Republic Vrs Baffoebonnie and Others 2018 GHASC 40 (7 June 2018)
Republic Vrs Baffoebonnie and Others 2018 GHASC 40 (7 June 2018)
Republic Vrs Baffoebonnie and Others 2018 GHASC 40 (7 June 2018)
THE REPUBLIC
VRS
JUDGMENT
The case emanated from a criminal trial of the five accused person who are
facing various charges ranging from conspiracy to causing financialloss to
the State contrary to sections 23(1) and 179(A), willfully causing financial
loss to the State contrary to section 179(A), conspiracy to steal contrary to
sections 23(1) and 124, Stealing contrary to section 124, using public office
for profit contrary to section 179(c) all of the Criminal and Other Offences
Act, 1960, (Act 29). Other charges include contravention of theProcurement
Act contrary to sections 92(1) and 134(1)(a) of the Public ProcurementAct,
2003, (Act 663), money laundering contrary to section 1(1)(c) of the Anti-
Money Laundering Act, 2007, (Act 749) and intentionally misapplying public
funds contrary to section 1(2) of the Public Property Protection Act, 1977,
(SMCD 140). The amount involved and for which the Republic claim to have
lost is Four Million United States Dollars (USD$4,000.000.00). All the
accused persons have pleaded not guilty. A rendition of the facts in support
of the seventeen charges against the accused persons are irrelevant for
purposes of the case stated for the interpretation of article19 (2) (e) and (g)
of the 1992 Constitution.
Before the prosecution called its first witness the defence lawyers made an
oral application on 9 January, 2018, for the documents that the prosecution
will rely on in the summary trial. The DPP acceded to the request and
indicated that the prosecution would supply the lawyers with the documents
available and as when more documents come into their custody in the
course of the trial. The lawyers for the fourth and fifth accused persons,
respectively, filed applications before the High Court praying for all the
evidence the prosecution will rely on to be furnished them before a witness
starts to give evidence. What they were requesting forwere, a summary of
evidence, police witness statements, documents discovered by the
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prosecution including those that will not be tendered. The lawyer for the
fourth accused further wanted a declaration that any document or other
material evidence that the prosecution may attempt to tender in evidence
without first giving the same to the accused at least three clear days before
attempting to tender such evidence is inadmissible.
The prosecution opposed the application on the grounds that it has already
met with the order of the court for them to be provided with the necessary
documents that they will rely on at the trial. That the documents were made
available to the Registrar of the Court on the 10 January 2018 and that as
the trial proceeds, the documents that came into their possession would be
made available to the accused persons before a witness tenders them in
court. And this to the prosecution is in accord with the nature of the trial
which is a summary one that does not require laborious preparation of
summary of evidence and a list of witnesses together with all the documents
they will rely on at the trial.
The High Court therefore in compliance with Article 130 (2) referred the
matter to the Supreme Court to determine the following issues:
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2. If the answer is yes, then at what point should prosecution
make the disclosures available to the accused person in view
of the fact that summary trial may commence within 48 hours
upon arrest and charges being proffered against the accused.
3. Whether on a true and proper interpretation and construction
of article 19(2)(e) (g) of the Constitution, an accused in a
summary trial was entitled to full disclosure of documents in
the possession of prosecution that would not even be tendered
by the prosecution as exhibits before a trial court
It is necessary for purposes of clarity to set out article 19(1) in addition to the
relevant clauses the Supreme Court has been called upon to interpret.
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2000. Our Chapter 5 on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms is a
direct incorporation of the international bill of rights based on universal
human rights and freedoms contained in the UDHR. Our Article 19 which
reflects article 10 of the UDHR is in pari materia with article 14 of CCPR. It
will therefore be useful to set out the relevant provisions of these
international conventions as well.
Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.
3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone
shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
Similarly, Article 6 (1) (2) (b) (d) of the European Convention and
Fundamental Freedom [ECFF], Rome 4th November 1960 provides:
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1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law…
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his case
General Observations
“For one of the basic principles of any civilized system of justice is that
a person is entitled to a fair trial free from prejudice. No system of
justice can be effective unless a fair trial to both sides is ensured…
This common law right to a fair trial is now elevated to a fundamental
right in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.”
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In addition to the right to fair trial, are other guarantees such as equal
access to justice and equality of arms, which require that the parties to the
proceedings in question are treated without any discrimination and or
distinction based on the nature or mode of the trial in both civil and criminal
proceedings.Consequently, we are of the view that access to administration
of justice and the enforcement of the constitutional right to fair hearing shall
be enforced in a manner that ensures that no individual is deprived, in
procedural terms, of his/her right to seek justice.
With the enactment of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004,
(C.I.47) Ghana follows best practices and our civil procedure is in
compliance with article 19 (13) which provide that:
Unfortunately this is not the position in criminal trials where the liberty and
freedom of the person is at stake. Currently pretrial disclosure in criminal
trials only exists under Part Four of the Criminal and Other Offences
Procedure Act, 1960, (Act 30)which relates to trials on indictment. Even
then the disclosure is not comprehensive as it does not extend to some of
the materials, counsels herein were demanding from the prosecution at the
High Court.
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The element of surprise in summary trials should be a matter of concern for
this Court as the bulk of criminal and other offences under Act 29 and other
enactments are tried summarily. It is only in respect of offences, the
punishment for which is death or imprisonment for life, which are tried by
jury, [article 19 (2) (a) (i) and (ii)] and the offence of high treason or treason
which is tried by the High Court constituted by three justices of the High
Court [article 19 (2) (i)].
We take note that the same provisions existed under the 1969 and 1979
Constitutions before the 1992 Constitution was adopted, and no effort was
made to initiate reforms to bring Act 30 of 1960 in conformity with the
provisions of the Constitution or otherwise to give effect to or enable effect
to be given to the changes effected by the Constitution in respect of
fundamental human rights to fair trial.The controversy which gave rise to
this case indicates the lack of certainty with respect to disclosures in criminal
trials.
Until now the Supreme Court has not been given the opportunity to interpret
the scope and dimension of the right of an accused person under article
19(2) (e) and (g) though it had in a couple of cases called for certain
procedures available in trials by indictment to be extended to summary trials
for the effective protection of the liberty of the individual on trial.
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Ghana.Furthermore, by the clear wording of the article 19 (1) that: “A person
charged with a criminal offence shall be given a fair hearing within a
reasonable time by a court,” no distinction, can legitimately be made in the
application or enforcement of this basic right, by the nature of the offence or
mode of trial.
Question 1
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of the minimum rights of a fair trial guaranteed under article 19 of the
Constitution of Ghana.
Submissions by parties
First counsel submits that “in order to enjoy the full panoply of the right to
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of an accused person’s
defence, the accused must be furnished with all materials that the
prosecution is in possession of whether inculpatory or exculpatory to ensure
equality of arms between the prosecution and the accused.”.
Third counsel expressed similar views as first counsel did and adds that this
constitutional requirement for discovery does not impose any extra burden
on the prosecution as the prosecution would have completed investigations
before arraigning an accused before court and would have in their
possession documentary evidence including statements it has obtained from
the investigation of the alleged crime and statements which might support
the case of the accused. Drawing an analogy from the rules of civil
procedures he contends that the natural interpretation of article 19(2) (e)
can only mean that an accused person in a criminal trial and whose liberty is
on the line has to be given all materials which the prosecution intends to use
at trial within a reasonable time; to enable the accused to adequately
prepare his defence.
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He submits finally that in view of article 19(2) (e) and (g) even though the
third accused is being tried under Part III of Act 30 in a summary trial, he is
entitled to be given all documents which the prosecution would make
available to an accused being tried under indictment otherwise, and
according to counsel, it would be discriminatory to deny an accused person
on summary trial such facilities.
Fourth counsel submits that the omission or the absence of a provision in Act
30 to compel the prosecution to furnish the fourth accused person
undergoing summary trial, with a list of witnesses and documents to be
relied on by the prosecution has been cured by the provisions of article 19(2)
(e) and (g). He contends that to confine the pre-trial disclosures which are
fundamental ingredients of fair trial only to trials on indictment to the total
exclusion of summary trials which is the most common form of trial in our
criminal justice system ‘is an aberration of justice’. He concludes that proper
disclosure of evidence of great force may cause the accused to plead guilty,
to the advantage of both the administration of justice and of the accused.
Fifth counsel submits that the 5th accused, must be on the same footing as
the prosecution, and that whatever evidence the prosecution intends to rely
on for trial should be placed at the disposal of the fifth accused so that no
surprises is sprung on him. He contends that the current practice whereby
pretrial disclosure is restricted to indictable trials suggests that the quality of
justice and fairness of the hearing one gets in criminal trial depends on the
mode of trial. He concludes that article 19(2) (e) and (g) is meant to rectify
this error.
The DPP on her part declared that in principle, the Republic is not opposed to
disclosure of relevant information reasonably necessary for an accused
person in a summary trial but is opposed to absolute disclosure and calls for
restrictions in the public interest and national security. She submits that the
position of the prosecution was demonstrated by their readiness to file all
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documents in their possession at the Court Registry and their intention to file
other documents as and when they have them. She considered as
misconceived and totally unsupportable, the suggestion that the distinction
between the mode of trial of summary offences and trial on indictment
amounts to setting two different standards for justice delivery. The DPP
submits that such distinctions are not unconstitutional especially when under
the provisions of the said article 19 there are distinctions in mode of trial for
certain offences and the type of punishment .She contends these differences
confer a greater right on the accused persons standing trial in respect of
those offences, which are listed as murder, manslaughter and high treason
or treason.She considered the application unwarranted and intended to
delay the trial.
Consideration
The rules of disclosure owe their origin to the elementary right of every
defendant to a fair trial. In R v DPP ex parte Lee [1999]2 ALL ER 737
at747 the Court of Appeal in adopting the earlier House of Lords decision in
R v Brown [1997] 3All ER 769at 778, said:
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Some of the reasons made against disclosure in summary trials are that it is
not provided for under Act 30; that it would cause delays, expense and place
a burden on overburdened prosecutors, in addition to concerns for
maintaining national and state security. The question we pose is: “Does the
expediency of prompt and less expensive trials in summary trials be more
important than the liberty of the accused which is at stake to justify non-
disclosure?”
With the consensus on the issue at the bar that an accused person in a
summary trial is entitled to pretrial disclosures in accordance with article
19(2) (e), our task is therefore simplified.
The matter for consideration then is what is ‘adequate time and facilities’
which formed the basis of the conflictthat called for the reference.It is
pertinent to restate article 19 (2) (e) and (g) that provides as follows:
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The first counsel urged on us that the words contained in article 19 (2) (e)
and (g) are plain and therefore invited us to adopt ‘‘the true plain, ordinary
and grammatical meaning of the words used’’. However giving the words
‘adequate time and facilities’ its plain, ordinary and grammatical meaning
does not give the true purpose and intent of the rights they are supposed to
entail. For example, in Black’s Law Dictionary, [Ninth Edition] the word
‘adequate’ is defined as ‘legally sufficient’ and ‘facilities’ or ‘facility’ is not
defined. Its verb to‘facilitate’ is defined as (Criminal Law) to make the
commission of a crime easier. In the Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary 7th Edition the word ‘adequate’ has been defined inter alia as:
‘enough in quantity, good in quality for a purpose or need’ and ‘facilities’
defined as, ‘buildings, services, equipments etc that are provided for a
particular purpose’. It is obvious from these illustrations that adopting the
ordinary dictionary meanings of the words adequate facilities would not aid
us.
We will therefore, as has been the practice and jurisprudence of this Court,
rather choose the liberal, generous, benevolent or purposive approach.
Accordingly in our context, ‘facilities’ is to be understood as resources, or
means, which makes it easier to achieve a purpose, an unimpeded
opportunity of doing something, favourable conditions for the easier
performance or doing of something, Its verb ‘to facilitate’ means to render
easy or easier the performance of doing something to attain a result, to
promote, help forward, assist, aid or lesson the labour of one; to make less
difficult; or to free from difficulty or impediment.
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Non-disclosure is a potent source of injustice as it is often difficult to say
whether an undisclosed item of evidence might have shifted the balance or
opened up a new line of defence.
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right to fair trial; however we have to find out the true intent and purpose
ofarticle 19 (2) (e) and (g.
What is needed here is a firm statement or rule which can in the first
instance provide the police and prosecutors with a proper basis of judgment
of what to disclose.Our Constitution, unlike some other countries, does not
specifically provide for the kind of materials to be disclosed. We take note
that, the Constitution of Kenya expressly makes provision for that in article
50 (2) (j) which provides:
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“Every accused person has the right to a fair trial which includes the
right to be informed in advance of the evidence the prosecution
intends to rely on, and have reasonable access to that evidence.”
The counsels for the accused persons advocate for comprehensive pretrial
disclosure which should include a list of witnesses, summary of evidence,
names of witnesses, documents and any other relevant material in the
custody of the prosecution whether inculpatory or exculpatory. The DPP
agrees in principle and not opposed to disclosure of relevant information
reasonably necessary which she lists as follows, copies of the charge sheet,
statement of facts, documents to be tendered at the trial, copy of an
accused person’s own statement and all of these are to be provided upon
demand by the accused.
The words ‘adequate facilities’ as used in our article19 (2) (e) is more or
less a legal term commonly used in international conventions in relation to
fair trial, Notable examples are found in article 6 of the ECFF supra and in
article 14 of the CCPR supra. ‘Adequate facilities’ was clarified by the
Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 32[CCPR/C/GC 32, of 23
August 2007] on Article 14 ‘on theright to equality before courts and
tribunals and to a fair trial;’ in paragraphs 32 and 33 as follows:
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material establishing innocence but also other evidence that assist the
defence (e.g. indications that confession was not voluntary)“
From the foregoing we hold that, in order to meet the requirement of fair
trial in criminal matters, it is the duty of the prosecution in both indictment
and summary trials, to disclose to the defence, statements made to the
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police by persons who will or may not be called to testify as witnesses for the
prosecution, as well as copies of exhibits and documents which are to be
offered in evidence for the prosecution.The list of documents specified by the
DPP in her brief would therefore not meet this requirement.
We reject submissions by the counsels for the accused persons that witness
statements be summarised, as this would culminate in delays in summary
trials. Experience has shown the Bar’s preference for copies of original police
witness statements when conducting cross-examinations. In order to avoid
delays in summary trials, copies of witness statements should suffice and
these materials may be filed at the Registry of the trial court for service on
the accused.
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(g) be afforded facilities to examine, in person or by his lawyer, the
witnesses called by the prosecution before the court, and to obtain the
attendance and carry out the examination of witnesses to testify on
the same conditions as those applicable to witnesses called by the
prosecution.
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It seems to us that the right of compelling the attendance of witnesses by
the accused implies reciprocity of a disclosure by the accused to the
prosecution of the names and addresses of his witnesses especially when an
alibi is raised. This usually happens at committal proceedings under Act
30.This would enable subpoenas to be issued on his behalf. However the
accused need not disclose the nature of the evidence the witness is to give.
Is article19 (2) (e) and (g) limited in its terms? What is the extent of the
limitation, if any? We pose these questions as the accused’s right to a fair
trial ultimately takes precedence over any person’s right to privacy. The right
to fair trial under article 19 is unqualified whereas the right to privacy under
article 18(1) is qualified under clause (2) by reference to the need to protect
the right and freedom of others. In Raphael Cubagee V Michael Yeboah
Asare & Ors, Suit No J6/04/2017unreported dated 28 February 2018,
the Supreme Court in considering the scope of article 18 (1) observed
through Pwamang JSC as follows: “The enforcement of human rights is not a
one way street since no human right is absolute. There are other policy
considerations that have to be taken into account when a court in the course
of proceedings is called upon to enforce human rights by excluding evidence
and that explains why more jurisdictions have now adopted the discretionary
rule approach.”
"(2) Every person in Ghana, whatever his race, place of origin, political
opinion, colour, religion, creed or gender shall be entitled to the
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fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual contained in
this Chapter but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms
of others and for the public interest". [Emphasis supplied]
This Court recalls the case, Civil and Local Government Staff
Association of Ghana [CLOSAG] v The Attorney-General and 2 Ors,
Suit No J1/16/2016 dated 14 June 2017, (unreported), whereSophia
Akuffo CJ said:
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b. Is the limitation proportional? Is the limitation over-broad such as
to effectively nullify a particular right or freedom guaranteed by the
constitution? [Emphasis supplied]
In this context, it will suffice to say that .the right of the defence to disclosure
is not unlimited as explained in paragraph 39 of the Human Rights
Committee in their General Comment:
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parties to determine the admissibility of evidence and how
their courts assess it.”[Emphasis supplied]
Counsel for the accused can initiate a review with respect to the exercise of
discretion by the prosecution. On review the prosecution must justify its
refusal to disclose.
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The word ‘adequate’ connotes the notion of reasonableness, so that on the
true and proper meaning and application of this constitutional right we hold
that disclosure should be made within such time and space so as to enable
theaccused to prepare for the commencement of proceedings. What counts
as “adequate time” depends on the circumstances of each case such as the
complexity of the case.
One of the major criticisms against disclosure is that it causes delay and
overburdens the prosecution. We appreciate this concern, but if the
prosecution voluntarily discloses materials to the accused, there would be
fewer delays. In any event, the system of administration of criminal justice
will benefit from early disclosures as it will foster the resolution of many
cases without trial and promote reconciliation in cases where the offence
does not amount to felony and not aggravated in degree as provided by
section 73 the Courts Act, 1993, (Act 459). Disclosures may also lead to
plea bargaining (Section 239 of Act 30) or a plea of guilty by the disclosure
of a good case by the prosecution.
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prosecution in the course of the trial,as was promised by the DPP at the trial
court
. If counsel reasonably feels that the time for the preparation of the defence
is insufficient, it is his duty to request the adjournment of the trial. There is
an obligation to grant reasonable requests for adjournment, in particular,
when the accused is charged with a serious criminal offence and additional
time for preparation of the defence is needed.
The provisions under consideration are stated in mandatory terms and the
prosecution is obliged to comply. It is therefore the duty of the prosecution
to do disclosure voluntarily andit is to be made at all stages until the final
judgment on appeal. The disclosure, whether in first instance or on appeal
must take place “without undue delay.”
When an appellate court is called upon to review a failure to disclose, all the
circumstances of the case would have to be taken into account to determine
whether the failure to disclose such evidence resulted in an unfair trial.
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ISSUE 2 If the answer is yes, then at what point should prosecution
make the disclosures available to the accused person in view of the
fact that summary trial may commence within 48 hours upon arrest
and charges being proffered against the accused.
The fact that a trial may commence within 48 hours does not alter the
position that an accused person is entitled to full disclosure. Completion of
investigation before proceeding with prosecution of a charge or charges is
very much within the control of the prosecution. The prosecution by
commencing the hearing of evidence in support of a charge against an
accused person within 48 hours of arrest clearly demonstrates that it has
completed its investigation and thus would be obliged to provide copies of
the necessary documents. On the other hand where investigations may still
be on- going, the prosecution’s brief will often not be complete and
disclosure will be limited by this fact. There may also be situations in which
early disclosure may impede completion of an investigation. The obligation
to disclose is however a continuing one and disclosure must be completed
when additional information is received in the course of the trial. In all such
situations the prosecution has the discretion to determine the time and
manner of disclosure.
CONCLUSION
On a proper and true interpretation of article 19 (2) (e) and (g), we hold that
it is inherent in the right to a fair trial, of an accused person’s right to be
given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence as well
as facilities to examine in person or by his lawyer, the witnesses called by
the prosecution before the court and to obtain the attendance and carry out
the examination of witnesses on the same condition as those applicable to
witnesses called by the prosecution.
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Consequently, we hold that to give meaning to this right to a fair trial, the
accused person in a summary trial is entitled to be given or have access to
copies of witnesses’ statements, copies of documents and exhibits in the
possession of the prosecution, including materials they do not intend to
tender before a trial court.
Failure to disclose does not automatically nullify a trial. When the issue is
raised on appeal, the court must consider whether such failure impaired the
right of the accused to make a defence, which in turn depends on the nature
of the information withheld and whether it might have affected the outcome
or the failure has occasioned a miscarriage of justice under section 31 of
the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459)
Law Reform
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This decision is yet another urgent call to the Law Reform Commission to
overhaul Act 30 which is an earlier and subordinate legislation to bring it in
line with the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. In view of the
numerous clarification and interpretation of Constitution by this Court in
contradiction with provisions of the said Act 30, there is the need for urgent
reforms in the administration of criminal justice in the country. This call is
urgent in view of the on-going reforms and restructuring of the Judiciary by
way of case management, e-filing and electronic tracking of criminal cases.
Rules of Civil Procedure have been exhaustively reformed in 2004, by the C.I.
47; an overhaul of Act 30 must follow suit in respect of trial on indictment
and summary trials for it to be in compliance with the Constitution.
Legislation on disclosure of information and documents will give a clear
guide to all stakeholders and thereby reduce the number of unnecessary
cases put on trial, and applications for disclosures as well as minimize delays
and the miscarriage of justice.
S. O. A. ADINYIRA (MRS)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
ATUGUBA, JSC:-
W. A. ATUGUBA
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
ANSAH, JSC:-
J. ANSAH
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(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
DOTSE, JSC:-
J. V. M. DOTSE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
YEBOAH, JSC:-
ANIN YEBOAH
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
GBADEGBE, JSC:-
N. S. GBADEGBE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
APPAU, JSC:-
Y. APPAU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
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COUNSEL
THADDEUS SORY FOR THE 1ST ACCUSED WITH HIM THERESA TALATA KUNLIE
AND ABU JUAN JAGIARRA.
SAMUEL CUDJOE FOR THE 3RD ACCUSED WITH HIM JOHNSON NORMESINU.
BAFFOE ASAASE GYIMAH FOR THE 4TH ACCUSED WITH HIM KODJO YANKSON
AND GODWIN TAMAKLOE.
OSAFO BUABENG FOR THE 5TH ACCUSED WITH HIM REINDORF TWUMASI
ANKRAH.
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