Lecture 7 - Human Factors

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Securing g Digital

g Democracyy
Lecture 7 | Human Factors

J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan
7.1 Usability Securing Digital Democracy

Usability
7.1 Usability Securing Digital Democracy

I t it
Integrity
The outcome matches voter intent.
intent

Votes are cast as intended.


intended
Votes are counted as cast.
7.1 Usability Securing Digital Democracy

Votomatic
Butterfly
Ballot

Florida, 2000
7.1 Usability Securing Digital Democracy
7.1 Usability Securing Digital Democracy

iVotronic
DRE
Ballot

Sarasota, FL
2006
7.1 Usability Securing Digital Democracy

14%
undervote rate!

~1%
undervote rate
7.1 Usability Securing Digital Democracy

Banner Blindness

Slow Responses

Miscalibrated Displays

21 Page
P P
Process!
!
7.1 Usability Securing Digital Democracy

Usability test results:


DRE
Review 95% say they checked
review screen
Screens
63% failed to
detect changes!

6% “fleeing voters”
7.2 Usable Paper Ballots Securing Digital Democracy

Usable Paper Ballots


7.2 Usable Paper Ballots Securing Digital Democracy

Voters
Don’t Read
Instructions

10% missed
this question!
7.2 Usable Paper Ballots Securing Digital Democracy

Complex
Ballot
Layouts

12% didn’t cast


valid vote for
Source: Brennan Center analysis
Governor!
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/ballot_library_kewaunee_county
7.2 Usable Paper Ballots Securing Digital Democracy

IInconsistent
i t t
Design

17% missed
Senate race
Source: Brennan Center analysis
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/ballot_library_kewaunee_county
7.2 Usable Paper Ballots Securing Digital Democracy
7.2 Usable Paper Ballots Securing Digital Democracy

Faulty Mental Models


7.2 Usable Paper Ballots Securing Digital Democracy

Design
Best Large text
Avoid ALL CAPS
Practices

Columns and
Simple instructions,
instructions
layout
plain language
reinforce
organization
Meaningful use of Instructions where
color and contrast voters need them

http://www.aiga.org/archivedmedia/ballot‐design‐samples/DFD_OpticalScan_SampleBallot_Proposed.pdf
Based on Design for Democracy and EAC guidelines, adapted by Drew Davies and Joe Sparano, Oxide Design Co.
7.3 Accessibility Securing Digital Democracy

Accessibility
7.3 Accessibility Securing Digital Democracy

Voters with Disabilities

In the U.S. … 1.8 million unable to see


2.77 million use a wheelchair
9.1 million need a cane, crutches, etc.
1 million unable to hear

People 15 and older, based on US. Census Bureau data


7.3 Accessibility Securing Digital Democracy

Opportunities
O ii
Voter Assistance
for Fraud

A accessible
An ibl secrett ballot
b ll t
for everyone?
7.3 Accessibility Securing Digital Democracy

DREs
to the
t e
Rescue?

VVPATs?
7.3 Accessibility Securing Digital Democracy

Physical Access Problems

Source: California Top‐to‐Bottom Review


http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting‐systems/oversight/ttbr/accessibility‐review‐report‐california‐ttb‐absolute‐final‐version16.pdf
7.3 Accessibility Securing Digital Democracy

Difficult Controls

Source: California Top‐to‐Bottom Review


http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting‐systems/oversight/ttbr/accessibility‐review‐report‐california‐ttb‐absolute‐final‐version16.pdf
7.3 Accessibility Securing Digital Democracy

P bl
Problematic
ti AAudio
di BBallots
ll t

Source: California Top‐to‐Bottom Review


http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting‐systems/oversight/ttbr/accessibility‐review‐report‐california‐ttb‐absolute‐final‐version16.pdf
7.3 Accessibility Securing Digital Democracy

Making
Paper Ballots
Accessible

http://www.memco.net/ballot.htm
7.3 Accessibility Securing Digital Democracy

Making
Paper Ballots
Accessible

Image from ES&S Brochure, http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/automark.html


7.3 Accessibility Securing Digital Democracy

Source: New York Board of Elections


http://www.vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/documents/boe/bmd/english/AccessibleVotingEnglish.pdf
7.3 Accessibility Securing Digital Democracy

Source: New York Board of Elections


http://www.vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/documents/boe/bmd/english/AccessibleVotingEnglish.pdf
7.4 Absentee Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Absentee Voting
7.4 Absentee Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Absentee Voting

No
Excuse

Early
y Voting
g Proxy
y Voting
g Remote Voting
g
7.4 Absentee Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Effect on
Turnout?

Postal Voting
g
Photo by Chris Phan (Clipdude) licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution‐Share Alike 3.0 Unported license
Via Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Oregon_ballot_return_box.jpg
7.4 Absentee Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Ballot


Privacy Envelope

Mailing Envelope
7.4 Absentee Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Ballot Misdirection

Blank
l k Ballot
ll Theft
h f

Voted Ballot Theft

Vote Buying

Coercion
7.4 Absentee Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Overseas Voters?

Fax? E mail?
E‐mail?

Print blank ballot & mail back


Securing g Digital
g Democracyy
Lecture 7 | Human Factors

J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan

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