Concept of Justice

Justice means giving each person what he or she deserves or, in more traditional terms, giving
each person his or her due. Justice and fairness are closely related terms that are often today used
interchangeably. There have, however, also been more distinct understandings of the two terms.
While justice usually has been used with reference to a standard of rightness, fairness often has
been used with regard to an ability to judge without reference to one's feelings or interests;
fairness has also been used to refer to the ability to make judgments that are not overly general
but that are concrete and specific to a particular case. In any case, a notion of being treated as
one deserves is crucial to both justice and fairness.

When people differ over what they believe should be given, or when decisions have to be made
about how benefits and burdens should be distributed among a group of people, questions of
justice or fairness inevitably arise. In fact, most ethicists today hold the view that there would be
no point of talking about justice or fairness if it were not for the conflicts of interest that are
created when goods and services are scarce and people differ over who should get what. When
such conflicts arise in our society, we need principles of justice that we can all accept as
reasonable and fair standards for determining what people deserve.

But saying that justice is giving each person what he or she deserves does not take us very far.
How do we determine what people deserve? What criteria and what principles should we use to
determine what is due to this or that person?

Principles of Justice

The most fundamental principle of justice—one that has been widely accepted since it was first
defined by Aristotle more than two thousand years ago—is the principle that "equals should be
treated equally and unequal’s unequally." In its contemporary form, this principle is sometimes
expressed as follows: "Individuals should be treated the same, unless they differ in ways that are
relevant to the situation in which they are involved." For example, if Jack and Jill both do the
same work, and there are no relevant differences between them or the work they are doing, then
in justice they should be paid the same wages. And if Jack is paid more than Jill simply because
he is a man, or because he is white, then we have an injustice—a form of discrimination—
because race and sex are not relevant to normal work situations.

There are, however, many differences that we deem as justifiable criteria for treating people
differently. For example, we think it is fair and just when a parent gives his own children more
attention and care in his private affairs than he gives the children of others; we think it is fair
when the person who is first in a line at a theater is given first choice of theater tickets; we think
it is just when the government gives benefits to the needy that it does not provide to more
affluent citizens; we think it is just when some who have done wrong are given punishments that
are not meted out to others who have done nothing wrong; and we think it is fair when those who
exert more efforts or who make a greater contribution to a project receive more benefits from the
project than others. These criteria—need, desert, contribution, and effort—we acknowledge as
justifying differential treatment, then, are numerous.
On the other hand, there are also criteria that we believe are not justifiable grounds for giving
people different treatment. In the world of work, for example, we generally hold that it is unjust
to give individuals special treatment on the basis of age, sex, race, or their religious preferences.
If the judge's nephew receives a suspended sentence for armed robbery when another offender
unrelated to the judge goes to jail for the same crime, or the brother of the Director of Public
Works gets the million dollar contract to install sprinklers on the municipal golf course despite
lower bids from other contractors, we say that it's unfair. We also believe it isn't fair when a
person is punished for something over which he or she had no control, or isn't compensated for a
harm he or she suffered.

Different Kinds of Justice

There are four different types of justice: distributive (determining who gets what), procedural
(determining how fairly people are treated), retributive (based on punishment for wrong-doing)
and restorative (which tries to restore relationships to "rightness.")

There are different kinds of justice. Distributive justice refers to the extent to which society's
institutions ensure that benefits and burdens are distributed among society's members in ways
that are fair and just. When the institutions of a society distribute benefits or burdens in unjust
ways, there is a strong presumption that those institutions should be changed. For example, the
American institution of slavery in the pre-civil war South was condemned as unjust because it
was a glaring case of treating people differently on the basis of race.

A second important kind of justice is retributive or corrective justice. Retributive justice

refers to the extent to which punishments are fair and just. In general, punishments are held to be
just to the extent that they take into account relevant criteria such as the seriousness of the crime
and the intent of the criminal, and discount irrelevant criteria such as race. It would be
barbarously unjust, for example, to chop off a person's hand for stealing a dime, or to impose the
death penalty on a person who by accident and without negligence injured another party. Studies
have frequently shown that when blacks murder whites, they are much more likely to receive
death sentences than when whites murder whites or blacks murder blacks. These studies suggest
that injustice still exists in the criminal justice system in the United States.

Yet a third important kind of justice is compensatory justice. Compensatory justice refers to the
extent to which people are fairly compensated for their injuries by those who have injured them;
just compensation is proportional to the loss inflicted on a person. This is precisely the kind of
justice that is at stake in debates over damage to workers' health in coal mines. Some argue that
mine owners should compensate the workers whose health has been ruined. Others argue
that workers voluntarily took on this risk when they chose employment in the mines.

The foundations of justice can be traced to the notions of social stability, interdependence, and
equal dignity. As the ethicist John Rawls has pointed out, the stability of a society—or any
group, for that matter—depends upon the extent to which the members of that society feel that
they are being treated justly. When some of society's members come to feel that they are subject
to unequal treatment, the foundations have been laid for social unrest, disturbances, and strife.
The members of a community, Rawls holds, depend on each other, and they will retain their
social unity only to the extent that their institutions are just. Moreover, as the philosopher
Immanuel Kant and others have pointed out, human beings are all equal in this respect: they all
have the same dignity, and in virtue of this dignity they deserve to be treated as equals.
Whenever individuals are treated unequally on the basis of characteristics that are arbitrary and
irrelevant, their fundamental human dignity is violated.

Justice, then, is a central part of ethics and should be given due consideration in our moral lives.
In evaluating any moral decision, we must ask whether our actions treat all persons equally. If
not, we must determine whether the difference in treatment is justified: are the criteria we are
using relevant to the situation at hand? But justice is not the only principle to consider in making
ethical decisions. Sometimes principles of justice may need to be overridden in favor of other
kinds of moral claims such as rights or society's welfare. Nevertheless, justice is an expression of
our mutual recognition of each other's basic dignity, and an acknowledgement that if we are to
live together in an interdependent community we must treat each other as equals.
What is “Global Justice”?

The discussion of global justice engenders a number of questions, with each academic camp
providing different solutions. In this section, I will outline the definitions utilised in referring to
key terminology.

Firstly, what is global justice? Global justice is a component in normative IR theory focusing on
the moral obligation of the world’s rich to the world’s poor (Shapcott 2014). The key tenant is
redistribution of wealth to reduce global poverty. The term ‘global justice’ will be used
interchangeably with ‘distributive justice’.

Secondly, what is meant specifically by justice, is it the same as equality? This essay will use a
definition of justice predicated on Adam Smith’s original position and John Rawls’ veil of
ignorance. These measures focus around how best to theorise a just society without inherent
bias. These approaches work by questioning whether an individual, with no knowledge of their
position within a society in terms of wealth, merit, or genetics, would consider it just.

Theories of Justice

There are three primary approaches to global justice: cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, and
neorealism. Each of these views emphasise a different component in IR theory and posit
different solutions to the issue of inequality. While cosmopolitanism views individuals as
members of a global society, communitarianism and neorealism adopt a state-centric view of
justice.

Cosmopolitanism, as an approach, focuses on the responsibility of individuals to act as global

citizens. The compulsion towards cosmopolitanism is grounded in two criteria – a commitment
to a universal community, and detachment from local or national affiliations (Slaughter 2008).
There are multiple distinctions within cosmopolitanism. I will adopt the nomenclature put
forward by Steven Slaughter to easily distinguish. Cosmopolitanism is broken into three sub-
theories, each mandating different levels of systemic alteration: moral, institutional, and political.

Moral cosmopolitanism argues for very little change. Rather, it suggests principles of human
concern can be used as metrics by which existing arrangements and institutions may be measured
(Beitz 1999). Thereunder, it is a consequentialist framework to ensure each political relationship
maintains a positive influence on human rights. For example, the current model of the United
Nations (UN) forms an ersatz moral cosmopolitan institution. In this capacity, it affirms and
denounces states for their impact on human rights and justice. However, the UN is subject to the
same theoretical flaws as moral cosmopolitanism itself. For a political body to be in a position to
exercise this critique of nations in a democratic international system, it must have the consent of
every nation of its constituency. The UN achieves this consent through a commitment to
‘sovereignty’ and ‘territorial integrity’ of member states (United Nations Charter Section 2(4)
1945). However, this means that the UN is near-void of ‘hard power’, and is dependent on
member states (Nye 2012). Rather, the UN’s ability to be an impetus of reform is largely via
‘soft power’. Nye delineates the difference, saying “hard power works through payments and
coercion (carrots and sticks); soft power works through attraction and co-option” (Nye 2012).
Yet, hard power is subject to scorn from realist governments. Joseph Stalin once asked
derisively, “How many troops does the Pope have?” Nye acknowledges this weakness, saying
the UN has ‘very little power when the great powers oppose an action’ (Nye 2012). Therefore,
for moral cosmopolitanism to be a proper method through which to achieve global justice,
significant restructuring is required of existing global structures such as the UN to give greater
autonomy.

Institutional cosmopolitanism seeks to create institutions that champions the primacy of human
rights compared to other state affairs (Slaughter 2008). This theory is taken up by Thomas Pogge
in his seminal book, World Poverty and Human Rights. A central approach is the development of
state-transcendent bodies to oversee the state’s commitment to human rights. Institutional
cosmopolitanism, by its very design, evokes violations of a state’s right to self-determination.
This, while increasing the likelihood of tangible change, invites considerable critique from realist
scholars for compromising state autonomy. Therefore, where moral cosmopolitanism
theoretically fails but could practically succeeds in the objective of instituting change,
institutional cosmopolitanism practically fails, but theoretically succeeds. The foundational
impasse of cosmopolitan theories of global justice is creating some form of body to ensure
human rights are upheld, yet by the same token requiring that body be powerless enough to gain
state consent.

The final cosmopolitan approach, mandating the most systematic reform, is political
cosmopolitanism. This theory argues for the creation of universal political institutions which
include all people to ensure global justice is upheld (Slaughter 2008). This is the theory taken on
by the likes of Daniele Archibugi, Richard Falk, Anthony McGrew, and David Held. The model
put forward by Held is tripartite, mirroring the governmental system present throughout much of
the Western world, but at an international level. Firstly, the establishment of regional ‘councils’
that make decisions over a certain geopolitical area. While some examples of this exist, such as
the European Parliament, Held argues for an ‘enhancement of the role of such bodies’ (Held
1995:108). Secondly, change in the General Assembly and Security Council to ‘give the Third
World a significant voice’ (p. 111). Thirdly, the creation of a transcendent UN chamber to
exercise further scrutiny on the actions of member states (p. 111).

Whilst comprehensive, this theory fails on both counts of practicality and theoretical
cohesiveness. The inherent logic of this approach is to establish a global watchdog to ensure
global justice is met. By this method, corrupted and malignant states will no longer be in a
position to entrench abuse of its people. There is no reason, however, to think this new
government would be any less prone to corruption or denigration of virtue. Additionally, this
approach engenders a furthering of a neo-imperialist agenda and traditional Western liberal
democratic hegemony, undermining the very concept of global. Theoretically, there is no
comprehensive detailing of how one may assimilate the entirety of the world’s population into a
sole democratic body. If a single state (or cultural or racial group in the advent of a
deconstruction of states) were to abstain, this body would fail in its central aims. This body
would then be forced to acknowledge the disjunction in aims and reality (not true global justice),
or pressure – through hard power – remaining groups to acquiesce to the new governmental
system.
Communitarianism opts for a different tact to that of cosmopolitanism, and instead emphasises
one’s role within their political community. The power of this theory is its ability to preempt
opposition from states on the infringement of sovereignty for the cause of justice. It suggests that
global justice within the microcosm of every state should be the “ought” (Hoffman 1991) we
grope towards. In doing so, it appeases the UN requirement of sovereignty and territorial
integrity (United Nations Charter Section 2(4), 1945), while maintaining a commitment to
marginalised communities. Unfortunately, communitarianism fails in the former component of
the titular issue – globalness. This methodology has no organ through which to ensure justice in
countries with serious inequality. To mandate countries work towards resolving inequality and
injustice would infringe on the very sovereignty this approach intends to uphold. Therefore a
practical implementation of this theory would see minimal change. Highly ranked inequality-
adjusted human development index (IHDI) countries such as Norway (HDR 2014) have little
incentive or requirement to further equality. Low IHDI countries such as the Democratic
People’s Republic of Congo (HDR 2014) lack the financial resource to resolve massive
systematic inequality. There is a crucial need for the impetus of well-positioned wealthy
countries to assist in the establishment of sustainable and equitable sociopolitical and economic
paradigms in poorer nations. Peter Sutch (2001) argues that the nature of communitarianism
necessarily instigates moral relativism. In doing so, it would only uphold the status quo.
Furthermore, such a solution ignores any causal connection between disenfranchised (frequently
post-colonial) states and the incredible benefit acquired by Western outsourcing. In the words of
Pogge:

The idea that our economic policies and global economic institutions we impose make us
causally and morally responsible for the perpetuation – even aggravation – of world hunger … is
an idea rarely taken seriously … in the developed world (2001:15).

This highlights the need for accountability for the detrimental economic influence the West
imports to poverty-stricken nations.

Neorealism has a strained relationship with the concept of global justice. With a foundational
emphasis on state sovereignty, the primacy of the state, and security above all, it leaves little
motivation for magnanimity. While certain explanations of global justice present a causal
connection between aid and security, this constitutes a morally unsatisfying explanation for
charity. One intrinsically feels that philanthropy should not be premised on the notion of selfish
gain or the eventual reciprocity of the assisted party. However this question has been explored by
many other thinkers (see Peter Singer). Some realist authors such as Robert Gilpin argue that
systemic economic inequalities are unavoidable in IR (McGrew 2004). Furthermore, the
impotence of global institutions means an inability to ensure rich states will pursue altruistic
policies in terms of distributive justice (Krasner 1985). Therefore neorealist theorists may err
towards a perspective similar to that of communitarianism, looking to governments to ameliorate
poverty within their respective states. However, realists adopt a further critique of this
perspective for its redistribution of wealth without commitment to economic prosperity.