Computer Aided Civil Eng - 2024 - Nofal - Community Level Post Hazard Functionality Methodology For Buildings Exposed To

DOI: 10.1111/mice.
13135
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Community-level post-hazard functionality methodology

for buildings exposed to floods
Omar Nofal1 Nathanael Rosenheim2 Sabarethinam Kameshwar3

Jayant Patil4 Xiangnan Zhou4 John W. van de Lindt5
Leonardo Duenas-Osorio4 Eun Jeong Cha6 Amin Endrami7 Elaina Sutley7
Harvey Cutler8 Tao Lu8 Chen Wang9 Hwayoung Jeon9
1 Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Florida International University, Miami, Florida, USA
2 Department of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, USA
3 Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, USA
4 Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA
5 Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA
6 Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois, USA
7 Department of Civil, Environmental and Architectural Engineering, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, USA
8 Department of Economics, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA
9 National Center for Supercomputing Applications, University of Illinois Urbana Champaign, Champaign, Illinois, USA
Correspondence
John W. van de Lindt, Department of Civil Abstract
Engineering, Colorado State University, This paper presents a building-level post-hazard functionality model for com-
400 Isotope Dr, Fort Collins, CO 80521,
USA. munities exposed to flood hazards including the interdependencies between
Email: [email protected] the population, buildings, and infrastructure. An existing portfolio of building
archetypes is used to model the post-hazard physical flood functionality of dif-
Funding information
NIST Center of Excellence for Risk-Based ferent building typologies within the community with the goal of supporting
Community Resilience Planning under resilience-informed decision-making. Specific fragility-based flood functionality
Cooperative Agreement, Grant/Award
curves were developed for this portfolio to quantify the exceedance probabil-
Numbers: 70NANB20H008,
70NANB15H044; National Institute of ity of a prescribed set of functionality states. While the physical functionality
Standards and Technology; Colorado State of buildings is significant to the total functionality of a building and community
University
resilience assessment, the functionality of utilities such as power and water along
with the accessibility of the household to essential services such as schools and
hospitals is crucial to measure their total functionality. Therefore, functionality
models for essential infrastructure were developed to assess housing unit- and
building-level functionality following flood hazards. This model also accounts
for the functionality of the road network following a flood hazard to identify
the level of accessibility of households to different services (e.g., schools, hos-
pitals, gas stations, shopping centers, etc.). The main novelty of this paper is the
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.
© 2024 The Authors. Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Editor.
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2 NOFAL et al.
ability to quantify the total functionality of buildings based on a socio-physical

formulation after including the interdependencies between the functionality of
the physical systems and the subsequent functionality of the socio-economic sys-
tems, which is key to measuring resilience at the community level. This was
evident from the analysis results using a testbed community of Lumberton, NC,
showing that the physical functionality is not sufficient to quantify the total post-
hazard functionality of buildings and that the functionality of other subsystems
such as utilities and accessibility to essential services are also needed to quantify
the total functionality of buildings and the livability of households.
1 INTRODUCTION ties to be more or less vulnerable (Cutter, 1996). Research

has repeatedly illustrated how people with different socio-
Over the last two decades, the concept of community economic status (1) perceive, prepare for, and respond to
resilience has been studied in the context of analysis, natural hazard risks; (2) have been impacted differentially
modeling, measurement, and implementation techniques both physically and psychologically; and (3) are differen-
(Bruneau et al., 2003; Cimellaro et al., 2010; Cutter et al., tially affected during different stages along the disaster
2008; Ouyang et al., 2012; Renschler et al., 2010; Sharma timeline (Fothergill & Peek, 2004; Hamideh & Rongerude,
et al., 2018, 2020). At the same time, understanding 2018; Peacock et al., 2014; Sutley et al., 2017, 2020; Tier-
and modeling infrastructure interdependencies (Bocchini ney, 2006; van de Lindt et al., 2018). Policy research has
et al., 2014; Eusgeld et al., 2011; González et al., 2016; also pointed out that existing disaster recovery policies
Ouyang & Dueñas-Osorio, 2012; Talebiyan & Duenas- have further exacerbated social inequalities after disasters
Osorio, 2020) offer a stepping stone to more expansive by setting qualifying criteria that exclude socially vulnera-
community resilience models with population dynam- ble people, including renters, the poor, and some cultures,
ics and economic activity. The wide array of definitions from accessing recovery resources (Kamel & Loukaitou-
for community resilience across different disciplines was Sideris, 2004; Sutley & Hamideh, 2018). Thus, it is critical
reviewed in several studies (Bhamra et al., 2011; Koliou to incorporate the differential needs and experiences of
et al., 2018; Manyena, 2006; Martin-Breen & Anderies, the population in community resilience analysis, which in
2011). In this study, we use the general definition of com- predictive studies has primarily been done through social
munity resilience introduced by the Presidential Policy vulnerability measurements (Berke et al., 2023; Sutley &
Directive (PPD-21, 2013) as “. . . the ability to prepare for and Hamideh, 2020; Tate et al., 2021).
adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover Population subgroups with higher levels of social vul-
rapidly from disruptions.” McAllister reviewed research nerability have a greater probability of experiencing larger
needs to achieve community resilience and addressed the reductions in functionality and longer periods of recov-
current research gaps to measure community resilience ery (Van Zandt, 2019). For community-level resilience
using metrics (McAllister, 2016). Quantifying the post- to be improved, steering assistance to the most socially
hazard functionality of buildings and full communities is vulnerable populations may be the most equitable path
the first several steps to measuring community resilience (Kim & Sutley, 2021; Sutley et al., 2017). The models
since it provides information on disruption (robustness of developed herein will allow for a level of detail that is
systems). Tracking community resilience requires quanti- novel and provide models of post-hazard functionality to
tative models for the functionality of the built and social explore equitable solutions. Equitable solutions focus on
systems, which in turn requires modeling interdependen- how to create opportunities for populations that have been
cies between physical, social, and economic systems along “denied a full opportunity to participate in aspects of eco-
with propagating uncertainties in the response of these nomic, social, and civic life” (Exec. Order No. 13985, 2021).
systems to external stressors. Linking people, employees, children, and households to
Decades of disaster research have demonstrated that buildings and infrastructure has produced community
disasters do not affect all people living in a community resilience planning tools capable of examining differential
equally (Fothergill & Peek, 2004; Sutley & Hamideh, 2020). impacts on population groups (Fereshtehnejad et al., 2021;
Other important social, physical, economic, cultural, and Guidotti et al., 2017; Mazumder et al., 2023; Roohi et al.,
political factors drive people, households, and communi- 2020; Rosenheim et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2021). Previous
NOFAL et al. 3
studies have explored population impacts by key social vul- components (2019). Dvir et al. studied the role of access
nerability characteristics such as race (Roohi et al., 2020), to essential facilities and the status of local infrastructure
income (Wang et al., 2021), and tenure status (Rosenheim during hazard weather events in shaping individuals’ risk
et al., 2021). perceptions, emphasizing the importance of evaluating
In recent efforts to integrate the impacts of infras- access as an element of public risk perceptions (2022).
tructure disruptions, socio-economic factors, and build- Esmalian et al. developed a computational multi-agent
ing functionality on post-disaster recovery and resilience simulation model to enable the integration of social equity
(Mitsova et al., 2019; Ulak et al., 2018), explored the effects considerations in infrastructure resilience assessments,
of infrastructure service disruptions on hurricane recov- focusing on hurricane-induced power outages (2022).
ery, with a focus on electric power and cell phone/Internet However, a comprehensive post-hazard functionality
services, and their relationship with socio-economic and model that accounts for all the interdependencies across
demographic factors. Burton et al. (2016) incorporated physical and social systems is still lacking.
the failure of electric power supply and water supply This paper provides an overview of a methodology to
subsystems in the definitions of probabilistic building per- quantify the post-hazard functionality of buildings follow-
formance limit states and then aggregated building-level ing flood hazards by accounting for both physical and
performance metrics to produce community-level perfor- social systems. To do this, it utilizes an example commu-
mance measures. Lin and Wang (2017a, 2017b) considered nity to illustrate the new approach using a flood scenario
different building functionality states based on structural to demonstrate the key decisions, assumptions, and nec-
and non-structural component damage and utility avail- essary data for applying the framework. The main contri-
ability to model post-disaster functionality recovery of bution of the developed approach is the ability to quantify
building portfolios. Masoomi and van de Lindt (2018) the post-hazard functionality of each subsystem within the
accounted for the repair and restoration time of elec- community with a resolution fine enough to allow chain-
tric and water utilities when assessing the impact of ing between the post-hazard functionality of the different
a tornado on community outmigration. Although these subsystems within the community. The proposed analysis
studies offer valuable insights, most consider utilities to resolution is at building-level using high-resolution mod-
have binary limit states, neglecting the interdependencies els that can allow modeling the physical functionality of
between physical systems and the subsequent functional- buildings based on the damage probability to the different
ity of socio-economic systems in the context of post-hazard components within these buildings. Also, the population
functionality. Nofal et al. (2022), Nofal, Rosenheim, et al. model is at the household level, which allows linking
(2023), and Nofal, Amini, et al. (2023) paved the way for households to housing units and buildings. The ability
more robust modeling to chain the functionality of the to chain such physical and social models allowed model-
built environment with the socio-economic systems. ing interdependencies between physical systems and social
In efforts to deploy resilience concepts in practice, systems through population needs. Through the presented
Almufti and Willford (2013) developed the Resilience- methodology and application in this paper, it became clear
based Earthquake Design Initiative (REDi) framework that although physical functionality is crucial for building
that focused on post-earthquake utility disruption curves, functionality, it is not sufficient to inform the total building
with binary utility states (functional and non-functional) functionality and requires a multidisciplinary approach
for electrical, water, and natural gas systems. These curves that can integrate physical and social models.
were employed to assess utility-specific and total down-
times for buildings. The REDi rating system supports
the implementation of resilience-based design of the 2 OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY
built environment. Terzic et al. introduced the F-Rec
framework, which explicitly considers this aspect for the Community resilience is defined by the Presidential Policy
probabilistic evaluation of functional recovery in building Directive (PPD-21, 2013) as “. . . the ability to prepare for
systems (2021). Physical building and infrastructure recov- and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and
ery do not necessarily imply that the community is func- recover rapidly from disruptions.” The way to measure and
tional at pre-disaster levels. This necessitates consideration track community resilience is through the functionality
of socio-economic factors and models, including their of its subsystems. Therefore, in this paper, functionality
impact on infrastructure recovery processes. Ulak et al. is defined as “the performance level and ability of a system
examined the functionality of various physical elements of to provide its intended functions.” Functionality can be
electric power infrastructure, critical facilities, and differ- measured relative to a baseline level of functions, which
ent socio-demographic segments of the population after is usually defined by ideal or pre-event conditions such
Hurricane Hermine in Tallahassee, FL, highlighting the as occupancy, commercial and organizational activities,
distinct and non-homogeneous performance of different and availability of utilities. In the next subsections, flood
4 NOFAL et al.
post-hazard functionality models were developed for the functionality ratios (Fri ) using Equation (2):
main subsystems that contribute to the total buildings
4
∑
functionality across the community. In this paper, we
distinguish between physical functionality and total 𝑃(𝐵_𝐹𝑆𝑖 |𝐼𝑀 = 𝑥) = [𝑃(𝐵_𝐹𝑆𝑖 |𝐵_𝐷𝑆𝑗 )
𝑗=1
functionality. The physical building functionality is the
functionality of the structure itself in terms of its safety .𝑃(𝐵_𝐷𝑆𝑗 |𝐼𝑀 = 𝑥)] (1)
for occupancy. On the other hand, the total building
functionality is the functionality of the building as a whole 4
∑
in terms of physical and socio-economic functionality. 𝐵_𝐹𝑟(𝐼𝑀 = 𝑥) = [𝑃(𝐵_𝐹𝑆𝑖 |𝐼𝑀 = 𝑥)
𝑖=0
It includes structural safety, utilities availability, and
accessibility to essential services. Two separate quantities −𝑃(𝐵_𝐹𝑆𝑖+1 |𝐼𝑀 = 𝑥)].𝐹𝑟𝑖 (2)
were used to calculate the functionality, which is the
functionality state (FS) and the functionality ratio (Fr). where P(B_FSi |B_DSi ) is the exceedance probability of
The FS is the functional level of a building based on its functionality state FSi given damage state B_DSi , and
safety and habitability. The Fr variable is the function- P(B_DSj | IM = x) is the probability of exceeding a build-
ality ratio that represents the percentage of remaining ing damage state B_DSj at an intensity measure IM = x.
functionality. Finally, B_Fr(IM = x) is the physical functionality ratio of
the building at an intensity measure IM = x, and Fri is
the functionality ratio associated with building function-
2.1 Physical building functionality ality state B_FSi . This approach is similar to the approach
analysis used by Burton et al. (2018) for earthquake hazards to
transform from loss-based limit states to recovery-based
The physical functionality is introduced herein as the limit states. These conditional probabilities can be bet-
structural and functional integrity of the building to pro- ter evaluated using field observation of the damage states
vide safety and habitability to its occupants. The proposed along with their observed post-hazard functionality to cor-
functionality concept is different from the damage con- relate both variables empirically. This approach allowed
cept. This is because buildings might not be damaged but transforming the damage fragility curves into functional-
still not be functional because of losing power, water, or ity fragility curves. Figure 1 shows a comparison between
accessibility to essential services. With a focus on flood the resulting damage fragility curves and the functional-
hazards, the proposed methodology was applied to the ity fragility curves for archetype F2 (Nofal & van de Lindt,
building sectors within the community to account for their 2020), which is a one-story residential building with a slab-
physical post-hazard functionality by transforming dam- on-grade foundation. This was applied to the 15 building
age into functionality. This was done using the relationship archetypes described in Section 2.1.
between damage and functionality through a conditional
probability [P(B_FSi |B_DSi )] where B_FSi is the building
functionality state, B_DSi is the building damage state, 2.2 Functionality analysis of networks
j is the number of damage states from 1 to 4, and i is
the number of functionality states from 0 to 4. A detailed To assess the power availability at the building level using
description of the damage and functionality states can the power distribution network (PDN) model, first, the
be found elsewhere (Nofal & van de Lindt, 2020c; Nofal direct damage to the point of delivery (POD) substations
et al., 2020). Best engineering judgment among the mul- is assessed. The level of power outage depends on both
tidisciplinary authors team was used to estimate these the intensity of the hazard and the physical characteris-
conditional probabilities based on the description of each tics of the substation components. For the flood hazard,
B_DS and B_FS corresponding to each building type as the elevation of the control room and other components
shown in Table 1. However, other conditional probabilities is used in conjunction with a step fragility function to
can be used for specific facilities or buildings of interest determine if a substation is functional or not. If the equip-
that are required to perform or provide specific levels of ment height from the ground level is unknown, it may
functionality. The probability of exceeding a building func- be assumed to be either at 3 ft for risk-managed electric
tionality state B_FSi for each building at a specific intensity power facilities or at the ground level for low, medium,
measure (IM) at level x or [P(B_FSi |IM = x)] was calculated and high voltage substations as per the Electric Power Sys-
using Equation (1), which feeds into the building function- tem Classifications, Functionality Thresholds, and Flood
ality ratio B_Fr, calculated by multiplying the probability Model Default Parameters in (FEMA, 2021). Using the
of being in a functionality state by their corresponding step function as the substation fragility function for the
NOFAL et al. 5
T A B L E 1 Conditional probability of the occurrence of a certain building functionality state B_FSi given the occurrence of a certain
building damage state B_DSj [P(B_FSi |B_DSj )] for residential buildings.
P(B_FSi |B_DSj )
Restricted entry Restricted use Restricted occupancy Limited occupancy Operational
FS0 FS1 FS2 FS3 FS4
Slight DS1 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.7
Moderate DS2 0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2
Extensive DS3 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0
Complete DS4 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 0
F I G U R E 1 Comparison between the flood fragility curves of damage and physical functionality for a one-story residential building on a
slab-on-grade foundation: (a) Fragility curves for the exceedance probability of each damage state and (b) fragility curves for the exceedance
probability of each functionality state.
flood hazard implies that all the buildings in the service where N* is the set that contains all the nodes that have
area corresponding to an affected substation experience a water demands; 𝐷𝑖𝑑 (𝑡) and 𝐷𝑖𝑒 (𝑡) are the delivered and
power outage. The graph model of the PDN contains the expected demands at node 𝑖 at time 𝑡, respectively. The
distribution poles and distribution lines. After assessing expected demand 𝐷𝑖𝑒 (𝑡) is estimated using household allo-
hazard-induced damage to the PDN components, the con- cation data, an assumed average demand per person per
nectivity of the PDN model can be checked using either day, and a general hourly demand time series. Node 𝑖 is
breadth first search or depth first search (DFS) algorithms. mapped to specific households based on the shortest dis-
The distribution poles may be vulnerable to hydrody- tance rule, and the expected demand 𝐷𝑖𝑒 (𝑡) reflects the
namic pressure and water-borne debris as well. However, cumulative estimated demands of these households. The
in this study, direct damage to the distribution poles due to delivered demands are obtained from hydraulic analysis
flooding is not considered. or simplified network flow analysis if the hydraulic anal-
Regarding water distribution networks (WDNs) func- ysis does not converge. In the context of flood hazards,
tionality, it consists of three correlated measures: quantity, system failures include inundation of facilities and loss of
pressure, and quality. In this study, the functionality focus electricity, which are modeled in the post-hazard function-
is on water quantity because it is often the most basic ality analysis. The inundation of facilities such as the water
requirement for the stability of a community. The system- treatment plants and pump stations is modeled by turn-
wide water service availability (𝑊𝑆𝐴) of a WDN at time t ing off the corresponding nodes or links in the EPANET
is defined as hydraulic model. The loss of electricity is modeled through
the partial functionality of the pump link or the water
∑ treatment plant node.
𝑑
𝑖∈𝑁∗ 𝐷𝑖 (𝑡) The functionality of the roadway system was assessed
𝑊𝑆𝐴 (𝑡) = ∑ 𝑒 (3)
𝑖∈𝑁∗ 𝐷𝑖 (𝑡)
by estimating the travel time to the nearest hospital,
6 NOFAL et al.
TA B L E 2 Qualitative description of the functionality states for residential buildings in terms of the functionality of each subsystem.
Residential buildings Physical functionality Socio-economic functionality
functionality (Ω) Buildings (Ω1 ) Utilities (Ω2,3 ) Provided services (Ω4 ) Educational (Ω5 ) Health (Ω6 )
FS4 Operational Full service Full access Full access Full access
FS3 Limited occupancy Normal service Normal access Normal access Normal access
FS2 Restricted occupancy Partial service Partial access Partial access Partial access
FS1 Restricted use Poor service Poor access Poor access Poor access
FS0 Restricted entry No service No access No access No access
grocery store, gas station, and school (if applicable) for (FS) of each physical and social system that contribute to
each building before and in the aftermath of a hazard the total post-hazard functionality of a residential build-
event, herein floods. For this purpose, the road network ing. Each table is divided into physical functionality and
was modeled using a graph theoretic approach where socio-economic functionality. The physical functionality
intersections were modeled as nodes and the roads were includes the functionality of buildings and the availability
modeled as links. Bridges can be considered to be a part of utilities including power and water. The socio-economic
of roads (i.e., links) or they could be modeled separately as functionality includes the accessibility of households to
nodes or links. To estimate realistic travel times between gas stations, shopping centers, schools, and hospitals. The
any two locations in the network, first, travel times on each assumed functionality weight Cj for each system j is listed
roadway link were obtained using OpenStreets maps and in the last row of Table 3, which represents the contribution
their travel distance matrix data (Luxen & Vetter, 2011). of each system to the total post-hazard functionality of the
These travel times were used in a weighted Dijkstra’s algo- building. The summation of the Cj terms for all contribut-
rithm (Broumi et al., 2016) to estimate the travel time ing systems should be equal to 1.0 assuming that all the
between any two locations in the network. In this pro- considered systems will make up the 100% functionality of
cess, during hazard conditions, damaged or impassable a building. The proposed model can be parameterized to
roads were identified by determining the maximum inun- handle more systems by adjusting Cj and the cardinality
dation depth for each link. Following recommendations of set J accordingly. These functionality weights are based
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, roads on the best judgments from the multidisciplinary team
with more than 6 inches of inundation depth were con- to represent the contribution of each system. However,
sidered to be impassable and were removed from the road these judgment-based weights can be replaced with field-
network. Travel times were re-estimated for the flooded driven (data) weights based on community engagement
road network. Herein, the percentage change in the travel projects.
time was used for determining the functionality of the road The total functionality Ωj of each subsystem j is quan-
network for each building. Furthermore, to assess connec- tified using Equation (4). The quantified value is then
tivity, a DFS was used, which can be used to determine the compared to the performance criteria defined in Tables 2
existence of a path between two nodes in a road network. and 3 to assign a functionality state. For example, the phys-
ical functionality of a building is Ω1 = B_FR as calculated
from Equation (2), and similarly done for other Ωj for
2.3 Total building functionality analysis considered subsystems j to build the functionality vector
in Equation (5). The functionality vector Ω contains the
A total building socio-physical post-hazard functional- functionality ratio for each considered subsystem within
ity model was developed to capture the functionality the community, obtained by multiplying the exceedance
contributions from the different subsystems (Ωj ), with probability of each functionality state by the function-
j belonging to set J = {1, . . . , 6}, including buildings, ality ratio R corresponding to each system j associated
networks, and services. In particular, the total post-hazard with each damage state i. Then, Ωt , which is the total
functionality Ωt calculation is based on the contribution functionality ratio of the building after including the func-
of the physical functionality of the building (Ω1 ), utilities tionality of each subsystem, is calculated by multiplying
functionality (power [Ω2 ] and water [Ω3] ), accessibility the subsystem’s functionality vector Ω by the functional-
to services (shopping centers and gas stations [Ω4 ]), and ity weight vector C using Equation (6). The same approach
accessibility to social institutions (educational [Ω5 ] and can become fully probabilistic by using Equation (7),
healthcare services [Ω6 ]). Tables 2 and 3 show a qualitative where the exceedance probability functionality matrix
and quantitative description of the functionality states (with elements P(FSi ) is weighted by the functionality
NOFAL et al. 7
T A B L E 3 Quantitative description of the functionality states for residential buildings in terms of the functionality of each subsystem (T
is the actual travel time, and Tn is the average normal travel time).
Physical functionality Socio-economic functionality
Residential buildings Buildings Utilities Provided services Educational Health
functionality (Ω) (Ω1 ) (Ω2,3 ) (Ω4 ) (Ω5 ) (Ω6 )
FS4 100%−95% 100% T < Tn (100%)
FS3 95%−85% 100%−75% Tn < T < 2 Tn (75%)
FS2 85%−50% 75%−50% 2Tn < T < 3 Tn (50%)
FS1 50%−0% 50%−0% 3Tn < T < 4 Tn (20%)
FS0 0% 0% No access (0%)
Functionality weight Cj 0.45 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.1
weight vector Cj to calculate the overall exceedance prob- a system of systems, which represents the total functional-
ability of the building after including all the contributing ity of a building, 𝑅𝑗𝑖 is the functionality ratio corresponding
subsystems. The final calculated functionality Ωp is in to each functionality state i associated with each system j,
terms of a probabilistic functionality vector with the Cj is the functionality weight corresponding to each sys-
exceedance probability of each functionality state in each tem j, m is the number of systems, and n is the number of
row PΩ(FSi ). functionality states.
∑
Ω𝑗 = 𝑃(𝐹𝑆𝑗𝑖 ).𝑅𝑗𝑖 (4)
𝑖=0∶𝑛 2.4 IN-CORE) model
∑ 𝑖 𝑖 The data used to model the community components and

⎛ Ω1 ⎞ ⎛ 𝑖=0∶𝑛 𝑃(𝐹𝑆1 ).𝑅1 ⎞ the computational models developed to link between these
⎜ ⎟ ⎜∑ ⎟
⎜ 𝑃(𝐹𝑆2𝑖 ).𝑅2𝑖 ⎟ components were made available through IN-CORE (van
Ω
Ω = ⎜ 2⎟ =⎜
𝑖=0∶𝑛
⎜ ⋮ ⎟ ⎟ (5) de Lindt et al., 2023). With the suite of tools to use and the
⎜ ⋮ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ capability of interconnecting and chaining different phys-
⎝Ω𝑚 ⎠𝑚×1 ⎜⎝∑ 𝑖
⎟
𝑖 ⎠
𝑖=0∶𝑛 𝑃(𝐹𝑆𝑚 ).𝑅𝑚 𝑚×1 ical infrastructure damage analyses and socio-economic
analyses, there have been increasing use cases of IN-CORE
for different communities. Therefore, IN-CORE is curat-
𝑇 ∑
Ω𝑡 = (Ω)1×𝑚 .(𝐶)𝑚×1 ⋯ where ⋯ 𝐶𝑗 = 1 (6) ing a collection of Jupyter Notebooks and publishing them
𝑖=1∶𝑚 for a number of testbeds designed to investigate different
hazards including earthquakes, tornados, hurricanes,
tsunamis, and flooding. For this paper, a Matlab code for
0 0 0
⎛ 𝑃Ω (𝐹𝑆0) ⎞ ⎛ 𝑃(𝐹𝑆1 ) 𝑃(𝐹𝑆2 ) ⋯ 𝑃(𝐹𝑆𝑚 )⎞ the proposed concept was developed for a flood hazard
⎜ Ω ⎟ ⎜ 1 1 1 ⎟
⎜ 𝑃 (𝐹𝑆1) ⎟ ⎜ 𝑃(𝐹𝑆1 ) 𝑃(𝐹𝑆2 ) ⋯ 𝑃(𝐹𝑆𝑚 )⎟ application using Lumberton, NC, as a testbed for this
Ω𝑝 = ⎜ =
⎟ ⎜ ⎟ application. The developed models are available upon
⎜ ⋮ ⎟ ⎜ ⋮ ⋮ ⋯ ⋮ ⎟
⎜𝑃Ω (𝐹𝑆𝑛)⎟ ⎜ request, and notebooks for some of the used models are
𝑛 ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝𝑃(𝐹𝑆 ) 𝑃(𝐹𝑆 𝑛 )
𝑛
1 2 ⋯ 𝑃(𝐹𝑆𝑚 )⎠
(𝑛+1)×𝑚 published as an open-source science contribution for
researchers to use. This notebook has detailed Python
⎛ 𝐶1 ⎞ algorithms along with detailed descriptions for each of
⎜ ⎟
⎜ 𝐶2 ⎟ ∑ the developed models. Readers are referred to this link
.⎜ ⎟ ⋯ where ⋯ 𝐶𝑗 = 1 (7) (https://incore.ncsa.illinois.edu/doc/incore/notebooks/
⎜ ⋮ ⎟ 𝑖=1∶𝑚
⎜𝐶 ⎟ Lumberton_testbed/Lumberton_testbed.html).
⎝ 𝑚⎠ 𝑚×1 The proposed computational model can handle dif-
ferent types of data at different levels of resolution with
Here, Ωp is the total functionality vector in a probabilis- varying levels of complexities between the linkages that
tic format. P(FSi j ) is the exceedance probability of each connect the components/systems. Figure 2 shows how
functionality state i corresponding to each subsystem j the data were organized and linked before applying the
in the probabilistic setting, PΩ (FSi) is the probability of hazard, how the damage is transformed into functionality,
exceeding a functionality state i for the entire building as and how the functionality of each component/system is
8 NOFAL et al.
FIGURE 2 Post-execution of the post-hazard functionality assessment framework for the built environment.
linked to its supporting elements and systems. The flow units within the buildings where i: residential building, j:
chart starts by showing how the population information commercial building, k: social building, u: housing unit,
(household size X1(i,u), number of labor X2(i,u), students b: business unit, and s: social institution. Also, the service
X3(i,u), etc.) are linked to the different building sec- area associated with each network was specified (Z1, Z2,
tors including each housing unit within each residential Z3). Using housing unit identities (IDs) and building IDs
building Y1(i,u), each business unit within each commer- facilitated these linkages between the population, build-
cial building Y2(j,b), and each social institution Y3(k,s) ings, and infrastructure. Then, the hazard was coupled
where i, j, and k are the buildings and u, b, and s are the with the linked/interdependent components/systems for
NOFAL et al. 9
the community. Finally, the damage to buildings and other Similarly, while many datasets exist (Data-Axel, 2020;
physical infrastructure was transformed into functionality Geverdt, 2018; U.S. Census Bureau, 2021) that link busi-
estimates. nesses to jobs and schools to staff, there is only limited
data that provide the link between where workers live and
where they work within large groups of industry sectors.
3 BASIC STRUCTURE OF MODELS
To overcome this limitation and provide details on indus-
AND DATA
try sectors such as education and health care, an algorithm
was developed to link jobs to people in the person record
The proposed post-hazard functionality method uses high-
file (Rosenheim, 2021). While the labor allocation data pre-
resolution community-level models for population alloca-
sented in this paper apply to the education sector, the labor
tion, building functionality, and infrastructure functional-
market allocation model can be extended to apply to any
ity. A computational environment named IN-CORE served
economic sector in a community. The labor data consist
as the modeling technology necessary for studying the
of details on each job’s industry and wage level, as well as
framework (van de Lindt et al., 2023). The application
the employee’s race, ethnicity, sex, and age level. The labor
discretizes the built environment by performing spatial
data are designed to reflect the economic and social insti-
analysis of households, buildings, and networks to iden-
tutions (schools and hospitals) within a community and
tify the social and physical exposure of the community
link impacts to businesses with the employees as well as
from the spatial distribution of hazard intensity across the
impacts population disruptions may have on business and
community. This was done by modeling of the households’
social institutions.
synthesis (e.g., size, race, ethnicity, etc.), different build-
To model the building inventory within the community,
ing types (e.g., residential, commercial, social, etc.) along
the building portfolio developed by Nofal and van de Lindt
with essential networks (e.g., power, water, roadway, etc.)
(2020c) was used to model the different building typologies
within the community.
within the community. This portfolio consists of 15 build-
ing archetypes with a number of residential, commercial,
3.1 Household, population, and and social institution buildings as shown in Table 4. Read-
building model ers are referred to Nofal and van de Lindt (2020c) for more
details about these archetypes. This suite of 15 archetypes
Usually, household information is restricted at the hous- is believed to be diverse enough such that they can repre-
ing unit level to protect privacy. The US Census Bureau sent small- to mid-size communities with an appropriate
provides information about the population at higher levels resolution. These archetypes can then be mapped to any
of geography such as blocks, block groups, and cen- community of interest and linked with the population
sus tracts. Household-level population characteristics are model as shown schematically in Figure 3, which shows
necessary, however, to get a more accurate depiction of a schematic representation of how the household data get
equity or inequity. To enable a more accurate analysis, linked with building data through a household allocation
Rosenheim (2021) developed a housing unit inventory algorithm.
methodology with person record files that estimates socio-
demographic characteristics at the household level. The
estimated population data include each household mem- 3.2 Network models
ber’s race, ethnicity, sex, age, and school grade level; the
model also estimates each household’s tenure status and The scale of the electric power system model to be used
income level and assigns each household a physical home in the analysis is primarily determined by the geograph-
based on geospatial housing unit data. Readers are referred ical extent of the hazard. As the fluvial flood hazard is
to Rosenheim (2021) for more details about the household limited to the community, phenomena at the power trans-
and population characteristics methodology and Rosen- mission network scale are minimal thus mainly requiring
heim et al. (2021) for specifics on the household allocation community-level PDN models. The PDN model consists
method. The individual and household estimates are based of POD substations and a distribution network layout or
on de-aggregated Census data and thus are accurate at the graph. The POD substations receive bulk power from the
selected aggregate level, that is, Census block. The pop- transmission network and distribute it in the correspond-
ulation data are designed to reflect the community as a ing service areas through radially operated main feeders
whole and provide a tool to connect impacts to individual and laterals. When high-resolution data for the commu-
structures and infrastructure on the people that live in the nity PDN is unavailable, the service areas of individual
community, and vice versa. substations can be estimated using Voronoi polygons or
10 NOFAL et al.
TA B L E 4 The building archetypes description.

Building archetype Building description
F1 One-story single-family residential building on a crawlspace foundation
F2 One-story multifamily residential building on a slab-on-grade foundation
F3 Two-story single-family residential building on a crawlspace foundation
F4 Two-story multifamily residential building on a slab-on-grade foundation
F5 Small grocery store/gas station with a convenience store
F6 Multiunit retail building (strip mall)
F7 Small multiunit commercial building
F8 Super retail center
F9 Industrial building
F10 One-story school
F11 Two-story school
F12 Hospital/clinic
F13 Community center (place of worship)
F14 Office building
F15 Warehouse (small/large box)
FIGURE 3 A schematic representation of the linkages between populations and the building inventory.
cellular automata (Pala et al., 2014). If the locations of tion data in IN-CORE, as well as the operation information
utility poles are known, the topology of the PDN can be shared by the community, is used as inputs to build an inte-
modeled either as a minimum spanning tree (Mensah & grated WDN model, where an EPANET (2017) hydraulic
Dueñas-Osorio, 2016; Montoya & Ramirez, 2012) or it can network model is integrated with the building and house-
be modeled using constraints based on road infrastruc- hold allocation model. With this integrated model, each
ture (Meyur et al., 2020), where damage to substations or household’s water demand is mapped to its nearest node in
poles leads to downstream user outages. If the locations the hydraulic network. Therefore, this approach can sim-
of utility poles are unknown, nodes representing aggregate ulate the water service disruption to any what-if hazard
loads may be assumed to be distributed in the service area scenario and map its impact on the community’s house-
(Mensah & Dueñas-Osorio, 2016) or inferred based on load holds, revealing how water infrastructure functionality is
models. connected with the community functionality.
The WDN of a community should deliver water flows of Road networks facilitate the movement of goods and
adequate quantity, pressure, and quality to end consumers. people and can be modeled in IN-CORE using a graph-
In this study, the asset and topological data provided by based approach as described in Section 2.2. Locations of
the local government, the building, and household alloca- interest such as buildings, essential facilities, and other
NOFAL et al. 11
infrastructure components (e.g., water and power assets) adopted across the entire model. Buildings shapefile has
were linked to the road network. Furthermore, the pop- the essential data about the buildings within the com-
ulation data from buildings were associated with the road munity of interest including first-floor elevation (FFE),
network to determine the number of people that can access building archetype, construction material, and foundation
different essential service facilities (ESFs) and other social type. Also, a shapefile for each lifeline including power,
institutions such as schools. For this purpose, the locations water, and transportation network is used to extract the
of buildings, schools, ESFs, grocery stores, and other loca- essential data about each infrastructure. This shapefile
tions were mapped to the nearest link or node. Herein, for provides a topology, connectivity, and the characteristics
analysis, all major roads were included in the road net- of each network (pipe diameters, road speed, number of
work. Simplifications were made to remove roads ending lanes, etc.). The population data were in the form of an
in dead ends and cul-de-sacs. Additionally, two-way streets Excel file downloaded from the US Census data and are
were converted to two one-way roads to preserve the two then linked with building data using unique IDs. A com-
directions. During a given hazard event (floods), the result- plete description of data can be found in van de Lindt et al.
ing network was used for assessing connectivity and travel (2023), which summarizes the theory behind the IN-CORE
time before and in the aftermath of a hazard using the modeling environment and includes a section on data.
procedure mentioned in Section 2.1.
4.1 Buildings data

4 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF
METHODOLOGY: COMMUNITY OF Detailed building data were provided by the NC OneMap
LUMBERTON, NC (2023), which includes building occupancy, number of sto-
ries, foundation type, and construction material. Then, the
Lumberton is located in Robeson County in southeast aforementioned portfolio of 15 building archetypes along
North Carolina, US, about 130 km (80 miles) from the with their associated fragility functions was mapped to the
Atlantic Ocean. The Lumber River flows from west to buildings within the community as shown in Figure 4a.
east, through the middle of the community. Lumberton The mapping process is based on a mapping algorithm that
is the site of a longitudinal field study following flooding uses the collected detailed building information (field data,
caused by 2016 Hurricane Matthew and 2018 Hurricane Google Street Map View data, and NC OneMap data) to
Florence (Helgeson et al., 2021; van de Lindt et al., 2018; assign a specific archetype to each building. More infor-
van de Lindt et al., 2020). Lumberton is selected for the mation about the mapping process for Lumberton can
illustrative example here due to its repeated flooding expo- be found in Nofal et al. (2021) and Nofal and van de
sure and the data available from the longitudinal study Lindt (2020a, 2021). Additionally, the housing units for
and other testbed analysis (Crawford, 2022; Nofal & van each building along with addresses are provided to the
de Lindt, 2020a, 2020b, 2021). Figure 4 shows a map of household allocation model.
Lumberton color-coding building occupancies, including
residential buildings in green, commercial buildings in
red, social institutions in yellow, and the city boundaries 4.2 Population data
in magenta. The map depicts 20,000 buildings within and
around Lumberton that share the city’s facilities and net- Lumberton is a multiracial community with a population
works. The Lumberton virtual building inventory includes of 21,542 people according to the 2010 Census data (U.S.
16 school campuses with 10 elementary schools, three mid- Census Bureau, 2010). The community’s population
dle schools, and three high schools along with one main has significant racial diversity, including 36% African
hospital and three medical clinics. The location of these American, 13% Native American, and 39% White. The
social institutions with respect to Lumberton is also shown median household income in Lumberton is $32,383,
in Figure 4. Detailed information about the buildings and which is significantly lower than the median income for
networks was provided by the North Carolina spatial data the United States ($53,046), and North Carolina ($46,450;
download website along with other field and virtual recon- U.S. Census, 2012). Table 5 provides intersectional socio-
naissance studies (Helgeson et al., 2021; Nofal & van de economic characteristics of Lumberton based on data
Lindt, 2020b; Sutley et al., 2021; van de Lindt et al., 2020, from the 2010 US Census. Although 13 years old at the
2018). time of this writing, the 2010 Census data were used
The data needed to run the models proposed herein because it is the most detailed and spatially refined data
includes buildings data, infrastructure data, and available to represent the community’s baseline prior to
population data. A shapefile format for these data is the 2016 flooding scenario modeled herein. At the time
NOFAL et al.
F I G U R E 4 Color-coded map for the built environment: (a) Buildings color-coded based on their archetypes and (b) transportation,
power, and water networks within Lumberton, NC.
12
NOFAL et al. 13
TA B L E 5 Summary of housing unit, population, and socio-economic characteristics of Lumberton, 2010.

Detailed housing unit characteristics Housing unit count Population Median income
White alone, not Hispanic 3728 8411 $45,528
Black or African American alone, not Hispanic 2869 7914 $21,374
American Indian and Alaska Native alone, not Hispanic 956 2738 $17,265
Other race, not Hispanic 213 1028 –
Hispanic or Latino 318 1451 $28,715
Vacant 793 0 –
Total: 8877 21,542 $32,383
of this writing, the US Census Bureau has not released helps inform the extent of the building inventory and net-
the 2020 Census data. For the income data, the 2012 works to accurately predict the community-level needs and
5-year American Community Survey is used because functionality.
it provides detailed income distributions by race and
reduces uncertainty by combining surveys from 2008 to
2012. As shown in Table 5, race and ethnicity intersect with 4.3 Networks data
median household income anticipated to increase social
vulnerability. Non-Hispanic White households have the Information about the water and roadway networks was
highest median income ($45,528), compared to American- provided, among other sources, by the North Carolina spa-
Indian households with a median income of $17,265 and tial data download website (State of North Carolina, 2019).
non-Hispanic Black households with a median income of These datasets include network topology, connectivity and
$21,374 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). These data provide a a number of specific characteristics for each network (e.g.,
means to link detailed socio-economic characteristics to pipe size for water network, number of lanes for roadway
the building data described in the previous section and network), complemented by Public Works information.
the network data described in the next section. As a detailed model for the PDN is unavailable publicly,
In addition to the general population, this paper expands the model was created using the techniques described
the community model to include the education system, in Section 2.3, particularly the locations of substations
which includes students and school staff. While the from OpenStreetMap and HIFLD, and the service-area
building inventory identified 16 possible school locations, approach for power distribution. Figure 4b shows a layout
the National Center for Education Statistics identifies for the essential networks within Lumberton, NC, includ-
eight schools within the City of Lumberton, five pri- ing power, water, and roadway. The roadway network is
mary schools, two middle schools, and one high school. green, the power network is red, and the water network is
The schools are part of the Robeson County School Dis- blue. There is one water treatment plant within Lumber-
trict. Within the city of Lumberton, there were no private ton, and the intake source of this plant is at the Lumber
schools identified. During the 2009–2010 school district River along with other eight deep ground wells to provide
(selected to match the 2010 Census data), there were around 4 to 6 million gallons of water per day to 25,000
4758 students; 21% American Indian alone, 30% White people within and around Lumberton.
alone, and 39% Black alone (National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics, 2022). For the labor market, this analysis
focuses specifically on the education sector, which in 2010 4.3.1 Power network
included 2915 jobs or 15% of the total jobs located in Lum-
berton (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021). The education sector While the Eastern Interconnection has thousands of sub-
includes public schools, secondary schools, and private stations, in this study, we only identify the three POD
education-related businesses. For this study, we focused substations that provide electric power to all the buildings
specifically on the eight public schools that serve students in Lumberton. The service areas were delineated for each
within the city of Lumberton. The labor market alloca- substation in Lumberton using the Voronoi polygons tech-
tion uses origin–destination data on where workers live nique (Pala et al., 2014). Additionally, as the locations of
and work (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021). These data show utility poles are not available, a uniform grid of nodes rep-
that only around 16.5% of workers live and work within resenting aggregate loads was used and connected using
Lumberton, and 83.5% of workers commute into the study Kruskal’s algorithm to create a minimum spanning tree.
area. For the workers commuting in, 60% have commutes This is a reasonable assumption to model the PDNs, as they
of greater than 10 miles. Knowing where workers live are radially operated and aggregate customers upstream
14 NOFAL et al.
F I G U R E 5 Development of power distribution networks for Lumberton. (a) determine location of point of delivery substations, (b)
estimate service area for each substation using Voronoi polygons, (c) example substation and corresponding service area, (d) use Kruskal’s
algorithm for minimum spanning tree to create a graph model of uniform-grid aggregated loads.
to their respective substations (Mensah & Duenas-Osorio,

2016; Montoya & Ramirez, 2012). Figure 5 shows the devel-
opment of the PDN for building functionality assessment
in this study.
4.3.2 Water network
To build the hydraulic WDN model, data from different

sources was used, namely: (1) publicly available Geograph-
ical Information System (GIS) infrastructure data that
describes the topology and the structural attributes of phys-
ical components (NC OneMap, 2023); (2) public digital ele-
vation maps that provide node elevations (NC Floodplain
Mapping Program); (3) IN-CORE’s synthetic household
unit allocation data that produce realistic water demands
at nodes; and (4) operational data shared by the local util-
ity, Department of Public Works, Lumberton, to define
system settings (e.g., pump curves, water level ranges in
tanks); and modeling knowledge based on experience by
the networks team. The hydraulic model can easily be
updated when new information is available. Lumberton’s
WDN includes one water treatment plant, three elevated
tanks, each having 1-million-gallon capacity, and one oper- F I G U R E 6 The road network for the region within and
ating pump at the water treatment plant. Of its average around Lumberton.
daily supply between 4 and 6 million gallons, 60% comes
from the Lumber River and 40% from the ground wells.
in different counties. Since Lumberton is the region of
interest, all types of roads are considered in the Lumber-
4.3.3 Road network ton urban area (as per the census). The data on all the
roads in the region were obtained from NC OneMaps.
Although Lumberton is considered for the analysis, the Only interstate and arterial roads were considered out-
road network model extends beyond Lumberton and spans side Lumberton. Figure 6 shows the road network for the
the entire Fayetteville-Lumberton-Laurinburg combined region along with locations of ESFs such as hospitals,
statistical area, which includes Robeson, Scotlan, Hoke, grocery stores, gas stations, and schools to which connec-
and Cumberland counties. A larger extent of the road net- tivity is assessed. These facilities and building locations
work is necessitated due to commuters working and living are mapped to the nearest nodes in the road network.
NOFAL et al. 15
The flood hazard map is overlaid on the road network, exposed to flooding, the probability of losing physical func-
and when there was more than 6 inches of inundation, tionality is 0%, and if a building is submerged in water (e.g.,
it was assumed to be impassable to traffic. Correspond- 4.0-m flood depth), the probability of losing functionality
ingly, travel time analysis is performed using travel times is 100%. It is clear that there are a large number of buildings
on individual links obtained from OpenStreet maps and its that remain fully functional (FS4) since the considered
distance matrix Application Programming Interface (API). buildings within the study area are 20,085 buildings, and
the flood-exposed buildings are 2857 buildings. On the
other hand, 393 buildings are identified as restricted occu-
4.4 Flood scenario data pancy (FS2), and 10 buildings are identified as restricted
entry (FS0). Figure 8a,b shows a color-coded map for the
A scenario-based flood hazard map for Lumberton was functionality state of each building, which shows the spa-
used herein to investigate the developed post-hazard func- tial variation in the functionality state across the entire
tionality approach. The flooding event after Hurricane community for the building directly exposed to flood haz-
Matthew 2016 was used to model the functionality of the ards. These physical functionality states served as an input
built environment. A high-resolution flood hazard map for the total functionality of each building. The last row
developed by Nofal and van de Lindt (2020c, 2020d) was in Table 6 (Building FS) provides the number of buildings
applied as hazard input. Figure 7 shows the simulated designated by their most probable functionality state.
flood hazard map. The exposure analysis results showed
that almost all of the buildings and networks along with
their associated facilities in the southwest side of the city 5.2 Post-hazard functionality analysis
got flooded as shown in Figure 7a shows the flooded build- results for networks
ings, which are color-coded based on their archetypes.
Figure 7b shows a close-up view of the neighborhoods that 5.2.1 Power network
were severely flooded by Hurricane Matthew in 2016. The
analysis shows that there are 2857 exposed buildings in Of the three substations in Lumberton, the central substa-
the flood model with 2400 buildings being inundated, that tion located near the Lumber River was severely affected by
is, water levels above the FFE. The main water treatment flooding. Based on the flood hazard scenario data, the max-
plant that provides potable water to the entire city was imum water depth at this substation had reached 8.68 ft
also severely flooded as shown in Figure 7c. The main (2.65 m) thus warranting the de-energizing of the sub-
electrical power substation that provides power to the station that ultimately affected its service area. This is
majority of buildings in Lumberton was also flooded as coherent with the findings of the community resilience-
shown in Figure 7e. focused technical investigation of the 2016 Lumberton, NC,
flood (van de Lindt et al., 2018). Although the disruption
due to the substation flooding was alleviated to some extent
5 RESULTS using power rerouted from the other two substations, the
rerouting was not modeled in this study because the exact
5.1 Building post-hazard physical technical details are not public. Electric power was also dis-
functionality analysis results rupted for many households throughout Lumberton due to
downed trees (van de Lindt et al., 2018). However, these
The physical functionality of each building was quanti- outages resulted from wind, which was not modeled in
fied based on the methodology in Section 3.1. The fragility this study. During the hurricane, a large majority (99.4%)
functions developed in this paper provide the exceedance of the surveyed households in Lumberton reported loss of
probability for each functionality state using the hazard power due to cumulative effects from flood and wind (van
intensity. For example, a building exposed to a specific de Lindt et al., 2018). Figure 8c shows the resulting electric
flood depth has a specific exceedance probability of each power outage within and around Lumberton.
FS. Since it is not feasible to present these results for every
building in the community, Table 6 summarizes the physi-
cal functionality of all the buildings considered in the study 5.2.2 Water network
area in terms of the probability of being in each functional-
ity state. The exceedance probability of each functionality According to the technical investigation following the
is divided into ranges from 0% to 100% exceedance proba- Hurricane Matthew flooding (van de Lindt et al., 2018),
bility. The number of buildings within each range is deter- Lumberton’s water supply system was disrupted on Octo-
mined and listed as shown in Table 6. If a building is not ber 10, 2016, after failures of the river intake pump, the
16 NOFAL et al.
F I G U R E 7 A scenario-based flood hazard map based on Hurricane Matthew 2016: (a) The state of flooding across Lumberton, NC; (b) a
close-up view on the west side of Lumberton where most buildings got flooded; (c) the state of flooding for the water network; (d) the state of
flooding for the transportation network; and (e) the state of flooding for the power network which affects the central region.
treatment plant generator, and the water treatment plant Based on the information from the technical investigation,
due to inundation. Limited service resumed by October 15, as well as from the simulated water depth, it is inferred
when portable treatment units were available to treat water that the pump as well as the water treatment plant was
from the ground wells, with water conservation notices offline starting from 10:00 p.m., October 10; the system
launched to save water to backwash the system. Many recovered 50% of total water supply and pumped associated
households reported days to weeks of water supply outage. amounts to the system starting at 2:00 p.m., October 15; and
17
functionality ratio; (b) buildings physical functionality states; (c) electrical power network functionality; and (d) water network functionality.
F I G U R E 8 Color-coded maps for the performance of the infrastructure in terms of their functionality: (a) Buildings physical
NOFAL et al.
18 NOFAL et al.
TA B L E 6 The number of buildings within each probability range of exceedance of a functionality state.
Number of impacted buildings (total = 20,085)
Exceedance probability of a functionality state FS0 FS1 FS2 FS3 FS4
P = 0% 18,366 17,678 17,560 17,555 17,552
0% < P = < 20% 1687 1841 432 171 72
20% < P = < 40% 28 524 1242 131 71
40% < P = < 60% 4 37 536 220 77
60% < P = < 80% 0 5 295 1024 111
80% < P = < 100% 0 0 20 984 2202
Buildings FS (total = 20,085) 10 0 393 1572 18,110
recovered full water supply by 2:00 p.m., October 20. Due dation, the travel times to the nearest gas station and
to very limited information on water quality degradation, grocery store ranged up to 6 and 10 min, respectively. The
only water quantity and pressure changes after Hurricane average travel time to both of these facilities was a few min-
Matthew are simulated. utes. While the consideration of floods did not change the
Simulation results match empirical data and show that average travel time to the gas station and grocery stores,
nearly all the households lost water around 2:00 p.m., the maximum travel time doubled, and approximately
October 10, 16 h after the system failure, when the ele- 15% of the buildings lost access to grocery stores and gas
vated tanks were drained. When the tanks supplied water stations.
for the system, the water pressure at all nodes was satisfied A similar analysis was conducted for schools. For this
as enough potential energy was stored in them. Afterward, purpose, students attending public schools in Lumberton
the WDN remained empty until 2:00 p.m., October 15, after were assigned to one of the buildings in Lumberton (see
which a fraction of households got access to water of ade- Rosenheim, 2021). Correspondingly, the travel time for
quate quantity and pressure, while some households could each student to their school with and without flooding was
not get water during the peak demand period (6:00 to 10:00 evaluated. Since more than one student was assigned to
p.m.). Figure 8d shows the water service availability results some of the buildings, the average travel time to school for
for buildings (at 8:00 p.m., October 19). In the current all the students in a building was calculated along with
simulation for Hurricane Matthew, water quantity avail- the number of students who can reach the school. The
ability dominates the post-hazard functionality because average travel time to school without flooding was approx-
there were no significant structural damages, which can imately 3 min, with a maximum of 11 min. Considering
dissipate energy and reduce pressure. The water service flooding, the average travel time for students who could
availability for each household from 10:00 p.m., Octo- access the school increased to 11 min, and the maximum
ber 10, to 2:00 p.m., October 20, is obtained from joint time increased to 66 min. Over 22% of the students lost
hydraulic and network flow analysis. connectivity to schools.
5.2.3 Road network 5.3 Total building post-hazard

functionality analysis results
Immediate post-flood connectivity to gas stations, grocery
stores, and schools was evaluated herein. Figure 9 shows The total building functionality for each building was
the analysis results in terms of the accessibility of each calculated using the proposed total post-hazard func-
household within each building to reach hospitals, gas sta- tionality approach. This was done by including the
tions, and shopping centers with and without flood. For impact of the building integrity, utilities functionality,
comparison, travel times to these locations were also cal- and the accessibility to schools, hospitals, and essential
culated. Without floods, the travel time to the hospital services. Figure 10 shows the buildings with Lumberton
ranged from 0 to 17 min, with an average travel time of color-coded based on their total functionality ratio. This
approximately 9 min. Considering the loss of connectivity map shows that most of the flooded buildings have a
caused by floods, over 17% of the buildings lost connectiv- total functionality ratio in the range of 50%–75% or less
ity to the hospital. Furthermore, the travel times increased due to the large contribution of the loss of functionality
up to 80 min for some buildings, and the average travel from physical damage (color-coded in red and orange).
time increased to 20.5 min. Without flood-induced inun- On the other hand, many of the non-flooded buildings
NOFAL et al. 19
F I G U R E 9 The analysis results for the transportation network in terms of the accessibility time in seconds for each household to the
different facilities with and without flooding including: (a,b) Hospitals; (c,d) gas station; (e,f) shopping centers.
have total functionality ranging from 70% to 95%, and the because they are far away from the impacted locations and
major loss of functionality comes from losing utilities and supported by power from other non-impacted substations.
accessibility to essential services (color-coded in green). The total functionality for buildings in Figure 10a
The buildings color-coded in blue have a functionality reflects many functionality parameters related to the
ratio ranging from 95% to 100%, which can be explained contribution of the different subsystems within the
NOFAL et al.
F I G U R E 1 0 Color-coded buildings based on the total post-hazard functionality for buildings: (a) The total functionality of all buildings
within and around Lumberton and (b) a close-up view of a part of the city.
20
NOFAL et al. 21
community. The major observation from Figure 10a, sibility of the households occupying a specific building to
although most of the buildings color-coded with green a number of services such as healthcare and educational
were not directly exposed to flooding, is that they still services. One of the main contributions of this research is
have functionality level from 86% to 95%. This can be due the ability to quantitatively include non-physical aspects in
to a number of reasons mentioned in the methodology, the post-hazard functionality of buildings and integrate the
which include utilities availability and accessibility to community-level performance of the infrastructure such
essential services including gas stations, shopping centers, as power and water network in the functionality assess-
schools, and hospitals. Figure 10b shows a close-up view ment of buildings. The output from this study can be
of a part of the impacted locations west side of Lumber used to initiate a number of studies such as investigating
River with some highlights on the total functionality of the impact of the calculated post-hazard functionality on
some buildings. Figure 10b shows the variation in the total population dislocation, and socio-economic activity. The
functionality ratio across the buildings within the com- proposed approach can be further enhanced by including
munity. Such results can help policymakers make more other subsystems (e.g., fire and police stations, recre-
informed decisions based on the holistic performance of ational centers, etc.) and infrastructure functionality (e.g.,
the coupled built and social systems. telecommunication network, sewer network, gas network,
etc.). Finally, this approach can provide a robust means
for policymakers to make resilience-informed decisions for
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION communities impacted by flooding.
The proposed approach advances the state of the art in AC K N OW L E D G M E N T S

community resilience modeling by capturing the perfor- This research was conducted as part of the NIST Cen-
mance of the interdependent social and physical systems ter of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience
within the community and their impacts on the total post- Planning under Cooperative Agreement 70NANB20H008
hazard functionality of the buildings themselves. This was and 70NANB15H044 between the National Institute of
done by linking the physical functionality models of build- Standards and Technology (NIST) and Colorado State
ings and infrastructure with social science models for the University. The content expressed in this paper is the
population to calculate the post-hazard functionality of views of the authors and does not necessarily represent
each building. Although the approach was applied to a the opinions or views of NIST or the US Department of
specific hazard for a specific community, the approach is Commerce.
general and can be applied to any community of inter-
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DOI: 10.1111/mice.

Community-level post-hazard functionality methodology

Omar Nofal1 Nathanael Rosenheim2 Sabarethinam Kameshwar3

Comput Aided Civ Inf. 2024;1–24. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/mice 1

ability to quantify the total functionality of buildings based on a socio-physical

1 INTRODUCTION ties to be more or less vulnerable (Cutter, 1996). Research

∑ 𝑖 𝑖 The data used to model the community components and

TA B L E 4 The building archetypes description.

4.1 Buildings data

TA B L E 5 Summary of housing unit, population, and socio-economic characteristics of Lumberton, 2010.

to their respective substations (Mensah & Duenas-Osorio,

4.3.2 Water network

To build the hydraulic WDN model, data from different

5.2.3 Road network 5.3 Total building post-hazard

The proposed approach advances the state of the art in AC K N OW L E D G M E N T S

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