Pycryptodome

PyCryptodome Documentation
Release 3.17.0
Legrandin
Jan 27, 2023

Contents
1 PyCryptodome 3
2 Features 5
3 Installation 9
3.1 Compiling in Linux Ubuntu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 Compiling in Linux Fedora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3 Windows (from sources) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4 Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5 PGP verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4 Compatibility with PyCrypto 13
5 API documentation 15
5.1 Crypto.Cipher package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.2 API principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.3 Symmetric ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1.4 Legacy ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.2 Crypto.Signature package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2.1 Signing a message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2.2 Verifying a signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2.3 Available mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.3 Crypto.Hash package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.3.1 API principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.3.2 Attributes of hash objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.3.3 Modern hash algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.3.4 Extensible-Output Functions (XOF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.3.5 Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.3.6 Historic hash algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.4 Crypto.PublicKey package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.4.1 API principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.4.2 Available key types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.4.3 Obsolete key type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.5 Crypto.Protocol package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.5.1 Key Derivation Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.5.2 Secret Sharing Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
i
5.6 Crypto.IO package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.6.1 PEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.6.2 PKCS#8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.7 Crypto.Random package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.7.1 Crypto.Random.random module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.8 Crypto.Util package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.8.1 Crypto.Util.asn1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.8.2 Crypto.Util.Padding module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.8.3 Crypto.Util.RFC1751 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.8.4 Crypto.Util.strxor module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.8.5 Crypto.Util.Counter module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.8.6 Crypto.Util.number module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6 Examples 79
6.1 Encrypt data with AES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.2 Generate an RSA key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.3 Generate public key and private key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.4 Encrypt data with RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7 Frequently Asked Questions 83

7.1 Is CTR cipher mode compatible with Java? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.2 Are RSASSA-PSS signatures compatible with Java? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.3 Are RSASSA-PSS signatures compatible with OpenSSL? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.4 Why do I get the error No module named Crypto on Windows? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.5 Why does strxor raise TypeError: argument 2 must be bytes, not bytearray? 84
7.6 Why do I get a translation_unit_or_empty undefined error with pycparser? . . . . 85
8 Contribute and support 87
9 Future plans 89
10 Changelog 91
10.1 3.17.0 (29 January 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
10.1.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
10.1.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
10.1.3 Other changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.2 3.16.0 (26 November 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.2.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.2.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.3 3.15.0 (22 June 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.3.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.3.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.4 3.14.1 (5 February 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.4.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.5 3.14.0 (30 January 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.5.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.6 3.13.0 (23 January 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.6.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.6.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.6.3 Other changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.7 3.12.0 (4 December 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.7.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.7.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.8 3.11.0 (8 October 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.8.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
ii
10.8.2 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.9 3.10.4 (25 September 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.9.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.10 3.10.3 (22 September 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.10.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.10.2 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.10.3 Other changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.11 3.10.1 (9 February 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.11.1 Other changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.12 3.10.0 (6 February 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.12.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.12.2 Other changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.12.3 Breaks in compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.13 3.9.9 (2 November 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.13.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.13.2 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.14 3.9.8 (23 June 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.14.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.14.2 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.15 3.9.7 (20 February 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.15.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.16 3.9.6 (2 February 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.16.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.17 3.9.5 (1 February 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.17.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.17.2 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.18 3.9.4 (18 November 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.18.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.19 3.9.3 (12 November 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
10.19.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
10.20 3.9.2 (10 November 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
10.20.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
10.20.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
10.21 3.9.1 (1 November 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
10.21.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
10.21.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
10.22 3.9.0 (27 August 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
10.22.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
10.22.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10.23 3.8.2 (30 May 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10.23.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10.24 3.8.1 (4 April 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10.24.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10.24.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10.25 3.8.0 (23 March 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10.25.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10.25.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10.26 3.7.3 (19 January 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10.26.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10.27 3.7.2 (26 November 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10.27.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10.28 3.7.1 (25 November 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10.28.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
iii
10.28.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10.29 3.7.0 (27 October 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
10.29.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
10.29.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
10.30 3.6.6 (17 August 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
10.30.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
10.31 3.6.5 (12 August 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
10.31.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
10.32 3.6.4 (10 July 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
10.32.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
10.32.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
10.33 3.6.3 (21 June 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
10.33.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
10.34 3.6.2 (19 June 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
10.34.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
10.34.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
10.35 3.6.1 (15 April 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.35.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.35.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.36 3.6.0 (8 April 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.36.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.36.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.37 3.5.1 (8 March 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.37.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.38 3.5.0 (7 March 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.38.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.38.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
10.39 3.4.12 (5 February 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
10.39.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
10.40 3.4.11 (5 February 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
10.40.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
10.41 3.4.10 (2 February 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
10.41.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
10.42 3.4.9 (1 February 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
10.42.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
10.42.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10.43 3.4.8 (27 January 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10.43.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10.43.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10.44 3.4.7 (26 August 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10.44.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10.44.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10.45 3.4.6 (18 May 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10.45.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10.46 3.4.5 (6 February 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.46.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.47 3.4.4 (1 February 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.47.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.48 3.4.3 (17 October 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.48.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.49 3.4.2 (8 March 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
iv
10.49.1 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.50 3.4.1 (21 February 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.50.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.51 3.4 (7 February 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.51.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.51.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
10.52 3.3.1 (1 November 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
10.52.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
10.52.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
10.53 3.3 (29 October 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
10.53.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
10.53.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
10.54 3.2.1 (9 September 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
10.54.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
10.55 3.2 (6 September 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
10.55.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
10.55.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
10.56 3.1 (15 March 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
10.56.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
10.56.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
10.57 3.0 (24 June 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
10.57.1 New features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
10.57.2 Resolved issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
10.57.4 Other changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11 License 111
11.1 Public domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
11.2 BSD license . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Python Module Index 113
Index 115
v
vi
PyCryptodome Documentation, Release 3.17.0
Contents 1
2 Contents
CHAPTER 1
PyCryptodome
PyCryptodome is a self-contained Python package of low-level cryptographic primitives.

It supports Python 2.7, Python 3.5 and newer, and PyPy.
The installation procedure depends on the package you want the library to be in. PyCryptodome can be used as:
1. an almost drop-in replacement for the old PyCrypto library. You install it with:
pip install pycryptodome
In this case, all modules are installed under the Crypto package.
One must avoid having both PyCrypto and PyCryptodome installed at the same time, as they will interfere with
each other.
This option is therefore recommended only when you are sure that the whole application is deployed in a
virtualenv.
2. a library independent of the old PyCrypto. You install it with:
pip install pycryptodomex
In this case, all modules are installed under the Cryptodome package. PyCrypto and PyCryptodome can
coexist.
For faster public key operations in Unix, you should install GMP in your system.
PyCryptodome is a fork of PyCrypto. It brings the following enhancements with respect to the last official version of
PyCrypto (2.6.1):
• Authenticated encryption modes (GCM, CCM, EAX, SIV, OCB)
• Accelerated AES on Intel platforms via AES-NI
• First class support for PyPy
• Elliptic curves cryptography (NIST P-curves; Ed25519, Ed448)
3
• Better and more compact API (nonce and iv attributes for ciphers, automatic generation of random nonces and
IVs, simplified CTR cipher mode, and more)
• SHA-3 hash algorithms (FIPS 202) and derived functions (NIST SP-800 185):
– SHAKE128 and SHA256 XOFs
– cSHAKE128 and cSHAKE256 XOFs
– KMAC128 and KMAC256
– TupleHash128 and TupleHash256
• KangarooTwelve XOF (derived from Keccak)
• Truncated hash algorithms SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256 (FIPS 180-4)
• BLAKE2b and BLAKE2s hash algorithms
• Salsa20 and ChaCha20/XChaCha20 stream ciphers
• Poly1305 MAC
• ChaCha20-Poly1305 and XChaCha20-Poly1305 authenticated ciphers
• scrypt, bcrypt, HKDF, and NIST SP 800 108r1 Counter Mode key derivation functions
• Deterministic (EC)DSA and EdDSA
• Password-protected PKCS#8 key containers
• Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme
• Random numbers get sourced directly from the OS (and not from a CSPRNG in userspace)
• Simplified install process, including better support for Windows
• Cleaner RSA and DSA key generation (largely based on FIPS 186-4)
• Major clean ups and simplification of the code base
PyCryptodome is not a wrapper to a separate C library like OpenSSL. To the largest possible extent, algorithms are
implemented in pure Python. Only the pieces that are extremely critical to performance (e.g. block ciphers) are
implemented as C extensions.
For more information, see the homepage.
For security issues, please send an email to [email protected].
All the code can be downloaded from GitHub.
4 Chapter 1. PyCryptodome
CHAPTER 2
Features
This page lists the low-level primitives that PyCryptodome provides.

You are expected to have a solid understanding of cryptography and security engineering to successfully use them.
You must also be able to recognize that some primitives are obsolete (e.g. TDES) or even unsecure (RC4). They are
provided only to enable backward compatibility where required by the applications.
A list of useful resources in that area can be found on Matthew Green’s blog.
• Symmetric ciphers:
– AES
– Single and Triple DES (legacy)
– CAST-128 (legacy)
– RC2 (legacy)
• Traditional modes of operations for symmetric ciphers:
– ECB
– CBC
– CFB
– OFB
– CTR
– OpenPGP (a variant of CFB, RFC4880)
• Authenticated Encryption:
– CCM (AES only)
– EAX
– GCM (AES only)
– SIV (AES only)
5
– OCB (AES only)

– ChaCha20-Poly1305
• Stream ciphers:
– Salsa20
– ChaCha20
– RC4 (legacy)
• Cryptographic hashes:
– SHA-1
– SHA-2 hashes (224, 256, 384, 512, 512/224, 512/256)
– SHA-3 hashes (224, 256, 384, 512) and XOFs (SHAKE128, SHAKE256)
– Functions derived from SHA-3 (cSHAKE128, cSHAKE256, TupleHash128, TupleHash256)
– KangarooTwelve (XOF)
– Keccak (original submission to SHA-3)
– BLAKE2b and BLAKE2s
– RIPE-MD160 (legacy)
– MD5 (legacy)
• Message Authentication Codes (MAC):
– HMAC
– CMAC
– KMAC128 and KMAC256
– Poly1305
• Asymmetric key generation:
– RSA
– ECC (NIST P-curves; Ed25519, Ed448)
– DSA
– ElGamal (legacy)
• Export and import format for asymmetric keys:
– PEM (clear and encrypted)
– PKCS#8 (clear and encrypted)
– ASN.1 DER
• Asymmetric ciphers:
– PKCS#1 (RSA)
* RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
* RSAES-OAEP
• Asymmetric digital signatures:
– PKCS#1 (RSA)
6 Chapter 2. Features
* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
* RSASSA-PSS
– (EC)DSA
* Nonce-based (FIPS 186-3)

* Deterministic (RFC6979)
– EdDSA
• Key derivation:
– PBKDF2
– scrypt
– HKDF
– PBKDF1 (legacy)
• Other cryptographic protocols:
– Shamir Secret Sharing
– Padding
* PKCS#7
* ISO-7816
* X.923
7
8 Chapter 2. Features
CHAPTER 3
Installation
The installation procedure depends on the package you want the library to be in. PyCryptodome can be used as:
1. An almost drop-in replacement for the old PyCrypto library. You install it with:
In this case, all modules are installed under the Crypto package. You can test everything is right with:
pip install pycryptodome-test-vectors

python -m Crypto.SelfTest
One must avoid having both PyCrypto and PyCryptodome installed at the same time, as they will interfere with
each other. This option is therefore recommended only when you are sure that the whole application is deployed
in a virtualenv.
2. A library independent of the old PyCrypto. You install it with:
pip install pycryptodomex
You can test everything is right with:
pip install pycryptodome-test-vectors

python -m Cryptodome.SelfTest
In this case, all modules are installed under the Cryptodome package. The old PyCrypto and PyCryptodome
can coexist.
Note: If you intend to run PyCryptodome with Python 2.7 under Windows, you must first install the Microsoft Visual
C++ 2015 Redistributable. That is not necessary if you use Python 3.
The procedures below go a bit more in detail, by explaining how to setup the environment for compiling the C exten-
sions for each OS, and how to install the GMP library.
9
3.1 Compiling in Linux Ubuntu
Note: If you want to install under the Crypto package, replace below pycryptodomex with pycryptodome.
For Python 2.x:
$ sudo apt-get install build-essential python-dev

$ pip install pycryptodomex
$ pip install pycryptodome-test-vectors
$ python -m Cryptodome.SelfTest
For Python 3.x:
$ sudo apt-get install build-essential python3-dev

$ python3 -m Cryptodome.SelfTest
For PyPy:
$ sudo apt-get install build-essential pypy-dev

$ pypy -m Cryptodome.SelfTest
3.2 Compiling in Linux Fedora
For Python 2.x:
$ sudo yum install gcc gmp python-devel

$ python -m Cryptodome.SelfTest
For Python 3.x:
$ sudo yum install gcc gmp python3-devel

$ python3 -m Cryptodome.SelfTest
For PyPy:
$ sudo yum install gcc gmp pypy-devel

$ pypy -m Cryptodome.SelfTest
10 Chapter 3. Installation
3.3 Windows (from sources)
That being the case and if you want to run the test, instead of Cryptodome.SelfTest, run Crypto.SelfTest.
Windows does not come with a C compiler like most Unix systems. The simplest way to compile the PyCryptodome
extensions from source code is to install the minimum set of Visual Studio components freely made available by
Microsoft.
1. [Once only] Download Build Tools for Visual Studio 2019. In the installer, select the C++ build tools, the
Windows 10 SDK, and the latest version of MSVC v142 x64/x86 build tools.
2. Compile and install PyCryptodome:
> pip install pycryptodomex --no-binary :all:
3. To make sure everything work fine, run the test suite:

> pip install pycryptodome-test-vectors
> python -m Cryptodome.SelfTest
3.4 Documentation
Project documentation is written in reStructuredText and it is stored under Doc/src. To publish it as HTML files,
you need to install sphinx and use:
> make -C Doc/ html
It will then be available under Doc/_build/html/.
3.5 PGP verification
All source packages and wheels on PyPI are cryptographically signed. They can be verified with the following PGP
key:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----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(continues on next page)
3.3. Windows (from sources) 11

(continued from previous page)
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==
=DpoI
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
12 Chapter 3. Installation
CHAPTER 4
Compatibility with PyCrypto
PyCryptodome exposes almost the same API as the old PyCrypto so that most applications will run unmodified.
However, a very few breaks in compatibility had to be introduced for those parts of the API that represented a security
hazard or that were too hard to maintain.
Specifically, for public key cryptography:
• The following methods from public key objects (RSA, DSA, ElGamal) have been removed:
– sign()
– verify()
– encrypt()
– decrypt()
– blind()
– unblind()
Applications should be updated to use instead:
– Crypto.Cipher.PKCS1_OAEP for encrypting using RSA.
– Crypto.Signature.pkcs1_15 or Crypto.Signature.pss for signing using RSA.
– Crypto.Signature.DSS for signing using DSA.
• Method: generate() for public key modules does not accept the progress_func parameter anymore.
• Ambiguous method size from RSA, DSA and ElGamal key objects have been removed. Instead, use methods
size_in_bytes() and size_in_bits() and check the documentation.
• The 3 public key object types (RSA, DSA, ElGamal) are now unpickable. You must use the export_key()
method of each key object and select a good output format: for private keys that means a good password-based
encryption scheme.
• Removed attribute Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.algorithmIdentifier.
• Removed Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.RSAImplementation (which should have been private in the first
place). Same for Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.DSAImplementation.
13
For symmetric key cryptography:

• Symmetric ciphers do not have ECB as default mode anymore. ECB is not semantically secure and it exposes
correlation across blocks. An expression like AES.new(key) will now fail. If ECB is the desired mode, one
has to explicitly use AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB).
• Crypto.Cipher.DES3 does not allow keys that degenerate to Single DES.
• Parameter segment_size cannot be 0 for the CFB mode.
• Parameters disabled_shortcut and overflow cannot be passed anymore to Crypto.Util.
Counter.new. Parameter allow_wraparound is ignored (counter block wraparound will always be
checked).
• The counter parameter of a CTR mode cipher must be generated via Crypto.Util.Counter. It cannot
be a generic callable anymore.
• Keys for Crypto.Cipher.ARC2, Crypto.Cipher.ARC4 and Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish must be
at least 40 bits long (still very weak).
The following packages, modules and functions have been removed:
• Crypto.Random.OSRNG, Crypto.Util.winrandom and Crypto.Random.randpool. You should
use Crypto.Random only.
• Crypto.Cipher.XOR. If you just want to XOR data, use Crypto.Util.strxor.
• Crypto.Hash.new. Use Crypto.Hash.<algorithm>.new() instead.
• Crypto.Protocol.AllOrNothing
• Crypto.Protocol.Chaffing
• Crypto.Util.number.getRandomNumber
• Crypto.pct_warnings
Others:
• Support for any Python version older than 2.6 is dropped.
14 Chapter 4. Compatibility with PyCrypto

CHAPTER 5
API documentation
5.1 Crypto.Cipher package
5.1.1 Introduction
The Crypto.Cipher package contains algorithms for protecting the confidentiality of data.
There are three types of encryption algorithms:
1. Symmetric ciphers: all parties use the same key, for both decrypting and encrypting data. Symmetric ciphers
are typically very fast and can process very large amount of data.
2. Asymmetric ciphers: senders and receivers use different keys. Senders encrypt with public keys (non-secret)
whereas receivers decrypt with private keys (secret). Asymmetric ciphers are typically very slow and can process
only very small payloads. Example: oaep.
3. Hybrid ciphers: the two types of ciphers above can be combined in a construction that inherits the benefits of
both. An asymmetric cipher is used to protect a short-lived symmetric key, and a symmetric cipher (under that
key) encrypts the actual message.
5.1.2 API principles
The base API of a cipher is fairly simple:

• You instantiate a cipher object by calling the new() function from the relevant cipher module (e.g. Crypto.
Cipher.AES.new()). The first parameter is always the cryptographic key; its length depends on the partic-
ular cipher. You can (and sometimes must) pass additional cipher- or mode-specific parameters to new() (such
as a nonce or a mode of operation).
• For encrypting data, you call the encrypt() method of the cipher object with the plaintext. The method
returns the piece of ciphertext. Alternatively, with the output parameter you can specify a pre-allocated buffer
for the result.
For most algorithms, you may call encrypt() multiple times (i.e. once for each piece of plaintext).
15
Fig. 5.1: Generic state diagram for a cipher object
• For decrypting data, you call the decrypt() method of the cipher object with the ciphertext. The method
returns the piece of plaintext. The output parameter can be passed here too.
For most algorithms, you may call decrypt() multiple times (i.e. once for each piece of ciphertext).
Note: Plaintexts and ciphertexts (input/output) can only be bytes, bytearray or memoryview. In Python 3,
you cannot pass strings. In Python 2, you cannot pass Unicode strings.
Often, the sender has to deliver to the receiver other data in addition to ciphertext alone (e.g. initialization vectors or
nonces, MAC tags, etc).
This is a basic example:
>>> from Crypto.Cipher import Salsa20

>>>
>>> key = b'0123456789012345'
>>> cipher = Salsa20.new(key)
>>> ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(b'The secret I want to send.')
>>> ciphertext += cipher.encrypt(b'The second part of the secret.')
>>> print cipher.nonce # A byte string you must send to the receiver too
5.1.3 Symmetric ciphers
There are two types of symmetric ciphers:

• Stream ciphers: the most natural kind of ciphers: they encrypt data one byte at a time. See chacha20 and
salsa20.
• Block ciphers: ciphers that can only operate on a fixed amount of data. The most important block cipher is aes,
which has a block size of 128 bits (16 bytes).
In general, a block cipher is mostly useful only together with a mode of operation, which allows one to encrypt
a variable amount of data. Some modes (like CTR) effectively turn a block cipher into a stream cipher.
The widespread consensus is that ciphers that provide only confidentiality, without any form of authentication, are
undesirable. Instead, primitives have been defined to integrate symmetric encryption and authentication (MAC). For
instance:
• Modern modes of operation for block ciphers (like GCM).
16 Chapter 5. API documentation

• Stream ciphers paired with a MAC function, like chacha20_poly1305.
Classic modes of operation for symmetric block ciphers
A block cipher uses a symmetric key to encrypt data of fixed and very short length (the block size), such as 16 bytes
for AES. In order to cope with data of arbitrary length, the cipher must be combined with a mode of operation.
You create a cipher object with the new() function in the relevant module under Crypto.Cipher:
1. the first parameter is always the cryptographic key (a byte string)
2. the second parameter is always the constant that selects the desired mode of operation
Constants for each mode of operation are defined at the module level for each algorithm. Their name starts with
MODE_, for instance Crypto.Cipher.AES.MODE_CBC. Note that not all ciphers support all modes.
For instance:
>>> from Crypto.Cipher import AES

>>> from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes
>>>
>>> key = get_random_bytes(16)
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC)
>>>
>>> # You can now use use cipher to encrypt or decrypt...
The state machine for a cipher configured with a classic mode is:
Fig. 5.2: Generic state diagram for a cipher object
What follows is a list of classic modes of operation: they all provide confidentiality but not data integrity (unlike
modern AEAD modes, which are described in another section).
ECB mode
Electronic CodeBook. The most basic but also the weakest mode of operation. Each block of plaintext is encrypted
independently of any other block.
Warning: The ECB mode should not be used because it is semantically insecure. For one, it exposes correlation
between blocks.
5.1. Crypto.Cipher package 17

The new() function at the module level under Crypto.Cipher instantiates a new ECB cipher object for the
relevant base algorithm. In the following definition, <algorithm> could be AES:
Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.new(key, mode)
Create a new ECB object, using <algorithm> as the base block cipher.
Parameters
• key (bytes) – the cryptographic key
• mode – the constant Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.MODE_ECB
Returns an ECB cipher object
The method encrypt() (and likewise decrypt()) of an ECB cipher object expects data to have length multiple
of the block size (e.g. 16 bytes for AES). You might need to use Crypto.Util.Padding to align the plaintext to
the right boundary.
CBC mode
Ciphertext Block Chaining, defined in NIST SP 800-38A, section 6.2. It is a mode of operation where each plaintext
block gets XOR-ed with the previous ciphertext block prior to encryption.
The new() function at the module level under Crypto.Cipher instantiates a new CBC cipher object for the
Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.new(key, mode, *, iv=None)
Create a new CBC object, using <algorithm> as the base block cipher.
Parameters
• mode – the constant Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.MODE_CBC
• iv (bytes) – the Initialization Vector. A piece of data unpredictable to adversaries. It is
as long as the block size (e.g. 16 bytes for AES). If not present, the library creates a random
IV value.
Returns a CBC cipher object
The method encrypt() (and likewise decrypt()) of a CBC cipher object expects data to have length multiple of
the block size (e.g. 16 bytes for AES). You might need to use Crypto.Util.Padding to align the plaintext to the
right boundary.
A CBC cipher object has a read-only attribute iv, holding the Initialization Vector (bytes).
Example (encryption):
>>> import json

>>> from base64 import b64encode
>>> from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
>>>
>>> data = b"secret"
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC)
>>> ct_bytes = cipher.encrypt(pad(data, AES.block_size))
>>> iv = b64encode(cipher.iv).decode('utf-8')
>>> ct = b64encode(ct_bytes).decode('utf-8')


>>> result = json.dumps({'iv':iv, 'ciphertext':ct})
>>> print(result)
'{"iv": "bWRHdzkzVDFJbWNBY0EwSmQ1UXFuQT09", "ciphertext":
˓→"VDdxQVo3TFFCbXIzcGpYa1lJbFFZQT09"}'
Example (decryption):
>>> import json

>>> from base64 import b64decode
>>> from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad
>>>
>>> # We assume that the key was securely shared beforehand
>>> try:
>>> b64 = json.loads(json_input)
>>> iv = b64decode(b64['iv'])
>>> ct = b64decode(b64['ciphertext'])
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
>>> pt = unpad(cipher.decrypt(ct), AES.block_size)
>>> print("The message was: ", pt)
>>> except (ValueError, KeyError):
>>> print("Incorrect decryption")
CTR mode
CounTeR mode, defined in NIST SP 800-38A, section 6.5 and Appendix B. This mode turns the block cipher into a
stream cipher. Each byte of plaintext is XOR-ed with a byte taken from a keystream: the result is the ciphertext. The
keystream is generated by encrypting a sequence of counter blocks with ECB.
A counter block is exactly as long as the cipher block size (e.g. 16 bytes for AES). It consists of the concatenation of
two pieces:
1. a fixed nonce, set at initialization.
2. a variable counter, which gets increased by 1 for any subsequent counter block. The counter is big endian
encoded.
The new() function at the module level under Crypto.Cipher instantiates a new CTR cipher object for the
Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.new(key, mode, *, nonce=None, initial_value=None, counter=None)
Create a new CTR object, using <algorithm> as the base block cipher.
Parameters

• mode – the constant Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.MODE_CTR

• nonce (bytes) – the value of the fixed nonce. It must be unique for the combination
message/key. Its length varies from 0 to the block size minus 1. If not present, the library
creates a random nonce of length equal to block size/2.
• initial_value (integer or bytes) – the value of the counter for the first counter
block. It can be either an integer or bytes (which is the same integer, just big endian en-
coded). If not specified, the counter starts at 0.
• counter – a custom counter object created with Crypto.Util.Counter.new().
This allows the definition of a more complex counter block.
Returns a CTR cipher object
The methods encrypt() and decrypt() of a CTR cipher object accept data of any length (i.e. padding is not
needed). Both raise an OverflowError exception as soon as the counter wraps around to repeat the original value.
The CTR cipher object has a read-only attribute nonce (bytes).
>>> import json

>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR)
>>> ct_bytes = cipher.encrypt(data)
>>> nonce = b64encode(cipher.nonce).decode('utf-8')
>>> result = json.dumps({'nonce':nonce, 'ciphertext':ct})
>>> print(result)
{"nonce": "XqP8WbylRt0=", "ciphertext": "Mie5lqje"}
>>> import json

>>>
>>> try:
>>> nonce = b64decode(b64['nonce'])
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR, nonce=nonce)
>>> pt = cipher.decrypt(ct)
CFB mode
Cipher FeedBack, defined in NIST SP 800-38A, section 6.3. It is a mode of operation which turns the block cipher
into a stream cipher. Each byte of plaintext is XOR-ed with a byte taken from a keystream: the result is the ciphertext.

The keystream is obtained on a per-segment basis: the plaintext is broken up in segments (from 1 byte up to the size
of a block). Then, for each segment, the keystream is obtained by encrypting with the block cipher the last piece of
ciphertext produced so far - possibly backfilled with the Initialization Vector, if not enough ciphertext is available yet.
The new() function at the module level under Crypto.Cipher instantiates a new CFB cipher object for the
Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.new(key, mode, *, iv=None, segment_size=8)
Create a new CFB object, using <algorithm> as the base block cipher.
Parameters
• mode – the constant Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.MODE_CFB
• iv (bytes) – the Initialization Vector. It must be unique for the combination message/key.
It is as long as the block size (e.g. 16 bytes for AES). If not present, the library creates a
random IV.
• segment_size (integer) – the number of bits (not bytes!) the plaintext and the ci-
phertext are segmented in (default if not specified: 8 bits = 1 byte).
Returns a CFB cipher object
The methods encrypt() and decrypt() of a CFB cipher object accept data of any length (i.e. padding is not
needed).
The CFB cipher object has a read-only attribute iv (bytes), holding the Initialization Vector.
>>> import json

>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CFB)
>>> print(result)
{"iv": "VoamO23kFSOZcK1O2WiCDQ==", "ciphertext": "f8jciJ8/"}
>>> import json

>>>
>>> try:
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CFB, iv=iv)


OFB mode
Output FeedBack, defined in NIST SP 800-38A, section 6.4. It is another mode that leads to a stream cipher. Each
byte of plaintext is XOR-ed with a byte taken from a keystream: the result is the ciphertext. The keystream is obtained
by recursively encrypting the Initialization Vector.
The new() function at the module level under Crypto.Cipher instantiates a new OFB cipher object for the
Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.new(key, mode, *, iv=None)
Create a new OFB object, using <algorithm> as the base block cipher.
Parameters
• mode – the constant Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.MODE_OFB
• iv (bytes) – the Initialization Vector. It must be unique for the combination message/key.
It is as long as the block size (e.g. 16 bytes for AES). If not present, the library creates a
random IV.
Returns an OFB cipher object
The methods encrypt() and decrypt() of an OFB cipher object accept data of any length (i.e. padding is not
needed).
The OFB cipher object has a read-only attribute iv (bytes), holding the Initialization Vector.
>>> import json
>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_OFB)
>>> print(result)
{"iv": "NUuRJbL0UMp8+UMCk2/vQA==", "ciphertext": "XGVGc1Gw"}
>>> import json
>>>
>>> try:


>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_OFB, iv=iv)
OpenPGP mode
Constant: Crypto.Cipher.<cipher>.MODE_OPENPGP.
OpenPGP (defined in RFC4880). A variant of CFB, with two differences:
1. The first invocation to the encrypt() method returns the encrypted IV concatenated to the first chunk of
ciphertext (as opposed to the ciphertext only). The encrypted IV is as long as the block size plus 2 more bytes.
2. When the cipher object is intended for decryption, the parameter iv to new() is the encrypted IV (and not the
IV, which is still the case for encryption).
Like for CTR, an OpenPGP cipher object has a read-only attribute iv.
Modern modes of operation for symmetric block ciphers
Classic modes of operation such as CBC only provide guarantees over the confidentiality of the message but not over
its integrity. In other words, they don’t allow the receiver to establish if the ciphertext was modified in transit or if it
really originates from a certain source.
For that reason, classic modes of operation have been often paired with a MAC primitive (such as Crypto.Hash.
HMAC), but the combination is not always straightforward, efficient or secure.
Recently, new modes of operations (AEAD, for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) have been designed
to combine encryption and authentication into a single, efficient primitive. Optionally, some part of the message can
also be left in the clear (non-confidential associated data, such as headers), while the whole message remains fully
authenticated.
In addition to the ciphertext and a nonce (or IV - Initialization Vector), AEAD modes require the additional delivery
of a MAC tag.
This is the state machine for a cipher object:
Beside the usual encrypt() and decrypt() already available for classic modes of operation, several other meth-
ods are present:
update(data)
Authenticate those parts of the message that get delivered as is, without any encryption (like headers). It is
similar to the update() method of a MAC object. Note that all data passed to encrypt() and decrypt()
get automatically authenticated already.
Parameters data (bytes) – the extra data to authenticate
digest()
Create the final authentication tag (MAC tag) for a message.
Return bytes the MAC tag
hexdigest()
Equivalent to digest(), with the output encoded in hexadecimal.

Fig. 5.3: Generic state diagram for a AEAD cipher mode
Return str the MAC tag as a hexadecimal string

verify(mac_tag)
Check if the provided authentication tag (MAC tag) is valid, that is, if the message has been decrypted using the
right key and if no modification has taken place in transit.
Parameters mac_tag (bytes) – the MAC tag
Raises ValueError – if the MAC tag is not valid, that is, if the entire message should not be
trusted.
hexverify(mac_tag_hex)
Same as verify() but accepts the MAC tag encoded as an hexadecimal string.
Parameters mac_tag_hex (str) – the MAC tag as a hexadecimal string
trusted.
encrypt_and_digest(plaintext, output=None)
Perform encrypt() and digest() in one go.
Parameters plaintext (bytes) – the last piece of plaintext to encrypt
Keyword Arguments output (bytes/bytearray/memoryview) – the pre-allocated buffer
where the ciphertext must be stored (as opposed to being returned).
Returns
a tuple with two items
• the ciphertext, as bytes

• the MAC tag, as bytes

The first item becomes None when the output parameter specified a location for the result.
decrypt_and_verify(ciphertext, mac_tag, output=None)
Perform decrypt() and verify() in one go.
Parameters ciphertext (bytes) – the last piece of ciphertext to decrypt
Keyword Arguments output (bytes/bytearray/memoryview) – the pre-allocated buffer
where the plaintext must be stored (as opposed to being returned).
trusted.
CCM mode
Counter with CBC-MAC, defined in RFC3610 or NIST SP 800-38C. It only works with ciphers having block size 128
bits (like AES).
The new() function at the module level under Crypto.Cipher instantiates a new CCM cipher object for the
relevant base algorithm. In the following definition, <algorithm> can only be AES today:
Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.new(key, mode, *, nonce=None, mac_len=None, msg_len=None, assoc_l
Create a new CCM object, using <algorithm> as the base block cipher.
Parameters
• mode – the constant Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.MODE_CCM
message/key. For AES, its length varies from 7 to 13 bytes. The longer the nonce, the
smaller the allowed message size (with a nonce of 13 bytes, the message cannot exceed
64KB). If not present, the library creates a 11 bytes random nonce (the maximum message
size is 8GB).
• mac_len (integer) – the desired length of the MAC tag (default if not present: 16
bytes).
• msg_len (integer) – pre-declaration of the length of the message to encipher. If not
specified, encrypt() and decrypt() can only be called once.
• assoc_len (integer) – pre-declaration of the length of the associated data. If not
specified, some extra buffering will take place internally.
Returns a CTR cipher object
The cipher object has a read-only attribute nonce.
>>> import json
>>>
>>> header = b"header"
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CCM)


>>> cipher.update(header)
>>> ciphertext, tag = cipher.encrypt_and_digest(data)
>>>
>>> json_k = [ 'nonce', 'header', 'ciphertext', 'tag' ]
>>> json_v = [ b64encode(x).decode('utf-8') for x in (cipher.nonce, header,
˓→ciphertext, tag) ]
>>> result = json.dumps(dict(zip(json_k, json_v)))

>>> print(result)
{"nonce": "p6ffzcKw+6xopVQ=", "header": "aGVhZGVy", "ciphertext": "860kZo/G", "tag":
˓→"Ck5YpVCM6fdWnFkFxw8K6A=="}
>>> import json

>>>
>>> try:
>>> jv = {k:b64decode(b64[k]) for k in json_k}
>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CCM, nonce=jv['nonce'])
>>> cipher.update(jv['header'])
>>> plaintext = cipher.decrypt_and_verify(jv['ciphertext'], jv['tag'])
>>> print("The message was: " + plaintext.decode('utf-8'))
EAX mode
An AEAD mode designed for NIST by Bellare, Rogaway, and Wagner in 2003.
The new() function at the module level under Crypto.Cipher instantiates a new EAX cipher object for the
relevant base algorithm.
Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.new(key, mode, *, nonce=None, mac_len=None)
Create a new EAX object, using <algorithm> as the base block cipher.
Parameters
• mode – the constant Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.MODE_EAX
message/key. If not present, the library creates a random nonce (16 bytes long for AES).
• mac_len (integer) – the length of the MAC tag, in bytes. At least 2, and not larger than
the cipher’s block size (default), which is 16 bytes for AES.
Returns an EAX cipher object

>>> import json

>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_EAX)
>>>

>>> print(result)
{"nonce": "CSIJ+e8KP7HJo+hC4RXIyQ==", "header": "aGVhZGVy", "ciphertext": "9YYjuAn6",
˓→"tag": "kXHrs9ZwYmjDkmfEJx7Clg=="}
>>> import json

>>>
>>> try:
>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_EAX, nonce=jv['nonce'])
GCM mode
Galois/Counter Mode, defined in NIST SP 800-38D. It only works in combination with a 128 bits cipher like AES.
The new() function at the module level under Crypto.Cipher instantiates a new GCM cipher object for the
Create a new GCM object, using <algorithm> as the base block cipher.
Parameters
• mode – the constant Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.MODE_GCM
message/key. If not present, the library creates a random nonce (16 bytes long for AES).

• mac_len (integer) – the desired length of the MAC tag, from 4 to 16 bytes (default:
16).
Returns a GCM cipher object
>>> import json

>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM)
>>>

>>> print(result)
{"nonce": "DpOK8NIOuSOQlTq+BphKWw==", "header": "aGVhZGVy", "ciphertext": "CZVqyacc",
˓→"tag": "B2tBgICbyw+Wji9KpLVa8w=="}
>>> import json

>>> from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad
>>>
>>> try:
>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM, nonce=jv['nonce'])
Note: GCM is most commonly used with 96-bit (12-byte) nonces, which is also the length recommended by NIST
SP 800-38D.
If interoperability is important, one should take into account that the library default of a 128-bit random nonce may
not be (easily) supported by other implementations. A 96-bit nonce can be explicitly generated for a new encryption
cipher:

>>> nonce = get_random_bytes(12)


>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM, nonce=nonce)
SIV mode
Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV), defined in RFC5297. It only works with ciphers with a block size of 128 bits
(like AES).
Although less efficient than other modes, SIV is nonce misuse-resistant: accidental reuse of the nonce does not jeop-
ardize the security as it happens with CCM or GCM. As a matter of fact, operating without a nonce is not an error
per se: the cipher simply becomes deterministic. In other words, a message gets always encrypted into the same
ciphertext.
The new() function at the module level under Crypto.Cipher instantiates a new SIV cipher object for the relevant
base algorithm.
Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.new(key, mode, *, nonce=None)
Create a new SIV object, using <algorithm> as the base block cipher.
Parameters
• key (bytes) – the cryptographic key; it must be twice the size of the key required by the
underlying cipher (e.g. 32 bytes for AES-128).
• mode – the constant Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.MODE_SIV
message/key. If not present, the encryption will be deterministic.
Returns a SIV cipher object
If the nonce parameter was provided to new(), the resulting cipher object has a read-only attribute nonce.
>>> import json

>>>
>>> key = get_random_bytes(16 * 2)
>>> nonce = get_random_bytes(16)
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_SIV, nonce=nonce) # Without nonce, the
˓→encryption
>>> # becomes deterministic

>>>
>>> json_v = [ b64encode(x).decode('utf-8') for x in (nonce, header, ciphertext, tag)
˓→]

>>> print(result)
{"nonce": "zMiifAVvDpMS8hnGK/z+iw==", "header": "aGVhZGVy", "ciphertext": "Q7lReEAF",
˓→"tag": "KgdnBVbCee6B/wGmMf/wQA=="}

>>> import json

>>>
>>> try:
>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_SIV, nonce=jv['nonce'])
One side-effect is that encryption (or decryption) must take place in one go with the method
encrypt_and_digest() (or decrypt_and_verify()). You cannot use encrypt() or decrypt().
The state diagram is therefore:
Fig. 5.4: State diagram for the SIV cipher mode
The length of the key passed to new() must be twice as required by the underlying block cipher (e.g. 32 bytes for
AES-128).
Each call to the method update() consumes an full piece of associated data. That is, the sequence:
>>> siv_cipher.update(b"builtin")
>>> siv_cipher.update(b"securely")

is not equivalent to:

>>> siv_cipher.update(b"built")
>>> siv_cipher.update(b"insecurely")
OCB mode
Offset CodeBook mode, a cipher designed by Rogaway and specified in RFC7253 (more specifically, this module
implements the last variant, OCB3). It only works in combination with a 128 bits cipher like AES.
OCB was patented in USA but the author eventually abandoned the patents.
The new() function at the module level under Crypto.Cipher instantiates a new OCB cipher object for the
Note: The OCB state machine is slightly different compared to other modes: if you encrypt (or decrypt) multiple
chunks, at the end you MUST call the method encrypt (or decrypt) with no parameters. This last call will return
any piece of internally cached ciphertext (or plaintext).
Fig. 5.5: State diagram for the OCB mode

Create a new OCB object, using <algorithm> as the base block cipher.
Parameters


• mode – the constant Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.MODE_OCB
• nonce (bytes) – the value of the fixed nonce, wuth length between 1 and 15 bytes. It
must be unique for the combination message/key. If not present, the library creates a 15
bytes random nonce.
• mac_len (integer) – the desired length of the MAC tag (default if not present: 16
bytes).
Returns an OCB cipher object
The cipher object has two read-only attributes: nonce and block_size.
Example (encryption as a once-off operation):
>>> import json
>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_OCB)
>>>

>>> print(result)
{"nonce": "I7E6PKxHNYo2i9sz8W98", "header": "aGVhZGVy", "ciphertext": "nYJnJ8jC", "tag
˓→": "0UbFcmO9lqGknCIDWRLALA=="}
Example (decryption as a once-off operation):

>>> import json
>>>
>>> try:
>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_OCB, nonce=jv['nonce'])
Example (encryption with multiple chunks):

>>> import json


>>>
>>> header = b'header'
>>> data = [b'chunk1', b'chunk2', b'chunk3']
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_OCB)
>>> ciphertext = b''
>>> for chunk in data:
>>> ciphertext += cipher.encrypt(chunk)
>>> ciphertext += cipher.encrypt()
>>> tag = cipher.digest()
>>>

>>> print(result)
{"nonce": "IABQ/ww8vGsu7F4sbHXK", "header": "aGVhZGVy", "ciphertext":
˓→"7Amm2DoiMHVkYC8dY7NEX86M", "tag": "qOPnjAxF63MOAx6xjwRvJQ=="}
Example (decryption with multiple chunks):
>>> import json

>>>
>>> try:
>>>
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_OCB, nonce=jv['nonce'])
>>> ciphertext = jv['ciphertext']
>>>
>>> # Split into small chunks, just for demo purposes
>>> chunks = [ ciphertext[i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(ciphertext), 2) ]
>>>
>>> plaintext = b''
>>> for chunk in chunks:
>>> plaintext += cipher.decrypt(chunk)
>>> plaintext += cipher.decrypt()
>>> cipher.verify(jv['tag'])
>>>
5.1.4 Legacy ciphers
A number of ciphers are implemented in this library purely for backward compatibility purposes. They are deprecated
or even fully broken and should not be used in new designs.

• des and des3 (block ciphers)

• arc2 (block cipher)
• arc4 (stream cipher)
• blowfish (block cipher)
• cast (block cipher)
• pkcs1_v1_5 (asymmetric cipher)
5.2 Crypto.Signature package
The Crypto.Signature package contains algorithms for performing digital signatures, used to guarantee integrity
and non-repudiation.
Digital signatures are based on public key cryptography: the party that signs a message holds the private key, the one
that verifies the signature holds the public key.
5.2.1 Signing a message
1. Instantiate a new signer object for the desired algorithm, for instance with Crypto.Signature.
pkcs1_15.new(). The first parameter is the key object (private key) obtained via the Crypto.
PublicKey module.
2. Instantiate a cryptographic hash object, for instance with Crypto.Hash.SHA384.new(). Then, process
the message with its update() method.
3. Invoke the sign() method on the signer with the hash object as parameter. The output is the signature of the
message (a byte string).
5.2.2 Verifying a signature
1. Instantiate a new verifier object for the desired algorithm, for instance with Crypto.Signature.
pkcs1_15.new(). The first parameter is the key object (public key) obtained via the Crypto.PublicKey
module.
2. Instantiate a cryptographic hash object, for instance with Crypto.Hash.SHA384.new(). Then, process
the message with its update() method.
3. Invoke the verify() method on the verifier, with the hash object and the incoming signature as parameters.
If the message is not authentic, an ValueError is raised.
5.2.3 Available mechanisms
• pkcs1_v1_5
• pkcs1_pss
• eddsa
• dsa

5.3 Crypto.Hash package
Cryptographic hash functions take arbitrary binary strings as input, and produce a random-like fixed-length output
(called digest or hash value).
It is practically infeasible to derive the original input data from the digest. In other words, the cryptographic hash
function is one-way (pre-image resistance).
Given the digest of one message, it is also practically infeasible to find another message (second pre-image) with the
same digest (weak collision resistance).
Finally, it is infeasible to find two arbitrary messages with the same digest (strong collision resistance).
Regardless of the hash algorithm, an n bits long digest is at most as secure as a symmetric encryption algorithm keyed
with n/2 bits (birthday attack).
Hash functions can be simply used as integrity checks. In combination with a public-key algorithm, you can implement
a digital signature.
Every time you want to hash a message, you have to create a new hash object with the new() function in the relevant
algorithm module (e.g. Crypto.Hash.SHA256.new()).
A first piece of message to hash can be passed to new() with the data parameter:
>> from Crypto.Hash import SHA256

>>
>> hash_object = SHA256.new(data=b'First')
Note: You can only hash byte strings or byte arrays (no Python 2 Unicode strings or Python 3 strings).
Afterwards, the method update() can be invoked any number of times as necessary, with other pieces of message:
>>> hash_object.update(b'Second')
>>> hash_object.update(b'Third')
The two steps above are equivalent to:
>>> hash_object.update(b'SecondThird')
At the end, the digest can be retrieved with the methods digest() or hexdigest():
>>> print(hash_object.digest())
b'}\x96\xfd@\xb2$?O\xca\xc1a\x10\x15\x8c\x94\xe4\xb4\x085"\xd5
˓→"\xa8\xa4C\x9e+\x00\x859\xc7A'
>>> print(hash_object.hexdigest())
7d96fd40b2243f4fcac16110158c94e4b4083522d522a8a4439e2b008539c741
5.3.2 Attributes of hash objects
Every hash object has the following attributes:
5.3. Crypto.Hash package 35

Fig. 5.6: Generic state diagram for a hash object

Attribute Description
digest_size Size of the digest in bytes, that is, the output of the digest() method. It does not exist
for hash functions with variable digest output (such as Crypto.Hash.SHAKE128). This
is also a module attribute.
block_size The size of the message block in bytes, input to the compression function. Only appli-
cable for algorithms based on the Merkle-Damgard construction (e.g. Crypto.Hash.
SHA256). This is also a module attribute.
oid A string with the dotted representation of the ASN.1 OID assigned to the hash algorithm.
5.3.3 Modern hash algorithms
• SHA-2 family (FIPS 180-4)

– sha224
– sha256
– sha384
– sha512
• SHA-3 family (FIPS 202)
– sha3_224
– sha3_256
– sha3_384
– sha3_512
– tuplehash128
– tuplehash256
• BLAKE2
– blake2s
– blake2b
5.3.4 Extensible-Output Functions (XOF)
A XOF is similar to a conventional cryptographic hash: it is a one-way function that maps a piece of data of arbitrary
size to a random-like output. It provides some guarantees over collision resistance, pre-image resistance, and second
pre-image resistance.
Unlike a conventional hash, an application using a XOF can choose the length of the output. For this reason, a XOF
does not have a digest() method. Instead, it has a read(N) method to extract the next N bytes of the output.
• SHA-3 family (FIPS 202)

– shake128
– shake256
• SHA-3 derived functions (NIST SP 800-185)
– cshake128
5.3. Crypto.Hash package 37

Fig. 5.7: Generic state diagram for a XOF object

– cshake256
• k12
5.3.5 Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms
• hmac
• cmac
• poly1305
• SHA-3 derived functions (NIST SP 800-185)
– kmac128
– kmac256
5.3.6 Historic hash algorithms
The following algorithms should not be used in new designs:

• sha1
• md2
• md5
• ripemd160
• keccak
5.4 Crypto.PublicKey package
In a public key cryptography system, senders and receivers do not use the same key. Instead, the system defines a key
pair, with one of the keys being confidential (private) and the other not (public).
Algorithm Sender uses.. Receiver uses. . .

Encryption Public key Private key
Signature Private key Public key
Unlike keys meant for symmetric cipher algorithms (typically just random bit strings), keys for public key algorithms
have very specific properties. This module collects all methods to generate, validate, store and retrieve public keys.
Asymmetric keys are represented by Python objects. Each object can be either a private key or a public key (the
method has_private() can be used to distinguish them).
A key object can be created in four ways:
1. generate() at the module level (e.g. Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.generate()). The key is randomly
created each time.
2. import_key() at the module level (e.g. Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.import_key()). The key is
loaded from memory.
5.4. Crypto.PublicKey package 39

3. construct() at the module level (e.g. Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.construct()). The key will be

built from a set of sub-components.
4. publickey() at the object level (e.g. Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.RsaKey.publickey()). The key
will be the public key matching the given object.
A key object can be serialized via its export_key() method.
Keys objects can be compared via the usual operators == and != (note that the two halves of the same key, private
and public, are considered as two different keys).
5.4.2 Available key types
RSA
RSA is the most widespread and used public key algorithm. Its security is based on the difficulty of factoring large
integers. The algorithm has withstood attacks for more than 30 years, and it is therefore considered reasonably secure
for new designs.
The algorithm can be used for both confidentiality (encryption) and authentication (digital signature). It is worth
noting that signing and decryption are significantly slower than verification and encryption.
The cryptographic strength is primarily linked to the length of the RSA modulus n. In 2017, a sufficient length is
deemed to be 2048 bits. For more information, see the most recent ECRYPT report.
Both RSA ciphertexts and RSA signatures are as large as the RSA modulus n (256 bytes if n is 2048 bit long).
The module Crypto.PublicKey.RSA provides facilities for generating new RSA keys, reconstructing them from
known components, exporting them, and importing them.
As an example, this is how you generate a new RSA key pair, save it in a file called mykey.pem, and then read it
back:
>>> from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA

>>>
>>> key = RSA.generate(2048)
>>> f = open('mykey.pem','wb')
>>> f.write(key.export_key('PEM'))
>>> f.close()
...
>>> f = open('mykey.pem','r')
>>> key = RSA.import_key(f.read())
Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.generate(bits, randfunc=None, e=65537)

Create a new RSA key pair.
The algorithm closely follows NIST FIPS 186-4 in its sections B.3.1 and B.3.3. The modulus is the product of
two non-strong probable primes. Each prime passes a suitable number of Miller-Rabin tests with random bases
and a single Lucas test.
Parameters
• bits (integer) – Key length, or size (in bits) of the RSA modulus. It must be at least
1024, but 2048 is recommended. The FIPS standard only defines 1024, 2048 and 3072.
• randfunc (callable) – Function that returns random bytes. The default is Crypto.
Random.get_random_bytes().

• e (integer) – Public RSA exponent. It must be an odd positive integer. It is typically a

small number with very few ones in its binary representation. The FIPS standard requires
the public exponent to be at least 65537 (the default).
Returns: an RSA key object (RsaKey, with private key).
Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.construct(rsa_components, consistency_check=True)
Construct an RSA key from a tuple of valid RSA components.
The modulus n must be the product of two primes. The public exponent e must be odd and larger than 1.
In case of a private key, the following equations must apply:
𝑝*𝑞 =𝑛 (5.1)
𝑒 * 𝑑 ≡ 1(mod lcm[(𝑝 − 1)(𝑞 −(5.2)
1)])
𝑝 * 𝑢 ≡ 1(mod 𝑞)
(5.3)
Parameters
• rsa_components (tuple) – A tuple of integers, with at least 2 and no more than 6
items. The items come in the following order:
1. RSA modulus n.
2. Public exponent e.
3. Private exponent d. Only required if the key is private.
4. First factor of n (p). Optional, but the other factor q must also be present.
5. Second factor of n (q). Optional.
6. CRT coefficient q, that is 𝑝−1 mod 𝑞. Optional.
• consistency_check (boolean) – If True, the library will verify that the provided
components fulfil the main RSA properties.
Raises ValueError – when the key being imported fails the most basic RSA validity checks.
Returns: An RSA key object (RsaKey).
Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.import_key(extern_key, passphrase=None)
Import an RSA key (public or private).
Parameters
• extern_key (string or byte string) – The RSA key to import.
The following formats are supported for an RSA public key:
– X.509 certificate (binary or PEM format)
– X.509 subjectPublicKeyInfo DER SEQUENCE (binary or PEM encoding)
– PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey DER SEQUENCE (binary or PEM encoding)
– An OpenSSH line (e.g. the content of ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ASCII)
The following formats are supported for an RSA private key:
– PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey DER SEQUENCE (binary or PEM encoding)
– PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo or EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo DER SEQUENCE
(binary or PEM encoding)
– OpenSSH (text format, introduced in OpenSSH 6.5)
For details about the PEM encoding, see RFC1421/RFC1423.

• passphrase (string or byte string) – For private keys only, the pass phrase
that encrypts the key.
Returns: An RSA key object (RsaKey).
Raises ValueError/IndexError/TypeError – When the given key cannot be parsed (pos-
sibly because the pass phrase is wrong).
class Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.RsaKey(**kwargs)
Class defining an actual RSA key. Do not instantiate directly. Use generate(), construct() or
import_key() instead.
Variables
• n (integer) – RSA modulus
• e (integer) – RSA public exponent
• d (integer) – RSA private exponent
• p (integer) – First factor of the RSA modulus
• q (integer) – Second factor of the RSA modulus
• invp (integer) – Chinese remainder component (𝑝−1 mod 𝑞)
• invq (integer) – Chinese remainder component (𝑞 −1 mod 𝑝)
• u (integer) – Same as invp
Undocumented exportKey, publickey
exportKey(format=’PEM’, passphrase=None, pkcs=1, protection=None, randfunc=None)
Export this RSA key.
Parameters
• format (string) – The format to use for wrapping the key:
– ’PEM’. (Default) Text encoding, done according to RFC1421/RFC1423.
– ’DER’. Binary encoding.
– ’OpenSSH’. Textual encoding, done according to OpenSSH specification. Only suitable
for public keys (not private keys).
• passphrase (string) – (For private keys only) The pass phrase used for protecting
the output.
• pkcs (integer) – (For private keys only) The ASN.1 structure to use for serializing the
key. Note that even in case of PEM encoding, there is an inner ASN.1 DER structure.
With pkcs=1 (default), the private key is encoded in a simple PKCS#1 structure
(RSAPrivateKey).
With pkcs=8, the private key is encoded in a PKCS#8 structure (PrivateKeyInfo).
Note: This parameter is ignored for a public key. For DER and PEM, an ASN.1 DER
SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure is always used.
• protection (string) – (For private keys only) The encryption scheme to use for
protecting the private key.
If None (default), the behavior depends on format:

– For ‘DER’, the PBKDF2WithHMAC-SHA1AndDES-EDE3-CBC scheme is used. The

following operations are performed:
1. A 16 byte Triple DES key is derived from the passphrase using Crypto.
Protocol.KDF.PBKDF2() with 8 bytes salt, and 1 000 iterations of Crypto.
Hash.HMAC.
2. The private key is encrypted using CBC.
3. The encrypted key is encoded according to PKCS#8.
– For ‘PEM’, the obsolete PEM encryption scheme is used. It is based on MD5 for key
derivation, and Triple DES for encryption.
Specifying a value for protection is only meaningful for PKCS#8 (that is, pkcs=8)
and only if a pass phrase is present too.
The supported schemes for PKCS#8 are listed in the Crypto.IO.PKCS8 module (see
wrap_algo parameter).
• randfunc (callable) – A function that provides random bytes. Only used for PEM
encoding. The default is Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes().
Returns the encoded key
Return type byte string
Raises ValueError – when the format is unknown or when you try to encrypt a private key
with DER format and PKCS#1.
Warning: If you don’t provide a pass phrase, the private key will be exported in the clear!
export_key(format=’PEM’, passphrase=None, pkcs=1, protection=None, randfunc=None)

Export this RSA key.
Parameters
• format (string) – The format to use for wrapping the key:
– ’PEM’. (Default) Text encoding, done according to RFC1421/RFC1423.
– ’DER’. Binary encoding.
– ’OpenSSH’. Textual encoding, done according to OpenSSH specification. Only
suitable for public keys (not private keys).
• passphrase (string) – (For private keys only) The pass phrase used for protect-
ing the output.
• pkcs (integer) – (For private keys only) The ASN.1 structure to use for serializing
the key. Note that even in case of PEM encoding, there is an inner ASN.1 DER
structure.
With pkcs=1 (default), the private key is encoded in a simple PKCS#1 structure
(RSAPrivateKey).
With pkcs=8, the private key is encoded in a PKCS#8 structure
(PrivateKeyInfo).
Note: This parameter is ignored for a public key. For DER and PEM, an ASN.1
DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure is always used.

• protection (string) – (For private keys only) The encryption scheme to use for
protecting the private key.
If None (default), the behavior depends on format:
– For ‘DER’, the PBKDF2WithHMAC-SHA1AndDES-EDE3-CBC scheme is used.
The following operations are performed:
1. A 16 byte Triple DES key is derived from the passphrase using Crypto.
Protocol.KDF.PBKDF2() with 8 bytes salt, and 1 000 iterations of
Crypto.Hash.HMAC.
2. The private key is encrypted using CBC.
3. The encrypted key is encoded according to PKCS#8.
– For ‘PEM’, the obsolete PEM encryption scheme is used. It is based on MD5 for
key derivation, and Triple DES for encryption.
Specifying a value for protection is only meaningful for PKCS#8 (that is,
pkcs=8) and only if a pass phrase is present too.
The supported schemes for PKCS#8 are listed in the Crypto.IO.PKCS8 module
(see wrap_algo parameter).
• randfunc (callable) – A function that provides random bytes. Only used for
PEM encoding. The default is Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes().
with DER format and PKCS#1.
has_private()
Whether this is an RSA private key
public_key()
A matching RSA public key.
Returns a new RsaKey object
publickey()
A matching RSA public key.
Returns a new RsaKey object
size_in_bits()
Size of the RSA modulus in bits
size_in_bytes()
The minimal amount of bytes that can hold the RSA modulus
Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.oid = '1.2.840.113549.1.1.1'
Object ID for the RSA encryption algorithm. This OID often indicates a generic RSA key, even when such key
will be actually used for digital signatures.

DSA
DSA is a widespread public key signature algorithm. Its security is based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP).
Given a cyclic group, a generator g, and an element h, it is hard to find an integer x such that 𝑔 𝑥 = ℎ. The problem is
believed to be difficult, and it has been proved such (and therefore secure) for more than 30 years.
The group is actually a sub-group over the integers modulo p, with p prime. The sub-group order is q, which is prime
too; it always holds that (p-1) is a multiple of q. The cryptographic strength is linked to the magnitude of p and q. The
signer holds a value x (0<x<q-1) as private key, and its public key (y where 𝑦 = 𝑔 𝑥 mod 𝑝) is distributed.
In 2017, a sufficient size is deemed to be 2048 bits for p and 256 bits for q. For more information, see the most recent
ECRYPT report.
The algorithm can only be used for authentication (digital signature). DSA cannot be used for confidentiality (encryp-
tion).
The values (p,q,g) are called domain parameters; they are not sensitive but must be shared by both parties (the signer
and the verifier). Different signers can share the same domain parameters with no security concerns.
The DSA signature is twice as big as the size of q (64 bytes if q is 256 bit long).
This module provides facilities for generating new DSA keys and for constructing them from known components.
As an example, this is how you generate a new DSA key pair, save the public key in a file called public_key.pem,
sign a message (with Crypto.Signature.DSS), and verify it:
>>> from Crypto.PublicKey import DSA

>>> from Crypto.Signature import DSS
>>> from Crypto.Hash import SHA256
>>>
>>> # Create a new DSA key
>>> key = DSA.generate(2048)
>>> f = open("public_key.pem", "w")
>>> f.write(key.publickey().export_key())
>>> f.close()
>>>
>>> # Sign a message
>>> message = b"Hello"
>>> hash_obj = SHA256.new(message)
>>> signer = DSS.new(key, 'fips-186-3')
>>> signature = signer.sign(hash_obj)
>>>
>>> # Load the public key
>>> f = open("public_key.pem", "r")
>>> hash_obj = SHA256.new(message)
>>> pub_key = DSA.import_key(f.read())
>>> verifier = DSS.new(pub_key, 'fips-186-3')
>>>
>>> # Verify the authenticity of the message
>>> try:
>>> verifier.verify(hash_obj, signature)
>>> print "The message is authentic."
>>> except ValueError:
>>> print "The message is not authentic."
Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.generate(bits, randfunc=None, domain=None)

Generate a new DSA key pair.
The algorithm follows Appendix A.1/A.2 and B.1 of FIPS 186-4, respectively for domain generation and key
pair generation.

Parameters
• bits (integer) – Key length, or size (in bits) of the DSA modulus p. It must be 1024,
2048 or 3072.
• randfunc (callable) – Random number generation function; it accepts a single
integer N and return a string of random data N bytes long. If not specified, Crypto.
Random.get_random_bytes() is used.
• domain (tuple) – The DSA domain parameters p, q and g as a list of 3 integers. Size
of p and q must comply to FIPS 186-4. If not specified, the parameters are created anew.
Returns a new DSA key object
Return type DsaKey
Raises ValueError – when bits is too little, too big, or not a multiple of 64.
Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.construct(tup, consistency_check=True)
Construct a DSA key from a tuple of valid DSA components.
Parameters
• tup (tuple) – A tuple of long integers, with 4 or 5 items in the following order:
1. Public key (y).
2. Sub-group generator (g).
3. Modulus, finite field order (p).
4. Sub-group order (q).
5. Private key (x). Optional.
• consistency_check (boolean) – If True, the library will verify that the provided
components fulfil the main DSA properties.
Raises ValueError – when the key being imported fails the most basic DSA validity checks.
Returns a DSA key object
Return type DsaKey
class Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.DsaKey(key_dict)
Class defining an actual DSA key. Do not instantiate directly. Use generate(), construct() or
Variables
• p (integer) – DSA modulus
• q (integer) – Order of the subgroup
• g (integer) – Generator
• y (integer) – Public key
• x (integer) – Private key
Undocumented exportKey, publickey
domain()
The DSA domain parameters.
Returns tuple : (p,q,g)

exportKey(format=’PEM’, pkcs8=None, passphrase=None, protection=None, randfunc=None)

Export this DSA key.
Parameters
• format (string) – The encoding for the output:
– ’PEM’ (default). ASCII as per RFC1421/ RFC1423.
– ’DER’. Binary ASN.1 encoding.
– ’OpenSSH’. ASCII one-liner as per RFC4253. Only suitable for public keys, not
for private keys.
• passphrase (string) – Private keys only. The pass phrase to protect the output.
• pkcs8 (boolean) – Private keys only. If True (default), the key is encoded with
PKCS#8. If False, it is encoded in the custom OpenSSL/OpenSSH container.
• protection (string) – Only in combination with a pass phrase. The encryption
scheme to use to protect the output.
If pkcs8 takes value True, this is the PKCS#8 algorithm to use for deriving the
secret and encrypting the private DSA key. For a complete list of algorithms, see
Crypto.IO.PKCS8. The default is PBKDF2WithHMAC-SHA1AndDES-EDE3-
CBC.
If pkcs8 is False, the obsolete PEM encryption scheme is used. It is based on
MD5 for key derivation, and Triple DES for encryption. Parameter protection is
then ignored.
The combination format='DER' and pkcs8=False is not allowed if a
passphrase is present.
• randfunc (callable) – A function that returns random bytes. By default it is
Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes().
with DER format and OpenSSL/OpenSSH.
export_key(format=’PEM’, pkcs8=None, passphrase=None, protection=None, randfunc=None)

Export this DSA key.
Parameters
• format (string) – The encoding for the output:
– ’PEM’ (default). ASCII as per RFC1421/ RFC1423.
– ’DER’. Binary ASN.1 encoding.
– ’OpenSSH’. ASCII one-liner as per RFC4253. Only suitable for public keys, not
for private keys.
• passphrase (string) – Private keys only. The pass phrase to protect the output.
• pkcs8 (boolean) – Private keys only. If True (default), the key is encoded with
PKCS#8. If False, it is encoded in the custom OpenSSL/OpenSSH container.

• protection (string) – Only in combination with a pass phrase. The encryption

scheme to use to protect the output.
If pkcs8 takes value True, this is the PKCS#8 algorithm to use for deriving the
secret and encrypting the private DSA key. For a complete list of algorithms, see
Crypto.IO.PKCS8. The default is PBKDF2WithHMAC-SHA1AndDES-EDE3-
CBC.
If pkcs8 is False, the obsolete PEM encryption scheme is used. It is based on
MD5 for key derivation, and Triple DES for encryption. Parameter protection is
then ignored.
The combination format='DER' and pkcs8=False is not allowed if a
passphrase is present.
• randfunc (callable) – A function that returns random bytes. By default it is
Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes().
with DER format and OpenSSL/OpenSSH.
has_private()
Whether this is a DSA private key
public_key()
A matching DSA public key.
Returns a new DsaKey object
publickey()
A matching DSA public key.
Returns a new DsaKey object
Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.import_key(extern_key, passphrase=None)
Import a DSA key.
Parameters
• extern_key (string or byte string) – The DSA key to import.
The following formats are supported for a DSA public key:
– X.509 certificate (binary DER or PEM)
– X.509 subjectPublicKeyInfo (binary DER or PEM)
– OpenSSH (ASCII one-liner, see RFC4253)
The following formats are supported for a DSA private key:
– PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo or EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo DER SE-
QUENCE (binary or PEM)
– OpenSSL/OpenSSH custom format (binary or PEM)

• passphrase (string) – In case of an encrypted private key, this is the pass phrase
from which the decryption key is derived.
Encryption may be applied either at the PKCS#8 or at the PEM level.
Returns a DSA key object
Return type DsaKey
Raises ValueError – when the given key cannot be parsed (possibly because the pass phrase is
wrong).
ECC
ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) is a modern and efficient type of public key cryptography. Its security is based on
the difficulty to solve discrete logarithms on the field defined by specific equations computed over a curve.
ECC can be used to create digital signatures or to perform a key exchange.
Compared to traditional algorithms like RSA, an ECC key is significantly smaller at the same security level. For
instance, a 3072-bit RSA key takes 768 bytes whereas the equally strong NIST P-256 private key only takes 32 bytes
(that is, 256 bits).
This module provides mechanisms for generating new ECC keys, exporting and importing them using widely sup-
ported formats like PEM or DER.
Curve Strings accepted for the curve API parameter

NIST P-192 'NIST P-192', 'p192', 'P-192', 'prime192v1', 'secp192r1'
Ed25519 'ed25519', 'Ed25519'
Ed448 'ed448', 'Ed448'
For more information about each NIST curve see FIPS 186-4, Section D.1.2.
The Ed25519 and the Ed448 curves are defined in RFC8032.
The following example demonstrates how to generate a new ECC key, export it, and subsequently reload it back into
the application:
>>> from Crypto.PublicKey import ECC
>>>
>>> key = ECC.generate(curve='P-256')
>>>
>>> f = open('myprivatekey.pem','wt')
>>> f.write(key.export_key(format='PEM'))
>>> f.close()
...
>>> f = open('myprivatekey.pem','rt')
>>> key = ECC.import_key(f.read())
The ECC key can be used to perform or verify signatures, using the modules Crypto.Signature.DSS (ECDSA;
NIST curves only) or Crypto.Signature.eddsa (EdDSA; Ed25519 and Ed448 curve only).
class Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccKey(**kwargs)
Class defining an ECC key. Do not instantiate directly. Use generate(), construct() or

Variables
• curve (string) – The name of the curve as defined in the ECC table.
• pointQ (EccPoint) – an ECC point representating the public component.
• d (integer) – A scalar that represents the private component in NIST P curves. It is
smaller than the order of the generator point.
• seed (bytes) – A seed that representats the private component in EdDSA curves
(Ed25519, 32 bytes; Ed448, 57 bytes).
export_key(**kwargs)
Export this ECC key.
Parameters
• format (string) – The format to use for encoding the key:
– 'DER'. The key will be encoded in ASN.1 DER format (binary). For a public
key, the ASN.1 subjectPublicKeyInfo structure defined in RFC5480 will be
used. For a private key, the ASN.1 ECPrivateKey structure defined in RFC5915
is used instead (possibly within a PKCS#8 envelope, see the use_pkcs8 flag
below).
– 'PEM'. The key will be encoded in a PEM envelope (ASCII).
– 'OpenSSH'. The key will be encoded in the OpenSSH format (ASCII, public keys
only).
– 'SEC1'. The public key (i.e., the EC point) will be encoded into bytes according
to Section 2.3.3 of SEC1 (which is a subset of the older X9.62 ITU standard). Only
for NIST P-curves.
– 'raw'. The public key will be encoded as bytes, without any metadata.
* For NIST P-curves: equivalent to 'SEC1'.

* For EdDSA curves: bytes in the format defined in RFC8032.
• passphrase (byte string or string) – The passphrase to use for protect-
ing the private key.
• use_pkcs8 (boolean) – Only relevant for private keys.
If True (default and recommended), the PKCS#8 representation will be used. It must
be True for EdDSA curves.
• protection (string) – When a private key is exported with password-protection
and PKCS#8 (both DER and PEM formats), this parameter MUST be present and
be a valid algorithm supported by Crypto.IO.PKCS8. It is recommended to use
PBKDF2WithHMAC-SHA1AndAES128-CBC.
• compress (boolean) – If True, the method returns a more compact representa-
tion of the public key, with the X-coordinate only.
If False (default), the method returns the full public key.
This parameter is ignored for EdDSA curves, as compression is mandatory.
Warning: If you don’t provide a passphrase, the private key will be exported in the clear!

Note: When exporting a private key with password-protection and PKCS#8 (both DER and PEM formats),
any extra parameters to export_key() will be passed to Crypto.IO.PKCS8.
Returns A multi-line string (for 'PEM' and 'OpenSSH') or bytes (for 'DER', 'SEC1',
and 'raw') with the encoded key.
has_private()
True if this key can be used for making signatures or decrypting data.
public_key()
A matching ECC public key.
Returns a new EccKey object
class Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccPoint(x, y, curve=’p256’)
A class to model a point on an Elliptic Curve.
The class supports operators for:
• Adding two points: R = S + T
• In-place addition: S += T
• Negating a point: R = -T
• Comparing two points: if S == T: ... or if S != T: ...
• Multiplying a point by a scalar: R = S*k
• In-place multiplication by a scalar: T *= k
Variables
• x (integer) – The affine X-coordinate of the ECC point
• y (integer) – The affine Y-coordinate of the ECC point
• xy – The tuple with affine X- and Y- coordinates
copy()
Return a copy of this point.
double()
Double this point (in-place operation).
Returns This same object (to enable chaining).
is_point_at_infinity()
True if this is the point-at-infinity.
point_at_infinity()
Return the point-at-infinity for the curve.
size_in_bits()
Size of each coordinate, in bits.
size_in_bytes()
Size of each coordinate, in bytes.
exception Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.UnsupportedEccFeature

Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.construct(**kwargs)
Build a new ECC key (private or public) starting from some base components.
In most cases, you will already have an existing key which you can read in with import_key() instead of
this function.
Parameters
• curve (string) – Mandatory. The name of the elliptic curve, as defined in the ECC
table.
• d (integer) – Mandatory for a private key and a NIST P-curve (e.g., P-256): the integer
in the range [1..order-1] that represents the key.
• seed (bytes) – Mandatory for a private key and an EdDSA curve. It must be 32 bytes
for Ed25519, and 57 bytes for Ed448.
• point_x (integer) – Mandatory for a public key: the X coordinate (affine) of the
ECC point.
• point_y (integer) – Mandatory for a public key: the Y coordinate (affine) of the
ECC point.
Returns a new ECC key object
Return type EccKey
Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.generate(**kwargs)
Generate a new private key on the given curve.
Parameters
• curve (string) – Mandatory. It must be a curve name defined in the ECC table.
• randfunc (callable) – Optional. The RNG to read randomness from. If None,
Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes() is used.
Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.import_key(encoded, passphrase=None, curve_name=None)
Import an ECC key (public or private).
Parameters
• encoded (bytes or multi-line string) – The ECC key to import. The func-
tion will try to automatically detect the right format.
Supported formats for an ECC public key:
– X.509 certificate: binary (DER) or ASCII (PEM).
– X.509 subjectPublicKeyInfo: binary (DER) or ASCII (PEM).
– SEC1 (or X9.62), as bytes. NIST P curves only. You must also provide the
curve_name (with a value from the ECC table)
– OpenSSH line, defined in RFC5656 and RFC8709 (ASCII). This is normally the
content of files like ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub.
Supported formats for an ECC private key:
– A binary ECPrivateKey structure, as defined in RFC5915 (DER). NIST P curves
only.
– A PKCS#8 structure (or the more recent Asymmetric Key Package, RFC5958): bi-
nary (DER) or ASCII (PEM).
– OpenSSH 6.5 and newer versions (ASCII).

Private keys can be in the clear or password-protected.

• passphrase (byte string) – The passphrase to use for decrypting a private key.
Encryption may be applied protected at the PEM level (not recommended) or at the
PKCS#8 level (recommended). This parameter is ignored if the key in input is not en-
crypted.
• curve_name (string) – For a SEC1 encoding only. This is the name of the curve, as
defined in the ECC table.
Note: To import EdDSA private and public keys, when encoded as raw bytes, use:
• Crypto.Signature.eddsa.import_public_key(), or
• Crypto.Signature.eddsa.import_private_key().
Returns a new ECC key object

Return type EccKey
Raises ValueError – when the given key cannot be parsed (possibly because the pass phrase is
wrong).
• RSA keys
• DSA keys
• Elliptic Curve keys
5.4.3 Obsolete key type
El Gamal
Warning: Even though ElGamal algorithms are in theory reasonably secure, in practice there are no real good
reasons to prefer them to RSA instead.
Signature algorithm
The security of the ElGamal signature scheme is based (like DSA) on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Given a
cyclic group, a generator g, and an element h, it is hard to find an integer x such that 𝑔 𝑥 = ℎ.
The group is the largest multiplicative sub-group of the integers modulo p, with p prime. The signer holds a value x
(0<x<p-1) as private key, and its public key (y where 𝑦 = 𝑔 𝑥 mod 𝑝) is distributed.
The ElGamal signature is twice as big as p.
Encryption algorithm
The security of the ElGamal encryption scheme is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH). Given
a cyclic group, a generator g, and two integers a and b, it is difficult to find the element 𝑔 𝑎𝑏 when only 𝑔 𝑎 and 𝑔 𝑏 are
known, and not a and b.

As before, the group is the largest multiplicative sub-group of the integers modulo p, with p prime. The receiver holds
a value a (0<a<p-1) as private key, and its public key (b where 𝑏 = 𝑔 𝑎 ) is given to the sender.
The ElGamal ciphertext is twice as big as p.
Domain parameters
For both signature and encryption schemes, the values (p,g) are called domain parameters. They are not sensitive but
must be distributed to all parties (senders and receivers). Different signers can share the same domain parameters, as
can different recipients of encrypted messages.
Security
Both DLP and CDH problem are believed to be difficult, and they have been proved such (and therefore secure) for
more than 30 years.
The cryptographic strength is linked to the magnitude of p. In 2017, a sufficient size for p is deemed to be 2048 bits.
For more information, see the most recent ECRYPT report.
The signature is four times larger than the equivalent DSA, and the ciphertext is two times larger than the equivalent
RSA.
Functionality
This module provides facilities for generating new ElGamal keys and constructing them from known components.
Crypto.PublicKey.ElGamal.generate(bits, randfunc)
Randomly generate a fresh, new ElGamal key.
The key will be safe for use for both encryption and signature (although it should be used for only one purpose).
Parameters
• bits (int) – Key length, or size (in bits) of the modulus p. The recommended value is
2048.
• randfunc (callable) – Random number generation function; it should accept a sin-
gle integer N and return a string of random N random bytes.
Returns an ElGamalKey object
Crypto.PublicKey.ElGamal.construct(tup)
Construct an ElGamal key from a tuple of valid ElGamal components.
The modulus p must be a prime. The following conditions must apply:
1<𝑔 <𝑝−1 (5.4)

𝑝−1
𝑔 = 1 mod 1
(5.5)
−1
1 < 𝑥 < 𝑝(5.6)
𝑔 𝑥 = 𝑦 mod 𝑝
(5.7)
Parameters tup (tuple) – A tuple with either 3 or 4 integers, in the following order:
1. Modulus (p).
2. Generator (g).
3. Public key (y).

4. Private key (x). Optional.

Raises ValueError – when the key being imported fails the most basic ElGamal validity checks.
Returns an ElGamalKey object
class Crypto.PublicKey.ElGamal.ElGamalKey(randfunc=None)
Class defining an ElGamal key. Do not instantiate directly. Use generate() or construct() instead.
Variables
• p – Modulus
• g – Generator
• y (integer) – Public key component
• x (integer) – Private key component
has_private()
Whether this is an ElGamal private key
publickey()
A matching ElGamal public key.
Returns a new ElGamalKey object
• ElGamal keys
5.5 Crypto.Protocol package
5.5.1 Key Derivation Functions
This module contains a collection of standard key derivation functions.

A key derivation function derives one or more secondary secret keys from one primary secret (a master key or a pass
phrase).
This is typically done to insulate the secondary keys from each other, to avoid that leakage of a secondary key com-
promises the security of the master key, or to thwart attacks on pass phrases (e.g. via rainbow tables).
PBKDF2
PBKDF2 is the most widespread algorithm for deriving keys from a password, originally defined in version 2.0 of the
PKCS#5 standard or in RFC2898.
It is computationally expensive (a property that can be tuned via the count parameter) so as to thwart dictionary and
rainbow tables attacks. However, it uses a very limited amount of RAM which makes it insufficiently protected against
advanced and motivated adversaries that can leverage GPUs.
New applications and protocols should use scrypt or bcrypt instead.
For example, if you need to derive two AES256 keys:
from Crypto.Protocol.KDF import PBKDF2
from Crypto.Hash import SHA512
from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes
password = b'my super secret'

salt = get_random_bytes(16)
5.5. Crypto.Protocol package 55


keys = PBKDF2(password, salt, 64, count=1000000, hmac_hash_module=SHA512)
key1 = keys[:32]
key2 = keys[32:]
Crypto.Protocol.KDF.PBKDF2(password, salt, dkLen=16, count=1000, prf=None,

hmac_hash_module=None)
Derive one or more keys from a password (or passphrase).
This function performs key derivation according to the PKCS#5 standard (v2.0).
Parameters
• password (string or byte string) – The secret password to generate the key
from.
Strings will be encoded as ISO 8859-1 (also known as Latin-1), which does not allow any
characters with codepoints > 255.
• salt (string or byte string) – A (byte) string to use for better protection from
dictionary attacks. This value does not need to be kept secret, but it should be randomly
chosen for each derivation. It is recommended to use at least 16 bytes.
Strings will be encoded as ISO 8859-1 (also known as Latin-1), which does not allow any
characters with codepoints > 255.
• dkLen (integer) – The cumulative length of the keys to produce.
Due to a flaw in the PBKDF2 design, you should not request more bytes than the
prf can output. For instance, dkLen should not exceed 20 bytes in combination with
HMAC-SHA1.
• count (integer) – The number of iterations to carry out. The higher the value, the
slower and the more secure the function becomes.
You should find the maximum number of iterations that keeps the key derivation still
acceptable on the slowest hardware you must support.
Although the default value is 1000, it is recommended to use at least 1000000 (1 mil-
lion) iterations.
• prf (callable) – A pseudorandom function. It must be a function that returns a
pseudorandom byte string from two parameters: a secret and a salt. The slower the
algorithm, the more secure the derivation function. If not specified, HMAC-SHA1 is
used.
• hmac_hash_module (module) – A module from Crypto.Hash implementing a
Merkle-Damgard cryptographic hash, which PBKDF2 must use in combination with
HMAC. This parameter is mutually exclusive with prf.
Returns A byte string of length dkLen that can be used as key material. If you want multiple
keys, just break up this string into segments of the desired length.
scrypt
scrypt is a password-based key derivation function created by Colin Percival, described in his paper “Stronger key
derivation via sequential memory-hard functions” and in RFC7914.
In addition to being computationally expensive, it is also memory intensive and therefore more secure against the risk
of custom ASICs.

Example:
from Crypto.Protocol.KDF import scrypt

password = b'my super secret'

key = scrypt(password, salt, 16, N=2**14, r=8, p=1)
Crypto.Protocol.KDF.scrypt(password, salt, key_len, N, r, p, num_keys=1)

Derive one or more keys from a passphrase.
Parameters
• password (string) – The secret pass phrase to generate the keys from.
• salt (string) – A string to use for better protection from dictionary attacks. This
value does not need to be kept secret, but it should be randomly chosen for each deriva-
tion. It is recommended to be at least 16 bytes long.
• key_len (integer) – The length in bytes of each derived key.
• N (integer) – CPU/Memory cost parameter. It must be a power of 2 and less than 232 .
• r (integer) – Block size parameter.
• p (integer) – Parallelization parameter. It must be no greater than (232 − 1)/(4𝑟).
• num_keys (integer) – The number of keys to derive. Every key is key_len bytes
long. By default, only 1 key is generated. The maximum cumulative length of all keys is
(232 − 1) * 32 (that is, 128TB).
A good choice of parameters (N, r , p) was suggested by Colin Percival in his presentation in 2009:
• ( 214 , 8, 1 ) for interactive logins (100ms)
• ( 220 , 8, 1 ) for file encryption (5s)
Returns A byte string or a tuple of byte strings.
bcrypt
bcrypt is a password hashing function designed by Niels Provos and David Mazières.
In addition to being computationally expensive, it is also memory intensive and therefore more secure against the risk
of custom ASICs.
This implementation only supports bcrypt hashes with prefix $2a.
By design, bcrypt only accepts passwords up to 72 byte long. If you want to hash passwords with no restrictions on
their length, it is common practice to apply a cryptographic hash and then BASE64-encode For instance:
from base64 import b64encode

from Crypto.Protocol.KDF import bcrypt
password = b"test"
b64pwd = b64encode(SHA256.new(password).digest())
bcrypt_hash = bcrypt(b64pwd, 12)
and to check them:

from base64 import b64encode

from Crypto.Protocol.KDF import bcrypt
password_to_test = b"test"
try:
b64pwd = b64encode(SHA256.new(password).digest())
bcrypt_check(b64pwd, bcrypt_hash)
except ValueError:
print("Incorrect password")
Crypto.Protocol.KDF.bcrypt(password, cost, salt=None)

Hash a password into a key, using the OpenBSD bcrypt protocol.
Parameters
• password (byte string or string) – The secret password or pass phrase. It
must be at most 72 bytes long. It must not contain the zero byte. Unicode strings will be
encoded as UTF-8.
• cost (integer) – The exponential factor that makes it slower to compute the hash. It
must be in the range 4 to 31. A value of at least 12 is recommended.
• salt (byte string) – Optional. Random byte string to thwarts dictionary and rain-
bow table attacks. It must be 16 bytes long. If not passed, a random value is generated.
Return (byte string): The bcrypt hash
Raises ValueError – if password is longer than 72 bytes or if it contains the zero byte
Crypto.Protocol.KDF.bcrypt_check(password, bcrypt_hash)
Verify if the provided password matches the given bcrypt hash.
Parameters
• password (byte string or string) – The secret password or pass phrase to
test. It must be at most 72 bytes long. It must not contain the zero byte. Unicode strings
will be encoded as UTF-8.
• bcrypt_hash (byte string, bytearray) – The reference bcrypt hash the
password needs to be checked against.
Raises ValueError – if the password does not match
HKDF
The HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand key derivation function (HKDF) was designed by Hugo Krawczyk. It is stan-
dardized in RFC 5869 and in NIST SP-800 56C.
This KDF is not suitable for deriving keys from a password or for key stretching.
Example, for deriving two AES256 keys:
from Crypto.Protocol.KDF import HKDF

key1, key2 = HKDF(master_secret, 32, salt, SHA512, 2)

Crypto.Protocol.KDF.HKDF(master, key_len, salt, hashmod, num_keys=1, context=None)

Derive one or more keys from a master secret using the HMAC-based KDF defined in RFC5869.
Parameters
• master (byte string) – The unguessable value used by the KDF to generate the
other keys. It must be a high-entropy secret, though not necessarily uniform. It must not
be a password.
• key_len (integer) – The length in bytes of every derived key.
• salt (byte string) – A non-secret, reusable value that strengthens the randomness
extraction step. Ideally, it is as long as the digest size of the chosen hash. If empty, a
string of zeroes in used.
• hashmod (module) – A cryptographic hash algorithm from Crypto.Hash.
Crypto.Hash.SHA512 is a good choice.
long. The maximum cumulative length of all keys is 255 times the digest size.
• context (byte string) – Optional identifier describing what the keys are used for.
Returns A byte string or a tuple of byte strings.
Counter Mode
A KDF can be generically constructed with a pseudorandom function (PRF). If the PRF has a fixed-length output, you
can evaluate the PRF multiple times and concatenate the results until you collect enough derived keying material.
This function implements such type of KDF, where a counter contributes to each invokation of the PRF, as defined
in NIST SP 800-108 Rev 1. The NIST standard only allows the use of HMAC (recommended) and CMAC (not
recommended) as PRF.
This KDF is not suitable for deriving keys from a password.
Example 1 (HMAC as PRF, one AES128 key to derive):
>> from Crypto.Hash import SHA256, HMAC
>>
>> def prf(s, x):
>> return HMAC.new(s, x, SHA256).digest()
>>
>> key_derived = SP800_108_Counter(secret, 16, prf, label=b'Key A')
Example 2 (HMAC as PRF, two AES128 keys to derive):

>> from Crypto.Hash import SHA256, HMAC
>>
>> def prf(s, x):
>> return HMAC.new(s, x, SHA256).digest()
>>
>> key_A, key_B = SP800_108_Counter(secret, 16, prf, num_keys=2, label=b'Key AB')
Example 3 (CMAC as PRF, two AES256 keys to derive):

>> from Crypto.Cipher import AES
>> from Crypto.Hash import SHA256, CMAC
>>
>> def prf(s, x):


>> return CMAC.new(s, x, AES).digest()
>>
>> key_A, key_B = SP800_108_Counter(secret, 32, prf, num_keys=2, label=b'Key AB')
Crypto.Protocol.KDF.SP800_108_Counter(master, key_len, prf, num_keys=None, label=b”, con-

text=b”)
Derive one or more keys from a master secret using a pseudorandom function in Counter Mode, as specified in
NIST SP 800-108r1.
Parameters
• master (byte string) – The secret value used by the KDF to derive the other keys.
It must not be a password. The length on the secret must be consistent with the input
expected by the prf function.
• key_len (integer) – The length in bytes of each derived key.
• prf (function) – A pseudorandom function that takes two byte strings as parameters:
the secret and an input. It returns another byte string.
long. By default, only 1 key is derived.
• label (byte string) – Optional description of the purpose of the derived keys. It
must not contain zero bytes.
• context (byte string) – Optional information pertaining to the protocol that uses
the keys, such as the identity of the participants, nonces, session IDs, etc. It must not
contain zero bytes.
Returns
• a byte string (if num_keys is not specified), or
• a tuple of byte strings (if num_key is specified).
PBKDF1
PBKDF1 is an old key derivation function defined in version 2.0 of the PKCS#5 standard (v1.5) or in RFC2898.
Warning: Newer applications should use the more secure and versatile scrypt instead.
Crypto.Protocol.KDF.PBKDF1(password, salt, dkLen, count=1000, hashAlgo=None)

Derive one key from a password (or passphrase).
This function performs key derivation according to an old version of the PKCS#5 standard (v1.5) or RFC2898.
Parameters
• password (string) – The secret password to generate the key from.
• salt (byte string) – An 8 byte string to use for better protection from dictionary
attacks. This value does not need to be kept secret, but it should be randomly chosen for
each derivation.
• dkLen (integer) – The length of the desired key. The default is 16 bytes, suitable for
instance for Crypto.Cipher.AES.

• count (integer) – The number of iterations to carry out. The recommendation is

1000 or more.
• hashAlgo (module) – The hash algorithm to use, as a module or an object from the
Crypto.Hash package. The digest length must be no shorter than dkLen. The default
algorithm is Crypto.Hash.SHA1.
Returns A byte string of length dkLen that can be used as key.
5.5.2 Secret Sharing Schemes
This module implements the Shamir’s secret sharing protocol described in the paper “How to share a secret”.
The secret can be split into an arbitrary number of shares (n), such that it is sufficient to collect just k of them to
reconstruct it (k < n). For instance, one may want to grant 16 people the ability to access a system with a pass code,
at the condition that at least 3 of them are present at the same time. As they join their shares, the pass code is revealed.
In that case, n=16 and k=3.
In the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, the n shares are created by first defining a polynomial of degree k-1:
𝑞(𝑥) = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝑥 + 𝑎2 𝑥2 + . . . + 𝑎𝑘−1 𝑥𝑘−1
The coefficient 𝑎0 is fixed with the secret value. The coefficients 𝑎1 . . . 𝑎𝑘−1 are random and they are discarded as
soon as the shares are created.
Each share is a pair (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 ), where 𝑥𝑖 is an arbitrary but unique number assigned to the share’s recipient and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑞(𝑥𝑖 ).
This implementation has the following properties:
• The secret is a byte string of 16 bytes (e.g. an AES 128 key).
• Each share is a byte string of 16 bytes.
• The recipients of the shares are assigned an integer starting from 1 (share number 𝑥𝑖 ).
• The polynomial 𝑞(𝑥) is defined over the field GF(2128 ) with the same irriducible polynomial as used in AES-
GCM: 1 + 𝑥 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥7 + 𝑥128 .
• It can be compatible with the popular ssss tool when used with the 128 bit security level and no dispersion: the
command line arguments must include -s 128 -D. Note that ssss uses a slightly different polynomial:
𝑟(𝑥) = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝑥 + 𝑎2 𝑥2 + . . . + 𝑎𝑘−1 𝑥𝑘−1 + 𝑥𝑘
which requires you to specify ssss=True when calling split() and combine().
Each recipient needs to hold both the share number (𝑥𝑖 , which is not confidential) and the secret (which needs to be
protected securely).
As an example, the following code shows how to protect a file meant for 5 people, in such a way that any 2 of them
are sufficient to reassemble it:
>>> from binascii import hexlify

>>> from Crypto.Protocol.SecretSharing import Shamir
>>>
>>> shares = Shamir.split(2, 5, key)
>>> for idx, share in shares:
>>> print "Index #%d: %s" % (idx, hexlify(share))
>>>
>>> with open("clear.txt", "rb") as fi, open("enc.txt", "wb") as fo:


>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_EAX)
>>> ct, tag = cipher.encrypt(fi.read()), cipher.digest()
>>> fo.write(cipher.nonce + tag + ct)
Each person can be given one share and the encrypted file.
When 2 people gather together with their shares, they can decrypt the file:
>>> from binascii import unhexlify

>>> from Crypto.Protocol.SecretSharing import Shamir
>>>
>>> shares = []
>>> for x in range(2):
>>> in_str = raw_input("Enter index and share separated by comma: ")
>>> idx, share = [ strip(s) for s in in_str.split(",") ]
>>> shares.append((idx, unhexlify(share)))
>>> key = Shamir.combine(shares)
>>>
>>> with open("enc.txt", "rb") as fi:
>>> nonce, tag = [ fi.read(16) for x in range(2) ]
>>> cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_EAX, nonce)
>>> try:
>>> result = cipher.decrypt(fi.read())
>>> cipher.verify(tag)
>>> with open("clear2.txt", "wb") as fo:
>>> fo.write(result)
>>> print "The shares were incorrect"
Attention: Reconstruction may succeed but still produce the incorrect secret if any of the presented shares is
incorrect (due to data corruption or to a malicious participant).
It is extremely important to also use an authentication mechanism (such as the EAX cipher mode in the example).
class Crypto.Protocol.SecretSharing.Shamir
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
A secret is split into n shares, and it is sufficient to collect k of them to reconstruct the secret.
static combine(shares, ssss=False)
Recombine a secret, if enough shares are presented.
Parameters
• shares (tuples) – The k tuples, each containin the index (an integer) and the share
(a byte string, 16 bytes long) that were assigned to a participant.
• ssss (bool) – If True, the shares were produced by the ssss utility. Default:
False.
Returns The original secret, as a byte string (16 bytes long).
static split(k, n, secret, ssss=False)
Split a secret into n shares.
The secret can be reconstructed later using just k shares out of the original n. Each share must be kept
confidential to the person it was assigned to.

Each share is associated to an index (starting from 1).

Parameters
• k (integer) – The sufficient number of shares to reconstruct the secret (k < n).
• n (integer) – The number of shares that this method will create.
• secret (byte string) – A byte string of 16 bytes (e.g. the AES 128 key).
• ssss (bool) – If True, the shares can be used with the ssss utility. Default:
False.
Return (tuples): n tuples. A tuple is meant for each participant and it contains two items:
1. the unique index (an integer)
2. the share (a byte string, 16 bytes)
• Key Derivation Functions
• Secret Sharing Schemes
5.6 Crypto.IO package
Modules for reading and writing cryptographic data.

• PEM
• PKCS#8
5.6.1 PEM
Set of functions for encapsulating data according to the PEM format.

PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail) was an IETF standard for securing emails via a Public Key Infrastructure. It is specified
in RFC 1421-1424.
Even though it has been abandoned, the simple message encapsulation it defined is still widely used today for encoding
binary cryptographic objects like keys and certificates into text.
Crypto.IO.PEM.encode(data, marker, passphrase=None, randfunc=None)
Encode a piece of binary data into PEM format.
Parameters
• data (byte string) – The piece of binary data to encode.
• marker (string) – The marker for the PEM block (e.g. “PUBLIC KEY”). Note that
there is no official master list for all allowed markers. Still, you can refer to the OpenSSL
source code.
• passphrase (byte string) – If given, the PEM block will be encrypted. The key
is derived from the passphrase.
• randfunc (callable) – Random number generation function; it accepts an integer
N and returns a byte string of random data, N bytes long. If not given, a new one is
instantiated.
Returns The PEM block, as a string.
5.6. Crypto.IO package 63

Crypto.IO.PEM.decode(pem_data, passphrase=None)
Decode a PEM block into binary.
Parameters
• pem_data (string) – The PEM block.
• passphrase (byte string) – If given and the PEM block is encrypted, the key will
be derived from the passphrase.
Returns A tuple with the binary data, the marker string, and a boolean to indicate if decryption
was performed.
Raises ValueError – if decoding fails, if the PEM file is encrypted and no passphrase has been
provided or if the passphrase is incorrect.
5.6.2 PKCS#8
PKCS#8 is a standard for storing and transferring private key information. The wrapped key can either be clear or
encrypted.
All encryption algorithms are based on passphrase-based key derivation. The following mechanisms are fully sup-
ported:
• PBKDF2WithHMAC-SHA1AndAES128-CBC
• PBKDF2WithHMAC-SHA1AndDES-EDE3-CBC
• scryptAndAES128-CBC
The following mechanisms are only supported for importing keys. They are much weaker than the ones listed above,
and they are provided for backward compatibility only:
• pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC
• pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC
• pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC
• pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC
Crypto.IO.PKCS8.wrap(private_key, key_oid, passphrase=None, protection=None, prot_params=None,
key_params=<Crypto.Util.asn1.DerNull object>, randfunc=None)
Wrap a private key into a PKCS#8 blob (clear or encrypted).
Parameters
• private_key (byte string) – The private key encoded in binary form. The actual
encoding is algorithm specific. In most cases, it is DER.
• key_oid (string) – The object identifier (OID) of the private key to wrap. It is a
dotted string, like 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (for RSA keys).
• passphrase (bytes string or string) – The secret passphrase from which
the wrapping key is derived. Set it only if encryption is required.

• protection (string) – The identifier of the algorithm to use for securely wrapping
the key. The default value is PBKDF2WithHMAC-SHA1AndDES-EDE3-CBC.
• prot_params (dictionary) – Parameters for the protection algorithm.
Key Description
itera- The KDF algorithm is repeated several times to slow down brute force attacks
tion_count
on passwords (called N or CPU/memory cost in scrypt). The default value for
PBKDF2 is 1000. The default value for scrypt is 16384.
salt_sizeSalt is used to thwart dictionary and rainbow attacks on passwords. The de-
fault value is 8 bytes.
block_size
(scrypt only) Memory-cost (r). The default value is 8.
par- (scrypt only) CPU-cost (p). The default value is 1.
al-
leliza-
tion
• key_params (DER object or None) – The parameters field to use in the

AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE. If None, no parameters field will be
added. By default, the ASN.1 type NULL is used.
• randfunc (callable) – Random number generation function; it should accept a sin-
gle integer N and return a string of random data, N bytes long. If not specified, a new
RNG will be instantiated from Crypto.Random.
Returns The PKCS#8-wrapped private key (possibly encrypted), as a byte string.
Crypto.IO.PKCS8.unwrap(p8_private_key, passphrase=None)
Unwrap a private key from a PKCS#8 blob (clear or encrypted).
Parameters
• p8_private_key (byte string) – The private key wrapped into a PKCS#8 blob,
DER encoded.
• passphrase (byte string or string) – The passphrase to use to decrypt the
blob (if it is encrypted).
Returns
A tuple containing
1. the algorithm identifier of the wrapped key (OID, dotted string)
2. the private key (byte string, DER encoded)
3. the associated parameters (byte string, DER encoded) or None
Raises ValueError – if decoding fails
5.7 Crypto.Random package

Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes(N)
Return a random byte string of length N.
5.7. Crypto.Random package 65

5.7.1 Crypto.Random.random module
Crypto.Random.random.getrandbits(N)
Return a random integer, at most N bits long.
Crypto.Random.random.randrange([start ], stop[, step ])
Return a random integer in the range (start, stop, step). By default, start is 0 and step is 1.
Crypto.Random.random.randint(a, b)
Return a random integer in the range no smaller than a and no larger than b.
Crypto.Random.random.choice(seq)
Return a random element picked from the sequence seq.
Crypto.Random.random.shuffle(seq)
Randomly shuffle the sequence seq in-place.
Crypto.Random.random.sample(population, k)
Randomly chooses k distinct elements from the list population.
5.8 Crypto.Util package
Useful modules that don’t belong in any other package.
5.8.1 Crypto.Util.asn1 module
This module provides minimal support for encoding and decoding ASN.1 DER objects.
class Crypto.Util.asn1.DerObject(asn1Id=None, payload=b”, implicit=None, con-
structed=False, explicit=None)
Base class for defining a single DER object.
This class should never be directly instantiated.
decode(der_encoded, strict=False)
Decode a complete DER element, and re-initializes this object with it.
Parameters der_encoded (byte string) – A complete DER element.
Raises ValueError – in case of parsing errors.
encode()
Return this DER element, fully encoded as a binary byte string.
class Crypto.Util.asn1.DerInteger(value=0, implicit=None, explicit=None)
Class to model a DER INTEGER.
An example of encoding is:
>>> from Crypto.Util.asn1 import DerInteger

>>> from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify
>>> int_der = DerInteger(9)
>>> print hexlify(int_der.encode())
which will show 020109, the DER encoding of 9.

And for decoding:

>>> s = unhexlify(b'020109')
>>> try:
>>> int_der = DerInteger()
>>> int_der.decode(s)
>>> print int_der.value
>>> print "Not a valid DER INTEGER"
the output will be 9.

Variables value (integer) – The integer value
Decode a complete DER INTEGER DER, and re-initializes this object with it.
Parameters der_encoded (byte string) – A complete INTEGER DER element.
encode()
Return the DER INTEGER, fully encoded as a binary string.
class Crypto.Util.asn1.DerOctetString(value=b”, implicit=None)
Class to model a DER OCTET STRING.
>>> from Crypto.Util.asn1 import DerOctetString

>>> os_der = DerOctetString(b'\xaa')
>>> os_der.payload += b'\xbb'
>>> print hexlify(os_der.encode())
which will show 0402aabb, the DER encoding for the byte string b'\xAA\xBB'.
For decoding:
>>> s = unhexlify(b'0402aabb')
>>> try:
>>> os_der = DerOctetString()
>>> os_der.decode(s)
>>> print hexlify(os_der.payload)
>>> print "Not a valid DER OCTET STRING"
the output will be aabb.

Variables payload (byte string) – The content of the string
class Crypto.Util.asn1.DerNull
Class to model a DER NULL element.
class Crypto.Util.asn1.DerSequence(startSeq=None, implicit=None)
Class to model a DER SEQUENCE.
This object behaves like a dynamic Python sequence.
Sub-elements that are INTEGERs behave like Python integers.
Any other sub-element is a binary string encoded as a complete DER sub-element (TLV).
5.8. Crypto.Util package 67

>>> from Crypto.Util.asn1 import DerSequence, DerInteger

>>> obj_der = unhexlify('070102')
>>> seq_der = DerSequence([4])
>>> seq_der.append(9)
>>> seq_der.append(obj_der.encode())
>>> print hexlify(seq_der.encode())
which will show 3009020104020109070102, the DER encoding of the sequence containing 4, 9, and the
object with payload 02.
For decoding:
>>> s = unhexlify(b'3009020104020109070102')
>>> try:
>>> seq_der = DerSequence()
>>> seq_der.decode(s)
>>> print len(seq_der)
>>> print seq_der[0]
>>> print seq_der[:]
>>> print "Not a valid DER SEQUENCE"
the output will be:
3
4
[4, 9, b'{}']
decode(der_encoded, strict=False, nr_elements=None, only_ints_expected=False)

Decode a complete DER SEQUENCE, and re-initializes this object with it.
Parameters
• der_encoded (byte string) – A complete SEQUENCE DER element.
• nr_elements (None or integer or list of integers) – The num-
ber of members the SEQUENCE can have
• only_ints_expected (boolean) – Whether the SEQUENCE is expected to
contain only integers.
• strict (boolean) – Whether decoding must check for strict DER compliancy.
DER INTEGERs are decoded into Python integers. Any other DER element is not decoded. Its validity
is not checked.
encode()
Return this DER SEQUENCE, fully encoded as a binary string.
Raises ValueError – if some elements in the sequence are neither integers nor byte strings.
hasInts(only_non_negative=True)
Return the number of items in this sequence that are integers.
Parameters only_non_negative (boolean) – If True, negative integers are not
counted in.
hasOnlyInts(only_non_negative=True)
Return True if all items in this sequence are integers or non-negative integers.

This function returns False is the sequence is empty, or at least one member is not an integer.
Parameters only_non_negative (boolean) – If True, the presence of negative inte-
gers causes the method to return False.
class Crypto.Util.asn1.DerObjectId(value=”, implicit=None, explicit=None)
Class to model a DER OBJECT ID.
>>> from Crypto.Util.asn1 import DerObjectId

>>> oid_der = DerObjectId("1.2")
>>> oid_der.value += ".840.113549.1.1.1"
>>> print hexlify(oid_der.encode())
which will show 06092a864886f70d010101, the DER encoding for the RSA Object Identifier 1.2.840.
113549.1.1.1.
For decoding:
>>> s = unhexlify(b'06092a864886f70d010101')
>>> try:
>>> oid_der = DerObjectId()
>>> oid_der.decode(s)
>>> print oid_der.value
>>> print "Not a valid DER OBJECT ID"
the output will be 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.

Variables value (string) – The Object ID (OID), a dot separated list of integers
Decode a complete DER OBJECT ID, and re-initializes this object with it.
Parameters
• der_encoded (byte string) – A complete DER OBJECT ID.
encode()
Return the DER OBJECT ID, fully encoded as a binary string.
class Crypto.Util.asn1.DerBitString(value=b”, implicit=None, explicit=None)
Class to model a DER BIT STRING.
>>> from Crypto.Util.asn1 import DerBitString

>>> bs_der = DerBitString(b'\xAA')
>>> bs_der.value += b'\xBB'
>>> print(bs_der.encode().hex())
which will show 030300aabb, the DER encoding for the bit string b'\xAA\xBB'.
For decoding:

>>> s = bytes.fromhex('030300aabb')
>>> try:
>>> bs_der = DerBitString()
>>> bs_der.decode(s)
>>> print(bs_der.value.hex())
>>> print "Not a valid DER BIT STRING"
the output will be aabb.

Variables value (byte string) – The content of the string
Decode a complete DER BIT STRING, and re-initializes this object with it.
Parameters
• der_encoded (byte string) – a complete DER BIT STRING.
encode()
Return the DER BIT STRING, fully encoded as a byte string.
class Crypto.Util.asn1.DerSetOf(startSet=None, implicit=None)
Class to model a DER SET OF.
>>> from Crypto.Util.asn1 import DerBitString

>>> so_der = DerSetOf([4,5])
>>> so_der.add(6)
>>> print hexlify(so_der.encode())
which will show 3109020104020105020106, the DER encoding of a SET OF with items 4,5, and 6.
For decoding:
>>> s = unhexlify(b'3109020104020105020106')
>>> try:
>>> so_der = DerSetOf()
>>> so_der.decode(s)
>>> print [x for x in so_der]
>>> print "Not a valid DER SET OF"
the output will be [4, 5, 6].

add(elem)
Add an element to the set.
Parameters elem (byte string or integer) – An element of the same type of ob-
jects already in the set. It can be an integer or a DER encoded object.
Decode a complete SET OF DER element, and re-initializes this object with it.
DER INTEGERs are decoded into Python integers. Any other DER element is left undecoded; its validity
is not checked.

Parameters
• der_encoded (byte string) – a complete DER BIT SET OF.
encode()
Return this SET OF DER element, fully encoded as a binary string.
5.8.2 Crypto.Util.Padding module
This module provides minimal support for adding and removing standard padding from data. Example:
>>> from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad, unpad

>>>
>>> data = b'Unaligned' # 9 bytes
>>> iv = get_random_bytes(16)
>>>
>>> cipher1 = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
>>> ct = cipher1.encrypt(pad(data, 16))
>>>
>>> cipher2 = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
>>> pt = unpad(cipher2.decrypt(ct), 16)
>>> assert(data == pt)
Crypto.Util.Padding.pad(data_to_pad, block_size, style=’pkcs7’)

Apply standard padding.
Parameters
• data_to_pad (byte string) – The data that needs to be padded.
• block_size (integer) – The block boundary to use for padding. The output length
is guaranteed to be a multiple of block_size.
• style (string) – Padding algorithm. It can be ‘pkcs7’ (default), ‘iso7816’ or ‘x923’.
Returns the original data with the appropriate padding added at the end.
Crypto.Util.Padding.unpad(padded_data, block_size, style=’pkcs7’)
Remove standard padding.
Parameters
• padded_data (byte string) – A piece of data with padding that needs to be
stripped.
• block_size (integer) – The block boundary to use for padding. The input length
must be a multiple of block_size.
• style (string) – Padding algorithm. It can be ‘pkcs7’ (default), ‘iso7816’ or ‘x923’.
Returns data without padding.

Raises ValueError – if the padding is incorrect.
5.8.3 Crypto.Util.RFC1751 module
Crypto.Util.RFC1751.english_to_key(s)
Transform a string into a corresponding key.
Example:
>>> from Crypto.Util.RFC1751 import english_to_key

>>> english_to_key('RAM LOIS GOAD CREW CARE HIT')
b'66666666'
Parameters s (string) – the string with the words separated by whitespace; the number of
words must be a multiple of 6.
Returns A byte string.
Crypto.Util.RFC1751.key_to_english(key)
Transform an arbitrary key into a string containing English words.
Example:
>>> from Crypto.Util.RFC1751 import key_to_english

>>> key_to_english(b'66666666')
'RAM LOIS GOAD CREW CARE HIT'
Parameters key (byte string) – The key to convert. Its length must be a multiple of 8.
Returns A string of English words.
5.8.4 Crypto.Util.strxor module
Fast XOR for byte strings.

Crypto.Util.strxor.strxor(term1, term2, output=None)
From two byte strings of equal length, create a third one which is the byte-by-byte XOR of the two.
Parameters
• term1 (bytes/bytearray/memoryview) – The first byte string to XOR.
• term2 (bytes/bytearray/memoryview) – The second byte string to XOR.
• output (bytearray/memoryview) – The location where the result will be written
to. It must have the same length as term1 and term2. If None, the result is returned.
Return If output is None, a new byte string with the result. Otherwise None.
Note: term1 and term2 must have the same length.
Crypto.Util.strxor.strxor_c(term, c, output=None)
From a byte string, create a second one of equal length where each byte is XOR-red with the same value.
Parameters
• term (bytes/bytearray/memoryview) – The byte string to XOR.

• c (int) – Every byte in the string will be XOR-ed with this value. It must be between 0
and 255 (included).
• output (None or bytearray/memoryview) – The location where the result
will be written to. It must have the same length as term. If None, the result is returned.
Returns If output is None, a new bytes string with the result. Otherwise None.
5.8.5 Crypto.Util.Counter module
Richer counter functions for CTR cipher mode.

CTR is a mode of operation for block ciphers.
The plaintext is broken up in blocks and each block is XOR-ed with a keystream to obtain the ciphertext. The keystream
is produced by the encryption of a sequence of counter blocks, which all need to be different to avoid repetitions in the
keystream. Counter blocks don’t need to be secret.
The most straightforward approach is to include a counter field, and increment it by one within each subsequent
counter block.
The new() function at the module level under Crypto.Cipher instantiates a new CTR cipher object for the
relevant base algorithm. Its parameters allow you define a counter block with a fixed structure:
• an optional, fixed prefix
• the counter field encoded in big endian mode
The length of the two components can vary, but together they must be as large as the block size (e.g. 16 bytes for
AES).
Alternatively, the counter parameter can be used to pass a counter block object (created in advance with the function
Crypto.Util.Counter.new()) for a more complex composition:
• an optional, fixed prefix
• the counter field, encoded in big endian or little endian mode
• an optional, fixed suffix
As before, the total length must match the block size.
The counter blocks with a big endian counter will look like this:
The counter blocks with a little endian counter will look like this:
Example of AES-CTR encryption with custom counter:

from Crypto.Cipher import AES

from Crypto.Util import Counter
from Crypto import Random
nonce = Random.get_random_bytes(4)
ctr = Counter.new(64, prefix=nonce, suffix=b'ABCD', little_endian=True, initial_
˓→value=10)
key = b'AES-128 symm key'

plaintext = b'X'*1000000
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=ctr)
ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(plaintext)
Crypto.Util.Counter.new(nbits, prefix=b”, suffix=b”, initial_value=1, little_endian=False, al-

low_wraparound=False)
Create a stateful counter block function suitable for CTR encryption modes.
Each call to the function returns the next counter block. Each counter block is made up by three parts:
prefix counter value postfix
The counter value is incremented by 1 at each call.

Parameters
• nbits (integer) – Length of the desired counter value, in bits. It must be a multiple
of 8.
• prefix (byte string) – The constant prefix of the counter block. By default, no
prefix is used.
• suffix (byte string) – The constant postfix of the counter block. By default, no
suffix is used.
• initial_value (integer) – The initial value of the counter. Default value is 1. Its
length in bits must not exceed the argument nbits.
• little_endian (boolean) – If True, the counter number will be encoded in little
endian format. If False (default), in big endian format.
• allow_wraparound (boolean) – This parameter is ignored.
Returns An object that can be passed with the counter parameter to a CTR mode cipher.
It must hold that len(prefix) + nbits//8 + len(suffix) matches the block size of the underlying block cipher.

5.8.6 Crypto.Util.number module
Crypto.Util.number.bytes_to_long(s)
Convert a byte string to a long integer (big endian).
In Python 3.2+, use the native method instead:
>>> int.from_bytes(s, 'big')
For instance:
>>> int.from_bytes(b'P', 'big')
80
This is (essentially) the inverse of long_to_bytes().
Crypto.Util.number.ceil_div(n, d)
Return ceil(n/d), that is, the smallest integer r such that r*d >= n
Crypto.Util.number.getPrime(N, randfunc=None)
Return a random N-bit prime number.
N must be an integer larger than 1. If randfunc is omitted, then Random.get_random_bytes() is used.
Crypto.Util.number.getRandomInteger(N, randfunc=None)
Return a random number at most N bits long.
If randfunc is omitted, then Random.get_random_bytes() is used.
Deprecated since version 3.0: This function is for internal use only and may be renamed or removed in the
future. Use Crypto.Random.random.getrandbits() instead.
Crypto.Util.number.getRandomNBitInteger(N, randfunc=None)
Return a random number with exactly N-bits, i.e. a random number between 2**(N-1) and (2**N)-1.
future.
Crypto.Util.number.getRandomRange(a, b, randfunc=None)
Return a random number n so that a <= n < b.
future. Use Crypto.Random.random.randrange() instead.
Crypto.Util.number.getStrongPrime(N, e=0, false_positive_prob=1e-06, randfunc=None)
Return a random strong N-bit prime number. In this context, p is a strong prime if p-1 and p+1 have at least one
large prime factor.
Parameters
• N (integer) – the exact length of the strong prime. It must be a multiple of 128 and >
512.
• e (integer) – if provided, the returned prime (minus 1) will be coprime to e and thus
suitable for RSA where e is the public exponent.
• false_positive_prob (float) – The statistical probability for the result not to be
actually a prime. It defaults to 10-6 . Note that the real probability of a false-positive is far
less. This is just the mathematically provable limit.

• randfunc (callable) – A function that takes a parameter N and that re-

turns a random byte string of such length. If omitted, Crypto.Random.
get_random_bytes() is used.
Returns The new strong prime.
future.
Crypto.Util.number.inverse(u, v)
The inverse of u mod v.
Crypto.Util.number.isPrime(N, false_positive_prob=1e-06, randfunc=None)
Test if a number N is a prime.
Parameters
• false_positive_prob (float) – The statistical probability for the result not to be
actually a prime. It defaults to 10-6 . Note that the real probability of a false-positive is far
less. This is just the mathematically provable limit.
• randfunc (callable) – A function that takes a parameter N and that re-
turns a random byte string of such length. If omitted, Crypto.Random.
get_random_bytes() is used.
Returns True is the input is indeed prime.
Crypto.Util.number.long_to_bytes(n, blocksize=0)
Convert a positive integer to a byte string using big endian encoding.
If blocksize is absent or zero, the byte string will be of minimal length.
Otherwise, the length of the byte string is guaranteed to be a multiple of blocksize. If necessary, zeroes
(\x00) are added at the left.
Note: In Python 3, if you are sure that n can fit into blocksize bytes, you can simply use the native method
instead:
>>> n.to_bytes(blocksize, 'big')
For instance:
>>> n = 80
>>> n.to_bytes(2, 'big')
b'\x00P'
However, and unlike this long_to_bytes() function, an OverflowError exception is raised if n does
not fit.
Crypto.Util.number.size(N)
Returns the size of the number N in bits.
All cryptographic functionalities are organized in sub-packages; each sub-package is dedicated to solving a specific
class of problems.

Package Description
Crypto.Cipher Modules for protecting confidentiality that is, for encrypting and decrypting data (example:
AES).
Crypto.Signature Modules for assuring authenticity, that is, for creating and verifying digital signatures of
messages (example: PKCS#1 v1.5).
Crypto.Hash Modules for creating cryptographic digests (example: SHA-256).
Crypto.PublicKey Modules for generating, exporting or importing public keys (example: RSA or ECC).
Crypto.Protocol Modules for faciliting secure communications between parties, in most cases by leveraging
cryptograpic primitives from other modules (example: Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme).
Crypto.IO Modules for dealing with encodings commonly used for cryptographic data (example:
PEM).
Crypto.Random Modules for generating random data.
Crypto.Util General purpose routines (example: XOR for byte strings).
In certain cases, there is some overlap between these categories. For instance, authenticity is also provided by
Message Authentication Codes, and some can be built using digests, so they are included in the Crypto.Hash
package (example: HMAC). Also, cryptographers have over time realized that encryption without authentication is
often of limited value so recent ciphers found in the Crypto.Cipher package embed it (example: GCM).
PyCryptodome strives to maintain strong backward compatibility with the old PyCrypto’s API (except for those few
cases where that is harmful to security) so a few modules don’t appear where they should (example: the ASN.1 module
is under Crypto.Util as opposed to Crypto.IO).


CHAPTER 6
Examples
6.1 Encrypt data with AES
The following code generates a new AES128 key and encrypts a piece of data into a file. We use the EAX mode because
it allows the receiver to detect any unauthorized modification (similarly, we could have used other authenticated
encryption modes like GCM, CCM or SIV).

data = b'secret data'
key = get_random_bytes(16)
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_EAX)
ciphertext, tag = cipher.encrypt_and_digest(data)
file_out = open("encrypted.bin", "wb")

[ file_out.write(x) for x in (cipher.nonce, tag, ciphertext) ]
file_out.close()
At the other end, the receiver can securely load the piece of data back (if they know the key!). Note that the code
generates a ValueError exception when tampering is detected.
file_in = open("encrypted.bin", "rb")

nonce, tag, ciphertext = [ file_in.read(x) for x in (16, 16, -1) ]
file_in.close()
# let's assume that the key is somehow available again

cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_EAX, nonce)
data = cipher.decrypt_and_verify(ciphertext, tag)
79
6.2 Generate an RSA key
The following code generates a new RSA key pair (secret) and saves it into a file, protected by a password. We use
the scrypt key derivation function to thwart dictionary attacks. At the end, the code prints our the RSA public key in
ASCII/PEM format:
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
secret_code = "Unguessable"
key = RSA.generate(2048)
encrypted_key = key.export_key(passphrase=secret_code, pkcs=8,
protection="scryptAndAES128-CBC")
file_out = open("rsa_key.bin", "wb")

file_out.write(encrypted_key)
file_out.close()
print(key.publickey().export_key())
The following code reads the private RSA key back in, and then prints again the public key:
secret_code = "Unguessable"
encoded_key = open("rsa_key.bin", "rb").read()
key = RSA.import_key(encoded_key, passphrase=secret_code)
print(key.publickey().export_key())
6.3 Generate public key and private key
The following code generates public key stored in receiver.pem and private key stored in private.pem. These
files will be used in the examples below. Every time, it generates different public key and private key pair.
key = RSA.generate(2048)
private_key = key.export_key()
file_out = open("private.pem", "wb")
file_out.write(private_key)
file_out.close()
public_key = key.publickey().export_key()
file_out = open("receiver.pem", "wb")
file_out.write(public_key)
file_out.close()
6.4 Encrypt data with RSA
The following code encrypts a piece of data for a receiver we have the RSA public key of. The RSA public key is
stored in a file called receiver.pem.
80 Chapter 6. Examples
Since we want to be able to encrypt an arbitrary amount of data, we use a hybrid encryption scheme. We use RSA
with PKCS#1 OAEP for asymmetric encryption of an AES session key. The session key can then be used to encrypt
all the actual data.
As in the first example, we use the EAX mode to allow detection of unauthorized modifications.

from Crypto.Cipher import AES, PKCS1_OAEP
data = "I met aliens in UFO. Here is the map.".encode("utf-8")

file_out = open("encrypted_data.bin", "wb")
recipient_key = RSA.import_key(open("receiver.pem").read())
session_key = get_random_bytes(16)
# Encrypt the session key with the public RSA key

cipher_rsa = PKCS1_OAEP.new(recipient_key)
enc_session_key = cipher_rsa.encrypt(session_key)
# Encrypt the data with the AES session key

cipher_aes = AES.new(session_key, AES.MODE_EAX)
ciphertext, tag = cipher_aes.encrypt_and_digest(data)
[ file_out.write(x) for x in (enc_session_key, cipher_aes.nonce, tag, ciphertext) ]
file_out.close()
The receiver has the private RSA key. They will use it to decrypt the session key first, and with that the rest of the file:

from Crypto.Cipher import AES, PKCS1_OAEP
file_in = open("encrypted_data.bin", "rb")
private_key = RSA.import_key(open("private.pem").read())
enc_session_key, nonce, tag, ciphertext = \

[ file_in.read(x) for x in (private_key.size_in_bytes(), 16, 16, -1) ]
file_in.close()
# Decrypt the session key with the private RSA key

cipher_rsa = PKCS1_OAEP.new(private_key)
session_key = cipher_rsa.decrypt(enc_session_key)
# Decrypt the data with the AES session key

cipher_aes = AES.new(session_key, AES.MODE_EAX, nonce)
data = cipher_aes.decrypt_and_verify(ciphertext, tag)
print(data.decode("utf-8"))
6.4. Encrypt data with RSA 81

82 Chapter 6. Examples
CHAPTER 7
Frequently Asked Questions
7.1 Is CTR cipher mode compatible with Java?
Yes. When you instantiate your AES cipher in Java:
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CTR/NoPadding");
SecretKeySpec keySpec = new SecretKeySpec(new byte[16], "AES");

IvParameterSpec ivSpec = new IvParameterSpec(new byte[16]);
cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, keySpec, ivSpec);
You are effectively using CTR mode without a fixed nonce and with a 128-bit big endian counter starting at 0. The
counter will wrap around only after 2128 blocks.
You can replicate the same keystream in PyCryptodome with:
ivSpec = b'\x00' * 16
ctr = AES.new(keySpec, AES.MODE_CTR, initial_value=ivSpec, nonce=b'')
7.2 Are RSASSA-PSS signatures compatible with Java?
Yes. For Java, you must consider that by default the mask is generated by MGF1 with SHA-1 (regardless of how you
hash the message) and the salt is 20 bytes long.
If you want to use another algorithm or another salt length, you must instantiate a PSSParameterSpec object, for
instance:
Signature ss = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withRSA/PSS");
AlgorithmParameters pss1 = ss.getParameters();
83

PSSParameterSpec pssParameterSpec = new PSSParameterSpec("SHA-256", "MGF1", new
˓→MGF1ParameterSpec("SHA-256"), 32, 0xBC);
ss.setParameter(spec1);
7.3 Are RSASSA-PSS signatures compatible with OpenSSL?
Yes, but one quirk of OpenSSL (and of a few other libraries, especially if they are wrappers to OpenSSL) is that the
salt length is computed in two possible ways:
Salt length Value for EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen()

openssl pkeyutl command
Same as digest RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST -pkeyopt
size rsa_pss_saltlen:digest
Maximized RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX -pkeyopt
rsa_pss_saltlen:max
In PyCryptodome, the salt length matches the digest size by default (which is what RFC8017 recommends). However,
you can also maximize the salt length with:
key = RSA.import_key(open('privkey.der').read())
h = SHA256.new(message)
max_salt_bytes = key.size_in_bytes() - h.digest_size - 2
signature = pss.new(key, salt_bytes=max_salt_bytes).sign(h)
7.4 Why do I get the error No module named Crypto on Windows?
Check the directory where Python packages are installed, like:

/path/to/python/Lib/site-packages/
You might find a directory named crypto, with all the PyCryptodome files in it.
The most likely cause is described here and you can fix the problem with:
pip uninstall crypto
pip uninstall pycryptodome
The root cause is that, in the past, you most likely have installed an unrelated but similarly named package called
crypto, which happens to operate under the namespace crypto.
The Windows filesystem is case-insensitive so crypto and Crypto are effectively considered the same thing. When
you subsequently install pycryptodome, pip finds that a directory named with the target namespace already exists
(under the rules of the underlying filesystem), and therefore installs all the sub-packages of pycryptodome in it.
This is probably a reasonable behavior, if it wasn’t that pip does not issue any warning even if it could detect the issue.
7.5 Why does strxor raise TypeError: argument 2 must be

bytes, not bytearray?
Most probably you have installed both the pycryptodome and the old pycrypto packages.
84 Chapter 7. Frequently Asked Questions

Run pip uninstall pycrypto and try again.

The old PyCrypto shipped with a strxor module written as a native library (.so or .dll file). If you install
pycryptodome, the old native module will still take priority over the new Python extension that comes in the latter.
7.6 Why do I get a translation_unit_or_empty undefined error

with pycparser?
Unfortunately,‘‘pycparser‘‘ does not work with optimzed (-O) Python builds, which strips out the docstrings, causing
this error. This is a known issue and it will not be fixed.
The possible workarounds are:
• Do not run Python iwth -O
• Remove cffi and cparser. PyCryptodome will fall back to ctypes for interfacing with the native modules.
• Use an earlier version of cparser (2.14)
7.6. Why do I get a translation_unit_or_empty undefined error with pycparser? 85

86 Chapter 7. Frequently Asked Questions

CHAPTER 8
Contribute and support
• Do not be afraid to contribute with small and apparently insignificant improvements like correction to typos.
Every change counts.
• Read carefully the License of PyCryptodome. By submitting your code, you acknowledge that you accept to
release it according to the BSD 2-clause license.
• You must disclaim which parts of your code in your contribution were partially copied or derived from an
existing source. Ensure that the original is licensed in a way compatible to the BSD 2-clause license.
• You can propose changes in any way you find most convenient. However, the preferred approach is to:
– Clone the main repository on GitHub.
– Create a branch and modify the code.
– Send a pull request upstream with a meaningful description.
• Provide tests (in Crypto.SelfTest) along with code. If you fix a bug add a test that fails in the current
version and passes with your change.
• If your change breaks backward compatibility, highlight it and include a justification.
• Ensure that your code complies to PEP8 and PEP257.
• If you add or modify a public interface, make sure the relevant type stubs remain up to date.
• Ensure that your code does not use constructs or includes modules not present in Python 2.6.
• Add a short summary of the change to the file Changelog.rst.
• Add your name to the list of contributors in the file AUTHORS.rst.
The PyCryptodome mailing list is hosted on Google Groups. You can mail any comment or question to py-
[email protected].
Bug reports can be filed on the GitHub tracker.
87
88 Chapter 8. Contribute and support

CHAPTER 9
Future plans
Future releases will include:

• Update Crypto.Signature.DSS to FIPS 186-4
• Make all hash objects non-copyable and immutable after the first digest
• Add alias ‘segment_bits’ to parameter ‘segment_size’ for CFB
• Coverage testing
• Implement AES with bitslicing
• Add unit tests for PEM I/O
• Move old ciphers into a Museum submodule
• Add more ECC curves
• Import/export of ECC keys with compressed points
• Add algorithms:
– Elliptic Curves (ECIES, ECDH)
– Camellia, GOST
– Diffie-Hellman
– bcrypt
– argon2
– SRP
• Add more key management:
– Export/import of DSA domain parameters
– JWK
• Add support for CMS/PKCS#7
• Add support for RNG backed by PKCS#11 and/or KMIP
89
• Add support for Format-Preserving Encryption

• Remove dependency on libtomcrypto headers
• Speed up (T)DES with a bitsliced implementation
• Run lint on the C code
• Add (minimal) support for PGP
• Add (minimal) support for PKIX / X.509
90 Chapter 9. Future plans

CHAPTER 10
Changelog
10.1 3.17.0 (29 January 2023)
10.1.1 New features
• Added support for the Counter Mode KDF defined in SP 800-108 Rev 1.
• Reduce the minimum tag length for the EAX cipher to 2 bytes.
• An RSA object has 4 new properties for the CRT coefficients: dp, dq, invq and invq (invp is the same
value as the existing u).
10.1.2 Resolved issues
• GH#526: improved typing for RSA.construct.

• GH#534: reduced memory consumption when using a large number of cipher objects.
• GH#598: fixed missing error handling for Util.number.inverse.
• GH#629: improved typing for AES.new and the various mode-specific types it returns. Thanks to Greg Werbin.
• GH#653: added workaround for an alleged GCC compiler bug that affected Ed25519 code compiled for AVX2.
• GH#658: attribute curve of an ECC key was not always the preferred curve name, as it used to be in v3.15.0
(independently of the curve name specified when generating the key).
• GH#637: fixed typing for legacy modules PKCS1_v1_5 and PKCS1_PSS, as their verify() returned a
boolean.
• GH#664: with OCB mode, nonces of maximum length (15 bytes) were actually used as 14 bytes nonces. After
this fix, data that was encrypted in past using the (default) nonce length of 15 bytes can still be decrypted by
reducing the nonce to its first 14 bytes.
• GH#705: improved typing for nonce, iv, and IV parameters of cipher objects.
91
10.1.3 Other changes
• Build PyPy wheels only for versions 3.8 and 3.9, and not for 3.7 anymore.
10.2 3.16.0 (26 November 2022)
10.2.1 New features
• Build wheels for musl Linux. Thanks to Ben Raz.
• GH#639: ARC4 now also works with ‘keys’ as short as 8 bits.

• GH#669: fix segfaults when running in a manylinux2010 i686 image.
10.3 3.15.0 (22 June 2022)
10.3.1 New features
• Add support for curves Ed25519 and Ed448, including export and import of keys.
• Add support for EdDSA signatures.
• Add support for Asymmetric Key Packages (RFC5958) to import private keys.
• GH#620: for Crypto.Util.number.getPrime , do not sequentially scan numbers searching for a prime.
10.4 3.14.1 (5 February 2022)
• GH#595: Fixed memory leak for GMP integers. Thanks to Witalij Siebert and Pablo Quílez.
10.5 3.14.0 (30 January 2022)
10.5.1 New features
• Add support for curve NIST P-192.
92 Chapter 10. Changelog

10.6 3.13.0 (23 January 2022)
10.6.1 New features
• Add support for curve NIST P-224.
• GH#590: Fixed typing info for Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.
• Relaxed ECDSA requirements for FIPS 186 signatures and accept any SHA-2 or SHA-3 hash. sign() and
verify() will be performed even if the hash is stronger than the ECC key.
10.7 3.12.0 (4 December 2021)
10.7.1 New features
• ECC keys in the SEC1 format can be exported and imported.

• Add support for KMAC128, KMAC256, TupleHash128, and TupleHash256 (NIST SP-800 185).
• Add support for KangarooTwelve.
• GH#563: An asymmetric key could not be imported as a memoryview.

• GH#566: cSHAKE128/256 generated a wrong output for customization strings longer than 255 bytes.
• GH#582: CBC decryption generated the wrong plaintext when the input and the output were the same buffer.
Thanks to Michael K. Ashburn.
10.8 3.11.0 (8 October 2021)
• GH#512: Especially for very small bit sizes, Crypto.Util.number.getPrime() was occasionally gen-
erating primes larger than given the bit size. Thanks to Koki Takahashi.
• GH#552: Correct typing annotations for PKCS115_Cipher.decrypt().
• GH#555: decrypt() method of a PKCS#1v1.5 cipher returned a bytearray instead of bytes.
• GH#557: External DSA domain parameters were accepted even when the modulus (p) was not prime. This
affected Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.generate() and Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.construct().
Thanks to Koki Takahashi.
10.6. 3.13.0 (23 January 2022) 93

10.8.2 New features
• Added cSHAKE128 and cSHAKE256 (of SHA-3 family). Thanks to Michael Schaffner.
• GH#558: The flag RTLD_DEEPBIND passed to dlopen() is not well supported by address sanitizers. It
is now possible to set the environment variable PYCRYPTDOME_DISABLE_DEEPBIND to drop that flag and
allow security testing.
10.9 3.10.4 (25 September 2021)
• Output of Crypto.Util.number.long_to_bytes() was not always a multiple of blocksize.
10.10 3.10.3 (22 September 2021)
• GH#376: Fixed symbol conflict between different versions of libgmp.

• GH#481: Improved robustness of PKCS#1v1.5 decryption against timing attacks.
• GH#506 and GH#509: Fixed segmentation faults on Apple M1 and other Aarch64 SoCs, when the GMP library
was accessed via ctypes. Do not use GMP’s own sscanf and snprintf routines: instead, use simpler conversion
routines.
• GH#510: Workaround for cffi calling ctypes.util.find_library(), which invokes gcc and ld on
Linux, considerably slowing down all imports. On certain configurations, that may also leave temporary files
behind.
• GH#517: Fix RSAES-OAEP, as it didn’t always fail when zero padding was incorrect.
10.10.2 New features
• Added support for SHA-3 hash functions to HMAC.
• The Windows wheels of Python 2.7 now require the VS2015 runtime to be installed in the system, because
Microsoft stopped distributing the VS2008 compiler in April 2021. VS2008 was used to compile the Python 2.7
extensions.
10.11 3.10.1 (9 February 2021)
• Python 3 wheels use abi3 ABI tag.

• Remove Appveyor CI.

10.12 3.10.0 (6 February 2021)
• Fixed a potential memory leak when initializing block ciphers.

• GH#466: Crypto.Math.miller_rabin_test() was still using the system random source and not the
one provided as parameter.
• GH#469: RSA objects have the method public_key() like ECC objects. The old method publickey()
is still available for backward compatibility.
• GH#476: Crypto.Util.Padding.unpad() was raising an incorrect exception in case of zero-length
inputs. Thanks to Captainowie.
• GH#491: better exception message when Counter.new() is called with an integer initial_value than
doesn’t fit into nbits bits.
• GH#496: added missing block_size member for ECB cipher objects. Thanks to willem.
• GH#500: nonce member of an XChaCha20 cipher object was not matching the original nonce. Thanks to
Charles Machalow.
• The bulk of the test vectors have been moved to the separate package pycryptodome-test-vectors. As
result, packages pycryptodome and pycryptodomex become significantly smaller (from 14MB to 3MB).
• Moved CI tests and build service from Travis CI to GitHub Actions.
10.12.3 Breaks in compatibility
• Drop support for Python 2.6 and 3.4.
10.13 3.9.9 (2 November 2020)
• GH#435: Fixed Crypto.Util.number.size for negative numbers.
• Build Python 3.9 wheels on Windows.
10.14 3.9.8 (23 June 2020)
• GH#426: The Shamir’s secret sharing implementation is not actually compatible with ssss. Added an optional
parameter to enable interoperability.
10.12. 3.10.0 (6 February 2021) 95

• GH#427: Skip altogether loading of gmp.dll on Windows.

• GH#420: Fix incorrect CFB decryption when the input and the output are the same buffer.
• Speed up Shamir’s secret sharing routines. Thanks to ncarve.
10.15 3.9.7 (20 February 2020)
• GH#381: Make notarization possible again on OS X when using wheels. Thanks to Colin Atkinson.
10.16 3.9.6 (2 February 2020)
• Fix building of wheels for OS X by explicitly setting sysroot location.
10.17 3.9.5 (1 February 2020)
• RSA OAEP decryption was not verifying that all PS bytes are zero.
• GH#372: fixed memory leak for operations that use memoryviews when cffi is not installed.
• Fixed wrong ASN.1 OID for HMAC-SHA512 in PBE2.
• Updated Wycheproof test vectors to version 0.8r12.
10.18 3.9.4 (18 November 2019)
• GH#341: Prevent key_to_english from creating invalid data when fed with keys of length not multiple of
8. Thanks to vstoykovbg.
• GH#347: Fix blocking RSA signing/decryption when key has very small factor. Thanks to Martijn Pieters.

10.19 3.9.3 (12 November 2019)
• GH#308: Align stack of functions using SSE2 intrinsics to avoid crashes, when compiled with gcc on 32-bit
x86 platforms.
10.20 3.9.2 (10 November 2019)
• Add Python 3.8 wheels for Mac.
• GH#308: Avoid allocating arrays of __m128i on the stack, to cope with buggy compilers.
• GH#322: Remove blanket -O3 optimization for gcc and clang, to cope with buggy compilers.
• GH#337: Fix typing stubs for signatures.
• GH#338: Deal with gcc installations that don’t have x86intrin.h.
10.21 3.9.1 (1 November 2019)
• Add Python 3.8 wheels for Linux and Windows.
• GH#328: minor speed-up when importing RSA.
10.22 3.9.0 (27 August 2019)
• Add support for loading PEM files encrypted with AES256-CBC.

• Add support for XChaCha20 and XChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphers.
• Add support for bcrypt key derivation function (Crypto.Protocol.KDF.bcrypt).
• Add support for left multiplication of an EC point by a scalar.
• Add support for importing ECC and RSA keys in the new OpenSSH format.
10.19. 3.9.3 (12 November 2019) 97

• GH#312: it was not possible to invert an EC point anymore.

• GH#316: fix printing of DSA keys.
• GH#317: DSA.generate() was not always using the randfunc input.
• GH#285: the MD2 hash had block size of 64 bytes instead of 16; as result the HMAC construction gave incorrect
results.
10.23 3.8.2 (30 May 2019)
• GH#291: fix strict aliasing problem, emerged with GCC 9.1.
10.24 3.8.1 (4 April 2019)
• Add support for loading PEM files encrypted with AES192-CBC and AES256-GCM.
• When importing ECC keys in PEM format, ignore the redundant EC PARAMS section that was included by
certain openssl commands.
• repr() did not work for ECC.EccKey objects.

• Fix installation in development mode (setup install develop or pip install -e .).
• Minimal length for Blowfish cipher is 32 bits, not 40 bits.
• Various updates to docs.
10.25 3.8.0 (23 March 2019)
• Speed-up ECC performance. ECDSA is 33 times faster on the NIST P-256 curve.
• Added support for NIST P-384 and P-521 curves.
• EccKey has new methods size_in_bits() and size_in_bytes().
• Support HMAC-SHA224, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384, and HMAC-SHA512 in PBE2/PBKDF2.

• DER objects were not rejected if their length field had a leading zero.
• Allow legacy RC2 ciphers to have 40-bit keys.
• ASN.1 Object IDs did not allow the value 0 in the path.
• point_at_infinity() becomes an instance method for Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccKey, from a

static one.
10.26 3.7.3 (19 January 2019)
• GH#258: False positive on PSS signatures when externally provided salt is too long.
• Include type stub files for Crypto.IO and Crypto.Util.
10.27 3.7.2 (26 November 2018)
• GH#242: Fixed compilation problem on ARM platforms.
10.28 3.7.1 (25 November 2018)
• Added type stubs to enable static type checking with mypy. Thanks to Michael Nix.
• New update_after_digest flag for CMAC.
• GH#232: Fixed problem with gcc 4.x when compiling ghash_clmul.c.

• GH#238: Incorrect digest value produced by CMAC after cloning the object.
• Method update() of an EAX cipher object was returning the underlying CMAC object, instead of the EAX
object itself.
• Method update() of a CMAC object was not throwing an exception after the digest was computed (with
digest() or verify()).
10.26. 3.7.3 (19 January 2019) 99

10.29 3.7.0 (27 October 2018)
• Added support for Poly1305 MAC (with AES and ChaCha20 ciphers for key derivation).
• Added support for ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD cipher.
• New parameter output for Crypto.Util.strxor.strxor, Crypto.Util.strxor.strxor_c,
encrypt and decrypt methods in symmetric ciphers (Crypto.Cipher package). output is a pre-
allocated buffer (a bytearray or a writeable memoryview) where the result must be stored. This requires
less memory for very large payloads; it is also more efficient when encrypting (or decrypting) several small
payloads.
• GH#266: AES-GCM hangs when processing more than 4GB at a time on x86 with PCLMULQDQ instruction.
• Drop support for Python 3.3.

• Remove Crypto.Util.py3compat.unhexlify and Crypto.Util.py3compat.hexlify.
• With the old Python 2.6, use only ctypes (and not cffi) to interface to native code.
10.30 3.6.6 (17 August 2018)
• GH#198: Fix vulnerability on AESNI ECB with payloads smaller than 16 bytes (CVE-2018-15560).
10.31 3.6.5 (12 August 2018)
• GH#187: Fixed incorrect AES encryption/decryption with AES acceleration on x86 due to gcc’s optimization
and strict aliasing rules.
• GH#188: More prime number candidates than necessary where discarded as composite due to the limited way
D values were searched in the Lucas test.
• Fixed ResouceWarnings and DeprecationWarnings.
• Workaround for Python 3.7.0 bug on Windows (https://bugs.python.org/issue34108).

10.32 3.6.4 (10 July 2018)
• Build Python 3.7 wheels on Linux, Windows and Mac.
• GH#178: Rename _cpuid module to make upgrades more robust.

• More meaningful exceptions in case of mismatch in IV length (CBC/OFB/CFB modes).
• Fix compilation issues on Solaris 10/11.
10.33 3.6.3 (21 June 2018)
• GH#175: Fixed incorrect results for CTR encryption/decryption with more than 8 blocks.
10.34 3.6.2 (19 June 2018)
• ChaCha20 accepts 96 bit nonces (in addition to 64 bit nonces) as defined in RFC7539.
• Accelerate AES-GCM on x86 using PCLMULQDQ instruction.
• Accelerate AES-ECB and AES-CTR on x86 by pipelining AESNI instructions.
• As result of the two improvements above, on x86 (Broadwell):
– AES-ECB and AES-CTR are 3x faster
– AES-GCM is 9x faster
• On Windows, MPIR library was stilled pulled in if renamed to gmp.dll.
• In Crypto.Util.number, functions floor_div and exact_div have been removed. Also, ceil_div
is limited to non-negative terms only.
10.32. 3.6.4 (10 July 2018) 101

10.35 3.6.1 (15 April 2018)
• Added Google Wycheproof tests (https://github.com/google/wycheproof) for RSA, DSA, ECDSA, GCM, SIV,
EAX, CMAC.
• New parameter mac_len (length of MAC tag) for CMAC.
• In certain circumstances (at counter wrapping, which happens on average after 32 GB) AES GCM produced
wrong ciphertexts.
• Method encrypt() of AES SIV cipher could be still called, whereas only encrypt_and_digest() is
allowed.
10.36 3.6.0 (8 April 2018)
• Introduced export_key and deprecated exportKey for DSA and RSA key objects.
• Ciphers and hash functions accept memoryview objects in input.
• Added support for SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256.
• Reintroduced Crypto.__version__ variable as in PyCrypto.

• Fixed compilation problem with MinGW.
10.37 3.5.1 (8 March 2018)
• GH#142. Fix mismatch with declaration and definition of addmul128.
10.38 3.5.0 (7 March 2018)
• Import and export of ECC curves in compressed form.

• The initial counter for a cipher in CTR mode can be a byte string (in addition to an integer).
• Faster PBKDF2 for HMAC-based PRFs (at least 20x for short passwords, more for longer passwords). Thanks
to Christian Heimes for pointing out the implementation was under-optimized.

• The salt for PBKDF2 can be either a string or bytes (GH#67).

• Ciphers and hash functions accept data as bytearray, not just binary strings.
• The old SHA-1 and MD5 hash functions are available even when Python’s own hashlib does not include them.
• Without libgmp, modular exponentiation (since v3.4.8) crashed on 32-bit big-endian systems.
• Removed support for Python < 2.6.
10.39 3.4.12 (5 February 2018)
• GH#129. pycryptodomex could only be installed via wheels.
10.40 3.4.11 (5 February 2018)
• GH#121. the record list was still not correct due to PEP3147 and __pycache__ directories. Thanks again to
John O’Brien.
10.41 3.4.10 (2 February 2018)
• When creating ElGamal keys, the generator wasn’t a square residue: ElGamal encryption done with those keys
cannot be secure under the DDH assumption. Thanks to Weikeng Chen.
10.42 3.4.9 (1 February 2018)
• More meaningful error messages while importing an ECC key.
10.39. 3.4.12 (5 February 2018) 103

• GH#123 and #125. The SSE2 command line switch was not always passed on 32-bit x86 platforms.
• GH#121. The record list (–record) was not always correctly filled for the pycryptodomex package. Thanks to
John W. O’Brien.
10.43 3.4.8 (27 January 2018)
• Added a native extension in pure C for modular exponentiation, optimized for SSE2 on x86. In the process, we
drop support for the arbitrary arithmetic library MPIR on Windows, which is painful to compile and deploy. The
custom modular exponentiation is 130% (160%) slower on an Intel CPU in 32-bit (64-bit) mode, compared to
MPIR. Still, that is much faster that CPython’s own pow() function which is 900% (855%) slower than MPIR.
Support for the GMP library on Unix remains.
• Added support for manylinux wheels.
• Support for Python 3.7.
• The DSA parameter ‘p’ prime was created with 255 bits cleared (but still with the correct strength).
• GH#106. Not all docs were included in the tar ball. Thanks to Christopher Hoskin.
• GH#109. ECDSA verification failed for DER encoded signatures. Thanks to Alastair Houghton.
• Human-friendly messages for padding errors with ECB and CBC.
10.44 3.4.7 (26 August 2017)
• API documentation is made with sphinx instead of epydoc.

• Start using importlib instead of imp where available.
• GH#82. Fixed PEM header for RSA/DSA public keys.
10.45 3.4.6 (18 May 2017)
• GH#65. Keccak, SHA3, SHAKE and the seek functionality for ChaCha20 were not working on big endian
machines. Fixed. Thanks to Mike Gilbert.
• A few fixes in the documentation.

10.46 3.4.5 (6 February 2017)
• The library can also be compiled using MinGW.
10.47 3.4.4 (1 February 2017)
• Removed use of alloca().

• [Security] Removed implementation of deprecated “quick check” feature of PGP block cipher mode.
• Improved the performance of scrypt by converting some Python to C.
10.48 3.4.3 (17 October 2016)
• Undefined warning was raised with libgmp version < 5

• Forgot inclusion of alloca.h
• Fixed a warning about type mismatch raised by recent versions of cffi
10.49 3.4.2 (8 March 2016)
• Fix renaming of package for install command.
10.50 3.4.1 (21 February 2016)
• Added option to install the library under the Cryptodome package (instead of Crypto).
10.51 3.4 (7 February 2016)
• Added Crypto.PublicKey.ECC module (NIST P-256 curve only), including export/import of ECC keys.
• Added support for ECDSA (FIPS 186-3 and RFC6979).
10.46. 3.4.5 (6 February 2017) 105

• For CBC/CFB/OFB/CTR cipher objects, encrypt() and decrypt() cannot be intermixed.

• CBC/CFB/OFB, the cipher objects have both IV and iv attributes. new() accepts IV as well as iv as param-
eter.
• For CFB/OPENPGP cipher object, encrypt() and decrypt() do not require the plaintext or ciphertext
pieces to have length multiple of the CFB segment size.
• Added dedicated tests for all cipher modes, including NIST test vectors
• CTR/CCM/EAX/GCM/SIV/Salsa20/ChaCha20 objects expose the nonce attribute.
• For performance reasons, CCM cipher optionally accepted a pre-declaration of the length of the associated data,
but never checked if the actual data passed to the cipher really matched that length. Such check is now enforced.
• CTR cipher objects accept parameter nonce and possibly initial_value in alternative to counter
(which is deprecated).
• All iv/IV and nonce parameters are optional. If not provided, they will be randomly generated (exception:
nonce for CTR mode in case of block sizes smaller than 16 bytes).
• Refactored ARC2 cipher.
• Added Crypto.Cipher.DES3.adjust_key_parity() function.
• Added RSA.import_key as an alias to the deprecated RSA.importKey (same for the DSA module).
• Added size_in_bits() and size_in_bytes() methods to RsaKey.
• RSA key size is now returned correctly in RsaKey.__repr__() method (kudos to hannesv).
• CTR mode does not modify anymore counter parameter passed to new() method.
• CTR raises OverflowError instead of ValueError when the counter wraps around.
• PEM files with Windows newlines could not be imported.
• Crypto.IO.PEM and Crypto.IO.PKCS8 used to accept empty passphrases.
• GH#6: NotImplementedError now raised for unsupported methods sign, verify, encrypt, decrypt,
blind, unblind and size in objects RsaKey, DsaKey, ElGamalKey.
• Parameter segment_size cannot be 0 for the CFB mode.

• For OCB ciphers, a final call without parameters to encrypt must end a sequence of calls to encrypt with
data (similarly for decrypt).
• Key size for ARC2, ARC4 and Blowfish must be at least 40 bits long (still very weak).
• DES3 (Triple DES module) does not allow keys that degenerate to Single DES.
• Removed method getRandomNumber in Crypto.Util.number.
• Removed module Crypto.pct_warnings.
• Removed attribute Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.algorithmIdentifier.

10.52 3.3.1 (1 November 2015)
• Opt-in for update() after digest() for SHA-3, keccak, BLAKE2 hashes
• Removed unused SHA-3 and keccak test vectors, therefore significantly reducing the package from 13MB to
3MB.
• Removed method copy() from BLAKE2 hashes

• Removed ability to update() a BLAKE2 hash after the first call to (hex)digest()
10.53 3.3 (29 October 2015)
• Windows wheels bundle the MPIR library

• Detection of faults occurring during secret RSA operations
• Detection of non-prime (weak) q value in DSA domain parameters
• Added original Keccak hash family (b=1600 only). In the process, simplified the C code base for SHA-3.
• Added SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 (of SHA-3 family)
• GH#3: gcc 4.4.7 unhappy about double typedef
• Removed method copy() from all SHA-3 hashes

• Removed ability to update() a SHA-3 hash after the first call to (hex)digest()
10.54 3.2.1 (9 September 2015)
• Windows wheels are automatically built on Appveyor
10.52. 3.3.1 (1 November 2015) 107

10.55 3.2 (6 September 2015)
• Added hash functions BLAKE2b and BLAKE2s.

• Added stream cipher ChaCha20.
• Added OCB cipher mode.
• CMAC raises an exception whenever the message length is found to be too large and the chance of collisions
not negligeable.
• New attribute oid for Hash objects with ASN.1 Object ID
• Added Crypto.Signature.pss and Crypto.Signature.pkcs1_15
• Added NIST test vectors (roughly 1200) for PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS signatures.
• tomcrypt_macros.h asm error #1
• Removed keyword verify_x509_cert from module method importKey (RSA and DSA).
• Reverted to original PyCrypto behavior of method verify in PKCS1_v1_5 and PKCS1_PSS.
10.56 3.1 (15 March 2015)
• Speed up execution of Public Key algorithms on PyPy, when backed by the Gnu Multiprecision (GMP) library.
• GMP headers and static libraries are not required anymore at the time PyCryptodome is built. Instead, the code
will automatically use the GMP dynamic library (.so/.DLL) if found in the system at runtime.
• Reduced the amount of C code by almost 40% (4700 lines). Modularized and simplified all code (C and Python)
related to block ciphers. Pycryptodome is now free of CPython extensions.
• Add support for CI in Windows via Appveyor.
• RSA and DSA key generation more closely follows FIPS 186-4 (though it is not 100% compliant).
• None

• New dependency on ctypes with Python 2.4.

• The counter parameter of a CTR mode cipher must be generated via Crypto.Util.Counter. It cannot
be a generic callable anymore.
• Removed the Crypto.Random.Fortuna package (due to lack of test vectors).
• Removed the Crypto.Hash.new function.
• The allow_wraparound parameter of Crypto.Util.Counter is ignored. An exception is always gen-
erated if the counter is reused.
• DSA.generate, RSA.generate and ElGamal.generate do not accept the progress_func param-
eter anymore.
• Removed Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.RSAImplementation.
• Removed Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.DSAImplementation.
• Removed ambiguous method size() from RSA, DSA and ElGamal keys.
10.57 3.0 (24 June 2014)
• Initial support for PyPy.

• SHA-3 hash family based on the April 2014 draft of FIPS 202. See modules Crypto.Hash.SHA3_224/
256/384/512. Initial Keccak patch by Fabrizio Tarizzo.
• Salsa20 stream cipher. See module Crypto.Cipher.Salsa20. Patch by Fabrizio Tarizzo.
• Colin Percival’s scrypt key derivation function (Crypto.Protocol.KDF.scrypt).
• Proper interface to FIPS 186-3 DSA. See module Crypto.Signature.DSS.
• Deterministic DSA (RFC6979). Again, see Crypto.Signature.DSS.
• HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand key derivation function (Crypto.Protocol.KDF.HKDF, RFC5869).
• Shamir’s Secret Sharing protocol, compatible with ssss (128 bits only). See module Crypto.Protocol.
SecretSharing.
• Ability to generate a DSA key given the domain parameters.
• Ability to test installation with a simple python -m Crypto.SelfTest.
• LP#1193521: mpz_powm_sec() (and Python) crashed when modulus was odd.

• Benchmarks work again (they broke when ECB stopped working if an IV was passed. Patch by Richard Mitchell.
• LP#1178485: removed some catch-all exception handlers. Patch by Richard Mitchell.
• LP#1209399: Removal of Python wrappers caused HMAC to silently produce the wrong data with SHA-2
algorithms.
• LP#1279231: remove dead code that does nothing in SHA-2 hashes. Patch by Richard Mitchell.
10.57. 3.0 (24 June 2014) 109

• LP#1327081: AESNI code accesses memory beyond buffer end.

• Stricter checks on ciphertext and plaintext size for textbook RSA (kudos to sharego).
• Removed support for Python < 2.4.

• Removed the following methods from all 3 public key object types (RSA, DSA, ElGamal):
– sign
– verify
– encrypt
– decrypt
– blind
– unblind
Code that uses such methods is doomed anyway. It should be fixed ASAP to use the algorithms available in
Crypto.Signature and Crypto.Cipher.
• The 3 public key object types (RSA, DSA, ElGamal) are now unpickable.
• Symmetric ciphers do not have a default mode anymore (used to be ECB). An expression like AES.new(key)
will now fail. If ECB is the desired mode, one has to explicitly use AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB).
• Unsuccessful verification of a signature will now raise an exception [reverted in 3.2].
• Removed the Crypto.Random.OSRNG package.
• Removed the Crypto.Util.winrandom module.
• Removed the Crypto.Random.randpool module.
• Removed the Crypto.Cipher.XOR module.
• Removed the Crypto.Protocol.AllOrNothing module.
• Removed the Crypto.Protocol.Chaffing module.
• Removed the parameters disabled_shortcut and overflow from Crypto.Util.Counter.new.
• Crypto.Random stops being a userspace CSPRNG. It is now a pure wrapper over os.urandom.
• Added certain resistance against side-channel attacks for GHASH (GCM) and DSA.
• More test vectors for HMAC-RIPEMD-160.
• Update libtomcrypt headers and code to v1.17 (kudos to Richard Mitchell).
• RSA and DSA keys are checked for consistency as they are imported.
• Simplified build process by removing autoconf.
• Speed optimization to PBKDF2.
• Add support for MSVC.
• Replaced HMAC code with a BSD implementation. Clarified that starting from the fork, all contributions are
released under the BSD license.

CHAPTER 11
License
The source code in PyCryptodome is partially in the public domain and partially released under the BSD 2-Clause
license.
In either case, there are minimal if no restrictions on the redistribution, modification and usage of the software.
11.1 Public domain
All code originating from PyCrypto is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
Anyone is free to copy, modify, publish, use, compile, sell, or distribute this software, either in source code form or as
a compiled binary, for any purpose, commercial or non-commercial, and by any means.
In jurisdictions that recognize copyright laws, the author or authors of this software dedicate any and all copyright
interest in the software to the public domain. We make this dedication for the benefit of the public at large and to the
detriment of our heirs and successors. We intend this dedication to be an overt act of relinquishment in perpetuity of
all present and future rights to this software under copyright law.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED “AS IS”, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PAR-
TICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR
ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR
OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR
OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
For more information, please refer to <http://unlicense.org>
11.2 BSD license
All direct contributions to PyCryptodome are released under the following license. The copyright of each piece belongs
to the respective author.
111
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the
following conditions are met:
1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the follow-
ing disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS “AS IS” AND ANY
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT
SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, IN-
CIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSI-
NESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CON-
TRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY
WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAM-
AGE.
112 Chapter 11. License

Python Module Index
c
Crypto.IO.PEM, 63
Crypto.IO.PKCS8, 64
Crypto.Protocol.SecretSharing, 62
Crypto.PublicKey.DSA, 45
Crypto.PublicKey.ECC, 49
Crypto.PublicKey.ElGamal, 54
Crypto.PublicKey.RSA, 40
Crypto.Util.asn1, 66
Crypto.Util.Counter, 74
Crypto.Util.number, 75
Crypto.Util.Padding, 71
Crypto.Util.RFC1751, 72
Crypto.Util.strxor, 72
113
114 Python Module Index

Index
A Crypto.Random.random.shuffle() (built-in
add() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerSetOf method), 70 function), 66
Crypto.Util.asn1 (module), 66
B Crypto.Util.Counter (module), 74
Crypto.Util.number (module), 75
bcrypt() (in module Crypto.Protocol.KDF), 58
Crypto.Util.Padding (module), 71
bcrypt_check() (in module Crypto.Protocol.KDF),
Crypto.Util.RFC1751 (module), 72
58
Crypto.Util.strxor (module), 72
bytes_to_long() (in module Crypto.Util.number),
75
D
C decode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerBitString method), 70
ceil_div() (in module Crypto.Util.number), 75 decode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerInteger method), 67
combine() (Crypto.Protocol.SecretSharing.Shamir decode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerObject method), 66
static method), 62 decode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerObjectId method), 69
construct() (in module Crypto.PublicKey.DSA), 46 decode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerSequence method), 68
construct() (in module Crypto.PublicKey.ECC), 51 decode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerSetOf method), 70
construct() (in module Crypto.PublicKey.ElGamal), decode() (in module Crypto.IO.PEM), 63
54 decrypt_and_verify(), 25
construct() (in module Crypto.PublicKey.RSA), 41 DerBitString (class in Crypto.Util.asn1), 69
copy() (Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccPoint method), 51 DerInteger (class in Crypto.Util.asn1), 66
Crypto.IO.PEM (module), 63 DerNull (class in Crypto.Util.asn1), 67
Crypto.IO.PKCS8 (module), 64 DerObject (class in Crypto.Util.asn1), 66
Crypto.Protocol.SecretSharing (module), 62 DerObjectId (class in Crypto.Util.asn1), 69
Crypto.PublicKey.DSA (module), 45 DerOctetString (class in Crypto.Util.asn1), 67
Crypto.PublicKey.ECC (module), 49 DerSequence (class in Crypto.Util.asn1), 67
Crypto.PublicKey.ElGamal (module), 54 DerSetOf (class in Crypto.Util.asn1), 70
Crypto.PublicKey.RSA (module), 40 digest(), 23
Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes() (built-in domain() (Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.DsaKey method), 46
function), 65 double() (Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccPoint method),
Crypto.Random.random.choice() (built-in 51
function), 66 DsaKey (class in Crypto.PublicKey.DSA), 46
Crypto.Random.random.getrandbits()
(built-in function), 66 E
Crypto.Random.random.randint() (built-in EccKey (class in Crypto.PublicKey.ECC), 49
function), 66 EccPoint (class in Crypto.PublicKey.ECC), 51
Crypto.Random.random.randrange() (built-in ElGamalKey (class in Crypto.PublicKey.ElGamal), 55
function), 66 encode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerBitString method), 70
Crypto.Random.random.sample() (built-in encode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerInteger method), 67
function), 66 encode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerObject method), 66
115
encode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerObjectId method), 69 import_key() (in module Crypto.PublicKey.RSA), 41

encode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerSequence method), 68 inverse() (in module Crypto.Util.number), 76
encode() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerSetOf method), 71 is_point_at_infinity()
encode() (in module Crypto.IO.PEM), 63 (Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccPoint method),
encrypt_and_digest(), 24 51
english_to_key() (in module isPrime() (in module Crypto.Util.number), 76
Crypto.Util.RFC1751), 72
export_key() (Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.DsaKey K
method), 47 key_to_english() (in module
export_key() (Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccKey Crypto.Util.RFC1751), 72
method), 50
export_key() (Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.RsaKey L
method), 43 long_to_bytes() (in module Crypto.Util.number),
exportKey() (Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.DsaKey 76
method), 46
exportKey() (Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.RsaKey N
method), 42
new() (in module Crypto.Util.Counter), 74
G O
generate() (in module Crypto.PublicKey.DSA), 45
oid (in module Crypto.PublicKey.RSA), 44
generate() (in module Crypto.PublicKey.ECC), 52
generate() (in module Crypto.PublicKey.ElGamal), P
54
generate() (in module Crypto.PublicKey.RSA), 40 pad() (in module Crypto.Util.Padding), 71
getPrime() (in module Crypto.Util.number), 75 PBKDF1() (in module Crypto.Protocol.KDF), 60
getRandomInteger() (in PBKDF2() (in module Crypto.Protocol.KDF), 56
module
Crypto.Util.number), 75 point_at_infinity()
getRandomNBitInteger() (in module (Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccPoint method),
Crypto.Util.number), 75 51
getRandomRange() (in module Crypto.Util.number), public_key() (Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.DsaKey
75 method), 48
getStrongPrime() (in module Crypto.Util.number), public_key() (Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccKey
75 method), 51
public_key() (Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.RsaKey
H method), 44
has_private() (Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.DsaKey publickey() (Crypto.PublicKey.DSA.DsaKey
method), 48 method), 48
has_private() (Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccKey publickey() (Crypto.PublicKey.ElGamal.ElGamalKey
publickey()
has_private() (Crypto.PublicKey.ElGamal.ElGamalKey (Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.RsaKey
has_private() (Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.RsaKey
method), 44
R
hasInts() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerSequence method), RsaKey (class in Crypto.PublicKey.RSA), 42
68
hasOnlyInts() (Crypto.Util.asn1.DerSequence S
method), 68 scrypt() (in module Crypto.Protocol.KDF), 57
hexdigest(), 23 Shamir (class in Crypto.Protocol.SecretSharing), 62
hexverify(), 24 size() (in module Crypto.Util.number), 76
HKDF() (in module Crypto.Protocol.KDF), 58 size_in_bits() (Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccPoint
method), 51
I size_in_bits() (Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.RsaKey
import_key() (in module Crypto.PublicKey.DSA), 48 method), 44
import_key() (in module Crypto.PublicKey.ECC), 52
116 Index
size_in_bytes() (Crypto.PublicKey.ECC.EccPoint
method), 51
size_in_bytes() (Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.RsaKey
method), 44
SP800_108_Counter() (in module
Crypto.Protocol.KDF), 60
split() (Crypto.Protocol.SecretSharing.Shamir static
method), 62
strxor() (in module Crypto.Util.strxor), 72
strxor_c() (in module Crypto.Util.strxor), 72
U
unpad() (in module Crypto.Util.Padding), 71
UnsupportedEccFeature, 51
unwrap() (in module Crypto.IO.PKCS8), 65
update(), 23
V
verify(), 24
W
wrap() (in module Crypto.IO.PKCS8), 64
Index 117

Pycryptodome

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pycryptodome

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pycryptodome

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

PyCryptodome Documentation

Jan 27, 2023

4 Compatibility with PyCrypto 13

7 Frequently Asked Questions 83

8 Contribute and support 87

Python Module Index 113

PyCryptodome is a self-contained Python package of low-level cryptographic primitives.

pip install pycryptodome

pip install pycryptodomex

This page lists the low-level primitives that PyCryptodome provides.

– OCB (AES only)

* Nonce-based (FIPS 186-3)

pip install pycryptodome

pip install pycryptodome-test-vectors

pip install pycryptodomex

You can test everything is right with:

pip install pycryptodome-test-vectors

3.1 Compiling in Linux Ubuntu

For Python 2.x:

$ sudo apt-get install build-essential python-dev

For Python 3.x:

$ sudo apt-get install build-essential python3-dev

$ sudo apt-get install build-essential pypy-dev

3.2 Compiling in Linux Fedora

For Python 2.x:

$ sudo yum install gcc gmp python-devel

For Python 3.x:

$ sudo yum install gcc gmp python3-devel

$ sudo yum install gcc gmp pypy-devel

3.3 Windows (from sources)

3. To make sure everything work fine, run the test suite:

It will then be available under Doc/_build/html/.

3.5 PGP verification

3.3. Windows (from sources) 11

(continued from previous page)

Compatibility with PyCrypto

For symmetric key cryptography:

14 Chapter 4. Compatibility with PyCrypto

5.1 Crypto.Cipher package

5.1.2 API principles

The base API of a cipher is fairly simple:

Fig. 5.1: Generic state diagram for a cipher object

>>> from Crypto.Cipher import Salsa20

5.1.3 Symmetric ciphers

There are two types of symmetric ciphers:

16 Chapter 5. API documentation

• Stream ciphers paired with a MAC function, like chacha20_poly1305.

Classic modes of operation for symmetric block ciphers

>>> from Crypto.Cipher import AES

Fig. 5.2: Generic state diagram for a cipher object

5.1. Crypto.Cipher package 17

>>> import json

18 Chapter 5. API documentation

(continued from previous page)

>>> import json

5.1. Crypto.Cipher package 19

• mode – the constant Crypto.Cipher.<algorithm>.MODE_CTR

>>> import json

>>> import json