G.R. No.

144237 October 26, 2001

ATTY. WINSTON C. RACOMA, petitioner,

BELLOSILLO, J.:

A kindred fellow seeks our intervention to collect what he claims is justly due him.

Respondent Camarines Norte Water District (CNWD) engaged the legal services of Atty. Winston C.
Racoma to prevent the takeover of its operation, facilities and properties by its creditor the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). This problem was precipitated by allegations of default and
unfair unilateral increase in interest rate on the part of CNWD in the payment of its loans from
LWUA. As LWUA eventually took over the CNWD and installed an Interim Board of Directors and
General Manager on 4 October 1991, Atty. Racoma filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against LWUA, docketed as Civil Case No.
6030.1 The following day petitioner obtained for CNWD a temporary restraining order preventing
LWUA from further managing and operating his client's services.2

On 17 October 1991 the Board of Directors of CNWD passed three (3) resolutions revising the
original contract of legal services of petitioner Racoma.3 In this regard, CNWD paid him P20,000.00
on 17 October 1991 and P15,000.00 on 23 October 1991.

After the expiration of the temporary restraining order, LWUA (purportedly in behalf of CNWD)
moved to discharge Atty. Racoma as CNWD's counsel. This was followed by LWUA's motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 6030. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order requiring petitioner to file a
compliance manifestation to both motions and denied the application for preliminary injunction.4 As
instructed, petitioner filed the compliance manifestation.5 On 17 January 1992 the trial court issued
a Resolution-Order granting the motion for the discharge of petitioner as counsel for CNWD and
ordered the payment of his legal fees "in accordance with the 'quantum meruit' rule in relation [to] his
up-to-date professional services rendered under the contract of legal services dated September 1,
1991, particularly paragraph IV, as his last pleading submitted."6

Petitioner appealed the Resolution-Order to the Court of Appeals which however dismissed the
appeal on 8 January 1993 due to his failure to file the corresponding brief.7 On 3 February 1993 the
dismissal became final and executory, and entry of judgment was made on 19 April 1993.8 On 30
March 1998 petitioner moved for execution of the Resolution-Order,9 which the trial court granted on
4 June 1998.10 However, on 9 June 1998 the trial court amended its order instructing payment to
petitioner of P250,000.00 as his legal fees.11 On 19 June 1998 CNWD moved for reconsideration of
the amended order.12 But the trial court denied the motion, explaining that the amount of
P250,000.00 was the result of the reference of the Resolution-Order to the "contract of legal services
dated September 1, 1991, particularly paragraph IV, as his last pleading submitted," which was
inclusive of the P100,000.00 filing charge for the memorandum that petitioner had filed.13 On 6 July
1998 however the trial court held in abeyance the issuance of a writ of execution due to the
pendency of a petition for certiorari with application for injunction and/or restraining order before the
Court of Appeals.14

On 8 September 1998 CNWD filed a petition with the Court of Appeals to review the Order of
Execution and the alleged Writ of Execution issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 6030. On 5
April 2000 the appellate court nullified these processes on the ground that the dispositive portion of
the Resolution-Order that was to be executed did not indicate the exact amount of legal fees payable
to petitioner.15 On 21 June 2000 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this
petition seeking to overturn these resolutions.

Petitioner argues that the Resolution-Order is not fatally vague. He says that this order in fact
resolved in his favor his entitlement to legal fees and the amount thereof on the basis of the
provisions of the contract for legal services of 1 September 1991, particularly paragraph IV of the
last pleading filed. In arriving at the precise amount of legal fees due him, petitioner invokes the
power of the court to amend and control its processes as well as the general supervisory control of
the tribunal which rendered the decision over the process of execution. He avers in addition that no
writ of execution was ever issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 6030.

We rule for petitioner. As a matter of record, the trial court did not issue any writ of execution that the
Court of Appeals thought the court a quo had. This is clear from the Order of the trial court of 6 July
1998 holding in abeyance the execution of the Resolution-Order. It is also a matter of record that the
dispositive portion of the Resolution-Order unequivocally set the parameters for the determination of
the precise amount of petitioner's legal fees. For purposes of a strait-jacketed enforcement of a writ
of execution, this specification of parameters is enough.

As early as Locsin v. Paredes16 we ruled that the trial judge may clarify omissions and set forth
specificities that can be ascertained from the allegation of the complaint, the prayer thereof, the
evidence and the conclusions of fact and law.17 With more reason should this rule apply in the instant
case considering that the dispositive portion of the Resolution-Order itself carries the standard by
which to determine petitioner's legal fees, and the failure to specify the amount so collectible is a
mere omission that the court may correct even at finality of judgment by supplemental or amended
order.18

Seavan Carrier, Inc. v. GTI Sportswear Corp.19 is instructive. This case similarly involves a judgment
that failed to state the actual amount to be satisfied. We then ruled: "Hence, the trial court, pursuant
to its supervisory control over the execution of the judgment, should have ordered a hearing on the
motion to determine the actual amount to be recovered by the private respondent, for the full
satisfaction of the judgment."20 So must we rule now. Verily, there is no reason to abandon this ruling
and in the process unjustly deprive petitioner of the fruits of his efforts as it were and the wherewithal
to maintain an honorable profession. To stress all that the trial court has to do in the present case is
to compute the amount owing him following the guidelines set in the Resolution-Order itself.

But we have to correct the elementary computation of legal fees done by the trial court. In the 19
June 1998 Order, the court a quo assessed P250,000.00 in petitioner's favor. Said the trial court: "x
x x the Resolution-Order have (sic) even noted the last pleading submitted which is paragraph IV of
the contract which is for P100,000.00 for filing and submission of memorandum and it would follow
that the previous actual services rendered were for a successful application for a preliminary
injunction order for P80,000.00, paragraph III, filing of the case in court for P40,000.00, paragraph II,
and signing of the agreement for P30,000.00, paragraph I, or a total of P250,000.00 is what
the Resolution-Order want to be the payment in quantum meruit."21

While in truth the last pleading filed by petitioner in connection with Civil Case No. 6030 was the
compliance manifestation as narrated above,22 we will nonetheless assume that the trial court
consulted all relevant circumstances and acted in compliance with law23 when it ruled that the
memorandum was indeed the last pleading filed by him. It must be stressed that under Sec. 24, Rule
138, of the Rules of Court the trial court has wide discretion to ordain the payment of reasonable
legal fees of a lawyer.
But the award of P80,000.00 in connection with his application for preliminary injunction must be
reduced by fifty percent (50%) or P40,000.00 it appearing that hearings were conducted on the
application although no preliminary injunction was issued in the end.24 Moreover, he had been
previously paid P20,000.00 and P15,000.00. The total legal fees pegged at P250,000.00 must
accordingly be whittled down. Recomputing what is due him: P30,000.00 upon signing of the
contract, plus P40,000.00 upon filing of the case in court, plus P100,000.00 upon filing of the
memoranda plus P40,000.00 for the application for preliminary injunction less P35,000.00 previously
paid, results in a collectible amount of P175,000.00 only. The kind spirit in petitioner should see this
amount as reasonable compensation for his legal services in behalf of CNWD.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED although the professional legal fee of petitioner Atty.
Winston C. Racoma is reduced to One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P175,000.00). The
9 June 1998 Amended Order of Execution of the 17 January 1992 Resolution-Order is accordingly
MODIFIED.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.