Complete Encyclopedia of Unusual Sex

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Complete Encyclopedia of Unusual Sex terms and Practices

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accomplish the business he intends, for these reasons. 1. Because
there is not the common notion of a spiritual and immaterial being
in all or any Man, neither is it (to use his own words) true at first
sight to all men in their wits upon a clear perception of the terms,
without any further discourse or reasoning, but is only a bare
supposition without any proof or evidence at all. 2. The being of an
immaterial and spiritual substance can no way incurr into the senses
nor affect them, because it is manifest (as Des Cartes hath
sufficiently proved) that all sensation is procured by corporeal
contact, and not otherwise. And though we deny not that there have
been, are and may be apparitions, that cannot be rationally supposed
to be the ordinary Phænomena of corporeal matter, yet affecting the
senses, there must be something in them that performeth that effect,
that is corporeal, or else the senses could not be wrought upon, for
immateriale non agit in materiale, nisi eminenter ut Deus. 3. No
right deductions can possibly be drawn from the highest power of
ratiocination, where the understanding hath no cognoscibility of the
things that reason would draw its conclusions from, for as the same
Doctor frameth his Axiome which is this: Whatsoever things are in
themselves, they are nothing to us, but so far forth as they become
known to our faculties or cognitive powers. But we assert (which we
shall make good anon) that our faculties or cognitive powers (how far
soever some would vainly magnifie and extol them) have not the
power of understanding beings that are simply and absolutely
immaterial and incorporeal. 4. There is nothing that is more
undoubtedly true than what the Lord Verulam hath told us in these
words: Causa vero & radix ferè omnium malorum in scientiis ea
una est: quod dum mentis humanæ vires falso miramur &
extollimus, vera ejus auxilia non quæramus. And again: Subtilitas
naturæ subtilitatem sensûs & intellectûs multis partibus superat,
the which may be proved from many undeniable instances, which
need not here be mentioned, only we shall add what the aforesaid
learned Lord speaks to the same purpose which is this: “The fault of
sense is twofold: For it either forsaketh or deceiveth us. For first
there are many things that escape the sense, though rightly disposed,
and no way impeded either by the subtilty of the whole body or by
the minuteness of the parts, or by the distance of place, or tardity
and velocity of motion, or by the familiarity of the object, or by
reason of other causes. Neither again, where the sense doth
apprehend the thing, are those apprehensions sufficiently firm. For
the testimony and information of sense is always from the Analogie
of Man, not from the Analogie of the Universe.” And it is altogether
asserted with great error, that sense is the measure of things. Neither
can these notions the Doctor would make so clear, be had or
gathered, without some intimation from some of the senses.
2. Further the Immortal. p. 21. An Antidot. &c. p.
Doctor tells us that 12.
the Idea of a Spirit is as easie a notion, as of any other substance
whatsoever. And he also saith: “Nevertheless I shall not at all stick to
affirm, that his Idea or notion (speaking of God) is as easy as any
notion else whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of
any thing else in the World.” This later he speaketh concerning God.
But that these assertions are unsound, these following reasons will
sufficiently evince.
1. He doth define a Spirit thus: A Spirit is Reas. 1.
a substance penetrable and indiscerpible.
Now if it be true that he affirms before, that, “the subject, or naked
essence, or substance of a thing is utterly unconceiveable to any of
our faculties, and that if we take away aptitudes, operations,
properties and modifications from a subject, that then the
conception vanisheth into nothing, but into the Idea of a meer
undiversificated substance, so that one substance is not then
distinguishable from another, but only from accidents or modes, to
which properly belongs no subsistence.” So then if we take away
penetrability and indiscerpibility, which are but the modes and
properties of a Spirit, whose genus he maketh substance to be, then it
vanisheth into an indistinguishable notion, and so his definition
comes to nothing.
2. For if substances be known by their Reas. 2.
properties and modifications, as we grant
they are, the modifications and properties must of necessity be some
ways known unto us: but there are no ways either by common
notions, evidence of the senses, or sound deductions of reason that
can certainly inform us of these properties or modifications of
penetrability and indiscerpibility, and the Doctor yet never proved
either; but is only a bare supposition, and a melancholy figment.
The Immort. p. 68. Reas. 3.
 3. He tells us De Natur. Subst. De Inject. p. 598.
that all substance Energ. p. 406.
has dimensions, that is, length, breadth and depth, but all has not
impenetrability, and boldly saith: It is not the Characteristical of a
body to have dimensions, but to be impenetrable; to which we
answer. It is strongly asserted by learned Helmont, that by the
ultimate strength of nature, bodies do sometimes penetrate
themselves and one another, and to that purpose he giveth
convincing examples, and concludeth thus from them. Invenio
equidem, naturæ contiguam dimensionum penetrationem, licet non
ordinariam. And after saith thus: Quibus constat corpora solida,
satis magna, penetrasse stomachum, intestina, uterum, omentum,
abdomen, pleuram, vesicam, membranas inquam, tanti vulneris
impatientes. Id est, absq; vulnere cultros per istas membranas
transmissos. Quod æquivalet penetrationi dimensionum, factæ in
natura, absq; ope Diaboli. And to the same purpose that most acute
person, Dr. Glisson, handling this very point saith: Verum enimverò,
si sola quantitas actualis sit causa impenetrabilitatis corporum (ut
ex supra dictis liquet,) eaq; sit naturaliter mutabilis; quid impedit
ne substantia materialis aliam substantiam, mutatâ quantitate,
novâq; simul assumptâ utrisq; communi, penetret? And therefore
we may as confidently deny his assumption, that Impenetrability is
the Characteristical of body, as he affirm it without proof, and must
with all the whole company of the learned, assign Extension to be the
true and Genuine Character of Body. And further he granting that
substance hath length, breadth, and depth, we must of necessity
conclude, that whatsoever hath those properties must needs be
material and corporeal, and so that which he would make to be Spirit
is meerly Body.
4. Whereas he Nov. organ. p. 18. Reas. 4.
saith that the
notion of Spirit is as easy a notion, as any other whatsoever, it is
granted, but is not at all to the purpose: for our inquiry need not be
of the facility of a notion, but of the verity of it, that is, of the
congruity and adequation of the notion and the thing from whence it
is taken; otherwise though the notion be easy, yet without an
adequate congruity to the thing it is meerly false. As for instance,
when a melancholy person doth verily imagine himself to be changed
into a Wolf or Dog, it is not only an easy notion, but also it is truly a
notion, and yet a false notion, because there is no true congruity
betwixt it and the thing from whence it is taken, the Body of the
person so conceiving, being not at all changed into Wolf or Dog, but
still retaining its humane shape and figure. And therefore the Lord
Verulam doth to this point speak truly and clearly in these words:
Itaq; si notiones ipsæ mentis (quæ verborum quasi anima sunt, &
totius hujusmodi structuræ ac fabricæ basis) malè ac temere à
rebus abstractæ, & vagæ, nec satis definitæ & circumscriptæ, deniq;
multis modis vitiosæ fuerint, omnia ruunt. And therefore the Doctor
might very well have considered, whether these his new notions had
been fitly and rightly drawn from the things, to which he doth so
confidently affix them, before he had so boldly asserted them, which
though they be truly his notions, that is, that he did think, conceive,
and frame them, yet they are not truly abstracted from the things:
And so he may be rather judged to be led by speculative and
Philosophick Enthusiasm, than by the clear light of a sound
understanding.
5. And Job 11. 12. Reas. 5.
concerning his 1 Kings 8. 27.
Tenent that the Idea or Notion of God is as
easy as the notion of any thing else whatsoever, that the notion may
be easy we grant; but whether it be true and adequate, there lies the
question. For those old Hereticks that held that God had Eyes, Ears,
Head, Hands and Feet and the like, had an easie notion of it,
conceiving him to have humane members, but I hope the Doctor will
not say that this notion of theirs was a notion truly drawn from the
nature and being of God, because there is no corporeity in him at all.
And it is and hath been the Tenent of all Orthodox Divines, Ancient,
Middle and Modern, that God in his own nature and being is infinite
and incomprehensible, and therefore there can no true and adequate
notion of him, as being so, be duly and rightly gathered in the
understanding of creatures; and so the Doctors position or notion
must needs be Phantastry and imaginary Enthusiasm. For as there
are many things in nature that in themselves are finite and
comprehensible, that as he grants of naked essence or substance are
utterly unconceivable to any of our faculties; much more must the
being of God that is infinite and incomprehensible, which are
attributes that are incommunicable, be utterly unconceivable to any
of our faculties. And it is but the vain pride of Mans Head and Heart,
thereby to magnifie his own abilities, whereas the Text doth
pronounce this of him, For vain man would be wise; though he be
born like a wild ass colt; that lifts him up to conceit that he can
fathom and comprehend the Infinite and Almighty, whom the
Heaven of Heavens cannot contain, and therefore cannot frame a
true notion of him, whom perfectly he doth not understand nor
comprehend, and the attributes of God are matters of Faith and not
the weak deductions of humane reason.
3. Those that seem to idolize humane Origin. sacr. l. 2. c.
abilities and carnal reason, have not only 8. p. 233, 234.
applied those so much magnified Engines to the discovery of created
things, wherein they have effected so little, that sufficiently
proclaims the invalidity of the instruments or the inauspicious
application of them, or both, all the several sorts of Natural
Philosophy hitherto found out, or used, being examined, coming far
short of solving the Phænomena of nature, when even the least
animal or vegetable affords matter enough to puzzle and nonplus the
greatest Philosopher, so that we may justly complain with Seneca,
that the greatest part of those things we know are the least part of
those things we know not; These engines (I say) though proving
ineffectual to find out the true notions and knowledge of natural
things, have also (like the fiction of the Gyants) notwithstanding
invaded Heaven, and taken upon them to discover and determine of
Celestials, wherein it is in a manner totally blind, or sees but with an
Owl-like vision. For indeed the deciding of this point must be taken
from the Divine authority of the Scriptures, and the clear deductions
that may be drawn from thence; for this is that clear light, that we
ought to follow, and not the Dark-lanthorn of Mans blind, frail and
weak reason, for it is a sure word of Prophecie whereunto it is good
to take heed, and not to vain Philosophy, old Wives Fables, or
opposition of Sciences falsly so called. And therefore we shall
conclude this point here concerning the corporeity or incorporeity of
Angels with that Christian and learned position of Dr. Stillingfleet in
these words: “But although Christianity be a Religion which comes in
the highest way of credibility to the minds of Men, although we are
not bound to believe any thing but what we have sufficient reason to
make it appear that it is revealed by God, yet that any thing should be
questioned whether it be of Divine revelation, meerly because our
reason is to seek, as to the full and adequate conception of it, is a
most absurd and unreasonable pretence.”
4. In handling Eccles. 3. 21. Gen. 2. 7.
this point of the
corporeity or incorporeity of Angels, we do here once for all exclude
and except forth of our discourse and arguments the humane and
rational Soul as not at all to be comprised in these limits, and that
especially for these reasons. 1. Because the humane Soul had a
peculiar kind of Creation differing from the Creation of other things,
as appeareth in the words of the Text. And the Lord God formed
man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the
breath of life; and man became a living soul. Upon which the note of
Tremellius and Junius is, anima verò hominis spiritale quiddam est,
& divinum. 2. Because I find Solomon the wisest of Men making this
question: who knoweth the spirit of man, that goeth upward: and
the spirit of the beast, that goeth downward to the earth? 3. Because
it is safer to believe the nature of the Soul to be according to the
Analogy of Faith, and the concurrent opinion of the learned, than to
sift such a deep question by our weak understanding and reason. So
having premised these things, and left this as a general exception and
caution, we shall proceed to the matter intended in this order.
1. We lay it down 2 Cor. 3. 17. John 4. 24.
for a most certain
and granted truth, that God simply and absolutely is only a most
simple spirit, in whom there is no corporeity or composition at all,
and what other things soever that are called or accounted spirits are
but so in a relative and respective consideration, and not in a simple
and absolute acceptation. And this is the unanimous Tenent of the
Fathers, Schoolmen and all other Orthodox Divines, agreeing with
the plain and clear words of the Scripture, as, God is a spirit, and
they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth. And
again: Now the Lord is that spirit, and where the spirit of the Lord is
there is liberty. Therefore we shall lay down this following
proposition.
2. That Angels being created substances, are not simply and
absolutely incorporeal, but if they be by any called or accounted
spirits, it can but be in a relative and respective sense, but that really
and truly they are corporeal. And this we shall labour to make good
not only by shewing the absurdities of that opinion of their being
simply spiritual, but in laying open the unintelligibility of that
opinion, and by answering the most material objections.
1. And first to begin at the lowest step, Argum. 1.
Body is a thing that affecteth the senses
most plainly and feelingly; for though many bodies are so pure, as
the air, æther, steams of the Loadstone, and many other steams of
bodies, that they escape the sight of our eyes, yet are they either
manifest to our feeling, or otherwise made manifest by some sensible
effect, operation, or the like; yet for all this, the intrinsick nature of
body as such is utterly unknown unto us, for when we speak of the
extension of body, as its Characteristical property, we do but
conceive of its superficial dimensions, its internal nature quatenus
Corpus, being utterly unknown unto us; it being a certain truth, that
Quidditates rerum, non sunt cognoscibiles; and as Dr Moore
granteth, the naked essence or substance of a thing is utterly
unconceiveable to any of our faculties. From whence we argue, à
minori ad majus, that if the substance of a body, whose affections
and modifications do fully incur into, and work upon our senses, be
utterly unconceiveable to any of our senses, much more of necessity
must the substance of a Created spirit, conceived as immaterial and
incorporeal, be utterly unconceiveable to any of our faculties,
because it hath no effects, operations, or modifications that can or do
operate upon our senses.
2. And as we know not the intrinsick Argum. 2.
nature of body, so also we are ignorant of
the highest degree of the purity and spiritualness of bodies, nor do
we know where they end, and therefore cannot tell where to fix the
beginning of a meer spiritual and immaterial being. For there are of
Created bodies in the Universe, so great a diversity, and of so many
sorts and degrees of purity and fineness, one exceeding another, that
we cannot assign which of them cometh nearest to incorporeity, or
the nature of spirit. And many of these being compared with other
more gross and palpable bodies, may be and are called and
accounted spirits, though notwithstanding they be all Corporeal, and
but under a gradual difference. So the vital part in the bodies of men
are by Physicians called Spirits in relation to the bones, ligaments,
musculous flesh and the like; nay even in respect of the blood,
lymphatick humor, lacteal juyce, or the succus nutritius nervosus,
and yet still are contained within the limits of body, and are as really
Corporeal as any of the rest, and so are the air and æther. And those
visible species of other bodies that are carried in the air and
represented unto our Eyes, by which we distinguish the shape,
colour, site and similitude of one body from another, though by the
Schools passed over with that sleight title of qualities, as though they
were either simply nothing, or incorporeal things, are
notwithstanding really Corporeal, else they could not incur into, nor
affect the visive sensories: And these do in the air intersect and pass
through one another (as may be optically demonstrated) without
Confusion, Commixion, or discerpsion, and may comparatively be
accounted spirital and incorporeal, though really they be not so. But
what shall we say to that wonderful body, Image or Idolum of our
selves, and other things that we behold in a mirrour or looking-glass?
must this be a meer nothing, or an absolute incorporeal thing? surely
not. For it is as really a body as any in the Universe, though of the
greatest purity and fineness of any that we know; and how near it
approaches to the nature of spirit, is very difficult (if not impossible)
to determine; for if it did exist when the body or subject from whence
it floweth were removed, it might rationally be taken for a Spirit, and
with far more probable ground than many things else that have been
vainly supposed to be Spirits. And that these visible shapes of things,
and this Image in the glass, are not meerly imaginary nothings, but
Corporeal Figures and steams, is most manifest, because they vanish
when the body or subject is removed, because that nullius entis nulla
est operatio, & Incorporeum non incurrit in sensus, and because
they would pass through the glass, but only for the foil or Bractea
laid on the otherside, by which the Image is reflected. So that if we
have bodies of so great purity, and near approach unto the nature of
spirit, we cannot tell where spirit must begin, because we know not
where the purest bodies end.
3. Dr Moore The Immortal. of Argum. 3.
maketh substance the Soul. Axiom. 2.
p. 6.
to be the genus,
and spirit and body to be the two species, so De natura substant.
Energetic. c. 27. p.
that body and spirit are of one generical 379.
Identity, and so there must of necessity
some certain specific difference betwixt them be assigned and
proved, or else the division is vitious, and the property of spirit not
proved, and so their opinion of spirit falls totally to the ground. For
we affirm (and shall prove) that though a difference be imagined and
supposed, yet it was never yet sufficiently proved, for omnia
supposita, non sunt vera, otherwise all the impossible figments and
vain Chimæras of melancholy and doting persons might pass for true
Oracles: but it is one thing truly to understand, and another thing to
imagine and fancy what indeed is not, nor ever was. And though the
supposition seem never so probable and like, yet it will but at the
best infer the possibility of such an imagined difference, but not
prove it really to be so, and therefore here we shall retort the Doctors
Axiom against him, which is this: “Whatsoever is unknown to us, or
is known but as meerly possible, is not to move us or determine us
any way, or make us undetermined; but we are to rest in the present
light and plain determination of our own faculties.” Now that a spirit
is penetrable and indiscerpible, may be imagined as possible to the
fancies of some, but cannot be clearly intelligible to any sober mind;
for to imagine, and to understand, are faculties that are very
different, and however if such a difference be conceived as possible
(which cannot enter the narrow gate of my Intellect) yet the
difference of being penetrable and indiscerpible, is not to move us to
determine that a spirit hath those distinct properties from bodies,
because they are but known to us as meerly possible. And therefore
that these two differences of penetrability and indiscerpibility
assigned by Dr Moore, are not sufficiently proved to be so, we shall
give these reasons. 1. If bodies in the ultimate act of nature can
penetrate themselves and one another, as Helmont and Dr Glisson
do strongly labour to prove, then penetrability is not the proper
difference of spirit from body, because then common to them both.
2. But if it be taken for a truth (and the one of necessity must be true)
that bodies do not, or can possibly penetrate themselves or one
another, as the common tenent holdeth, and seemeth most agreeable
to verity, for it is simply unintelligible and impossible to conceive,
that two Cubes (suppose of Marble or Metal) should penetrate one
another, and yet but to have the dimensions of one, and to possess
no greater space than the one did formerly fill: And if this be
impossible and unintelligible in respect of bodies, whose properties,
aptitudes, affections and modifications are apparent to our senses,
then must it be more impossible and unintelligible in substances
supposed to be meerly incorporeal, because they must needs be more
pure and perfect, and therefore less subject to such unconceiveable
affections; and however, it can be no wayes known to our faculties or
cognitive powers, that they have any such specifical property or
affection. 3. As it is not any way manifest to any of our senses, nor
can be proved by any sound deductions of reason, so it cannot be
manifested to be any innate notion shining from the Intellect it self,
and we ought not to take adventitious ones instead of those that are
innate, nor fictitious ones for either, but to make a due distinction of
each of them one from another. 4. Neither is indiscerpibility a proper
difference of a spiritual substance from a corporeal one, because the
visible species of things do in the air intersect one another, and suffer
not discerpibility: and that these are bodies is manifest, because they
affect the senses; and therefore that which is a property of some
bodies cannot be the proper difference to distinguish a spirit from a
body. 5. This is only an arbitrary and feigned supposition, and
cannot be proved either by the testimony of any of the senses, by
sound reason, or innate notions; and what is or cannot be proved by
some of these (according to his own position) ought to be rejected.
And therefore as indiscerpibility is no proper difference of a spirit
from a body, no more is penetrability, which can no more be in a
spiritual substance, than either in discreet quantity one can be two,
or two one, or in continuate quantity one inch can be two, or two can
become one. Dr Glisson from his much admired Suarius the great
Weaver of fruitless Cobwebs, hath devised another difference of
spirit from body which he thus layeth down, as we give it in this
English. “I assign (he saith) a twofold difference betwixt the
substance of matter and that of spirits. The first is taken from the
substantial (à substantiali materiæ mole) heap or weight of the
matter. For I (he saith) besides the actual and accidental extension,
do attribute to the matter this substantial heap or weight which is
denied to spirits. But the sign of this heap or weight is, that if the
matter in the same space be duplicated, triplicated, or centuplicated,
that it will be made more dense twofold, threefold, or an hundred
fold. And concludeth thus: I answer (he saith) that matter and spirit
in this do agree betwixt themselves, that they both are finite, and
from thence that they have this common, that neither of them can
reduce themselves into a littleness that is infinite, or into an infinite
magnitude. Therefore the difference betwixt them doth not consist in
this; but in this, that a spirit whether it be contracted or dilated, is
not made more dense or rare; but on the contrary, matter, whether it
be contracted or expanded, is made more dense, or more rare.” To
which we return this responsion. 1. It is usual with men, when by
their wills and fancies they would maintain an opinion that is weak
and groundless, finding they cannot clearly perform it, to bring in
some strange, obscure or equivocal word, thereby to make a flourish,
though they prove nothing: So here this learned person to make a
shew to prove the difference of spirit doth assign moles substantialis
as peculiar to body, but not to spirit; but what is to be understood by
moles, he might know his own meaning, but I am sure there are few
others that do or can understand it, and therefore is but a devised
subterfuge to stumble and blind mens intellects, and not to prove the
thing intended. 2. If by the word moles he intend weight or gravity
(and what else it can signifie is not intelligible) then it will not be a
difference betwixt body and spirit, because gravity and levity are
differences of bodies in respect of one another, and therefore can be
none as he assignes it. 3. To assert that a spirit when contracted or
dilated is not made more dense or more rare, but that matter
whether it be contracted or expanded, is made more dense or more
rare, is easily spoken, but not so easily proved: and rude assertions
without sound proof, are of no validity, and may with as good reason
be denied and rejected, as affirmed or received. 4. We have no
density in bodies but in respect of the paucity and parvity of the
pores, so that less of another body is contained in them, and that is
accounted rare that hath many or greater, and so containeth more of
another body in them, and are qualities or modifications that only
belong unto bodies, and not at all unto spirits, and is but
precariously taken up by the Doctor without any proof or
demonstration at all. 5. If spirits cannot expand themselves into an
infinite space, nor contract themselves into an infinite littleness, then
where are bounds and limits of this contraction and expansion, or
how is it proved that they can do either? seeing they are properties
and affections of bodies and matter, and never were proved to be
peculiar to spirits.
4. Those that are much affected to and Argum. 4.
zealous for experimental Philosophie, do
often run into that extream, as utterly to condemn and throw away
all the ancient Scholastick Learning, as though there were nothing in
it of verity or worth: But this is too severe and dissonant from truth,
as might be made manifest in many of their Maximes; but we shall
only instance in one as pertinent to our present purpose, which is
this: Imaginatio non transcendit Continuum. And this if we perpend
it seriously, is a most certain and transcendant truth; for when we
come to cogitate and conceive of a thing, we cannot apprehend it
otherwise than as continuate and corporeal; for what other notions
soever we make of things, they are but adventitious, arbitrary, and
fictitious, for even non entia ad modum entium concipiuntur. And
therefore those that pretend that Angels are meerly incorporeal,
must needs err, and put force upon their own faculties, which cannot
conceive a thing that is not continuate and corporeal: But if they will
trust their own Cogitations and faculties rightly disposed, and not
vitiated, then they must believe that Angels are Corporeal, and not
meerly and simply spirits, for absolutely nothing is so but God only.
5. If the Vid. Rob. Fludd. Argum. 5.
Angelical nature utri. Cosm. Hist.
were simply and Tract. 1. l. 4. c. 2. p.
110.
absolutely spiritual
and incorporeal, then they would be of the same essential Identity
with God, which is simply impossible. For the Angels were not
Created forth of any part of Gods Essence, for then he should be
divisible, which he is not, nor can be, his Essence being simplicity,
unity, and Identity it self, and therefore the Angels must of necessity
be of an essence of Alterity, and different from the essence of God.
Now God being a simple, pure, and absolute spirit in the Identity of
his essence, if the Angels were simply and absolutely spiritual and
incorporeal, then they must be of the same essence with him, which
is absurd and impossible; and therefore they have Alterity in them,
and so of necessity must be Corporeal, and not simply and meerly
spiritual. And that as much as we contend for here is granted by Dr
Moore in these words: “For (he saith) I look upon Angels to be as
truly a compound Being consisting of soul and body, as that of men
and brutes.” Whereby he plainly asserteth their Composition, and so
their Alterity, and therefore that they must needs have an Internum
and externum, as the learned and Christian Philosopher Dr Fludd
doth affirm in these words: Certum est igitur inesse ipsis (scilicet
Angelis) aliud, quod agit, aliud autem, quod patitur; nec verò illud
secundùm quod agunt, aliud quam actus esse poterit, qui forma
dicitur; neq; etiam illud secundum quod patiuntur, est quicquam
præter potentiam, hæc autem materia appellatur.
6. Therefore to Serm. 6 sup. Cantic. Argum. 6.
conclude, these p. 505.
arguments do sufficiently and evidently Lib. 5.
prove that Angels are either Corporeal, or
have bodies united unto them, which is all one to our purpose
whether way soever it be taken. To which only we shall add these
authorities; and first S. Bernard tells us thus much rendered into
English. “Therefore (he saith) as we render unto God alone true
immortality, so also incorporeity, because he alone doth so far
transcend the universal Corporeal nature of spirits, that he doth not
stand need of any body whatsoever, in any operation whatsoever,
being content with only a spiritual nodd (or motion) when he will, to
perform whatsoever he pleaseth. Therefore only that majesty of his,
is that, which neither for himself, nor for another, hath need of the
help of a Corporeal instrument, by which omnipotent will he is
immediately present at every work.” And that of Damascen is full to
the purpose, which is this: “That Angels quantum ad nos, are said to
be incorporeal and immaterial: but compared to God, are found to be
Corporeal and material.” And of this opinion besides were Tertullian,
S. Augustin, Nazianzen, Beda, and many others, as may be seen in
the learned Writings of Zanchy upon this subject: with whose words
we shall shut up this particular: Certum enim est, ex iis quæ
scripturæ tradunt de Angelis, probabiliorem esse Patrum
sententiam, quàm Scholasticorum: utram tamen sequaris, non
multum peccaveris, nec proptereà inter Hæreticos haberi poteris.
And on the otherside, if they be holden to be simply and absolutely
incorporeal, then these absurdities must of necessity follow.
1. If Angels be simply incorporeal, then they can cause no Physical
or local motion at all, because nothing can be moved but by contact,
and that must either be by immediate or virtual contact, for the
Maxime is certain, Quicquid agit, agit vel mediatione suppositi, as
when ones hand doth immediately touch a thing and so move it; vel
mediatione virtutis, as when a man with a rod or a line, doth draw a
thing forth of the water, both of these do require a Corporeal contact,
that is, that the superficies of the body moving or drawing, must
either mediately or immediately touch the superficies of the body to
be moved or drawn. But that which is absolutely incorporeal hath no
superficies at all, and therefore can make no contact either mediate
or immediate; and therefore Angels if simply incorporeal, can cause
no Physical or local motion at all.
2. If Angels be Princip. Phil. Part. The Immortal. l. 1.
absolutely 2. p. 40. c. 10. p. 72.
incorporeal, then they cannot be contained or circumscribed in
place, and consequently can perform no operation in Physical things.
To which if they answer with Thomas Aquinas: Quod circumscribi
terminis localibus est proprium Corporum, sed circumscribi
terminis essentialibus, est commune cuilibet Creaturæ, tam
corporali, quam spirituali; This aiery distinction might have taken
place, if Aquinas had shewed us what essential terms and limitations
are, but of this we have no proof at all, and what was never proved
may justly be denied. For what a definitive place is, was never yet
defined, neither can we possibly conceive an Idea or notion of any
such thing, but only as we may make a Chimæra or figment of that
which never was nor is. For though we may apprehend that they are
not circumscribed in place, as gross bodies are, yet it is not to be
doubted, but that they move from place to place, and do so consist in
some place, that they occupy a certain space of place, and this is most
certain, if we believe (as we ought) those things which the Scriptures
do declare concerning the mission and motion of Angels. And
therefore notwithstanding this frivolous and feigned distinction, we
may conclude with Theodoret, Angelorum naturam esse finitam, &
circumscriptam, eóq; opus habere loco. Neither doth that avail to
solve the business, and make this a good distinction, which is
brought by Dr Moore, to wit, that there are two acceptions of place,
the one being imaginary space, the other that place is the concave
superficies of one body immediately environing another body, and
that therefore there being these two acceptions of place (he
concludeth) that the distinction of being there Circumscriptive &
definitive, is an allowable distinction. But by the Doctors leave we
must affirm, that what he saith is not allowable, and that for these
reasons. 1. Because imaginary space hath no existence in nature, but
only in the fancy of the Imaginant, & entia rationalia, non sunt entia
naturalia ex parte rerum existentia. 2. Because it is a certain truth
which Des Cartes hath taught us, to wit: That the names of place or
space, do not signifie any thing different from a body that is said to
be in a place, but only do design the magnitude, figure and site of it
amongst other bodies. And that this site may be determined, we
ought to have respect unto some other bodies, which we may
consider as immoveable. And as we respect divers bodies, we may
say that the same thing at the same time doth change place and not
change place. As when a Ship is carried in the Sea, he who sitteth in
the Ship doth alwayes remain in one place, if respect be had to the
parts of the Ship, betwixt which parts he keepeth the same site: And
the same person doth continually change place, if respect be had to
the shores, because he continually receedeth from some shores, and
cometh more near unto other. 3. Neither is this distinction good,
because as the same Author tells us: Non etiam in re differunt
spatium, sive locus internus, substantia corporea in eo contenta, sed
tantum in modo, quo à nobis concipi soleat. 4. Dr Moore granteth
that spirits are substances and have extension, and we affirm that
nothing can be so but what is Corporeal, and consequently must be
in place circumscriptively, and therefore the fancy of a definitive
place, is meerly a fictitious foppery, without ground or reason.
And now let us 1 Timoth. 6. 16. Object. 1.
examine the 1 Tim. 6. 13. Hebr. 1. 3.
objections that are De Lithias. l. c. 8. p. Job 34. 14, 15.
usually brought 70.
against this
opinion, the strongest of which is to this purpose; that if Angels be
Corporeal, then of necessity they must be mortal, alterable and
destructible; to which I answer. 1. Because no Creaturely nature is or
can be immortal, per se & ab intrinsecâ & propriâ naturâ, for God
only is so as saith the Text, ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν, Who only hath
immortality; Therefore the Angels whether corporeal or incorporeal,
are not immortal, neither by themselves or their intrinsick nature,
either (as the Schools speak) à parte ante, vel à parte post, because
God only is so, exclusively considered in regard of any Creature, and
so the objection is of no force. 2. The Corporeity of Angels doth not at
all hinder their immortality à parte post, for as God is only immortal
in respect of Essence, Eternity, Infinity and Independency, so Angels
nor any Creatures, are immortal in that point or respect, but only in
regard of their dependency upon God, who by his conservative power
doth keep them by Christ, that for the time or duration to come, they
shall not die, perish, or be annihilated; and this he can and doth as
well perform if they be corporeal as spiritual, even as he doth
preserve and conserve the bodies of the Saints in their Graves until
the general Resurrection, and in the World to come doth keep them
in immortality; though they be changed and made spiritual bodies,
yet they remain bodies still. For it is he that sustaineth all things by
the power of his word; And it is he that doth vivifie or quicken all
things: and if he gather unto himself his spirit and his breath, all
flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again unto dust. So
that the objection is of no validity, because no Creature is kept in
perpetual duration, à parte post, ab intrinsecâ naturâ, sed ex causis
conservantibus, which is the goodwill, benignity, and blessed
influence of Jehovah, and not from any internal creaturely power. 3.
Every spiritual and incorporeal substance that is created, is as
annihilable by the prime power that created it, as is a Corporeal
created substance. And on the contrary, a Corporeal or material
substance is no more capable of annihilation by any power or
efficiency of second Causes, than an incorporeal and spiritual
substance is; and therefore whether Angels be simply incorporeal, or
that they be Corporeal, it neither maketh for nor against their
immortality, which consists only in the benign emanation of the
Divine conservative power of the Almighty: And therefore doth
profound Bradwardine draw that invincible, and undeniable
Corollary of verity, Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet
Creaturam immediatiùs quacunq; causa creata. 4. Though the most
of the bodies that are known unto us be divisible, alterable and
discerpible, or dissipable in respect of our conceptions of them, yet
actually we may find many bodies in nature that are not, nor ever
were dissipated or dissevered secundum totum, though there may be
alteration in their superficial parts, as the Earth, the Sun, Moon, the
rest of the Planets, and those great and glorious bodies that we call
Stars; so that for the duration of bodies à parte post we can conclude
little of certainty. And as there are bodies that secundum suum
totum, are not severed or dissipated, so there are some bodies that
though they may suffer division and dissipation into smaller parts,
yet do those parts though most minute, suffer no real transmutation,
but remain of the same Homogeneous nature they were before, as is
most manifest in Silver dissolved in Aqua fortis, wherein though it
be so severed and dispersed, that it appear not at all unto the eye, yet
may it be from thence recovered and redintegrated into its own
nature as it was before. And also the Masters of the more abstruse
Philosophy affirm to us upon their own certain experience, that
though metallick Mercury may be divided into insensible and
invisible Atomes, yet still it retains the nature of metallic Mercury,
and that thus Helmont tells us: Si non vidissem argentum vivum
eludere quamcunq; artificum operam, adeò, quod aut totum avolet
adhuc integrum, aut totum in igne permaneat, atq; utrolibet modo,
servet impermutabilem sui ac primitivam identitatem, identitatisq;
homogeneitatem anaticam: dicerem artem non esse veram, quæ
vera est, sine mendacio, atq; longè verissima. So also there are
bodies which although they suffer division and separation by some
other bodies dissevering of them, yet by motion of coition they soon
close and redintegrate themselves, having thereby suffered no
detriment at all, as is most apparent in the pure body of the Æther,
the visible species of things, the images in a Looking-glass and in
shadows, which are all bodies. So that seeing bodies, no more than
Spirits to be annihilable by second causes, and that there are some
bodies that are not dissipated secundum totum, and that there are
others that though they are separable into more minute particles, yet
do they remain in Analytical and Homogeneous Identity, and that
there are others that though they be actually for a small moment
divided, yet they do instantaneously coalesce, and by coition unite
themselves; yet we may therefore rationally conclude, that
corporeity, quatenus such, doth not at all take away immortality à
parte post, because bodies as well as spirits may be kept in
immortality by the conservative concourse of Divine Power, and so
the objection utterly falls to the ground.
2. There is only Psal. 104. 4. Object. 2.
another argument Heb. 1. 7.
that the persons of the other opinion have
urged, such as Aquinas, and the rest of the Scholastick rabble, to wit,
the Text in the Psalm, which is this: Who maketh his Angels spirits:
his ministers a flaming fire. From whence they would positively
conclude that they are spirits, and absolutely incorporeal; but fail of
their purpose for these clear reasons. 1. The Text there cannot be
rationally understood of their creation, or of their creaturely nature,
but of their offices and administrations, because the word used there
is not from ‫ ָּב ָר א‬to create, or form forth of nothing, but from ‫ָע ָש א‬
fecit, that is by ordering them in their offices and ministrations. And
again the word ‫ רּוַח‬doth not alwaies or of necessity signifie an
incorporeal thing but that which is a body, as the winds, and so doth
Luther and diverse others render it, and it is commonly attributed to
beasts as well as Men, as in that of Solomon, Who knoweth the spirit
of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth
downward to the earth? Where the word spirit, which is all one in
the Hebrew, is attributed to beasts as well as to men, but no man (I
suppose) will believe that the spirit of a beast is simply incorporeal,
and therefore by the word spirit in the Psalm cannot necessarily be
understood a simple incorporeal substance, and therefore the
consequence is not necessary.
But the Author Vid. August. Metaphys. l. 2. c. 4.
of the Epistle to Tom. 2. l. de spir. & p. 222.
the Hebrews must an. c. 8.
needs be taken for
the best Expositor of these words of the Psalmist, who doth quote
them only for this purpose, to prove that Christ in dignity and office
is far above the Angels who are all ordered to serve and obey him,
and are by their offices all but ministring spirits, sent forth to
minister for them who shall be heirs of Salvation. By which it is
manifest that this place is to be understood of their ministration and
offices, and not of their nature or substances. 2. They can no more be
meerly and literally said to be spirits, understanding spirit to intend
an absolute incorporeal substance, than his ministers can be literally
understood to be flaming fire, they must either be both literally true,
which is absolutely absurd, or else those words must have a
metaphorical interpretation, as they may and must have, and there is
no inconvenience in that exposition. For as the winds, which is but a
strong motion of the air, and the shining or flaming fire, are two of
the most quick, agile and operative agents that are known unto us in
nature, so the Angels and Christs Ministers are strong, quick and
most nimble and powerful in performing their offices and
administrations. Therefore we shall conclude this as Scheibler doth
from S. Augustine: Nihil enim invisibile & incorporeum naturâ
credendum est, præter solum Deum, qui ex eo incorporeus &
invisibilis dicitur, quia infinitus, & incircumscriptus est, & simplex,
& sibi omnibus modis sufficiens se ipso, & per seipsum: omnis verò
rationalis creatura corporea est, Angeli & omnes Virtutes corporeæ
sunt, licet non subsistunt in carne.
Now though we Dan. 3. 24, 25. Judges 13. 20.
have sufficiently Luke 24. 39.
proved that they are corporeal, that is, that
they have bodies naturally united unto them, and so have an
internum, or moving power, and an externum, or a part moved, that
is, as Dr. Moore confesseth, a spiritual and incorporeal part, and a
corporeal part or vehicle, yet to assign what kind of bodies they have,
or what proper difference there is betwixt their substance and other
corporeal substances is no easie matter to determine. Only we shall
give two differences whereby they are distinguished from other
substances that are corporeal, and that as the Scripture holdeth them
forth unto us. 1. The first differential distinction is, that their bodies
do not suffer, or are altered or dissipated, by the most strong, and
operative sublunary agent that is known unto us: Amongst which we
have none of greater force and activity than our culinary fire, yet it is
manifest that that Element did not work upon nor burn the Angel
that appeared to Manoah and his Wife, who ascended in the flame of
the altar, and was not touched, or altered at all, which plainly
sheweth that his body was not to be wrought upon by the fierce flame
of sublunary fire, and he is there called the Angel of Jehovah. This
also is confirmed by that which Nebuchadnezzar saw, and confessed,
that though there were three men only cast into the fiery furnace,
yet he saw a fourth (which by all the learned is judged to be an Angel)
and they had no hurt upon them, that is, the fire did not work upon
their bodies to burn, alter, or consume them. So that in this the
bodies of Angels differ from the most of other bodies, because they
do not suffer by sublunary fire, the most violent agent that we know.
And this must needs rationally be taken to be proper unto Angels in
regard of their created natures, and not as superadded by a Divine
and Almighty Power, as in some other cases it may be granted. 2. A
second difference is, that what bodies soever spirits or Angels have,
or appear in, they have not flesh and bones such as Christ had in his
true and numerical body in which he did appear after his
resurrection, which was the same individual body which he had
before he was crucified. But though they have bodies, yet to feeling
and tangibility they have not flesh and bones as humane bodies have,
which have a renitency and resistibility to our touch, which their
bodies have not, being as it were ethereal, airy and shadowy; and
yielding and giving way to the touch, and though to be divided and
separated, yet, maybe, do as soon close by counition, and so suffer
nothing at all by that division.
Concerning the Sup. Cantic. p. 504. Saints Everlast.
properties of their rest, c. 7. part 2. p.
bodies it seems to have been the opinion of 255.
Tertullian (as I find him quoted by Mr. Baxter) that they had thin
pure and aereal bodies which they could dilate and expand, condense
and contract at their pleasures, and so frame them into diverse and
sundry shapes; his words are these: Dæmones sua hæc corpora
contrahunt, & dilatant, ut volunt: sicut etiam lumbrici, & alia
quædam insecta. So we see that some worms and insects will extend
themselves into a vast length and smallness, that they can pass
through a very small hole, or passage, and again contract themselves
into a great bulk, drawing in the length, and increasing the breadth
and thickness, which though it still be the same corporeal substance,
and in general doth, in what figure soever it be brought into, but
retain the same dimensions in respect of place, yet in regard of
accidental shape or figure it may change the dimensions in respect of
one another, as one while to be more in longitude, and less in
breadth and depth, and sometimes more in breadth and depth, and
less in length. So may the bodies of Angels by contraction and
dilatation, sundry wayes alter their dimensions, and consequently
their shapes and figures, and all this according to the motion and act
of their own wills, so that still there must be limits to these acts of
distention and contraction, that they can do neither in an infinite
degree as either to become an insensible and indivisible prick, nor to
be infinitely expanded or dilated, and this opinion hath sufficiency of
rationality and intelligibility in it. Of this very point S. Bernard
speaketh thus modestly: Videntur Patres de hujusmodi diversa
sensisse, nec mihi perspicuum est undè alterutrum doceam: &
nescire me fateor. And though we cannot punctually enumerate, nor
assign the certain properties of their bodies, yet we may rationally
conclude thus much. 1. That they being creatures ordained for high
and noble ends must needs have their bodies and organs fitted and