Section XVIII: The Western World in the Twentieth Contemporary Civilization (Ideas and Institutions

Century: The Historical Setting of Western Man)

1958

1. International Anarchy (1900-1918)

Robert L. Bloom
Gettysburg College

Basil L. Crapster
Gettysburg College

Harold L. Dunkelberger
Gettysburg College

See next page for additional authors

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Bloom, Robert L. et al. "1. International Anarchy (1900-1918). Pt. XVIII: The Western World in the Twentieth Century: The
Historical Setting." Ideas and Institutions of Western Man (Gettysburg College, 1958), 1-4.

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1. International Anarchy (1900-1918)
Abstract
It is probable that most people, if asked to list the characteristics of the Western World in this century, would
place at or near the top of their list something about international rivalries. Curiously enough, a similar poll
conducted in Europe and North America in 1900 would likely have given equal prominence to the idea that
the world had entered a period of increasing international amity. [excerpt]

Keywords
Contemporary Civilization, Anarchy, Communication, Western Powers, International Economy, International
Capitalism, International Socialism, International Red Cross, Universal Postal Union, International Amity

Disciplines
European History | History | International Relations | Political History | Political Science | United States
History

Comments
This is a part of Section XVIII: The Western World in the Twentieth Century: The Historical Setting. The
Contemporary Civilization page lists all additional sections of Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, as well as
the Table of Contents for both volumes.

More About Contemporary Civilization:

From 1947 through 1969, all first-year Gettysburg College students took a two-semester course called
Contemporary Civilization. The course was developed at President Henry W.A. Hanson’s request with the
goal of “introducing the student to the backgrounds of contemporary social problems through the major
concepts, ideals, hopes and motivations of western culture since the Middle Ages.”

Gettysburg College professors from the history, philosophy, and religion departments developed a textbook
for the course. The first edition, published in 1955, was called An Introduction to Contemporary Civilization and
Its Problems. A second edition, retitled Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, was published in 1958 and 1960.
It is this second edition that we include here. The copy we digitized is from the Gary T. Hawbaker ’66
Collection and the marginalia are his.

Authors
Robert L. Bloom, Basil L. Crapster, Harold L. Dunkelberger, Charles H. Glatfelter, Richard T. Mara, Norman
E. Richardson, and W. Richard Schubart

This book chapter is available at The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/
contemporary_sec18/1
 XVIII p. 1

XVIII. THE WESTERN WORLD IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

lo International Anarchy (1900-1918)

It is probable that most people, if asked to list the

characteristics of the Western World in this century, would place
at or near the top of their list something.about international
rivalries. Curiously enough, a similar poll conducted in Europe
and North America in 1900 would likely have given equal prominence
to the idea that the world had entered a period of increasing
international amity,
This idea was certainly plausible. No major war had involved
two or more of the great powers since 1871. There had been no
general war since Napoleon's defeat in 1815,, The partition of
Asia and Africa had been largely completed, without provoking war.
Improved communications were bringing people closer together, and
it was widely held that the more the peoples of the world knew of
each other, the more they would like each other. Improved com-
munications also Hasteheff^^t growth of an international ernnnmy,
in which the various parts were mutually dependent. International
capitalisffi-5 an<i it&-op»onent.^__international socialism, were accys-
tomed to transcending national The convening of dis­
armament conferences seemed to suggest that statesmen realized that
improved weapons made war so disastrously destructive that there
were no longer victors and vanquished, only fellow sufferers. The
foundation of orjiajilzationa-JLlke-the ,ln,texjiata.onal-Red Cross.(1863)
showed that hximanitarians too knew no national boundaries. Already
governments were learning to cooperate with each other in bodies
like the Universal Postal Union (1875), Nevertheless, despite
these and other impressive indications of international amity, the
fact remains that in 1914 the planet was plunged into what we call
World War I,
How did such a catastrophe happen? The first factor to
note is the independent state system within which international
affairs operated, Th^ wm-i H was di vl_di5d-.-ijitQ snvpreign states,
each a law unto itself, ^d none owinp; anep;iance to ,any such
larger concept as Europe. Christendom. or mankind. HerewaS"
the b^asic element of international anarchy, Many of these po­
litical units were nation-states, while those nations not inde­
pendent ardently desired that status. Owing to the way in which
nations were intermingled, rare thf European state
which did not have some of its fellow nationalsli vin^ out^de
its frontiers or. within its Tro^ntlira. "some foreign nationality
 XVIII p. 2
clamoringfor national self-determination. The problem was
particularly acute for the multiha^Eional guasiaa, Austro-
Hungarian, andTurkish empires and for the small states of the
Balkan peninsula. ~~5yTr9Ti, inany nations were fatalistically
convinced that they could achieve the fruition of their desires
only at the expense of others.
National rivalries were intensified by colonial and eco­
nomic rivalries. In the scramble for colonies, some powers
were latecomers or weak contestants, and even the most success­
ful failed to achieve all that they wanted. The resultant
legacy of humiliation and frustration was hardly calculated to
smooth international relations. Although the livelihood of
many now depended directly on the free international movement
of goods, capital, and labor, all sta^tea. contained groups whose
prosperity was injured or threatened by foreign competition,
l^ven though minorlTies, sucE~gToups were "oTten abTe to exert
pressure quite disproportionate to their size. The high tariff
walls which were a tribute to their power further increased
friction.
To cope with the economic and other aspects of interna­
tional relations was no mean task for public op±jxxon. nnuri shed
by inadequate education and a press wM was often sensational.
Yet with the spread of democratic institxTn^olis'^bric opinion
was able, and indeed required, to influence governmental deci­
sions. Unfortunately, all too often the public was swayed by
selfish, ambitious, or ill-informed leaders. The man in the
street, faced*with successive diplomatic crises which he under­
stood only poorly, was apt to greet war with positive relief.
The long years of peace had erased the memory of what war was
really like. On the battlefield, at any rate, theissug^
seemed clear and one could distinguish between friend-and—foe.
F^ar psychosis in the public mind was inpart the product of
the armamenTs~race. A"s~more "a^ "terrible armaments were
produceirijynp^o^^ in search of security, a premium was placed
on declaring war at a favorable time. Whoever got in the first
blow had an immense advantage. Consequently, purely mii-ita-ry
CQnsA^era:4^i nms assiumpd an i rnip; in diplomacy, revers­
ing the dictum that "war is merely diplomacy carried on by
other means." In the crisis which prerip-j tated war in 1914.
military authorities must bear some of the blame for frustrat­
ing attempts, at pacifIcatlQn^-
The immediate cause of this crisis was the assassination
of the heir~" to tne Austrian throne bv a Serb nationalist whn
wanted to'liberafeIf^XloM:.-SfixbS - living under Au§Jsxiaa--j^^.
Austrian military leaders, always fearful that nationalism
would destroy their multinational state, pressed for a pre­
ventive war against Serbia. Germany announced that she would
stand by Austria, her only dependable ally. Russia, afraid
that if Serbia was destroyed her own influence in the Balkans
would disappear, came to the aid of Serbia. France stuck to
her ally, Russia. Thus, tlie alliance system, which had divided
the European great•powers—into two armed camps, helped spread a
local conflict across tbe continent.
 XVIII p. 3
Germany's military leaders endeavored to knock out their
enemies by methods which created more enemies. In so doing
they were taking a calculated risk, hoping to win the war be­
fore the potential of the new enemies could be effectively
mobilized0 They aimed a massive offensive against France
through neutral Belgium, thereby bringing Britain into the
conflicts The knock-out failed and the contestants settled
down to prolonged and bloody trench warfare in northern France.
Germany tried next to starve out Britain with a submarine
blockade. Her sinking of neutral shipping was the occasion for
the United States' declaration of war in 1917, The techniques
of modern warfare made the role of a neutral a difficult one
indeed. Some powers, for example Italy and Japan, deserted
this role when offered booty by Britain and France. Eventu­
ally a total of twenty-four states were arrayed as the Allies
against the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Turkey)„
Tjiat the war lasted as long as it did is a tribnto -Hig
ability Qf_ the modern stale_Jlq.roobillze its resQurces_i„jjaiaxlal,
human, aad^ldejalQglcal.. However, by 1918, despite intensive
'"regulation of what in modern total war is called the home front,
the European belligerents on both sides were approaching ex­
haustion. The first power-JLo crack under internal and external
pressures wg,s Russia. In 1917 the tsarist government was over­
thrown by a liberal and radical coalition, which was in turn
supplanted by the Bolsheviks who accepted humiliating peace
terms from the Central Powers. Nevertheless, the Allies proved
to have superior resources and in the autumn of 1918 the Central
Powers collapsed.
For the next two years representatives of the victors were
busily engaged in imposing on the vanquished a series of
treaties^ known collectively as the Paris Peace Settlement
(1919-20). President Woo«1row~¥41rson5--w4io~4ar~^a~ tliofi^^ headed the
American delegation.to the conferences, hoped to establish a
lastlng_jp£a££_based on national self-determinatlon and inter­
national cooperation. Thanks to widespread disgust with prewar
diplomacy J whl^~was popularly blamed for the recent holocaust,
he was able to carry his point on a number of issues. The Turk­
ish and Austro-Hungarian empires were broken up, and their ter­
ritories divided among a number of nation-states (for example,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia)^ some newly created.
Never before had the political map of Europe been drawn more
nearly in accord with national groupings. A League of Nations
was estAb_llshed to provide a forum..where ifiTerTiaTtTonll^
coulC bie..-^-e.ttljgd, amicably it was hoped. However, old and new
fears, ambitions, and hatreds were not to be denied and on many
issues the treaties were much harsher than Wilson had envisaged.
The vanquished ..^vere r^eguired J;o jfOX-.causing
the war j, ,shoulder a heavy burden of debts to the All^e^, dl^§arm
uniiaterally, and sifrCTder all overseas colonies and eveiL.£uro-
pean territpJOL^-Oataijalng . In short,"they were
treated as second-class citizens. Thus, the settlement after
one war helped foment the next.
 XVIII p.
In spite of all this, the vjears- from 19?,1 to 1929 brought
spme^ rela^^utxon of-dAtejpnartioHftl--tensrirott»-,—thanks 1argelyZtpl^
rel^tTve"]^osperlty, the pressure of pwxeiy~ domesti.c_,issu
an^ fear of another waF7~"'Treague membership was granted the de­
feated powers. Their financial obligations were lightened some
what. Preliminary steps were taken toward general disarmament.
Probably the best symbol of the new spirit — and of its pre­
carious nature — was the Kellogg-Briand Pact,(1928) "iii^ which
uIJtJijiately sixty-two states^T^hounced aeSr^sive war as an in­
strument of natTonal policy. Peace was to be achieved in. a
new Holy Alliance at the-SicXQke_-xxL a,.pen^