Article

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The end of pan-Arab Communication Gazette

2019, Vol. 81(5) 418–444
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and identity in Morocco,
Tunisia and Jordan
after 2011
Viola Sarnelli
University of Aberdeen, UK

Vera Lomazzi
GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Germany

Abstract
The article explores the relation between identity definition and trust in different infor-
mation sources in Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia following the 2011 Uprisings. While
prior to 2011 literature mostly highlighted the role of pan-Arab news channels in
consolidating a transnational Arab public sphere, recent studies argued that there has
been a reinforcement of national media and identities in the Middle East and North
Africa, as a consequence of a partial liberalisation of national broadcasting. Our study is
based on the Arab Transformations survey (2014), which unlike previous surveys
included questions covering both media consumption and identity definition. We
looked at how in the three countries the choice of Muslim, Arab or national identity
definition was associated with the preference for distinct sources of political news. The
results only partially confirmed the hypothesis of a renewed importance of national
media and showed that in the three countries people tended to attribute very different
values to the same news sources.

Keywords
Arab Uprisings, ethnic identity, information sources, Jordan, Morocco, national identity,
religious identity, social media, transnational television, Tunisia

Corresponding author:
Viola Sarnelli, University of Aberdeen, School of Social Sciences, Aberdeen AB24 3FX, UK.
Email: [email protected]
Sarnelli and Lomazzi 419

Introduction
This article builds on the intersection of two fields of study – that of social and
political identity definition and that of media consumption – to explore attitudes
towards national and international news sources in three Arab countries following
the 2011 Uprisings. Our analysis is based on data from Arab Transformations
(AT), a survey carried out in 2014 in six Arab countries.1 While previous sur-
veys in the MENA region did not cover both domains of media consumption
and identity definition, nor include detailed and comparable sets of questions,
AT data allowed us to explore the two dimensions separately and their interaction.
The article therefore aims at contributing to a research area which has rarely
been supported by empirical data – with very few exceptions, such as Nisbet
and Myers (2010) – by looking at the cases of Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia
after 2011.
The nexus between media use and identity definition has been traditionally
explored in relation to the building or reinforcement of national communities
(Anderson, 1983; Habermas, 1989). Within the MENA region, the set-up of
state broadcasting systems in the post-colonial era also served the nation-building
process and the consolidation of authoritarian regimes (Ayish, 2002; Hafez, 2001;
Rugh, 2004). However, since the end of the 1990s, the focus of most media scholars
started to shift from the national to the transnational level of media production
and consumption, as the rise of satellite television, first from Europe and then from
the Gulf countries, broadened the choice of available channels in the region
(Eickelman and Anderson, 1999; el-Nawaway and Iskandar, 2002; Lynch, 2006).
The consolidation of a transnational Arab and Muslim identity in the MENA
region in fact has often been associated with the growing visibility of pan-Arab
satellite television since the 1990s (Cherribi, 2006; El Oifi, 2005), and later on with
the rise of the digital media domain, from blogs to social networks (Allaoui and
Kuebler, 2011; Faris, 2013; Lynch, 2007).
After 2011, however, the consolidation of a pan-Arab public and identity seems
to have been interrupted. According to several observers, following the Uprisings
the popularity of pan-Arab media started to decline, while at the same time new
and old national broadcasters started to gain larger shares of the national audi-
ences (Guaaybess, 2013; Kraidy, 2014; Mellor, 2013; Sarnelli and Kobibi, 2017).
We tested this hypothesis with empirical data from the AT survey and found very
different results in each of the three countries.
Among the six countries covered by the AT survey (Morocco, Tunisia, Libya,
Egypt, Jordan, Iraq), we selected for the purpose of this study Tunisia, a republic
going through a process of radical political transformation, and Morocco and
Jordan, two authoritarian monarchies which resisted the 2011 ‘revolutionary
wave’. We deliberately excluded countries which are undergoing a phase of
authoritarian restoration (Egypt) or of civil war (Libya, Iraq), as their unstable
condition would make it more difficult to explore and compare results.
The article aims therefore to confront some broader theoretical issues on media
and identity in the MENA region with empirical data from the AT survey.
420 the International Communication Gazette 81(5)

Given the lack of previous equivalent data, we cannot compare our results with
pre-2011 trends. However, we can discuss them in relation to the recent literature
and suggest possible future investigations.
We will also focus on the differences among age cohorts, given the importance
often attributed to young people’s role within the Uprisings (Howard and Hussain,
2011; Wilson and Dunn, 2011). Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix 1 provide the sample
sizes and the main socio-demographic characteristics of the samples.
We tried to address the following questions: How are the post-2011 political and
social changes in the three countries reflected by the preference for different infor-
mation sources? What are the main definitions of identity chosen in the three
countries? Is there a correlation between the preference for a certain identity
definition and the trust in some information sources (national or international,
traditional or digital)?
We argue that the combined analysis of news media choice and identity defin-
ition can offer a useful perspective on the relation between national and supra-
national identity in the light of the social and political transformations reshaping
the MENA region. In particular, respondents in each country seem to attribute
very different levels of trust to the same media sources even when choosing the
same identity definition (Muslim, Arab, national identity). Against new and old
forms of technological determinism – emphasising, in turn, the capacity of pan-
Arab channels to encourage transnational solidarity, and of social media to pro-
mote political change – our data show that distinct national contexts can inform
very different media choices, and reflect the post-2011 divergent political paths
taken by Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco.

Media in Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia after 2011

After 2011, Tunisia started a gradual – although bumpy – ride towards democratic
reforms; Morocco and Jordan, two monarchies, implemented some minor political
reforms, with different degrees of support and participation, but their authoritarian
structures managed to resist the ‘revolutionary wave’ which shook the region.
These political differences are also somehow reflected in the three countries’
media systems.

Moroccan media before and after 2011

The state monopoly on broadcasting in Morocco was lifted in 2002, but the process
of media liberalisation that followed was ‘an incoherent one’ (El Issawi, 2012).
Currently Morocco has nine domestic television channels, of which seven are gov-
ernment owned, one is private and one is of mixed ownership. Television, therefore,
is still a symbol of the regime’s sovereignty, while liberalisation was mostly con-
fined to radio: there are 18 private radio stations today (El Issawi, 2012; Zaid and
Ibahrine, 2011). The government announced the awarding of new television
licenses in 2012, but the reform has stalled since then. Press law in Morocco
Sarnelli and Lomazzi 421

explicitly prohibits criticism of the monarchy and Islam, and effectively bars criti-
cism of other taboo subjects (Freedom House, 2015b).
Following the 2011 protests, the monarchy promoted a constitutional reform,
also reinforcing the freedom of the press. However, the gap between written prin-
ciples and unwritten practices continues to be evident. Several trials to journalists
have recently been based on charges like ‘threatening state security’ or ‘failing to
report foreign financing’. Particularly terrorism-related investigations, Western
Sahara and the reputation of King Mohammed VI continue to form ‘grey areas’
that can land reporters in prison (Freedom House, 2015b).

Tunisian media before and after 2011

Following a series of reforms, the media system in Tunisia saw significant
openings after 2011. However, the new institutional framework is still ‘subject to
the inconsistencies and difficulties of a post-revolutionary transition period’
(Ghazali, 2015: 3).
Television in Tunisia was opened to the private sector in 2003, but what took
place, as in other fields, was a liberalisation mainly promoting the ruling clan’s
interests. As a result, until 2011, many dissident channels, such as El Hiwar
Ettounsi, were broadcasting from abroad to escape government control. After
the Revolution, though, this and other channels relocated to Tunisia, switching
from satellite to terrestrial and becoming mainstream national channels.
In 2014, the new Independent Broadcasting Authority granted licenses to more
than 20 new outlets, although some of them later dissolved. Tunisia’s new consti-
tution, adopted in January 2014, also contained numerous protections for media
independence. However, the charter also left in force some remnants of the Ben Ali
era, such as possible arbitrary restrictions on journalists, or charges of defamation.
Moreover, the legacy of Tunisia’s authoritarian system is still present in the media
system in the form of financial, political and security constraints (Ghazali, 2015;
Lynch, 2015), and journalists continue to operate in difficult professional condi-
tions (El Issawi, 2012). Nevertheless, compared to the pre-2011 scenario, the result
is a much greater diversity of political voices.

Jordan media before and after 2011

Also in Jordan a series of media reforms were introduced well before the
2011 Uprisings – in 1997, 1998 and 2004 – but the current media environment
still seems to be very ‘vulnerable to political interference’ (Murphy, 2011: 967).
State-owned Jordan Radio and TV had until recently almost no competitors for the
coverage of national political issues, given the extra financial surcharge required to
private broadcasters wishing to cover such topics. In September 2012, the
Audiovisual Commission lifted these fees on political content, although the state
continued to keep its control through less formal restraints (Sweis and Baslan,
2013: 29).
422 the International Communication Gazette 81(5)

In 2011, Jordanian youth activists, like their counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt,
organised their political initiatives mostly through social media (Ryan, 2011: 573).
After that, an increasing amount of control measures targeted the online media
sector. The 2012 Press Law introduced the requirement for news websites to obtain
expensive licenses from the state. Following this provision, some 300 news websites
were blocked by the government, as they failed to adhere to new registration and
licensing provisions. In 2014, new amendments to the antiterrorism law also
included restrictions on freedom of speech related to national security issues, result-
ing in the arrest or intimidation of several journalists and activists (Freedom
House, 2015a).

A changing regional mediascape?

Overall, the 2011 protests had a significant effect on the regional media environ-
ment, and introduced or emphasised some important differences among MENA
countries. Several authors noticed a return to a national perspective (Guaaybess,
2013; Mellor, 2013; Sarnelli and Kobibi, 2017) or ‘a renaissance of national broad-
casting’ (Kraidy, 2014) following the Uprisings. This process coincided with the
decreasing popularity and credibility of pan-Arab broadcasters like Al Arabiya and
Al Jazeera, despite the fundamental role they played during the protests in Tunisia
and Egypt in connecting online and offline protesters (Sarnelli, 2013). In fact, it
seems that when further revolts in other countries were met with violent govern-
ment repression and ultimately resulted in civil wars, the mistrust towards these
outlets started to increase, as their coverage ‘degenerated into an arena for regional
power struggles’ (Lynch, 2015: 93), despite some important exceptions (like the
successful ‘Al Hadath’ news channel launched by Al Arabiya network in 2012). In
the following paragraphs we will confront the ‘national broadcasting renaissance’
hypothesis with empirical data from Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan.

Main sources of political information: Questions from the AT survey

One of the questions in the AT questionnaire was ‘what are the main sources of
political information for you?’ (see Table 7, Appendix 1). Respondents could indi-
cate more than one option, choosing from traditional media (newspapers, radio,
television), digital media and telecommunication (internet, email, text messages,
social media) and ‘offline social media’ (friends and colleagues, public spaces, word
of mouth). For newspapers, radio and television, the list also included a further
differentiation among national state-funded, national private and international
outlets. This distinction allowed us to test the hypothesis of the new relevance of
national media that according to some observers characterised the aftermath of the
2011 revolts.
Our focus on sources of political information, instead of information in general,
was motivated by the generally stronger alignment of political information between
nationalist and internationalist, or pro- and anti-government perspectives.
Sarnelli and Lomazzi 423

These sources are also the ones which are first targeted by national authorities in
times of crisis, to influence public opinion and gather support around new govern-
ment policies.
Before and after AT, other surveys such as World Values Survey (WVS), Arab
Barometer and Afro Barometer investigated the frequency of use of different infor-
mation sources in the MENA region, each of them using a different list of media.2
In all these cross-sectional surveys, the data collection is carried out using a
common questionnaire, translated into Arabic and its local variants.1 While
Arab Barometer asks about sources of political news, the other two surveys con-
sider only generic sources of news. The different formulation of the question might
affect the respondents’ interpretation, as one could prefer different sources for
different contents (e.g., the internet for political news and television for ‘soft
news’). Moreover, unlike AT, investigating the preferred sources, the other surveys
refer to the frequency of use – which in many cases could be affected by coverage
and access to the media sources. The question on preference, instead, allows a focus
on the choice of the respondent.
Furthermore, the question on trust in media sources, based on the same list
of options, allowed us to explore also how the public reacted to the reforms tar-
geting both traditional and digital media. In contrast, other surveys did not include
questions on trust in the media (Afro Barometer) or only consider traditional
media such as newspapers and television (WVS). Arab Barometer’s last waves
included a detailed section on media, with questions on frequency, trust and pur-
poses of use of media sources; however, the fact that frequency of use is preferred
to choice, and even more that social media are not considered, makes these data
less useful.
Apart from comparing the results from the three countries, we also looked at
cross-generational comparisons. Most of the recent debate on media in the MENA
region focused in fact on generational differences, and particularly on how Arab
youth used social media during the 2011 protests (Hoffman and Jamal, 2012;
Howard and Hussain, 2011). Several studies also analysed critically the emergence
of digital-based citizen journalism in the region (Onodera, 2011; Sreberny and
Khiabany, 2010), although this phenomenon is beyond the scope of our study.
In general, the definition of ‘youth’ adopted by most literature is often controver-
sial (Murphy, 2012; Wilson and Dunn, 2011). The dynamic of the protests in
Tunisia and Egypt suggests that the most active offline and online protesters
ranged from teenagers to young adults. As Chouikha (2015) suggested for
Tunisia, the relation between the ‘media activists’ of the 1999–2000 and the
‘cyber-dissidents’ of the 2000–2011 was defined by continuity, not rupture, despite
some important differences between the two generations. For the purpose of our
analysis the age of the respondents was coded into three groups, following a
classification already adopted for the AT report on youth and social media
(Vincent et al., 2016). Following this classification, ‘young’ were defined as
respondents between 18 and 35 years old – according to the hypothesis of a
‘delayed transition’ to adulthood caused by social and economic blockages
424 the International Communication Gazette 81(5)

(Dhillion and Yousef, 2009) – while respondents between 36 and 55 were the
‘middle-aged’, and those aged 56 or more were included in the oldest group.

News sources in Morocco

Main sources of political information in Morocco
The main difference among age groups in Morocco, based on AT data, seemed to
concern the preference of internet-based media over other sources of political infor-
mation (Table 1). This value was much higher for the youngest generation, but also
a third of the 36–55 age group indicated the same preference. According to recent
investigations, the number of internet users in Morocco grew by an estimated 60%
from 2005 to 2010, although access is still limited mostly to urban areas and to
educated segments of the population (Zaid and Ibahrine, 2011).
One distinctive element of the Moroccan media landscape is the popularity that
radio stations enjoy among all age groups. One major reason for the success of the

Table 1. Mentioned sources of political news by age groups, Morocco (%).

18–35 36–55 56+

Newspaper
Government newspapers 22.6 22 14.3
Private national newspapers 23.5 23.7 20
International newspapers 11.2 11.4 10.3
TV
Government TV 38.3 36.1 46.9
Private national TV 34.2 38.9 35.4
International TV 49.6 45.4 38.9
Radio
Government radio 19 19.7 28.6
Private national radio 22 21.7 22.3
International radio 23.2 23.8 22.9
Internet and new media
Internet 46.7 29.3 15.4
Email 7.6 5.3 2.9
Text messages 5.6 4.3 2.9
Social media 19 13.6 8
Other
Friends and colleagues 23.7 18.2 22.3
Public places 16.3 16.1 20
Word of mouth 15.7 11.3 13.1
Sarnelli and Lomazzi 425

private radio stations launched after 2002 is the choice of a language which, com-
pared to the more formal language of state media, is closer to everyday Moroccan
Arabic, creating an image of a young and dynamic medium also through the use of
social networks pages (Miller, 2012: 27; Zaid and Ibahrine, 2011: 6). As for the
newspapers, their relatively high popularity compared to the other two countries
can be seen as the legacy of a phase of greater independence of the press which
started with the reign of Mohammed VI (1999), although it was again reduced
shortly after by the introduction of new forms of government control (Baylocq and
Granci, 2012: 12).
The youngest and the oldest generation seem to make quite different choices also
in terms of television channels. While almost 47% of the over-56 group expressed a
preference for national television, about 49% of the 18–35 group indicated inter-
national channels as their main source.
In sum, despite the delayed liberalisation of the television sector, and therefore
the limited role of national independent channels, three years after 2011 the media
landscape in Morocco seemed to include a plurality of media and formats, provid-
ing space for a political debate which was not appeased by the constitutional
reforms (Bennafla and Seniguer, 2011).

Trust in national/international television in Morocco

In Morocco, not only the preference for, but also the reputation of international
news channels was considerably higher than that of national channels, especially
for the first two age groups (Figure 1). The limited trust in national channels could

40.0
34.6 34.8
35.0

30.0 26.9
25.1
25.0
20.4 20.6 18-35
20.0 18.9 18.7
17.1 36-55
15.0 56+
10.0

5.0

0.0
government TV private naonal tv internaonal TV

Figure 1. Trust in TV as source of political information by age groups, Morocco (%).

426 the International Communication Gazette 81(5)

be related to the persisting hold the monarchy has on the sector, particularly with
the public service stations, 2M and Al Oula (Zaid and Ibahrine, 2011: 7).
Government-owned national television seems to be challenged both by local and
transnational outlets also in terms of language and formats, as it is still mostly
characterised by the use of formal Arabic or formal French (Zaid and Ibahrine,
2011: 8), unlike the private local alternatives (Miller, 2012: 16), and does not offer
the benefits of a more independent coverage provided by satellite channels.

News sources in Tunisia

Main information sources in Tunisia
The preference for internet-based media appeared to be quite high among young
people but also relatively high among other age groups in Tunisia. Among internet-
based media and telecommunications, social media were by far the most important
source for political news in the country (Table 2), in line with previous findings
from a 2010 survey (Touati, 2012: 8).

Table 2. Mentioned sources of political news by age groups, Tunisia (%).

18–35 36–55 56+

Newspaper
Government newspapers 8.5 14.7 12.1
Private national newspapers 24.3 28.4 18.3
International newspapers 11.3 12.5 12.8
TV
Government TV 25.4 29.8 25.3
Private national TV 61.4 65.7 63.3
International TV 43.9 44.9 38.1
Radio
Government radio 19.1 21.3 19.4
Private national radio 40.8 45.4 49.1
International radio 12.9 12.3 9.7
Internet and new media
Internet 38 13.2 9.3
Email 7.6 3.3 2.4
Text messages 3.8 2.6 2.1
Social media 33.6 14.7 6.9
Other
Friends and colleagues 30.4 22.5 22.8
Public places 11.7 12.1 8.7
Word of mouth 9.1 11.3 8.3
Sarnelli and Lomazzi 427

60.0

49.1
50.0 46.6

40.0 38.0
31.4 31.9 18-35
30.0
24.2 36-55
19.3 18.2 56+
20.0 15.6

10.0

0.0
government TV private naonal tv internaonal TV

Figure 2. Trust in TV as source of political information by age groups, Tunisia (%).

Another distinctive aspect emerging from the Tunisian data is the distribution of
the preferences in the television domain, following the post-revolutionary reforms.
The popularity of state-funded television in Tunisia is in fact much lower than in
Morocco and Jordan and is largely surpassed by the preference for private national
channels. International television channels and private radio stations also score
higher than state channels.
As for the press sector, post-revolutionary changes also included the creation of
new magazines and newspapers, and the disappearance of others connected with
the old ruling party (Touati, 2012: 6). Also in this case, the new private sector seems
to have met the approval of the public.

Trust in national/international television in Tunisia

The high number of respondents indicating trust in private channels seems to
confirm the relevance of the post-revolutionary reforms in Tunisia, even though
for the youngest generation the trust in transnational channels is also very high
(Figure 2). These two types of TV channels are probably associated with different
sets of qualities. While transnational satellite channels have a consolidated
(although at times controversial) reputation for professionalism and independence,
the new post-revolutionary channels are highly heterogeneous in terms of both
form and content. As underlined by Amamou (2016), these channels finally reflect
the composition, and the internal divisions, of Tunisian society, after the previous
regime tried for decades to ‘even out’ its mediated representation (Amamou,
2016: 11). After an initial revolutionary crisis, it seems however that the reformed
state-funded television might already be regaining its audience share: in a 2012
national poll, the evening newscast of Al Wataniya 1 was again the most popular
(Amamou, 2016: 12). Although this new positive trend for state-funded television is
428 the International Communication Gazette 81(5)

not evident from AT data, both state-funded and private national channels in
Tunisia are surely experimenting with new ways to get closer to their audience,
based on popular entertainment programmes but also on the style and reliability of
their newscasts.

News sources in Jordan

Main sources of information in Jordan
Also in Jordan, the gap in the preference for internet-based sources between the
younger generation and the other groups is quite substantial. However, for all the
age groups, television appears to be the main source of political information, with
an almost equal distribution among state-funded, private and international chan-
nels (Table 3).
Although the proportion of the population that regularly accesses the internet in
Jordan has risen significantly in the last few years,3 access remains limited

Table 3. Mentioned sources of political news by age groups, Jordan (%).

18–35 36–55 56+

Newspaper
Government newspapers 16.9 16.7 17.7
Private national newspapers 5.9 7.6 7.3
International newspapers 3.8 2.9 3.6
TV
Government TV 41.9 49.6 51.7
Private national TV 39.4 52 56.4
International TV 41.1 54.8 53.5
Radio
Government radio 8.4 9.9 8.3
Private national radio 5.3 7.5 8.1
International radio 3.3 3.7 4.9
Internet and new media
Internet 37.3 20.3 8.8
Email 0.9 0.4 0.5
Text messages 1.2 0.4 0.3
Social media 7 3.5 2.9
Other
Friends and colleagues 16.7 16.7 19.7
Public places 3.7 4.4 8.1
Word of mouth 12 12.7 13
Sarnelli and Lomazzi 429

40.0

35.0
29.6 28.6
30.0
26.6
25.2 25.7 25.5
25.0 21.9
18-35
20.0 18.8 18.9
36-55
15.0 56+

10.0

5.0

0.0
government TV private naonal tv internaonal TV

Figure 3. Trust in TV as source of political information by age groups, Jordan (%).

especially in rural areas (Pies and Madanat, 2011; Sweis and Baslan, 2013).
Moreover, the fact that online media became the main target for new repressive
government policies after 2011 also helped television to remain ‘the only universal
medium in Jordan’ (Sweis and Baslan, 2013: 6).
Despite the persisting government hold on broadcasting, though, national tele-
vision is going through a phase of gradual transformations. On the one hand, a few
national private channels, such as Roya TV and Nourmina TV, were introduced in
the last few years and, according to a recent investigation, are already perceived by
the public as more professional than state television (Sweis and Baslan, 2013: 28).
On the other hand, the decade before 2011 saw regional satellite channels becoming
increasingly popular in the country (Pies and Madanat, 2011). Because of this
national and international competition, JRTV started to focus more on localised
reporting (Sweis and Baslan, 2013: 7). AT data also show that radio and news-
papers enjoy a limited popularity, and that for newspapers preference is given to
the government ones, probably due to the legal and economic barriers still faced by
independent outlets.

Trust in national/international television in Jordan

State, private and international television channels in Jordan reach almost the same
score also in terms of trust, although a slight preference for the private national
channels suggests that some form of change might be taking place (Figure 3). For
the time being, though, the government reaffirmed its tight control on the sector on
more than one occasion. In 2012 for example, Josat TV, one of the few private
competitors, lost its license over opinions expressed by a guest during a pro-
gramme, and was charged with ‘inciting against the regime’ and ‘undermining
430 the International Communication Gazette 81(5)

the king’s dignity’ (Sweis and Baslan, 2013: 8). Such legal repressive measures have
been combined with extra-legal interventions, starting with the closing of Al
Jazeera’s office in 2002, and continuing with violent attacks on journalists during
the 2011 demonstrations.
As a result, citizens tend to associate the media with government control.
Among the institutions which ‘absolutely cannot criticise the government’, listed
in a 2008 survey, the media – including the internet – received the highest score
(71%), revealing a generalised distrust towards the sector (Pies and Madanat, 2011:
6). In the same survey, 38% of Jordanians considered state television to be reliable
for local news, where it holds a quasi-monopoly, but only 9% considered it to be
trustworthy for international political news, in which it faces competition from
pan-Arab channels (Pies and Madanat, 2011: 6). Although AT data do not
allow us to measure such differences, it is likely that similar patterns have continued
after 2011, even considering a rise of national private competitors.

Ethnic, religious or national identity?

Defining social, political and mediated identity
While in the past it was more common to think about the concept of identity as a
crystallised dimension of the human being, nowadays it is generally assumed to be
a dynamic concept, resulting from the interaction between subjective perceptions
and external features. The individual’s identity is forged from early childhood in an
ongoing development through the various phases of life, an evolving process of
‘becoming’ (Peek, 2005). The individual concept of the self is connected with social
structure through mechanisms of belonging that define one’s social identity. This
sense of belonging constitutes therefore a relevant aspect of identity development
which starts within the primary groups (family) and then continues with other
significant groups during a lifetime. Feelings of belonging to a nation, ethnicity
or religion are broadly recognised as extremely significant as markers of both group
and individual identity (Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2007). While the national identity
dimension reflects a connection with territory and is frequently associated with
civic and political belonging, ethnicity and religion provide a group’s members
with a shared cultural worldview, offering a base for values, norms, beliefs and
practices. National, religious and ethnic identities are therefore all incorporated in
the multidimensional individual identity. As Stryker and Serpe (1994) argued, these
different aspects can be organised according to a salience hierarchy. Depending on
the circumstances, one of these identities may be more relevant in a specific cultural
setting, defined not only by traditions but also by political choices and relations
with other groups (Howard, 2000). Governments’ policies, as well as media cover-
age, can therefore affect this hierarchy.
Mass media have long been associated with the emergence and reinforcement of
national communities, in parallel with the birth of the modern nation state
(Anderson, 1983; Habermas, 1989; Schlesinger, 2000). Among different media
Sarnelli and Lomazzi 431

forms, television has often been considered particularly influential in the process of
national identity formation (Curran, 2002; Price, 1995). More specifically, the per-
sisting significance of national television news for national audiences has been con-
firmed by recent studies (Aalberg et al., 2013; Riegert, 2011). On the other hand,
internet-based media have been related since the beginning to the emergence of a
global public sphere, based on the dematerialised social interactions supported by
digital technologies (Castells, 1996; Sassen, 2003). Despite the enduring importance
of the intersections between physical and digital spaces (Lovink, 2013; Morley,
2000), satellite television and the internet have surely contributed to reshape the
relation between political communities, territories and identities. Within a broader
global media environment, in fact, digital media do not only nourish pre-existing
communities but they also contribute to the establishment of new ‘de-territorialised’
ones (Jansson, 1999) and therefore potentially encourage more ‘cosmopolitan’ atti-
tudes (Chalaby, 2005; Norris and Inglehart, 2009; Verboord, 2017).
This expansion of transnational communications has often been discussed in the
case of the MENA region as a factor reinforcing a Muslim and/or Arab identity
(Cherribi, 2006; Lynch, 2006). Before the recent growth in internet and social
media use in the region, the rise of transnational identity had been related to the
launch of the first generation of satellite news channels (Ayish, 2002; el-Nawaway
and Iskandar, 2002; Hafez, 2001; Rugh, 2004). Despite the frequent association
between the growth of regional media and the changing perception of collective
identity, however, there is a lack of empirical studies connecting the two domains,
with a very few exceptions, such as that of Nisbet and Myers (2010). In their study,
based on survey data collected between 2004 and 2008, they found that increased
exposure to transnational media was associated with more respondents identifying
themselves as Muslims or Arabs rather than with their nation state (Nisbet and
Myers, 2010: 355–358). However, the study only considered transnational televi-
sion and did not include the growing sector of online-based media; and, most
importantly, the dataset on which the study is based is not fully accessible, not
allowing for a proper comparison over time.
For limits of space and purpose the following paragraphs will cover only the
preference of new and old media in relation with the perceived identity definition
three years after the 2011 Uprisings. We will look first at the hierarchy among
different identity definitions in the three countries, and then at how the dimension
of identity can be related with different degrees of trust in various news sources.

Identity definition in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan

Cross-national surveys can be a valuable instrument to study the relation between
media preference, trust and identity because they also allow comparisons across
countries. However, not all the main cross-sectional surveys collect information
with the same level of detail. AT is in fact the only survey, among those explored so
far, that allowed us to study possible relations between identity definition and the
consumption and trust of media. Other surveys that collect information globally
432 the International Communication Gazette 81(5)

(like WVS) or in the MENA region (Arab Barometer or Afro Barometer) do not
explore both these aspects or cover the MENA countries (as in the case of the
International Social Survey Programme).
As we saw above, individual identity is a complex and multidimensional con-
cept. This concept is often investigated in general population surveys mainly con-
sidering geographical and/or religious and/or ethnic identity. In most of the cases,
information about these dimensions is collected through different questions.
However, to study the possible relation between the choice of specific media and
a particular dimension of identity it is necessary for these different dimensions to be
presented to the respondents as competing alternatives. This is the case for AT’s
question, where the available options were as follows: (1) Your country of origin;
(2) Arab (Ethnicity); (3) Muslim (Religion); (4) Region; (5) Local community, place
where you live; (6) Other (see Table 8 in Appendix 1). For the purpose of this
analysis, we collapsed the fourth and fifth option together, as they both indicated a
form of belonging to sub-national areas, and both obtained a limited amount of
preferences from the respondents in all the countries.
A few but significant differences emerged from the answers from Morocco,
Jordan and Tunisia (Figure 4). In all of them, the prevalent dimension was the
national identity, followed by the religious one. However, while Morocco and
Jordan are almost similar in their distribution, in Tunisia people seemed to con-
sider their religious identity less important.
As most of the previous surveys do not allow for the establishment of a proper
hierarchy between competing identity definitions, it is almost impossible to draft a
longitudinal trend, and to explore possible changes following the 2011 events.
Some indications, however, can be drawn from the results of the Annual Arab

60
50.9
48.9
50
42.3
40 38.138.8

29.6 Jordan
30
Morocco
20 Tunisia
13.3
10.3
8.6
10 5.9 6.2 7

0
Homecountry Arab Muslim Region/place
where I live

Figure 4. Do you identify yourself with... (%) by country.

Sarnelli and Lomazzi 433

Table 4. Identity definition in six Arab countries according to the Annual Arab Public
Opinion Poll (Telhami, 2010).

Identity definition (average of

six countries) 2008 2009 2010 2011 Jordan, 2010 Morocco, 2010

Muslim 36 32 39 31 15 64
Home country 39 35 32 33 53 20
Arab 20 32 25 26 21 4
Citizen of the world 4 1 4 9 11 11

Public Opinion Poll (Telhami, 2010), the same survey programme referred to by
Nisbet and Myers (2010). These results (shown in Table 4), though, are only
provided at the aggregate level, as the average resulting from six very different
countries (Egypt, UAE, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, KSA) with the exception of
the 2010 wave. While the overall picture appears quite flat, by looking at specific
countries such as Morocco and Jordan (Table 4) it is clear that the situation differs
greatly from one national context to another. Just as in 2014, national identity was
the most salient dimension for the Jordanians in 2010 (Figure 4). However, the
preference for a transnational Arab identity has decreased since then, the number
of people giving primacy to their religious identity more than doubled in 2014. In
Morocco, the change goes the other way. While the difference in the salience given
to Arab identity does not present noticeable differences, those who identify them-
selves with their home country doubled in 2014. Muslim identity, instead, dramat-
ically dropped from 64 to 38.3%.
These differences should be taken only as a general orientation, as not only the
questions but also the sampling strategies adopted for the two surveys were quite
different: while the Arab Public Opinion Poll used representative samples of great
cities in each country, AT also covered rural areas (Abbott et al., 2016). In add-
ition, the Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll did not cover Tunisia.

Trust in different information sources and identity definition

We tried to investigate how the preferred identity definitions in the three countries
could be associated with trust in different information sources. More specifically,
we wanted to explore whether the choice of one of the options of identity definition
included in the AT questionnaire had any positive or negative correlation with trust
in one kind of information source. The only recent example of such correlation is
the already mentioned study by Nisbet and Myers (2010), which concluded that a
higher exposure to pan-Arab news channels corresponded to a higher probability
of respondents identifying themselves as Arabs or Muslims rather than preferring
their national identity. Instead of considering exposure to certain media, we chose
the measure of trust in information sources, as it seems to be a more reliable
indicator of people’s values and their attitudes towards these sources. For the
434 the International Communication Gazette 81(5)

Government naonal tv Private naonal tv internaonal tv new media

Region/place where I live 9.2 48.1 22.1 20.6

Tunisia

Religion (Muslim) 7.1 44.6 28.1 20.2

Ethnicity (Arab) 4.8 50 24.2 21
Homecountry 7.3 25.4 32.3 35.1
Region/place where I live 10.4 14.8 30.4 44.4
Morocco

Religion (Muslim) 14.5 11.7 34.9 38.9

Ethnicity (Arab) 9.6 19.1 38.3 33
Homecountry 12.2 17.6 36.3 33.9
Region/place where I live 16.8 35.8 28.4 18.9
Religion (Muslim)
Jordan

23.1 22.7 31.2 22.9

Ethnicity (Arab) 25.7 15.8 38.6 19.8
Homecountry 25.1 29 28.3 17.7

Figure 5. Self-definition of identity and trusted source of political information by country.

purpose of this investigation, we considered the whole national samples, and

selected the most popular media options among the ones included in the AT ques-
tionnaire: national private TV, government-owned TV, international TV and new
media (including both internet and social networks). In what follows, we will point
out some of the results of this combination in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan, by
focusing on the difference among Muslim (1), Arab (2) or national (3) identity
which were the most popular choices in the three countries.

1. Preference for Muslim identity. In Tunisia, 29.6% of the people identified them-
selves as Muslims (Figure 4). As displayed in Figure 5, almost half of this share
(44.6%) trusted private national channels, less than one-third trusted inter-
national television and one-fifth the new media. Only a small portion (7.1%)
expressed trust in national channels. This distribution could be explained by the
fact that among the new channels born after 2011, several express religious
views. More generally, this also shows that the preference for a religious identity
dimension does not necessarily imply a detachment from the national political
sphere – in fact, the party winning the first post-revolutionary elections in 2011
was the moderate religious party Ennahda.
In Morocco, the respondents identifying themselves as Muslims are 38.8% of
the whole Moroccan sample (Figure 4) and, compared to the Tunisian, showed a
different distribution in their trust in the sources of information (Figure 5). Most
of them (38.9%) trusted new media and international televisions (34.9%). The
governmental national channels did not find a big support among this group
(only 14.5%), and even less did the private ones (11.7%). This might indicate
that respondents identifying themselves as Muslims in Morocco might not feel
Sarnelli and Lomazzi 435

well represented by the ‘institutional’ religious organisations (such as the

Islamist conservative democrat party PJD, ruling party at the time of the
survey) and consequently by the national (state-owned, or partially private)
television channels. By contrast, transnational channels offer a popular alterna-
tive, and the new media domain showed to be an even more conducive platform
for independent local initiatives.
In Jordan, people identifying as Muslims (38.1% of the Jordan sample, see
Figure 4) seem also to trust mostly international television (31.3%, as shown
in Figure 5). Private national televisions and new media are considered trustful
sources by a similar share of people (22.7 and 22.9%), while 23.1% expressed
trust in national channels. Muslims in Jordan, as a political category, are often
part of opposition parties and organisations, such as the Islamic Action Front,
which generally represent the views of the Palestinian Jordanians, and tend to
have a rather tense relationship with the monarchy (Ryan, 2011). In this sense, it
might be that Muslim identity in Jordan is associated with a higher trust of
transnational channels as they best represent a dispersed community such as the
Palestinian one.
2. Preference for Arab identity. For the small group of respondents identifying
themselves as Arabs (only 8.6% in Tunisia; 5.9% in Morocco; 6.2% in
Jordan), one could have expected to find a higher level of trust in the trans-
national, pan-Arab news channels. However, while this is the case in Jordan and
in Morocco, it is certainly not so in Tunisia. As shown in Figure 5, most of the
Moroccans and Jordanians belonging to this group (respectively, 38.3 and
38.6%), expressed trust mostly in international televisions, while this share
among the Tunisian is relatively quite low (24.2%). Surely, the feeling of belong-
ing to a given community does not necessarily imply a higher level of trust in the
media which are considered the most representative of that community, as
people might disagree on these media’s language or representations. Still,
there is a wide consensus among scholars and media analysts on the role
played by pan-Arab news channels in the past 20 years in bolstering and pro-
moting a new kind of pan-Arab cultural and social identity. This process also
probably contributed to building a regional base for the shared grievances that
resulted in the 2011 revolts. In this sense, the limited popularity of the pan-Arab
channels in 2014, even among the respondents identifying themselves as ‘Arabs’,
might confirm the mistrust in pan-Arab channels which followed their ambigu-
ous coverage of the ‘less successful’ 2011 protests, such as those in Bahrain, in
Libya and Syria (Lynch, 2015). At the same time, it could also suggest the
emergence of new national priorities in the aftermath of the revolts, which
cannot be covered by transnational media but need to be told by ‘local’
voices. This could be in particular the case for Tunisia and Jordan where
national channels (private and governmental) are considered trustful by about
half of the subgroups who identify themselves with their ethnicity.
3. Preference for national identity. Finally, if we look at the respondents who chose
to identify themselves by their nationality (as shown in Figure 4: 42.3% of the
436 the International Communication Gazette 81(5)

Tunisians; 48.9% of the Moroccans; 50.9% of the Jordanians), one could expect
to find a positive correlation with trust in national (state-funded) channels, but
this does not happen in any of the three countries. In general, state-funded
national television does not seem to enjoy high popularity (as displayed in
Figure 5: only 7.3% in Tunisia and 12.2% in Morocco), with the partial excep-
tion of Jordan (25.1%). This exception could be due to the persisting dominant
position of state television in the country, and the obstacles still faced by inde-
pendent competitors, although the slight advantage of private television chan-
nels registered by the AT survey might indicate that some opening-up of the
news environment is finally happening. Interestingly, in Tunisia, people choos-
ing national identity are also the ones trusting mostly new media (35.1%) and
transnational television (32.1%). This could be a consequence of the ‘revolu-
tionary’ nationalism which supported the 2011 protests, and which still does not
recognise the newly launched national television channels as reliable options
when compared with the more established transnational sources, or the more
independent online networks. A similar picture emerges also from Morocco,
where trust in transnational television is even higher compared with Tunisia
(36.3% versus 32.3%), while is lower the trust in private national channels
(17.6%, compared to the share in Tunisia – 25.4%, and Jordan – 29%), given
the very limited amount of independent options available in the country.

These data overall point towards the apparent paradox of contrasting values
characterising the relation between identity definition and trust in media sources in
Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia. However, from these results we can draw a series of
useful indications. First of all, the data show the importance of considering, in any
media analysis, the impact of recent political trajectories, which for the region
considered resulted in a fragmented and profoundly differentiated mediascape
rather than in a more homogeneous pan-Arab media space. Second, this fragmen-
tation seems to show the limits of ‘technological determinist’ media theories, and
their recurring tendency to overestimate the importance of one single media form –
e.g., satellite channels at the end of the 1990s, blogs at the beginning of the new
millennium and social media after 2011 – in relation to political and social changes.
Rather, our data reveal composite media systems in which different values can be
attributed to specific technologies depending on the political, social and cultural
context. In this sense, the provocative question posed by our title remains open, as
what emerges is a picture made of distinct and meaningful media recombinations –
small and big, regional and local, old and new – in each of the countries considered
(as already partially anticipated in Sarnelli (2013, 2014)).

Conclusions
We looked at the preference for diverse information sources in Morocco, Tunisia
and Jordan, and at how these choices reflect the different social and political envir-
onments of the three countries in the aftermath of the 2011 events. In Tunisia, the
Sarnelli and Lomazzi 437

post-revolutionary reforms allowed for the creation of a variety of new voices in the
domain of traditional media. However, the post-revolutionary system is still quite
unstable, and some of its features might be only temporary. In Morocco, the
limited reforms approved by the government in the political sphere did not have
an equivalent in the news media environment. Therefore, there seems to be still a
significant division between the media outlets that are perceived as more independ-
ent (online media, international television, local radio stations) and the ones under
direct government control (state-funded and private national television). Finally, in
Jordan, the online news domain seems to be the one that suffered the most from a
series of repressive government measures following the 2011 protests. As a result,
when the survey was carried out (2014) online news media were not perceived as a
strong alternative to national television. At the same time, the credibility slowly
gained by private national channels could increasingly challenge the dominant
position of the government-owned channels. This variety of national results does
not point towards a new possible trend in the whole MENA region, but rather
towards national differences reflecting – and at the same time shaping – the post-
2011 changes on several levels.
We started from the hypothesis of a ‘resurgence’ of national media in the
MENA area and of a decline in popularity of the pan-Arab channels following
the 2011 Uprisings (Guaaybess, 2013; Kraidy, 2014; Lynch, 2015; Mellor, 2013;
Sarnelli and Kobibi, 2017). To test this hypothesis, we compared the data on trust
in state, private and international television channels in each country. Among the
countries considered, a clear rise in the popularity of national news sources
emerged only in Tunisia, given the growth of national independent outlets which
followed the revolution. A more limited increase in the popularity of national
independent channels was visible also in Jordan, but still very much susceptible
to the limitations imposed by the government. In Morocco, liberalisation of the
television sector continues to be delayed, not allowing for the emergence of inde-
pendent national alternatives. The popularity of pan-Arab broadcasters, in effect,
was not particularly high in the three countries, with the partial exception of
Morocco. This could possibly confirm the hypothesis that the reputation of these
channels has been damaged by their uneven coverage of the 2011 protests.
However, it could also simply indicate that the current regional fragmentation is
better represented by local voices, reflecting divergent national priorities.
In this sense, it seems that the current phase is characterised more by different
combinations of new and existing information sources, acquiring a different value
in each national context, rather than by the dominance of one media technology
contributing to a specific political phase, as it has been often argued for the satellite
channels first and more recently for the social media.
We also combined the results of the main identity definitions (Arab, Muslim,
national identity) with the trust in different information sources (national govern-
ment TV, national private TV, international TV, online media). Based on AT
survey data, we found that the relation between identity definition and trust in
different information sources also varies notably from country to country, with the
438 the International Communication Gazette 81(5)

case of Tunisia breaking the most with the pre-2011 context, given the extent of the
post-revolutionary transformations in the country.
In general, while previous studies found a positive correlation between exposure
to transnational television and choice of Arab and Muslim identity definition (Nisbet
and Myers, 2010) our results, although only partially comparable, seem to indicate
that this is no more the case in the post-2011 scenario. In fact, the respondents
identifying themselves as Muslims tended to express a higher degree of trust in
national television in Tunisia and in online media in Morocco, while only in
Jordan did they indicate a preference for transnational television. At the same
time, identification with the home country was matched by higher trust in online
media in Tunisia, with transnational television in Morocco, and with similar levels of
national and transnational television in Jordan. If a common pattern emerges, there-
fore, it is that of a further differentiation of national media systems after the
Uprisings. In fact, despite the difficulties in comparing our data with previous sur-
veys, another factor emerging from our analysis is the resurgence of national iden-
tities in the post-2011 era, compared to transnational identities (Arab, Muslim) in the
region, which is perhaps not surprising given the profoundly different trajectories
experienced by MENA countries after the Uprisings. This indicates once again the
importance of local settings which can inform the attribution of different value to
various media formats, depending on how they are perceived by groups in relation to
their national, ethnic or cultural identity. Following the literature on new media and
cosmopolitanism (Chalaby, 2005; Norris and Inglehart, 2009; Verboord, 2017), digi-
tal media are often expected to offer a cosmopolitan alternative to traditional
national media. However, our data showed that the preference for digital news
sources in countries like Tunisia or Morocco can actually correspond to a stronger
identification with national and religious identities.
This phase seems thus to be characterised by new tensions, or rather by a new
form of coexistence, between national and transnational collective identities,
mediated by different information sources. To be sure, a regional ‘Arab’ identity
is still strong, as it has coexisted for decades with the nation-building process in
each country (Phillips, 2012). However, this identity does not seem to be strongly
represented or mediated by transnational pan-Arab channels as before. In fact,
despite the fundamental role played by pan-Arab television in the recent past, as
Noemi Sakr (2015: 116) pointed out, ‘transnational channels cannot constitute an
alternative to a ‘‘national’’ television system, for practical reasons – that is, they
cannot offer detailed coverage of all local news – but also symbolic reasons – that is
representing local diversity, culture and perspective’. This appears to be particu-
larly true in times of political transformations.
In conclusion, it seems that the relationship between identity definition and trust
in different media sources can offer important insights into the evolving nature of
public attitudes in the MENA states and should be further explored. Empirical data
can help to understand how perceptions of collective identity, mediated by different
information sources, can reflect broader political and social changes. Unfortunately,
not all the survey programmes recently carried out in the MENA region can support
Sarnelli and Lomazzi 439

this kind of exploration. We hope that more surveys will follow the attempt of AT,
allowing researchers to expand its results for longitudinal analysis.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication
of this article.

Notes
1. The EU-funded AT project collected data though face-to-face interview in 2014 (with a
common questionnaire, translated into Arabic and its local variants) with representative
samples of the population in six countries of the Middle East and North Africa: Egypt,
Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia (for a summary of the main results see Teti and
Abbot, 2018). The sampling strategy involved elements of cluster sampling, stratification
and simple random selection or methods designed to simulate it; its precise application
varied from country to country, according to local conditions. Despite the possible limits of
the use of secondary data, such as the lack of direct control over sample selection and data
collection by the authors, we can rely on the quality of the AT data on the basis of the
quality control reports provided by the project. In addition to fieldwork monitoring pro-
cedures, the quality of the data has been checked after the data collection through missing
values analysis, construct validity tests and duplication of records checks. In this study we
applied weights to equalise samples. For more information see the Methods Handbook
edited by Abbott et al. (2016). After the embargo, the dataset is freely accessible since
April 2017 on the project’s website (arabtrans.eu).
2. Afro Barometer asks about: radio, newspapers, television, internet, social media; Arab
Barometer uses the same list with the exception of social media; WVS adopts a different
list: daily newspapers, printed magazines, TV news, radio news, mobile phone, email,
internet, talk with friends and colleagues.
3. In 2014 46.2% of Jordanians (compared with 56.8% of Moroccans and 46.16% of
Tunisians) were using the internet (Abbott et al., 2017; Lomazzi et al., 2017).

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Appendix

Table 5. Sample sizes, age and gender distributions within the samples by country.

Sample Size Age (%) Sex (%)

n 18–35 36–55 56+ Male Female

Jordan 2139 42.9 39.1 18.8 50.3 49.7

Morocco 1777 56.2 34.8 9.8 49.9 50.1
Tunisia 1215 41.4 34.8 23.8 50.3 49.7
Sarnelli and Lomazzi 443

Table 6. Type of settlement and educational level distributions within the samples by country.

Settlement (%) Education (%)

Urban Rural None/elementary Basic Secondary Higher

Jordan 77.1 22.9 12.9 22.4 48.2 16.5

Morocco 60.2 39.8 25.9 14.2 30.8 29.0
Tunisia 64.4 35.6 31.1 11.9 36.3 20.7

Table 7. Main source of political information: original question from ATs and non-response
rate by country.

59a. Please, tell me, what are the main

sources of political information for you?
[several options are possible]
59b. And which sources of information 59a. Main 59b. Trusted
do you trust most? [several options are possible] Sources (4) sources (4)

1 Government newspapers 1 1
2 Private national newspapers 2 2
3 International newspapers 3 3
4 Government TV 4 4
5 Private national TV 5 5
6 International TV 6 6
7 Government radio 7 7
8 Private national radio 8 8
9 International radio 9 9
10 Internet 10 10
11 Email 11 11
12 Text messages 12 12
13 Social media 13 13
14 Friends and colleagues 14 14
15 Public places (mosque, market) 15 15
16 Word of mouth (gossip, rumours) 16 16
17 Other (specify) 17 17
98 Don’t know (do not read) 98 98
99 Refuse to answer (do not read) 99 99
Non-response rate in Morocco 2.9% 4.6%
Non-response rate in Tunisia 4.0% 9.3%
Non-response rate in Jordan 3.4% 0.7%
ATs: Arab Transformations.
444 the International Communication Gazette 81(5)

Table 8. Self-definition of identity: original question from ATs and non-response rate by
country.

Q28. If you have been asked to identify 1. Your country of origin

yourself, with which of the following 2. Arab (ethnicity)
do you most closely identify yourself? 3. Muslim (religion)
4. Region
5. Local community, city where I live
6. Others
98. Don’t know (do not read)
Non-response rate in Morocco 1.5%
Non-response rate in Tunisia 3.3%
Non-response rate in Jordan 0.1%
ATs: Arab Transformations.