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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/25/2016, SPi
Animalism
Animalism
New Essays on Persons,
Animals, and Identity
edited by
Stephan Blatti
and Paul F. Snowdon
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© the several contributors 2016
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2016
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
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Library of Congress Control Number: 2016930898
ISBN 978–0–19–960875–1
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Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
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contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
Contents
List of Contributors vii
1. Introduction 1
Stephan Blatti and Paul F. Snowdon
Part I
2. We Are Not Human Beings 31
Derek Parfit
3. Animalism vs. Constitutionalism 50
Lynne Rudder Baker
4. Constitution and the Debate between Animalism and
Psychological Views 64
Denis Robinson
5. Remnant Persons: Animalism’s Undoing 89
Mark Johnston
6. Thinking Animals Without Animalism 128
Sydney Shoemaker
Part II
7. The Remnant-Person Problem 145
Eric T. Olson
8. Headhunters 162
Stephan Blatti
9. Thinking Parts 180
Rory Madden
10. Four-Dimensional Animalism 208
David B. Hershenov
Part III
11. Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning 229
Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan
12. A Case in which Two Persons Exist in One Animal 253
Mark D. Reid
vi c ontents
13. Animalism and the Unity of Consciousness: Some Issues 266

Paul F. Snowdon
14. Animal Ethics 283
Jens Johansson
15. The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism 303
David Shoemaker
Index 329
List of Contributors
Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Stephan Blatti, University of Memphis
Tim Campbell, Institute for Futures Studies
David B. Hershenov, University at Buffalo
Jens Johansson, Uppsala University
Mark Johnston, Princeton University
Rory Madden, University College London
Jeff McMahan, University of Oxford
Eric T. Olson, University of Sheffield
Derek Parfit, University of Oxford
Mark D. Reid, Wilkes University
Denis Robinson, University of Auckland
David Shoemaker, Tulane University
Sydney Shoemaker, Cornell University
Paul F. Snowdon, University College London
1
Introduction
Stephan Blatti and Paul F. Snowdon
The purpose of this collection is to gather together a group of chapters that are inspired
by three central questions: What is animalism? What implications does it have? Is
animalism true? The aim is to push the debate about these questions forward. Most of
the chapters are new. The two that are not—those by Parfit and by Campbell and
McMahan—are recent and highly important essays that raise fundamental questions
about animalism, and we feel they deserve a place in this collection. We also wanted to
collect together good work from different intellectual centres around the world, in
North America, the UK, and Australasia, but also work from philosophers of different
ages and at different stages. Some chapters represent forceful and novel presentations
of relatively well-known viewpoints, whereas others move the debate along totally new
directions. No view is dominant, and different chapters focus on different aspects of
the debate. We, the editors, are both animalists (which is not to say that we are animal-
ists of precisely the same kind), but our main hope with this collection is that it will
stimulate new discussion, not that we shall make converts to our own view. It takes
time for debates in philosophy to deepen and to sort the wheat from the chaff, but
we hope this collection will help those things to happen in the next stage of debate
about animalism.
In this introduction we shall sketch the background to the current debates and try to
relate the chapters here to that background. It is impossible for us to pick out every
issue or argument in all the chapters that we regard as important. All we can do is to
highlight some of them. As with all philosophical subjects, properly sorting out the
issues is a task for those who wish to think about them.
One way to think of animalism is as a view about the relation between us, persons,
and animals. According to it we are identical with some animals. We can, then, regard
the background question as—what is our relation to animals? It is interesting to note
that this general question has risen to prominence not only in the analytic philosoph-
ical tradition, but also in the continental tradition (e.g. in the work of Derrida) and in
various areas of interdisciplinary inquiry (e.g. animal studies). The issues discussed
here, then, provide one example of intellectual convergence between multiple philo-
sophical traditions and areas of investigation.
2 Stephan Blatti and Paul f. Snowdon
1.1. ‘Animalism’
As is the wont with -ism’s in philosophy, not everyone will define ‘animalism’ in the
same way. But a way that seems true to its use by many people is that it stands for the
claim that we, each of us, are identical to, are one and the same thing as, an animal of a
certain kind. That kind is what is called Homo sapiens. Putting it less technically, each
of us is a human animal. According to this proposal we can say that at various places
there is both an animal and one of us, and those things are in fact the same thing.
Now, it is often convenient to have a noun picking out those things that we have so
far picked out as ‘us’, or as ‘one of us’. We shall talk of the ‘person’ and of ‘persons’. In
using this venerable noun we are not committing ourselves to our usage being the
same as that of the normal usage. But using this noun, so interpreted, we can formulate
the claim as ‘each person is an animal’.
Formulating it in these ways leaves plenty of important interpretative questions
unexplored, to which we shall return, but it suffices to fix the central thesis. And putt-
ing the thesis this way renders it an answer to the question ‘What are we?’ or ‘What is
our nature?’ These questions are ones that have perennially gripped us, and to which
many intellectual traditions have given their answers.
1.2. Recent History

We shall begin with a brief and schematic history of the recent emergence of this
approach in philosophical thinking about ourselves.
In post-war analytical philosophy the problem of personal identity received consid-
erable attention from a succession of highly talented and creative philosophers, includ-
ing Strawson, Williams, Shoemaker, Parfit, Nagel, Mackie, Lewis, Unger, and Noonan,
to name only a few of those involved in the debates. One striking thing about these
debates was the almost total absence in them of any mention of the notion of an ani-
mal. People in the debate simply assumed that an interest in the nature of ourselves was
an interest in the analysis of what it is to be a person. The term ‘person’ was, that is,
taken to express or stand for our basic nature. With that as a background assumption,
thinking about our persistence over time—called, of course, the problem of personal
identity—tended to start by considering the proposal that persons are tied to their
bodies, a proposal that was defended by Bernard Williams. However, this view was
more or less universally rejected by philosophers, a rejection based primarily on the
power of brain transplant arguments, initially and very effectively developed by
Shoemaker. This dismissal was usually very rapid and taken to be more or less obvious.
The debate then resolved itself, very roughly, into a choice between increasingly
sophisticated versions of the type of approach originally proposed by Locke—a
development led with great ingenuity by Shoemaker and Parfit—and the proposal that
we are tied in our persistence requirements to our brains, a view articulated, among
others, by Nagel and Mackie. Although the debates continued to regard these as the
introduction 3
two main alternative ways to think about our persistence, they were enriched and
complicated by two further developments. The first was the extraordinary popularity
within American and Australian philosophy, and subsequently in British philosophy,
of thinking about what is called identity over time within a framework of four-
dimensionalism. David Lewis’s work had a major influence in moving the debate in
that direction, of course. This meant that new ways to formulate the basic ideas were
inserted into the debate, and some new and fairly technical issues emerged. The second
new direction resulted from the very important work of Parfit who took what was
basically a sophisticated Lockean approach and tried to derive from it some radical
claims in value theory about the importance of facts about personal identity, captured,
no doubt rather crudely, in the slogan that ‘identity is not what matters’. Parfit’s ideas
about value and his linking of the personal identity debate to value theory generated a
rich discussion, and this linkage remains present in more recent debates, and indeed in
some contributions to this volume.
There is an important question that can be raised here, on the assumption that the
foregoing is more or less correct: Why was the idea of an animal conspicuously absent
in this classical period of debate? To answer this question we need to return to Locke’s
famous discussion of personal identity, in which the notion of an animal was central.1
One of Locke’s purposes was to affirm that the person—one example, as we might say,
being Locke himself—is not the animal but has persistence conditions which are quite
different, and is therefore a different item. Locke exercised great care in specifying the
different ideas for which the words ‘animal’ and ‘person’ stood. A reasonable conjec-
ture, or proposal, we suggest, is that Locke’s treatment of these two terms and notions
was so effective that it generated in people engaging with the problem the conviction
that the notion of a person is the central one fixing the type of thing the problem is
about, with the consequence that the notion of an animal was lost to sight. The cen-
trality of the notion of person represented what we might call a basic framework
assumption in the very formulation of the problem.2
Whatever the truth in that hypothesis, it is surely hard to escape the conviction that,
despite the richness of these debates, the invisibility in them of the notion of an animal
represented a gross impoverishment and oversight. This conviction struck a number
of philosophers, whose styles and metaphysical inclinations were otherwise quite
diverse, more or less simultaneously and independently in the 1980s (or perhaps
earlier). Among the philosophers who endorsed this conviction were David Wiggins,
Michael Ayers, Paul Snowdon, and Eric Olson in the UK, and Bill Carter and Peter van
1
See Locke 1975, II.xxviii.3, 5–8, 12–15, 21, 29. In these sections Locke regularly alludes to animals and
humans in his efforts to settle the nature of personal identity. Currently the interpretation of Locke’s dis-
cussion is a matter of considerable controversy, but Locke’s role in relegating the notion of animal can be
acknowledged whichever side one is on in this debate.
2
The invisibility of the notion of ‘animal’ in what we are calling the classical period was not of course
total. In influential discussions by both Shoemaker and Johnston, the notion does surface. What is striking
is how rare this engagement is, and, moreover, how—even when the notion of an animal attracted
attention—the assumption was that, of course, the animal is not what we are.
Inwagen in the USA. Although this is not true of all those listed in the previous sen-
tence, the emergence into the debate of the notion of an animal was tied to three basic
convictions: first, that where each of us is, there is an animal, a thing belonging to a
kind that represents one of our most fundamental categories we operate with; second,
that given what seem to be the properties that the animal in question has (in particular,
its psychological properties), there is something close to a paradox in denying the iden-
tity between the animal and the person, and hence there is something close to a para-
dox in the major views that the dominant tradition was exploring; third, in the light of
the force of that type of consideration, we should search very hard for ways to counter
the arguments that philosophers provide for denying the identity, since those argu-
ments give the appearance of leading us astray. The initial and shared reason for
thinking that there is something close to a paradox in the denial of the identity acquired
the name of the ‘two lives objection’.3
These developments in philosophy were driven primarily by responses within that
discipline to the arguments that were taken to be powerful by its practitioners, but
other disciplines provided what we might call ‘aid and comfort’ for the new ideas.
Criticisms of what came to be called ‘anthropodenial’ (i.e. the denial that we are ani-
mals) in the writings of such ethologists as Frans de Waal strongly supported
animalism.
Once this animalist approach came to the notice of philosophers more generally,
and the idea of an animal ceased to be so invisible to philosophers, the debate became
much richer, in a way that was dictated by the basic structure of the early animalist
writings. One area of debate was the attempt by anti-animalists to discredit the
so-called two lives objection.4 Another area of debate has been the development of
anti-animalist arguments that did not surface in the initial period of discussion.5
However, on the pro-animalist side of the debate, new arguments are emerging and
new difficulties in the opposition views are being constructed.6 We shall spell some of
these out in more detail in Section 1.3. The work in the present volume bears testimony
to these critical and constructive developments.
1.3. Objections to Animalism

We have emphasized that animalism can be described as an identity thesis (each of us
is identical to an animal) and this, we shall argue, illuminates the structure of the
debates about it. The fundamental commitment of an identity thesis is that, since the
entities in question are supposed to be the same thing, they must have the same
properties. So the argumentative strategy of opponents to the claim will be to find a
3
For early expressions of this line of thought see Carter 1989, Snowdon 1990, Ayers 1991.
4
See Noonan 1998, Baker 2000, Shoemaker 1999.
5
See, e.g., Baker 2000, McMahan 2002, Johnston 2007.
6
See Blatti 2012, Snowdon 2014.
introduction 5
property which one entity has but the other lacks. If that can be found, then however
closely they are related, they are not identical. Now, if we simply compare in a superfi-
cial way ourselves with the animals located where we are, what is striking is how much
overlap there is in our properties. We would say that the two things have the same
physical properties (e.g. we weigh the same, look the same, etc.), and we share the same
biological features (e.g. the two of us are alive, digest food, breathe, reproduce, and so
on).7 So, how might someone argue that there is property difference? One cannot argue
that the animal is an animal, but that we are persons, since any animalist will agree with
that but claim that what follows is that there is an animal which is a person, and there is
no obvious reason to object to that as a possibility.
What supposed differences do philosophers think they have located which support
the denial of this identity? One traditional reason for rejecting this identity emerged in
the writings of Descartes. He combined the claim that we rational creatures are
non-physical selves, or egos, with the further claim that animals are purely physical
systems running according to physical-mechanical laws. The conjunction of these
claims implied that we things which are selves are not the self-same things as animals.
However, in the tradition of debate that the chapters in this volume are situated, this
Cartesian conception of an alleged difference in properties has not really had any ser-
ious influence. Further, part of Descartes’ reasons for thinking that we are non-physical
egos is that he believed that a purely physical system is very limited in what it can do,
whereas we are capable of an almost unlimited range of achievements due to our
rationality. This supposed contrast in capacities, however, is doubly unjustified. First,
Descartes really has no good reason to think that he knows what powers purely mater-
ial things can possess. Either he should have held that he was ignorant of the powers of
material things, or, maybe, he should even have inclined to the idea that some matter
has very advanced capacities. This latter idea would have amounted, so to speak, to an
early discovery of that amazing physical thing, the central nervous system. Second,
Descartes had no grounds for supposing he knew what our cognitive powers are.
Maybe they are much more limited than he knew. The anti-animalists in this volume
are not really inspired by such Cartesian reasons.8
The supposed property differences between us and the human animal occupying
the same space that have seemed to occur to most philosophers are differences in what
should be counted as happening to us and to the linked human animal in certain
7
To anyone who has spent any time on safari, what is most obvious is how the activities and processes
that fill the lives of the animals observed there are ones that fill our time too, such activities as cleaning
oneself and others, feeding, drinking and excreting, resting, searching for food, etc. These similarities
between us and them are what is most striking, though the precise way we, for example, acquire food is
different to the way they acquire it. Of course it is also striking that we devote time to things they do not
engage in—like writing philosophy, making clothes, and putting up buildings!
8
Although writers in the present volume do not belong to the Cartesian tradition, there is in current
philosophy an approach to the problem of personal identity, known as the Simple View, which, in many of
its expositions, resembles the Cartesian approach in its conclusions and its style of argument. Presentations
and criticisms of this approach can be found in Gasser and Stefan 2012.
s upposedly possible circumstances. Putting it very broadly, these alleged differences

between us the animal where we are are modal differences, that is, differences between
what is possible for us and what is possible for the human animal. The assumption
behind this is that such modal differences are genuine differences in properties. This
seems to us, and to most people in the debate, a reasonable assumption.
Now, one way to describe these candidate cases is to say that they represent potential
disassociations between us and the animal. In traditional discussions these disassoci-
ations are of two basic kinds. In one kind of case, the disassociation takes the form of a
potential development allegedly resulting in the presence of the animal but not of the
original person. End of life cases supply examples that some would describe this way.
Suppose some trauma has resulted in permanent loss of mental capacity. Some
describe this result as consisting in the human animal remaining but the person as
having gone. There are, of course, other candidate cases that elicit this description from
some people considering them.
In the second dominant kind of dissociation case, the idea is that a potential
sequence of events results in the presence of the person—the thing of our kind—but
not of the animal. The best-known and strongly influential example of this sort of case
is that of a brain transplant. When most people think about brain transplant examples,
making the assumptions that they do, their verdict is that the process preserves the
person with the brain, but the animal does not go with the brain and could even be
destroyed if, say, what is left of the body minus the brain were destroyed.
Since brain transplant cases have been so influential, they have been the focus of
considerable debate, including debate within this volume. The crucial task for anyone
using such an argument against animalism is to persuade us that we can say with confi-
dence that the outcome for the person is different from the outcome for the animal.
The task for the defender of animalism is to make a convincing case for supposing that
we cannot say this with confidence. Now, one point that has emerged is that it is not at
all obvious that concentrating within the debate on what are solely brain cases is justi-
fied. It might seem that head transplants ground the same pair of dialectically signifi-
cant contrasting verdicts about the person and the animal. In Chapter 2, Parfit’s
argument starts with a head transplant case, though he also relies on brain transplant
cases too. It would also not be inaccurate to describe Chapter 11, by Campbell and
McMahan, as centrally concerned with the philosophical consequences of things that
can happen to human heads.
Another issue concerns the basis that people who employ such transplant argu-
ments have for making their judgements about the outcome. Standardly and originally
the basis was thought of, and described as, intuition. On hearing the description of the
outcome, we simply judge that the person is still there but that the animal need not be.
Such relatively immediate judgements were called (philosophical) intuitions. Anyone
with any inclination to accept animalism will naturally ask whether such intuitions are
reliable. A very interesting viewpoint on this is the one developed by Mark Johnston,
some aspects of which figure in Chapter 5 in this volume, according to which there is
introduction 7
no good basis to trust our relatively immediate reactions to the description of cases
when tracing the fate of the persons involved, but that there are relatively well-
established metaphysical principles that support the verdict about the survival of the
person upon which the brain transplant argument rests. In contrast, in chapter 9 Rory
Madden expresses scepticism about this proposal. It needs pointing out, also, that such
transplant arguments rely on our being accurate about what happens to the animal.
Are we entitled to be confident about that?
1.4. Animalism and Personal Identity

We have been arguing that animalism can be regarded as an identity thesis, and that
this understanding of it illuminates the character of what have been the main types
of objections to it. Such dissociation cases are not, of course, the sole type of objec-
tion to it, and we shall return to some of those shortly. On the present understanding
of animalism, there is a significant contrast between it and what is called Lockeanism
(either ancient or modern). The contrast is that animalism is not per se a theory of
what is normally called personal identity, whereas Lockeanism is such a theory.
When people talk of personal identity, they mean facts about the persistence over
time of things that are persons. A theory of personal identity is, then, some attempt
to spell out in an informative way what is involved in, or essential for, such facts
obtaining. The Lockean answer is that facts about personal persistence are consti-
tuted by facts about psychological relations over time. The animalist identity claim
does not purport to pick out such essential elements in personal identity. It at most
implies that, whatever those facts are, they will be the same as the facts that are con-
stitutive of the animal (with which the person is identical) remaining in existence.
Animalists can disagree radically about what those facts are. It is therefore a serious
mistake for philosophers to describe a particular approach to personal identity as
the animalist approach, even if practically all animalists agree with it. For example, it
is in principle an unsettled issue what the relation is between animal persistence and
life. Most animalists hold that the end of life marks the end of the existence of the
animal, but that is a separate and further claim from the core animalist thesis that the
person is identical with the animal. Further, whether or not life is essential for ani-
mal, and, therefore, personal survival, it is far from clear to what degree something
that is an animal of the human kind can lose its parts and remain in existence.
Obviously it can lose parts, such as limbs and some organs, and equally obviously it
cannot remain in existence after all its parts, say the atoms of which it made, are sep-
arated and dispersed. What can we say about other cases though? A serious task for
animalism is to make progress with these questions. However, since the notion of an
animal is shared between the supporters of the animalist identity thesis and its
opponents, this task is also a shared one. Objections to animalism equally rely on
assumptions about animals.
Although drawing the contrast between animalism as an identity thesis and animal-
ism as a thesis about personal identity is important because it makes the central thesis
more precise, doing so also encourages us to think about the basic thesis in broader
ways. Thus, if each of us is a human animal and we count ourselves as subjects of
experience, it is implied that a human animal is a subject of experience. The question
then is: Are there conditions on being single subjects of experience that human ani-
mals might fail to satisfy? This is the question that Snowdon engages with in Chapter 13,
especially in relation to the idea of the unity of experience, and perhaps cognition, that
single subjects must enjoy.
We have argued in this section that animalism per se is not a theory of personal
identity, but also that it has a generality that certainly makes it a much broader proposal
than being merely a theory of personal identity.
1.5. Issues and Motivations

We want to investigate briefly four other aspects of the content of animalism and to
make some remarks about its appeal. The first is what its epistemological status is. We
can compare it with the supposed status of standard theories of personal identity. In
what we have called the classical period of debate, the working assumption was that we
can determine in some suitably a priori manner what our requirements for persistence
are. The method was that of classical conceptual analysis, in which intuitive verdicts on
described cases were taken to be the method of adjudicating between alternative pro-
posals. Mark Johnston engagingly called this ‘the method of cases’.9 What needs
remarking is that the animalist identity thesis is not committed at all to its being an a
priori discernible truth. The idea is simply that it is a true identity. One consequence of
this status is that proponents of the identity are not committed—when considering sup-
posed counterexamples where there are alleged property differences—to convincing
their opponents that simply thinking about their example ultimately will reveal that
there is no property difference. The proponent is committed only to convincing the
opponent that he or she is not entitled to think they have located a property difference.
Requiring more simply reveals a failure to grasp the real status of the proposal.10
A second issue concerns the employment of the first person plural pronoun in
stating the thesis. Why has that been adopted? One point is that formulating it that way
reflects the fact that the basic source of interest in these questions is an interest in our
own nature. Each of us naturally asks: What am I? But we also naturally accept that we
as a group share a nature, and so we ask: What are we? This represents one justification
9
See Johnston 1987.
10
The philosopher mentioned earlier as an early animalist who did not see things this way is Wiggins.
For him the notion of an animal can be discerned in the best analysis of the notion of a person. His view
seemed to be that it is obvious that we are persons, and that philosophy can reveal that the proper analysis
of ‘person’ builds the notion around that of a type of animal. Most animalists, by contrast, do not regard the
identity as defensible by that sort of reasoning.
introduction 9
for putting the thesis this way. But, further, there is no obvious noun that picks out the
group we wish to talk about. It might seem that the animalist identity could be
expressed by saying that (all) persons are animals. But there is no reason to suppose
that this picks out the right group. One problem is that—at least according to one
standard use of ‘person’ encapsulated in Locke’s famous definition that a person is a
being with reason and reflection that can consider itself the same thinking self in dif-
ferent times and places—there is no ground for supposing there could not be persons
who are not animals (say, gods, angels, pixies, etc.). On the other hand, if we are inter-
ested in what we are, there is no reason to exclude from the extension of ‘we’ creatures
like us who lack the psychological faculties that Locke deems necessary for person-
hood. Of course, there may be other nouns that could be used than ‘person’, but there
seem to be problems with these alternatives as well.
If it is thought that we have a reason to employ the first-person plural pronoun in
stating the identity, then a question needs posing and facing. The problem arises
because pronouns like ‘we’ and ‘us’ do not have strict rules governing their reference. If
a speaker uses the word ‘we’ to pick out a group, it seems that it must include the
speaker, but who else it includes is left open simply given the use of ‘we’. So, a philo-
sophical identity thesis employing the word ‘we’ or ‘us’ raises the question: Which
group is meant by ‘we’? Our aim here is not to answer that question, but rather simply
to highlight it as one that ultimately needs a proper treatment within this debate.
The third issue we want to highlight is that our formulation of animalism as an iden-
tity thesis has made no commitment to the claim, which animalists typically endorse,
that, as we might put it, if something is an animal, then it is essentially and fundamen-
tally an animal.11 This way of speaking is surely familiar, even if it is hard to explain in a
much fuller way if it is challenged. Another way of putting it is that ‘animal’ is a
high-level sortal term. Let us call this the ‘animal as sortal’ thesis.
It is clear that the basic identity thesis does not entail the ‘animal as sortal’ thesis. It is
quite obvious that there is no reverse entailment, since many deniers of the identity
assume that the ‘animal as sortal’ thesis is true. Locke seems to have been a prime
example. It needs, then, to be recognized that it is possible to hold the identity thesis
with or without the ‘animal as sortal’ thesis.
That leaves two important questions to be faced. The first is whether the sortal thesis
is true or not. The second is whether the position that affirms the identity without
affirming the sortal thesis is interesting and important or not. We are not proposing to
answer those questions here, but simply to point them out as ones that hang over the
debate about animalism. Chapter 5 by Mark Johnston engages with this problem.
The fourth area to which we would like to draw attention is the relation between
animalism and value theory. Although the question ‘What are we?’ (and the proposed
answers to that question, for example, that we are animals) are not directly about value,
it is natural to see links between them. There are various examples of philosophers
11
For an endorsement of this claim see Snowdon 1990, Olson 1997.
proposing links here. For example, Locke’s original discussion of personal identity
stresses that ‘person’ is a forensic term, that is, a notion the application of which has
implications about responsibility. His arguments frequently appeal to intuitions about
responsibility and about concern.12 More recently Parfit has defended the radical
idea that ‘identity does not matter’ on the basis of an argument resting on aspects of
a theory of personal identity. In his case, the assumed account of our persistence
conditions is neo-Lockeanism. Further, in some discussions of animalism, when
defending it against some objections, appeal has been made to such ideas.13 So, one
general theme, currently somewhat limited, in the literature about animalism has been
its links to values (in the broadest sense). Several of the chapters in Part III address
themselves to these links.
What are the issues here more generally? One general question is whether there are
arguments from claims about value which count against animalism, or such arguments
which count for animalism. An example of a line of thought against animalism, deriving
from Locke’s approach is based on two claims: first, if person x is the same person as y,
then x is responsible for everything that y did; and second, to be responsible for an
action, a person must be mentally linked to the action, say, by way of remembering it. If
both these claims are true, then animalism is in trouble. But in reply it is perfectly rea-
sonable to deny both claims. A person is not necessarily responsible for what he or she
did, and there is no rigid prohibition on someone counting as responsible for an action
that is not remembered. A further general issue is whether the animalist thesis might
clarify our thinking about value. If animalism is correct does that undermine the argu-
ments that Parfit advances to support his claims about value? Or does the idea that we
have an animal nature help us to identify what is of value in our lives? These are ques-
tions that need investigation. In this volume Chapter 14 by Jens Johansson provides an
illuminating and original discussion of some of these issues.
Although it is not our aim to make converts to animalism, nor to argue for the pos-
ition here, there are some features of the position that seem to us to warrant not simply
abandoning it in the face of a few typical philosophical objections. That is to say, we
should test such objections thoroughly. Here are four reasons for regarding it this way.
First, once one rejects animalism it becomes difficult to propose an account of our
nature and persistence conditions that will be complete and intelligible, and which
has any chance of generating agreement. Even if neo-Lockeans have satisfactorily
answered the standard objections to their view, they seem to have no route to filling in
the details of the required psychological links that will look plausible. Those who
favour a view based on the notion of the continuance of neural structures enabling
consciousness either are tempted to identify us with those inner neural structures,
in which we have a self-conception that is more or less incredible, or they identify us in
normal times with the larger surrounding entity, but they still face the task of specifying
12
For one development of the idea that such value concerns are central to Locke, see Strawson 2011.
13
See Olson 1997, ch. 3.
introduction 11
what neural bundles are necessary and sufficient for persistence, which it is hard to
believe can be done in a way that generates agreement. It may be that we have to go in
such directions but there is considerable attraction in trying to avoid that. Second,
animalism has the singular advantage of being the view that many scientifically know-
ledgeable people assume and work within. It should give philosophers some pause
when they deny what many people take as more or less obvious.14 Third, although
philosophers have concentrated on analysing the conditions for us remaining in exist-
ence over time, we should also aim to achieve some understanding of our spatial extent
at a time. Why are these limbs and organs part of me, but, say, my clothes are not? Most
so-called theories of personal identity shed no light on this question. We have, though,
a well-grounded and clear grasp of the extent at a time of animals. Animalism prom-
ises to explain (or illuminate) both our persistence conditions and our spatial extent.
Fourth, animalism seems to make available to us explanations of many of our basic
features. Thus, if we are animals we can explain why the world contains us in terms of
ordinary evolutionary theory. And, we assume, we can explain why we have special
concerns about our own futures, and why we are drawn to sex, and eating, and so on, in
terms of our nature as animals. There is an explanatory simplicity built into the view.
These points do not force us to accept animalism, but they surely give some support
to being reluctant to give up such a view without a real fight. Anyway, the chapters that
follow need to be carefully weighed, if these attractions are real.
1.6. Contents
We now wish to highlight some of the issues raised by the contributors, and point to
some questions that need asking in light of them. Our approach has to be very select-
ive, and we cannot pick out everything that is of significance.
We have arranged the chapters into three broad groups: those that are principally
concerned with criticizing animalism (Part I), those that are principally concerned with
defending animalism (Part II), and those that are principally concerned with exploring
animalism’s practical applications (Part III). Of course, this is not the only way the chap-
ters might have been arranged, and even by the classifications we adopted, individual
chapters might have been grouped differently. (Chapter 11 by Campbell and McMahan,
for example, is both critical of animalism and an exploration of animalism’s implica-
tions.) In any case, the reader should follow her interests in determining the sequence in
which she moves through the volume; the chapters certainly need not be read in the
order in which we have arranged them. A second purpose of this section of our intro-
duction, then, can be seen as guiding the reader’s determination on how to proceed.
14
For a characteristic affirmation of animalism by a scientist, here is the opening of psychologist
Thomas Suddendorf ’s recent book (2013: 1): ‘Biology puts beyond doubt that you are an organism. Like all
living organisms, humans metabolize and reproduce. Your genome uses the same dictionary as a tulip and
overlaps considerably with the genetic makeup of yeast, bananas, and mice. You are an animal.’
Part I
In Chapter 2, Derek Parfit provides an important contribution in presenting his cur-
rent thinking on animalism, Lockeanism, and the fundamental nature of human per-
sons. Parfit observes that the whole human animal thinks only derivatively, i.e. only in
virtue of having a proper part that is directly engaged in thinking. The part of the ani-
mal that thinks nonderivatively is not the head, since the head thinks only in virtue of
having a thinking brain as a part. Nor is the animal’s brain a nonderivative thinker,
since it thinks only in virtue of including a thinking cerebrum. And while Parfit never
tells us precisely what thing it is that thinks nonderivatively, ultimately there must be
a smallest proper part of a human animal that does so: the cerebrum itself maybe, or
perhaps some still smaller part. And whatever brain part it is that nonderivatively
satisfies Locke’s definition of a person (‘a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason
and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different
times and places’), this thing, Parfit says, is what we are. He calls this the ‘embodied
person view’ because this proper part of your animal is a person and this embodied
person is you.
Parfit’s extended argument for this position consists in demonstrating its utility. For
example, this view preserves our intuition about transplant cases: when the part of
your brain that thinks nonderivatively is removed from one animal body and
implanted into another animal body, you (i.e. the person you are) are thus relocated.
The embodied person view can also answer various challenges that the animalist has
put to the Lockean. For example, the too many thinkers objection makes the point that
the Lockean distinction between persons and animals carries the absurd implication
that every thought is had by two thinkers: the person and the animal. But the Lockean
who affirms the embodied person view has the resources to avoid this problem: unlike
the person who thinks nonderivatively, the animal thinks only by having a part that
does. Furthermore, Parfit presents his view as ‘an obvious solution’ to the thinking
parts objection to animalism. For each human animal, there is only one thing—one
small part of the animal’s brain—that is nonderivatively a Lockean person. To the
extent that proper parts of the animal are thinking parts, they are not thinkers in the
most important sense. As a result, you can know that you are not an animal because
you are whatever thing it is that thinks nonderivatively, and that thing—that person—
is not an animal.
Parfit’s embodied person view is innovative and represents an important contribu-
tion both to the debate over personal identity generally and to the discussion of ani-
malism specifically. Indeed, it is for this reason that we wanted to include this essay in
the volume, despite its having appeared in print previously. Nevertheless, the
embodied person view relies on some distinctions that will require further scrutiny.
One such distinction is the derivative–nonderivative distinction itself. It is unclear, for
instance, precisely what conditions a thing must satisfy in order to qualify as being
directly involved in thinking. In the absence of this precissification, animalists may
introduction 13
suspect that any plausible candidate for being a nonderivative thinker will include as a
proper part something that is not directly involved in thinking. The embodied person
view also relies on a distinction between two usages of the first-person pronoun. In
defending his view against an important objection, Parfit distinguishes the ‘Inner-I’
used to refer to the Lockean person and the ‘Outer-I’ used to refer to the human ani-
mal. Parfit is certainly not the first Lockean to draw this distinction; Baker (2000, 2007),
Noonan (1998, 2001), Strawson (2009), and others have done so as well. But nor is it a
distinction that has escaped controversy.15
In Chapter 3, Lynne Rudder Baker usefully and carefully presents her distinctive
and well-known view of the relation between persons and animals, which is anti-
animalist, and which holds that, in standard conditions, the animal constitutes, but is
not identical with, the person. She sketches her distinctive elucidation of the constitu-
tion relation and its links with predication and truth conditions. She then employs
these ideas to try to rebut the core pro-animalist arguments, and finally she adds two
new reasons to favour her approach. Her response to the pro-animalist arguments
raises the question why we should operate with the logic that she sketches. This is a
question that has already received considerable attention, and the conduct of that
debate will benefit from her clear and concise presentation. With her novel anti-ani-
malist arguments one rests on the conviction that it is possible to preserve a person
while totally replacing the constituting organic matter by inorganic matter, hence
removing the animal while preserving the person, and one crucial question is why we
should concede that is possible. This question has, at least, two sides. Can we be confi-
dent that a non-organic construct can sustain mentality? The other issue is whether we
are entitled to be confident that if such an entity is possible it should count as being the
person. The other argument rests on the conviction that persons will survive bodily
death, a central religious conviction in the Christian tradition, but not something all of
us are inclined to think. The argument also relies on the principle that if something is
in fact to exist eternally it must be incorruptible. It might seem to those on the outside
of the religious debate that God’s supposed omnipotence might unlock this problem.
However, this interesting argument illustrates the way in which debate about animal-
ism can be, and has been, broadened by its links to theological considerations.
In Chapter 4, Denis Robinson’s ambitious aim is to persuade us that what he calls
psychological views of our fundamental nature fit well within what we might call a
plausible metaphysics of the natural world. In particular, Robinson aims to counter the
claim, promoted by Ayers and Olson, that it is a difficulty for non-animalist accounts if
they employ the notion of constitution. He starts by engaging with the thought that
animalism is more commonsensical than the psychological alternative. Robinson
holds that the psychological view implies that entities of different types can coincide,
but he suggests that this possibility is one that is not repugnant to common sense, since
15
For discussion, see Noonan 2012 and Olson 2002, 2007: 37–9.
it seems to be an implication of standardly recognized cases in which we start with

something, A, and things happen to A resulting in the emergence of a new thing, B,
without A ceasing to exist, so that A and another thing B end up coinciding. In such
cases there is often a sense in which B emerges gradually, which fits the way in which,
supposedly, the human animal develops into a person. The psychological theorist
should take ‘person’ as a substance concept, and, it is argued, the popularity of
responses to thought-experiments that favour the psychological account should be
granted as evidence that we do indeed operate with such a concept.
Setting aside worries specifically about employing the notion of constitution in the
theory of persons, Robinson investigates the general notion, or notions, of constitu-
tion. One notion is that of ‘minimal constitution’ (or ‘m-constitution’) which applies
when two items are constituted at a time by the same material elements. This is con-
trasted with a more limited notion of constitution linked to the employment of the
term by Baker. Robinson’s aim is to develop an account of m-constitution, which
though not specifically tied to four-dimensionalism, can easily accommodate it. He
develops his account by giving a series of suggested examples of m-constitution. For
the purpose of this summary, the first example will have to suffice. Robinson has a
normal car, from which the doors are removed. Cars without doors can be regarded as
a new type of thing called a pre-car, suitable for beach driving. This pre-car has never
had doors, but Robinson’s old car—which is still there without its doors—did have
doors, so the pre-car and the old car are not identical but they are composed of the
same matter. In the next section, however, Robinson expands his account to cover
what are the important cases of substances in the debate about personal identity,
namely substances which are dynamic, constantly evolving and changing their matter
(e.g. human animals and perhaps persons). In setting up his account, he also prepares
an answer to the query, posed by Olson, as to how there can be different substances
with different modal properties composed of the same matter at the same place and
time. It is remarked that the categories we employ in describing the world involve lots
of ones which merely approximate to full substance concepts, but nonetheless there are
good examples of substance concepts. In developing his account of substances of this
sort, Robinson alludes to the way of speaking (endorsed by Wiggins, for example)
which links substance concepts to principles of activity as insightful, but he tries to
make it more precise by bringing in the fundamental notion of immanent causation,
operating at different levels. The idea of coincident substances simply represents the
idea that two substances constituting processes can happen to converge at a time so
that the material base sustaining the appropriate processes are grounded in the same
material base. This, it is claimed, does not generate any puzzles.
Robinson ends by acknowledging that there are many uncovered complexities here,
some to do with the way that ‘person’ might be a psychological substance concept, but
he suggests that, despite the strong link between human animals and persons of our
kind, there can be room for individual human persons to leave behind their animal
origins.
introduction 15
Robinson’s highly metaphysical and original analysis can, perhaps, be examined at

two levels. The first is whether the metaphysical nature of substance concepts and puz-
zles about them have been properly resolved. The second is whether he has located
solid evidence that in discussions about our nature and persistence conditions we need
to regard ‘person’ as a separate substance concept.
In Chapter 5, Mark Johnston provides an extremely rich and multifaceted evaluation
of animalism, leading to the conclusion that it is false. This conclusion Johnston regards
as the point at which we need to begin the interesting task of saying what we really are,
but that is, sadly, a task that he does not attempt in this chapter. The shape of the overall
negative argument is familiar from some of his earlier attempts to face up to the prob-
lem of personal identity, but the present chapter develops the argument in novel, wide-
ranging, and powerful ways, which this summary is barely able to indicate.
Johnston’s discussion starts by fixing the target—animalism—as requiring not
simply that we are animals, but that we cannot cease to be animals. As he puts it, this
latter requirement can be expressed by saying that animalism requires that the kind
‘animal’ is a substance kind. Johnston begins with the important question: How can we
determine whether animalism is true? One candidate method is what Johnston calls
‘the method of cases’, which is really the method of testing proposed accounts by
whether they fit our intuitions about various imagined scenarios. This is taken to be
the method of old-fashioned conceptual analysis. Standardly this method is taken to
work against animalism, given the normal intuitive verdict on brain transplants (and
other cases). In the section ‘Some New Worries About the Method of Cases’, Johnston
opposes this method in the present case. One new argument is that whether dualism is
true is an empirical question, so we cannot settle what our basic nature is by an a priori
method of cases. A second and new argument is that the best model for the way we
apply general concepts is that we rely on ‘generic’ connexions, which are not exception-
less principles, so our conceptual resources, on which the method of cases relies, does
not contain data to determine verdicts about the type of cases that philosophers imag-
ine. This section of argument raises the issue of whether either line of thought does
discredit reliance on the method of cases. If Johnston is right then some dialectical
benefit accrues to animalism since this method usually is taken to supply counterargu-
ments to animalism. In Johnston’s view, though, this relief is merely temporary.
Johnston suggests a new method. At a general level it is to use ‘all relevant knowledge
and argumentative ingenuity’. With that there could be no quarrel. But at a more specific
level Johnston stresses that the kind of thing that we are must be a kind that our ordinary
methods of tracing do actually trace. He proposes that his idea initially indicates that we
are animals. A significant question is whether there is even this initial link.
The crucial question, though, is whether the type animal is a substance type. After
discussing whether ‘homo sapiens’ is a substance type, and arguing that it is not,
Johnston focuses on the central question about ‘animal’. Johnston makes two initial
points. The first is that ordinary brain transplant arguments, pioneered by Shoemaker,
do not settle this question, being examples of the discredited method of cases. The
second is that the well-known too-many-thinkers argument for animalism merely

shows that we are animals and not that animal is a substance kind. It does not, there-
fore, support animalism.
This second critical conclusion is correct. The too-many-thinkers argument does
not show that animal is a substance kind. However, it is well worth asking (1) whether
it remains a significant argument since not everyone, unlike Johnston, does think we
are animals; and (2) whether in the original context (and perhaps the abiding context)
in which it was proposed the idea that animal is a substance type was more or less taken
for granted, in which case it would take us all the way to animalism.
In the rest of the chapter Johnston argues that some fundamental principles about the
creation and destruction of persons means that animal is not a substance notion. These
principles force us to describe certain cases as ones in which a person who was an ani-
mal remains in existence but ceases to be an animal. One of the principles is called No
Creation and it says: you do not cause a person to come into being by removing tissue,
unless that tissue is suppressing the capacity for reflective mental life. Johnston claims
that if this is correct then cases like brain transplants on standard assumptions about the
role of the brain in the generation of consciousness and reflection will be examples
which merit the above verdict. Johnston himself proposes the gruesome example of a
guillotine that chops off heads but also crushes and eviscerates the rest of the body. It
should be pointed out that Chapter 9, by Rory Madden, contains a response to this type
of argument, and a crucial question is whether that reply seems strong.
In the rest of the chapter Johnston considers and rejects different responses to this
problem proposed by van Inwagen and by Olson, and also the proposal that such
severed heads can count as animals. This part of the discussion is interesting and
forceful, and each significant claim deserves scrutiny. Johnston leaves us at this point,
longing to know what he thinks we are, which, of course, he is entitled to in a volume
focussed on animalism.
In Chapter 6, Shoemaker continues his defence and elucidation of a modified
Lockean account of personal identity, further amplifying a tradition of thought to
which he has already made many significant contributions. It is extremely valuable
having his recent thinking on this in the volume.
Shoemaker wishes to say that persons are animals with psychological persistence
conditions, but that in the space each of us occupies, there is also what he calls a ‘bio-
logical’ animal, which is an entity with biological persistence conditions. He regards
this as meaning that ‘animal’ is ambiguous. Shoemaker follows Unger in holding that
what we call animals (e.g. the cats and dogs we have as pets) are animals with psycho-
logical persistence conditions, but they themselves also coincide with biological ani-
mals. On Shoemaker’s reading of the animalist view, it says that persons are animals
with biological persistence conditions. The aim of his chapter is to explain how
his complex view can escape the so-called ‘too many minds’ objection to it, which is
supposed to support animalism. In Shoemaker’s view, the objection arises because we
accept physicalism, which seems to imply that physically identical things have the
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“I don’t know,” replied Walter in some confusion. “Of course, I’d
like our nine to have him. But his pitching isn’t all there is to Dan.
He’s——”
“I can understand that,” broke in Mr. Borden. “Come, Walter, we
mustn’t keep your grandmother’s dinner waiting.” As they at once
started toward the farmhouse Walter was eager to ask his father
what his decision was, but as Mr. Borden walked thoughtfully along
the roadside his boy looked at him keenly and decided to wait before
he made any further inquiries. Indeed, Mr. Borden did not again refer
to the matter until just before his departure for the city. He had been
away from the farmhouse twice, but he had gone by himself each
time, and did not refer to what he had been doing.
“Walter,” Mr. Borden said as he was preparing for his departure, “I
have decided to let you tell Dan that he can go to the Tait School this
coming year.”
“Great!” shouted Walter in his delight. “I was sure you would do it
when you found out what kind of a fellow Dan is.”
“I have talked with two or three who know him well—Mr. Moulton
among others. Their reports are all favorable to Dan, but the one
thing that more than any other influenced me was what I found he
was doing in the work on the farm. Walter, he will room with you.”
“Just what I want.”
“You know, he has not been accustomed to some things that are a
part of your life. He may appear a bit awkward at first——”
“I’ll risk all that!” broke in the boy in his enthusiasm.
Mr. Borden smiled and said: “Very well, Walter. There is much that
you and Dan can teach each other and I’ve no doubt each of you will
try to be a teacher. Whether or not either of you will be a very apt
scholar remains to be seen.”
“I don’t understand.”
“You will a little later.”
“It’s good of you to do this for Dan.”
“Is it? Your mother says you are the one that is doing it. Don’t
forget that, Walter. Good-bye; I’ll see you soon and I shall be
interested in hearing about your talk with Dan.”
As Mrs. Borden was to accompany her husband to the station,
Walter at once started for Dan’s home. He was highly elated over his
father’s decision, though he had been confident that his consent
would be granted. It was seldom that Walter met a rebuff in the
family in which he was an only child.
He stopped a moment on the bridge that spanned the brook and
saw Dan coming from the fields to his house. The sight of his friend
aroused his enthusiasm once more, and turning into the near-by lot
Walter began to run. As he came near, he shouted in his eagerness,
“Dan! Dan! Wait a minute! I’ve got something to tell you!”
Dan stopped as he heard the call, and in a brief time his friend ran
to him. “What’s wrong?” inquired Dan in his quiet way as he became
aware of the excitement under which Walter was laboring.
“I’ve got some great news for you, Dan,” panted Walter.
“For me?”
“Yes, sir! For you and me too. You’re going to the Tait School this
year. You’re to room with me. You’ll be the pitcher on the nine and
the biggest ‘find’ we’ve ever had. Oh, it’s immense, Dan! I just——”
“Hold on a minute,” interrupted Dan. “I’m not very clear what you
mean.”
“You are to go to the Tait School this year and room with me.”
“How am I to go?”
“My father is to send you.”
“Do you mean he is to pay for me?”
“Yes, sir. That’s it exactly. He’s going to send you and you’re to
room with me. Why? What’s wrong about that? It’s just as I’m telling
you!” exclaimed Walter somewhat aghast as Dan slowly shook his
head.
CHAPTER XI
A REFUSAL
“I can’t do it,” said Dan soberly.

“Can’t do it!” exclaimed Walter. “You can’t help yourself! You’re
going to the Tait School! You’re going to room with me; you’re going
to pitch on our nine and——”
“It’s good of you, Walter; but I can’t, that’s all.”
“Why can’t you?”
“It costs too much. I simply can’t do it. I can go to the normal
school——”
“But, man, you aren’t going to pay the bills!” interrupted Walter.
“Who will pay them?”
“My father.”
Dan was silent a moment, looking down at the ground at his feet.
When he glanced at his friend again he said, “That’s too much,
Walter. It’s too much for your father——”
“You don’t know my father!” broke in Walter impulsively. “He has
whole barrels of money. Why, Dan, only last month he cleaned up a
cool hundred thousand in a deal——”
“Well, it’s his money, not mine.”
“Of course it is, and if he chooses to take one per cent of what he
made on that deal and put it into your education, why, that’s his
business too, isn’t it?”
“Not entirely.”
“Whose is it?”
“Partly mine.”
“No, sir!” declared Walter emphatically. “It’s none of your business!
My father has a right to spend his own money just as he wants to,
hasn’t he? I’ve heard him say a million times that all money was
good for anyway was just to use. Don’t be foolish, Dan.”
“I don’t mean to be. I can’t tell you how much I appreciate what
you’ve just said to me. But, Walter, there’s another side and you
haven’t thought of that.”
“There isn’t any other side!” declared Walter promptly.
“Doesn’t everything have at least two sides?” asked Dan
quizzically.
“No, sir!”
“What hasn’t, for example?”
“This offer I’m making you. Why, Dan, it’s the chance of a lifetime.
You’ve never been out of Rodman except to go over to Benson or to
Simpson’s Corners to play ball. You don’t know anything of what the
world is like.” Unaware of the dull flush that spread over Dan’s
cheeks as he spoke, Walter continued eagerly: “Why, man alive, the
Tait School is the greatest school in the United States! There isn’t
another that can hold a candle to it! Why, our nine whipped the
freshman nine of every one of the big colleges. We’ve had more men
enter college without conditions in the last five years than any other
prep school. We’ve got the best teachers, the finest buildings, the
greatest crowd of fellows. Why, Dan, you simply don’t know what
you’re talking about! You’re turning down a chance that hundreds of
fellows would jump at. You can’t mean it! If you talk it over with
Moulton, he’ll tell you that if you are fool enough to say no it’ll just
show that you haven’t brains and aren’t fit to go to school anywhere,
not even to the normal school that you seem to think is one of the big
institutions of the land. I’m not going to say another word to you
about it now. When you think it over and tell your mother and Tom
and Moulton about it you won’t have a peg left to hang your hat on.”
“It’s good of you anyway, Walter,” said Dan quietly. “Don’t forget
that I appreciate all you say.”
“No! You don’t half appreciate it or you wouldn’t pull off the way
you’re doing. Honestly, Dan, is there a single real reason why you
can’t say ‘yes’ right off the bat?”
“Yes.”
“What is it?”
“I don’t know that I can make you see it, Walter, but it’s too much
to take when I know it will be a long time before I can pay back the
money.”
“But you don’t have to pay it back! You don’t even have to think of
that! My father will pay every cent of the term-bills!”
“Walter, did you ever think of what it means for a fellow to be poor
and have to take what some one else gives him?”
“I don’t know that I have,” replied Walter more seriously. “Though
when it comes to that,” he added lightly, “I haven’t very many shekels
myself, except my allowance.”
“That’s different.”
“I suppose it is—after a fashion. I never thought very much about it
anyway.”
“If I should offer to give you my yearling colt would you take her?”
“No.”
“Of course you wouldn’t,” said Dan positively.
“That’s different too. In the first place, you couldn’t afford to give
Ban away. She’s too valuable——”
“No, that’s not it!” interrupted Dan. “You wouldn’t be thinking as
much of me as you would of yourself. You’d be saying to yourself, ‘I
can’t take Ban. It’s too much to take as a gift.’ Now, be honest,
Walter, isn’t that really just what you’d think?”
“Perhaps I might,” admitted Walter, “but that has nothing to do with
this case.”
“Hasn’t it?”
“Not a bit! You see——”
“I don’t just see. I tell you, old man, it’s good of you and your
father, but I want you to think of my side too.”
“Dan, you’re an obstinate old——”
“I guess you’re another.”
“I’m not, either! You just pull back like a balky mule!”
“While you’re pulling just as hard the other way.”
“You’ll be sorry some day and call yourself seven kinds of a fool! It
isn’t every day in the week a fellow gets the chance to turn down
such an offer as you’ve got.”
“Don’t you suppose I know that?” asked Dan softly, as he became
aware that his disappointed friend was becoming angry.
“You’ll be sorry when it’s too late, I’m afraid.”
“That may be true.”
“It will be true! It is true! I simply can’t understand how any fellow
can be such a fool as to throw over a chance to go to the Tait
School, especially when the chances are that he’ll be the pitcher on
the school nine. And, Dan,” Walter continued eagerly, “there hasn’t
been a pitcher on the Tait School team who hasn’t been a varsity
pitcher after he entered college. There’s Moulton, for example—oh,
I’m not going to say anything more about it. If you could only see the
Tait School just once you’d be perfectly willing for your old normal
school to go to the hayseeds where it belongs. You think it over. I’ll
see you again sometime. I’m going back to my grandfather’s now.”
As Walter turned away abruptly, and without once looking behind
him, he was not aware that Dan remained standing in the place
where the conversation had taken place and was ruefully watching
his friend as he walked rapidly back to the old bridge.
“Well, Walter, what did Dan say when you told him what your
father was going to do for him?” inquired Mrs. Borden cheerily as her
boy entered his grandfather’s house.
“He said he wouldn’t do it,” replied Walter somewhat tartly.
“What?”
“Yes, mother, that’s exactly what he said.”
“Why did he say that?”
“You can search me! Dan is as obstinate as a pig in a garden. He’s
the most unreasonable fellow I know anywhere.”
“I’m sure you did your part. It was noble of you to want to help Dan
to obtain an education. I said that to your father——”
“What did father say when you told him?” broke in Walter.
“He laughed, and all he said was Dan had fifteen hit-outs in the
game.”
“Strike-outs, I guess you mean, mother.”
“Is there any difference between a strike and a hit? I should think
they meant pretty much the same thing. If you were to strike another
boy you’d be hitting him, wouldn’t you?”
“I might strike at him without hitting him.”
“Yes?” said Mrs. Borden dubiously. “Well, I shouldn’t let it trouble
me, Walter. You were generous, I’m sure. I think it was noble of you
and you made me feel very proud. Probably when your father comes
up for the week-end he’ll be able to persuade Dan, though it does
seem a little strange that one should have to persuade a boy to take
what you are giving him.”
“You don’t know Dan! He’s the most obstinate and unreasonable
boy in seven kingdoms.”
“Don’t be discouraged, my boy. Your father will find some way. He
always does.”
Whether Walter was “discouraged” or not he did not explain,
though he did not go near Dan’s home before the end of the week
brought the return of Mr. Borden to the old homestead. His first word
to his father, when Walter went in the automobile to meet him at the
station, was, “Dan won’t do it.”
“Won’t he?” inquired Mr. Borden with a smile and not seeming at
all surprised.
“No, sir. He’s as obstinate as an old mule.”
“Perhaps it isn’t quite so bad as that.”
“Yes, it is! I never saw such a fellow as Dan is. He doesn’t say
much, but when he takes his stand you can’t budge him an inch. I
don’t see why he turns down such a chance.”
“It may be that he will change his mind. What did you say when
you told him of the offer?”
“I don’t remember. I didn’t say very much. I just told him what you
had said. Probably I didn’t put it strongly enough.”
Mr. Borden laughed and said, “Never mind, my boy. I’ll have a little
talk with Dan.”
“I wish you would, father! I don’t know that it will do any good, but
there’s no harm in trying anyway.”
“Let me see—how many was it that Dan struck out in the game
with the Benson nine?”
“You know already,” replied Walter a trifle tartly.
“Twenty-six?”
“No, sir. Fifteen.”
“That’s a good record. Well, I’ll see Dan soon.”
Walter’s eagerness and impatience increased when apparently his
father forgot or ignored his promise. Not a word concerning his
promised interview was said that evening nor on the morning
following. It was late Saturday afternoon when Mr. Borden told his
boy that he was about to go to Dan’s home and that he wished to go
alone.
“You’ll need me,” pleaded Walter. “You don’t know Dan as well as I
do.”
“Not in the same way, is what you mean, Walter.”
“I’d like to go.”
“I’d be glad to have you, but it will be better for you to stay here. If I
have to do more afterward I may call in your help, but I’m sure, my
boy, much as you think of Dan you would hinder more than you
would help if you were to accompany me this time. I am not without
hope that I’ll have a good word for you when I come back. Please tell
me once more, Walter, how many Dan struck out in the Benson
game.”
“You know already.”
“So I do. It was fifteen, wasn’t it?”
“Yes, sir.”
“What is the record?”
“For strike-outs?”
“Yes.”
“There have been quite a good many ‘no hit’ games. I don’t know
just what the record for strike-outs is. It might be——”
“Perhaps Dan will make it when he becomes the pitcher of the Tait
School nine,” suggested Mr. Borden good-naturedly. “Don’t give up
too easily, Walter. One never can tell what may come, but in
business I have learned at least one thing which would have been of
help to you if you had known it before your interview with Dan.”
“What is that?”
“Never give the ‘other fellow’ the chance to say ‘no.’”
“I don’t see how you can help it sometimes.”
“That’s one of the things you have to learn by experience. Now I’ll
go over to see the great ‘strike-out’ pitcher. Let me see now; I must
be sure of my ground. Was it twenty that Dan struck out?”
“I sha’n’t tell you any more that it was fifteen,” replied Walter a little
crossly as he became aware that his father was good-naturedly
making fun of him.
“Where will you be, Walter, when I come back?”
“Right here on the piazza.”
CHAPTER XII
DAN RECONSIDERS
A n hour had elapsed when Walter, who had not once left the
piazza where he and his mother had been seated, exclaimed
excitedly, “There he comes, mother! I hope he has had good luck.”
“I’m sure your father has induced the foolish boy to accept his
offer. He has a great way of dealing with men, though I must confess
that I haven’t very much sympathy with Dan. It seems to me that he
has been a very foolish boy even to hesitate a moment. I’m sure he
never will have another such opportunity.”
“You don’t know Dan, mother,” said Walter as he arose and ran
down the steps to greet his father. “What luck, father?” he asked
eagerly. “Did you get Dan to say he would go?”
“Yes.”
“Great!” shouted the excited boy. “We’ll make you an honorary
member of the nine! How did you do it? What did Dan say?”
“He didn’t say very much.”
“But he really is going?”
“You’ll find him next September in your room when you go back to
school.”
“Tell me how you did it!”
“I can’t do that just now. Isn’t it enough for you to know that Dan is
to enter the Tait School this fall?”
“Yes, sir; but I’d like to know how you got him to say yes.”
“He won’t tell you.”
“And you won’t, either?”
“Not just now.”
“When will you tell me?”
“Perhaps at Christmas, perhaps next summer, or it may be that
you never will know.”
“Why not?”
“That’s another thing you may never know, though I don’t mind
telling you that I think you will find out.”
“How? When?”
“You must wait. I have succeeded in getting Dan to go to school
with you. Can’t you be content with that?”
“I’ll have to be,” said Walter, “though I’d like to know the rest. May I
go over then and talk it over with Dan?”
“Of course.”
“Then I’ll go now!” exclaimed Walter as he ran from the piazza.
“John, what did you say to Dan?” inquired Mrs. Borden of her
husband, as he seated himself in a chair beside her.
“Well, I told Dan for one thing that he was not acting wisely in
turning down the chance I gave him. I told him there was a difference
between begging and receiving. That it sometimes was more
gracious to receive than it was to give.”
“I can’t understand you, John,” said Mrs. Borden a little impatiently.
“One would think to hear you that it was Dan conferring the favor and
not you or Walter.”
“That is exactly what I did tell him,” said Mr. Borden quietly.
“You did?”
“I did. I told him that I knew as well as he that Walter was an only
child and spoiled by his mother——”
“I don’t do any more for him than you do, John,” protested Mrs.
Borden.
“I know that. We both do too much. The boy would be better off if
he did more for himself, but I haven’t the strength of character to do
what I know I ought to do. I didn’t have, when I was a boy, a fraction
of what Walter has. My father made me work for almost everything I
had. I didn’t like it then, but he was a wiser as well as a better man
than I am.”
“There couldn’t be a more generous man than you, John.”
“Couldn’t there?” laughed Mr. Borden. “Well, I told Dan that I knew
as well as he did that Walter is conceited and selfish—he thinks a
good deal more of himself than of anyone else——”
“You didn’t tell him that!”
“I most certainly did. I told him Walter needed some things that
Dan had——”
“What, for example?”
“Oh, Walter doesn’t work, he’s too easily turned aside, he gives up
when he ought to hang on, he is vain as a peacock, and he hasn’t
the remotest idea of the existence of anyone besides himself on this
planet.”
“You didn’t say that about your own boy!”
“Not in those words, but Dan knew what I meant. Then I told him
that he could help Walter, and I felt that if he should get my boy into
a steadier way of working I’d be glad to pay him a good deal more
than the amount his year at the Tait School will cost me. I put it so
strongly that at last Dan agreed to try it a year. If I should not be
satisfied then he is to leave the school and call off the bargain and
he even suggested that he would pay back what I might have
advanced——”
“He couldn’t pay it. He hasn’t any money.”
“Not just now. He’ll have plenty later. Likewise, he struck out fifteen
men in the Benson game!” Mr. Borden added laughingly as he arose.
“Oh, it’s Walter’s chance as well as Dan’s, but I don’t want you to tell
Walter what I have just now told you. It might spoil my plan.”
“I think Walter is a good boy. I can’t understand you when you find
so much fault with your own flesh and blood.”
“Mother,” said Mr. Borden softly, “sometimes it costs one more to
be true than it does to say or do pleasing things. Ever think of that?”
“Of course I have, but I don’t see what that has to do with Walter.”
“Trust me—you will see it and more clearly than I do now.”
Meanwhile Walter had gone to Dan’s home, and as he entered the
yard he saw his friend just coming out of the barn. He was carrying a
pail of milk in each hand and his appearance, dressed as he was in
his overalls and without any hat, for the first time impressed his
friend with a vague sense of unfitness. What would Sinclair Bradley
(called “Sin” by his fellows for more reasons than one) say if he
should see Walter’s new roommate in his present garb? Walter
vaguely thought also of the remarks which others of his classmates
might make, but his feeling of vague uneasiness speedily departed
as he ran forward to greet Dan. The thought of fifteen strike-outs was
vastly stronger at the moment than that of the remarks of his friends
over Dan’s somewhat uncouth appearance.
“Hello, Dan!” called Walter lightly as he approached. “I’ve heard
the good news! You’re going to the Tait School with me this fall.”
“Yes,” responded Dan quietly.
“Why don’t you get excited, Dan?” Walter demanded as he walked
beside his friend toward the milk-room, which was an addition to the
old farmhouse, built of stone and provided with ice which Dan and
his brother cut every winter from the mill-pond not far away.
“Perhaps I am, more than you think,” replied Dan.
“That’s all right. You’re as cool when you face the prospect of
rooming with me as you are when you face the heaviest hitter on the
other nine and have three men on bases.”
“Am I?” Dan spoke quietly, and Walter, in his own feeling of
elation, perhaps failed to look beneath the surface.
“Yes. You wouldn’t be, if you knew what you are going into.”
“I guess you’re right,” said Dan soberly.
“Of course I am!” exclaimed Walter, enthusiastic once more in the
company of his friend. “You’ll like the fellows immensely. Right
across the hall from us will be Owen Pease and Sin Bradley’s room.
You’ll like both of them. Owen plays in the field on the nine. He’s
about ten feet long and two inches wide.”
“I should think he’d go with Barnum. I never saw a man built on
that plan.”
“Oh, well, I’ve put it a little strong,” laughed Walter. “But he’s length
without breadth or thickness. Honestly, Dan, he’s the thinnest person
you ever saw.”
“But I never saw him.”
“You will, soon. Thinner than anyone I ever saw then; put it that
way if you want to. When we were playing the Colt nine this spring
Owen was scared, at least he said he was, to face the pitcher. He
did throw a wicked ball, Dan, there’s no mistake about that. I felt a
little nervous myself when I faced him. But Owen made such a time
over it and said he was afraid of being hit that Sin took a bat and
stuck it up on the ground right in front of Owen and said, ‘Here, old
man, you just hide behind that and you’ll be safe.’”
“Did he get all his ten feet behind one bat?”
“He might as far as his thickness was concerned. Owen is the
thinnest chap I ever saw, just as I told you, but he’s made of wire and
steel.”
“Who is this ‘Sin’ you speak of?”
“Sin Bradley.”
“Why do you call him ‘Sin’?”
“His full name is Sinclair,” laughed Walter, “but I guess the name
fits him all right just as it is. You never saw such a fellow in all your
life, Dan. He’s up to more tricks than you can dream of. One day
there was a fellow on the campus who was begging, pretending he
was a deaf-mute——”
“How do you know he was ‘pretending’?”
“That’s what I’m telling you. Sin saw through his game before the
beggar could get a chance. He just walked up to him and jumped on
his toes. I’m telling you, Dan, that he wasn’t ‘mute’ for a spell there.
He called Sin all kinds of names in about a thousand different
languages.”
“He must have been pretty well educated to use as many different
languages as that.”
“Oh, well, probably it wasn’t quite a thousand,” laughed Walter.
“But the air was full of owskis and oskis there for about five minutes.”
“What did Sin do?”
“He went up to the beggar, sober as a judge, and begged his
pardon. He told him how deeply he regretted the ‘accident’ and then
said, ‘I feel worse about it because you are deaf and dumb. How
long have you had this trouble?’
“‘More as dree year,’ muttered the fellow, caught off his guard. You
ought to have heard the fellows yell.”
“What did the deaf-and-dumb man do?”
“Started for some vast wilderness, I guess. We heard about him
afterward, though. He got on a street-car in the city the next day and
he still had his big card placard on, ‘Please help a poor man who is
deaf and dumb.’ There were some good people on the car and one
of them suggested that they chip in and help the fellow. This man
was a minister and he said it was a great pity that one who was so
young should suffer from such a terrible affliction. The deaf-mute
kept mum, pretending that he didn’t hear any of the talk, but just
before they turned the money over to him a big fat man got on the
car and when it started it threw him against the beggar and he
brought one of his big feet down hard on the mute’s left foot. ‘Ouch!’
yelled the beggar. ‘You old fat porcupine; can’t you look where you’re
going?’”
“What happened to the poor fellow then?” inquired Dan with a
smile.
“Oh, the good people hurried him off to the police court. Sin said
he would have walked a thousand miles just to see the fellow when
he was brought up before the magistrate.”
“How far?” said Dan quizzically.
“You’re too literal, Dan,” laughed Walter.
“Tell me about the teachers,” said Dan after he and his friend had
joined Mrs. Richards and Tom on the piazza.
“Oh, they are the finest ever!” declared Walter. “Of course they try
to make you ‘grind’——”
“Grind what?” inquired Mrs. Richards.
“Oh, grind at your books,” said Walter lightly. “Some of them are all
right, though. There’s young Samson for example——”
“Is that his real name?” asked Tom.
“It is among the fellows. On the catalogue his name is Richard Lee
Thomas, I believe. He was captain of the football team at college two
years ago. He’s the strongest fellow you ever set eyes on.”
“What does he teach?” inquired Mrs. Richards.
“He coaches mostly, though he has charge of the gym work too.”
“I don’t understand,” said Mrs. Richards simply.
“He looks after the teams and the ‘physical welfare of the pupils,’
the catalogue says. Then there’s Kaiser; he has charge of the
German and French. He’s a fine old boy. Soc too is good.”
“Soc?” asked Dan.
“Short for Socrates,” explained Walter. “He has the Latin and
Greek. His real name is Jones, but the fellows all call him ‘Soc’ for
short. ‘Trig’ has the mathematics. His name, I suppose, is Ephraim
Jeremiah Paine, but the fellows had pity for him and changed his
name to ‘Trig.’ Oh, they’re all fine old boys. You’ll have the time of
your young life, Dan!”
CHAPTER XIII
ENTERING SCHOOL
T he summer days passed rapidly and Walter spent many of them

in the company of Dan. One day while they were fishing on Six
Town Pond the great snake was seen again and after a struggle was
killed, though just why either of the boys wanted to kill the harmless
reptile neither could have explained. “He had no business to be born
a snake if he wanted to stay here,” Dan said with cheerful assurance
and as if his explanation was sufficient.
There were days when the fishing was excellent and other times
when the efforts of the boys apparently were without avail in
tempting the pickerel which hid among the weeds and refused to
leave their shelter.
The return game with the Benson nine provided another day of
interest and Walter greatly enjoyed the experience. Rodman and
Benson both made a gala day of the occasion, and when Walter
rode with the Rodman nine in the huge band-wagon which the
Rodman Cornet Band kindly lent the defenders of the local name, he
was deeply interested in the long line of vehicles which followed the
heroes on their way to the rival village, absorbing dust and loyalty all
the way.
The game itself was more or less of a repetition of the preceding
game. Dan’s cunning did not fail him, and exactly the same number
of hitters fell victims to his curves as had struck out in the former
game. Walter’s father had been in town on the great day and, at his
boy’s eager request, had ridden in his automobile to the scene of the
contest. He was quizzically warm in his words of praise after the
game, for Walter had played a better game than in the previous
match, but it was his boy’s enthusiasm over the youthful pitcher’s
“great work” that called forth Mr. Borden’s deeper interest. Upon his
invitation both Walter and Dan rode with him back to Rodman. Silas,
the harness-maker, upon Mr. Borden’s suggestion also occupied a
seat in the car, and his continued praises caused Mr. Borden to
enjoy his presence.
“I’m tellin’ ye,” roared Silas, “that Dan ought to have the New Yorks
up here for one game anyway. That boy is a credit to Rodman an’
everybody what lives here! He can pitch th’ legs off a brass monkey!
I never see such a ball-player.”
“He plays a very good game,” remarked Mr. Borden smiling
pleasantly at Dan as he spoke. “Aren’t you afraid, Silas, that you’ll
spoil him with your flattering words?”
“Not a bit! Ye can’t spoil Dan. I hear ye’re goin’ off t’ school with
this Borden boy, Dan.”
“Yes,” said Dan quietly.
“Well, education’s a great thing. I wish I had some o’ it.”
“You have,” remarked Mr. Borden.
“Who? You mean me? I may be a fool ’bout some things, but I
guess I ain’t such a fool as t’ not know that I don’t know nothin’.”
“One of the wisest men that ever lived once said that he thought
the men who didn’t know and knew enough to know that they didn’t
know were very wise.”
“Shucks!” sniffed Silas, his round freckled face nevertheless
betraying his deep pleasure. “I guess I c’n make a harness that can
stan’ the strain o’ five ton, but when ye’ve said that ye’ve said th’
whole thing. Now, here’s Walter. Th’ other day I see in th’ Rodman
‘Reflector’ some newfangled words. If I rec’lect aright they was ‘sick
transum glory Monday’——”
“Sic transit gloria mundi,” interrupted Walter laughingly.
“That’s jes’ exackly what I said,” declared Silas. “I didn’t know no
more what they mean than ’s if they been words that Julius Cæsar
spoke.”
“Perhaps he did,” said Walter. “They are Latin words.”
“Ye don’t tell me. Well, Mr. Borden, I couldn’t make head nor tail t’
’em. A ‘sick transum’ an’ ‘Monday’ was all th’ sense there was. But
that boy o’ yourn he come ’long an’, sir, he read ’em jes’ ’s easy ’s if
he was fallin’ off a log. Yes, sir. Now, ye see, he had th’ education
and I had none.”
“What did Walter say the words meant?” inquired Mr. Borden dryly.
“I disremember, but it was something ’bout glory.”
“Do you think Walter or Dan could mend a horse-collar?”
“Dan might; I’m not so sure o’ your boy, that is, jes’ at th’ present
time. Course he could learn.”
“Then he’d be better educated after he had learned.”
“Sewin’ horse-collars isn’t education!” sniffed Silas.
“I think it is or may be.”
“How d’ye make that out? I never went t’ school much. I c’n make
out th’ scores in th’ Rodman ‘Reflector’ an’ I c’n chalk up th’ charge
for fixin’ Deacon Stillman’s horse-collar, but I never went t’ school
none whatever.”
“Going to school does not necessarily mean obtaining an
education.”
“Go on! I guess ye’re tryin’ t’ stuff me.”
“Suppose a boy should go to school and not learn?”
“His teachers will give him th’ learnin’.”
“Unfortunately that is one of the things no teacher can give—at
least he can’t give it unless a boy takes it.”
“I guess th’ may be somethin’ in that, same’s ye c’n lead a hoss up
t’ th’ water but if he takes a notion he won’t drink, then th’ whole o’
jumpin’ creation can’t make him swallow a cupful.”
“Precisely. And a boy can be sent to the best school, but if he
won’t learn there’s no education or power for him. I used to know
some of the boys when I was in school who thought they were

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List of Contributors vii

13. Animalism and the Unity of Consciousness: Some Issues 266

Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

2 Stephan Blatti and Paul f. Snowdon

1.2. Recent History

4 Stephan Blatti and Paul f. Snowdon

1.3. Objections to Animalism

6 Stephan Blatti and Paul f. Snowdon

s­ upposedly possible circumstances. Putting it very broadly, these alleged differences

1.4. Animalism and Personal Identity

8 Stephan Blatti and Paul f. Snowdon

1.5. Issues and Motivations

10 Stephan Blatti and Paul f. Snowdon

12 Stephan Blatti and Paul f. Snowdon

14 Stephan Blatti and Paul f. Snowdon

it seems to be an implication of standardly recognized cases in which we start with

Robinson’s highly metaphysical and original analysis can, perhaps, be examined at

16 Stephan Blatti and Paul f. Snowdon

second is that the well-known too-many-thinkers argument for animalism merely

“I can’t do it,” said Dan soberly.

T he summer days passed rapidly and Walter spent many of them

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List of Contributors vii

13. Animalism and the Unity of Consciousness: Some Issues 266

s upposedly possible circumstances. Putting it very broadly, these alleged differences