
except from the historical standpoint, p. 221. The choice of particular arts
itself an expression-means of the higher order, p. 222. Apollinian and
Faustian art-groups, p. 224. The stages of Western Music, p. 226. The
Renaissance an anti-Gothic and anti-musical movement, p. 232. Character
of the Baroque, p. 236. The Park, p. 240. Symbolism of colours, p. 245.
Colours of the Near and of the Distance, p. 246. Gold background and
Rembrandt brown, p. 247. Patina, p. 253.
Chapter VIII. Music and Plastic. (2) Act and Portrait 257
Kinds of human representation, p. 259. Portraiture, Contrition, Syntax, p. 261.
The heads of Classical statuary, p. 264. Portrayal of children and women,
p. 266. Hellenistic portraiture, p. 269. The Baroque portrait, p. 272.
Leonardo, Raphael and Michelangelo overcome the Renaissance, p. 273.
Victory of Instrumental Music over Oil-Painting, corresponding to the victory
of Statuary over Fresco in the Classical, p. 282. Impressionism, p. 285.
Pergamum and Bayreuth, p. 291. The finale of Art, p. 293.
INTRODUCTION
I
In this book is attempted for the first time the venture of
predetermining history, of following the still untravelled stages in the
destiny of a Culture, and specifically of the only Culture of our time
and on our planet which is actually in the phase of fulfilment—the
West-European-American.
Hitherto the possibility of solving a problem so far-reaching has
evidently never been envisaged, and even if it had been so, the
means of dealing with it were either altogether unsuspected or, at
best, inadequately used.
Is there a logic of history? Is there, beyond all the casual and
incalculable elements of the separate events, something that we
may call a metaphysical structure of historic humanity, something
that is essentially independent of the outward forms—social, spiritual
and political—which we see so clearly? Are not these actualities
indeed secondary or derived from that something? Does world-
history present to the seeing eye certain grand traits, again and
again, with sufficient constancy to justify certain conclusions? And if
so, what are the limits to which reasoning from such premisses may
be pushed?
Is it possible to find in life itself—for human history is the sum of
mighty life-courses which already have had to be endowed with ego
and personality, in customary thought and expression, by predicating
entities of a higher order like “the Classical” or “the Chinese Culture,”
“Modern Civilization”—a series of stages which must be traversed,
and traversed moreover in an ordered and obligatory sequence? For
everything organic the notions of birth, death, youth, age, lifetime are
fundamentals—may not these notions, in this sphere also, possess a
rigorous meaning which no one has as yet extracted? In short, is all
history founded upon general biographic archetypes?
The decline of the West, which at first sight may appear, like the
corresponding decline of the Classical Culture, a phenomenon
limited in time and space, we now perceive to be a philosophical
problem that, when comprehended in all its gravity, includes within
itself every great question of Being.
If therefore we are to discover in what form the destiny of the
Western Culture will be accomplished, we must first be clear as to
what culture is, what its relations are to visible history, to life, to soul,
to nature, to intellect, what the forms of its manifestation are and how
far these forms—peoples, tongues and epochs, battles and ideas,
states and gods, arts and craft-works, sciences, laws, economic
types and world-ideas, great men and great events—may be
accepted and pointed to as symbols.
II
The means whereby to identify dead forms is Mathematical Law.
The means whereby to understand living forms is Analogy. By these
means we are enabled to distinguish polarity and periodicity in the
world.
It is, and has always been, a matter of knowledge that the
expression-forms of world-history are limited in number, and that
eras, epochs, situations, persons are ever repeating themselves true
to type. Napoleon has hardly ever been discussed without a side-
glance at Cæsar and Alexander—analogies of which, as we shall
see, the first is morphologically quite inacceptable and the second is
correct—while Napoleon himself conceived of his situation as akin to
Charlemagne’s. The French Revolutionary Convention spoke of
Carthage when it meant England, and the Jacobins styled
themselves Romans. Other such comparisons, of all degrees of
soundness and unsoundness, are those of Florence with Athens,
Buddha with Christ, primitive Christianity with modern Socialism, the
Roman financial magnate of Cæsar’s time with the Yankee.
Petrarch, the first passionate archæologist (and is not archæology
itself an expression of the sense that history is repetition?) related
himself mentally to Cicero, and but lately Cecil Rhodes, the
organizer of British South Africa, who had in his library specially
prepared translations of the classical lives of the Cæsars, felt himself
akin to the Emperor Hadrian. The fated Charles XII of Sweden used
to carry Quintus Curtius’s life of Alexander in his pocket, and to copy
that conqueror was his deliberate purpose.
Frederick the Great, in his political writings—such as his
Considérations, 1738—moves among analogies with perfect
assurance. Thus he compares the French to the Macedonians under
Philip and the Germans to the Greeks. “Even now,” he says, “the
Thermopylæ of Germany, Alsace and Lorraine, are in the hands of
Philip,” therein exactly characterizing the policy of Cardinal Fleury.
We find him drawing parallels also between the policies of the
Houses of Habsburg and Bourbon and the proscriptions of Antony
and of Octavius.
Still, all this was only fragmentary and arbitrary, and usually
implied rather a momentary inclination to poetical or ingenious
expressions than a really deep sense of historical forms.
Thus in the case of Ranke, a master of artistic analogy, we find
that his parallels of Cyaxares and Henry the Fowler, of the inroads of
the Cimmerians and those of the Hungarians, possess
morphologically no significance, and his oft-quoted analogy between
the Hellenic city-states and the Renaissance republics very little,
while the deeper truth in his comparison of Alcibiades and Napoleon
is accidental. Unlike the strict mathematician, who finds inner
relationships between two groups of differential equations where the
layman sees nothing but dissimilarities of outward form, Ranke and
others draw their historical analogies with a Plutarchian, popular-
romantic, touch, and aim merely at presenting comparable scenes
on the world-stage.
It is easy to see that, at bottom, it is neither a principle nor a sense
of historic necessity, but simple inclination, that governs the choice of
the tableaux. From any technique of analogies we are far distant.
They throng up (to-day more than ever) without scheme or unities,
and if they do hit upon something which is true—in the essential
sense of the word that remains to be determined—it is thanks to
luck, more rarely to instinct, never to a principle. In this region no one
hitherto has set himself to work out a method, nor has had the
slightest inkling that there is here a root, in fact the only root, from
which can come a broad solution of the problems of History.
Analogies, in so far as they laid bare the organic structure of
history, might be a blessing to historical thought. Their technique,
developing under the influence of a comprehensive idea, would
surely eventuate in inevitable conclusions and logical mastery. But
as hitherto understood and practised they have been a curse, for
they have enabled the historians to follow their own tastes, instead of
soberly realizing that their first and hardest task was concerned with
the symbolism of history and its analogies, and, in consequence, the
problem has till now not even been comprehended, let alone solved.
Superficial in many cases (as for instance in designating Cæsar as
the creator of the official newspaper), these analogies are worse
than superficial in others (as when phenomena of the Classical Age
that are not only extremely complex but utterly alien to us are
labelled with modern catchwords like Socialism, Impressionism,
Capitalism, Clericalism), while occasionally they are bizarre to the
point of perversity—witness the Jacobin clubs with their cult of
Brutus, that millionaire-extortioner Brutus who, in the name of
oligarchical doctrine and with the approval of the patrician senate,
murdered the Man of the Democracy.
III
Thus our theme, which originally comprised only the limited
problem of present-day civilization, broadens itself into a new
philosophy—the philosophy of the future, so far as the
metaphysically-exhausted soil of the West can bear such, and in any
case the only philosophy which is within the possibilities of the West-
European mind in its next stages. It expands into the conception of a
morphology of world history, of the world-as-history in contrast to the
morphology of the world-as-nature that hitherto has been almost the
only theme of philosophy. And it reviews once again the forms and
movements of the world in their depths and final significance, but this
time according to an entirely different ordering which groups them,
not in an ensemble picture inclusive of everything known, but in a
picture of life, and presents them not as things-become, but as
things-becoming.
The world-as-history, conceived, viewed and given form from out
of its opposite the world-as-nature—here is a new aspect of human
existence on this earth. As yet, in spite of its immense significance,
both practical and theoretical, this aspect has not been realized, still
less presented. Some obscure inkling of it there may have been, a
distant momentary glimpse there has often been, but no one has
deliberately faced it and taken it in with all its implications. We have
before us two possible ways in which man may inwardly possess
and experience the world around him. With all rigour I distinguish (as
to form, not substance) the organic from the mechanical world-
impression, the content of images from that of laws, the picture and
symbol from the formula and the system, the instantly actual from
the constantly possible, the intents and purposes of imagination
ordering according to plan from the intents and purposes of
experience dissecting according to scheme; and—to mention even
thus early an opposition that has never yet been noted, in spite of its
significance—the domain of chronological from that of mathematical
number.[1]
Consequently, in a research such as that lying before us, there
can be no question of taking spiritual-political events, as they
become visible day by day on the surface, at their face value, and
arranging them on a scheme of “causes” or “effects” and following
them up in the obvious and intellectually easy directions. Such a
“pragmatic” handling of history would be nothing but a piece of
“natural science” in disguise, and for their part, the supporters of the
materialistic idea of history make no secret about it—it is their
adversaries who largely fail to see the similarity of the two methods.
What concerns us is not what the historical facts which appear at this
or that time are, per se, but what they signify, what they point to, by
appearing. Present-day historians think they are doing a work of
supererogation in bringing in religious and social, or still more art-
history, details to “illustrate” the political sense of an epoch. But the
decisive factor—decisive, that is, in so far as visible history is the
expression, sign and embodiment of soul—they forget. I have not
hitherto found one who has carefully considered the morphological
relationship that inwardly binds together the expression-forms of all
branches of a Culture, who has gone beyond politics to grasp the
ultimate and fundamental ideas of Greeks, Arabians, Indians and
Westerners in mathematics, the meaning of their early
ornamentation, the basic forms of their architecture, philosophies,
dramas and lyrics, their choice and development of great arts, the
detail of their craftsmanship and choice of materials—let alone
appreciated the decisive importance of these matters for the form-
problems of history. Who amongst them realizes that between the
Differential Calculus and the dynastic principle of politics in the age
of Louis XIV, between the Classical city-state and the Euclidean
geometry, between the space-perspective of Western oil-painting
and the conquest of space by railroad, telephone and long-range
weapon, between contrapuntal music and credit economics, there
are deep uniformities? Yet, viewed from this morphological
standpoint, even the humdrum facts of politics assume a symbolic
and even a metaphysical character, and—what has perhaps been
impossible hitherto—things such as the Egyptian administrative
system, the Classical coinage, analytical geometry, the cheque, the
Suez Canal, the book-printing of the Chinese, the Prussian Army,
and the Roman road-engineering can, as symbols, be made
uniformly understandable and appreciable.
But at once the fact presents itself that as yet there exists no
theory-enlightened art of historical treatment. What passes as such
draws its methods almost exclusively from the domain of that
science which alone has completely disciplined the methods of
cognition, viz., physics, and thus we imagine ourselves to be
carrying on historical research when we are really following out
objective connexions of cause and effect. It is a remarkable fact that
the old-fashioned philosophy never imagined even the possibility of
there being any other relation than this between the conscious
human understanding and the world outside. Kant, who in his main
work established the formal rules of cognition, took nature only as
the object of reason’s activity, and neither he himself, nor anyone
after him, noted the reservation. Knowledge, for Kant, is
mathematical knowledge. He deals with innate intuition-forms and
categories of the reason, but he never thinks of the wholly different
mechanism by which historical impressions are apprehended. And
Schopenhauer, who, significantly enough, retains but one of the
Kantian categories, viz., causality, speaks contemptuously of history.
[2]
That there is, besides a necessity of cause and effect—which I
may call the logic of space—another necessity, an organic necessity
in life, that of Destiny—the logic of time—is a fact of the deepest
inward certainty, a fact which suffuses the whole of mythological
religions and artistic thought and constitutes the essence and kernel
of all history (in contradistinction to nature) but is unapproachable
through the cognition-forms which the “Critique of Pure Reason”
investigates. This fact still awaits its theoretical formulation. As
Galileo says in a famous passage of his Saggiatore, philosophy, as
Nature’s great book, is written “in mathematical language.” We await,
to-day, the philosopher who will tell us in what language history is
written and how it is to be read.
Mathematics and the principle of Causality lead to a naturalistic,
Chronology and the idea of Destiny to a historical ordering of the
phenomenal world. Both orderings, each on its own account, cover
the whole world. The difference is only in the eyes by which and
through which this world is realized.
IV
Nature is the shape in which the man of higher Cultures
synthesizes and interprets the immediate impressions of his senses.
History is that from which his imagination seeks comprehension of
the living existence of the world in relation to his own life, which he
thereby invests with a deeper reality. Whether he is capable of
creating these shapes, which of them it is that dominates his waking
consciousness, is a primordial problem of all human existence.
Man, thus, has before him two possibilities of world-formation. But
it must be noted, at the very outset, that these possibilities are not
necessarily actualities, and if we are to enquire into the sense of all
history we must begin by solving a question which has never yet
been put, viz., for whom is there History? The question is seemingly
paradoxical, for history is obviously for everyone to this extent, that
every man, with his whole existence and consciousness, is a part of
history. But it makes a great difference whether anyone lives under
the constant impression that his life is an element in a far wider life-
course that goes on for hundreds and thousands of years, or
conceives of himself as something rounded off and self-contained.
For the latter type of consciousness there is certainly no world-
history, no world-as-history. But how if the self-consciousness of a
whole nation, how if a whole Culture rests on this ahistoric spirit?
How must actuality appear to it? The world? Life? Consider the
Classical Culture. In the world-consciousness of the Hellenes all
experience, not merely the personal but the common past, was
immediately transmuted into a timeless, immobile, mythically-
fashioned background for the particular momentary present; thus the
history of Alexander the Great began even before his death to be
merged by Classical sentiment in the Dionysus legend, and to
Cæsar there seemed at the least nothing preposterous in claiming
descent from Venus.
Such a spiritual condition it is practically impossible for us men of
the West, with a sense of time-distances so strong that we habitually
and unquestioningly speak of so many years before or after Christ,
to reproduce in ourselves. But we are not on that account entitled, in
dealing with the problems of History, simply to ignore the fact.
What diaries and autobiographies yield in respect of an individual,
that historical research in the widest and most inclusive sense—that
is, every kind of psychological comparison and analysis of alien
peoples, times and customs—yields as to the soul of a Culture as a
whole. But the Classical culture possessed no memory, no organ of
history in this special sense. The memory of the Classical man—so
to call it, though it is somewhat arbitrary to apply to alien souls a
notion derived from our own—is something different, since past and
future, as arraying perspectives in the working consciousness, are
absent and the “pure Present,” which so often roused Goethe’s
admiration in every product of the Classical life and in sculpture
particularly, fills that life with an intensity that to us is perfectly
unknown.
This pure Present, whose greatest symbol is the Doric column, in
itself predicates the negation of time (of direction). For Herodotus
and Sophocles, as for Themistocles or a Roman consul, the past is
subtilized instantly into an impression that is timeless and
changeless, polar and not periodic in structure—in the last analysis,
of such stuff as myths are made of—whereas for our world-sense
and our inner eye the past is a definitely periodic and purposeful
organism of centuries or millennia.
But it is just this background which gives the life, whether it be the
Classical or the Western life, its special colouring. What the Greek
called Kosmos was the image of a world that is not continuous but
complete. Inevitably, then, the Greek man himself was not a series
but a term.[3]
For this reason, although Classical man was well acquainted with
the strict chronology and almanac-reckoning of the Babylonians and
especially the Egyptians, and therefore with that eternity-sense and
disregard of the present-as-such which revealed itself in their
broadly-conceived operations of astronomy and their exact
measurements of big time-intervals, none of this ever became
intimately a part of him. What his philosophers occasionally told him
on the subject they had heard, not experienced, and what a few
brilliant minds in the Asiatic-Greek cities (such as Hipparchus and
Aristarchus) discovered was rejected alike by the Stoic and by the
Aristotelian, and outside a small professional circle not even noticed.
Neither Plato nor Aristotle had an observatory. In the last years of
Pericles, the Athenian people passed a decree by which all who
propagated astronomical theories were made liable to impeachment
(εἰσαγγελία). This last was an act of the deepest symbolic
significance, expressive of the determination of the Classical soul to
banish distance, in every aspect, from its world-consciousness.
As regards Classical history-writing, take Thucydides. The mastery
of this man lies in his truly Classical power of making alive and self-
explanatory the events of the present, and also in his possession of
the magnificently practical outlook of the born statesman who has
himself been both general and administrator. In virtue of this quality
of experience (which we unfortunately confuse with the historical
sense proper), his work confronts the merely learned and
professional historian as an inimitable model, and quite rightly so.
But what is absolutely hidden from Thucydides is perspective, the
power of surveying the history of centuries, that which for us is
implicit in the very conception of a historian. The fine pieces of
Classical history-writing are invariably those which set forth matters
within the political present of the writer, whereas for us it is the direct
opposite, our historical masterpieces without exception being those
which deal with a distant past. Thucydides would have broken down
in handling even the Persian Wars, let alone the general history of
Greece, while that of Egypt would have been utterly out of his reach.
He, as well as Polybius and Tacitus (who like him were practical
politicians), loses his sureness of eye from the moment when, in
looking backwards, he encounters motive forces in any form that is
unknown in his practical experience. For Polybius even the First
Punic War, for Tacitus even the reign of Augustus, are inexplicable.
As for Thucydides, his lack of historical feeling—in our sense of the
phrase—is conclusively demonstrated on the very first page of his
book by the astounding statement that before his time (about 400
B.C.) no events of importance had occurred (oὐ μεγάλα γενέσθαι) in
the world![4]
Consequently, Classical history down to the Persian Wars and for
that matter the structure built up on traditions at much later periods,
are the product of an essentially mythological thinking. The
constitutional history of Sparta is a poem of the Hellenistic period,
and Lycurgus, on whom it centres and whose “biography” we are
given in full detail, was probably in the beginning an unimportant
local god of Mount Taygetus. The invention of pre-Hannibalian
Roman history was still going on even in Cæsar’s time. The story of
the expulsion of the Tarquins by Brutus is built round some
contemporary of the Censor Appius Claudius (310 B.C.). The names
of the Roman kings were at that period made up from the names of
certain plebeian families which had become wealthy (K. J.
Neumann). In the sphere of constitutional history, setting aside
altogether the “constitution” of Servius Tullius, we find that even the
famous land law of Licinius (367 B.C.) was not in existence at the time
of the Second Punic War (B. Niese). When Epaminondas gave
freedom and statehood to the Messenians and the Arcadians, these
peoples promptly provided themselves with an early history. But the
astounding thing is not that history of this sort was produced, but that
there was practically none of any other sort; and the opposition
between the Classical and the modern outlook is sufficiently
illustrated by saying that Roman history before 250 B.C., as known in
Cæsar’s time, was substantially a forgery, and that the little that we
know has been established by ourselves and was entirely unknown
to the later Romans. In what sense the Classical world understood
the word “history” we can see from the fact that the Alexandrine
romance-literature exercised the strongest influence upon serious
political and religious history, even as regards its matter. It never
entered the Classical head to draw any distinction of principle
between history as a story and history as documents. When, towards
the end of the Roman republic, Varro set out to stabilize the religion
that was fast vanishing from the people’s consciousness, he
classified the deities whose cult was exactly and minutely observed
by the State, into “certain” and “uncertain” gods, i.e., into gods of
whom something was still known and gods that, in spite of the
unbroken continuity of official worship, had survived in name only. In
actual fact, the religion of Roman society in Varro’s time, the poet’s
religion which Goethe and even Nietzsche reproduced in all
innocence, was mainly a product of Hellenistic literature and had
almost no relation to the ancient practices, which no one any longer
understood.
Mommsen clearly defined the West-European attitude towards this
history when he said that “the Roman historians,” meaning especially
Tacitus, “were men who said what it would have been meritorious to
omit, and omitted what it was essential to say.”
In the Indian Culture we have the perfectly ahistoric soul. Its
decisive expression is the Brahman Nirvana. There is no pure Indian
astronomy, no calendar, and therefore no history so far as history is
the track of a conscious spiritual evolution. Of the visible course of
their Culture, which as regards its organic phase came to an end
with the rise of Buddhism, we know even less than we do of
Classical history, rich though it must have been in great events
between the 12th and 8th centuries. And this is not surprising, since
it was in dream-shapes and mythological figures that both came to
be fixed. It is a full millennium after Buddha, about 500 A.D., when
Ceylon first produces something remotely resembling historical work,
the “Mahavansa.”
The world-consciousness of Indian man was so ahistorically built
that it could not even treat the appearance of a book written by a
single author as an event determinate in time. Instead of an organic
series of writings by specific persons, there came into being
gradually a vague mass of texts into which everyone inserted what
he pleased, and notions such as those of intellectual individualism,
intellectual evolution, intellectual epochs, played no part in the
matter. It is in this anonymous form that we possess the Indian
philosophy—which is at the same time all the Indian history that we
have—and it is instructive to compare with it the philosophy-history
of the West, which is a perfectly definite structure made up of
individual books and personalities.
Indian man forgot everything, but Egyptian man forgot nothing.
Hence, while the art of portraiture—which is biography in the kernel
—was unknown in India, in Egypt it was practically the artist’s only
theme.
The Egyptian soul, conspicuously historical in its texture and
impelled with primitive passion towards the infinite, perceived past
and future as its whole world, and the present (which is identical with
waking consciousness) appeared to him simply as the narrow
common frontier of two immeasurable stretches. The Egyptian
Culture is an embodiment of care—which is the spiritual
counterpoise of distance—care for the future expressed in the choice
of granite or basalt as the craftsman’s materials,[5] in the chiselled
archives, in the elaborate administrative system, in the net of
irrigation works,[6] and, necessarily bound up therewith, care for the
past. The Egyptian mummy is a symbol of the first importance. The
body of the dead man was made everlasting, just as his personality,
his “Ka,” was immortalized through the portrait-statuettes, which
were often made in many copies and to which it was conceived to be
attached by a transcendental likeness.
There is a deep relation between the attitude that is taken towards
the historic past and the conception that is formed of death, and this
relation is expressed in the disposal of the dead. The Egyptian
denied mortality, the Classical man affirmed it in the whole
symbolism of his Culture. The Egyptians embalmed even their
history in chronological dates and figures. From pre-Solonian Greece
nothing has been handed down, not a year-date, not a true name,
not a tangible event—with the consequence that the later history,
(which alone we know) assumes undue importance—but for Egypt
we possess, from the 3rd millennium and even earlier, the names
and even the exact reign-dates of many of the kings, and the New
Empire must have had a complete knowledge of them. To-day,
pathetic symbols of the will to endure, the bodies of the great
Pharaohs lie in our museums, their faces still recognizable. On the
shining, polished-granite peak of the pyramid of Amenemhet III we
can read to-day the words “Amenemhet looks upon the beauty of the
Sun” and, on the other side, “Higher is the soul of Amenemhet than
the height of Orion, and it is united with the underworld.” Here indeed
is victory over Mortality and the mere present; it is to the last degree
un-Classical.
V
In opposition to this mighty group of Egyptian life-symbols, we
meet at the threshold of the Classical Culture the custom, typifying
the ease with which it could forget every piece of its inward and
outward past, of burning the dead. To the Mycenæan age the
elevation into a ritual of this particular funerary method amongst all
those practised in turn by stone-age peoples, was essentially alien;
indeed its Royal tombs suggest that earth-burial was regarded as
peculiarly honourable. But in Homeric Greece, as in Vedic India, we
find a change, so sudden that its origins must necessarily be
psychological, from burial to that burning which (the Iliad gives us the
full pathos of the symbolic act) was the ceremonial completion of
death and the denial of all historical duration.
From this moment the plasticity of the individual spiritual evolution
was at an end. Classical drama admitted truly historical motives just
as little as it allowed themes of inward evolution, and it is well known
how decisively the Hellenic instinct set itself against portraiture in the
arts. Right into the imperial period Classical art handled only the
matter that was, so to say, natural to it, the myth.[7] Even the “ideal”
portraits of Hellenistic sculpture are mythical, of the same kind as the
typical biographies of Plutarch’s sort. No great Greek ever wrote
down any recollections that would serve to fix a phase of experience
for his inner eye. Not even Socrates has told, regarding his inward
life, anything important in our sense of the word. It is questionable
indeed whether for a Classical mind it was even possible to react to
the motive forces that are presupposed in the production of a
Parzeval, a Hamlet, or a Werther. In Plato we fail to observe any
conscious evolution of doctrine; his separate works are merely
treatises written from very different standpoints which he took up
from time to time, and it gave him no concern whether and how they
hung together. On the contrary, a work of deep self-examination, the
Vita Nuova of Dante, is found at the very outset of the spiritual
history of the West. How little therefore of the Classical pure-present
there really was in Goethe, the man who forgot nothing, the man
whose works, as he avowed himself, are only fragments of a single
great confession!
After the destruction of Athens by the Persians, all the older art-
works were thrown on the dustheap (whence we are now extracting
them), and we do not hear that anyone in Hellas ever troubled
himself about the ruins of Mycenæ or Phaistos for the purpose of
ascertaining historical facts. Men read Homer but never thought of
excavating the hill of Troy as Schliemann did; for what they wanted
was myth, not history. The works of Æschylus and those of the pre-
Socratic philosophers were already partially lost in the Hellenistic
period. In the West, on the contrary, the piety inherent in and
peculiar to the Culture manifested itself, five centuries before
Schliemann, in Petrarch—the fine collector of antiquities, coins and
manuscripts, the very type of historically-sensitive man, viewing the
distant past and scanning the distant prospect (was he not the first to
attempt an Alpine peak?), living in his time, yet essentially not of it.
The soul of the collector is intelligible only by having regard to his
conception of Time. Even more passionate perhaps, though of a
different colouring, is the collecting-bent of the Chinese. In China,
whoever travels assiduously pursues “old traces” (Ku-tsi) and the
untranslatable “Tao,” the basic principle of Chinese existence,
derives all its meaning from a deep historical feeling. In the
Hellenistic period, objects were indeed collected and displayed
everywhere, but they were curiosities of mythological appeal (as
described by Pausanias) as to which questions of date or purpose
simply did not arise—and this too in the very presence of Egypt,
which even by the time of the great Thuthmosis had been
transformed into one vast museum of strict tradition.
Amongst the Western peoples, it was the Germans who
discovered the mechanical clock, the dread symbol of the flow of
time, and the chimes of countless clock towers that echo day and
night over West Europe are perhaps the most wonderful expression
of which a historical world-feeling is capable.[8] In the timeless
countrysides and cities of the Classical world, we find nothing of the
sort. Till the epoch of Pericles, the time of day was estimated merely
by the length of shadow, and it was only from that of Aristotle that the