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Advances in African Economic,
Social and Political Development

Everisto Benyera Editor

Africa and
the Fourth
Industrial
Revolution
Curse or Cure?
Advances in African Economic, Social and
Political Development

Series Editors
Diery Seck, CREPOL - Center for Research on Political Economy, Dakar, Senegal
Juliet U. Elu, Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA, USA
Yaw Nyarko, New York University, New York, NY, USA
Africa is emerging as a rapidly growing region, still facing major challenges, but
with a potential for significant progress – a transformation that necessitates vigorous
efforts in research and policy thinking. This book series focuses on three intricately
related key aspects of modern-day Africa: economic, social and political develop-
ment. Making use of recent theoretical and empirical advances, the series aims to
provide fresh answers to Africa’s development challenges. All the socio-political
dimensions of today’s Africa are incorporated as they unfold and new policy options
are presented. The series aims to provide a broad and interactive forum of science at
work for policymaking and to bring together African and international researchers
and experts. The series welcomes monographs and contributed volumes for an
academic and professional audience, as well as tightly edited conference proceed-
ings. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to, economic policy and trade,
regional integration, labor market policies, demographic development, social issues,
political economy and political systems, and environmental and energy issues.
All titles in the series are peer-reviewed. The book series is indexed by Scopus.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/11885

Everisto Benyera
Editor

Africa and the Fourth

Industrial Revolution
Curse or Cure?

123
Editor
Everisto Benyera
Department of Political Sciences
University of South Africa
Pretoria, Gauteng, South Africa

ISSN 2198-7262 ISSN 2198-7270 (electronic)

Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development
ISBN 978-3-030-87523-7 ISBN 978-3-030-87524-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87524-4
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Contents

On the Elusiveness of Epistemic Freedom in Africa and the Need

to Unmask the Colonial Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Everisto Benyera
Race and Robotics: Black Theology in the Digital Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Hlulani Mdingi
University 4.0: A Conceptual Model for South African Universities
and the Fourth Industrial Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Lizette Wessels and Jo-Ansie van Wyk
Against the Grain: The Tragedy of Zimbabwe in the Context
of 4IR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Umali Saidi
Africa and the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Turning a Curse
into a Resource Through the Prism of Human Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Ndikumana David Emmanuel
Rising to the Occasion: Africa, the Fourth Industrial Revolution
and Lessons from China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Torque Mude, Sadiki Maeresera, and Tafadzwa Clementine Maramura
Survival of African Governments in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Elvin Shava
The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Africa: A Cure Which Kills
the Patient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Everisto Benyera

v
Editor and Contributors

About the Editor

Everisto Benyera Ph.D. is Associate Professor of African Politics in the

Department of Political Sciences at the University of South Africa in Pretoria,
South Africa. He holds a doctorate in African Politics from the same university. He
researches and publishes on community-based non-state transitional justice, human
rights, transitology, and decoloniality. He has worked and researched in Zimbabwe,
South Africa, Namibia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He has three edited
books, 18 chapters, and 13 peer-reviewed journal articles. His books are: (1) 2021.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution and (Re)colonisation of Africa: Coloniality of
Data, London: Routledge; (2) 2020. (ed.) Breaking the Colonial “Contract”: From
Oppression to Autonomous Decolonial Futures, New York: Lexington; (3) (ed.)
2020. Reimagining Justice, Human Rights and Leadership in Africa Challenging
Discourse and Searching for Alternative Paths, Cham: Springer; and (4) 2019. (ed.)
Indigenous, Traditional, and Non-State Transitional Justice in Southern Africa:
Namibia and Zimbabwe, New York: Lexington. He is Editor of Politeia—The
Journal of Political Sciences and Public Administration and Associate Editor of
Strategic Review for Southern Africa.

Contributors

Everisto Benyera University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa

Ndikumana David Emmanuel Mzumbe Univesirty, Mzumbe, Tanzania
Sadiki Maeresera Institute of Strategic Research and Analysis, Zimbabwe
National Defence University, Harare, Zimbabwe
Tafadzwa Clementine Maramura University of the Free State, Bloemfontein,
South Africa

vii
viii Editor and Contributors

Hlulani Mdingi Faculty of Theology and Religion, Department of Systematic and

Historical Theology, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
Torque Mude Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe
Umali Saidi Midlands State Universirty, Senga Road, Gweru, Zimbabwe
Elvin Shava School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy,
College of Business & Economics, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park,
Kingsway Campus, Johannesburg, South Africa
Lizette Wessels Department of Library and Information Services, University of
South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa
Jo-Ansie van Wyk Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa,
Pretoria, South Africa
On the Elusiveness of Epistemic
Freedom in Africa and the Need
to Unmask the Colonial Contract

Everisto Benyera

Abstract The chapter lays the foundation for the book by broadly exploring what
Africa needs to do in order for it to turn the Fourth Industrial Revolution from being
a curse just like the past three Industrial Revolutions into a resource. Three key
components for turning the 4IR from being a curse into a resource are identified.
These are (1) ethical leadership, (2) just leadership and (3) epistemic freedom. The
chapter calls for masking the colonial contract using epistemic freedom as the first
step in ensuring that Africa looks after its national interests. Africa’s national
interests are its: (1) human capital, (2) natural capital, (3) social capital, (4) epis-
temic capital and (5) financial and built capital. Safeguarding these five capitals is a
key component in pushing back the five monopolies of colonialism and capitalism
which are monopoly over: (1) war and weapons, (2) finance, (3) natural resources,
(4) technology and (5) the media. In using epistemic independence, Africa will be
seeking to gain control of its political and economic autonomy which is important
in ensuring that the continent benefits equitably from the 4IR.

1 Introduction

In this chapter, I respond to the cardinal question: how can Africa use the Fourth
Industrial Revolution (4IR) as an opportunity to extricate itself from coloniality?
Two leading questions can be asked here: what was the fate of Africa in the past
three Industrial Revolutions and what can Africa do in order to benefit from the 4IR
and in the process use it as a vehicle for solving the African problem? Secondly,
what is the African problem which we intend to solve using the 4IR? The short
answer is that since attaining political independence, most of Africa was ruled by
pseudo-nationalist who while blindfolding their followers was in the service of
coloniality. That is what has been variously termed state capture (Grzymala-Busse
2008), executive impunity (Benyera 2015; Benyera et al. 2020; Mamdani 2002),

E. Benyera (&)
1 Preller Street, Muckleneuk, Pretoria 0003, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

E. Benyera (ed.), Africa and the Fourth Industrial Revolution,
Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87524-4_1
2 E. Benyera

corruption (Knutsen et al. 2016; Meagher 2014; Saunders 2014), extroverted

economies (Amin 1997; Benyera et al. 2020), dictatorships (Hall et al. 2018;
Masango 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012), military juntas (Decalo 1986; Fanon 1983;
Khadiagala 1995; Riedl 2014; Tendi 2013), military coups (Benyera 2017; Fako
2007; Japhet 1978; McGowan 2003; McGowan and Johnson 1986; Welch 1982;
Wells 1974), failed states (Englebert and Tull 2008; Di John 2011; Mazrui 1986;
Nay 2013; Richmond 2013; Rotberg 2010a, b; van Wyk 2007) and other host of
symptoms of this disease. Stated differently, the African problem is that of colo-
niality, lack of epistemic freedom and a leadership which is not ethical and just.
These problems play out within the gamut of the western model of the state which
is imposed on Africa as part of the colonial processes.
What does Africa lack? For the west, Africa lacks everything. Grosfoguel
captures this well-designed strategy to portray Africa as a place on omnipresent,
perpetual deficits.
European/Euro-American colonial expansion and domination was able to construct a
hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge and, thus, of superior and inferior people
around the world. We went from the sixteenth century characterization of “people without
writing” to the eighteenth and nineteenth-century characterization of “people without his-
tory,” to the twentieth-century characterization of “people without development” and more
recently, to the early twenty-first century of “people without democracy”. We went from the
sixteenth century “rights of people” (Sepúlveda versus de las Casas debate in the University
of Salamanca in the mid-sixteenth century), to the eighteenth-century “rights of man”
(Enlightenment philosophers), and to the late twentieth-century “human rights. (Grosfoguel
2007:214)

Having designed a strategy to portray Africa as a place of lack, the abundance

side of Africa was left open to looting. After all, how can Euro North Americans
steal from such poor people. For Africans, the most important side of the story that
Euro North America carefully omitted was that Africa is a place of plenty. Africa
has plenty natural resources, human capital, freshwater, human diversity, wildlife,
mineral resources, civilisations, etc. After all, it is these ‘plenties’ which attracted
Euro North Americans to Africa initially as hunters, missionaries, traders and
explorers. Stated inversely, it is the poverty and omnipresent lacks which drove
colonialists from the discomfort of their homes to come and steal, enslave and
decivilise Africa. The magnitude of the crimes committed by the empire in the
colonies tells a true story about the magnitude of the crises they were facing back
home. For the empire, colonialism was a do or die affair.
Another important background as Africa enters the 4IR is that of colonialism as
a duress contract. Portrayed is a duress contract, and the argument is that this
contract must be unpacked and unmasked in order for Africa to enter into the 4IR at
least on an equal footing with other members of the international community.
Colonialism is a duress contract which was sealed in blood, delivered through
genocides and epistemic sides. This fact of history must be accepted uncondi-
tionally as it forms a key part of attaining epistemic freedom in Africa. Arguing for
the pursuing of epistemic freedom in Africa, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes
On the Elusiveness of Epistemic Freedom in Africa … 3

Epistemic Freedom in Africa is about the struggle for African people to think, theorize,
interpret the world and write from where they are located, unencumbered… Thus epistemic
freedom speaks to cognitive justice. Epistemic freedom is fundamentally about the right to
think, theorize, interpret the world, develop own methodologies and write from where one
is located and unencumbered by Eurocentrism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018b:1&3).

Unmasking the colonial contract is a key aspect of fighting coloniality.

Coloniality is the continued existence of symmetrical power relations between the
former colonisers and the former colonised, and it is the infrastructure of colo-
nialism which continues to deliver the colonial mandate long after the official end of
colonialism. If the colonial infrastructure remains intact, Africa will suffer the fate
to that which it suffered in the past three Industrial Revolutions which were
enslavement, colonialism, linguicides, cultural imperialism and general alienation
in international relations. It is not an exaggeration to argue that today Africa is
treated like a pupil, a stepchild or even an imbecile.

2 The Elusiveness of Epistemic Freedom in Africa

What key challenges will face Africa is it in the 4IR? First and foremost, the
elusiveness of epistemic freedom is a key hindrance to Africa’s autonomous par-
ticipation in the 4IR. Without epistemic freedom, Africa will participate in the 4IR
as what Achille Mbembe termed a provincialised Africa by the (former) colonisers
(Mbembe 2011). This is an existential phenomenon, wherein African countries are
taken as extensions of their (former) colonisers, a continued source of labour (brain
drain), raw materials and other necessities of the 4IR and life in the Global North.
The economies of the Global North are underwritten by Africa, and their ‘aid’ and
foreign direct investment are a small fraction of the massive benefits which they
continue to reap from Africa. Their colonial investments continue to pay off even
after the official end of colonialism. This is the crux of what has come to be known
coloniality. But what is epistemic freedom and why is it so important for Africa in
the 4IR? Ndlovu-Gatsheni postulates both the meaning and importance of epistemic
freedom.
Thus the triple processes of provincializing Europe, deprovincializing Africa and episte-
mological decolonization which frame this book constitute a drive for a restorative epis-
temic agenda and process that simultaneously addresses ontological and epistemological
issues haunting Africa. … Thus epistemic freedom speaks to cognitive justice. Epistemic
freedom is fundamentally about the right to think, theorize, interpret the world, develop
own methodologies and write from where one is located and unencumbered by
Eurocentrism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018a:3).

I address the issue of epistemic freedom and its relevance to the 4IR in chapter
eight of this book. The 4IR is non-negotiable, and as Africa enters into this dis-
pensation, there are two broad options: to enter the 4IR in manner which turns this
moment into a resource and to have the 4IR become another curse on Africa just
4 E. Benyera

like the past three Industrial Revolutions. The most desired position is for Africa to
use the 4IR as a resource and use it to solve ‘the African problem’.
The preceding section proposed three prerequisites for Africa to participate
autonomously and independently in the 4IR. These are: firstly, seeking and
attaining epistemic independence; secondly, by having just leadership; and thirdly,
by having ethical leadership. Independence of thought, just and ethical leadership
are a sine qua non for Africa to benefit from the 4IR. Whether it is in the agri-
cultural sector where Africa suffers from perennial food shortages, or it is in the
quality of life, where Africans have one of the lowest qualities of life in the world,
or the issue of justice where Africans have suffered some of the most persistent
deep and long injustices in the world, epistemic independence, just and ethical
leadership remain overarching priorities for Africa. Injustices suffered by Africans
include being enslaved, colonised, scientifically experimented upon, genocides and
epistemicides. In order to solve these and many other problems that Africa faces
today and faced in the past, there is need for the right leadership which is auton-
omous, especially one that is autonomous from the West and the East, i.e. auton-
omous from the (former) colonisers on the one hand and Russia and China on the
other hand.
This is not a call for Africa to isolate itself in the 4IR, but a call for Africa to
think and act from Africa and for Africans. Today, Africa thinks from various
places such as but not limited to France for Francophone countries, the UK for
Anglophone Africa, from Portugal for Lusophony Africa and variously from
Russia, China, the USA and rarely from Johannesburg, Lusaka, Kinshasa or Addis
Ababa. In this regard, the greatest threats to Africa in the 4IR are the local elites,
their cartels and networks which were aptly characterised by Artwell Nhemachena
as networks of coloniality (Nhemachena 2018). The rationale for colonialism was
not the occupation of the land but the occupation of the episteme and setting up of
colonial networks resulting in the nefarious coloniality of networks and networks of
coloniality. So devastating are networks of coloniality that Nhemachena noted.
Colonisation was about the establishment of imperial networks. Networks of imperial
academies were created; networks of imperial polities were established; networks of
imperial economies were established; networks of imperial health institutions were estab-
lished; networks of imperial armies were established; networks of imperial communication
were established. Networks were and are central to neo imperialism (Nhemachena 2018:1).

Local elites have mastered the art of misrepresenting and appropriation. They
misrepresent the problems of the majority as if they are their own problems and end
up being the sole local beneficiaries of the (post)colony as testified by the luxurious
lives they live and the many millions of dollars which they stashed in offshore
accounts. They are also good at appropriating local resources in a manner which
can only be classified as primitive accumulation. There are African elites who are
richer than the countries which they lead. This is financial gluttony at its best.
Devoid of epistemic freedom, an ethical and just leadership which thinks from
and for Africa, the 4IR will become a curse unto Africa. The many 4IR-related
technologies will not be used to eradicate tropical diseases, end poverty, enhance
On the Elusiveness of Epistemic Freedom in Africa … 5

food security and hold leaders to account. On the contrary, the 4IR will be another
avenue for the local elites to loot Africa and enrich themselves. The rare earth
minerals that are predominantly found in Africa will certainly be a key target for
these local elites to loot. In order to protect themselves from both local and global
citizens, local elites usually connive with foreign multinational corporations with
whom they enter into clandestine agreements, wherein the local elites are protected
from accountability by foreign governments in exchange for certain resources
which these companies will then ruthlessly extract from Africa. It is a typical
win-win scenario for the local elites and the foreign multinational corporations and
their governments. This is the highest form of injustice which Africans suffer and
will continue to suffer if the leadership trajectory does not change. How then do
Africans change the leadership trajectory of their continent?
One of the greatest colonial heists ever pulled by the colonisers was to the theft
of Africa’s history, to borrow from Goody (2009), and with it Africa’s episte-
mologies. The real essence of the colonial project was not to occupy the land, but to
displace African epistemologies and replace them with those of the colonisers.
Using the epistemologies of the colonisers as the premise for Africa’s thought
processes became a form of coloniality of being, hence the continued asymmetrical
power relations between the (former) colonised and the (former) colonisers long
after the physical departure of the colonisers. Stated differently, the greatest
achievement of colonialism was to embed the colonial logic into the African
mentality so that this logic became self-reproducing and normal.
The indelible mark of the coloniser is omnipresent in Africa (Mtapuri and
Benyera 2019). It is visible in African cultures, laws, education and even identity,
with Africans accepting labels such as Lusophone Africans, Francophone Africans,
Anglophone Africans or some other colonially acquired identities. Besides per-
petuating coloniality, the continued use of these colonially created identities and
identity markers retards continental unity which is a prerequisite for Africa’s
autonomous participation in the 4IR. The expectation was that with the attainment
of political independence, the first thing that Africans would do was to shade off the
colonially inscribed identities and divisions. This failed when the nationalists,
referred to as the Monrovia bloc, prevailed over the continentalists, also known as
the Casablanca bloc or the Brazzaville bloc (Uzoigwe 2014). The failure of the
continentalists to prevail is attributable to the lack of epistemic freedom in Africa.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni rightly pointed to epistemic freedom as the right type of
freedom for Africa to seek first ahead of all others such as but not limited to
political and economic freedom (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018a). The idea of sequencing
freedoms such as that political freedom is acquired first, followed by economic
freedom, and then epistemic freedom has failed such that epistemic freedom must
be sought urgently and immediately, Ndlovu-Gatsheni rightly posits. Armed with
epistemic freedom, some of the symptoms of the problems of the (post)colony
which have been mistaken for the problems will be solvable. However, epistemic
freedom alone is not adequate to drive Africa forward in the 4IR, and it needs to be
complemented with a just and ethical leadership.
6 E. Benyera

3 The Need for Just, Ethical Leadership and Epistemic

Freedom in Africa

We have to admit that Africa lacks something. Africa lacks three cardinal things:
(1) just leadership, (2) ethical leadership and (3) epistemic freedom (Benyera et al.
2020; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018b). Generally, Africa lacks intellectuals and philoso-
phers who think for and from Africa.
The absence of epistemic freedom in Africa has been well explored in leader-
ship, and its position as a sine qua non for Africa’s autonomous development was
well argued (Benyera et al. 2020; Fernandes 2018; Hinchliffe 2018;
Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018b, c; Velleman 2016). Suffice to mention that the chief
causality of the absence of epistemic freedom in Africa is that Africa’s most bril-
liant minds are among those educated in the Global North. Upon their return to
Africa and elsewhere in the Global South, they become a kind of native informers
as they act as extensions of the Global North’s epistemologies. When it comes to
leadership in Africa, the Global North will generally support such western educated
elites to lead Africa. This was the case with the presidency in Ivory Coast when
Alessandro Ouattara, a former World Bank technocrat, was supported by the Global
North to assume the leadership of that country after the demise of Laurent Gbagbo.
When these western educated elites return to Africa, their preferred interventions
are western-centric because that is all they know. This exacerbates Africa's
marginality in the global economy as this entrenches coloniality. In the absence of
the three, any economic intervention presented as developing Africa will actually be
pacifying Africans while continuing to benefit the (former) colonisers. This
includes the Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and many other
forms of what Zambian economist Moyo (2009) termed dead aid and the resultant
international and domestic debt accumulated by Africa over years. African leaders
who lack epistemic freedoms resort to borrowing as their default management and
leadership style. They borrow money, ideas, technology and even solutions to local
problems. With Africa still stuck in the political independence euphoria, and with
economic independence seemingly drifting away each year, what can Africa do on
these two fronts. Remember, the colonial strategy was to steadily release political
power while simultaneously and proportionally increasing their stranglehold on
economic power. The result is that Africa has governments in office and as opposed
to the desired governments in power.

4 What is to be Done: Political Power or Economic

Power?

Besides the seeking and attainment of epistemic freedom, just and ethical leader-
ship, attention must be paid to Africa's political and economic independence.
Specifically, which of the two must Africa prioritise and what is the proper
On the Elusiveness of Epistemic Freedom in Africa … 7

sequencing between political and economic independence. Stated differently,

should Africa seek political power or economic power first? The simple answer is
that both must be attained simultaneously if it is possible. The idea behind getting
political independence was that it will then enable Africans to get economic
independence. With economic independence and political independence, Africa
must then seek epistemic freedom. As the 4IR unfolds, Africa is still stuck in the
political independence mode, with some even arguing that Africa’s political inde-
pendence was undermined and eroded by the Global North and its nefarious
institutions such that it can safely be stated that Africa no longer has political
independence. For Africa, political power is good, but economic power is better,
while epistemic independence is best.
With economic power, it is easy to control politics. But with political power, it is
very difficult to control economics. The primacy of economics over politics is why
the decolonisation processes did not deliver total and autonomous independence for
Africa. When the colonisers realised this logic, they quickly entrenched themselves
in the economics of Africa while giving up political power. The first port of call
must therefore be economics and not politics. The control of economics over
politics is why the white minority can continue to control the black majority. People
with economic power are more respected than those with political power. The same
goes to countries where countries with economic power are more respected. After
all, every country has political power, although some have more than others.
At a practical level and by way of example, when confronted with a problem,
people with political power and no economic power resort to marching and handing
over petitions. Those with economic power will never march and demonstrate or
throw stones, and they deploy their economic power to get the decisions which they
want.
Once Africa is in control of its economy, it can easily control and manage its
politics. Without political and economic control, Africa’s democracy is sponsored
and underwritten by other governments, thereby creating fertile conditions for
(re)colonisation. With the control of the economy, it is much easier to end political
interference. But with political power, ending economic interference is almost
impossible, more so given the nature in which the capitalist world economy is
globalised, borderless and very integrated. With economic freedom in Africa in the
4IR, there will be no room for dead aid, Structural Adjustment Programs, begging
for foreign direct investments and being subjected to endless economic sanctions.
Stated crudely, it is money that controls politics and not politics which controls
money. Once in control of both politics and the economy, Africa can then use its
economic and political power to build strong institutions. One of the biggest
challenges facing Africa is that (post)colonial African statecraft was built on strong
men (males) and not strong institutions. It is institutions which must be resilient and
not politicians and citizens.
State institutions must be built on ethical grounds. They must also respond to
local problems and be based on local epistemologies. This includes the contentious
issue of what form of education and curriculum is right for Africa. With epistemic
and ontological autonomy, Africans must use their locus of enunciation to define
8 E. Benyera

their problems and design the solutions. The current problems with Africa are that
local problems are solved using imported methods and epistemologies. A simple
example is the abuse of Marxism as a solution to many of Africa's theoretical and
existential problems. Karl Marx and Frederick Angels never visited Africa. Their
theories were never intended to solve African problems.

5 Towards Active Citizenry in Africa

A lot has been said and written about Africa's fit in the 4IR (Ayentimi and Burgess
2019; Knott-Craig 2018; Markowitz 2019; Nalubega and Uwizeyimana 2019;
Naudé 2017). The current diagnosis is important because it enables the right pre-
scriptions to be made. The summary presented in this book is that Africa suffers
from coloniality and the lack of epistemic independence. The solution to Africa’s
coloniality problems is therefore to be found in seeking first and foremost epistemic
independence. But how do we seek and obtain epistemic independence in Africa?
The most efficacious way of seeking, establishing and maintaining epistemic
independence is through active citizenry. I postulate active citizenry is a panacea to
Africa’s lack of epistemic independence for the reasons outlined below.
The deployment of active citizenry is the best decolonial way of getting back
Africa’s epistemic independence. Active citizenry is the best way for Africa to
claim its epistemic independence because it is useful in undoing the damages done
by coloniality, especially coloniality of being and coloniality of knowledge. But
what is active citizenry? Like most concept, active citizenry is a very contested
term. For Bryony Hoskins, active citizenry
… is frequently used to describe citizens that engage in a broad range of activities that
promote and sustain democracy. These actions include civil society activities such as
protesting and collecting petitions, community activities such as volunteering, and con-
ventional political engagement such as voting or campaigning for elections. In addition to
participation, there is a normative value element to active citizenship. Active citizenship
usually refers to participation that requires respect for others and that does not contravene
human rights and democracy (Hoskins 2014).

Active citizenry belongs to one of Verba and Almond’s the three main political
cultures: parochial political culture, subject and participatory political culture
(Verba and Almond 1963). It is part of participation political culture in the opposite
of subject political culture in which citizens are not active participants in the
political processes of their polity. Active citizenry restores the agency of local
communities and in the process empowering them and presenting them not as a
problem to be solved but as communities with problems which they can solve. The
other added advantages of active citizenry are that it ensures fairness and inclu-
sivity, thereby addressing the challenges of social coercion and equity.
Firstly and foremost, the state which is the main problem in post-colonial Africa
is a colonial creation, created to enforce colonial desires and still working to
achieve and maintain colonial objectives such as but not limited to keeping Africa
On the Elusiveness of Epistemic Freedom in Africa … 9

as a marginalised and subjugated member of the international community. Since the

problem is the western model of the state which was imposed on Africa together
with its characteristics such as divisiveness, a paradigm of war and survival of the
fittest, solutions to the African problem must be outside of the state. I characterise
the state in Africa is a poisoned chalice, the proverbial fruit from the poisoned tree
from which nothing good emanates.
Secondary active citizenry allows for bottom-up grass-roots-based initiatives that
do not need any interpretation or contextualisation. Some of these locally based
solutions to the African problem are based on the everyday modes of living of the
most affected communities. These mechanisms, systems and epistemologies were
crowded out by epistemologies of the Global North as part of the colonial pro-
cesses. Generalised, demonised or adulterated, African indigenous solutions to
African problems have never found application in the solving of the African
problem. Africa is endowed with a lot of solutions such as how to farm in arid
regions, how to solve conflicts at community level without involving the state, how
to preserve seed varieties in order to attain food sovereignty, alignment between
local soils with climate, food requirements and seed varieties being planted, an
education system which teaches local communities to master their environment for
the mutual benefit of humanity and nature, etc.
Linked to the above is that local epistemologies otherwise broadly known as
epistemologies of the Global South are easily acceptable by local communities
because they are not an imposition, communities are familiar with them and most
importantly they have proved to be efficacious. The beauty of epistemic freedom
through active citizenry is that it will crowd out a lot of imposed and important
solutions which hitherto have helped only to exacerbate the African problem.
Without running the risk of romanticising Africa’s pre-colonial past, one of the key
lessons that we learn from that period was the manner in which ordinary citizens
were able to hold political and military leaders to account. There is even a saying
that a king is a king because of the people. Ordinary citizens had a direct voice in
how they were governed.
This epistemology was one of the major casualties of the colonial project as it
placed the local political elites and the colonial administrators out of reach of the
ordinary citizens. It became a taboo for citizens to ask for accountability from the
grass roots going up. Accountability since the colonial times has always been
top-down. Citizens are the ones that are now accountable to the leaders and not the
other way around. This mocks the idea of being public servants as they long ceased
to be public servants but public enslavers. We need to return to a period when
citizens used to hold their political leaders accountable.
If Africa is to turn the 4IR into a resource, there is need for a two-way
accountability mechanism: one where the citizens are accountable to the political
leaders and the other where political leaders are accountable to the citizens. Citizens
must be active in their own administration and must cease from being passive
recipients of political orders. Local communities using whatever leadership struc-
tures exist on the grass roots must hold to account the nearest political leader, be it a
counsellor, or a ward leader to account. The ward leader is then tasked by citizens to
10 E. Benyera

report on their behalf to the next political office until they reach such an office as a
member of parliament or a minister. This system needs to be escalated until it
reaches the highest office which is that of the president or prime minister.
This need not be done in a belligerent and confrontational manner as African
elites and tyrants will take any opportunity to suppress and in the worst-case
scenarios misrepresent such arrangements. African political elites are found of
dodging public accountability by blaming the proverbial third forces and enemies
within instead of addressing the genuine concerns of their constituencies.
Community desires must be presented as complementary to the formal government
structures and an aide to the work which the government is doing in local com-
munities. I am aware of the different circumstances and conditions across Africa
and how this proposed model of active citizenry is not a one-size-fits-all. It is put
here as a starting point for communities to begin tinkering with how they can seek
autonomous just and ethical leadership.
Active citizenry enhances local accountability and helps in the fight against
autocracy, executive impunity other vices such as corruption. All these can be
attained through Ubuntu as the base philosophy for designing, implementing,
monitoring and evaluating active citizenry. Africa has been judged based on foreign
models of monitoring and evaluation. This had the impact of negating the
embeddedness of most phenomena such as human rights. When I argue that the 4IR
can enhance human rights in Africa, I conceptualise human rights from a decolonial
perspective which is to be born to live and to die a life devoid of humiliation (Shivji
2019:6–7). This is way different from the orthodox conceptualisation of human
rights which puts them in terms of generations where there are first-generation,
second-generation and third-generation human rights, etc. Ubuntu is the common
denominator for designing, implementing and monitoring active citizenry in Africa,
and the common denominator is that of one the other. Ubuntu means seeing the
other in yourself in a reciprocal manner: you are because I am. In this case, I see the
other the same way I see myself. Ubuntu is self-authenticating, and by authenticated
the self and the other, this has the effect of reversing the colonial processes of
doubting the humanity of the colonised.
This is different from the notion of the human which was inaugurated in early
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe. In this colonial view of the human, the
human is conceptualised as the civilised, Christian, predominantly male Caucasian
who is the opposite of the Easterners, the Heathens, Saracens and the colonisable,
dispensable black (Benyera et al. 2018; Mignolo 2009). The sum total of what
became known as the Anthropos is that they have a very low ontological density
and a humanity which can be doubted (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 2018).
The 4IR is not going to be the last Industrial Revolution. While Africa cannot
solve all its problems in the 4IR, it needs to take this as a propitious moment to set
in motion programmes to solve the African problem. Lessons from other civilisa-
tions such as the Chinese include the need and paramount importance of setting
long term (50 to 100 year) national goals which will consistently guide generations.
This is also termed the national interest. Africans must agree on what constitute
their national interest and then consistently seek to attend that over generations to
On the Elusiveness of Epistemic Freedom in Africa … 11

come. Mistakes will be made, lessons will be learnt, but Africa needs to that which
will make its citizens live a better-quality life, a life devoid of humiliation. This is
our definition of human rights: being born, living and dying a life devoid of any
humiliation.
So what constitutes Africa’s national interest. There are five aspects that con-
stitute Africa’s national interest. These are its: (1) natural capital, (2) human capital,
(3) epistemological capital, (4) social capital, (5) built and financial capital. These
five capitals constitute the protection of Africa’s national interest.
It is not accidental that these five capitals were the target of the colonial project.
For Samir Amin, they constitute the five monopolies of capitalism (Amin 1997,
2001). Colonialism has managed to outlive decolonisation because it monopolises
the following aspect of life: new technologies, the monetary standard and inter-
national financial flows, access to the planet’s natural resources, the media and
weapons of mass destruction (Amin 1998:26).
For Ali Mazrui, colonialism was the processes of forcing Africa and other parts
of the (formerly) colonised world into a Western scientific system of western
legalistic institutions and laws, capitalism, western-centric moral values and lan-
guages, western-centric epistemologies. There is a direct link between these
western-centric institutions which Africa was forced into and the resultant five
monopolies of capitalism and the five capitals which I am advocating to constitute
the core of Africa’s national interest.

6 Rationale Behind the Book

This book was born out of the need to debate the fate of Africa in the 4IR. The
responses to the call were divided into two predominant camps; one advocating that
that the 4IR will be a curse to Africa just like the past three Industrial Revolutions.
The other camp was of the view that it is upon us as Africans to turn our fortunes
around by among others turning the 4IR into a resource. We then decided to
document our various inputs and viewpoints, divergent as they were, not as an end
in themselves but as a way of initiating debate among Africans on how we see
ourselves participating in the 4IR.
The debate is not exhausted in this book. It is far too complex and huge to be
exhausted in just one book. In a revolution like the 4IR, the act of demystifying
certain myths, unpacking and exposing falsehoods, and proposing remedial action
in themselves become revolutionary actions. In writing this book, we borrow from
an old Turkish proverb. It states that ‘the forest was shrinking, but the trees kept
voting for the Axe for the Axe was clever and convinced the Trees that because his
handle was made of wood, he was one of them’. Africa keeps trusting and utilising
the epistemologies which are killing it.
An African perspective to the past three Industrial Revolutions is that they were
nothing short of a complete humiliation for Africa. The First Industrial Revolution
resulted in the steam engine being propelled to ‘harvest’ slaves from Africa in what
12 E. Benyera

became known as the transatlantic slave trade. Euro North America was developed
on the sweat and blood of slaves. Today, their economies are flourishing as a result
of the work that was done by the slaves in developing and building those econo-
mies. Even the much-touted vaccine technology was taken from an African slave
who told their slave–master in the USA how they used to take the blood of an
infected person and inject it into uninfected members of the community as a way of
controlling pandemics. The story of how an African slave enlightened the
Americans on vaccine technology was well captured by Isabel Wilkerson in these
words:
Cotton Mather was a Puritan minister and lay scientist in Boston and had come into
possession of an African man named Onesimus. The enslaved African told of a procedure
he had undergone back in his homeland that protected him from this illness. People in West
Africa had discovered that they could fend off contagions by inoculating themselves with a
specimen of fluid from an infected person. Mather was intrigued by the idea Onesimus de-
scribed. He researched it and decided to call it “variolation.” It would become the precursor
to immunization and “the Holy Grail of smallpox prevention for Western doctors and
scientists,” wrote the medical ethicist and author Harriet A. Washington (Wilkerson
2020:231).

Needless to mention that the actual inventor Onesimus, the ‘slave’ is never
acknowledged like Louis Pasteur who is now heralded as a lifesaving scientist who
discovered vaccination, microbial fermentation, and pasteurisation.
The Second Industrial Revolution resulted in the colonisation of Africa as the
colonisers sought new markets and (free) raw materials for their booming industries
which had suddenly embraced mass production technologies. The third industrial
revolution resulted in coloniality for us in Africa. Colonialism simply mutated into
a resilient phenomenon that hides in systems institutions and laws. Powerful nations
no longer directly subjugate and loot Africa, and they use institutions such as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the International Criminal Court (ICC), among other many multilateral
institutions which act as instruments of foreign policy for the powerful nations of
the Global North including the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC).
While other parts of the world celebrate the 4IR and its concomitant parapher-
nalia such as the Internet of things, for all intents and purposes, African economies
are still stuck in the First and Second Industrial Revolutions as most of African
countries are still characterised by subsistence agriculture and other modes of life
which were last experienced in Euro North America over centuries ago. The
question today is how can a continent still stuck in the First and Second Industrial
Revolutions be incorporated in the 4IR? The reason resides partly in how Africa is
bound in a colonial contract by the (former) colonisers (Benyera 2020). This
colonial contact can only be undone one Africans acquire and deploy epistemic
independence.
The first step for Africa is to recognise the omnipresence of coloniality that the
decolonisation processes were not an end in themselves but a means towards an
end, which is to gain economic and epistemic freedom. Without epistemic and
On the Elusiveness of Epistemic Freedom in Africa … 13

economic freedom, Africa cannot participate in the 4IR as an equal member of the
international community. Instead, it will participate as a source of cheap if not free
resources such as but not limited to natural resources especially rare earth minerals
and human resources. Stated differently, if Africa does not claim epistemic freedom,
it will continue to underwrite and sponsor the economies of the Global North.
This was well articulated by Walter Rodney theorised about How Europe
Underdeveloped Africa (Rodney 1973). The thesis was extended to How Africa
developed Europe (Mhango 2018). The First, Second and Third Industrial
Revolutions were from an African perspective, episodes of pillaging and plundering
Africa for the development of the Global North. Epistemic freedom is a prerequisite
for Africans to realise this phenomenon. Only after the colonial contract has been
unmasked can coloniality be fully comprehended, addressed and redressed.

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Everisto Benyera (PhD) is an Associate Professor of African Politics in the Department of

Political Sciences at the University of South Africa in Pretoria, South Africa. He holds a doctorate
in African Politics from the same university. Everisto researches and publishes on community
based non-state transitional justice, human rights, transitology, and decoloniality. Everisto has
worked and researched in Zimbabwe, South Africa Namibia, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Everisto has three edited books, 18 book chapters, and 13 peer-reviewed journal articles.
His books are: (1) 2021. The Fourth Industrial Revolution and (Re)colonisation of Africa:
Coloniality of Data, London: Routledge (2) 2020. (ed.) Breaking the Colonial “Contract”: From
Oppression to Autonomous Decolonial Futures, New York: Lexington. (3) (ed.) 2020.
Reimagining Justice, Human Rights and Leadership in Africa Challenging Discourse and
Searching for Alternative Paths, Cham: Springer. (4) 2019. (ed.) Indigenous, Traditional, and
Non-State Transitional Justice in Southern Africa: Namibia and Zimbabwe, New York: Lexington.
He is the editor of Politeia—The Journal of Political Sciences and Public Administration and
associate editor of Strategic Review for Southern Africa.
Race and Robotics: Black Theology
in the Digital Age

Hlulani Mdingi

Abstract The Fourth Industrial Revolution has been pedestalized as the greatest
leap of human intellect. 4IR does not hide the serious destruction to traditional
approaches to the sciences (theoretical and applied), technology, economics, poli-
tics, and human psychology. The rise of robotics change of the workplace,
biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and the change in human beings seem
extremely noble and worthy of celebration. However, the greatest neglect in this
“great” leap is that of human beings who for centuries have remained engulfed in a
contestation and defense of their humanity by the same superpowers that are
holding countries and continents at gunpoint—convert or die! The Third World
becomes subservient to the dominant change in societies. Issues of politics, the land
question, the centuries of the exploitation of resources, and the debt owed to the
oppressed and absolute destruction of worldviews, which have evolved over mil-
lennia’s are expected to change and be forgotten. In short, the 4IR despite the
language of technology and science often presented by geeks is extremely political.
This paper seeks to argue that the projection of (white) human “intellect” has and
continues to ignore the humanity and intelligence of blacks/oppressed. They rather
favor artificial intelligence and robotics than correct the previously disembodiment
of the oppressed, ontologically, politically, cultural, and physiologically. 4IR is a
prerogative of “superpowers” meant to replace the oppressed and continues the
project of the rulers of the world. The paper seeks to point out the nuances of 4IR,
however, reflecting 4IR political implication for the oppressed who are the majority
in the world.

H. Mdingi (&)
Faculty of Theology and Religion, Department of Systematic and Historical Theology,
University of Pretoria, Room 1-44 Hatfield, Pretoria, South Africa

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 17

E. Benyera (ed.), Africa and the Fourth Industrial Revolution,
Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87524-4_2
18 H. Mdingi

1 Introduction

The Fourth Industrial Revolution in South Africa and Africa has been discussed
within the realm of technology and its influence on future architectural design,
economies, medicine, and politics. However, there is no deep discussion around
the prospects or perils on the human side, little attention is paid on the issue of
singularity, which is tied to concepts of human physiology and intellect in the areas
of transhumanism, posthumanism robotics, and the deep cultural and political
implications for the human. Moreover, the question and concerns of those who have
been already deemed subhuman and disembodied through colonialism, imperial-
ism, and institutional racism are thoroughly ignored. 4IR is part of the continuum of
western modernity, black liberation, and black liberation theology should note that
modernity has not been bequeathed to us rather it has been imposed on us. The
“savage,” “native,” and “heathen” enters modernity and postmodernism with a
contested humanity. Western technological development is confronted with the
legacies of dehumanization in the Third World. With this consideration, racism is
not just a historical act but its profound power lies in its ontic role is restructuring
the human from an ontological level. It is a context where the modern enterprise
leaves us no hope except a direct adoption of the conception of life and force a
historical euthanasia of our worldviews. Racism is ontic and reflection of racism in
an age of technology requires a deep solidarity of the oppressed from an ontological
and political premise. West (1999: 115) was prophetic in his articulation that the
‘age of globalization, science, applied biology, global financial networks of com-
puterized transactions and technological innovations will make racism outdated and
irrelevant’. The paper contends that robotics, transhumanism, posthumanism, and
AI truly undermine the humanity of the oppressed.

2 History of the Oppressed is Their Epistemology

In the black world, western technology should be considered through a hermeneutic

of the quest of the human in real time. The history of natural resources is linked to
the survival of species; evolution has bequeathed a genetic ecological solidarity
deep in existence. While God has bequeathed his likeness and community to human
beings. As such, the terrors of subjugation, slavery, and land dispossession reflect
the breaking of that bond, a disembodiment of the sacred. The scientific revolution
in Europe occurred during the period of slavery. Thus, western political ambition
runs parallel with progress in the corridors of thought of the west.
White privilege has defined and determined God and the humanity of others and
reads the mind of God from a position of privilege and power. In this context, the
West not only plays God through subjugation, oppression, and imploding econo-
mies of the Third World. But through technology they become God, technology is
the electrical pulse resulting in Dr. Frankenstein asserting: He is alive! The
Race and Robotics: Black Theology in the Digital Age 19

invention of a Frankenstein does not require ontological disposition. Biko (1978)

referred to the ontological drainage of the oppressed, which is connected to the
drainage of the mind of an intelligible and enigmatic force who created them black
with the values and intellectual proclivities in their worldviews. The recreation of
human definition and blurring of lines between biology and robotic synthetics
confirms a fundamental move of the west from an ontological conception of life. In
a religious context, morphisms of divinities reflect their makers. Idolatry is no
longer a theological and religious concept but geopolitical scientists of the 4IR have
become idol makers who gamble on human conception in the fear that their arti-
ficial intelligence may result in a superintelligence that might be more intelligent
than us. For the black world, the “us” refers to the west and it could be worse to
have an artificial intelligent who is not only intelligent than us but is racist,
underlying the coders and algorithms that contain biases of their makers. As such,
imperialism and colonialism, especially regarding modernity, make it that tech-
nology is attached to power. The previous industrial revolutions and 4IR technol-
ogy should be considered with distrust and as another weapon to broaden the
empire. Mbembe (2003: 25) asserts:
In the past, indeed, imperial wars did have the objective of destroying local powers,
installing troops, and instituting new models of military control over civil populations.
A group of local auxiliaries could assist in the management of conquered territories
annexed to the empire. Within the empire, the vanquished populations were given a status
that enshrined their despoilment. In these configurations, violence constituted the original
form of the right, and exception provided the structure of sovereignty. Each stage of
imperialism also involved certain key technologies (the gunboat, quinine, steamship lines,
submarine telegraph cables, and colonial railroads)

The rise of 4IR is a political project decorated with sophisticated intents claiming
to improve the world. 4IR is a threat to the role of the true human being who lay
stacked on the ground, ignored by globalization, and is to be ignored by technology.
Schwab (2018) noted that there will blurring of the lines (singularity) by emerging
technology, which will make it impossible to distinguish synthetic from biological
material and this blurring encapsulates humans. As such, the future of humanity
lays undefined for the future. This lack of definition is amplified for blacks who
through the legacy of white supremacy have been dehumanized, landless, and poor.
The disembodiment of the oppressed depicts the living conditions of the poor but
also reflects the emptiness and disembodiment of the oppressor. Aime Cesaire
(1972: 2) asserts:
“First we must study how colonization works to decivilize the colonizer,
to brutalize him in the true sense of the word, to degrade him, to awaken him to
buried instincts, to covetousness, violence, race hatred, and moral relativism…” It
can be postulated then that the techno-economic-political direction easily shuns the
importance of an ontic expression of the being of the oppressed. An expression
renders meaning and teleos, which is the liberation of the oppressed. Fanon (1963:
168) argues:
20 H. Mdingi

When we consider efforts made to carry out the cultural estrangement so characteristic of
the colonial epoch, we realize that nothing has been left to chance and that the total result
looked for by colonial domination was indeed to convince the natives that colonialism came
to lighten their darkness. The effect consciously sought by colonialism was to drive into the
natives’ heads the idea that if the settlers were to leave; they would at once fall back into
barbarism, degradation, and bestiality.

Fanon’s position underlines the political confusion of black intellectuals as they

encounter masters of society. Technology, which is by extension a neocolonial and
neoliberal apparatus of power, is instrumental in fostering cultural (ontic)
estrangement and negating the need for historical justice. The native believes and
deceives him/herself by the fear of being left behind by those who deny the
oppressed justice, land, and resources. Unconsciously, it reaffirms the fear of the
native concerning the departure of the white man. The emergence of AI in robots,
which exhibit human physiological aesthetics, is an indication of accepting and
believing that it would add value to humanity. However, remaining ignorant of the
intellect and intelligence present in humanity, a humanity that suffers. The historical
neglect of the intelligence of blacks reveals AI obtained from an ontological drainage
through colonialism, slavery, and imperialism. AI, automation, and algorithmic
existence has long been at work in the minds of the oppressed as they toil factories
and the workplace working for the masters. As such, artificial intelligence has
already been part of the everyday life of the oppressed and thus justifies the fear of
future job loss. It reveals that black existence has been machinery and prefiguring
image of their technology. Biko (1978) pointed out: “The most potent weapon of the
oppressor is the mind of the oppressed.” Biko points to the use of one’s intelligence
to be a decapitating weapon operating from an ontological and physiological
framework. White supremacy initiated the point of disembodiment through the
historical instruction of present but perennially muted pigmented bodies. 4IR
blurring of the lines continues to undermine human physiology. Kumar and Thakur
(2012: 57) provide a definition of AI, which is linked to human physiology:
Artificial intelligence (AI) is defined as intelligence exhibited by an artificial entity to solve
complex problems and such a system is generally assumed to be a computer or machine.
Artificial Intelligence is an integration of computer science and physiology Intelligence in
simple language it is the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world.
Intelligence is the ability to think to imagine creating memorizing and understanding,
recognizing patterns, making choices adapting to change and learn from experience.
Artificial intelligence concerned with making computers behave like humans AI tries to
solve the complex problems in more human like fashion and in much less time than a
human takes. Hence it is called as Artificial Intelligence

Reflection on machines behaving like humans highlights western civilization’s

stance on their humanity and that of others. The oppressed have a questioned
humanity, a relegated existence of being subhuman and thus captures western
necessity to move from human or nonhuman to the machine. Areas of robotics, AI,
transhumanism, and posthumanism reveal the embedded biases of race and power.
Blacks are machines aware that they are humans with a machine existence suit-
able for western civilization.
Race and Robotics: Black Theology in the Digital Age 21

3 Cause for Protest: Human Insurgence, Agency,

and Emergency

The subject of race and robotics is motivated by the role that technology will play in
the new modes of human definitions and conceptions. This is a reflection on the
other side of 4IR, the question of human conception. For black theology and
liberation theologies, the human being rediscovered after disembowelment and
dehumanization is central to who and how one exists. The area of robotics is one
area that points to the looming darkness that lies ahead for human beings. The role
of artificial neural networks (ANN), various forms of artificial intelligence, the
theory of singularity and the human physiological aesthetics endowed to robotics
reflect the idolatry contained in western technological and scientific progress. Ideals
and physical representation of the idol gods finally obtain mobility through the
intelligence of its makers. The makers of the modern age reflect white prerogatives.
The sciences are now becoming great threats, conveyer belts of idolatry, and
self-deification. Modern technology of 4IR challenges the value of the human
being.
Viccini and Brazal (2015) note that the transhumanist and posthumanist believe
that technology will allow humans to overcome their bodily limitations. As humans
are transformed into cyborgs. Viccini and Brazal use the movie
Transcendence, especially its biblical parallels of a human mind uploaded to a
computer and the role artificial intelligence or superintelligence will play in the
future. Viccini and Brazal (2015: 149) assert:
In the movie, the concept of transcendence and the biblical healing imagery evoke their
profoundly theological matrix. But the divine and the human are both replaced by tech-
nology’s power and control. Technology’s promise of transcendence, by technologically
resurrecting mind and body, as well as radically benefiting human life on the planet, hides
the computer’s uncontrollable will to power that points toward the destruction of human
existence on earth.

For Christian theology, this narrative underlines a form of deification.

Furthermore, an assessment of the geopolitical context and history requires
reflection on the early deification of the modern period. Erskine (1981: 38) noted
that in the Christian faith, there is a history of white people wanting to be revered as
God. He noted that the reverence of a creature wanting to be God came with a
separation of the bodies and souls of black people. That separation underpins
projects such as robotic and transhumanism. As such, technological advancement
for black liberation cannot ignore the links between western society and the need
for recreating human beings. Vaccari (2002: 14) asserts: “During the industrial
revolutions of the nineteenth century, the Western imagination began to assign
technology a central role in its dreams and nightmares.” For the oppressed tech-
nology is more of a nightmare than a dream. Vaccari (2002: 17) asserts:
The Western romance with technology can be told through the various machines this
culture has fallen in and out of love with. The Information Age represents the third coming
22 H. Mdingi

of the Machine. A second Machine Age was ushered in after World War II, a renewed burst
of technological dreaming after the decline of the modernist faith in technology.

A more radical voice, which directly attacks the deep aspects of this reflection of
newfound humanity proposed by transhumanists, comes from the Eastern
Orthodox. Gallaher (2019: 200–201) asserts:
Transhumanism is Satanic. When I write this, I am not being provocative, let alone vaguely
metaphorical. It is meant literally and with the strongest realism. This ideology, alterna-
tively, new ‘religion’ or ‘religious philosophy’, of transhumanism, from an Eastern
Orthodox perspective, is a systematic elaboration of what various Russian religious thinkers
following Dostoevsky called the Luciferian ‘religion’ of ‘Mangodhood’ chelovekobozh-
estvo and chelovekobozhie) which is characterized by self-worship or the self-deification of
humanity.

Mangodhood, it was held, with the man-god or superman as its climax, was
Satanic in structure and inspiration. It is the mirror inverse of salvation, which is
called, in Patristic teaching, theosis, or theopoiesis (divinization/deification).
The radical critique from the Eastern Orthodox seeks to raise the question of
human arrogance, sinfulness, and imperfection, which makes this “great stride”
premature for a fallen creature. A creature seeks to assume divine inheritance before
they are ready for it and “seizing divinity from God” (Gallaher 2019: 201). It is
significant for Gallaher to discuss transhumanism within the perspective of human
teleology and Christian theology. Jorjani (2020) has discussed transhumanism and
technological singularity1 from the perspective of its roots of Russian mysticism.
Together with its close connotations to Greek mythology, Zoroastrianism theology,
alchemy, and androgynous theology also found in the Palestinian Talmud. The
mysticism and non-materialistic inspiration of transhumanism underpins the various
explanation from the west of seeking to be architectures of being human or cor-
rectors of the flaws of current human beings. It is this idolatry that serves as the
roots of deep ontological abandonment and disembodiment of the human being.
Sauter argues:
In Western Civilization, human beings are absorbed by the world of technology and
bureaucracy, by an impressive and oppressive administration of life and its turning of
reality into a made and manageable product. We are under pressure to produce, bring about,
form, and register something. Only that which we thus set forth is a reality for us and
others. It certainly cannot be denied that, because of all this, our being human is distorted
and the protest against this is justified. But the attitude taken by many theologians in the
face of this is little more than the expressionistic escape into a counterculture, into a world
where unruled activity and free associations are dominating (Sauter 1996: 80).

For black theology, the role and appreciation of human physiology and the mind
are of importance as blacks and people of color have endured oppression, which
disembodies human aesthetics, land, and human intellect. The importance of a
proper definition and use of intelligence should become a testimony to the value of
humans, organisms, nature, and knowing the limits of science. Liberation and

1
Jeffrey Mishlove discusses singularity with Jason Reza Jorjani on The New Thinking Allowed.
Race and Robotics: Black Theology in the Digital Age 23

having to live in a just and equitable world reflects intelligence turned into wisdom
and becoming a driving soul for future civilization. The basis of epistemological
reflection should usher in new discoveries that are guided by justice and humanity
with a humane face (Biko 1978). Thus, bound by a radical position of a humane
presence means that our technological advancements are entrenched in the harsh
realities of the modern and postmodern world. Western civilization through the
success of the scientific revolution and having been the dominant driving force of
technological advancement is embalmed by the history of dehumanization, market
capitalism, and oppression.
The great danger of transhumanism, posthumanism, AI, and robotics is that it
continues the process of disembowelment of the oppressed. The change in human
physic has been noted by Viccini and Brazal (2015: 149) in the somatic changes
that have been produced by mobile phones. Technology geared around human
bodily engagement through touch, vision, and hearing. This somatic change
informs a techno-gnostic spirituality:
In the Silicon Valley of the early 1990s, the merging of spirituality with new media
technologies stressed that salvation occurred by departing from the body (or the “meat”)
and joining the “immaterial sphere” of cyberspace. Referred to as cybergnosis, the virtual
space was perceived as a sacred sphere where people, transformed into virtual beings, can
escape the mortal body and triumph over alienation. Gnostic New Agers see the person as
basically spiritual and the Internet as a tool to discover truth within the inner sanctum of the
self, to turn the world into a paradise, and to connect all reality. The Internet is like a
magical medium that assists the spiritual transformation of humanity (Viccini and Brazal
2015: 150).

This cybergnosis reveals a new era of reembodiment through humans being

turned into virtual beings. However, this optimism must remind us that technology
will not result in a utopia on earth (see Viccini and Brazal 2015: 150). Viccini and
Brazal (2015: 150–151) asserts:
The emancipatory dimension of the Internet as a bodiless sphere also celebrates the
machines instead of their users and betrays a romantic view of the nonhuman. For Jean
Baudrilliard, the danger is to idealize Internet simulations and prefer them to the more
messy and complex actual life, thereby functioning as a distraction or an alibi.

The actual and messiness of life is precisely where the poor and everyday people
are and where the God of the oppressed operates. This technological escape is the
legacy of the depth of alienation in a capitalist and racist society, which underpins
the atheistic and material reading of 4IR, which is the belief that nature is a
disappointment (see Gallaher 2019: 202). Furthermore, it is a rejection of human
physiology; Gallaher (2019: 202) noted that transhumanism is anti-body and
anti-creation because all of existence is data and organisms are biochemical,
electronic, and biological algorithms.
There is a shift from homo-centric to data-centric. Burdett and Lorrimar (2018:
2470–250) has stressed the importance of looking at human enhancement from an
aspect of ethics. However, they stress the importance for theologians to look at
deification anew. This point is important because, whether in the area of robotics
24 H. Mdingi

and white humanoids, such as Sophia, with human aesthetics there is a deep reality
of self-deification of a race. However, deification, which comes with a geopolitical
context, Godless society/future, military power, and great leaps of technological
intelligence points to a greater threat posed by deification. Lipps (2019: 1–2)
asserts:
As modern technology continues its inexorable advance, we will begin to see the afore-
mentioned radically new understandings of what it means to be human play out in the
concrete realities of our lives. The sorts of dilemmas envisioned by science fiction writers
are going to be faced by everyday humans soon enough. The point of this essay is to
characterize the two most important poles of this debate. On the one hand, we will have the
ultimately Christian notion of humanity based in the imago dei, whose end state is cate-
gorized by theosis, defined as radical participation in the life of God. On the other hand, we
will have a purely technological notion of humanity which I will be calling the imago
machinae, or the “image of the machine”, whose end state is categorized by a secular
divinity, defined as the fulfillment of the will to power and often given the name
“transhumanism”.

This analysis is not a negation against technology because technology is part of

human history, everyday life (see Vaccari 2002: 1). As such, historically we
acknowledge that technology has a human dimension to it, which implies the close
proximity between technology and humans, the maker and tools. Therefore, in this
respect being human encompasses the inhuman element also e.g. tools (see Vaccari
2002: 1–2). Perhaps, this inhuman element of technology and humans is what has
remained for the west and reveals the need for a serious epistemic and political
skepticism concerning the climax of 4IR. Vaccari (2002: 2–3) argues:
‘Technology’ is arguably one of the most problematic and consequential of all modern
ideas, and one that resonates with enormous cultural weight. The idea remains a distinctly
western phenomenon. Although for many centuries other cultures remained ahead of
Christendom in what regards technical knowhow, no other culture would grant on tech-
nology such significance, nor develop such curious myths around it. Technology and myth
have been deeply entwined from the beginning.

Race within the context of technological and scientific advancement is viewed

from the position of a cultural shift, an involuntary destruction of worldviews, and
an invasion of a sovereign existence. The physiological reality of the color divide
haunts us in all aspects of modern-day existence. However, despite a seemingly
physiological representation that seeks to dispel the physiological divide, blacks,
and the oppressed ontology remains in barricades and quarantined by western
dictates.
Viccini and Brazal (2015: 152–153) noted that cyborgs claim to draw from
women embodiment, as such, claims are made that transhumanism through
cyborgs will breach the gap between male and female and race. Viccini and Brazal
(2015: 152–153) assert:
Haraway, however, does not see the cyborg as intrinsically liberating. She speaks of “scary
new networks” or “informatics of domination” that employ the latest scientific methods and
technologies. In cyborg society, forms of domination, such as classism, sexism, racism, and
Race and Robotics: Black Theology in the Digital Age 25

ethnocentrism, are not necessarily dissolved but are instead rearticulated into new forms.
Excluded from cyberspace are the “nobodies” or those in urban and rural regions who are
on the other side of the “digital divide,” and often bypassed by information and commu-
nication technologies, which Castells refers to as the “fourth world.”

They (2015: 153) further note that:

Furthermore, masculinist interests and stereotypes create a distinct digital gender divide. In
the developing world, women are nearly 25 percent less likely to use the Internet than men.
However, future Internet services and technology will nonetheless target populations with
already high-speed Internet connection, ignoring those who neither produce nor consume.
Paradoxically, cyber-exclusion will become a structural feature of the global capitalist
network society where networks aim for market dominance.

Another point worthy of consideration for black theology and theology is

that Imago Dei is the crowning moment of God’s creation. However, western
philosophy and religion have advocated for the Ubermensch who sees the need for
“evolution to evolve and transcend itself” (see Gallaher 2019: 204).
Transhumanism is thus king to Mangodhood through the singularity.
In envisioning the mangod or superman, the transhumanists argue not only for Intelligence
Amplification (IA), perhaps through installing a chip in the brain (connected to wifi for
updates), from more memory to better mathematical and linguistic skills, more ‘emotional
intelligence’ and even as yet unimagined carnal facility. This is what has led to the
American theological ethicist Gerald McKenny to speak of enhancement technologies as
“technologies of desire’ not need, and thereby being technologies of excess” (Gallaher
2019: 204).

The role of race in this imminent and inevitable future characterized by robotics
will not be restricted to optic reflection on color distinction, accumulation of wealth,
and being disadvantaged, rather racism will manifest itself by the cultural or
non-cultural imposition. Cultural imposition means the etymological reason for the
new wave of technology, which mechanically is useful but remains useless for a
lost humanity. Shoshana Zuboff2 (2019) has lamented on what she calls the Age of
Surveillance Capitalism, which comprises of data violating democracy. She also
notes that digital technology is something different from the evolution of capitalism
that brings things outside of the markets to the market. This evolution results in a
technology that has economic logic and thus seizing to be neutral. Zuboff laments
the fact of algorithms and AI that is in the business of selling possible futures to
third parties, who are multinational cooperation.
Cori Crider3 (2019a & 2019b) noted that AI cannot transcend the history and
stereotypes of white society on people of color. She notes that bias in machines and
algorithms plays an important role in predictive policing of poor and colored
communities. This policing is linked to racism and slavery from the Patty Rollers
who hunted runaway slaves and later became police who continue targeting blacks.
Data and algorithms are used by the military drawing from historical data in training

2
Shoshana Zuboff part 2 on Democracy Now 2019.
3
Cori Crider hosted The World According to AI part I and 2 on Aljazeera.
26 H. Mdingi

machines. As such, the continual profiling of black as dangerous in comparison to

whites continues. Crider (2019b) interview with Seeta Gangaharan from the
London School of Economics underpins deeply the connection of technology and
oppression. Gangaharan remarks that; “The marginalization of people of color
foretells what is to come with regards to degrees of control and lessoning auton-
omy.” Technology in this instance is seen as equipping and empowering cooper-
ation than the serious historical demands of the poor and people of color.
Gangaharan reveals historical biases, which will not be distorted by technological
advancements.
Furthermore, the algorithmic systems, which often reflect their white masters
will increase the profiling of blacks and express the technological security net for
white fragility. The fundamental point to be considered about 4IR is to reflect
whose prerogative is it that all of has humanity rush too.
The privilege givers of the world that controls the wealth of the world are using
business and the academy to shift and mold reality to ignore the historical demands
of the oppressed, marginalized, landless, and dehumanized. Maher4 noted that:
The tycoons of social media have to stop pretending that they’re friendly nerd gods
building a better world and admit they’re just tobacco farmers in T-shirts selling an
addictive product to children. Because, let’s face it, checking your ‘likes’ is the new
smoking.

He further asserts: “Phillip Morris just wanted your lungs; the App Store wants
your soul.” The above assertion by Bill Maher signalized the depths of the scourge
of technology, coding, and apps currently have on human nature even before
transhumanism and full swing of robotics and humanoids. The danger of tech-
nology is not its physical structure/object or the forms of its programming.
However, the danger lies in the ontological restructuring of the operation of the
human mind, which seemingly is free to use a device, however, playing into a
deterministic reality set by programmers, cooperation, and big business. Tristan
Harris5 noted that “a handful of people working at a handful of tech companies steer
the thoughts of billions of people every day.” Harris view reflects the point of
convergence between technology and human free will. Ramsey Brown6 remarked
why are neuroscientists working in programming and coding while they understand
brain activity, nature, and habits and are thus able to manipulate people's thoughts
through the manipulation of dopamine.
Brown reveals technology’s role in the acceleration of body chemistry, which
has societal and behavioral effects. Technology poses a great threat of our time and
exposes a world beyond our nightmare, as we are confronted by nihilism, objec-
tification, and digitized relationship with existence herself. This period can be
classified as an evolution of an accepted alienation and a creation of annihilation of
useful structures that the human mind has produced. Now, the human mind is

4
Bill Maher on Friday Night HBO series entitled “Real-Time.”
5
Tristan Harris om HBO series “Real-Time.”
6
Ramsey Brown on HBO series “Real-Time.”
Race and Robotics: Black Theology in the Digital Age 27

beginning to undo societal and historical values and in the process depersonalizes
human existence within a group. Technology disembodies humanity (see Biko on
the west obsession with technological know-how). The area of robotics can be
thought of as sacrilegious idolatry practiced by cooperation, scientist, and engi-
neers, noting that unlike the gods of old who were suffering from the impediment of
being motionless, often dependent and beholden to his/her maker. The area of
robotics through artificial intelligence has given the human deity a mechanical
body, a process of mechanical incarnation, and bodily sensation of becoming
transcendent. While technological advances seem mechanic and based on algo-
rithms there is an ontic transferal of human presence. The climax of scientific
discovery and technology is knitted into a process that scientists explain as a
singularity that will make biological physiology indistinguishable with synthetic
and artificial replicated systems. Eden et al. (2012: 1) explained the singularity
hypothesis in the following manner:
Indeed, a growing number of scientists, philosophers, and forecasters insist that the
accelerating progress in disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics,
genetic engineering, and nanotechnology may lead to what they refer to as the techno-
logical singularity: an event or phase that will radically change human civilization, and
perhaps even human nature itself, before the middle of the 21st century

Gallaher (2019: 201) further argues:

Mangodhood, in contrast, is an instance of the sort of sham human auto-divinization we see
in Genesis with the Fall of humanity through its temptation by the serpent who weaves
human beings into his ploys by both lies and illusions. Unlike the case of deification—
which assumes the patient, arduous self-work of askesis in Christ—auto-divinization, and
transhumanism is a contemporary instance of this, is the impatient attempt at seizing our
divine inheritance before we are ready for its responsibility. One uses all our intellectual
capacities to split open nature, to manipulate its inner parts to serve us as journeymen gods,
elevating ourselves, technologically beyond the merely human, and then in a suicidal
manner to subsume creation so that all one sees in the cosmos is the idolatrous face of
ourselves like Narcissus tipping into the pool.

Eden and Gallaher point to the point of no return for science and human con-
ception. Perhaps, the dancing serpents on Medusa’s head will look into our eyes
and turn our souls into concrete. Moreover, maybe Medusa has been the symbol at
the core of western society and technology bequeathing a narrow, cold, capitalist,
and materialistic worldviews (Biko 1978: 106).

4 The Political Corridors of Scientific Progress

Technological development seemingly unrelated to the social context, the political

elements that control all streams of power require a deep reflection of the desire to
make machines, seemingly, worthy to possess human disposition in the form of
intelligence. This reflection confirms the continual neglect of the otherness of the
28 H. Mdingi

oppressed. Black theology must reflect on power and episteme and the dehuman-
ization of blacks, which has not been resolved and will not be resolved by 4IR.
Hlatshwayo (2019: 26) argues:
However, a failure to unpack the role of technologies in capitalism makes it appear as
though, in the final analysis, there are no winners or losers in the 4IR game. If current social
relations remain unchanged, the 4IR is likely to reinforce existing inequalities. Not all
countries and classes participate in the 4IR as equal partners and therefore can derive
equitable gains from their participation in it. Workers, women, and the marginalized,
especially in countries of the Global South, are most likely to be the losers. Unless action is
taken to ensure otherwise, the 4IR is most likely to deepen the existing technological,
economic, and social gaps.

The technology that will transform markets, money, and wealth in the world
through cryptocurrency furthers affirms historical injustice. The ownership of land
and resources from former and current lords remains in the hands of the few. Black
theology’s emphasis on the God of the oppressed and Biko’s (1978) position on the
deliberate need of God creating black people as black needs to refocus conception
of reading the mind of the God of the oppressed who requires us to use intelligence
as a deliberate and liberating force. The reversal of power is an act of intelligence
and reveals that no algorithmic existence can address the history of Africa and the
Third World. The imposition of a given existence, prescribed and dictated upon,
engulfs true human consciousness, especially because black physiological existence
has been removed from existence. This human consciousness, an authentic intel-
ligence, becomes the meeting place for black intelligence and the prerogatives of an
oppressed existence. The scientific and mathematical impulses, which unravel the
mysteries of the universe must be directed by the geopolitical context of the black
world. Ani (1994: 67) noted that European consciousness breeds European science,
which ultimately becomes an ideology. As such, the neglect of the humanity of
others is evident in politics, religion, and technology. The disembodiment of the
oppressed explains the comfort of the West having machines with human dispo-
sition than acknowledging others as intelligent humans. Liberation becomes the
highest form of intelligence available to oppressed humans.

5 The Mind, Intelligence, and Liberation in 4IR

The importance of the mind is central to the articulation and formulation of black
existence because of the abstract reality that is thus brought forth by ideas and
human intellect. For blacks, in their oppression and disembodiment, the mind has
been at times existing as transcendence without a body. Thus, an articulation of
liberation in bleak circumstances has been the affirmation of intelligence without a
body. However, liberation embodies intelligence and guides its operation in the
world. The trajectory of western Christianity, which spearheaded the utter neglect
of this world and the body for heaven, revealed the allegorical pronouncements of a
different embodiment. Cone (1993 & 2004) pointed out that the cry of black slaves
Race and Robotics: Black Theology in the Digital Age 29

toward heaven was not merely articulation of other worldliness rather a rejection of
a future built by a white hands. The struggle for political freedom and sovereignty is
above technological progress and analysis but rather expresses the question of the
human intellect, black intellect, in particular, existing in the world. 4IR carves an
evolution in human history built fundamentally on the political ontology of western
supremacy. In short, an ontological evolution that stems not from the suitability of
nature and species. But this is a revolution guided by the human mind—intellect
with historical privilege. We are coming in contact with what the human mind can
do. But the historical rejection of the mind and body of the oppressed negates the
unitary sense of the Human Self that is expressed in these great leaps of technology.
The God of the oppressed makes liberation, or the articulation of liberation to be
linked to the world of the mind to build a truly egalitarian society on earth. This
society will pay attention to the importance of ordinary life (especially the
oppressed) because this ordinary life still gives grammar to our conceptions of what
it means to be human, justice, human action, and the invaluable role of being rooted
in your neighbor as an integral part of being in the world and is the primary def-
inition of being human (see Murphy and Knights (2010: 147; Waters 2006: 85).

6 Singularity and Eschatology: Conclusion

The fatal blow to human conception, liberation, and justice is the moment of
singularity, where the “acceleration of technology” is galvanized to enter into
existence through the biosphere. The biosphere will strengthen the biopower, which
has allowed the west to dictate who lives or dies (see Mbembe 2003: 11–12). This
singularity is not mere assertions of science but the full view of a material reading
of the world, which will create humanity anew. A world that seeks to make itself the
casket of the death of God. However, a black liberation theology response that sees
the commune between God and humanity demands not just the objectives of the
oppressed in the mere now. Rather directs a need for a more redefined humanity
that emerges from the history and existential context of oppression. Images of a new
heaven and earth accompanied by the bride, the New Jerusalem (Revelation 20),
express the eschatological vision of justice and egalitarian society and humans
being rescued to heaven and brought back to earth. The material existence of human
beings makes humanity bound to earth, and as such, the context of a need for justice
in the now is guaranteed by this syllogism of being Imago Dei being here again in
the context of otherworldliness. Liberation theologies emphasize the perfection of
this fragile human body and this emphasis remains. The vision of the eschato-
logical especially the image of Christ with a physical and wounded body
remaining in the realm of metaphysics lingers in the importance of a physiological
conception of the human beyond technology and the future. The God of the
oppressed who maintains his wounds as a point of contact and recognition with the
church and the downtrodden in his coming dispels incarnation and existence of
human beings as virtual beings or transhuman. Human body-liness-ness and
30 H. Mdingi

biological creatureliness still is a perfect base of the encounter with God, justice,
human intellect and liberation. 4IR is a prerogative of whites to determine the future
for humanity. Cone (2004: 151) argues:
Black spirituals say, there is a great camp meeting in the Promised Land. That song is not
primarily about the geography of heaven but rather a message of hope in direct circum-
stances. Blacks, with their backs against the wall of slavery, were saying that evil will not
have the last word about their humanity. We have a future not made with White hands.

The final aspect of 4IR is linked to Cone position concerning a negation from the
Spirituals of inhabiting a world, existence and future made by white hands. A future
that seeks to wish and wash away black physical presence. Currently, Africa and
Third World countries, with real physical people, through technology are made to
inhabit and think of a future made by white hands. The destruction of black peo-
ple’s worldviews and the dehumanization of people of color has become
insignificant for western civilization, science, technology, and academia in partic-
ular (see West 1999) because the burden of civilization upon the Third World is
a violent encounter, which demands absolute change. This line of reasoning
extends to seeing that western paradigms negates two competing interests e.g.
oppression and liberation. This realization cannot be as vivid in South Africa than
Mandela’s visit in the 1990s at the World Economic Forum in Davos. In an
interview underlying Mandela’s position at Davos, Mandela revealed that when he
spoke about the nationalization of mines, banks, and means of production at the
conference the tension was so dense that you could cut it with a knife. White guilt
and western civilization continue to ignore the real effects of slavery, colonialism,
imperialism, and institutional racism, which are all tentacles of capitalism. 4IR can
be meaningful if liberation is the fundamental stance for Third World and if
technological advancements are politically motivated. Hlatshwayo (2019: 26) has
warned us concerning the divides, and if the WEC did not accept Mandela's pro-
posal for South Africa to develop, technology in Africa must be rooted in Africa’s
political prerogatives and valuing of human conception.

References

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Hlulani Msimelelo Mdingi holds a PhD in Systematic Theology from the University of South
Africa (UNISA) with a focus on Christian dogmatics and black liberation theology. He has worked
at UNISA in the department of Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology for seven years.
First, as a research assistant for two years and as lecturer and senior lecturer for the remaining five
and half years in the disciplines of theological Ethics and Systematic Theology with a focus on
ecclesiology and eschatology. He received the Global Excellence and Stature (GES) grant in 2019
and is currently a postdoctoral research fellow (PDRF) at the University of Johannesburg (UJ) in
the Department of Religion Studies with a focus on Black liberation theology and 4IR (Fourth
Industrial Revolution). He has published articles on liberation theology and 4IR. He also teaches
Christian liberation theologies part-time (second semester) to honours students at the University of
Johannesburg, department of Religion Studies. He has been appointed as senior lecturer at the
University of Pretoria, Faculty of Theology and Religion in the department of Systematic and
Historical Theology and will assume this position first of January 2021. He is an activist and
member of the Black Consciousness Movement United (BCMU), which infuses intellectuality and
activism for both theory and praxis. He is a founder of Theology Of Azania (TOA), a movement
that works in the community with various programs that focus on empowerment, justice and truth.
University 4.0: A Conceptual Model
for South African Universities
and the Fourth Industrial Revolution

Lizette Wessels and Jo-Ansie van Wyk

Abstract We argue that Africa has a rightful place in the 4IR. We focus on the
higher education sector (universities only), with a specific focus on South Africa.
We argue that South African universities stand to benefit from the 4IR. In order to
achieve what we term University 4.0, we propose two conceptual models, desig-
nated as the macro- and micro-models, as a blueprint for institutional renewal (the
macro-model) aligned with the envisaged demands of the 4IR. The micro-model
proposes that teaching and learning stand to benefit too. Ideally, both models should
be implemented simultaneously to provide the optimum education conditions and
preparation for each graduate. Whereas technology is the main driver and anchor of
the 4IR, some of the demands of the 4IR can be met by leadership adaptability, staff
preparedness and an awareness of the needs of the current and future student
population. Therefore, we propose these models as practical and achievable tools to
enable Africa’s young student population.

1 Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has reiterated the importance of transformation and

adaptability to the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) (see the introductory chapter
for an overview of the previous Industrial Revolutions), especially for universities
as some of the most affected sectors. Digital technologies, as Dewar (2017: p. 5)

This chapter draws on Lizette Wessels. 2020. How South African universities can contribute to
preparing the future workforce for the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Master of Philosophy in
Higher Education. Stellenbosch University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/
108143.

L. Wessels (&)
Department of Library and Information Services, University of South Africa, Pretoria,
South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]
J.-A. van Wyk
Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 33

E. Benyera (ed.), Africa and the Fourth Industrial Revolution,
Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87524-4_3
34 L. Wessels and J.-A. van Wyk

predicted earlier, will continue to alter the international higher education landscape.
Changing workforce demands, now accelerated by the global pandemic and its
evolving consequences, directly impinge on universities’ qualification structures
because graduates will increasingly require new skills and expertise. The prospects
of teaching and training qualifications that are completely immersed in virtual
environments enable the reinforcement of literacies and skills that will be part of the
future workforce’s professional and personal lives (Richert et al. 2015: p. 63).
Graduates with multidisciplinary skills are increasingly valued in the workplace
(Nørgaard and Guerra 2018: p. 106). Therefore, these kinds of programmes and
qualifications may well be tailored to meet the particular requirements of the
Industry 4.0 workplace (Nørgaard and Guerra 2018: p. 108).
As Africa has a rightful place in the 4IR, this chapter proposes a model (con-
sisting of a macro- and a micro-element) for the transformation of the teaching and
learning functions of, specifically, South African universities to meet the demands
of 4IR. Thus, what is required for the establishment and sustainability of the future
African university (here, University 4.0)? In order to address this question, the
chapter proceeds as follows. The next section explains the methodological approach
and the theoretical framework of the study. Thereafter, the chapter proceeds to
answer the main research question posed herein. The argument presented proposes
and analyses two conceptual models: a macro- (Institutional Change 4.0.) model
and a micro (Teaching and Learning 4.0)-model, combining these as University 4.0
—with a view to meeting the demands of the 4IR, thus educating and preparing
students for these demands. This part of the chapter presents the elements of each
proposed model. Whereas Institutional Change 4.0, the macro-model, focuses on
institutional change, the micro-model (Teaching and Learning 4.0) focuses on
transformation required for the teaching and learning as a core university function
to prepare the future 4IR university, students and workforce. The chapter concludes
with an assessment of each model and the future implications thereof for South
African universities.

2 Approach and Methodology

The development of the proposed models is based on a scoping review (adopted

from Arksey and O’Malley 2005: p. 22) as the methodological approach of the
study. A distinctly different methodological approach than a literature review, a
scoping review, maps scholarship on a topic, whereas a literature review sum-
marises scholarship on a particular research question. A scoping review was con-
ducted using the following main electronic databases: EBSCO (Eric, Education
Source, Africa Wide, Academic Search Premier), Emerald, Google Scholar, IEEE;
ProQuest, ResearchGate, Sabinet—SA E-publications, Scopus—Elsevier
(ScienceDirect), Springer and Taylor & Francis. The databases were selected for
their multidisciplinary qualities and provide comprehensive coverage of the global
research output and available research studies. The search strategy contained no
University 4.0: A Conceptual Model for South African Universities … 35

restriction on the type of study, country of origin or the sector (e.g. academic,
policy, government, etc.). The search was delimited to include only studies that
were published in English between 2014 and 2018, with a follow-up search con-
ducted in 2019 to include new studies.
Four key concepts—4IR, universities, teaching and learning, and skills—
emerged from the scoping review. Based on the scoping review, the two theoretical
approaches found to be most relevant to the 4IR and its implications for higher
education (HE) are human capital theory and human development theory (Tomer
2016: p. 31). The former originated in the 1700s when Smith (1776: p. 73) posited
that education is the basis of human capital in every society, allowing and sus-
taining economic growth. Kupe (2019: p. 1) therefore argues that universities
should contribute to the advancement and development of their societies by
investing in their graduates. This needs to be supported by teaching and learning
policies that produce excellently educated, emotionally intelligent students equip-
ped with adequate skills for the 4IR workplace (Kupe 2019: p. 1). Largely influ-
enced by Maslow’s (1943) humanistic psychological view, human development
theory focuses on improving and empowering individuals in all areas of life (as
cited in Tomer 2016: p. 4).
One of the 4IR’s imperatives is to improve and empower humanity through the
application of advanced technology. This chapter focuses on combining the said
theories in the context of HE as a human capital development sector to achieve
these imperatives. However, the HE sector in South Africa is found to be lacking,
thus leading to the rationale for this study and the proposals for University 4.0.

3 Proposed Conceptual Models for University 4.0

In proposing each model, its underpinnings, core, key concepts and structure are
presented first.

3.1 The Macro-conceptual Model: Institutional Change 4.0

The first conceptual model is constructed on a macro-level to promote institutional

change at universities to meet the demands of 4IR. This paves the way for existing
universities to prepare and lead students to meet these demands.

3.2 Underpinnings of Institutional Change 4.0

Technology is crucial for the establishment and sustainability of future universities.

Artificial intelligence (AI), big data, blockchain, machine learning and robotics will
36 L. Wessels and J.-A. van Wyk

become increasingly important (Schwab 2016: p. 7). The integration and use of
these technologies for improving the efficiency of current practices form part of the
most prominent factor in the 4IR, namely digital transformation.
(a) Digital transformation
Digital transformation, the fulcrum around which 4IR operates (Eberhard et al.
2017: p. 49), is:
The changing pursuit of innovative and flexible business and operational models—driven
by emerging technologies, practices, applications, and skills—to generate new value and
opportunities for students, staff, and stakeholders (Solis 2019: p. 1).

The importance of digital transformation lies in the creative and innovative

manner in which digital technologies can be applied to enhance outmoded practices
(Adams Becker et al. 2018: pp. 42–43). Digital transformation in universities plays
a significant part in the enhancement of existing practices. However, the
improvements inspired by digital transformation and increasing interconnectivity
will challenge universities (Pereira and Romero 2017: p. 1213). Many of these
challenges will occur under the rubric of digital transformation, which will mostly
occur in the context of the core business of a university to meet the requirements of
students by leveraging technology, knowledge and information to ensure successful
student outcomes (Adams Becker et al. 2018: p. 29).
It is also crucial to establish new university business models capable of gener-
ating value from digital transformation and data operations and mitigating the
effects of unskilled staff when it comes to utilising these new technologies (Pollitzer
2019: pp. 77–78). University leaders are obliged to be astute when strategising
innovative approaches which address the challenges of digital transformation.
Therefore, the execution of transformation in a responsible manner, together with
the adoption of a code of ethics, is a crucial element in dealing with the digital
transformation process for every university (Nordin and Norman 2018: p. 6;
Shahroom and Hussin 2018: p. 317).
(b) Technology
Technology and digital transformation are the most disruptive forces in the 4IR,
impacting every aspect and process of the university (Spiro et al. 2019: pp. 16–17).
Digital technologies, wearables and virtual worlds have given rise to today’s dig-
itally linked opportunities (Bower and Sturman 2015: p. 352). These opportunities
are more varied than before and have become indispensable throughout the digital
transformation process (Richert et al. 2015: pp. 62–63). With the dawn of AI, along
with 3D printing, digital computing and robotics, the next decade will be a time of
astounding transition and change (Krueger 2018: p. 24). South African universities
should respond by adopting new technological innovations to improve their tech-
nological ability (Chetty 2018: p. 15).
While the 4IR offers unlimited opportunities, it questions universities’ future and
learning (Vey et al. 2017: p. 30). What are the implications for the skills needed to
succeed over the next two decades? How can universities guarantee that students
University 4.0: A Conceptual Model for South African Universities … 37

are prepared for these exponential changes? (Krueger 2018: p. 24). South African
universities are unquestionably answerable for developing the digital literacy of
students and supporting responsible and suitable use of technology (Pellini et al.
2019: p. 12; Pollitzer 2019: p. 87). The growing importance of digital skills has a
broad impact on curriculum design, professional staff development (PSD), opera-
tional services and resources. In applying digital, data, communication and tech-
nology skills to particular workplace issues, students are expected to add value to
the workplace, making them more desirable as employees (Chetty 2018: p. 34).
The main components that bolster the competitiveness and sustainability of
future universities are technology, innovation and course offerings. As technology
evolves rapidly, the adoption thereof should be the focus of any university if it is to
remain sustainable in the 4IR (Duc 2017: p. 37). Universities are already expected
to have increasingly adopted analytical techniques and should already be using big
data retrieved from a variety of sources, devices and systems, allowing interchange
of data between universities and analysing student data aimed at making predictions
and informed decisions (Halili 2019: p. 68). Additionally, makerspaces1 should
already be integrated in the curriculum (Adams Becker et al. 2018: pp. 40–41). The
timing for the adoption of adaptive learning technologies and AI is estimated to be
within the next two years (Adams Becker et al. 2018: pp. 44–45; Butler-Adam
2018: p. 1; Hamilton 2018). The progress in these technologies, and the promises
they hold for teaching and learning, must be recognised; mixed reality and robotics
are anticipated to become more prominent within three years (Adams Becker et al.
2018: pp. 46–49; Johannessen 2018: pp. 9–13; Lent 2018: p. 218).

3.3 The Top Structure of Institutional Change 4.0

A new business model defining the view of technology implementation and digital
transformation must be formulated for the 4IR university (Lee et al. 2018: p. 4). The
University 4.0 will not emerge unless these innovative inferences, reformed ser-
vices and a new kind of leadership to oversee the implementation of the new
business model are generated (Abeid et al. 2018: p. 105).
(a) New Business Models
Universities urgently need new business models if they are to remain relevant and
sustainable in the 4IR (Abeid et al. 2018: p. 105). Digital disruptions have chal-
lenged existing business models to such an extent that new business models are
required (Nordin and Norman 2018: p. 5). Such innovative models will accom-
modate transformations and future innovations, while guaranteeing worthwhile
teaching and learning still relevant to students (Selamat 2017). Moreover, 4IR
business models should be innovative and distinctive, focusing on niche areas for

1
A place where students can work together on projects, share ideas, thoughts and knowledge.
38 L. Wessels and J.-A. van Wyk

attracting industry investments and partnerships (Abeid et al. 2018: p. 107).

Previous efficacious business models, strategies, processes or structures for that
matter will not withstand the amount of disruption to be caused by the 4IR (Carillo
2017: p. 598). Therefore, although these new business models should be innovative,
South African universities should also strategically align their business models with
the service and products they wish to deliver in order to survive these 4IR forces
(Sledge and Fishman 2014: p. 15).
Hence, South African universities should assess and establish their uniqueness in
value (Sledge and Fishman 2014: p. 14). They should identify what products and
services set them apart from their counterparts (Kim 2017: pp. 21–21). In as much
as the University 4.0 will need a new business model, it will also need strong
leadership to implement the plan, steering the university through the transformation
of the 4IR.
(b) Leadership
Due to 4IR, universities find themselves in a permanent condition of reform, posing
huge challenges to university leaders (Schwab 2016: p. 43). University leaders
should constantly exploit new opportunities, adapting to the rapid changes brought
about by the 4IR with caution, wisdom and responsibility, in order to steer the
university in the right direction (Smith and Pourdehnad 2018: p. 88). These
adaptations will not be subtle; rather, they will be large-scale transformations
(Penprase 2018: p. 1). Therefore, the new digital world does not call only for the
development of digital literacy to manage the incorporation of digital technology in
the new university (Butler-Adam 2018: p. 1); it now also calls for a new kind of
leadership approach that can holistically lead these digital ramifications in uni-
versities (Shave 2017: p. 4).
Moreover, providing digital leadership and culture-shaping are now considered
two of the most important prerequisites for 4IR leaders, as “digital transformation is
the very heart” of the 4IR (Vey et al. 2017: p. 22). Therefore, leading with purpose,
reason and mission to succeed in the 4IR requires legitimate leadership, trust and
straightforwardness—all competencies and skills that leaders need to equip them-
selves within facing this digital storm aroused by the 4IR (Butler-Adam 2018: p. 1).
Reskilling should thus start at the highest level. Without digital skills and
knowledge of these disruptive technologies, leaders will be unsuccessful (Shook
and Knickrehm 2017: p. 22). Butler-Adam (2018: p. 1) adds the following com-
petencies: the ability to explore and adopt digital and AI solutions and to acquire
“the scarce skills required to implement, manage and work alongside the new
technology”. Obtaining such skills is crucial in staying relevant and leading opti-
mistically in a soon-to-be automated world. The 4IR requires a different kind of
leader, possessing emotional intelligence and mentor qualities, driven by sympathy
and not sense of self (Schwab 2016: pp. 100–101).
Although there were no clear pointers from the studies in the scoping review in
terms of the most appropriate leadership style for the 4IR, some studies lean towards
transformational leadership. Reasons given included that transformational leaders
first “think ahead”, setting the vision and strategy for the university to meet future
University 4.0: A Conceptual Model for South African Universities … 39

projections about remaining relevant and sustainable. Secondly, they “deliver

within”, managing the university amidst the change and reform, with the specific end
goal of assembling new capacities. Thirdly, and most vitally, transformational
leaders “lead across”, specifically captivating subordinates during the planning and
implementation phase of transformation (PWC 2017: pp. 13–18). This ability of
transformational leaders to connect, to motivate and to empower staff, and, more
importantly, to ascertain the desired change and transformation, positions them well
for leading universities through this period of fundamental change (Smith and
Pourdehnad 2018: p. 87). By comparison, Leurent et al. (2019: p. 10) also especially
find the supportive behaviours of transformational leaders to be the most successful
in the 4IR. Nonetheless, transformational leadership is by no means the be-all and
end-all solution. However, it is certainly a step in the right direction towards
accomplishing the ultimate aim in the 4IR: a new University 4.0, promoting an
innovative working environment and sustainable future (Schäfer 2018: p. 6).
South African leaders have slipped into a leadership abyss or “protectionist
mode” (Venter, as cited in Balkaran 2016: p. 11) and therefore require bold and
brave leaders (Schwab 2016: p. 97), as universities are perceived to have tinkered
around at the edge of real transformation for far too long (WEF 2017: p. 5). It is
now crucial to step up to the looming 4IR, to drive innovation, implement new
business models and establish new partnerships within the triple helix (government,
university and industry partnership) logic (Miron and Gherasim 2018: p. 612).

3.4 The Core of Institutional Change 4.0: The Triple Helix

Concept of Innovation

Encompassed by the need to form partnerships and to collaborate with industry, the
centre of the macro-conceptual model is based on the triple helix concept of
innovation, which emerged in the 1990s (Etzkowitz (1993), and Etzkowitz and
Leydesdorff (1995)).
The triple helix concept has been revisited by many leading universities for
innovation, economic growth and building an entrepreneurial university
(Leydesdorff 2018: p. 12). University–industry–government partnerships have
produced innovative formats for the invention, transmission and application of
knowledge and technology with beneficial impacts on national competitiveness
(Miron and Gherasim 2018: p. 618). In these partnerships, each partner plays a
distinctive role at structural level: “wealth generation (by industry), novelty pro-
duction (academia), and legislation and regulation (government)” (Leydesdorff
2018: p. 1). The triple helix of university–industry–government partnerships has
undoubtedly turned into the true central subsystem of an innovation model (Kim
2017: pp. 21–22).
The adoption of the triple helix model could be beneficial for universities in
generating extra income, initiating more relevant strategic research and develop-
ment suggestions, training a highly skilled and qualified student population, and
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
anéantit d’abord cette avant-garde, qui s’était imprudemment
engagée dans les steppes et puis battit à plat le gros de l’armée,
près de la petite ville de Korsoun, au mois de mai 1648. Tous les
chefs polonais tombèrent entre ses mains, la Pologne complètement
désarmée se trouva en face d’une insurrection formidable. Tout le
bassin du Dniéper se souleva ; les insurgés dévastèrent les
demeures des seigneurs, massacrèrent leurs serviteurs, les
Polonais et les Israélites.
Pour comble de malheur, mourut sur ces entrefaites le roi
Vladislas, très populaire chez les cosaques, qui s’étaient soulevés
convaincus qu’ils répondaient à son appel pour l’aider contre les
usurpations des seigneurs. Il se produisit alors une situation, à
laquelle ni les sphères gouvernementales, ni les chefs de
l’insurrection n’étaient préparés.
 XXII.
L’Ukraine orientale se sépare de la
Pologne et s’unit à la Moscovie.

En déchaînant l’insurrection, Chmelnytsky, outre que de venger

un outrage personnel, avait eu pour objet, comme d’ailleurs les chefs
des insurrections antérieures, de rétablir « les libertés cosaques »,
c’est-à-dire l’état de choses d’avant l’insurrection de 1637. Du reste,
il comptait probablement très sincèrement sur les sympathies du roi
Vladislas. Aussi, dès qu’il eut battu les chefs polonais, il lui envoya
une lettre portée par des délégués, s’excusant d’avoir infligé une
défaite aux troupes polonaises et lui offrant ses services.
Mais Vladislas était déjà mort et le gouvernement provisoire ne
pouvait se décider à prendre position dans cette affaire. Pendant ce
temps, l’armée polonaise s’était reformée et les seigneurs tâchaient
d’étouffer l’insurrection dans le sang. Ce défi lancé à Chmelnytsky le
força de reprendre ses opérations, il battit les nouvelles troupes, qui
s’étaient déjà avancées jusqu’en Volhynie, puis il pénétra en Galicie,
où un soulèvement éclata, il assiégea Léopol et ensuite Zamostie,
dans la contrée de Cholm. Il en était là lorsque fut enfin élu roi le
frère de Vladislas, Jean-Casimir. Celui-ci s’empressa de s’adresser
directement à Chmelnytsky, en lui proposant de démobiliser et
d’attendre ses envoyés.
 Ces derniers rencontrèrent le chef des insurgés à Péréïaslav, au
mois de février 1649. Ils lui apportaient sa nomination au poste
d’hetman [14] et déclarèrent que le roi consentait aux conditions, qui
avaient été formulées au début de l’insurrection. Mais vers ce temps
un changement s’était produit dans l’âme des chefs cosaques, qu’il
faut peut-être attribuer à l’influence des cercles kiéviens au milieu
desquels ils avaient passé la Noël. Le point de vue étroit des simples
revendications cosaques fut abandonné, on y substitua des projets
politiques plus larges, ayant pour base la constitution contre la
Pologne d’une ligue d’états, à laquelle l’Ukraine aurait participé
comme état indépendant. Voici les paroles que Chmelnytsky laissa
échapper devant la mission polonaise et qui furent soigneusement
notées par un des membres de cette mission :
[14] Chmelnytsky fut donc le premier à porter ce titre
officiellement. Jusqu’à lui le titre officiel des chefs
cosaques avait été « starchy » c.-à-d. aîné.

« J’ai fait ce dont je n’avais aucune idée au début, maintenant je

ferai ce que j’ai conçu. Je délivrerai du joug polonais tout le peuple
russe ! Au commencement j’ai fait la guerre pour venger un outrage
personnel, maintenant je combattrai pour notre religion orthodoxe.
Pour cela le peuple tout entier viendra à mon aide — jusqu’à Lublin,
jusqu’à Cracovie. Ce peuple je ne l’abandonnerai pas, car c’est notre
bras droit. Afin qu’après avoir exterminé les paysans vous
n’attaquiez pas les cosaques, j’aurai deux cent, trois cent mille des
miens et avec ça la horde toute entière !
« Je n’irai pas faire la guerre à l’étranger ! [15] Je ne lèverai pas
mon sabre sur les Turcs et sur les Tartares ! J’en ai assez
maintenant avec l’Ukraine, la Podolie et la Volhynie — j’ai assez de
liberté, de richesses, de provisions dans mon pays et dans ma
principauté — jusqu’à Léopol, Cholm et Halitch ! Or, après m’être
installé sur la Vistule, je dirai aux Polonais qui vivent au delà : restez
tranquille et ne bougez plus, Polonais ! Les grands et les princes je
les chasserai jusque-là et si, là-bas, ils essayent encore de nous
nuire, je saurai bien les y trouver. Aucun noble polonais ne remettra
plus les pieds dans ce pays [16] ».
[15] C’était répondre d’avance aux manœuvres des
Polonais, qui avaient l’intention, une fois la paix conclue,
de tourner les cosaques contre les Tartares et les Turcs,
pour briser l’alliance qui les unissait.
[16] Cette harangue qui nous dévoile les projets
politiques de Chmelnytsky et de son entourage au
moment où elle fut prononcée, nous éclaire aussi sur
l’état du sentiment national à cette époque et sur la
terminologie alors en usage. Comme nous le voyons, le
mot « russe » dans la bouche de Chmelnytsky est
l’équivalent de notre « ukrainien » actuel — « jusqu’à
Léopol, Cholm et Halitch » et pas davantage : voilà le
peuple russe tout entier, au delà il n’existe pas. Quelques
années plus tard, quand on aura besoin de mettre plus de
précision dans les rapports avec la Moscovie, viendra en
usage le terme de « Petite Russie » par opposition à la
« Grande Russie », mais pour le moment le besoin ne
s’en fait pas sentir. Il est curieux de noter qu’en Moscovie
on appliquait alors le nom de « blanc-russien » à tout ce
qui était ukrainien. C’est de ce nom que les chancelleries
se servaient pour désigner la langue, les lettres et la
population ukrainienne, tandis que l’on y avait conservé
l’ancienne dénomination moscovite de « Tcherkass » pour
les cosaques. Et, en effet, une différence entre ukrainien
et blanc-russien, telle que nous l’entendons de nos jours,
n’était pas encore clairement établie. Seulement, en
1654, une ligne de démarcation fut tirée lorsque l’Ukraine,
sous le nom de « Petite Russie » tomba dans une sorte
de vassalité de la Moscovie, tandis que cette dernière se
rattacha la « Russie Blanche » comme simple province.
Cette contrée, en même temps qu’elle était détachée du
ressort de l’hetman d’Ukraine, reçut officiellement son
nom, qui jusqu’alors n’avait eu qu’un sens assez vague,
comme nous l’avons vu. (Ceux qui voudraient connaître
les circonstances historiques dans lesquelles s’est
formée cette terminologie pourront lire dans la revue
« Oukraina » (l’Ukraine) 1917, no 1–2, notre article
« Grande et Petite Russie et Russie Blanche ».)
 Avec de pareilles dispositions, il ne pouvait être question d’arriver
à un accord fixant un modus vivendi entre le gouvernement polonais
et les cosaques. Chmelnytsky, ainsi que toute son armée, étaient
enflammés du désir de porter un coup décisif à la Pologne et de
délivrer à jamais l’Ukraine du joug qu’elle subissait. On conclut
seulement une trêve, qui devait durer jusqu’à la Pentecôte.
La guerre recommença en été ; les pays frontières entre la
Volhynie et la Galicie en furent le théâtre. Chmelnytsky avec le
Khan, qui commandait en personne, vinrent assiéger à Zbarage les
troupes polonaises, dont la situation devint bientôt désespérée. Le
roi, à la tête d’une nouvelle armée, accourut à leur secours, mais,
avant d’arriver à Zbarage, il se trouva entouré près de Zborov par
des forces ennemies bien supérieures. Les cosaques étaient prêts à
lui dicter leurs conditions, lorsqu’il trouva moyen de s’aboucher avec
le Khan, dont les instincts pillards dominaient les vues politiques et
qui consentit à faire la paix à condition qu’on lui payât le tribut avec
les arrérages de plusieurs années et que ses troupes fussent
autorisées à prendre en Ukraine autant d’esclaves qu’elles
voudraient. Il insista subsidiairement pour que les réclamations de
ses alliés fussent satisfaites. La paix étant ainsi conclue en principe,
il fallut donc se borner à demander les anciennes libertés cosaques,
mais on ne pouvait plus songer à une séparation d’avec la Pologne
et à l’affranchissement complet du joug polonais.
Le traité de Zborov, signé le 18 août 1649, après de pénibles
négociations, faites par l’intermédiaire du Khan, élevait à 40 mille le
nombre des cosaques enregistrés, leur permettait d’habiter non
seulement sur les terres du roi mais aussi sur les domaines des
grands seigneurs fonciers, dans la plus grande partie des bassins du
Dniéper et du Bog, c’est-à-dire dans les palatinats de Kiev, Braslav
et Tchernyhiv ; les troupes polonaises ne pouvaient pénétrer sur ce
territoire, qui recevait encore d’autres privilèges.
Comparées aux règlements cosaques jusque-là en vigueur ces
concessions paraissaient très appréciables, mais elles répondaient
si peu aux aspirations qui avaient déchaîné la guerre que
Chmelnytsky n’osa pas les rendre publiques. Il ne pouvait se
résigner à accepter un pareil résultat, s’opposait à ce que les
seigneurs revinssent en Ukraine, sachant que cela provoquerait une
nouvelle insurrection, et anxieusement il guettait une occasion
favorable pour reprendre les armes, afin de délivrer son pays.
Il essaya de gagner la Moscovie à ses plans, en même temps
que de se concilier la Turquie, afin de s’assurer l’aide de la Crimée.
Mais la Moscovie ne put se décider à sortir de sa neutralité et,
d’autre part, la Turquie était en pleine décadence de sorte que la
pression que Chmelnytsky cherchait à exercer par son intermédiaire
sur le Khan ne servait qu’à le desservir auprès de ce dernier. Aussi
lorsque, en 1651, éclata une nouvelle guerre, le Khan ne manqua
pas de le trahir et d’attirer par cette trahison une sanglante défaite
sur les cosaques, non loin de Berestetchko. Le traité de Bila Cerkva
qui s’en suivit ne fit que reproduire celui de 1649, en y ajoutant de
nouvelles restrictions et satisfit encore moins les Ukrainiens.
La guerre recommença un an plus tard et cette fois encore le
Khan prit ouvertement le parti des Polonais au milieu des opérations.
Mais cela ne pouvait avoir la même importance, car, à ce moment, la
Moscovie se préparait à abandonner sa neutralité et Chmelnytsky se
flattait d’en profiter pour donner une autre tournure aux évènements.
L’issue malheureuse des opérations militaires de 1651 réveilla en
effet la Moscovie, qui savait bien que, si les desseins de
Chmelnytsky échouaient, la Pologne s’empresserait de tourner
contre elle et les cosaques et les Tartares, pour donner un dérivatif à
leur activité. Aussi l’intervention fut-elle décidée en principe, mais on
voulait conserver d’abord les apparences.
Enfin l’assemblée du pays (« Zemski Sobor »), convoquée en
automne de l’année 1653, décida que le tzar, dans l’intérêt de
l’orthodoxie (c’était le prétexte traditionnel !), devait « prendre sous
sa haute protection l’hetman Bohdan Chmelnytsky, ainsi que l’armée
Zaporogue » et, à cet effet, engager la lutte contre la Pologne. Le
gouvernement de Moscou informa Chmelnytsky de cette décision et
lui fit savoir qu’il envoyait des délégués en Ukraine pour recevoir le
serment des cosaques et régler les nouveaux rapports.
 Cette rencontre eut lieu à Péréïaslav dans les premiers jours de
janvier 1654.
Le gouvernement moscovite consentait à intervenir militairement,
à condition que l’Ukraine reconnût la suzeraineté du tzar.
Chmelnytsky et les autres chefs cosaques y consentirent, mais ils
s’imaginaient leurs obligations sous la forme d’une convention
mutuelle par laquelle le tzar reconnaissait à l’Ukraine les libertés
qu’elle s’était conquises, en premier lieu ses droits d’état autonome,
régi par un hetman et dont il acceptait le protectorat. La Moscovie
s’engageait à défendre l’Ukraine contre tout ennemi, de même que
l’hetman devait amener ses troupes à l’appel du tzar. Des
déclarations furent échangées dans ce sens.
Alors les cosaques demandèrent que les envoyés prêtassent
serment au nom du tzar, qu’ils le prêteraient ensuite eux-mêmes,
comme cela se faisait quand on élisait un roi de Pologne. Mais les
envoyés déclarèrent que leur maître, en tant qu’autocrate, ne
pouvait prêter serment [17] , ce qui jeta la confusion parmi les
cosaques.
[17] Les délégués moscovites, dans leur rapport
officiel, insistent beaucoup sur ce point, quoique les
écrivains ukrainiens contemporains assurent que le
serment fut prêté aussi bien d’un côté que de l’autre.

En fin de compte ces derniers jurèrent solennellement fidélité au

tzar et élirent des délégués chargés de se rendre à Moscou pour y
régler dans les détails la convention entre les deux états.
 XXIII.
Divergences avec la Moscovie. Essais
de séparation.

Les pourparlers engagés avec la Moscovie, au mois de mars

1654, pour fixer dans les détails les obligations contenues dans la
brève formule adoptée à Péréïaslav, révélèrent une complète
divergence de vues dans l’esprit des deux contractants.
Les envoyés ukrainiens formulèrent leur façon d’envisager la
chose : indépendance complète de l’Ukraine sous le protectorat du
tzar ; convention militaire entre les deux parties. Le gouvernement
du pays devait rester entre les mains des autorités élues en
Ukraine : chefs de cosaques, fonctionnaires municipaux, hiérarchie
ecclésiastique. Telle était l’organisation politique qui convenait à un
peuple libéré.
D’ailleurs l’hetman de « l’armée Zaporogue » avait pris, de fait, la
place d’un chef d’état. Les colonels cosaques étaient les véritables
gouverneurs des « régiments » ou territoires qui se divisaient
l’Ukraine et dans lesquels ils commandaient non seulement les
cosaques, mais aussi la population paysanne, dont c’était le devoir
de maintenir le régiment. Les municipalités, les communautés
religieuses et la noblesse privilégiée étaient elles aussi sous le
protectorat et le contrôle du colonel. Les régiments se subdivisaient
en sotnia avec un centurion à la tête. Enfin dans les communes les
chefs cosaques de concert avec les maires, choisis par la population
civile, administraient les affaires.
C’est cette organisation en cercles, à la fois militaires et
politiques, qu’on désirait compléter, mettre au point et étendre sur
toute l’Ukraine, voire même au territoire blanc-russien, qui semblait
bien faire partie de la « Petite Russie » — à tout le ressort du
métropolite de Kiev.
Mais les desseins du gouvernement russe étaient tout autres.
L’union devait être, selon lui, le commencement d’une incorporation
réelle à la Moscovie, à titre de simples provinces, de toutes les
contrées de l’ancien royaume de Kiev, qui restaient encore sous la
suzeraineté de l’état lithuano-polonais.
En Ukraine même, il consentait à reconnaître l’autonomie de
l’armée cosaque, mais les autres couches de la population devaient
dépendre immédiatement du tzar, l’église ukrainienne se soumettre
au patriarche de Moscou, les impôts être établis et perçus par les
agents du fisc moscovite, etc. On était prêt à faire quelques
concessions d’un caractère provisoire eu égard à la personne de
l’hetman Chmelnytsky, mais on ne voulait point entendre parler de
sanctionner constitutionnellement l’état de choses créé en Ukraine
par les guerres de l’indépendance.
L’opposition entre les tendances centralistes et autocratiques de
la Moscovie et les visées autonomes et républicaines des Ukrainiens
se fit déjà sentir dans la réponse du tzar aux « articles » présentés
par les envoyés. Il faisait sur certains points des concessions
considérables (ainsi l’hetman conservait le droit d’entretenir des
relations avec les puissances étrangères) mais, en général,
l’autonomie de l’Ukraine était réduite le plus possible. L’hetman en
fut si peu satisfait qu’il tint ce document secret, comme il l’avait fait
auparavant pour le traité de Zborov.
Ces divergences se manifestaient encore davantage dans la
pratique. Les voïvodes moscovites, qui avaient amené en Ukraine
les troupes de renfort depuis longtemps désirées, refusèrent de se
placer sous le commandement de l’hetman et conservèrent leur
liberté de mouvement. Sans demander son autorisation, ils édifièrent
à Kiev leur propre forteresse, ne se souciant d’aucune autorité ou de
droits acquis et y tinrent garnison sans vouloir reconnaître aucun
pouvoir supérieur. De pareils voïvodes allaient paraître dans d’autres
villes.
Les troupes, envoyées au secours de l’hetman pour délivrer les
pays ukrainiens occidentaux du joug de la Pologne, s’appliquèrent à
soumettre ces contrées à la suzeraineté immédiate du tzar, de sorte
que Chmelnytsky jugea nécessaire d’en finir le plus tôt possible avec
cette expédition. En Russie Blanche, où les voïvodes opéraient de
concert avec les cosaques, ils ne permirent pas à ces derniers d’y
établir leurs organisations habituelles, mais insistèrent pour que les
pays occupés passassent immédiatement sous l’administration des
autorités moscovites.
Le mécontentement qui en résulta, poussa les chefs politiques
ukrainiens à chercher ailleurs un autre appui, puisque le tzar se
montrait beaucoup trop exigeant pour un allié et protecteur. La
Suède et la ligue protestante dont elle faisait partie : Transylvanie-
Brandebourg-Suède, semblaient être des alliés tout désignés. Les
cosaques avaient déjà eu anciennement des relations avec la
Suède, qui avait essayé de les gagner pour entreprendre des
opérations communes pendant les nombreuses contestations
dynastiques et territoriales que ce pays avait eues avec la Pologne.
Aussi Chmelnytsky décida-t-il de s’aboucher avec le gouvernement
suédois, mais il n’y réussit guère tant que régna la reine Christine,
peu encline à s’immiscer dans les affaires de la Pologne. Au
contraire, son successeur Charles X, dès son accession au trône
(1654), décida de profiter des difficultés qui résultaient pour la
Pologne de sa guerre avec l’Ukraine. Il fit proposer à Chmelnytsky
d’agir de concert, lui conseillant de ne point avoir confiance en la
Moscovie, mais plutôt de rompre avec elle, car le régime
autocratique du tzar ne tolérerait jamais qu’un peuple libre vécût
sous sa suzeraineté, qu’il était incapable de tenir ses promesses et
qu’en conséquence les cosaques marchaient à l’assujettissement.
 Au premier abord les Ukrainiens montrèrent peu de penchant à
renoncer définitivement à leur alliance avec la Moscovie qui leur
avait coûté tant de peines à obtenir et Chmelnytsky essaya au début
de persuader Charles de ne pas rompre avec la Moscovie et de ne
pas obliger l’Ukraine à le faire. Évidemment l’idée des hommes
politiques ukrainiens était de faire de leur pays un état neutre sous la
protection de la Moscovie, de la Suède, et peut-être aussi de la
Turquie, avec qui Chmelnytsky, après avoir prêté serment à la
Moscovie, avait renoué les anciennes relations. Mais était-ce
possible de rester longtemps neutre entre la Moscovie et la Suède ?
Il fallut choisir.
Quand les Suédois, favorisés par la chance, se furent emparés
de tout le nord de la Pologne, celle-ci employa tous les moyens pour
amener une guerre entre la Moscovie et la Suède. On fit briller aux
yeux du tzar l’espoir d’être élu roi de Pologne et d’accroître ainsi
considérablement ses états. De cette façon on parvint à signer un
armistice avec la Moscovie qui, sans régler définitivement ses
rapports avec la Pologne, entra en guerre contre la Suède. Toutes
ces négociations s’étaient passées à l’insu du gouvernement
ukrainien, qui ressentit comme une offense cette paix conclue avec
son ennemie derrière son dos.
Les Polonais, assurés de ce premier succès, entamèrent avec
Chmelnytsky des pourparlers pour annexer l’Ukraine, tout en
promettant de laisser au pays une autonomie complète. Mais il eût
été dangereux d’accepter une pareille proposition en raison des
sentiments qui régnaient dans les masses ukrainiennes envers la
Pologne. Une alliance étroite avec la Suède paraissait au contraire
d’autant plus désirable que l’éloignement de ce pays excluait toute
prétention de sa part à un pouvoir immédiat sur l’Ukraine. Il fallait
donc s’attacher à cette alliance, même au prix d’une rupture avec la
Moscovie. Au dire de Vyhovsky, le successeur de Chmelnytsky, ce
dernier aurait considéré comme inévitable, déjà en automne 1656,
cette rupture avec la Moscovie, à cause des prétentions exagérées
du tzar.
 On tâcha donc de s’entendre sur les bases suivantes : le roi de
Suède acceptait le protectorat de l’Ukraine, assurait l’intégrité de son
territoire, garantissait l’indépendance de ses habitants « comme
celle d’un peuple libre et ne dépendant de personne », promettant
d’obliger la Pologne à reconnaître la liberté et l’indépendance de
« l’Armée Zaporogue », c’est-à-dire le pouvoir de l’hetman, et
l’étendue de son autorité sur l’Ukraine occidentale, pour mieux dire
sur tout le territoire ethnographique ukrainien [18] .
[18] Le projet de ce traité a été publié, d’après les
documents conservés dans les archives de l’état suédois,
dans les « Archives de la Russie du Sud-Ouest » p. III v.
VI.

L’Ukraine devait combiner avec la Suède et la Transylvanie ses

opérations militaires dont le but était d’amener le partage de la
Pologne. Les premiers mois de l’année 1657 virent le début de ces
opérations. Elles manquèrent de coordination. De plus la Pologne,
ayant décidé les Tartares à faire une descente en Transylvanie, put
battre en déroute les troupes transylvaniennes. Même dans l’armée
cosaque il ne manquait pas de voix contre cette campagne, qui
menaçait de tout briser avec Moscou : Chmelnytsky était alors
gravement malade et l’on appréhendait que sa disparition ne fît
surgir de nouvelles complications.
Chmelnytsky, en effet, ne tarda pas à mourir, le 27 juillet 1657,
laissant le pouvoir entre les faibles mains de son fils, Georges, jeune
homme dépourvu de toute autorité, qu’il avait fait reconnaître
d’avance à l’armée comme son successeur. D’ailleurs, les chefs
militaires le remplacèrent bientôt par une de leurs créatures, le
chancelier de l’armée, Vyhovsky, ce qui fit une fort mauvaise
impression sur un grand nombre de cosaques pénétrés de
sentiments démocratiques. Dans la crise politique qui régnait alors
de pareilles dissensions étaient dangereuses.
Pour faire face aux prétentions formulées par la Moscovie :
soumission de l’église ukrainienne, installation de garnisons
moscovites dans les villes de l’Ukraine, paiement des impôts aux
agents du tzar — les Ukrainiens au pouvoir continuaient leurs
pourparlers avec la Suède. Mais juste à ce moment ce pays, attaqué
par le Danemark, interrompait sa campagne dans l’est, et, après la
mort de Charles X, concluait formellement des traités de paix avec la
Pologne et la Moscovie.
Le gouvernement de Vyhovsky se trouva en si mauvaise posture,
qu’il ne voyait plus le moyen d’arriver avec Moscou à un
arrangement nécessaire pour subjuguer ses adversaires. Le parti qui
lui était opposé voulut obtenir lui-même l’aide du gouvernement
moscovite, et celui-ci, point du tout fâché d’une division qui favorisait
sa propre politique, resta neutre.
Pour mettre fin à cette situation, Vyhovsky, de son propre
mouvement et sans s’inquiéter des intentions de Moscou, appela à
son aide les Tartares, battit ses adversaires politiques et mit à la
raison leurs partisans. Mais, jugeant impossibles ses relations avec
la Moscovie, il pensa ne trouver son salut qu’en acceptant les
propositions faites depuis longtemps par la Pologne au
gouvernement ukrainien.
Au cours de son expédition contre ses ennemis politiques au
delà du Dniéper, il signa à Hadiatch, le 6 (16) septembre 1658, avec
la mission polonaise, le traité d’union, qui a porté depuis le nom de
cette ville, par lequel l’Ukraine retournait sous la suzeraineté du roi
de Pologne, mais non pas à titre de province, mais en qualité d’état
demi-autonome sous le nom de « Grand-duché Russe », sur le
modèle du « Grand-duché de Lithuanie ». Ce nouveau grand-duché,
comprenant les palatinats de Kiev, de Braslav et de Tchernyhiv [19] ,
devait avoir ses ministres propres, son armée, ses finances et même
le droit de frapper monnaie. D’autre part, il n’aurait qu’une diète
commune avec la Pologne. A sa tête serait un hetman élu par les
classes supérieures de la population, ou pour mieux dire nommé par
le roi sur une liste de candidats présentée par les états.
[19] Quelques mois plus tard il adressa à la diète
polonaise un amendement supplémentaire, qui
probablement n’avait pas été accepté par les délégués
polonais par suite de l’insuffisance de leurs pouvoirs,
 demandant que dans le Grand-Duché Russe soient aussi
compris les pays ukrainiens occidentaux. Mais cet
amendement ne fut pas adopté.

Le gouvernement ukrainien adressa aux puissances de l’Europe

un manifeste, dans lequel il exposait les motifs de sa rupture avec la
Moscovie. Une agitation intensive fut menée dans la population par
les partisans de l’autonomie ukrainienne contre la politique
moscovite. On en exposait le danger, accusant entre autres la
Moscovie de vouloir agir en Ukraine tout comme dans la Russie
Blanche, de vouloir déporter des citoyens ukrainiens en Moscovie et
en Sibérie, de vouloir enlever des membres du clergé ukrainien pour
les remplacer par ses créatures, etc. Vyhovsky essaya aussi de
chasser de Kiev la garnison du voïvode et ne put y parvenir.
A Moscou, on prit connaissance du traité d’union et, pour le
briser, les voïvodes furent chargés de proposer des concessions
importantes à Vyhovsky, mais celui-ci, considérant le changement
comme irrémédiable, n’en continua pas moins sa politique d’union
avec la Pologne.
 XXIV.
L’Ukraine entre la Pologne, la
Moscovie et la Turquie.

Dans l’esprit de Vyhovsky l’union avec la Pologne devait lui servir

à obtenir l’aide nécessaire pour se débarrasser de la Moscovie et
abattre l’opposition qu’il rencontrait en Ukraine même. Mais la
Pologne était si affaiblie qu’elle avait besoin elle-même d’un secours
qu’elle espérait trouver chez les cosaques. Avec l’aide des Tartares,
Vyhovsky parvint à infliger, près de Konotope, une sanglante défaite
aux voïvodes moscovites, mais il ne réussit pas à se rendre maître
de la situation. La crainte de la domination polonaise et du retour
des seigneurs polonais en Ukraine suffisait à éloigner de lui la
population. On ne pouvait s’expliquer les motifs qui le faisaient agir.
De nouveau on lui opposa Georges Chmelnytsky et toute l’armée
cosaque embrassa le parti de ce dernier. Vyhovsky dut abdiquer
l’hetmanat.
Obligés par la pression des masses à reprendre le joug de la
Moscovie, les dirigeants ukrainiens auraient voulu du moins en
obtenir l’assurance qu’elle ne s’immiscerait pas dans les affaires
intérieures de l’Ukraine. Mais le gouvernement du tzar tenait à
profiter de la défaite du parti de Vyhovsky pour s’arroger les droits
les plus étendus. Aussi, après qu’ils eurent amadoué Georges
Chmelnytsky, ainsi que les principaux chefs et constitué un conseil
des cosaques favorable à leurs vues, les voïvodes firent accepter de
nouvelles restrictions à l’autonomie.
Cela n’était pas fait, évidemment, pour concilier les têtes
éclairées au nouveau régime. C’est pourquoi, lorsque, quelques
mois plus tard, la Moscovie envoya ses troupes et les cosaques en
Galicie et que cette expédition fut battue par la Pologne, celle-ci put
espérer renouer ses relations avec les Ukrainiens. Mais elle tomba
dans la même faute que la Moscovie : elle voulut profiter de la
pénible situation des Ukrainiens, causée par la défaite, pour
diminuer encore les concessions, qu’elle avait faites à Hadiatch
(quoique, comme on l’a vu, ces concessions n’eussent contenté
personne à l’époque). De fait, on en arriva à rétablir le traité d’union
de Hadiatch, sous une forme plus désavantageuse pour l’Ukraine
(1660), ce qui enlevait à cet acte toute possibilité de pouvoir servir
de base à des rapports politiques normaux.
Ces mouvements alternatifs, tantôt vers la Pologne, tantôt vers la
Moscovie, auxquels était condamnée la diplomatie cosaque,
devenaient, grâce à la malveillance de ces deux puissances à
l’égard des aspirations nationales et sociales de l’Ukraine,
désastreuses pour ce pays qui, à chaque nouvelle oscillation, restant
incapable de faire triompher sa cause, perdait quelque chose de ses
forces.
En réalité, depuis 1660, le territoire ukrainien se divisait en deux
parties : la partie orientale, qui ne pouvait se défendre contre
l’emprise moscovite et la partie occidentale obligée de s’entendre
avec la Pologne sans pouvoir en éluder les exigences. La masse de
la population était excédée des guerres incessantes et des coups
d’état fomentés par les classes dirigeantes, s’évertuant à obtenir une
autonomie qu’elles ne pouvaient atteindre et se refusant malgré
leurs échecs à renoncer à leurs aspirations.
Les dissentiments entre le peuple et les classes dirigeantes
aggravaient encore la faiblesse de l’Ukraine. Il était évident que les
chefs cosaques aspiraient à remplacer la noblesse, non seulement
dans son rôle politique, mais aussi dans sa situation sociale et qu’ils
voulaient conserver le cadre du droit polonais pour s’en servir dans
l’intérêt de leur classe. C’était éveiller la méfiance et la malveillance
des masses, qui avaient toujours le soupçon que, sous le couvert
des aspirations à l’autonomie, ne se cachassent des intérêts de
classe, surtout lorsqu’il s’agissait de pactes avec la Pologne. Aussi
par principe tenaient-elles pour la Moscovie, dont la politique leur
était tout aussi pernicieuse, mais moins connue que celle de la
Pologne, dont elles n’avaient eu que trop de preuves.
La capitale Zaporogue des steppes, la Sitche, conservait dans
toute sa pureté la tradition démocratique des anciens principes et
considérait de son devoir de s’opposer aux aspirations nobiliaires
des chefs de l’armée. Elle surveillait d’autant plus volontiers leurs
ambitions qu’elle ressentait comme une infraction aux vieux usages
que le centre politique de l’Ukraine, qui avait toujours été dans la
Zaporoguie, eût été transféré « dans les villes ». Mais l’immixtion
dans la vie politique des candidats qu’elle proposait pour l’hetmanat,
en s’inspirant plus des idées démocratiques que des besoins
politiques, ne faisait que compliquer la question au lieu de la
résoudre.
Pierre Dorochenko, élu hetman en 1665, essaya de mettre fin à
ces oscillations de l’Ukraine entre la Pologne et la Moscovie, avec
l’aide de la Turquie. C’était reprendre la politique de Chmelnytsky,
lorsqu’il essayait de secouer le joug de la Pologne en employant les
Turcs et les Tartares. La Turquie, après avoir traversé une période
de déchéance, était maintenant mieux en état d’entreprendre une
action efficace. Après avoir gagné les bonnes grâces du Khan,
Dorochenko entama directement avec le sultan des pourparlers, qui
aboutirent à un traité, par lequel l’hetman reconnaissait le protectorat
de la Sublime Porte, tandis que celle-ci s’engageait à aider l’Ukraine
à obtenir son indépendance sur tout son territoire ethnographique —
« jusqu’à Peremychl et Sambor (à l’ouest), la Vistule et le Neman (au
nord), Sivsk et Poutivl (sur les frontières de la Moscovie) ».
Le Khan reçut l’ordre du sultan de prêter son aide à Dorochenko.
Ce dernier, ainsi soutenu, sans briser directement avec la Pologne,
mais en attaquant les chefs cosaques, qu’elle soutenait, parvint
bientôt à chasser de la rive droite ukrainienne du Dniéper les
garnisons polonaises.
Puis il se tourna vers la rive gauche, où gouvernait alors l’hetman
Brukhovetsky, un habile démagogue, qui, mis d’abord en avant
comme candidat par la Sitche Zaporogue, avait ensuite, pour se
concilier la Moscovie, cédé à des exigences de cette dernière
qu’aucun de ses prédécesseurs n’avait voulu écouter.
Entre autres choses, il avait laissé réaliser le vieux désir de
Moscou d’introduire dans le pays les impôts moscovites. Mais
lorsque les agents du fisc commencèrent à établir un cadastre et à
lever des taxes, la colère de la population ne connut plus de bornes.
Le clergé ukrainien, de son côté, fut révolté par les prétentions du
patriarche de Moscou.
Le mécontentement était d’ailleurs général, suscité par l’armistice
que la Moscovie venait de signer avec la Pologne, à l’insu des
Ukrainiens, lui cédant la partie de l’Ukraine située sur la rive droite
du Dniéper, à l’exception de Kiev et ses environs immédiats.
Brukhovetsky, voyant sa position menacée, essaya de passer lui-
même au mouvement anti-moscovite. Mais cette manœuvre de la
dernière heure ne put le sauver. L’insurrection, qui éclata au début
de 1668 contre les garnisons et la domination moscovites, l’engloutit
également. A l’arrivée de Dorochenko, tout le monde joignit son
étendard, Brukhovetsky fut tué et les troupes moscovites durent
quitter le pays. Toute l’Ukraine cosaque était une fois de plus unifiée
sous le commandement de Dorochenko.
Ce premier pas accompli et comptant sur l’aide de la Turquie et
de la Crimée, l’hetman voulut réaliser l’ancien projet des
autonomistes : faire de l’Ukraine un état indépendant, sous la
protection de ses voisins. Ayant chassé les garnisons ennemies de
la rive droite du Dniéper, il voulait en faire autant de la rive gauche.
Avant tout, il désirait réduire les droits de Moscou à ceux d’un
véritable protectorat sans immixtion dans les affaires intérieures et il
exigeait en premier lieu le rappel des voïvodes.
 Quelques évènements, qu’il ne prévoyait pas, vinrent tout d’un
coup affaiblir sa position et privèrent de toute force convaincante ses
réclamations aux yeux de la Moscovie.
Il avait d’abord eu l’imprudence d’abandonner l’Ukraine de la rive
gauche et les troupes moscovites s’étaient hâtées de retourner dans
les contrées de Tchernyhiv. Les autorités locales, aussi bien que le
clergé et les chefs cosaques, désespérant de jamais s’en
débarrasser, tâchèrent de s’arranger avec Moscou, sans s’occuper
de Dorochenko, qui à ce moment ne pouvait leur être d’aucun
secours.
Ils élurent pour eux un hetman particulier, Mnohohrichny, avec le
titre « d’hetman des pays de Siver et de Tchernyhiv ». Celui-ci se
déclara prêt à se soumettre au tzar et à rompre toute alliance avec
les Tartares, à condition que l’on donnât des garanties à l’autonomie
ukrainienne, qu’on rappelât les voïvodes, etc. — en un mot, un
ensemble de réclamations assez semblables à celles de
Dorochenko. De son côté, la Sitche Zaporogue poursuivait une
politique séparée et opposait de nouveaux rivaux à Dorochenko.
Le gouvernement moscovite comptait sur ces querelles
intestines, aussi ne céda-t-il point. Par ses agents, notamment par
un homme aussi au courant des choses que le voïvode de Kiev,
Cheremetief, il savait bien que les réclamations de Dorochenko et de
Mnohohrichny correspondaient entièrement aux aspirations
populaires, que la population en avait assez des voïvodes et était
excédée par la licence des garnisons. Cependant, les milieux
influents de Moscou ne voulaient en aucune façon renoncer à leur
politique centraliste. Il fallait annexer l’Ukraine, serait-ce même
contre le vœu des populations.
Il ne restait à Dorochenko que de jouer sa dernière carte :
l’intervention turque. Politique dangereuse au premier chef, car les
cosaques ainsi que les masses avaient grandi dans la tradition de
« guerre à l’infidèle », aussi toute idée d’alliance, les passages
fréquents des Tartares dans le pays et les enlèvements d’esclaves
qui souvent les accompagnaient, soulevaient-ils un mécontentement
général. Dorochenko continuait en secret ses négociations avec la
Turquie parce qu’il n’apercevait pas d’autre moyen de salut.
Le sultan, lui ayant promis une aide active, déclara en 1671 la
guerre à la Pologne, parce qu’elle avait attaqué son vassal
Dorochenko. Au printemps il se mit en marche à la tête d’une
puissante armée, vint assiéger Kaminetz, la plus grosse forteresse
du sud, qui capitula assez rapidement, puis il marcha sur Léopol. La
Pologne, se sentant impuissante, se rendit à merci. Par le traité
conclu à Boutchatch, le 7 octobre 1672, elle céda à la Turquie la
Podolie et à Dorochenko « l’Ukraine dans ses anciennes frontières ».
En outre elle promettait de retirer ses garnisons des pays cédés et
de payer à la Turquie un tribut annuel.
Cela fit impression sur la Moscovie, qui ne douta pas, que l’été
suivant Dorochenko n’amenât les Tartares sur la rive gauche du
Dniéper. L’assemblée générale convoquée par le tzar lui conseilla de
prendre Dorochenko sous sa protection, puisque la Pologne se
désintéressait de l’Ukraine à droite du Dniéper et de satisfaire autant
que possible les demandes de l’hetman. Mais la Pologne fit savoir à
la Moscovie que ce n’était point son intention de renoncer à l’Ukraine
et qu’elle considérerait une démarche dans le sens indiqué par les
boïards comme une violation des traités.
Cependant les Turcs ne firent pas de nouvelle expédition. Bien
au contraire, l’hetman polonais Sobieski les attaqua, inaugurant
cette série de victoires, qui devaient lui valoir la couronne. Par
ailleurs, la façon dont les Turcs se conduisaient sur la rive droite du
Dniéper produisait un mécontentement, que les ennemis de
Dorochenko ne manquaient point de tourner à leur propre avantage.
La population fuyait en masse au delà du fleuve et les « régiments »
de ces contrées qui tenaient pour Dorochenko se dépeuplaient de
plus en plus.
Au courant de ces circonstances, l’hetman de la rive gauche,
Samoïlovitch, élu comme successeur de Mnohohrichny, conseilla à
la Moscovie de ne point se hâter de s’arranger avec son rival,
Dorochenko, dont il voulait se débarrasser. Au lieu d’entrer en
pourparlers avec ce dernier, il sembla l’ignorer complètement, fit une