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Chapter 07: Public Opinion at Home and Abroad
MULTIPLE CHOICE
1. Foreign policy elites are most likely to favor which of the following?
a. Isolationism
b. Multilateral cooperation
c. The delegate model
d. Unilateral action
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Comprehension
2. Studies have shown that which of the following statements is true regarding the “gender gap” in
U.S. foreign policy attitudes?
a. Men favor free-trade and open-market issues more than women do.
b. Men favor military intervention more than women do.
c. Women favor international institutions more than men do.
d. Women favor military intervention more than men do.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Physical Identities: Gender, Race, and Generation OBJ: 7.3
COG: Comprehension
4. In the late 1990s in the midst of the U.S. economic boom, which of the following was the most
common response to the public opinion survey question concerning the biggest foreign policy
problem facing the United States?
a. Don’t know
b. Terrorism
c. The situation in the Middle East
d. Trade restrictions from other countries
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Public Ambivalence in the Clinton Era OBJ: 7.2
COG: Knowledge
5. Under the Bush administration, public opinion surveys revealed a divine divide in public
opinion, as evidenced by which of the following statements?
a. The belief by frequent Christian churchgoers that Muslims are a generally peaceful
people
b. The belief by Jewish and Muslim Americans that the administration should be more
receptive to open immigration policies
c. The belief by Christians that the United States was “doing the right thing” in foreign
policy
d. The belief by Muslim Americans that the administration should support a two-state
solution in Israel
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Social Identities: Education, Wealth, and Religion OBJ: 7.3
COG: Application | Analysis
6. According to public opinion polls, which of the following does the general or mass public
support the least?
a. Foreign aid
b. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
c. The Kyoto Protocol
d. The United Nations
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.2 COG: Knowledge
8. Which of the following actions by Congress is likely to receive the least public support?
a. Rejecting the Kyoto Protocol on climate change
b. Participating in UN efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
c. Refusing to endorse the International Criminal Court
d. Launching a unilateral U.S. military attack on Iran’s nuclear weapons program
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.2 COG: Application | Analysis
9. Which of these groups is the least informed and interested in global politics and U.S. foreign
policy?
a. Independents
b. The attentive public
c. The foreign policy elite
d. The mass public
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Figure 7.1
OBJ: 7.1 COG: Knowledge
10. President George W. Bush’s policy regarding Iraq best fits which of the following models?
a. Delegate model
b. Latent model
c. Public relations model
d. Trustee model
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Rival Views of Political Leadership OBJ: 7.2
COG: Application | Analysis
11. In 2014, approximately what percentage of Americans supported active U.S. participation in
world affairs?
a. About 50 percent
b. About 60 percent
c. About 40 percent
d. About 30 percent
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Public Opinion since World War II OBJ: 7.2
COG: Knowledge
12. How much of the federal budget does the general public believe is spent on foreign aid?
a. 15 to 20 percent
b. 45 to 50 percent
c. 5 to 10 percent
d. About 1 percent
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: America’s Knowledge Gap
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Knowledge
13. Which of the following is not one of the three assumptions of the Almond–Lippmann consensus
discussed in your text with regard to U.S. foreign policy?
a. Critical
b. Volatile
c. Incoherent
d. Irrelevant
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Comprehension
14. Which of the following refers to the president’s ability to manipulate and gauge public opinion?
a. A president who “goes public”
b. An institutional president
c. A public relations presidency
d. An imperial president
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Chapter Introduction
OBJ: 7.1 COG: Comprehension
15. Which of the following best explains how foreign policy makers view international public
opinion?
a. Foreign policy makers are concerned with international public opinion because
many of these global citizens have interests in U.S. economic markets.
b. Foreign policy makers are unconcerned with international public opinion because
they are only responsible to the American electorate.
c. Foreign policy makers are unconcerned with international public opinion because
the Almond–Lippmann consensus identifies how there will always be a level of
anti-American sentiment as long as the United States remains a hegemonic power.
d. Foreign policy makers are concerned with international public opinion because
unfavorable perceptions of the United States can lead to pushback against its
policies.
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Chapter Introduction
OBJ: 7.1 COG: Comprehension
16. Which of the following terms describes the group of citizens that is smallest with regard to
opinions but that has the largest impact on foreign policy?
a. Attentive public
b. Disengaged public
c. Foreign policy elite
d. Mass public
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Democracy and the Paradox of World Power OBJ: 7.1
COG: Comprehension
17. Which of the following best describes the delegate model of political representation?
a. Elected officials use their best judgment and expertise to make policy decisions.
b. Elected officials make decisions based on what the majority of the public desires.
c. Elected officials do not involve the public in decision-making at all.
d. Elected officials defer to bureaucrats for their expertise in decision-making.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Rival Views of Political Leadership OBJ: 7.1
COG: Comprehension
18. Which of the following best describes the trustee model of political representation?
a. Elected officials involve and pass authority on to bureaucrats for policy
implementation.
b. Elected officials do not involve the public in decision-making at all.
c. Elected officials make decisions based on what the majority of the public desires.
d. Elected officials use their best judgment and expertise to make policy decisions.
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Rival Views of Political Leadership OBJ: 7.1
COG: Comprehension
19. The Almond–Lippmann consensus holds that public opinion on foreign policy is ______.
a. pragmatic, prudent, and sometimes relevant to the policy-making process
b. volatile, incoherent, and irrelevant to the policy-making process
c. stable, pragmatic, and sometimes relevant to the policy-making process
d. stable, coherent, and relevant to the policy-making process
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Knowledge
20. Which of the following is not a contemporary challenge to the Almond–Lippmann consensus?
a. Members of the foreign policy elite tend to reach a consensus more easily than
members of the attentive public.
b. Although the mass public tends to be more nationalistic on economic issues, it
favors U.S. engagement in multilateral organizations.
c. Most of the population favors an internationalist foreign policy and only a few
qualify as isolationist.
d. Whereas some citizens believe the United States should pursue a policy of militant
internationalism, others believe it should pursue cooperative internationalism.
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Application | Analysis
21. Which of the following societal groups is not an influential source of public opinion for foreign
policy makers?
a. Religious affiliated groups
b. Media rights groups
c. Human rights groups
d. Groups organized around economic causes
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Social Identities: Education, Wealth, and Religion OBJ: 7.3
COG: Knowledge
22. What is the concept that refers to the U.S. public’s aversion to military activism, coupled with a
sense of defeatism?
a. The diversionary theory of war
b. The isolationism effect
c. The Iraq Syndrome
d. The Vietnam Syndrome
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Consensus and Discord during the Cold War OBJ: 7.2
COG: Knowledge
23. Which of the following statements best reflects the public’s opinion of U.S. foreign aid?
a. A majority of the public knows the United States spends a small fraction of its
budget on foreign aid and believes it should spend much more.
b. A majority of the public sees foreign aid as the biggest U.S. “soft power” asset and
favors an increase in the amount spent.
c. A majority of the public favors reductions in foreign aid, despite having estimates of
spending that are too high.
d. A majority of the public knows how much the United States spends on foreign aid
but is undecided on whether it is an adequate amount.
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: America’s Knowledge Gap OBJ: 7.2 COG: Application | Analysis
24. Which of the following statements does not reflect foreign policy attitudes during the Cold
War?
a. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy faced a backlash from the public because of
U.S. involvement in the Korean War.
b. President Johnson initially enjoyed high levels of support for the war in Vietnam.
c. President Truman sought to rally public support around U.S. actions as the threat of
communism became more visible to the American public.
d. Ongoing domestic and foreign policy issues hampered public support for the
Vietnam War during the Nixon administration.
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Consensus and Discord during the Cold War OBJ: 7.2
COG: Comprehension
25. Which of the following statements best describes public opinion at the end of the Cold War?
a. At the end of the Cold War, the public was very concerned about the dissolution of
the Soviet Union and the potential instability posed by emerging states.
b. At the end of the Cold War, there was a considerable ambivalence about foreign
policy issues from both the public and elites, as no one issue dominated the foreign
policy agenda.
c. Both the public and foreign policy elites were primarily concerned with the “pivot to
Asia.”
d. Although foreign policy elites were concerned about emerging powers such as
Russia and China, the American public was more concerned about economic issues.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Public Ambivalence in the Clinton Era OBJ: 7.2
COG: Application | Analysis
26. President George W. Bush’s rise in public approval in 2001 and 2002 can best be attributed to
which of the following factors?
a. Institutional bargain
b. Latent public opinion
c. The rally-around-the-flag effect
d. Diversionary theory of war
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Rallying around the Flag after 9/11 OBJ: 7.2
COG: Application | Analysis
27. Both the mass public and elites share which of the following attitudes?
a. Declining trust in government
b. Lack of knowledge and facts about international relations
c. Lack of support for military intervention
d. Support for multilateral cooperation
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Application | Analysis
28. Which of the following is not a cause of the growing impact of global public opinion?
a. The advance of information technologies
b. Increased acts of terrorism
c. The widespread growth of civil societies in response to democratic reforms
d. The increase in transnational issues
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: The View from Overseas
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
29. During the Obama administration, surveys revealed that global public opinion of the United
States had increased in all of the following except ______.
a. Egypt
b. China
c. Japan
d. Mexico
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: The View from Overseas
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Knowledge
30. Which of the following best describes the concept of group identity?
a. An established organization through which individuals express their voting
preferences
b. An informal gathering of people that temporarily band together to support specific
causes
c. A sense of common cause with other citizens with shared personal traits
d. A shared sense of the “us versus them” dichotomy
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Group Identities and Foreign Policy Views OBJ: 7.3
COG: Comprehension
31. Which of the following is not a concern commonly identified as important to individuals who
identify as conservative?
a. Promoting U.S. business overseas
b. Restricting immigration
c. Strengthening U.S. military power
d. Reducing defense spending
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Political Identities: Ideology and Political Party OBJ: 7.3
COG: Knowledge
32. President Clinton’s decision to order the 1999 military intervention in Kosovo without public
(or congressional) support is an example of the president assuming a __________ of political
representation.
a. delegate model
b. latent model
c. public relations model
d. trustee model
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Rival Views of Political Leadership OBJ: 7.1
COG: Knowledge
33. President Obama’s decision to order a gradual withdrawal of American troops from
Afghanistan due to war weariness is an example of how public opinion may play a role in the
decision-making process, thus contradicting the ______.
a. public relations presidency theory
b. divine divide
c. Almond–Lippmann consensus
d. delegate model of representation
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Application | Analysis
34. Which of the following statements best reflects the overall trend in public opinion since World
War II?
a. Until the end of the Cold War, Americans consistently preferred a passive,
isolationist role for the United States in international politics.
b. Although public opinion varied over time, Americans have consistently preferred an
active role for the United States in world politics.
c. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reversed a long-term trend in public opinion,
leading more Americans to prefer militant internationalism in global affairs.
d. Public opinion has been too erratic since the end of WWII to conclusively determine
any trends in attitudes regarding the U.S. role in world politics.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Public Opinion since World War II OBJ: 7.2
COG: Comprehension
35. Which of the following statements best describes public opinion at the end of the Cold War?
a. The end of the Cold War was marked with considerable ambivalence among the
public and government leaders about U.S. foreign policy, bringing about new
patterns in public opinion that reflected the demise of superpower tensions and the
birth of U.S. predominance among the great powers.
b. Whereas public opinion remained steadfastly isolationist during the Cold War, the
end of the war resulted in a realization of the new globalized environment,
prompting the majority of Americans to favor cooperative internationalism.
c. Public opinion remained relatively unchanged with the end of the Cold War
regarding U.S. involvement in international politics; however, the majority of
Americans now preferred U.S. focus on growing threats in Asia, not the former
Soviet Union.
d. Public opinion remained too erratic at the end of the Cold War to conclusively
determine any trends in attitudes regarding the U.S. role in world politics.
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Public Ambivalence in the Clinton Era OBJ: 7.2
COG: Comprehension
36. Which of the following statements best describes the importance of public opinion in
evaluations of the Clinton administration?
a. Public opinion surveys frequently demonstrated that the mass public generally
supported President Clinton’s foreign policy agenda, but the lack of support for
Clinton’s domestic agenda and distrust stemming from the scandal and subsequent
impeachment hearing weighed heavily on his approval ratings and the public’s
evaluation of his performance on international issues.
b. Although surveys demonstrated that the public did not think highly of his domestic
policy performance, President Clinton enjoyed high job approval ratings because of
his favorable foreign policy goals.
c. Public opinion surveys demonstrated the mass public’s discontent with U.S.
participation in the Bosnian War, and poor job approval ratings plagued President
Clinton in the remaining years of his presidency because of this intervention.
d. Although surveys demonstrated that the public did not think highly of his foreign
policy performance, President Clinton received the highest approval ratings among
the ten postwar presidents in part because of his sensitivity to public opinion.
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Public Ambivalence in the Clinton Era OBJ: 7.2
COG: Comprehension
37. Which of the following statements best describes the importance of public opinion in
evaluations of the George W. Bush administration?
a. Public opinion surveys during the 2000 election demonstrated that foreign policy
issues ranked dead last on the list of voters’ concerns, and foreign policy played only
a nominal role in evaluations of the administration and the president’s job approval
ratings.
b. After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush experienced several short bursts of high
approval ratings due to the rally-around-the-flag effect, but as war fatigue set in and
political violence in places such as Iraq increased, those items caused a significant
decline in his approval ratings in the last years of his presidency.
c. The public was generally dissatisfied with President Bush’s domestic policies and
subsequently were unsupportive of his foreign policy performance, leading to low
approval ratings throughout his presidency.
d. The president’s job approval ratings throughout his presidency reflected the public
strongly supported both his domestic and foreign policy performance.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Rallying around the Flag after 9/11 OBJ: 7.2
COG: Comprehension
38. Which of the following was not identified as an example of public preferences shaping the
foreign policy goals of the Obama administration?
a. The administration’s participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan
b. The administration’s commitment to multilateral cooperation
c. The administration’s commitment to international law
d. The administration’s participation in international institutions
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: The Onset of War Fatigue
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
39. Which of the following statements best describes how public opinion on foreign policy issues
affected evaluations of President Obama’s job performance?
a. President Obama’s approval ratings rose consistently after U.S. participation in the
2011 Libyan intervention, and surveys demonstrate that a majority of Americans
believed his dovish approach to foreign policy issues was the best course of action.
b. President Obama’s approval ratings have remained consistently low, and the mass
public has repeatedly called for more hawkish policies in Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and
Iraq.
c. While President Obama started his first term with high approval ratings, public
opinion of his performance dropped in the following years, and surveys reflected
that Americans believed he was acting too passively on foreign policy issues, such
as the rise of the Islamic State.
d. President Obama’s approval ratings continued to fall after U.S. participation in the
2011 Libyan intervention, and surveys demonstrate that a majority of Americans
believed his approach to foreign policy issues was too hawkish.
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: The Onset of War Fatigue
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
40. Which of the following statements most accurately reflects global public opinions of the Obama
administration?
a. Although the Obama administration has voiced its concern about the U.S. reputation
globally, it has taken very little action to restore its relationships with long-standing
allies and pays little regard to global public opinion in practice.
b. Although the Obama administration claims to pay very little attention to global
public opinion, a decrease in U.S. favorability ratings after it failed to intervene in
the Ukrainian conflict led the United States to lead the charge in the Syrian
intervention.
c. The Obama administration is unconcerned with global public opinion, leading to
favorable attitudes about the United States in countries where the population
believes it is too involved in international affairs.
d. Although the Obama administration has successfully restored the U.S. reputation in
many parts of the world, some countries maintain low levels of satisfaction with the
United States, particularly in regard to the U.S. use of aerial drones.
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: The View from Overseas
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
41. While the American electorate generally disapproves of foreign policy actions that violate
citizens’ civil liberties and other principles that are the cornerstone of the American political
system, the mass public has made an exception in which of the following areas?
a. The prevention of terrorism
b. Immigration policy
c. The prosecution of international drug cartels
d. The prevention of civil conflicts abroad
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Opinions on War and Peace
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
42. Characteristics of a given population—such as ethnicity, age, religion, and wealth—that are
known to affect foreign policy opinions are also known as ______.
a. microexpressions
b. societal identities
c. demographics
d. group identities
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Group Identities and Foreign Policy Views OBJ: 7.3
COG: Comprehension
43. Which of the following statements best describes how wealth affects public opinion?
a. Whereas the mass public tends to favor open trade with other countries, more
affluent responders prefer the United States adopt protectionist policies that support
domestic industry.
b. Whereas the mass public tends to favor militant internationalism, more affluent
responders tend to favor cooperative internationalism.
c. Whereas education and religion play a significant role in the formulation of public
opinions of foreign policy, there are only minor fluctuations in attitudes among
different income levels.
d. Whereas the mass public tends to favor cooperative internationalism, more affluent
responders tend to favor militant internationalism.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Social Identities: Education, Wealth, and Religion OBJ: 7.3
COG: Comprehension
COMPLETION
44. The first president to establish an institution of polling and gauging public opinion about the
White House was ________.
45. Foreign policy scholars are interested in both the _________ of public opinion and the
__________ of public opinion on decision-makers.
46. The _________________ of war suggests that presidents may provoke conflicts in order to
boost their approval ratings.
PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Rallying around the Flag after 9/11
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Knowledge
47. Of all of the different social identities, ___________ and _________ are the most closely
linked, and both have a clear impact on Americans’ foreign policy preferences.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Social Identities: Education, Wealth, and Religion
OBJ: 7.3 COG: Comprehension
48. Higher levels of support for George W. Bush’s foreign policy from regular churchgoers than
those who go to church less frequently is an example of the _____________ in public opinion.
50. ____________ believe citizens may be competent to participate in matters of local governance
but not in foreign policy matters (which are more removed from their daily lives); thus, public
opinion should not be relied on for the formulation of foreign policy.
ANS: Realists
51. ___________ have a positive view of the public’s role in foreign policy and argue that foreign
decision-makers should closely follow the reason and judgment of the mass public.
ANS: Liberals
53. ______________ emphasizes diplomacy and multilateral collaboration rather than military
confrontation.
54. When ordinary citizens lack knowledge about a particular U.S. foreign policy, they rely on
_________ from opinion leaders that are often misleading or simply false.
ANS: cues
55. The idea that men and women differ in their opinions of U.S. foreign policy is known as the
_______________.
ANS: gender gap
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Physical Identities: Gender, Race, and Generation
OBJ: 7.3 COG: Comprehension
SHORT ANSWER
56. What are two of the paradoxes involving public opinion and U.S. foreign policy?
ANS:
Answers should explain that the United States has a large society and access to government
decision-making, but the public is generally not knowledgeable regarding world politics and
global affairs. Another answer could discuss how the public favors an active role for the United
States in world politics, but the public’s focus and major concerns rest with local and domestic
affairs.
57. Define and explain the significance of the term public relations presidency.
ANS:
Answers should discuss adjusting the presidency to emphasize communication and
manipulation of public opinion. Answers should address the significance of the president’s and
staff’s greater focus on opinion and mass communication than on governing functions.
ANS:
Answers should identify the Almond–Lippmann consensus as the early and dominant theory of
public opinion and U.S. foreign policy. This model emphasizes the volatile, incoherent, and
irrelevant nature of public opinion in terms of U.S. foreign policy.
59. Identify and explain the three categories of individuals that comprise public opinion. Include
which proportion of the public falls into each category.
ANS:
Answers should identify foreign policy elites (1 percent or less of the population), the attentive
public (about 15 percent of the population), and the mass public (the vast majority of citizens)
and also explain the demographics of each group.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Democracy and the Paradox of World Power
OBJ: 7.1 COG: Comprehension
60. How do the traditional theories of international relations shape opinions regarding the role of
political leadership in democratic governance?
ANS:
Answers should identify how realists are skeptical of public opinion as a reliable guide to
foreign policy and thus support the trustee model of representation, whereas liberal theories
argue in favor of close adherence to public opinion and support the delegate model of
representation.
61. How did the public’s core beliefs regarding the U.S. use of force affect support for military
interventions in the post–Cold War period?
ANS:
Answers should identify how one of the public’s core beliefs—that U.S. power should be
applied only to repel clear threats to vital national interests—produced support for military
intervention in some situations and calls for restraint in others. Examples of support may
include the Persian Gulf war and the war in Afghanistan. Examples of opposition may include
Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Iraq.
62. Identify and explain the difference between militant internationalism and cooperative
internationalism.
ANS:
Answers should identify militant internationalism as a form of activism in foreign policy that
emphasizes coercive measures (including the use of force) over diplomacy and other peaceful
means of statecraft. Answers should identify cooperative internationalism as a form of activism
that emphasizes diplomacy and multilateral collaboration rather than military confrontation.
63. Identify and explain how cultural detachment affects mass public opinion.
ANS:
Answers should identify how cultural detachment in the United States stems from its
geographic distance from other major powers and ideas regarding American exceptionalism.
Answers should also identify how this detachment has led to major deficiencies in
understanding global events and foreign policy issues in the mass public.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Rallying around the Flag after 9/11
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
65. How do physical identities—such as gender, race, and generation—affect the formation of
public opinion in foreign policy?
ANS:
Answers should identify how physical identities serve as a strong foundation for group
identities, which play a role in public opinion formation. Answers should also identify how
these identities have varying degrees of influence, with generation having a smaller impact than
gender or race.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Physical Identities: Gender, Race, and Generation
OBJ: 7.3 COG: Comprehension
66. How do social identities—such as education, wealth, and religion—affect the formation of
public opinion in foreign policy?
ANS:
Answers should identify how social identities serve as a strong foundation for group identities,
which play a role in public opinion formation. Answers should also identify how these identities
have varying degrees of influence, with education and wealth being very important. Answers
may also identify the role of religion in relation to the divine divide, or the phenomenon that
occurs between foreign policy opinions and church attendance.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Social Identities: Education, Wealth, and Religion
OBJ: 7.3 COG: Comprehension
67. How do political identities—such as ideology and political party—affect the formation of
public opinion in foreign policy?
ANS:
Answers should identify how political identities serve as a strong foundation for group
identities, which play a role in public opinion formation. Answers should also identify how
these basic attitudes tend to be stable over time and serve as a basis for future opinions.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Political Identities: Ideology and Political Party
OBJ: 7.3 COG: Comprehension
ESSAY
68. Compare and contrast the delegate and trustee models as they relate to the public’s role in U.S.
foreign policy.
ANS:
Answers should identify the delegate model as one in which politicians and officials make
decisions based on the preferences of the majority of their constituents. The trustee model, on
the other hand, should be identified as one in which officials make decisions based on their own
knowledge and experience; this model is based on the legitimacy given to officials by the voting
public. Answers could connect the models to theories of international relations (i.e., the
delegate model relates to liberalism and the trustee model to realism).
69. Explain and discuss the significance of the Vietnam Syndrome. Relate the Vietnam Syndrome
to a current or recent foreign policy situation. Does this concept help to explain public opinion
concerning the current or recent situation? Why or why not?
ANS:
Answers should describe the Vietnam Syndrome as the American public’s reaction to
casualties, news coverage, a corrupt administration, and the long war in Vietnam. Answers
should explain that the Vietnam Syndrome is the public’s general belief that the United States
should not get involved militarily in global affairs unless it is absolutely necessary. Current
examples that could be included in answers as public opinion constraints on foreign policy and
military interventions are Haiti and Kosovo in the 1990s and Iraq in 2003 to 2004.
70. Discuss the concept of the “rally-around-the-flag effect.” Does it apply to President Bush and
the war on terrorism?
ANS:
Answers should explain that public approval ratings tend to rise and spike in favor of the
president during a crisis and give as an example the spike in public approval for President Bush
following the September 11 attacks: President Bush’s approval rating went from the mid-fifties
to the nineties, the highest level for any president. Answers could also discuss the tendency of
other government officials and the news media not to critique the president during crisis
situations. Answers could also explain that presidential approval ratings tend to begin declining
in the middle of the crisis and conflict situation.
71. Identify and explain the difference between militant internationalism and cooperative
internationalism. How do these concepts align with traditional theories of international
relations? Do these perspectives represent larger trends in public opinion?
ANS:
Answers should identify militant internationalism, aligned with realism, as a form of activism
in foreign policy that emphasizes coercive measures, including the use of force, over diplomacy
and other peaceful means of statecraft. Answers should identify cooperative internationalism,
aligned with liberalism, as a form of activism that emphasizes diplomacy and multilateral
collaboration rather than military confrontation. Answers should also identify how militant and
cooperative internationalism represents a more subtle difference in the level of international
trust felt by individuals and explain the consequences of a lack of international trust by the
majority of Americans.
72. What is the “knowledge gap” in U.S. foreign policy? How does this gap impact public opinion
on foreign policy issues? What roles do the U.S. educational system and policy elites play in
widening or narrowing the gap?
ANS:
Answers should identify the knowledge gap as the common understanding that American
citizens are largely detached from politics, lacking both extensive knowledge of and interest in
government at any level. Answers should also identify that the gap shapes and leads citizens to
form opinions based on inaccurate or incomplete information. Answers should acknowledge
the ongoing difficulties within the educational system that are widening the information gap.
Answers should also acknowledge how citizens end up relying on elites for “cues” to form their
opinions, thus widening the gap further and preventing necessary scrutiny from being cast on
legislators’ actions.
73. How do attitudes regarding U.S. foreign aid reflect the knowledge gap in U.S. foreign policy?
How do these attitudes shape the behavior of members of Congress? Does this impact the
foreign policy bureaucracy?
ANS:
Answers should discuss how, due to the knowledge gap, the mass public tends to overestimate
the amount of money budgeted for U.S. foreign aid. This leads voters to believe the United
States is spending “too much” on foreign aid and demand the money be reallocated to domestic
causes. Because members of Congress are highly subject to electoral factors (Chapter 5), they
incorrectly assume voters prefer unilateralism. Examples of how this affects the foreign policy
bureaucracy will vary but may address how Congress may choose to defund certain foreign
policy agencies (Chapter 6).
74. How did public opinion of U.S. foreign policy change from the Clinton, Bush, and Obama
administrations? In what ways did foreign policy impact presidential approval ratings and
presidential behavior?
ANS:
Answers should identify how public opinion of the Clinton administration’s performance on
foreign policy issues was low, but presidential approval ratings remained high. In addition,
answers should identify the ways in which Clinton seemingly made foreign policy decisions
based on public opinion. Responses should identify high evaluations of Bush’s foreign policy
after the 9/11 attacks and acknowledge how it dropped in responses to the Iraq war and
mishandling of foreign affairs. Answers should also acknowledge how Bush sometimes
seemingly ignored public opinion (such as when he decided to invade Iraq without a UN
Security Council Resolution). Lastly, answers should identify how public opinion reflects that
many citizens feel the Obama administration has been too passive on foreign policy crises and
how presidential approval ratings have decreased over his term. Answers may identify cases
such as Syria as reflections of how public opinion may have impacted Obama’s
decision-making.
75. How has public opinion on U.S. foreign policy issues evolved during the Obama
administration? What evidence, if any, indicated that the Obama administration considered
public attitudes and/or changed its actions as a response to public opinion?
ANS:
Answers should detail how, over the course of the Obama administration, public opinion of
U.S. foreign policy issues has fallen, with many citizens believing that Obama was too passive
on foreign policy crises such as the Islamic State. Answers may identify cases such as the U.S.
withdrawal of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan as reflections of how public opinion may have
impacted Obama’s decision-making.
76. What role does global public opinion play in U.S. foreign policy decision-making and
American policy makers’ interactions with other countries? What observable trends exist in
post–Cold War global opinion?
ANS:
Answers should acknowledge how U.S. policy makers pay attention to global public opinion
and try to rally support for their policies and actions abroad. Answers should also acknowledge
the growing impact of public opinion, stemming from several sources: the advance of
information technologies, the widespread growth of civil societies in response to democratic
reforms, and the wider array of issues and problems that cross national borders. Answers
regarding observable trends in the post-Cold War period may vary but include relatively
favorable views of the United States in the first ten years after the war, followed by rising
anti-Americanism during the Iraq war due to the U.S. penchant for favoring military over
diplomatic solutions and unwillingness to consider the perspectives of other countries. Recent
trends indicated more favorable opinions in some regions (Western Europe, for example) but
remained low in others (Middle East and North Africa, for example).
ANS:
Answers should identify and describe physical traits (such as gender, age, and race), social
associations (such as education, wealth, and religion), and belief systems (including ideology
and political party). Answers regarding the importance of understanding demographics will
vary but should acknowledge how these demographics allow policy makers to make reliable
predictions about different groups on a variety of foreign policy issues.
78. In what ways does public opinion on foreign policy after the Cold War support or contradict the
idea that the mass public is inconsistent? Be specific in your answer and provide examples if
appropriate.
ANS:
Answers will vary widely but should trace the evolution of public opinion since the end of the
Cold War during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. Answers may also draw on the
literature regarding group identities to establish the ways in which people form opinions that
remain consistent over time.
79. How does contemporary research on public opinion and foreign policy support or contradict the
Almond–Lippmann consensus? Be sure to identify the principle assumptions of the Almond–
Lippmann consensus in your answer.
ANS:
Answers should identify the Almond–Lippmann consensus as a dominant theory of public
opinion and U.S. foreign policy that emphasizes the volatile, incoherent, and irrelevant nature
of public opinion in terms of U.S. foreign policy. Answers should also address how recent
contemporary research contradicts or challenges the fundamental assumptions of the Almond–
Lippmann consensus and provide examples of this research as appropriate.
Später zeigte mir die Frau Gräfin noch die beim Brande
größtenteils gerettete Bibliothek in einem Raume des Torhauses.
Diese Bücherei hat allerdings durch das Feuer eine sehr anziehende
Besonderheit verloren: den schön gebundenen Briefwechsel eines
weltbekannten Liebespaares, eines zu Goethes Zeit am Weimarer
Hofe lebenden Leutnants und Bergrats Johann August von Einsiedel
– sein Bruder war der Weimarische Geheime-Rat und
Oberhofmeister Friedrich Hildebrand von Einsiedel – und der
Freifrau Emilie von Werthern-Beichlingen, die, um mit ihrem
Geliebten entfliehen und eine Afrikareise antreten zu können, ihre
Todesnachricht verbreiten und ein ihr gleichendes Wachsbild
begraben ließ (1784). Andere wertvolle Schriftstücke aus dieser Zeit
und aus dem Weimarer Kreise sind erhalten geblieben; ich sah
Briefe von Wieland, Herder, Knebel, der Gräfin Tina von Brühl,
Dorothea Schlegel u. a. Dann genoß ich die herbstliche Schönheit
des vom Torhaus und Witwenflügel nach Westen zu liegenden
Burggartens (Abb. 8) mit der alten Bastion, die einen herrlichen Blick
ins Tal gewährt und umwanderte, soweit es der noch nicht völlig
beseitigte Bauschutt gestattete, dicht am Mauerwerk hin die West-
und Nordseite der Burg von außen. Dabei sieht man erst, wie
kunstvoll sich hier uraltes Mauerwerk und die neuen Flickarbeiten,
alte Unterbauten und neue Oberbauten einander durchdringen. Als
ich mich danach im Schlosse verabschiedet hatte und die Treppe
des Wohnflügels hinunterstieg, schaute ich, ehe ich in die noch
immer goldene und wärmende Herbstsonne hinaustrat, noch einmal
zur Tür der Burgkapelle hinüber – und gedachte der Kinderschar, die
in diesen Räumen getauft und erzogen, hoffentlich einmal ein
glücklicheres Deutschland sehen wird als das heutige. Aber weder
das heutige noch das künftige Deutschland möge die alten Wurzeln
seiner Kraft und seiner Kultur vergessen.
Aufnahme von Seidel-Naumann, Zschopau
Abb. 8 Burg Scharfenstein Gesamtansicht von Westen
Anmerkung. Die Quellen zu dieser Arbeit sind außer dem
wiederholten Besuch der Burg Scharfenstein und den Mitteilungen
des Herrn Grafen und der Frau Gräfin von Einsiedel auf Scharfenstein
die Akten des sächsischen Landesamts für Denkmalpflege, die Akten
des ehemaligen Lehnshofes und mehrere den Bergbau im Erzgebirge
betreffende Urkunden des sächsischen Hauptstaatsarchivs. Einzelne
Hinweise verdanke ich der von Prof. Dr. Meiche ebenda angelegten
Kartothek der Örter Sachsens.
Burgen als Stätten für Volksfeste
Von Otto Eduard Schmidt
Die Burg ist, sprachlich betrachtet, der Ort, wo man sich birgt, wo
man sich vor Feinden geborgen weiß. Und so wichtig und
angesehen war in alten Zeiten die Burg, daß sich auch der
vollberechtigte Einwohner der jüngeren Stadt mit Stolz als einen
Burgmannen (burgensis) = Bürger bezeichnete, weil ihm die Stadt
nicht anders erschien als eine größere Burg, hinter deren festen
Mauern und Toren sich die Einwohner vor aller äußeren Not
geborgen fühlten. In diesem Sinn hat schon König Heinrich I., der
das Sorbenland für die Deutschen zurückeroberte, »Städte« gebaut,
die nichts als größere Burgen waren, in denen die deutschen Bauern
während des Ansturmes der Ungarn mit Weib und Kind ihre Zuflucht
fanden. Aber freilich, als das mittelalterliche Kaisertum in
Römerzügen gegen kaiserfeindliche Päpste und Stadtrepubliken und
in Kreuzzügen gegen die Bekenner des Islam seine besten Kräfte
verbraucht hatte und in Schwäche und Auflösung verfiel, da
entartete, der kaiserlichen Leitung und des kaiserlichen Schutzes
beraubt, vielfach auch das burggesessene Rittertum: aus dem
Schirmer und Beschützer der Wehrlosen wurde hier und da ihr
Bedrücker, und die Burg, die vorher die Zuflucht bedrängter Bauern
und reisender Kaufleute gewesen war, wurde öfters der Ort ihrer
Qual, wo sie beraubt und zerschlagen im Gefängnis schmachteten,
bis ein Lösegeld oder das Dazwischentreten eines Mächtigeren die
Pforten des Kerkers sprengte. Damals sind auch in unserem
Sachsenland von volksfreundlichen Kaisern wie Rudolf von
Habsburg und Karl IV., aber auch von Landesfürsten und
verbündeten Städten Raubburgen in größerer Zahl gebrochen
worden. Ihre malerischen Ruinen grüßen uns aus dem Dunkel des
Waldes und aus schilfbewachsenen Gräben oder von
aussichtsreicher Höhe und steilen Felsklippen.
Glücklicherweise sind nicht alle Burgen unseres Sachsenlandes
zugrunde gegangen. Die meisten ritterlichen Geschlechter
gewöhnten sich rechtzeitig daran, in friedlicher Arbeit ihre Güter zu
bebauen oder setzten ihre Ehre darein, sich im Staats- und
Heeresdienst die Mittel für ein standesgemäßes Leben zu erwerben
und hielten dabei die von den Ahnen ererbte Burg wie ein liebevoll
gepflegtes Kleinod durch alle Zeitenstürme hindurch in Treue fest.
Bei den furchtbaren Kriegsschicksalen, die unser Sachsen fast in
allen seinen Teilen erduldete und bei der nachfolgenden starken
Industrialisierung des Landes ist es fast ein Wunder, wie viele der
alten Burgen sich mit leidlich heilen Gliedern in die Gegenwart
herübergerettet haben. Solche Burgen, in der Regel Trägerinnen
geheimnisvoller Sage und reichbewegter Geschichte, ragen in
unsere Zeit hinein wie lebendig gebliebene Recken der Vorzeit, zu
denen jedermann mit Liebe und Verehrung aufblickt. Sie sind
alljährlich das Wanderziel für Tausende, und jeder schätzt sich
glücklich, der von ihren inneren Reizen etwas mehr kennenlernen
durfte als die anderen. Die alten Burgen haben in unserer
schnellebigen Zeit die besondere Aufgabe, die alten Erinnerungen
der Landschaft, in der sie erwachsen sind, durch ihre bauliche
Anlage, durch den Eindruck ihrer Innenräume und ihrer
altväterischen Ausstattung viel lebendiger zu erhalten, als es
einzelne etwa in einem Museum aufgestellte Gegenstände
vermöchten. So sind die alten Burgen geeignet, ganze Geschlechter
mit geschichtlichem Sinn zu erfüllen und ihnen die Vergangenheit
näher zu rücken, ohne deren Kenntnis wir die Gegenwart nicht recht
verstehen können. Deshalb entsteht auch für die Besitzer gut
erhaltener Burgen beinahe eine sittliche Verpflichtung, wenigstens
an gewissen Tagen Teile ihrer Burg unter gewissen Bedingungen
den Besuchern zu öffnen. Und es ist erfreulich zu sehen, wie
großzügig und selbstlos manche Burgherren die mit dem Einlaß
Fremder unzweifelhaft verbundenen Unbequemlichkeiten um des
Volksganzenwillen auf sich nehmen.
Aufnahme von Bertha Zillessen, Bautzen
Abb. 1 Blick von Schloß Ehrenberg an der Zschopau auf die
Burg Kriebstein