U S Foreign Policy The Paradox of World Power 5th Edition Hook Test Bank All Chapters
U S Foreign Policy The Paradox of World Power 5th Edition Hook Test Bank All Chapters
U S Foreign Policy The Paradox of World Power 5th Edition Hook Test Bank All Chapters
https://testbankfan.com/product/u-s-foreign-policy-the-paradox-
of-world-power-5th-edition-hook-solutions-manual/
https://testbankfan.com/product/social-welfare-policy-for-a-
sustainable-future-the-u-s-in-global-context-1st-edition-wormer-
test-bank/
https://testbankfan.com/product/media-and-crime-in-the-u-s-1st-
edition-jewkes-test-bank/
https://testbankfan.com/product/american-foreign-policy-the-
dynamics-of-choice-in-the-21st-century-4th-edition-jentleson-
test-bank/
U S Banking System 3rd Edition Center-for-Financial-
Training Test Bank
https://testbankfan.com/product/u-s-banking-system-3rd-edition-
center-for-financial-training-test-bank/
https://testbankfan.com/product/cengage-advantage-books-the-
politics-of-united-states-foreign-policy-6th-edition-rosati-test-
bank/
https://testbankfan.com/product/cengage-advantage-books-the-
politics-of-united-states-foreign-policy-6th-edition-rosati-
solutions-manual/
https://testbankfan.com/product/cengage-advantage-american-
foreign-policy-and-process-6th-edition-mccormick-test-bank/
https://testbankfan.com/product/contemporary-american-foreign-
policy-influences-challenges-and-opportunities-1st-edition-
mansbach-test-bank/
Chapter 07: Public Opinion at Home and Abroad
MULTIPLE CHOICE
1. Foreign policy elites are most likely to favor which of the following?
a. Isolationism
b. Multilateral cooperation
c. The delegate model
d. Unilateral action
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Comprehension
2. Studies have shown that which of the following statements is true regarding the “gender gap” in
U.S. foreign policy attitudes?
a. Men favor free-trade and open-market issues more than women do.
b. Men favor military intervention more than women do.
c. Women favor international institutions more than men do.
d. Women favor military intervention more than men do.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Physical Identities: Gender, Race, and Generation OBJ: 7.3
COG: Comprehension
4. In the late 1990s in the midst of the U.S. economic boom, which of the following was the most
common response to the public opinion survey question concerning the biggest foreign policy
problem facing the United States?
a. Don’t know
b. Terrorism
c. The situation in the Middle East
d. Trade restrictions from other countries
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Public Ambivalence in the Clinton Era OBJ: 7.2
COG: Knowledge
5. Under the Bush administration, public opinion surveys revealed a divine divide in public
opinion, as evidenced by which of the following statements?
a. The belief by frequent Christian churchgoers that Muslims are a generally peaceful
people
b. The belief by Jewish and Muslim Americans that the administration should be more
receptive to open immigration policies
c. The belief by Christians that the United States was “doing the right thing” in foreign
policy
d. The belief by Muslim Americans that the administration should support a two-state
solution in Israel
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Social Identities: Education, Wealth, and Religion OBJ: 7.3
COG: Application | Analysis
6. According to public opinion polls, which of the following does the general or mass public
support the least?
a. Foreign aid
b. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
c. The Kyoto Protocol
d. The United Nations
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.2 COG: Knowledge
8. Which of the following actions by Congress is likely to receive the least public support?
a. Rejecting the Kyoto Protocol on climate change
b. Participating in UN efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
c. Refusing to endorse the International Criminal Court
d. Launching a unilateral U.S. military attack on Iran’s nuclear weapons program
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.2 COG: Application | Analysis
9. Which of these groups is the least informed and interested in global politics and U.S. foreign
policy?
a. Independents
b. The attentive public
c. The foreign policy elite
d. The mass public
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Figure 7.1
OBJ: 7.1 COG: Knowledge
10. President George W. Bush’s policy regarding Iraq best fits which of the following models?
a. Delegate model
b. Latent model
c. Public relations model
d. Trustee model
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Rival Views of Political Leadership OBJ: 7.2
COG: Application | Analysis
11. In 2014, approximately what percentage of Americans supported active U.S. participation in
world affairs?
a. About 50 percent
b. About 60 percent
c. About 40 percent
d. About 30 percent
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Public Opinion since World War II OBJ: 7.2
COG: Knowledge
12. How much of the federal budget does the general public believe is spent on foreign aid?
a. 15 to 20 percent
b. 45 to 50 percent
c. 5 to 10 percent
d. About 1 percent
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: America’s Knowledge Gap
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Knowledge
13. Which of the following is not one of the three assumptions of the Almond–Lippmann consensus
discussed in your text with regard to U.S. foreign policy?
a. Critical
b. Volatile
c. Incoherent
d. Irrelevant
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Comprehension
14. Which of the following refers to the president’s ability to manipulate and gauge public opinion?
a. A president who “goes public”
b. An institutional president
c. A public relations presidency
d. An imperial president
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Chapter Introduction
OBJ: 7.1 COG: Comprehension
15. Which of the following best explains how foreign policy makers view international public
opinion?
a. Foreign policy makers are concerned with international public opinion because
many of these global citizens have interests in U.S. economic markets.
b. Foreign policy makers are unconcerned with international public opinion because
they are only responsible to the American electorate.
c. Foreign policy makers are unconcerned with international public opinion because
the Almond–Lippmann consensus identifies how there will always be a level of
anti-American sentiment as long as the United States remains a hegemonic power.
d. Foreign policy makers are concerned with international public opinion because
unfavorable perceptions of the United States can lead to pushback against its
policies.
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Chapter Introduction
OBJ: 7.1 COG: Comprehension
16. Which of the following terms describes the group of citizens that is smallest with regard to
opinions but that has the largest impact on foreign policy?
a. Attentive public
b. Disengaged public
c. Foreign policy elite
d. Mass public
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Democracy and the Paradox of World Power OBJ: 7.1
COG: Comprehension
17. Which of the following best describes the delegate model of political representation?
a. Elected officials use their best judgment and expertise to make policy decisions.
b. Elected officials make decisions based on what the majority of the public desires.
c. Elected officials do not involve the public in decision-making at all.
d. Elected officials defer to bureaucrats for their expertise in decision-making.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Rival Views of Political Leadership OBJ: 7.1
COG: Comprehension
18. Which of the following best describes the trustee model of political representation?
a. Elected officials involve and pass authority on to bureaucrats for policy
implementation.
b. Elected officials do not involve the public in decision-making at all.
c. Elected officials make decisions based on what the majority of the public desires.
d. Elected officials use their best judgment and expertise to make policy decisions.
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Rival Views of Political Leadership OBJ: 7.1
COG: Comprehension
19. The Almond–Lippmann consensus holds that public opinion on foreign policy is ______.
a. pragmatic, prudent, and sometimes relevant to the policy-making process
b. volatile, incoherent, and irrelevant to the policy-making process
c. stable, pragmatic, and sometimes relevant to the policy-making process
d. stable, coherent, and relevant to the policy-making process
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Knowledge
20. Which of the following is not a contemporary challenge to the Almond–Lippmann consensus?
a. Members of the foreign policy elite tend to reach a consensus more easily than
members of the attentive public.
b. Although the mass public tends to be more nationalistic on economic issues, it
favors U.S. engagement in multilateral organizations.
c. Most of the population favors an internationalist foreign policy and only a few
qualify as isolationist.
d. Whereas some citizens believe the United States should pursue a policy of militant
internationalism, others believe it should pursue cooperative internationalism.
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Application | Analysis
21. Which of the following societal groups is not an influential source of public opinion for foreign
policy makers?
a. Religious affiliated groups
b. Media rights groups
c. Human rights groups
d. Groups organized around economic causes
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Social Identities: Education, Wealth, and Religion OBJ: 7.3
COG: Knowledge
22. What is the concept that refers to the U.S. public’s aversion to military activism, coupled with a
sense of defeatism?
a. The diversionary theory of war
b. The isolationism effect
c. The Iraq Syndrome
d. The Vietnam Syndrome
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Consensus and Discord during the Cold War OBJ: 7.2
COG: Knowledge
23. Which of the following statements best reflects the public’s opinion of U.S. foreign aid?
a. A majority of the public knows the United States spends a small fraction of its
budget on foreign aid and believes it should spend much more.
b. A majority of the public sees foreign aid as the biggest U.S. “soft power” asset and
favors an increase in the amount spent.
c. A majority of the public favors reductions in foreign aid, despite having estimates of
spending that are too high.
d. A majority of the public knows how much the United States spends on foreign aid
but is undecided on whether it is an adequate amount.
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: America’s Knowledge Gap OBJ: 7.2 COG: Application | Analysis
24. Which of the following statements does not reflect foreign policy attitudes during the Cold
War?
a. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy faced a backlash from the public because of
U.S. involvement in the Korean War.
b. President Johnson initially enjoyed high levels of support for the war in Vietnam.
c. President Truman sought to rally public support around U.S. actions as the threat of
communism became more visible to the American public.
d. Ongoing domestic and foreign policy issues hampered public support for the
Vietnam War during the Nixon administration.
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Consensus and Discord during the Cold War OBJ: 7.2
COG: Comprehension
25. Which of the following statements best describes public opinion at the end of the Cold War?
a. At the end of the Cold War, the public was very concerned about the dissolution of
the Soviet Union and the potential instability posed by emerging states.
b. At the end of the Cold War, there was a considerable ambivalence about foreign
policy issues from both the public and elites, as no one issue dominated the foreign
policy agenda.
c. Both the public and foreign policy elites were primarily concerned with the “pivot to
Asia.”
d. Although foreign policy elites were concerned about emerging powers such as
Russia and China, the American public was more concerned about economic issues.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Public Ambivalence in the Clinton Era OBJ: 7.2
COG: Application | Analysis
26. President George W. Bush’s rise in public approval in 2001 and 2002 can best be attributed to
which of the following factors?
a. Institutional bargain
b. Latent public opinion
c. The rally-around-the-flag effect
d. Diversionary theory of war
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Rallying around the Flag after 9/11 OBJ: 7.2
COG: Application | Analysis
27. Both the mass public and elites share which of the following attitudes?
a. Declining trust in government
b. Lack of knowledge and facts about international relations
c. Lack of support for military intervention
d. Support for multilateral cooperation
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Application | Analysis
28. Which of the following is not a cause of the growing impact of global public opinion?
a. The advance of information technologies
b. Increased acts of terrorism
c. The widespread growth of civil societies in response to democratic reforms
d. The increase in transnational issues
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: The View from Overseas
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
29. During the Obama administration, surveys revealed that global public opinion of the United
States had increased in all of the following except ______.
a. Egypt
b. China
c. Japan
d. Mexico
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: The View from Overseas
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Knowledge
30. Which of the following best describes the concept of group identity?
a. An established organization through which individuals express their voting
preferences
b. An informal gathering of people that temporarily band together to support specific
causes
c. A sense of common cause with other citizens with shared personal traits
d. A shared sense of the “us versus them” dichotomy
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Group Identities and Foreign Policy Views OBJ: 7.3
COG: Comprehension
31. Which of the following is not a concern commonly identified as important to individuals who
identify as conservative?
a. Promoting U.S. business overseas
b. Restricting immigration
c. Strengthening U.S. military power
d. Reducing defense spending
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Political Identities: Ideology and Political Party OBJ: 7.3
COG: Knowledge
32. President Clinton’s decision to order the 1999 military intervention in Kosovo without public
(or congressional) support is an example of the president assuming a __________ of political
representation.
a. delegate model
b. latent model
c. public relations model
d. trustee model
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Easy
REF: Rival Views of Political Leadership OBJ: 7.1
COG: Knowledge
33. President Obama’s decision to order a gradual withdrawal of American troops from
Afghanistan due to war weariness is an example of how public opinion may play a role in the
decision-making process, thus contradicting the ______.
a. public relations presidency theory
b. divine divide
c. Almond–Lippmann consensus
d. delegate model of representation
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Hard | Medium
REF: Mood Swings or Pragmatism? OBJ: 7.1 COG: Application | Analysis
34. Which of the following statements best reflects the overall trend in public opinion since World
War II?
a. Until the end of the Cold War, Americans consistently preferred a passive,
isolationist role for the United States in international politics.
b. Although public opinion varied over time, Americans have consistently preferred an
active role for the United States in world politics.
c. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reversed a long-term trend in public opinion,
leading more Americans to prefer militant internationalism in global affairs.
d. Public opinion has been too erratic since the end of WWII to conclusively determine
any trends in attitudes regarding the U.S. role in world politics.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Public Opinion since World War II OBJ: 7.2
COG: Comprehension
35. Which of the following statements best describes public opinion at the end of the Cold War?
a. The end of the Cold War was marked with considerable ambivalence among the
public and government leaders about U.S. foreign policy, bringing about new
patterns in public opinion that reflected the demise of superpower tensions and the
birth of U.S. predominance among the great powers.
b. Whereas public opinion remained steadfastly isolationist during the Cold War, the
end of the war resulted in a realization of the new globalized environment,
prompting the majority of Americans to favor cooperative internationalism.
c. Public opinion remained relatively unchanged with the end of the Cold War
regarding U.S. involvement in international politics; however, the majority of
Americans now preferred U.S. focus on growing threats in Asia, not the former
Soviet Union.
d. Public opinion remained too erratic at the end of the Cold War to conclusively
determine any trends in attitudes regarding the U.S. role in world politics.
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Public Ambivalence in the Clinton Era OBJ: 7.2
COG: Comprehension
36. Which of the following statements best describes the importance of public opinion in
evaluations of the Clinton administration?
a. Public opinion surveys frequently demonstrated that the mass public generally
supported President Clinton’s foreign policy agenda, but the lack of support for
Clinton’s domestic agenda and distrust stemming from the scandal and subsequent
impeachment hearing weighed heavily on his approval ratings and the public’s
evaluation of his performance on international issues.
b. Although surveys demonstrated that the public did not think highly of his domestic
policy performance, President Clinton enjoyed high job approval ratings because of
his favorable foreign policy goals.
c. Public opinion surveys demonstrated the mass public’s discontent with U.S.
participation in the Bosnian War, and poor job approval ratings plagued President
Clinton in the remaining years of his presidency because of this intervention.
d. Although surveys demonstrated that the public did not think highly of his foreign
policy performance, President Clinton received the highest approval ratings among
the ten postwar presidents in part because of his sensitivity to public opinion.
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Public Ambivalence in the Clinton Era OBJ: 7.2
COG: Comprehension
37. Which of the following statements best describes the importance of public opinion in
evaluations of the George W. Bush administration?
a. Public opinion surveys during the 2000 election demonstrated that foreign policy
issues ranked dead last on the list of voters’ concerns, and foreign policy played only
a nominal role in evaluations of the administration and the president’s job approval
ratings.
b. After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush experienced several short bursts of high
approval ratings due to the rally-around-the-flag effect, but as war fatigue set in and
political violence in places such as Iraq increased, those items caused a significant
decline in his approval ratings in the last years of his presidency.
c. The public was generally dissatisfied with President Bush’s domestic policies and
subsequently were unsupportive of his foreign policy performance, leading to low
approval ratings throughout his presidency.
d. The president’s job approval ratings throughout his presidency reflected the public
strongly supported both his domestic and foreign policy performance.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Rallying around the Flag after 9/11 OBJ: 7.2
COG: Comprehension
38. Which of the following was not identified as an example of public preferences shaping the
foreign policy goals of the Obama administration?
a. The administration’s participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan
b. The administration’s commitment to multilateral cooperation
c. The administration’s commitment to international law
d. The administration’s participation in international institutions
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: The Onset of War Fatigue
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
39. Which of the following statements best describes how public opinion on foreign policy issues
affected evaluations of President Obama’s job performance?
a. President Obama’s approval ratings rose consistently after U.S. participation in the
2011 Libyan intervention, and surveys demonstrate that a majority of Americans
believed his dovish approach to foreign policy issues was the best course of action.
b. President Obama’s approval ratings have remained consistently low, and the mass
public has repeatedly called for more hawkish policies in Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and
Iraq.
c. While President Obama started his first term with high approval ratings, public
opinion of his performance dropped in the following years, and surveys reflected
that Americans believed he was acting too passively on foreign policy issues, such
as the rise of the Islamic State.
d. President Obama’s approval ratings continued to fall after U.S. participation in the
2011 Libyan intervention, and surveys demonstrate that a majority of Americans
believed his approach to foreign policy issues was too hawkish.
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: The Onset of War Fatigue
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
40. Which of the following statements most accurately reflects global public opinions of the Obama
administration?
a. Although the Obama administration has voiced its concern about the U.S. reputation
globally, it has taken very little action to restore its relationships with long-standing
allies and pays little regard to global public opinion in practice.
b. Although the Obama administration claims to pay very little attention to global
public opinion, a decrease in U.S. favorability ratings after it failed to intervene in
the Ukrainian conflict led the United States to lead the charge in the Syrian
intervention.
c. The Obama administration is unconcerned with global public opinion, leading to
favorable attitudes about the United States in countries where the population
believes it is too involved in international affairs.
d. Although the Obama administration has successfully restored the U.S. reputation in
many parts of the world, some countries maintain low levels of satisfaction with the
United States, particularly in regard to the U.S. use of aerial drones.
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: The View from Overseas
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
41. While the American electorate generally disapproves of foreign policy actions that violate
citizens’ civil liberties and other principles that are the cornerstone of the American political
system, the mass public has made an exception in which of the following areas?
a. The prevention of terrorism
b. Immigration policy
c. The prosecution of international drug cartels
d. The prevention of civil conflicts abroad
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Opinions on War and Peace
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
42. Characteristics of a given population—such as ethnicity, age, religion, and wealth—that are
known to affect foreign policy opinions are also known as ______.
a. microexpressions
b. societal identities
c. demographics
d. group identities
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Group Identities and Foreign Policy Views OBJ: 7.3
COG: Comprehension
43. Which of the following statements best describes how wealth affects public opinion?
a. Whereas the mass public tends to favor open trade with other countries, more
affluent responders prefer the United States adopt protectionist policies that support
domestic industry.
b. Whereas the mass public tends to favor militant internationalism, more affluent
responders tend to favor cooperative internationalism.
c. Whereas education and religion play a significant role in the formulation of public
opinions of foreign policy, there are only minor fluctuations in attitudes among
different income levels.
d. Whereas the mass public tends to favor cooperative internationalism, more affluent
responders tend to favor militant internationalism.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Medium
REF: Social Identities: Education, Wealth, and Religion OBJ: 7.3
COG: Comprehension
COMPLETION
44. The first president to establish an institution of polling and gauging public opinion about the
White House was ________.
45. Foreign policy scholars are interested in both the _________ of public opinion and the
__________ of public opinion on decision-makers.
46. The _________________ of war suggests that presidents may provoke conflicts in order to
boost their approval ratings.
PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Rallying around the Flag after 9/11
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Knowledge
47. Of all of the different social identities, ___________ and _________ are the most closely
linked, and both have a clear impact on Americans’ foreign policy preferences.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Social Identities: Education, Wealth, and Religion
OBJ: 7.3 COG: Comprehension
48. Higher levels of support for George W. Bush’s foreign policy from regular churchgoers than
those who go to church less frequently is an example of the _____________ in public opinion.
50. ____________ believe citizens may be competent to participate in matters of local governance
but not in foreign policy matters (which are more removed from their daily lives); thus, public
opinion should not be relied on for the formulation of foreign policy.
ANS: Realists
51. ___________ have a positive view of the public’s role in foreign policy and argue that foreign
decision-makers should closely follow the reason and judgment of the mass public.
ANS: Liberals
53. ______________ emphasizes diplomacy and multilateral collaboration rather than military
confrontation.
54. When ordinary citizens lack knowledge about a particular U.S. foreign policy, they rely on
_________ from opinion leaders that are often misleading or simply false.
ANS: cues
55. The idea that men and women differ in their opinions of U.S. foreign policy is known as the
_______________.
ANS: gender gap
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Physical Identities: Gender, Race, and Generation
OBJ: 7.3 COG: Comprehension
SHORT ANSWER
56. What are two of the paradoxes involving public opinion and U.S. foreign policy?
ANS:
Answers should explain that the United States has a large society and access to government
decision-making, but the public is generally not knowledgeable regarding world politics and
global affairs. Another answer could discuss how the public favors an active role for the United
States in world politics, but the public’s focus and major concerns rest with local and domestic
affairs.
57. Define and explain the significance of the term public relations presidency.
ANS:
Answers should discuss adjusting the presidency to emphasize communication and
manipulation of public opinion. Answers should address the significance of the president’s and
staff’s greater focus on opinion and mass communication than on governing functions.
ANS:
Answers should identify the Almond–Lippmann consensus as the early and dominant theory of
public opinion and U.S. foreign policy. This model emphasizes the volatile, incoherent, and
irrelevant nature of public opinion in terms of U.S. foreign policy.
59. Identify and explain the three categories of individuals that comprise public opinion. Include
which proportion of the public falls into each category.
ANS:
Answers should identify foreign policy elites (1 percent or less of the population), the attentive
public (about 15 percent of the population), and the mass public (the vast majority of citizens)
and also explain the demographics of each group.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Democracy and the Paradox of World Power
OBJ: 7.1 COG: Comprehension
60. How do the traditional theories of international relations shape opinions regarding the role of
political leadership in democratic governance?
ANS:
Answers should identify how realists are skeptical of public opinion as a reliable guide to
foreign policy and thus support the trustee model of representation, whereas liberal theories
argue in favor of close adherence to public opinion and support the delegate model of
representation.
61. How did the public’s core beliefs regarding the U.S. use of force affect support for military
interventions in the post–Cold War period?
ANS:
Answers should identify how one of the public’s core beliefs—that U.S. power should be
applied only to repel clear threats to vital national interests—produced support for military
intervention in some situations and calls for restraint in others. Examples of support may
include the Persian Gulf war and the war in Afghanistan. Examples of opposition may include
Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Iraq.
62. Identify and explain the difference between militant internationalism and cooperative
internationalism.
ANS:
Answers should identify militant internationalism as a form of activism in foreign policy that
emphasizes coercive measures (including the use of force) over diplomacy and other peaceful
means of statecraft. Answers should identify cooperative internationalism as a form of activism
that emphasizes diplomacy and multilateral collaboration rather than military confrontation.
63. Identify and explain how cultural detachment affects mass public opinion.
ANS:
Answers should identify how cultural detachment in the United States stems from its
geographic distance from other major powers and ideas regarding American exceptionalism.
Answers should also identify how this detachment has led to major deficiencies in
understanding global events and foreign policy issues in the mass public.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Rallying around the Flag after 9/11
OBJ: 7.2 COG: Comprehension
65. How do physical identities—such as gender, race, and generation—affect the formation of
public opinion in foreign policy?
ANS:
Answers should identify how physical identities serve as a strong foundation for group
identities, which play a role in public opinion formation. Answers should also identify how
these identities have varying degrees of influence, with generation having a smaller impact than
gender or race.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Physical Identities: Gender, Race, and Generation
OBJ: 7.3 COG: Comprehension
66. How do social identities—such as education, wealth, and religion—affect the formation of
public opinion in foreign policy?
ANS:
Answers should identify how social identities serve as a strong foundation for group identities,
which play a role in public opinion formation. Answers should also identify how these identities
have varying degrees of influence, with education and wealth being very important. Answers
may also identify the role of religion in relation to the divine divide, or the phenomenon that
occurs between foreign policy opinions and church attendance.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Social Identities: Education, Wealth, and Religion
OBJ: 7.3 COG: Comprehension
67. How do political identities—such as ideology and political party—affect the formation of
public opinion in foreign policy?
ANS:
Answers should identify how political identities serve as a strong foundation for group
identities, which play a role in public opinion formation. Answers should also identify how
these basic attitudes tend to be stable over time and serve as a basis for future opinions.
PTS: 1 DIF: Medium REF: Political Identities: Ideology and Political Party
OBJ: 7.3 COG: Comprehension
ESSAY
68. Compare and contrast the delegate and trustee models as they relate to the public’s role in U.S.
foreign policy.
ANS:
Answers should identify the delegate model as one in which politicians and officials make
decisions based on the preferences of the majority of their constituents. The trustee model, on
the other hand, should be identified as one in which officials make decisions based on their own
knowledge and experience; this model is based on the legitimacy given to officials by the voting
public. Answers could connect the models to theories of international relations (i.e., the
delegate model relates to liberalism and the trustee model to realism).
69. Explain and discuss the significance of the Vietnam Syndrome. Relate the Vietnam Syndrome
to a current or recent foreign policy situation. Does this concept help to explain public opinion
concerning the current or recent situation? Why or why not?
ANS:
Answers should describe the Vietnam Syndrome as the American public’s reaction to
casualties, news coverage, a corrupt administration, and the long war in Vietnam. Answers
should explain that the Vietnam Syndrome is the public’s general belief that the United States
should not get involved militarily in global affairs unless it is absolutely necessary. Current
examples that could be included in answers as public opinion constraints on foreign policy and
military interventions are Haiti and Kosovo in the 1990s and Iraq in 2003 to 2004.
70. Discuss the concept of the “rally-around-the-flag effect.” Does it apply to President Bush and
the war on terrorism?
ANS:
Answers should explain that public approval ratings tend to rise and spike in favor of the
president during a crisis and give as an example the spike in public approval for President Bush
following the September 11 attacks: President Bush’s approval rating went from the mid-fifties
to the nineties, the highest level for any president. Answers could also discuss the tendency of
other government officials and the news media not to critique the president during crisis
situations. Answers could also explain that presidential approval ratings tend to begin declining
in the middle of the crisis and conflict situation.
71. Identify and explain the difference between militant internationalism and cooperative
internationalism. How do these concepts align with traditional theories of international
relations? Do these perspectives represent larger trends in public opinion?
ANS:
Answers should identify militant internationalism, aligned with realism, as a form of activism
in foreign policy that emphasizes coercive measures, including the use of force, over diplomacy
and other peaceful means of statecraft. Answers should identify cooperative internationalism,
aligned with liberalism, as a form of activism that emphasizes diplomacy and multilateral
collaboration rather than military confrontation. Answers should also identify how militant and
cooperative internationalism represents a more subtle difference in the level of international
trust felt by individuals and explain the consequences of a lack of international trust by the
majority of Americans.
72. What is the “knowledge gap” in U.S. foreign policy? How does this gap impact public opinion
on foreign policy issues? What roles do the U.S. educational system and policy elites play in
widening or narrowing the gap?
ANS:
Answers should identify the knowledge gap as the common understanding that American
citizens are largely detached from politics, lacking both extensive knowledge of and interest in
government at any level. Answers should also identify that the gap shapes and leads citizens to
form opinions based on inaccurate or incomplete information. Answers should acknowledge
the ongoing difficulties within the educational system that are widening the information gap.
Answers should also acknowledge how citizens end up relying on elites for “cues” to form their
opinions, thus widening the gap further and preventing necessary scrutiny from being cast on
legislators’ actions.
73. How do attitudes regarding U.S. foreign aid reflect the knowledge gap in U.S. foreign policy?
How do these attitudes shape the behavior of members of Congress? Does this impact the
foreign policy bureaucracy?
ANS:
Answers should discuss how, due to the knowledge gap, the mass public tends to overestimate
the amount of money budgeted for U.S. foreign aid. This leads voters to believe the United
States is spending “too much” on foreign aid and demand the money be reallocated to domestic
causes. Because members of Congress are highly subject to electoral factors (Chapter 5), they
incorrectly assume voters prefer unilateralism. Examples of how this affects the foreign policy
bureaucracy will vary but may address how Congress may choose to defund certain foreign
policy agencies (Chapter 6).
74. How did public opinion of U.S. foreign policy change from the Clinton, Bush, and Obama
administrations? In what ways did foreign policy impact presidential approval ratings and
presidential behavior?
ANS:
Answers should identify how public opinion of the Clinton administration’s performance on
foreign policy issues was low, but presidential approval ratings remained high. In addition,
answers should identify the ways in which Clinton seemingly made foreign policy decisions
based on public opinion. Responses should identify high evaluations of Bush’s foreign policy
after the 9/11 attacks and acknowledge how it dropped in responses to the Iraq war and
mishandling of foreign affairs. Answers should also acknowledge how Bush sometimes
seemingly ignored public opinion (such as when he decided to invade Iraq without a UN
Security Council Resolution). Lastly, answers should identify how public opinion reflects that
many citizens feel the Obama administration has been too passive on foreign policy crises and
how presidential approval ratings have decreased over his term. Answers may identify cases
such as Syria as reflections of how public opinion may have impacted Obama’s
decision-making.
75. How has public opinion on U.S. foreign policy issues evolved during the Obama
administration? What evidence, if any, indicated that the Obama administration considered
public attitudes and/or changed its actions as a response to public opinion?
ANS:
Answers should detail how, over the course of the Obama administration, public opinion of
U.S. foreign policy issues has fallen, with many citizens believing that Obama was too passive
on foreign policy crises such as the Islamic State. Answers may identify cases such as the U.S.
withdrawal of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan as reflections of how public opinion may have
impacted Obama’s decision-making.
76. What role does global public opinion play in U.S. foreign policy decision-making and
American policy makers’ interactions with other countries? What observable trends exist in
post–Cold War global opinion?
ANS:
Answers should acknowledge how U.S. policy makers pay attention to global public opinion
and try to rally support for their policies and actions abroad. Answers should also acknowledge
the growing impact of public opinion, stemming from several sources: the advance of
information technologies, the widespread growth of civil societies in response to democratic
reforms, and the wider array of issues and problems that cross national borders. Answers
regarding observable trends in the post-Cold War period may vary but include relatively
favorable views of the United States in the first ten years after the war, followed by rising
anti-Americanism during the Iraq war due to the U.S. penchant for favoring military over
diplomatic solutions and unwillingness to consider the perspectives of other countries. Recent
trends indicated more favorable opinions in some regions (Western Europe, for example) but
remained low in others (Middle East and North Africa, for example).
ANS:
Answers should identify and describe physical traits (such as gender, age, and race), social
associations (such as education, wealth, and religion), and belief systems (including ideology
and political party). Answers regarding the importance of understanding demographics will
vary but should acknowledge how these demographics allow policy makers to make reliable
predictions about different groups on a variety of foreign policy issues.
78. In what ways does public opinion on foreign policy after the Cold War support or contradict the
idea that the mass public is inconsistent? Be specific in your answer and provide examples if
appropriate.
ANS:
Answers will vary widely but should trace the evolution of public opinion since the end of the
Cold War during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. Answers may also draw on the
literature regarding group identities to establish the ways in which people form opinions that
remain consistent over time.
79. How does contemporary research on public opinion and foreign policy support or contradict the
Almond–Lippmann consensus? Be sure to identify the principle assumptions of the Almond–
Lippmann consensus in your answer.
ANS:
Answers should identify the Almond–Lippmann consensus as a dominant theory of public
opinion and U.S. foreign policy that emphasizes the volatile, incoherent, and irrelevant nature
of public opinion in terms of U.S. foreign policy. Answers should also address how recent
contemporary research contradicts or challenges the fundamental assumptions of the Almond–
Lippmann consensus and provide examples of this research as appropriate.
I have noticed, in a previous page, the very scant courtesy which the
queen of Charles I. met with at the hands of a Commonwealth
admiral. The courtesy of some of the Stuart knights toward royal
ladies was not, however, of a much more gallant aspect. I will
illustrate this by an anecdote told by M. Macaulay in the fourth
volume of his history. The spirit of the Jacobites in William’s reign
had been excited by the news of the fall of Mons.... “In the parks the
malcontents wore their biggest looks, and talked sedition in their
loudest tones. The most conspicuous among these swaggerers was
Sir John Fenwick, who had in the late reign been high in favor and
military command, and was now an indefatigable agitator and
conspirator. In his exaltation he forgot the courtesy which man owes
to woman. He had more than once made himself conspicuous by his
impertinence to the queen. He now ostentatiously put himself in her
way when she took her airing, and while all around him uncovered
and bowed low, gave her a rude stare, and cocked his hat in her
face. The affront was not only brutal but cowardly. For the law had
provided no punishment for mere impertinence, however gross; and
the king was the only gentleman and soldier in the kingdom who
could not protect his wife from contumely with his sword. All that the
queen could do was to order the park-keepers not to admit Sir John
again within the gates. But long after her death a day came when he
had reason to wish that he had restrained his insolence. He found,
by terrible proof, that of all the Jacobites, the most desperate
assassins not excepted, he was the only one for whom William felt
an intense personal aversion.”
The portrait of William III. as drawn by Burnet, does not wear any
very strong resemblance to a hero. The “Roman nose and bright
sparkling eyes,” are the most striking features, but the “countenance
composed of gravity and authority,” has more of the magistrate than
the man at arms. Nevertheless, and in despite of his being always
asthmatical, with lungs oppressed by the dregs of small-pox, and the
slow and “disgusting dryness” of his speech, there was something
chivalrous in the character of William. In “the day of battle he was all
fire, though without passion; he was then everywhere, and looked to
everything. His genius,” says Burnet in another paragraph, “lay
chiefly in war, in which his courage was more admired than his
conduct. Great errors were often committed by him; but his heroical
courage set things right, as it inflamed those who were about him.” In
connection with this part of his character may be noticed the fact that
he procured a parliamentary sanction for the establishment of a
standing army. His character, in other respects, is not badly
illustrated by a remark which he made, when Prince of Orange, to Sir
W. Temple, touching Charles II. “Was ever anything so hot and so
cold as this court of yours? Will the king, who is so often at sea,
never learn the word that I shall never forget, since my last passage,
when in a great storm the captain was crying out to the man at the
helm, all night, ‘Steady, steady, steady!’” He was the first of our kings
who would not touch for the evil. He would leave the working of all
miracles, he said, to God alone. The half-chivalrous, half-religious,
custom of washing the feet of the poor on Maundy Thursday, was
also discontinued by this prince, the last of the heroic five Princes of
Orange.
Great as William was in battle, he perhaps never exhibited more of
the true quality of bravery than when on his voyage to Holland in
1691, he left the fleet, commanded by Sir Cloudesley Shovel and Sir
George Rooke, and in the midst of a thick fog attempted, with some
noblemen of his retinue, to land in an open boat. “The danger,” says
Mr. Macaulay, who may be said to have painted the incident in a few
words, “proved more serious than they had expected.” It had been
supposed that in an hour the party would be on shore. But great
masses of floating ice impeded the progress of the skiff; the night
came on, the fog grew thicker, the waves broke over the king and the
courtiers. Once the keel struck on a sandbank, and was with great
difficulty got off. The hardiest mariners showed some signs of
uneasiness, but William through the whole night was as composed
as if he had been in the drawing-room at Kensington. “For shame,”
he said to one of the dismayed sailors, “are you afraid to die in my
company?” The vehis Cæsarem was, certainly, not finer than this.
The consort of Queen Anne was of a less chivalrous spirit than
William. Coxe says of him, that even in the battle-field he did not
forget the dinner-hour, and he appears to have had more stomach
for feeding than fighting. Of George I., the best that can be said of
him in his knightly capacity, has been said of him, by Smollet, in the
remark, that this prince was a circumspect general. He did not,
however, lack either courage or impetuosity. He may have learned
circumspection under William of Orange. Courage was the common
possession of all the Brunswick princes. Of some of them, it formed
the solitary virtue. But of George I., whom it was the fashion of poets,
aspiring to the laureatship, to call the great, it can not be said, as
was remarked of Philip IV. of Spain, when he took the title of “Great,”
“He has become great, as a ditch becomes great, by losing the land
which belonged to it.”
One more custom of chivalry observed in this reign, went finally out
in that of George II. I allude to the custom of giving hostages.
According to the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, “two persons of rank were
to reside in France, in that capacity, as sureties to France that Great
Britain should restore certain of its conquests in America and the
West Indies.” The “Chevalier,” Prince Charles Edward, accounted
this as a great indignity to England, and one which, he said, he
would not have suffered if he had been in possession of his rights.
The age of chivalry, in the old-fashioned sense of the word, went out
before Burke pronounced it as having departed. I do not think it
survived till the reign of George II. In that reign chivalry was defunct,
but there was an exclusive class, whose numbers arrogated to
themselves that nice sense of honor which was supposed, in olden
times, to have especially distinguished the knight. The people
alluded to were par excellence, the people of “fashion.” The
gentlemen who guarded, or who were supposed to guard, the
brightest principle of chivalry, were self-styled rather than universally
acknowledged, “men of honor.”
The man of honor has been painted by “one of themselves.” The
Earl of Chesterfield spoke with connoissance de fait, when he
treated of the theme; and his lordship, whose complacency on this
occasion, does not permit him to see that his wit is pointed against
himself, tells a story without the slightest recollection of the pithy
saying of the old bard, “De te fabula narratur.”
“A man of honor,” says Lord Chesterfield, “is one who peremptorily
affirms himself to be so, and who will cut anybody’s throat that
questions it, even upon the best grounds. He is infinitely above the
restraints which the laws of God or man lay upon vulgar minds, and
knows no other ties but those of honor, of which word he is to be the
sole expounder. He must strictly advocate a party denomination,
though he may be utterly regardless of its principles. His expense
should exceed his income considerably, not for the necessaries, but
for the superfluities of life, that the debts he contracts may do him
honor. There should be a haughtiness and insolence in his
deportment, which is supposed to result from conscious honor. If he
be choleric and wrong-headed into the bargain, with a good deal of
animal courage, he acquires the glorious character of a man of
honor; and if all these qualifications are duly seasoned with the
genteelest vices, the man of honor is complete; anything his wife,
children, servants, or tradesmen, may think to the contrary,
notwithstanding.”
Lord Chesterfield goes on to exemplify the then modern chivalrous
guardian of honor, by drawing the portrait of a friend under an
assumed name. He paints a certain “Belville” of whom his male
friends are proud, his female friends fond, and in whom his party
glories as a living example—frequently making that example the
authority for their own conduct. He has lost a fortune by
extravagance and gambling; he is uneasy only as to how his honor is
to be intact by acquitting his liabilities from “play.” He must raise
money at any price, for, as he says, “I would rather suffer the
greatest incumbrance upon my fortune, than the least blemish upon
my honor.” His privilege as a peer will preserve him from those
“clamorous rascals, the tradesmen”; and lest he should not be able
to get money by any other means, to pay his “debts of honor,” he
writes to the prime minister and offers to sell his vote and conscience
for the consideration of fifteen hundred pounds. He exacts his money
before he records his vote, persuaded as he is that the minister will
not be the first person that ever questioned the honor of the
chivalrous Belville.
The modern knight has, of course, a lady love. The latter is as much
like Guinever, of good King Arthur’s time, as can well be; and she
has a husband who is more suspicious and jealous than the founder
of the chivalrous Round Table. “Belville” can not imagine how the
lady’s husband can be suspicious, for he and Belville have been
play-fellows, school-fellows, and sworn friends in manhood.
Consequently, Belville thinks that wrong may be committed in all
confidence and security. “However,” he writes to the lady, “be
convinced that you are in the hands of a man of honor, who will not
suffer you to be ill-used, and should my friend proceed to any
disagreeable extremities with you, depend upon it, I will cut the c
——’s throat for him.”
Life in love, so in lying. He writes to an acquaintance that he had
“told a d——d lie last night in a mixed company,” and had challenged
a “formal old dog,” who had insinuated that “Belville” had violated the
truth. The latter requests his “dear Charles” to be his second—“the
booby,” he writes of the adversary who had detected him in a lie,
“was hardly worth my resentment, but you know my delicacy where
honor is concerned.”
Lord Chesterfield wrote more than one paper on the subject of men
of honor. For these I refer the reader to his lordship’s works. I will
quote no further from them than to show a distinction, which the
author draws with some ingenuity. “I must observe,” he says, “that
there is a great difference between a Man of Honor and a Person
of Honor. By Persons of Honor were meant, in the latter part of
the last century, bad authors and poets of noble birth, who were but
just not fools enough to prefix their names in great letters to the
prologues, epilogues, and sometimes even the plays with which they
entertained the public. But now that our nobility are too generous to
interfere in the trade of us poor, professed authors” (his lordship is
writing anonymously, in the World), “or to eclipse our performances
by the distinguished and superior excellency and lustre of theirs; the
meaning at present of a Person of Honor is reduced to the simple
idea of a Person of Illustrious Birth.”
The chivalrous courage of one of our admirals at the close of the
reign of George II., very naturally excited the admiration of Walpole.
“What milksops,” he writes in 1760, “the Marlboroughs and
Turennes, the Blakes and Van Tromps appear now, who whipped
into winter quarters and into ports the moment their nose looked
blue. Sir Cloudesley Shovel said that an admiral deserved to be
broken who kept great ships out after the end of September; and to
be shot, if after October. There is Hawke in the bay, weathering this
winter (January), after conquering in a storm.”
George III. was king during a longer period than any other sovereign
of England; and the wars and disasters of his reign were more
gigantic than those of any other period. He was little of a soldier
himself; was, however, constitutionally brave; and had his courage
and powers tested by other than military matters. The politics of his
reign wore his spirit more than if he had been engaged in carrying on
operations against an enemy. During the first ten years after his
accession, there were not less than seven administrations; and the
cabinets of Newcastle and Bute, Grenville and Rockingham, Grafton
and North, Shelburne and Portland, were but so many camps, the
leaders in which worried the poor monarch worse than the Greeks
badgered unhappy Agamemnon. Under the administration of Pitt he
was hardly more at his ease, and in no degree more so under that of
Addington, or that of All the Talents, and of Spencer Perceval. An
active life of warfare could not have more worn the spirit and health
of this king than political intrigues did; intrigues, however, be it said,
into which he himself plunged with no inconsiderable delight, and
with slender satisfactory results.
He was fond of the display of knightly ceremonies, and was never
more pleased than when he was arranging the ceremonies of
installation, and turning the simple gentlemen into knights. Of the
sons who succeeded him, George IV. was least like him in good
principle of any sort, while William IV. surpassed him in the
circumstance of his having been in action, where he bore himself
spiritedly. The race indeed has ever been brave, and I do not know
that I can better close the chapter than with an illustration of the
“Battle-cry of Brunswick.”
THE BATTLE-CRY OF BRUNSWICK.
The “Battle-cry of Brunswick” deserves to be commemorated among
the acts of chivalry. Miss Benger, in her “Memoirs of Elizabeth,
Queen of Bohemia,” relates that Christian, Duke of Brunswick, was
touched alike by the deep misfortunes, and the cheerful patience of
that unhappy queen. Indignant at the neglect with which she was
treated by her father, James I. of England, and her uncle, Frederick
of Denmark, Duke Christian “seemed suddenly inspired by a
sentiment of chivalric devotion, as far removed from vulgar gallantry
as heroism from ferocity. Snatching from her hand a glove, which he
first raised with reverence to his lips, he placed it in his Spanish hat,
as a triumphal plume which, for her sake, he ever after wore as a
martial ornament; then drawing his sword he took a solemn oath
never to lay down arms until he should see the King and Queen of
Bohemia reinstated in the Palatinate. No sooner had Christian taken
this engagement than he eagerly proclaimed it to the world, by
substituting on his ensign, instead of his denunciation of priests, an
intelligible invocation to Elizabeth in the words ‘For God and for her!’
Fur Gott und fur sie!”