G20 Rising Powers in The Changing International Development Landscape Potentialities and Challenges Emel Parlar Dal Full Chapter PDF
G20 Rising Powers in The Changing International Development Landscape Potentialities and Challenges Emel Parlar Dal Full Chapter PDF
G20 Rising Powers in The Changing International Development Landscape Potentialities and Challenges Emel Parlar Dal Full Chapter PDF
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G20 Rising Powers in
the Changing
International
Development
Landscape
Potentialities and Challenges
Edited by
Emel Parlar Dal
G20 Rising Powers in the Changing International
Development Landscape
“The G20 brings together the most important global actors. The club sharpens
the international development agenda. They all use development cooperation
as a soft power. That is why international development is always used as an
important instrumental approach to foreign policy. This timely reader is a crucial
contribution to better understanding the G20 in a highly dynamic and disruptive
global context.”
—Stephan Klingebiel, Chair of the Research Programme “International and
Transnational Cooperation” of the German Development Institute
“This edited work, connecting the role of the G20 with the changing develop-
ment landscape, is valuable in stretching our traditional understanding of these
dynamics. Originally elevated as a crisis committee in the context of the 2008
Global Financial Crisis, the G20 has struggled to widen its agenda. As well
mobilized by Emel Parlar Dal, the collection demonstrates both the will and
skill of select non-Western countries within the G20 to push the privileging of
South-South development cooperation and an alternative policy consensus more
generally. Although facing some structural limitations, the book is testimony to
the expansion of agency in an increasingly multi-polar world that needs to be
considered by both scholars and practitioners.”
—Andrew F. Cooper, University Research Chair,
Department of Political Science, and Professor, the Balsillie School of
International Affairs, University of Waterloo
Emel Parlar Dal
Editor
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents
v
vi CONTENTS
Index 191
Notes on Contributors
vii
viii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
xi
List of Tables
xiii
xiv LIST OF TABLES
Introduction
Since the mid-2000s, the world has increasingly witnessed the emergence
of new poles of powers from the Global South challenging the long-
prevailed global distribution of power among the immediate post-Cold
War era’s winning Western countries. These new powers are generally
referred to as “rising powers” in the literature in opposition to the so-
called “traditional” or “great” powers. These rising powers share some
commonalities, such as their impressive economic growth, their increasing
use of soft power at the international level to enhance the legitimacy of
their status and their growing involvement in international affairs. Indeed,
before the emergence of rising powers, the conduct of international poli-
tics was mainly concentrated in the hands of traditional great powers,
since developing countries remained largely focused on domestic poli-
tics. This trend has sharply changed since the 2008 financial crisis, which
revealed the limits of traditional great powers to drive global politics and
between and within the North and South. In the same stance, Sebastian
Paulo in his study titled, “India as a Partner in Triangular Development
Cooperation: Prospects for the India-UK Partnership for Global Devel-
opment,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF) Working Paper, March
2018, analyzes India’s approach to triangular cooperation by focusing on
the India-United Kingdom partnership for global development, which
has been shaping an innovative model for India’s participation in trian-
gular cooperation in the past years. This is where the present book adds
its distinctive feature by examining the linkage between rising powers’
foreign policy objectives and their international development agenda to
find out whether rising powers follow a developmental foreign policy and,
if so, how efficient that developmental foreign policy is.
Third, a restricted number of studies have examined the link between
rising powers, informal groupings and international development to elab-
orate on how rising powers and informal groupings influence each other
in international development performance. Yet few studies integrate all
this in their framework of analysis to provide a more comprehensive
approach to the study of rising powers in international development.
For instance, Adriana Erthal Abdenur, in “Emerging Powers as Norma-
tive Agents: Brazil and China within the UN Development System,”
Third World Quarterly, Routledge, 2014, analyzes the behavior of two
emerging powers—Brazil and China—within the field of international
development and examines the key motivations, positions and initiatives
taken by Brazil and China with special reference to the UN development
system (UNDS). Another study, titled “China as a Development Actor in
Southeast Asia,” Institute of Development Studies, 2016, by Neil Renwick,
examines China’s foreign relations through the perspective of foreign
policy to contribute to Chinese and Southeast Asian policy deliberation,
formulation and implementation, intending to maximize the development
benefits accruing to the region from China’s engagement, while also mini-
mizing or avoiding potential costs. The present book addresses this issue
by examining how informal groupings such as the G20, compared to
formal groupings like the UN and its related agencies, contribute to or
limit the global actorness of rising powers in international development.
Fourth, with the adoption of UN Agenda 2030, several studies
have also started to analyze rising powers’ role in the achievement of
sustainable development. Yet most of these studies limit their analytical
framework to the efforts of rising powers to achieve SDGs domestically,
neglecting the role of rising powers in promoting the achievement of
6 E. PARLAR DAL
In the empirical part, the authors investigate the various strategies used
by South Korea to integrate SDGs into its foreign policy agenda and to
enhance its achievement of SDGs both domestically and globally. This
study examines how South Korea’s pursuit of a development-centered
foreign policy contributes to its achievement of SDGs both in Korea and
globally. The authors argue that South Korea has used several instruments
to pursue its development-oriented foreign policy goals, including the
creation of an enabling environment for SDG implementation, strong
leadership and active involvement of stakeholders, integration of SDGs
into development cooperation frameworks, cooperation with the private
sector on SDG matters, an increase of knowledge-sharing on SDGs,
reduction of tariffs on trade exchanges with developing countries and
the strengthening of global partnerships. One of the key concluding
remarks of the authors is that the SFP stance is more pronounced in socio-
economic-related SDGs than in peace and security-related SDGs and that,
surprisingly enough, the development-oriented foreign policy nexus has
registered a low record in the international partnerships-related SDG,
which signals the need for South Korea to take deeper development-
oriented foreign policy measures to further increase its activeness in global
partnerships.
In Guise of Conclusion
The international development landscape is fast changing due to the
structural and conjunctural shifts in the changing international system.
The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this change by exerting financial
pressure on both traditional and emerging donor countries. We are now
witnessing states’ reduced budgets available to development assistance. In
addition to the reduction in traditional and emerging donors’ develop-
ment aid budget, the post-pandemic era has made the vulnerabilities of
the developing world more apparent than before. Added to the difficulties
emanating from the health crisis is the Russian-Ukrainian war, which will
certainly affect development aid distribution, most specifically of tradi-
tional donors. In this rapidly changing security environment, there is
a vital need for both traditional and emerging donors to redefine their
international development strategies.
In this new era, there is no doubt that emerging donors will continue
to rise in the fora of international development. Their ideational and
16 E. PARLAR DAL
Introduction
Over the last four decades, the International Relations (IR) debate
regarding international cooperation has largely been driven by two
distinct yet converging arguments regarding cooperation and develop-
ment. The development of interdependence is largely connected to the
1980s, a decade in which the spread of economic integration throughout
A. C. C. Leite (B)
Graduate Program of International Relations, PPGRI/UEPB, Paraíba State
University, João Pessoa, Brazil
e-mail: [email protected]
Graduate Program of Public Management and International Cooperation,
PGPCI/UFPB, Paraíba Federal University, João Pessoa, Brazil
A. C. C. Leite · L. Ramos · S. Spellmann
Graduate Program of International Relations, PPGRI/PUC-MINAS, Pontifical
Catholic University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
Arabia to China and Angola. As argued by Alden and Vieira (2005), these
initiatives can also be described as a reaction to neoliberalism’s ideological
diffusion through the existing International Development Cooperation
institutions during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Taken together, these
distinct SSC initiatives had already reached a particular level of develop-
ment by the mid-2000s, culminating in distinct alternatives to the World
Bank/IMF institutional engagement to the developing world (Manning
2006; Woods 2008). This movement can be described as an outreach
toward the expansion of the existing structures of multipolar world gover-
nance through developing cooperation initiatives, and in accordance with
different structural values of NSC to date.
The 2000’s decade also witnessed the changing economic process of
stabilization within developing countries’ economies. Generally, this led
to a reorganization of diplomatic initiatives by these States, reflecting
on their respective agendas, which were also influenced by particular
national historical conjunctures in the capitalist periphery. Several exam-
ples can be traced back to this period. The strengthening of Brazil and
Portuguese-speaking mutual bilateral and multilateral engagement initia-
tives happened on the wake of post-civil war periods in Angola and
Mozambique and Lula da Silva’s Administration diplomatic offensive to
the developing world (2003–2010) (Visentini and Pereira 2009). The
early 2000s economic recovery of Russia after the deep economic crisis
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union also became a factor of
consideration for international politics, now that the restructuring of the
Russian economy enabled several State-led developmental initiatives (Gray
and Gills 2016). During the early years of the 2000’s decade, China’s
reform and opening-up policy started to prove its advantages in rein-
forcing China’s international engagement (Zhou 2017). Jiang Zemin’s
third term as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPCh)
(1998–2002) oversaw both the final stages of the early period of market
reforms while sustaining China—and arguably to a larger extent Eastern
Asia’s—financial system after the 1997–1998 market crisis. Jiang also
presided over the institution of China’s going out policy, which enabled
the creation of several multilateral regional development cooperation
initiatives linking China and other developing countries, particularly at
this point South-east Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Woods 2008; Zhou
2017). China and Russia also led the creation of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization (SCO). These initiatives continued to prove themselves
fruitful during Hu Jintao’s mandate as head of the CPCh (2002–2012)
20 A. C. C. LEITE ET AL.
Brazil
Dealing with Brazilian cooperation at the start of the twenty-first century
constitutes a complex task. The period has been marked by both offen-
sives and retreats, by attempts at the continuity of policies started at the
early 1990s, as well as by ruptures bringing back bad practices and myopic
alignments.
The Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) Administration (1995–2002)
followed, in what concerns its foreign policy, the logic that was denoted
by Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) as “Autonomy through Participation”.
It was understood that being present at the main discussion topics of
the international agenda would bring good results for Brazilian inter-
national relations. The foreign policy formulations of the FHC govern-
ment considered that participating in multilateral and regional forums,
discussing the main themes of the global agenda, would consist of an
important, pragmatic and advantageous decision for Brazil.
Between the themes dealt at the time, several required Brazilian
efforts for fomenting international cooperation. However, what could be
observed in the case of the FHC Administration was that the great themes
that involved cooperation were subordinated to internal political vari-
ables, and the concern in presenting an explicit support to US-sponsored
agendas as an attempt at widening the Brazilian’ insertion in global topics
conversely led to Brazil’s insertion in themes of little promise, such as
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) integration agenda and the
discussions over the Brazilian participation as a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Regional integration also occupied a relevant role to the FHC Admin-
istration. The economic relations indicators (commerce and investments)
with Brazil’s South American surrounding countries were promising by
the end of the 1990s decade. In parallel, in what concerns international
cooperation, FHC’s main focus was on the diplomatic relations to the US
and the European Union, sustaining his personal thesis that the path for
Brazilian development was the nation’s insertion as a subsidiary capitalist
economy to the capitalist core.
Generally, the South-South Cooperation agenda was little explored
during this period. Few experiences with Global South countries were
observed when considering meaningful agreements. The continuity of
technical accords was observed, as they were usually restricted to the
independent actions of government agencies and public autarkies, such as
DISTINCT TRAJECTORIES OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AMONG … 23
Change: this is the keyword; this was the great message that the Brazilian
society gave at the [General Brazilian] October [2002] elections. Hope
defeated fear and the Brazilian society decided that it was time to trail new
paths. […] For this reason the Brazilian people elected me as President of
the Republic: to change. (Lula da Silva 2003, pp. 27–28)
Lula’s foreign policy forecast the construction of more solid and direct
relations to emerging countries, especially India, South Africa, Russia
and China. In order to do such, Lula and his foreign policy formulators
trusted in the capacity for integration, insertion and overcoming of South-
South Cooperation development obstacles. SSN represented an escape
route to Brazil’s constraints imposed by the existing division between
developed nations and those that seek to reach superior levels of devel-
opment. Domestic order constraints linked to the nation’s socio-historical
formation were also considered at the formulation of the Brazilian foreign
policy.
The CCS offensive represented an attempt at a wider integration to
countries in a similar situation to Brazil. Cepaluni and Vigevani (2007)
employ the concept of “Autonomy through Diversification” as a north for
the foreign policy of the Lula Administration. According to the authors,
the concept consisted on the adhesion of the country to international
principles and norms, having as its main instrument the construction
of alliances of South-South character, including regional partnerships,
24 A. C. C. LEITE ET AL.
According to Mendonça and Farias (2015), the core areas responsible for
the growth of cooperation relations were, in order of relevance, health,
agriculture and education. The authors state that the spike in agreements
obtained by Lula with African countries can be represented not only by its
sheer numbers, but also by the diversity of new partners and in thematic
areas.
At least in its first term, Dilma Rousseff Administration (2011–2016)
indicated a continuity of the same elements present in the foreign policy
of the Lula Administration, especially in what concerned the advances in
South-South Cooperation. There is a debate in literature which indicates
the disagreements over the use of the term continuity. Scholars involved
in this debate such as Goulart, Menezes and Fingermann 2020 sustain
that the Rousseff Administration suffered considerably due to the strong
instability at the international arena. This scenario enabled changes at the
domestic political forces, breaching the pact established between different
sectors of the business class during the Lula Administration, causing direct
consequences to the Brazilian aspirations concerning the inclusion of an
international commerce and investments matrix within SSC, especially
concerning technical cooperation. Conversely, the absence of a direct
presidential engagement to diplomacy, the dispersion of interest groups
that previously supported the Lula Administration, provoked a series of
disruptions on SSC Brazilian initiatives.
The bases for cooperation relations to emerging countries (the Global
South) derived from the Lula administration were kept at first. It should
be noted that Dilma Rousseff initiated her government facing the effects
of the international financial crisis of 2008. Consequently, recalibrating
the Administration’s attention to the domestic scenario could be under-
stood as a necessary decision. Domestic fragilities caused direct conse-
quences to the upkeep of Brazilian international cooperation, especially
within the framework of the SSC and Technical Cooperation for Devel-
opment agreements. Among the most striking factors of the impact of
the international financial crisis, we can highlight that it: obligated the
Brazilian government to further limit its resources destined to the contin-
uation of pre-existing agreements; inhibited the creation of new fronts
for international engagement; reduced the negotiation and execution
power of agreements to developing countries at diplomatic spaces; and it
affected the domestic economic activities that could foment international
cooperation.
26 A. C. C. LEITE ET AL.
China
China’s assessment of IDC can be traced back to the need for geopolitical
repositioning during the early stages of the Cold War in the 1950s, and it
is largely influenced by China’s own conceptions of development and its
consequences to world order. Chen (2014) argues that the then PRC
Premier Zhou Enlai’s engagement expressed in the Bandung Confer-
ence largely influenced the definition of the five principles for friendship
and cooperation among nations. The following decades however saw the
expansion of the US and the core capitalist countries’ organized reaction
against the spike of independence struggles. The spread of military inter-
ventions and neocolonial war throughout Africa, Latin-America and the
Asia–Pacific up until the end of the twentieth century led to several articu-
lated consequences for IDC. First, the 1970s erosion of the US hegemony
over capitalism created the necessary environment for the eventual reartic-
ulation of US control over the developing world through different means.
28 A. C. C. LEITE ET AL.
We hold that all countries, big or small, rich or poor, should be equal,
and that international economic affairs should be jointly managed by all
the countries of the world instead of being monopolized by the one or
two superpowers. We support the full right of the developing countries,
which comprise the great majority of the world’s population, to take part
in all decision-making on international trade, monetary, shipping and other
matters. (Deng 1974)
coincided with the creation of the Belt and Road Initiative. The geopolit-
ical and geoeconomic push for the greater integration of Eurasia rapidly
expanded to the whole world, as China firmed memorandums of under-
standing ranging from Ecuador and Argentina in South America to Italy
and Portugal in Western Europe. Parallel to this, the creation of the AIIB
as a multilateral institution for development financing. Originally focusing
on infrastructure and commercial finance, the bank rapidly became a
supplier for economic aid during the COVID-19 pandemic, partnering
with domestic institutions, national governments and multilateral finan-
cial institutions, particularly the World Bank (Spellmann and Lima 2021).
At the bilateral level, China also provided outstanding aid to the entire
world as a supplier for personal protective equipment and other medical
supplies, respirators and vaccines.
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the approval of the governor of the islands, authorize the
cities and towns to form among themselves associations or
communities for determined ends, such as the construction of
public works, the creation and foundation of beneficent,
charitable, or educational institutions, for the better
encouragement of public interests or the use of communal
property.
{389}
"ARTICLE 54.
It shall be the duty of commanding officers of military
districts, immediately after the publication of this order, to
recommend to the office of the military governor in which towns
within their commands municipal governments shall be
established, and upon approval of recommendations, either
personally or through subordinate commanders designated by
them, to issue and cause to be posted proclamations calling
elections therein. Such proclamations shall fix the time and
place of election and shall designate three residents of the
town who shall be charged with the duty of administering
electors' oaths; of preparing, publishing, and correcting,
within specified dates, a list of electors having the
qualifications hereinbefore set forth, and of presiding at and
making a due return of the election thus appointed. The
proclamation shall specify the offices to be filled, and in
order to determine the number of councilors the commanders
charged with calling the election shall determine, from the
best available evidence, the class to which the town belongs,
as hereinbefore defined; the classification thus made shall
govern until the taking of an official census. The first
alcaldes appointed under the provisions of this order shall
take and subscribe the oath of office before the commanding
officer of the military district or some person in the several
towns designated by said commanding officer for the said
purpose; whereupon the alcalde so sworn shall administer the
said oath of office to all the other officers of the municipio
there elected and afterwards appointed. The election returns
shall be canvassed by the authority issuing the election
proclamation, and the officers elected shall assume their
duties on a date to be specified by him in orders.
"ARTICLE. 55.
Until the appointment of governors of provinces their duties
under this order will be performed by the commanding officers
of the military districts. They may, by designation, confer on
subordinate commanding officers of subdistricts or of other
prescribed territorial limits of their commands the
supervisory duties herein enumerated, and a subordinate
commander so designated shall perform all and every of the
duties herein prescribed for the superior commanding officer.
"ARTICLE. 56.
For the time being the provisions of this order requiring that
alcaldes be elected, in all cases shall be so far modified as
to permit the commanding officers of military districts, in
their discretion, either to appoint such officers or to have
them elected as hereinbefore prescribed. The term of office of
alcaldes appointed under this authority shall be the same as
if they had been elected; at the expiration of such term the
office shall be filled by election or appointment.
"ARTICLE 57.
The governments of towns organized under General Orders No.
43, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army
Corps, series 1899, will continue in the exercise of their
functions as therein defined and set forth until such time as
municipal governments therefor have been organized and are in
operation under this order."
"At the same time the commission should bear in mind, and the
people of the islands should be made plainly to understand,
that there are certain great principles of government which
have been made the basis of our governmental system which we
deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of
individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately,
been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are
also certain practical rules of government which we have found
to be essential to the preservation of these great principles
of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules
of government must be established and maintained in their
islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however
much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure
with which they are familiar. It is evident that the most
enlightened thought of the Philippine Islands fully
appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and
they will inevitably within a short time command universal
assent. Upon every division and branch of the government of
the Philippines, therefore, must be imposed these inviolable
rules: That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation;
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall
exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of
attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press, or the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed.
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"The main body of the laws which regulate the rights and
obligations of the people should be maintained with as little
interference as possible. Changes made should be mainly in
procedure, and in the criminal laws to secure speedy and
impartial trials, and at the same time effective
administration and respect for individual rights. In dealing
with the uncivilized tribes of the islands the commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in
permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to
maintain their tribal organization and government, and under
which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by a civilization to which they are
unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments
should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation;
and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active
effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs. Upon all officers and employés of
the United States, both civil and military, should be
impressed a sense of the duty to observe not merely the
material but the personal and social rights of the people of
the islands, and to treat them with the same courtesy and
respect for their personal dignity which the people of the
United States are accustomed to require from each other. The
articles of capitulation of the City of Manila on the 13th of
August, 1898, concluded with these words: 'This city, its
inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its
educational establishments, and its private property of all
descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the
faith and honor of the American Army.' I believe that this
pledge has been faithfully kept. As high and sacred an
obligation rests upon the Government of the United States to
give protection for property and life, civil and religious
freedom, and wise, firm, and unselfish guidance in the paths
of peace and prosperity to all the people of the Philippine
Islands. I charge this commission to labor for the full
performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and
conscience of their country, in the firm hope that through
their labors all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands may
come to look back with gratitude to the day when God gave
victory to American arms at Manila and set their land under
the sovereignty and the protection of the people of the United
States.
WILLIAM McKINLEY."
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"In order to end our appeal we will say, with the learned
lawyer, Senor Mabini: 'To govern is to study the wants and
interpret the aspirations of the people, in order to remedy
the former and satisfy the latter.' If the natives who know
the wants, customs, and aspirations of the people are not fit
to govern them, would the Americans, who have had but little
to do with the Filipinos, be more capable to govern the
latter? We have, therefore, already proven—
Congressional Record,
January 10, 1901, page 850.