Environmental Science and Policy 107 (2020) 23–35

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Environmental Science and Policy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci

Enhancing the capacity of water governance to deal with complex T

management challenges: A framework of analysis
Claudia Pahl-Wostla,*, Christian Kniepera, Evelyn Lukata, Franziska Meergansb, Mirja Schodererc,
Nora Schützed, Daniel Schweigatza, Ines Dombrowskyc, Andrea Lenschowb, Ulf Steine,
Andreas Thield, Jenny Tröltzsche, Rorigo Vidaurree
a
Institute of Environmental Systems Research, Osnabrück University, Barbarstr. 12, 49076 Osnabrück, Germany
b
School of Cultural Studies and Social Sciences, European Integration, Osnabrück University, Seminarstraße 33, 49074 Osnabrück, Germany
c
German Development Institute, Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn, Germany
d
University of Kassel, Organic Agricultural Sciences, Section of International Agricultural Policy and Environmental Governance, Steinstr. 19, 37213 Witzenhausen,
Germany
e
Ecologic Institute, Pfalzburger Str. 43/44, 10717 Berlin, Germany

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Despite numerous efforts to promote and implement more integrated approaches, coordination problems persist
Water governance and impede sustainable water governance and management. This paper introduces a framework for guiding a
Inter-Sectoral coordination transdisciplinary diagnostic approach (i.e. a context-sensitive assessment of multi-level water governance, which
Integrated water resources management is combined with a change management process) to address such coordination problems. The approach aims at
Comparative case study analysis
addressing some of the challenges identified in scientific scholarship and water governance practice by com-
Diagnostic approach
bining context-specific participatory assessments of individual cases with comparative case analysis guided by a
generic conceptual framework. The focus is on implementation processes at regional and local scale and their
embedding in a multi-level water governance system and a specific environmental and societal context.
A coherent approach and formalized representation across individual cases is essential to develop cumulative
knowledge and to improve the diagnostic strength of the approach. Based on a broad literature review and
exploratory study of multiple, diverse cases conceptual framework identifies a variety of factors that are ex-
pected to be important for understanding the performance of environmental governance and management
systems. The paper makes explicit the hypotheses on relationships between core variables that resulted from
framework development. The framework, including the collection of hypotheses, offers a structured approach for
analysing a phenomenon as complex and multi-facetted as coordination. It allows identification of multiple
pathways that may lead an improvement or a decline in performance, respectively. The framework can find more
widespread application in supporting comparative case study analyses with a focus on improving the under-
standing of policy implementation also beyond the field of water governance and management.

1. Introduction particular as this agenda argues for a holistic approach and sustain-
ability transformation. At the same time, the fact that the Agenda only
Water connects and water is connected to everything. The nature of connects the targets of individual goals to a limited degree (Le Blanc,
water therefore makes it very difficult to govern and manage. Water 2015; Bhaduri et al., 2016; Pahl-Wostl, 2019a) implies that efforts need
also lies at the core of sustainable development. If managed sustainably, to be undertaken to minimize trade-offs among targets in general and
it will lay foundations for sustainable development in general (Pahl- trade-offs related to water in particular. The need for cross-sectoral
Wostl et al., 2013c; Vörösmarty et al., 2013). Hence, water is also es- policy integration and more vertical and horizontal coordination has
sential for the implementation of the UN 2030 agenda as a whole – in been a recurring claim for water governance and management for

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C. Pahl-Wostl), [email protected] (C. Knieper), [email protected] (E. Lukat), [email protected] (F. Meergans),
[email protected] (M. Schoderer), [email protected] (N. Schütze), [email protected] (D. Schweigatz),
[email protected] (I. Dombrowsky), [email protected] (A. Lenschow), [email protected] (U. Stein), [email protected] (A. Thiel),
[email protected] (J. Tröltzsch), [email protected] (R. Vidaurre).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.02.011
Received 31 July 2019; Received in revised form 15 December 2019; Accepted 12 February 2020
Available online 24 February 2020
1462-9011/ © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
C. Pahl-Wostl, et al. Environmental Science and Policy 107 (2020) 23–35

several years already (OECD, 2011; Pahl-Wostl, 2015c). The complexity • Effectiveness of implementation of basin organizations needs major
of water resource challenges requires multi-level governance and co- improvements. The capacity of these organizations needs to be in-
ordination across different governance levels and sectors (Gupta et al., creased in many countries to ensure they can effectively lead IWRM
2013). Many decisions affecting water resources and aquatic ecosys- implementation (ibid. p 37).
tems are not taken within the water sector (e.g. land use, hydropower • Cross-sectoral coordination mechanisms are common, but co-
development) and are not taking into account water management. ordination is weak in practice (ibid. p 56).
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) has been an at-
tempt to integrate water with other policy objectives (Pahl-Wostl et al., Such persistent governance deficits can hardly be overcome by a
2011b; Newig and Challies, 2014; GWP, 2004). Despite being broadly linear and incremental process but require profound and transformative
promoted in national and international policy arenas and adopted in change. However, a global reporting process, as the Agenda 2030 re-
national water legislation, IWRM has suffered from implementation quires it, has only limited potential to facilitate transformative change
problems (Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006; Medema et al., 2008; Biswas, towards enhanced governance capacity for dealing with complex water
2004; Schreiner, 2013; Horlemann and Dombrowsky, 2012). According management challenges. The very nature of the process itself is not
to a status report on IWRM implementation commissioned by UN- conducive to transformative change, in particular if it remains largely
Water, the majority of countries have adopted integrated resource within the realm of national governmental authorities. Mobilizing
management principles in their laws and policies (UNEP, 2012). transformative potential requires an engagement of diverse actors in
However, implementation on the ground which would translate prin- multi-level implementation processes (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2015; Hajer
ciples into management practice and ultimately into an improved state et al., 2015).
of water resources and sustainable use of water services is still slow (UN This paper introduces a transdisciplinary diagnostic approach, i.e. a
Environment, 2018). The South African Water Act (1998), for example, context-sensitive assessment of multi-level water governance, which is
has been praised internationally as one of the most innovative reg- combined with a participatory change management process. This ap-
ulatory frameworks and advanced with respect to translation of the proach, in the following called the STEER1 approach, aims at addres-
concept of IWRM into legislation. However, implementation has faced sing some of the challenges identified in scientific scholarship and
major difficulties, and environmental, economic and social water se- water governance practice by:
curity are low and even declining (Schreiner, 2013; Meissner et al.,
2016; Pahl-Wostl, 2019b). In England, the EU Water Framework Di- • developing and testing a diagnostic, solution-oriented approach,
rective has been implemented through a ‘top-down’ approach but a • combining context-specific participatory assessments of individual
‘bottom-up’ approach has been adopted for catchment management. cases with comparative case analysis guided by a generic conceptual
Both, the Water Framework Directive and the catchment-based ap- framework,
proach are consistent with the goals of IWRM, but their implementation • focusing on implementation processes at regional and local scale
arrangements are disconnected and operate at different scales (Watson, and their embedding in a multi-level water governance system and
2014). In Canada, Saskatchewan has introduced a new Agricultural an environmental and societal context.
Water Management Strategy to tackle problems related to agricultural
wetland drainage in the Canadian prairies. The implementation of this The paper provides a detailed presentation of the STEER approach
new Strategy is disconnected from already existing institutions on wa- to the scientific and practice community in order to make it available
tershed management (Breen et al., 2018). The examples show that for use and further development by projects similarly addressing
implementation challenges are multi-facetted and widespread even in questions of coordination in contexts of complex, multi-level govern-
highly developed countries. As a response to some of these deficits, the ance. The approach has been used in several single, small and medium
Water-Energy-Food (WEF) nexus concept has gained importance in N comparative case studies which are documented separately. The
debates in business, policy and practice in recent years (Benson et al., following sections first introduce the generic conceptual framework and
2015) – predominantly but not only in the water domain. The WEF- then elaborate in more depth on its scientific foundations. Thereafter,
nexus highlights that enhancing and guaranteeing water, energy and the entire transdisciplinary STEER approach is presented. The paper
food security requires a cross-sectoral approach and innovative co- concludes with an outlook on future applications.
ordination instruments (Weitz et al., 2017; Pahl-Wostl, 2019a). Despite
these different approaches to integration, coordination problems on the
ground persist and impede sustainable water governance and man- 2. STEER conceptual framework
agement.
Given persistent challenges and the importance of integrated gov- A diagnostic approach aims at navigating a middle course between
ernance, it is quite plausible that IWRM is also an essential element of types of analyses that arrive at simple panaceas seemingly independent
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6. Sub-target 6.5 states: By 2030, from context conditions and analyses thes suggest that problems are
implement integrated water resources management at all levels, including always unique and context-specific problems and solutions can there-
through transboundary cooperation as appropriate. In this paper we focus fore not be transferred from one case to another. A diagnostic approach
on the first part of target 6.5. In the UN system, its achievement is must therefore be able to capture the complexity and specificity of the
measured by building on the above-mentioned IWRM status report phenomena of interest in a comparable manner(Ostrom, 2007; Cox,
(UNEP, 2012). The approach taken in this assessment applies the nor- 2011; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012; Pahl-Wostl, 2015c). The STEER con-
mative concept of the Global Water Partnership (GWP) on requirements ceptual framework aims at an improved understanding of how the
for IWRM implementation (GWP, 2000, 2004), namely various aspects characteristics of the governance and management system determine its
related to (1) the enabling environment, (2) institutions and partici- performance and how and to which extent these relationships are in-
pation, (3) management instruments, and (4) financing. Assessments fluenced by the societal and environmental context.
across these four categories are aggregated into indicator 6.5.1 on the The essential elements of the framework are represented in Fig. 1. A
degree of IWRM implementation. The baseline assessment of IWRM
implementation unveiled the following challenges with regards to co- 1
STEER refers to the acronym of the BMBF financed research project within
ordination (UN Environment, 2018): which the approach has been developed. STEER is a abbreviation for the project
“Erhöhung der STEuerungskompetenz zur ERreichung der Ziele eines in-
• Efforts need to focus on advancing elements of IWRM implementa- tegrierten Wassermanagements” (“Increasing Good Governance for Achieving
tion at subnational, basin, and local levels (ibid, p 20). the Objectives of Integrated Water Resources Management”).

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C. Pahl-Wostl, et al. Environmental Science and Policy 107 (2020) 23–35

and relationships. Implementation comprises as well capacity building

(e.g. training farmers in environmentally friendly practices).
Implementation activities produce results that are of direct relevance
for ecosystem services interactions. Ecosystem services (ES)-interac-
tions comprise all aspects, stakeholders, and activities that directly
interfere with the resource. ES-interactions refer to operational activ-
ities of resource users that are based on contributions from ecosystems
and/or result in tangible changes in ecosystem services and/or physical
objects (e.g. building technical or green infrastructure, livestock pro-
duction, drinking water supply).
The context comprises all overarching societal and environmental
factors that may influence but can hardly be influenced by the water
governance and management system (e.g. climate variability, average
rainfall, societal norms such as corruption, demographics, socio-eco-
nomic variables, political regime type etc.). This does not imply that
nothing can be done within the water sector to mitigate for example the
effects of corruption or of climate change. However, corruption is a
societal characteristic, an informal societal norm that can hardly be
fundamentally changed within the water sector only. Furthermore, such
Fig. 1. Conceptual framework of analysis. transformative change takes time and is more likely to occur over
decades rather than years.
distinction is made between context, the ‘water governance and man- The performance of water governance and management systems
agement system’, which comprises the governance structure, govern- refers to the degree to which they fulfil certain societal functions (e.g.
ance processes and processes to be governed, as well as its emergent keep water resources in a desirable state, secure water-related services).
‘functional performance’ measured by outcomes and impacts. Performance measures relate to outcomes and impacts of the water
The ‘water governance and management system’ is the inter- governance and management system as a whole. More generally, out-
connected ensemble of political, social, economic and administrative comes can be defined as the short- and medium-term effects on en-
elements that perform the function of water governance and of water vironmental and social conditions (based on Koontz and Thomas, 2006;
management. These elements comprise institutions2 as well as actors OECD, 2002). In the STEER framework the focus is in particular on
and their interactions (Pahl-Wostl, 2015c). outcomes related to realized coordination and cooperation, furthermore
Governance structure comprises formal and informal rule struc- on social learning and conflict resolution. Impacts are the broad, long-
tures that regulate interdependencies between actors and change slowly term effects produced (directly or indirectly, intended or unintended)
– over time scales of years or decades – and provide stability but also by multiple outcomes on society as a whole or on the wider environ-
inertia to water governance and management processes. mental, economic, and social conditions (based on Koontz and Thomas,
Regarding processes, the framework focuses on policy im- 2006; OECD, 2002). Indicators for measuring impacts may relate to
plementation rather than the development of formal institutions. This specific contexts, based on the kind of outcomes water governance and
focus takes into account that the bottleneck for policy effectiveness is management are supposed to achieve (e.g. improvement of water
often implementation rather than policy development. Despite the ob- quality as prescribed by formal regulation). They can also be defined
vious importance of policy implementation, systematic comparative based on overall agreed normative criteria (e.g. sustainability principles
analyses on the effectiveness of (water) policy implementation in par- related to water security).
ticular at the operational level are largely lacking (Pahl-Wostl et al., Processes as introduced above are represented as networks of Action
2012). Situations (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010; McGinnis, 2011; Pahl-Wostl,
Understanding the effectiveness of policy implementation requires 2015a).
an improved understanding of how policies are embedded in a complex Fig. 2 shows a generic template of an Action Situation (AS). The
web of interactions and affect operational activities in water manage- notion of an AS was initially introduced by Elinor Ostrom as a core
ment practice. Therefore, the framework distinguishes three different concept of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework to
kinds of processes that refer to planning, implementation, and eco- depict a collective choice situation in a common pool resource game
system services interactions, respectively. Planning comprises all ac- (Ostrom, 2005). The notion of an AS has been further developed and
tors, as well as procedures that are established to develop and revise broadened for application in the Management and Transition Frame-
strategic and operational plans. Planning also includes the establish- work (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010; Knieper et al., 2010). An AS describes, in
ment of procedures to facilitate and control implementation. general, a structured context of social interactions that lead to identi-
Implementation at operational level refers to putting a more abstract fiable products. As shown in Fig. 2, each AS may be influenced by
policy, plan or rule into operation by developing specific measures. This different kinds of inputs and may produce different kinds of outputs.
extends to all actors involved in the process, their features, capacities, These comprise institutions, knowledge, operational factors (e.g. in-
frastructure, change in public opinion) and impacts on ecosystem ser-
vices. An output of one AS (e.g. knowledge) may serve as input to an-
2
‘Institution’ is used here according to the convention in institutional ana- other AS. A set of connected ASs serves now to describe governance and
lyses, within the social sciences, to denote rules governing the behaviour of management processes (e.g. a certain cross-sectoral coordination pro-
actors (North 1990; Scott 2008). Institutions do not refer to organizations or blem related to water quality). Such a representation allows the ana-
physical structures. Formal and informal refer to the nature of processes of
lysis of cross-level interactions and vertical integration as well as links
development, codification, communication and enforcement. Formal institu-
between different sectors.
tions are linked to the official channels of governmental bureaucracies. They
are codified in regulatory frameworks or any kind of legally binding documents. In the framework, planning and implementation processes as well as
Correspondingly, they can be enforced by legal procedures. Informal institu- ES-interactions were identified as elements that in their interaction
tions refer to socially shared rules such as social or cultural norms. In most cases constitute the process level. A set of governance functions (see Table 1)
they are not codified or written down. Compliance is not directly enforced via was introduced to characterize different kinds of AS representing
legally sanctioned channels. planning and implementation processes. The identification of such

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Fig. 2. Generic template of an Action Situation (AS).

Table 1
General types of AS that relate to different governance functions.
Governance Functions Definition and Explanation

Rule Making Rule Making ASs describe social interactions that have some kind of rules as a product.
Knowledge Generation Knowledge Generation ASs describe social interactions that have knowledge of relevance for other governance functions and possibly also for
operational activities – provision of ecosystem services as a product.
Conflict Resolution Conflict Resolution ASs describe social interactions that are specifically designed to resolve conflicts. These could for example be legal procedures or
round tables.
Coordination Coordination ASs describe those social interactions that are specifically designed to support the coordinated development and implementation of
strategies, plans, activities etc. These could for example be an instrument that links spatial planning and water management. Another example would
be a payments for ecosystems services scheme that links two sectors (e.g. water and agriculture). Such coordination instruments should follow a
specified process and have clearly identifiable products (e.g. cooperation agreements).
Enforcement of Rules ASs of this type refer to procedures in place to ensure compliance with rules. This may involve monitoring the achievement of pre-defined goals,
environmental targets etc. as well as procedures that assess the compliance with rules and their enforcement (e.g. sanctions).
Planning Planning ASs describe the social interactions that have some kind of plans as a product (strategic plans, operational water management plans etc.).
Application of Measures ASs of this type refer to the application of specific measures or programmes. Outputs are not plans but more tangible products – e.g. payment schemes
or a new governmental authority.

governance functions is based on assumptions about the requirements political systems and environmental conditions.
needed for governance processes to perform in complex and uncertain The development of hypotheses was guided by the central depen-
environments (McGinnis, 2011; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013b; Pahl-Wostl, dent variable to be explained: coordination and cooperation.
2015a). Governance functions are assigned only to AS with an explicit Coordination is distinguished from cooperation to capture the subtleties
(water) management focus. of learning processes that may lead to transformative change.
Coordination means that different stakeholders (organizations) develop
strategies, plans etc. separately, but take into account (inform and/or
3. Steps towards operationalization of the STEER framework
consider) the work and interests of other relevant stakeholders and
mututally adjust their respective plans and strategies. Cooperation, by
The STEER framework comprises the overarching conceptual fra-
contrast, means the joint elaboration and joint implementation of
mework (Fig. 1) and a representation of governance and management
strategies, plans etc. and even joint, collective action. Consequently, it
processes with a set of Action Situations (Fig. 2 and Table 1). These are
can be considered an intensified case of coordination that does not only
further operationalized by sets of 2nd and 3rd tier variables (chapter 4,
affect actors’ behaviour but also mental models and preferences that
Fig. 3). The framework is underpinned with a set of hypotheses that
inform their behaviour (Pahl-Wostl and Lebel, 2011; Pahl-Wostl et al.,
make statements on relationships between different elements of the
2013a; Margerum and Robinson, 2015). The hypotheses were derived
STEER framework (chapter 3).
from scholarly work – theoretical considerations and results from
The components were developed in an iterative inter- and trans-
(comparative) empirical analyses – not only in the domain of water
disciplinary process combining literature reviews, scientific expert
governance. Different sub-teams screened scientific literature in their
judgements and workshops with stakeholders in different case studies
respective scholarly domain, drawing on insights from institutional
of the STEER project. The STEER consortium comprises senior and ju-
economics, water and environmental governance and management, and
nior scholars from water/environmental governance and management.
policy integration. These screenings were informed by expert judge-
The consortium has ample expertise in empirical case study analyses in
ment rather than a systematic review that would have covered all
the domain of water governance in a wide range of countries char-
scholarly literature (i.e. peer-reviewed journals, books, expert reports).
acterized by different states of economic and institutional development,

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C. Pahl-Wostl, et al. Environmental Science and Policy 107 (2020) 23–35

Fig. 3. The multi-tier framework of analysis with first-, second- and third-tier variables.

Given the breadth of the aspects covered with the framework and the water management (Pahl-Wostl, 2015c; Ostrom, 2010b; Pahl-Wostl
number of approaches that address coordination and cooperation, and et al., 2012; OECD, 2011). The Steer framework makes a distinction
related aspects of conflict and learning, a thorough literature analysis between coordination and cooperation at process (de facto3 coordina-
would have been a project on its own. The hypotheses guided the initial tion) and at outcome level (effectiveness of coordination). Coordination
choice of variables to operationalize the framework (c.f. Fig. 3). Hy- instruments may for example be specified on paper, they may be im-
potheses and variables were discussed in the whole team and improved plemented in practice but they may not necessarily lead to coordination
in an iterative process. Both hypotheses and variables were validated in outcomes, i.e. mutually readjusted plans and strategies taking into ac-
stakeholder workshops to assess whether they capture what was con- count the interest of other parties up to joint strategies and collective
sidered relevant from the perspective of practitioners and scholars. To action. By de facto coordination at process level we refer to all gov-
allow an informed judgement, some of the rather abstract concepts ernance processes (formal and informal) that facilitate and provide
were expressed and explained in a language amenable for practitioners opportunities for coordination. At process level we analyse instruments
and case study experts. However, one should highlight that participants for promoting the coordination and cooperation of actors and policy
in these workshops had a high level of understanding and expert areas. Furthermore, the operationalization of the conceptual framework
knowledge on governance and management concepts and processes. acknowledges that methodologies and tools that support a systemic
processing of problem areas (e.g. ecosystem services approach) are
important since dealing with complex water governance challenges
4. Hypotheses guiding framework development requires a holistic perspective (e.g. Pahl-Wostl et al., 2011a; Wiek and
Larson, 2012). However, the mere existence of such formal or informal
The building blocks of the conceptual framework described in the mechanisms may not be sufficient to provide for positive coordination
previous section need to be further operationalized (e.g. the governance results. Coordination at outcome level would therefore include co-
structure needs to be expressed by a set of variables) to allow for di- ordinated results such as joint cross-sectoral implementation plans or
agnostic assessments. The operationalization was guided by the objec- cooperation in implementing measures such as payments for ecosystem
tive to understand factors that support governance with respect to services.
improved coordination and cooperation. The following paragraphs introduce and summarize conceptual
The scholarly literature on coordination and cooperation is vast (c.f. foundations for the central guiding hypotheses on what improves co-
e.g. Tosun and Lang, 2017). In this paper priority is given to what is ordination and cooperation related to: polycentric governance (3.1),
expected to be particularly relevant for understanding the role of co- coherence of governance functions and policies (3.2), synergistic
ordination in dealing with complex cross-sectoral water governance combination of governance modes (3.3), ecosystem services approach
and management challenges. A major focus is thus on horizontal (across
sectors and administrative boundaries) and on vertical (across gov-
ernance levels) coordination which have proven to be particularly im- 3
De facto refers to coordination in practice compared to what is prescribed by
portant for the effective implementation of integrated and adaptive formal institutions.

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(3.4). Even when the hypotheses make statements on individual re- facilitate long-term processes of change.
lationships, it is important to highlight that we do not assume that On the basis of the preceding elaborations we state the following
simple causalitites can explain coordination and cooperation in com- guiding hypotheses:
plex socio-ecological systems. The hypotheses are desgined to support
configurational analyses to examine which combination of factors ex- • H1A: Polycentric governance systems (multiple autonomous actors
plain the absence or presence of effective coordination and cooperation that are coordinated and mutually adjust) lead to effective co-
in a specific case or in a set of similar cases. ordination and cooperation on the outcome level and support
learning.
4.1. Polycentric governance systems • H1B: The presence of formal provisions for decentralization and
coordination, respectively, is a requirement for de facto decen-
The work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom laid the foundations for an tralization and coordination, respectively and thus polycentric
increased recognition of the importance of self-organization in poly- governance systems (de facto – in operation).
centric governance of environmental resources (Aligica and Tarko,
2012; McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011). Polycentric denotes the presence of As pointed out in the previous chapter effective coordination refers
many centers of decision making that have at least some degree of in- to outcomes as defined by the STEER conceptual framework (c.f.
dependence. Ostrom et al. (1961) stressed from the outset of their re- Fig. 1). Furthermore, analysing these hypotheses should also shed more
search that for a polycentric governance system to function as a system light on requirements for and pathways towards polycentric govern-
the distribution of responsibilities (e.g. decentralization vs. centraliza- ance systems.
tion) must be linked to coordination by a shared set of rules. In a
polycentric governance system autonomous decision centres take each 4.2. Coherence of governance functions and policies
other into account and mutually adapted to each other. Such govern-
ance systems are assumed to be more flexible, have a higher ability to In the literature on policy coherence, it is usually argued that a lack
adapt to a changing environment and its integrity is less affected by of coordination may lead to policy incoherence (e.g. May et al., 2006).
sudden changes or failures in parts of the system (Ostrom, 2001, 2005; However, literature on coordination also points to the reversed caus-
Pahl-Wostl, 1995, 2007a, 2007b; Hooghe and Marks, 2003). This would ality, namely that incoherencies may hinder coordinated policy out-
make polycentric governance systems particularly suited for dealing comes (e.g. Peters, 1998; Weitz et al., 2017). More specifically, it is
with complex water resource governance challenges. More than half a suggested that inter-sectoral coordination challenges may stem (1) from
century later, the benefits of wider distribution of authority are gen- an overlap or gaps in governance functions; and (2) from incoherence
erally acknowledged. However, despite numerous governance reforms due to contradictions in policies (Weitz et al., 2017). However, these
supporting decentralization, how to achieve coordination is still a major assumptions have rarely been further theorized or tested empirically.
challenge. Decentralization has far more often led to fragmentation This is a gap in the literature since incoherencies in the allocation of
rather than polycentric governance systems (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, governance functions and policies may arguably be a major obstacle
2014). The presence of autonomous decision making units does not towards coordination between interconnected policy sectors. In the
imply that they also function as a polycentric governance system following, we therefore distinguish incoherence due to overlaps or gaps
(Stephan et al., 2019). in goverance functions (henceforth functional incoherence) and the
Elinor Ostrom highlighted the importance of self-organization as a incoherencies in policies (henceforth policy incoherence).
guiding principle in polycentric systems (Ostrom, 2010a). Coordination Coherence of functional organization is arguably achieved if all
and rules evolve from negotiations and interactions rather than being aforementioned governance functions (Table 1) are formally allocated,
imposed by one powerful actor, as might be the case in a strictly clearly divided and consistent and if coordination is defined in case of
hierarchical system where coordination is imposed from the top. Es- shared functions. Shared functions are explicitly allocated to more than
sential elements of polycentric governance systems are a balance be- one entity and are to be performed jointly. A wide range of scholars
tween bottom-up and top-down influences and the capacity of actors to address the link between coherence of governance functions and the
self-organize (Andersson and Ostrom, 2008; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Huntjens management of resources, in general, or coordination, in particular. As
et al., 2011; Marshall et al., 2013; Plummer et al., 2013; Young, 2011). indicated above, theThe literature on environmental policy integration
However, developing institutional capacity for effective polycentric suggests that redundancy as well as lacunae or gaps in governance
watershed governance, which overcomes both fragmented bureau- functions constitute coordination challenges (Peters, 1998; Pattberg
cracies and rigid central coordination, may take considerable time as et al., 2014; Weitz et al., 2017). Redundancy is defined as the “dupli-
well as it may require significant investments in coordination (Thiel and cation and overlap in policy functions”, whereas lacunae or gaps are
Moser-Priewich, 2019). An example if provided by a comprehensive understood as the “absence of necessary policy arrangements” (Weitz
account of several decades of history of river basin management in the et al., 2017, p.168). In the same vein, public finance literature suggests
Columbia River basin in the US. Vogel (2012) pointed out that in- several principles for an efficient provision of public goods (e.g.
troducing another layer of decision making units at basin scale did not Hansjürgens, 2001). According to the principle of disentanglement, a
lead to more holistic, improved management due to the inherent un- strict separation of powers between different state levels is to be applied
equal and unchallenged distribution of power. In their analyses of the and the responsibilities of each state level have to be clearly defined,
development of integrated flood management in Europe, Pahl-Wostl including administrative roles and competencies (Petersen et al., 2008;
et al. (2013a) also demonstrated that change and development of in- Kropp and Behnke, 2016). This is complemented by the principle of
stitutional capacity and effectiv coordination in a polycentric govern- cooperation in case of shared or delegated functions. Regarding the
ance system have taken place on time scales of decades rather than special case of water, the OECD (2015) states that effective water
years. governance requires a clear-cut allocation and differentiation of water
The pathway towards polycentric governance systems may be es- governance roles and responsibilities, as well as good coordination
sential for building capacity for good governance. Pahl-Wostl et al. among the authorities. This conflicts to some extent with the generally
(2012) found a strong correlation between the polycentric governance positive view towards redundancy as an opportunity for risk mitigation
systems of the water governance system and the realization of good that many resilience and polycentricity scholars express (Carlisle and
governance principles and beneficial outcomes. This implies that de- Gruby, 2017; Galaz et al., 2012; Huitema et al., 2009; Norberg et al.,
veloping an improved understanding of the pathways towards poly- 2008). In their view, “if one unit fails, others may take over their
centric governance systems needs to receive more attention in order to functions” (Huitema et al., 2009). From the point of view of resource

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allocation, however, redundancy causes inefficiencies or necessitates among actors are mainly characterized by competitive relationships.
coordinated action to avoid these. It is also unclear how the overtaking Within networks, coordination is mainly based on trust and coopera-
of functions in case of failure of one unit is supposed to occur. Here as tion. Hence, such an ideal-typical configuration has a strong ex-
well, a minimum level of coordination seems necessary for the positive planatory power in terms of synergies as well as in terms of potential
effects of redundancy to take place (e.g. Baldwin et al., 2018). In that conflict if governance modes are combined (Pahl-Wostl, 2015b, 2019b).
sense, irrespective of its potential positive effects, redundancy causes As these descriptions show, the manifestation of governance modes is a
additional coordination requirements in polycentric systems. combination of formalized coordination such as decentralized decision
Against the background of the common distinction between polity, making structures and informal aspects of organizational culture such
policy and politics, coherence of functional organization refers to the as trust between actors.
dimension of polity, which is the institutional system framing political Hybrid forms of policy prevail in contemporary governance and are
action. In contrast, policy coherence refers to the content dimension even purposefully designed. A report on European environmental
(policy). It is understood as a policy attribute “that systematically re- policy concluded that a successful policy uses a variety of instruments
duces conflicts and promotes synergies between and within different and is based on one or several collaborating modes of governance; from
policy areas to achieve the outcomes associated with jointly agreed coercive public law to voluntary self-regulation, voluntary agreements
policy objectives” (Nilsson et al., 2012, p. 396). In addition to re- between actors, financial and legal support and by supporting actors to
dundancy and lacunae, incoherence understood as contradictions in engage in innovation trajectories (Rhodes, 1997, p.53; Bouwma et al.,
policy and implementation measures can lead to coordination chal- 2015). However, as different governance styles operate according to
lenges (Pattberg et al., 2014; Nilsson et al., 2012; Peters, 1998; Hillion, different logics, the combination of these styles is by no means
2008). straightforward. Incompatibilities and contradictions may lead to in-
Issues of policy coherence and vice versa incoherence are especially effective and inefficient approaches and even to severe conflicts rather
challenging in the European multi-level governance system (Lenschow than expected synergies (Pahl-Wostl, 2019b; Lambin et al., 2014). At
et al., 2018). Implementation research highlights the crucial role of the level of policy instruments del Rio and Howlett (2013d) distinguish
street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1969) since they are able to filter, in- instrument mixes where instruments are complementary, synergistic or
terpret and change the outcome of formal policy (Pressman and conflictive. Water authorities, for example, have operated traditionally
Wildavsky, 1984). The crucial role of street-level bureaucrats in case of in a technocratic and thus hierarchical mode that has become deeply
incoherent legislation is for example confirmed by Söderberg (2016) for engrained over time. The prevailing trend towards a stronger reliance
the case of Water Framework Directive implementation in Sweden. In on participatory approaches as a means to build network governance
addition, Nilsson et al. (2012) found that conflicts at the level of poses challenges to such a traditionally hierarchical bureaucracy, which
overarching goals and strategies are rare because of their high level of may lack skills and trust in participatory processes and be characterized
abstraction. Incoherencies rather come to the fore in the implementa- by institutional inertia (Allan and Curtis, 2005; Roth and Warner, 2007;
tion of policies. Therefore, we examine incoherencies at three analytical Pahl-Wostl et al., 2011a).
levels: policy objectives, policy instruments and scope. Moreover, co- In public administrations hierarchical governance and network
herence or incoherence can be studied either within a single policy field governance have in the past been combined in what Fritz Scharpf
(internal incoherence), between different policy fields (external in- coined “coordination in the shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf, 1997, 197
coherence), between policies at the same level of governance (hor- ff.). Within bureaucracies, hierarchical direction is by no means the
izontal incoherence) or between policies across different scales of only interaction mode, but hierarchies to a great extent also rely on
governance (vertical incoherence) (Nilsson et al., 2012). negotiations. In the ministerial bureaucracy, policy proposals are
On the basis of the preceding elaborations we stated the following usually prepared by various ‘horizontal negotiations’ among lower-level
guiding hypotheses: units within and across ministries as well as with third parties within
the parliament and lobby groups. Besides these horizontal negotiations,
• H2A: Coherence at the level of water governance functions (1) each of the participating units is also involved in a ‘vertical dialogue’
supports de facto coordination and (2) increases the effectiveness of with its respective political leadership. Reference to the superior’s po-
coordination. sition allows for the introduction of credible threats on both sides of the
• H2B: Policy incoherence (1) hinders de facto coordination and (2) negotiation table. Thus negotiations take place under the expectation to
reduces the effectiveness of coordination. reach agreement, but each side has the option to appeal to higher au-
thority if it is confronted with unfair bargaining strategies. The effect is
The hypotheses state two pathways how coherence of governance that transaction costs are reduced, and it is likely that the fairness of the
functions and policy incoherence, respectively, might influence co- outcome is increased. Beyond the public sector, hierarchical and net-
ordination: (1) a direct influence on coordination processes and the work governance modes can also be combined in co-management ap-
implementation of coordination instruments and (2) influence on the proaches between different levels and sectors of government and civil
outcomes of coordination processes. Even though coordination instru- society (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; Armitage, 2008). Network
ments may be implemented, they may not lead to effective coordination governance has a stronger emphasis on input legitimacy of governance
outcomes. (Pahl-Wostl, 2015b). However, problems of accountability may arise if
hierarchical control by the state is increasingly replaced by cooperative
4.3. Governance modes arrangements in complex networks (Papadopoulos, 2003). Legal ac-
countability problems may also arise if rules for attributing account-
Governance modes refer to the various forms through which gov- ability do not match the complexity of participatory and decentralized
ernance can be realized. An often employed conceptualization of decision-making processes (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). Trust, which is
idealized governance modes makes the distinction between hierarchies, essential for network governance, may easily be destroyed if consensual
markets and networks (Thorelli, 1986; Thompson et al., 1991; agreements achieved in participatory processes are overridden by top-
Thompson, 2003; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). They may be under- down decisions in a hierarchical mode (Mostert et al., 2007).
stood as ideal types in the Weberian sense since, in reality, an in- Hierarchical and market governance can be combined in public-
dividual mode will rarely occur in isolation. Hierarchies, markets and private partnerships. However, it is an open question to which extent
networks denote different ways of coordinating collective action and governmental control and market-based approaches should be com-
operate under different logics. In hierarchies, coordination is mainly bined. The privatization debate has shown that it is by no means trivial
achieved by top-down control. Within market systems, interactions to design hybrid forms and implement public-private partnerships. But

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it has also demonstrated that well designed and implemented hybrid other parties, no the one that manages the resource (externalities). This
forms seem to be superior to purely market or government-based ap- is for example the rationale for the WEF Nexus (Pahl-Wostl, 2019a). If
proaches (Pahl-Wostl, 2015c; Bakker, 2010; Tosun et al., 2016; Lambin coordination structures exist to manage interconnected ecological re-
et al., 2014). Market and network governance modes can also be sources, there is a better social-ecological fit (Bodin and Tengö, 2012).
combined in business-civil society arrangement, such as cooperatives or However, additional coordination comes at additional costs and may
payments for ecosystems services. increase problems of democratic control and accountability (Meijerink
Furthermore, the interplay between governance modes and between and Huitema, 2014), as the experience with river basin organizations
formal and informal institutions may not always be purposefully de- has shown. In case of river basin organizations, problems of fit between
signed but may arise from the co-existence of different governance natural resources and administrative boundaries have often been solved
processes. The implementation of formal provisions for river restoration at the expense of problems of interplay and increased transaction costs
may, for example, be supported by voluntary community-based activ- arising from the interplay between different administrative levels (Moss
ities for nature protection. Creating and nurturing such synergies is the et al., 2003; Moss, 2012).
goal of many participatory processes in policy implementation. On the basis of the preceding elaborations we stated the following
Based on the preceding elaborations we stated the following guiding guiding hypotheses:
hypotheses:
• H4A: Misfit between interdependencies among ecosystem services
• H3A: The absence of clear dominance of one governance mode (resource) uses and coordination (structures and processes) leads to
supports the synergistic interplay between governance modes which sustainability deficits. Such deficits can be remedied by coordina-
increases the effectiveness of coordination processes. tion tailored to reducing misfit.
• H3B: The absence of dominance of one governance mode in formal • H4B: However, coordination processes that match ES inter-
provisions supports the absence of dominance of one governance dependencies and thus increase fit increase also transaction costs.
mode in governance processes.
5. STEER framework – operationalization
4.4. Ecosystem services approach
The framework has been further operationalized into a set of vari-
Ecosystems are recognized for their essential services to human life
ables and a set of analytical protocols. This operationalization was
and the functional aspects of ecosystems that support these services
guided by the hypotheses introduced in chapter 3 and, furthermore, by
(MA, 2005c; Daily, 1997). Many environmental problems arise from
a set of supporting hypotheses and assumptions that are listed in the
negligence or ignorance of the role of vital ecosystem services and the
supplementary material (Tables S1 and S2). Fig. 3 represents all first-,
implications of overexploiting some services, thereby eroding the
second-, and third-tier variables4 . Not all variables are relevant for all
functional base of others and potentially generating new sources of
empirical studies. The choice of variables depends on the research focus
environmental hazards (MA, 2005a).
and the conditions that are encountered in a specific case study. The
In water governance and management systems, overwhelming em-
statement of individual hypotheses is based on the assumption that
phasis has been given to provisioning services, whereas regulating and
social-ecological systems are decomposable into different parts. Table
supporting services and the requirements for maintaining them have
S1 also shows, for each hypothesis, a causal diagram that includes a
been largely ignored for a long time (MA, 2005b; Russi et al., 2013).
representation of the interdependencies of all relevant variables ac-
Provisioning services, such as water supply for irrigation, provide the
cording to the relationships formulated in the hypothesis. In the fol-
most direct socio-economic benefits. Correspondingly, governance and
lowing, some representative causal diagrams will be discussed in more
management systems have evolved around their exploitation to guar-
detail to illustrate the logic and different levels of the analyses. Fur-
antee and regulate access to these services. Ineffective governance
thermore, the potential and limitations of the assumption of decom-
systems and ignorance of complex interdependencies have often led to
posability will be discussed from a more critical perspective.
ineffective use and overexploitation of some provisioning services to
Fig. 4 shows a combination of the causal diagrams for hypotheses
the detriment of the overall integrity of ecological systems, with long-
H1A and H1B on the role of polycentric governance systems that are
term negative consequences for human well-being (Howe et al., 2014).
characterized by the combination of decentralization of decision
Trade-offs between provisioning and regulating services arise for ex-
making power and the presence of institutional settings supporting
ample from intense agricultural production (Elmqvist et al., 2011). The
coordination. The clear distinction between variables related to struc-
production of food, fiber or biofuel depends on and affects the provision
ture, process and outcome allows a refined representation of causal
of freshwater. Regulating services such as water purification or
pathways. This is illustrated for coordination. A distinction is made
groundwater retention may be for example severely impeded by agri-
between formal provisions for coordination (G2), processes that support
cultural activities (Pahl-Wostl, 2019a). A decline in regulating services
coordination (P2) and coordination outcomes (O1). It seems to be quite
but also direct pollution may lead to negative impacts on the provision
evident to assume that formal provisions for coordination (G2) support
of freshwater, not only for agriculture but also for drinking water
coordination in practice (P2). However, on the one hand the latter may
supply. Interdependencies between services are often complex and are
not be limited to the implementation of formal coordination instru-
found on different spatial and temporal scales. Negative impacts may be
ments. Coordination in practice could for example arise as well from
felt only after considerable time lags and spatially dislocated from the
informal platforms and actor networks engaging in joint knowledge
activities causing them. Such interdependencies cause considerable
production. On the other hand, formal instrumens for coordination may
challenges for water governance. Coordination structures that do not
exist, but they may not be implemented. P2 thus embraces all processes
match ecological interdependencies reduce the sustainability of re-
(formal and informal) that facilitate and provide opportunities for co-
source use. In such situations, one can talk of a misfit between inter-
ordination. However, the mere existence of coordination opportunities,
dependencies of actors mediated by ecosystem services interactions and
be they formal or non-formal, does not automatically lead to positive
social interactions that would allow addressing such interdependencies.
coordination and cooperation results (O1), such as joint cross-sectoral
A lack of social-ecological fit makes governance difficult (Bodin et al.,
implementation plans or cooperation in implementing measures. The
2014). If any interconnected ecological system (also embracing dif-
ferent resources such as land and water) is managed independently by
different sectors, the governing structure is not well aligned with the 4
e.g. 1st-tier variable context, 2nd-tier variable C1 Environmental context, 3rd-
structure of the ecosystem. In this case ecological costs are occurring tier variable C1.1. Hydrological Variability

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production. In this region, incoherencies between energy and en-

vironmental policies have foiled successes of years of voluntary co-
ordination between the drinking water sector and agriculture in a
polycentric governance system (Franz et al., 2018; Pahl-Wostl, 2019b;
Meergans and Lenschow, 2018).
The hypotheses listed in Table S1 state a whole range of factors and
pathways of influence on coordination and cooperation. This does not
imply that all pathways are of equal importance and act at the same
time in different cases and different contexts. Hence, combining all the
different factors and causal pathways in one diagram would lead to
quite a misleading representation. The focus on individual hypotheses
strengthens the analytical precision and provides guidance to a struc-
tured approach of analysis. Understanding what happens in one case
and, in particular, understanding differences between cases very likely
requires the consideration of further factors. One objective of an ex-
tended comparative case study analysis would be to identify different
pathways and combinations of factors (necessary and sufficient condi-
tions) that support or prevent effective coordination, a phenomenon
that is also called equifinality (Ragin, 1987; Pahl-Wostl and Knieper,
2014).
Fig. 4. Causal diagram based on hypotheses H1A and H1B on polycentric
governance systems (G = Governance structure, P = Process, O = Outcome).
6. A trandisciplinary diagnostic approach
hypothesis states that the effectiveness of coordinations processes (i.e.,
the achievement of positive coordination results) depends also on de- The STEER approach describes and analyses the context and the
centralization, i.e. the degree of autonomy of different governance units determinants of the effectiveness of water governance and management
at different levels. Polycentric governance systems are assumed to be in detail. Factors whose interaction are believed to explain the effec-
characterized by the synergistic interplay between P1 and P2 (Pahl- tiveness of governance are captured as specific manifestations of vari-
Wostl and Knieper, 2014). Making a distinction between the different ables. The operationalization of these variables have been guided by an
pathways of influence allows sharpening the diagnostic strength of the overarching conceptual framework. Such an approach allows a com-
approach. It allows identifying critical factors of influence and prior- parative analaysis of cases in which corresponding factors manifest
itizing measures for intervention. differently. In particular, it supports a structured analysis of case-spe-
However, as already indicated, it may often be required to combine cific constellations of the context and decisive aspects of the governance
different hypotheses to explain findings in a case study setting. An ex- and management system, without falling into an interpretation that
ample is provided in Fig. 5, which shows a causal diagram integrating characterizes a case as unique (Basurto and Nenadovic, 2012; Cox,
hypotheses H1A, H1B and H2B. H2B states that policy incoherence 2011; Ostrom and Cox, 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012). Such a diag-
hinders (1) de facto coordination and (2) reduces the effectiveness of nostic procedure makes it possible to derive proposals for improvement
coordination processes (i.e. the achievement of positive results). The by means of a systematic comparison of different case constellations
two pathways indicated by the hypothesis are represented by the ar- and their results (see Fig. 6).
rows labelled with (1) and (2). An example for such a constellation has The quality of the diagnosis as an instrument of analysis increases
been provided by a case in Northern Germany with a long tradition of with the number of comparable cases. Fig. 6 shows a schematic re-
intensive livestock production and more recently increasing biogas presentation of the essential components of the transdiscieplinary
STEER approach. The figure shows that the approach entails one

Fig. 5. Causal diagram adding the relationships stated in hypotheses H2B to the interdependencies represented in Fig. 4.

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C. Pahl-Wostl, et al. Environmental Science and Policy 107 (2020) 23–35

Fig. 6. Essential components of the transdisciplinary diagnostic STEER approach.

component that is more science-based (i.e. guided by the conceptual 7. Concluding comments
framework) and one that is of a more participatory nature (i.e. guided
by stakeholder perceptions). In a participatory process, action strategies The paper presents a comprehensive conceptual framework to ad-
are identified based on a diagnosis of the causal connections in a case dress complex coordination challenges in water governance and man-
study. As indicated in Fig. 6, the diagnostic approach is an iterative agement as part of the transdisciplinary diagnostic STEER approach. A
process. The comparative analysis of further experiences in other case coherent approach and formalized representation across individual
studies continuously improves the comprehension of the complex re- cases is essential to develop cumulative knowledge and to improve the
lationships and the fit of solution approaches. The fact that the STEER diagnostic strength of the approach, which combines comparative
approach has a science-based and a participatory component is a analyses with a solution-oriented participatory approach to support
challenge since a science-based conceptual framework aims at ensuring transformative change. The framework can find more widespread ap-
comparability of insights among cases, whereas participatory processes plication in supporting comparative case study analyses with a focus on
emphasize case-specific aspects. The conceptual framework should improving the understanding of policy implementation also beyond the
guide and enable comparisons across case studies while allowing for a field of water governance and management.
diagnosis and therapy tailored to case-specific aspects. In the terminology of Ostrom (2005), the work presented here
The use of the terms diagnosis and therapy suggests proximity to the comprises a framework and a set of theories. In a paper describing a
field of medical treatment. Such an analogy could be considered too revision of the SES framework, McGinnis and Ostrom (2014) argue:
farfetched. Indeed, one can hardly compare decisions related to diag- “Frameworks organize diagnostic, descriptive, and prescriptive inquiry. A
nosis and therapy of an individual patient with the complex decision theory posits specific causal relationships among core variables. In contrast,
making processes in water governance and management. Furthermore, a model constitutes a more detailed manifestation of a general theoretical
the relationship between doctor and patient in medical treatment is explanation in terms of the functional relationships among independent and
quite different from the relationship between scientists and actors in dependent variables important in a particular setting.”
water management practice and policy. Nevertheless, one can also However, no framework is entirely independent of theories, of as-
identify some similarities. In both fields, scientific analyses aim at sumptions on relationships between core variables (Binder et al., 2013).
searching for general explanatory principles and transferability of in- Hence, this paper makes explicit the hypotheses that have led to the
sights from one case to another. At the same time, the importance of multi-tier framework presented in Fig. 3. This collection of hypotheses
context-specific individual factors needs to be acknowledged. The more is now out for being tested. This might include refinement, rejection or
complex the problem, the more importance context-specific factors may stating alternative relationships. We would like to emphasize that the
gain in the diagnosis and in particular in developing and implementing usefulness of such a set of hypotheses for guiding empirical analyses is
solution strategies. In the field of water governance and management, not mainly to produce statements that are true or false. Most often,
our current knowledge base is far too limited to make any informed empirical results will confirm or reject a hypothesis under certain
statement in this respect. conditions only, which will lead to more refined statements. However, a
By focusing on the implementation and regional level, the STEER major contribution lies in a structured approach to analysing a complex
approach can also make a valuable contribution to the implementation phenomenon. The set of hypotheses provides guidance for navigating
of SDG target 6.5 on IWRM. The STEER approach offers a precise the complex network of interdependencies in social-ecological systems.
strategy to assess gaps that allows for a more targeted analysis of needs A start in this respect has been made by the STEER project. The
for action and improvement. As such, it presents an option for countries framework has been applied to structured data collection and analysis
to (voluntarily) complement the IWRM assessment based on SDG in- in six in-depth case studies in Germany, Spain, South Africa, Mongolia
dicator 6.5.1 by an in-depth and action-oriented effectiveness analysis. and Iran. A further set of case studies uses a simplified data collection

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