Third World Quarterly, Vol 18, No 1, pp.

7± 23, 1997

False universalism and the geopolitics

of exclusion: the case of Islam
RICHARD FALK

Civilisational participation as a human right

In Twilight of the Gods Nietzsche insists that what makes Socrates interesting to
the modern mind is not his thought or method, but the extraordinary societal
signi® cance for Athens of having taken so seriously such silly and banal ideas.
I regard Huntington’ s ` clash’ thesis in a similar spirit. What is interesting is not
the argument, as such, which seems both simplistic and implausible, but its
extraordinary resonance around the world. I can recall no other short piece,
including even the famous ` X’ article of George Kennan, that has elicited such
an intense readership. My question, which anchors this paper, is this: what is this
resonance telling us?
I believe that this resonance is closely related to the theme of this article.
Namely, the emergent importance at this historical moment of civilisational
identity as a potent political, moral and psychological category that is an aspect
of a more multi-faceted challenge to the hegemonic, almost monopolistic,
dominance of statist identity bound up with the role of the state in the modern
world order system. In fairness to Huntington, his starting-point is similarly
conceptual, asserting that, for the long cycles of human experience, the
signi® cant unit of collective identity was something resembling what we now
call a civilisation rather than that which we label a state, the latter enjoying
prominence only in recent centuries. Huntington, along with many others, sees
the state as being in a waning phase, but unlike these commentators, he believes
the de® ning emergent reality is not ` the global village’ , or more dynamically,
` globalisation’ , but rather inter-civilisational reality.1 For Huntington, this re-
emergence of civilisational identity implies, above all, a recon® guration of
geopolitical patterns of con¯ ict, which in its essence will result in a new world
order framework. My own view is less pronounced, although also questioning
the intellectual viability of statist conceptions of world order, given the
signi® cance of global market forces and non-state political actors in the contem-
porary historical situation. I believe that the various dimensions of globalisation,
especially the economic and cultural dimensions, are of de® ning importance with
regard to superseding a world order system based upon the interaction of
sovereign states. Nevertheless I agree with Huntington to this extent: that

Richard Falk is Professor of InternationalLaw and Practice, Center of InternationalStudies, Princeton University,
Bendheim Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544-1022, USA.

0143-6597/97/010007-17 $7.00 Ó 1997 Third World Quarterly

 RICHARD FALK

inter-civilisational relations are newly of great signi® cance for world order
thinking, and particularly so with reference to human rights, political ideology
and the future of nationalism. But, I should hasten to add, not primarily because
of the issue of cultural relativism, and the related challenge to the purported
universalist claims put forward on behalf of international human rights standards
and procedures.
Rather my concern arises in relation to an exposed de® ciency of the human
rights enterprise, as broadly conceived, namely the discriminatory treatment of
non-Western civilisations, and especially of Islam, with respect to participatory
rights. My focus is not on the broad array of established human rights as such,
but on the posited human right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
authority structures, processes and practices that together constitute world order
as here de® ned and understood. Each element of this perspective requires some
explanation and is somewhat controversial: how has Islam been the victim of
discrimination in this world order sense? if this is so, in what respects does it
raise issues that are properly treated as falling within the domain of human
rights? And, even if it is granted that human rights can be encroached upon at
a civilisational level, how can the character of such rights be validated and
implemented, and by what means? Can international law be extended to serve as
an effective vehicle for achieving equitable inter-civilisational participation in
world order structures and processes without eroding its achievements in
regulating state±society relations by way of protecting individual human rights?
Perhaps I can best clarify my point of departure by reference to what might
be called ` the geopolitics of exclusion, both with respect to the dynamics of
global governance and those substantive and symbolic issues that seem to be of
greatest concern to the Islamic world. By using such terminology, I am not
implying a conspiracy among Western leaders to achieve such exclusionary
goals, or even claiming a consistent, deliberate pattern of this character. Indeed,
the implementation of exclusion occurs mostly as a result of what might be
called ` false universalism’ , depicting the particular and partial as if it were
synonymous with the general, not only with respect to substantive results, but
more crucially in relation to the processes by which these results are reached.
Without entering upon the treacherous terrain of cultural constructivism, I
attribute this false universalism mainly to the Enlightenment Project, with its
reliance on decontextualised reason, as embodied in the language, ideas, diplo-
matic style, experience and rules of representation that originated in Western
Europe and gradually evolved into a global framework of sovereign, secular,
territorial states over a period of centuries that is conveniently, yet arbitrarily,
linked to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This evolution is convincingly
depicted by Stephen Toulmin in his book, Cosmopolis, which shares the view
that the era of statist dominance is coming to an end, but he sees the sequel as
global humanist, rather than as inter-civilisational or some more complex
tapestry of overlapping and intersecting identities, a conception of world order
that has often been analogised to the multiple, interpenetrating levels of authority
associated with Medieval Europe.2
In effect, the universalism that I am calling ` false’ is a mask worn to obscure
Western civilisational hegemony. This mask has been worn so long that it is
8
 ISLAM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EXCLUSION

indistinguishable from the face itself for wearer and beholder alike. As would
be expected, such a hegemony is far greater than the sum of its political,
economic and even cultural parts, as it is civilisational, including distinctive
ideas, memories, beliefs, practices, misconceptions, myths and symbols that go
to the very core of human identity. In contrast, a true universality would
acknowledge signi® cant difference, as well as sameness, in constituting a world
order based on procedures and norms explicitly designed to ensure equitable
participation by each major world civilisation.3 Inter-civilisational equality, as a
constitutive principle of world order, seems to add a category to what David
Held, Daniele Archibugi and others have been so usefully describing and
advocating under the rubrics of ` cosmopolitan democracy’ and ` cosmopolitan
governance’ .4
My purpose here is not at all to enter into a discussion of the substance of
difference, or matters of relative merit, but only to support the view that the
neglect of civilisational participation for Islam has produced a series of partially
deformed institutions, practices and perceptions. In passing, it should also, of
course, be understood that it is accepted that there is an enormous range of
intra-civilisational differences in Islam that also need to be democratically
negotiated as part of a human rights process. My emphasis here is far more
limited, and in a sense preliminary, to the effect that at this historical juncture
civilisational identity is suf® ciently genuine for a suf® cient portion of the more
than one billion persons on the planet who consider themselves Muslim to be
treated as an essential category in evaluating the legitimacy of world order
structures and processes.5 Reinforcing this contention is the increasingly articu-
late expression of grievance and demand on the part of those who af® rm their
Islamic identity, and increasingly adopt a critical stance of normative and
emotive distance from the Western-emplaced, still largely prevailing, structures
and processes of world order, while themselves af® rming the quest for peace and
justice in the relations among the peoples of the world.6
The speci® c objective of this article is to link this analysis more directly to a
concern with human rights. The contours of this concern can be brie¯ y indicated:
we are in the midst of a period in international history in which the normative
architecture of international society has been increasingly expressed by reference
to a human rights discourse that combines, somewhat confusingly, ethical,
political and legal perspectives; these perspectives are intertwined in various
ways, but more in the form of claims, grievances and practices than as stages in
the articulation of binding rules and standards that are then implemented by
those with the authority to interpret and apply ` law’ . To a large extent, this
human rights discourse is unavoidably perceived, with varying degrees of
justi® cation and opportunism, as tainted by false universalism and its relations
to Western hegemony, one feature of which has been, and continues to be, the
suppression of civilisational identity and difference, with a particular historical/
political emphasis on the ` threat’ posed by Islam.7
This statement about the prevalence of human rights discourse can be
literalised somewhat by reference to the embodiment of the human rights
tradition in contemporary international law, primarily by means of a series of
declarations and agreements af® rmed by states, most notably including the
9
 RICHARD FALK

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two Covenants of 1966, as well as

through a series of regional formulations and more specialised conventions. On
an intra-civilisational basis this tradition has been subjected to various kinds of
assault, especially by those who af® rm Marxist and socialist priorities, and were
offended by an overly individualistic conception of rights that included extensive
protection of private property rights; in fact, although not as implemented, and
even as appreciated, the human rights tradition as entrenched in international law
carries forward a compromise between market-orientated individualism and
welfare-orientated social democracy.8
Additionally, from the beginning of this century there have been imaginative
and quite successful efforts, particularly by Latin American jurists, to challenge
a series of exploitative and unequal relationships protected by international law
in relation to foreign investment, extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and inter-
ventionary doctrines.9 Such juridical critiques and innovations were framed as
objections to the then prevailing character of inter-state, not inter-civilisational,
relations, especially in the context of interventionary diplomacy. In the 1960s
and 1970s this intra-civilisational critique from various Third World perspectives
was generalised to emphasise the overall unfairness of the way rights and duties
were distributed on a North±South basis, and was politicised within the United
Nations, especially the General Assembly, in the form of calls for a ` New
International Economic Order’ that were articulated in a series of declaratory,
quasi-legal instruments.10
The categories of North and South were very generalised designations, as was
reliance on the Third World or Non-Aligned Movement as a point of reformist
reference, referring to historical, geographical and developmental af® nities, but
not cultural or civilisational solidarity or encounter. These normative initiatives
designed to promote mainly global economic reform were effectively dis-
regarded as a result of a powerful market-orientated backlash associated with the
neoliberal orientation championed in the 1980s by Margaret Thatcher and
Ronald Reagan, and given the widening ® ssures in the Third World that resulted
from modernising strategies that yielded high growth rates and surging export
markets for a series of Paci® c Rim countries.
What has survived in the 1990s, at least rhetorically, from this effort to bring
normative pressures to bear for the sake of a more equitable international
economic order is ` the right to development’ .11 Whether this right has any
operational content is doubtful, although important legal scholars have lent
support to its validity. Although dif® cult to demonstrate, it would seem that the
status of the right to development has shaped the way the international agenda
on such other issues as environment, population and human rights generally is
addressed, as at important consciousness-raising UN conferences.12 It is sugges-
tive, however, of efforts to register as ` a right’ the perceived grievances of
disadvantaged nations in relation to existing world order, and hence, is linked to
an inquiry into how to overcome a circumstance of inter-civilisational inequity,
although the unit of the claimant is not societal, national, or statal, but
civilisational. These categories are overlapping rather than mutually exclusive
identities.
The ® rst truly inter-civilisational critique of the prevailing human rights
10
 ISLAM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EXCLUSION

discourse and its world order implications emerged, somewhat surprisingly, from
the concerted struggle of indigenous peoples in the 1980s and 1990s.13 This
struggle took shape against a background (and foreground) of exclusion, dis-
crimination and persecution, even extermination, assimilation and marginal-
isation that were expressive of confusing admixtures of arrogance, racism and
ignorance. These extraordinary efforts of indigenous peoples to protect the
remnants of their shared civilisational identity, an identity that was coherent and
self-consistent only in relation to the otherness of modernity, achieved two
results of direct relevance to this article: ® rst of all, it exposed the radical
inadequacy of a civilisationally ` blind’ approach to human rights, by which is
meant the utter failure of the modernist instruments of human rights to take
account in any satisfactory way of the claims, values, grievances and outlooks
of indigenous and traditional peoples; second, transnational activism by indige-
nous peoples in the last two decades has given rise to an alternative conception
of rights that represents an articulation after a long process by previously
excluded civilisational representatives.
In this regard, the contrast of this recent authentic expression of indigenous
peoples’ conception of their rights with that of earlier mainstream human rights
instruments is revealing. Also revealing is a comparison between these efforts by
indigenous peoples and the paternalistic efforts supposedly on their behalf in the
marginal arena provided by the International Labour Organisation. Such com-
parisons are con® rmatory of the contention that participatory rights are integral
to the acceptance of a political order as legitimate and to a reliable clari® cation
of grievance, demand and aspiration.14 This alternative conception has been
developed by indigenous peoples in an elaborate process of normative recon-
struction that involved sustained, and often dif® cult dialogue among the multi-
tude of representatives of indigenous traditional peoples, especially as these have
come together in recent years at the Informal Working Group on the Rights of
Indigenous Populations, set up under the Sub-Commission on Racial Discrimi-
nation and Persecution of the Human Rights Commission that has recently taken
the primary form of producing a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, which is now being considered within the wider UN system. It is
doubtful whether this Declaration of indigenous rights will eventually be
validated by state-centric procedures; in effect, these remain the gatekeepers
within the UN system of the still ascendant false universalism.15 The resistance
being mounted in reaction to this more adequate expression of human rights as
formulated by indigenous and traditional peoples in relation to their own destiny
is mainly centred on certain perceived tensions that could result if the right of
self-determination were to be legally con® rmed as possessed by indigenous
peoples. To what extent this struggle of indigenous peoples succeeds or fails is
conceptually and substantively beside the point of this inquiry into Islamic
exclusion, except to illustrate by analogy the surfacing of a different type of
inter-civilisational challenge within the same approximate historical time
interval.16 Of course, the indigenous struggle also reinforces the point that unless
authentic participation in the rights-creation process occurs, the results are not
likely to be genuinely representative and the whole process will be regarded as
illegitimate and alien.
11
 RICHARD FALK

Understanding the geopolitics of exclusion

At this point, it seems important to set forth the basic elements of the argument
for ` normative adjustment’ in response to the inter-civilisational challenge being
mounted from an Islamic perspective. Normative adjustment is understood in
two senses: the reshaping of the human rights discourse to make provision for
inter-civilisational participation; the further legitimating of world order by
improving the procedures for inter-civilisational participation and by establishing
better means for inter-civilisational representation in the main authority struc-
tures of the world.
Although the wider conceptual and normative concern is one of inter-civilisa-
tional participation in general, my focus is upon the speci® cs surrounding
Islamic exclusion and its implications. Arguably, a parallel inquiry could be
made from a Confucian or Hindu or African perspective, as well as from a
variety of indigenous perspectives. Further, to the extent that the analysis rests
upon either the existence of a civilisational right to participate or the dependence
of a legitimate world order upon equitable civilisational participation, then the
wider inquiry is tied to this narrower one that dwells upon Islam. The narrower
focus has the advantage of responding to the subjective side of civilisational
exclusion in the crucial sense that Islam perceives itself as having been
victimised within the framework of world order, and in turn, is perceived in the
West as posing a multi-dimensional challenge. It is important in light of this
adversary inter-civilisational interaction to assess whether there appear to be
objective grounds for the subjective perceptions of grievance. It is in this spirit
that the following steps in the argument will be taken:

1) the psycho-political sense of grievance and signi® cant difference that is

characteristic of Islam’ s civilisational self-image in relation to the West and
world order in general;
2) a presentation of empirical, yet impressionistic, evidence in support of the
view that Islam has been excluded from world order arenas and subjected to
discriminatory regimes of control and prohibition;
3) an insistence that the combination of perceived grievance and objective
grounds provides the basis for ` normative adjustment’ so as to enhance the
legitimacy of contemporary structures and processes of world order;
4) a conclusion that it would be useful to crystallise the case for normative
adjustment by an extension of human rights to incorporate an essentially
new right of civilisational participation, to be applied speci® cally to over-
come Islamic grievances, but potentially available on a comparable basis
for any civilisational unit of major stature in the present system of world
order.

It is important, at this point, to recall the limited nature of this analysis: that the
geopolitical exclusion of Islam is real, that it has negative world order conse-
quences, that its recti® cation would be of bene® t to Islam, and that expanding
human rights coverage to include civilisational rights of participation provides
one, but only one, mode of recti® cation.
12
 ISLAM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EXCLUSION

Islam’ s sense of grievance and signi® cant difference in relation to contemporary

world order
There is little doubt that there is a generalised Islamic sense of grievance that
overrides the very deep intra-civilisational cleavages (on the level of state, class,
religious tradition and geographic region) that currently exist in the Islamic
world. Possibly less self-evident is an appreciation that this sense of grievance
is coupled with an Islamic civilisational self-image that is capable of providing
an alternative normative grounding for world order. The psycho-political
con® rmation of these assessments can be gleaned from many sources and is
suf® ciently established that it doesn’ t need elaborate documentation. I would
refer anyone seeking such documentation to the range of presentations made at
the Just World Trust (JUST) conference, ` Images of Islam: Terrorising the Truth’ ,
held in Penang, Malaysia in October 1995. For a more speci® c, sophisticated
analysis of Islamic grievance and world order reconstruction I rely principally on
a book by one of the Penang participants, Ahmet Davutoglu’ s Civilizational
Transformation and the Muslim World.17
In a useful passage Davutoglu speci® es the main elements of Islamic griev-
ance in a manner that warrants extensive quotation:
There has been a tendency in recent years in western political and intellectual
centers to misrepresent Muslim societies as incongruous elements in the inter-
national order. The issue of Salman Rushdie and the discussions of the Islamic dress
code in France and Britain have provoked historical prejudices against Islam. The
mass media has been extensively used to strengthen this imagination. Lastly, in the
Gulf crisis, although the other front was also supported by many Muslim-populated
states, Saddam has been misrepresented as the symbol of the increasing threat of
Islamic fundamentalism.18
The point here is not to evaluate such a set of perceptions, but to set it off as
representative of Islamic perceptions. In a similarly useful passage, Davutoglu
extends this sense of grievance to the functioning of world order:
¼ the Muslim masses are feeling insecure in relation to the functioning of the
international system because of the double standards in international affairs. The
expansionist policy of Israel has been tolerated by the international system. The
Intifada has been called a terrorist activity while the mass rebellions of East Europe
have been declared as the victory of freedom. There was no serious response against
the Soviet military intervention in Azarbaijan in January 1990 when hundreds of
Azaris were killed while all Western powers reacted against Soviet intervention in
the Baltic Republics. The international organizations which are very sensitive to the
rights of small minorities in Muslim countries, did not respond against the
sufferings of the Muslim minorities in India, the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
Kashmir, Burma, etc¼ The atomic powers in some Muslim countries like Pakistan
and Kazakhstan have been declared a danger when such weapons have been
accepted as the internal affairs of other states such as Israel and India. Muslims who
make up about 25% of the world’ s population, have no permanent member in the
Security Council and all appeals from the Muslim World are being vetoed by one
of the permanent members. The Muslim masses have lost their con® dence in the
international system as Neutral Problem-solver after the experiences of the last
decade.19

13
 RICHARD FALK

Again it should be emphasised that it is not the accuracy, or even the

reasonableness, of such assertions that is being argued (although they seem
accurate and reasonable), but their representativeness.
The deeper argument, of course, moves beyond criticism to the claim that
Western civilisation as the dominant force in international life is having a
destructive impact and that Islam, properly understood, presents the reality of a
constructive alternative. Davutoglu also presents this case clearly, arguing,
especially, that the economic globalisation that he associates with the West is in
the process of destroying the other ` authentic cultures and civilizations’ that
together constitute world order.20 In effect, Davutoglu argues that the Islamic
recovery from a long period of suppression, culminating in the colonial era,
offers the world a strong and coherent alternative to what he calls ` the modernist
paradigm’ .21 In essence, then, the foundational premise of the argument here is
the double Islamic awareness of grievance and self-limitation on one side and
potential contributor to the emancipatory project of an ethically (and civilisa-
tionally) enhanced world order, on the other. In effect, in its more assertive
expression, Islam and its proponents are committed to the rescue of the West
(and others) from the calamity of modernism.22

Assessing Islam’ s grievances

Accepting the anthropological insistence that all knowledge is ` situated know-
ledge’ , re¯ ecting the experience and outlook of the observer, and eschewing any
pretension of an Olympian position above the fray, it still seems possible and
useful to evaluate the reasonableness of Islam’ s sense of grievance and
signi® cant difference. Indeed, such an assessment underlies both the critique of
false universalism and the argument favouring the incorporation of rights of
civilisational participation into the discourse and protective framework of inter-
national law.
There is little doubt that much of the recent discussion of Islam and the West,
whether in the form of journalistic portrayals or academic writings, is af¯ icted
with the Orientalist construction of the other in stereotypical terms that validate
hostile behavioural and policy responses. Since the globalising hegemony of the
West tilts this debate, especially by its dominance of TV, there is a strong
disposition to perceive Islam as disposed towards violence and extremism,
driven to terrorist action by hostility towards the West and Western values, and
epitomised by Ayatollah Khomeini’ s Islamic Revolution and the ordeal of the
hostage seizure in the US Embassy in Tehran that dragged on for many months
until resolved in January 1981. This prevailing perceptual framework helps
explain the extent to which the literature on Islam v the West is preoccupied with
the question of whether Islam does or does not pose a threat. Even the writings
most sensitive to the Islamic reality,23 seek mainly to reassure the West that
Islam is not as militant as often presented, that even political Islam is hetero-
geneous and not necessarily aggressive towards Western interests, and that it is
important for the West not to make the Islamic threat into a self-ful® lling
prophecy. What such perspectives tend not to do, except by way of acknowledg-
ing the historical extent of prior Western encroachment and abuse, is to examine
14
 ISLAM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EXCLUSION

the plausibility and structured character of Islamic grievances and the desirability
of a world order reconstructed to take into account inter-civilisational identities
and aspirations.
The main grievances enumerated by Davutoglu can be brie¯ y considered in
terms of their reasonableness.

Participation in the United Nations system. Despite having more than one
billion adherents spread across over 45 countries, no permanent member of the
Security Council is part of the Islamic world and, in most proposals for UN
reform, calls for the expansion of the Security Council usually do not propose
recti® cation. This, to be sure, in part, re¯ ects the statist and Eurocentric origins
of the United Nations at the end of World War II. And possibly it also re¯ ects
the failure of the Islamic countries to press harder for representation of this
character in the most symbolically important organ of the United Nations. But
the impression of exclusion is reinforced by the realisation that none of the
secretary generals of the UN to date have been of Muslim faith, and very few
of the important specialised agencies have been headed by a Muslim. Again this
can be explained, in part, by the contention that of® cials are selected on the basis
of secular criteria of merit and political support, not because of ethnic nor
religious identity. Yet when combined with other factors, there would be
reasonable grounds for believing that Islamic participation could make a
difference with respect to the role of the United Nations on such issues as
Palestinian self-determination and the status of Jerusalem, the approach to
international terrorism, and the maintenance of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime.
The Bosnian diplomatic and peace process can also be viewed as one that
denies the Islamic world a sense of equitable participation: each of the factions
except for the main victims of atrocity and aggression, the Bosnian Muslims,
were represented by an external actor with civilisational ties;24 Turkey, the only
European state with an Islamic identity and a steadfast member of the Western
alliance, although highly secularised at the level of the ruling elites, was not
included in ` the contact group’ of countries with a special role in the peace
process, while Russia, with fewer claims in many respects, was included. In
isolation, this pattern in Bosnia would perhaps not warrant comment, but as part
of the larger picture, it does seem to add a dimension to the geopolitics of
exclusion.

Double standards. Here again it is dif® cult to circumvent the subjectivity of

interpretative standards. Nevertheless, the orientation of the media and of US
foreign policy has seemed to produce consistent support for actors pursuing
goals inimical to Islamic interests and opposition or indifference to issues of
major symbolic and substantive concern to those with an Islamic interest.25 To
varying degrees the Arab±Israeli con¯ ict has been dominant over many years,
fostering an impression that Israeli violence against Palestinian refugees and
others is generally acceptable as an act of war and expression of security policy,
while Palestinian violence is treated as ` terrorism’ of a character that undermines
whatever political and moral claims may exist to support the Palestinian struggle.
15
 RICHARD FALK

Other con¯ icts that have involved Islamic victims of violent abuse, such as
Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir, are con® rmatory of the accusation of double
standards to the extent that it is probable that, if the identities of victim and
perpetrator were reversed, the international response would have been altered.
Such a pattern exists, and although each instance can be partially explained by
other factors such as deference to state coercive power, deployed within
territorial limits, or the infeasibility of challenging major states acting within
their own geographical zone of dominance, the cumulative weight of instances
and the selective reliance on international law to condemn and condone gives the
accusation of double standards a rather strong presumption of validity.

A discriminatory non-proliferation regime for nuclear weaponry. Aside from

China, the declared nuclear weapons states are Western in orientation, and claim
a continuing right and intention to retain possession of this weaponry of mass
destruction, and even proceed with further development. At the same time, states
with genuine security concerns are being denied, to the extent possible, access
to such weaponry. But even this dual structure is not being implemented
uniformly. Communist states (North Korea) and Islamic countries (Iraq, Iran,
Libya and Pakistan) are the object of strong non-proliferation efforts, while the
Israeli acquisition and development of nuclear weapons is completely over-
looked and, according to some sources, deliberately facilitated.26 The media
reinforce this impression by writing about Pakistan’ s possible acquisition of
nuclear weapons as creating the danger of ` an Islamic bomb’ , although
Pakistan’ s motivation is clearly directed at offsetting India’ s military, and
probable nuclear, threat. No one would seriously write about ` a Jewish bomb’ or
` a Confucian bomb’ or ` a Hindu bomb’ , and doing so about Pakistan’ s capability
conveys the impression that civilisational identity does count, but only nega-
tively, and only if it is Islamic! Such a double standard, as reasonably perceived
from an Islamic perspective, is taken as irrefutable proof of an anti-Islamic
structure of world order. Again there are extenuating circumstances, ranging
from Israel’ s isolated and endangered circumstance (but would not such extenu-
ation apply to North Korea, and to several other states seeking to possess a
nuclear option?) to the Western impression that there is an Islamic threat that
could materialise in a dangerous way if backed by nuclear weaponry. Neverthe-
less, the implementation of the global non-proliferation regime appears to have
an anti-Islamic component.27

Punitive peace. It is worth contrasting the way in which Serbia and Iraq have
been treated after the cessation of hostilitiesÐ lifting sanctions and a rapid
restoration of normalcy in one instance, compared to intrusive intervention and
the maintenance of sanctions well-known to have caused prolonged great
suffering and loss of life to the poorest sectors of Iraqi society without
contributing to the downfall of Saddam Hussein’ s regime, in the other.28 Janna
Nolan points out that the insistence on the extensive demands for Iraqi veri® ed
destruction of portions of its military capabilities, especially those relating to
weaponry of mass destruction, ` have some parallels to the Allied program to
16
 ISLAM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EXCLUSION

disarm Germany after World War I’ .29 The failure of the Versailles punitive
approach to a defeated enemy led to the abandonment of an imposition of
humiliating and punitive conditions in the wake of military victory partly
because it was seen as contributing to the rise of Fascism, but now it has been
resurrected against Iraq, an approach extended in certain respects to Iran mainly
by unilateral action. There seem good grounds, then, for regarding such policy
approaches to countries in the Islamic world as part of the broader pattern of the
geopolitics of exclusion, even to the extent of adapting the language of
containment, central to the West’ s posture vis-aÁ-vis the Soviet Union, in relation
to Iran and Iraq. This latter policy is being discussed by Washington policy-
makers under the rubric of ` double containment’ .

Policy making and participation in the world economy. As with the permanent
membership of the Security Council, the directorate of the world economy, the
Group of Seven, or G-7, includes no Islamic state. Would not Indonesia,
Malaysia or Saudi Arabia have as good a claim as Canada or Italy? In an era of
globalisation, with the Asia±Paci® c region in the ascendancy, it would seem
reasonable to expect greater representation for Islamic countries. The same
pattern of exclusion pertains, as well, to the Bretton Woods institutions that are
administered by top of® cials normally drawn from the West. A further source of
suspicion is the drastic, terminal manner of dealing with the disclosures of fraud
on the part of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), leading to
the immediate dissolution of the only international bank with primary Islamic
funding and direction.30

Responses to terrorist incidents. There does seem to be a hostile attitude to

Islam evident in the global media and Western governmental responses to
incidents of major terrorism. This pattern was evident in the differences with
which the US government responded to the World Trade Center bombing in
New York City on 26 February 1993 and the bombing of the Federal Building
in Oklahoma City on 19 April 1995. Perhaps most revealing was the re¯ ex of
suspicion directed towards political Islam, despite the timing of the Oklahoma
explosion coinciding with the anniversary of the Waco, Texas raid on the Branch
Davidian cult that was known to have agitated rightist militias and led several
of them to contemplate retaliation. Further, the government reaction in the USA
was to investigate whether excessive force had been used in the Waco raid and
to dismiss several of those in the government who seemed responsible, to pay
compensation for Federal force used in another attack on a survivalist family in
Montana, and to strengthen international laws on terrorism. The prosecutorial
strategy included reliance on a conspiracy theory to reach those indirectly
involved in the Trade Center bombing, especially the Islamic ® gure Sheik
Rahman, while the indications are that the US government will limit its
indictments arising from the Oklahoma incident to those individuals accused of
being the actual perpetrators. A further difference is the removal of the trial for
the sake of fairness to the defendant from Oklahoma, the venue where the crime
was committed, while denying a similar motion for a change of venue to the
17
 RICHARD FALK

Islamic defendants in New York, where the atmosphere was probably more
adversely in¯ amed.31

Stigmatisation of states as ` outlaw’ or ` rogue’ . The stigmatisation of several

states as ` outlaw’ or ` rogue’ ,especially by the US government, has again seemed
to focus particular attention on the Islamic world as the main irritant to world
order other than that associated with such communist survivors from the Cold
War era as Cuba and North Korea. Libya, Iran and Iraq have been consistently
so treated with varying degrees of justi® cation, but reinforcing an impression
that an Islamic orientation, if militant, will be dealt with as aggressively as
possible, while non-Islamic states that violate basic norms of international law
and offend the global conscience, such as Burma in recent years and South
Africa during most of the apartheid period, are dealt with by way of ` construc-
tive engagement’ , either formally or informally.32

The right to democratic governance. After the Cold War the West proclaimed
its commitment to the spread of democratic governance, which meant especially
the encouragement of constitutionalism in the form of multiparty elections. Yet
its concern with the spread of political Islam apparently led it to overlook the
coup that occurred in Algeria to deprive Islamicists of an electoral victory in
1990.33

The unevenness of compassion. Media treatments of Islamic suffering tend to

be abstract, general and scant, if given at all, and are dwarfed by repeated
inquiry into the tactics and mentality of extremism. Little attention is given to
understanding the moral and political pressures that might explain the desper-
ation that induces such extremist acts as suicide bombings and the like. The
support given by Palestinian refugees and some anti-Western governments
(Libya and Iran) to horrifying acts of terrorism is appropriately noted, but not the
Israeli calls for vengeance in ethnic terms (attacking Palestinians at random,
chants of ` death to the Arabs!’ ). These are delicate, complicated matters of
assessment, but the imbalance is cumulative in that treatment of the suffering
being experienced within the Islamic world tends to be comparatively much less
sympathetic than that accorded to the provocations and tactics of its enemies. It
is instructive to compare the small statistical advantage enjoyed by the house in
gambling casinos, where the gambler will certainly lose if he or she keeps
playing long enough. That is, a seemingly trivial imbalance in the appreciation
of justice claims can register over time a decisive edge in support of the moral
claims being favoured.34
Recalling the analogy to the emergence of indigenous peoples as a claimant,
the argument here is that Islamic perspectives have not been equitably repre-
sented in key authority structures and processes of world order, which seems to
account for the impression and actuality of an anti-Islamic bias in addressing
policy issues of the global agenda. Further, if civilisational rights of participation
existed, such an impression and its reality would be diminished and the policies
18
 ISLAM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EXCLUSION

produced would probably be more balanced, and viewed as such from Islamic
perspectives, if assessed on an inter-civilisational basis. Such an analysis is
minimalist in the sense that it does not give weight to the anti-modernist,
anti-secularist, anti-globalisation dimensions of the Islamic critique of the
structures of world order or to the contention that positive Islamic contributions
by way of balancing community values against individualist claims would
contribute to a more stable foundation for social relations and inter-civilisational
understanding.

The dif® cult challenge of normative adjustment

Normative adjustment implies a mutually reinforcing combination of moral,
political and legal developments, combined with supportive historical circum-
stances, if it is to achieve important positive results. Concretely, normative
adjustment in relation to world order conditions refers to alterations in patterns
of practice and the modes of participation in authority structures and processes.
It means overcoming grievances validated as reasonable. In the setting of this
analysis it means correcting the grievances outlined in the prior section. With
reference to Islam it means conferring and safeguarding rights of participation
based upon civilisational identity. As such, this particular normative adjustment
cannot be effectively achieved within the traditional framework of statism, even
as modi® ed to confer rights on individuals, minorities, groups and, arguably,
peoples.35 As earlier discussed, the struggle of indigenous peoples, conceived as
an aggregate reality that is superimposed on diverse distinct indigenous nations,
comes closest to staking a claim of right on behalf of a civilisation that seeks to
be acknowledged as such rather than to be dissolved into constituent statist
elements in line with Westphalian and post-Westphalian categories.36
The prospects for successful normative adjustment with respect to overcoming
what has been called the geopolitics of exclusion are cloudy at best. For one
thing, there is as yet no clear consensus that such exclusion is occurring, and
those aggrieved have not chosen as yet to present their grievances in this
manner. For another, there are strong policy grounds on the part of those social
forces that bene® t from false universalism to resist claims premised on the
reality of civilisational identity and difference. Such resistance is likely to be
particularly strong to the extent that an acknowledgement of bias would seem to
bene® t Islam. Finally, Islam is far from united in its self-de® nition with respect
to normative adjustment, with some portions of the Muslim world accepting the
premises of globalisation, secularisation and a world order that remains con-
stituted at the level of rights primarily by states.
The experience of normative adjustments is varied, but the study of past
instances would be instructive in bearing witness to the intertwined role of
morality, politics and law. Among the instances that seem useful as precedents
are the following: the prohibition of the international slave trade; the right of
self-determination; the process of decolonisation; the anti-apartheid campaign;
the prohibition of genocide as a distinct crime; realisation of civil and political
rights. Each instance is a complex narrative that generates a wide range of
appraisals in terms of impact, but each discloses a degree of normative
19
 RICHARD FALK

adjustment that resulted in some change in authoritative language and practices.

It would also be illuminating to consider projects of normative adjustment that
resulted in substantial failure: de® nition of aggression; establishment of a
collective security system; realisation of economic and social rights.
The normative adjustment that is appropriate depends on the character of the
grievances and the remedies being sought. My argument has been that the
essential normative adjustment on behalf of Islam would be more equitable
participation in authority structures (the United Nations, the administration of the
world economy) and an acknowledgement of civilisational identity. Of course,
even if such a position were to be generally accepted, dif® cult problems remain
relating to representation and the contours of civilisation units. All the same,
certain favourable conditions exist with respect to the prospect for normative
adjustment: the reality of an Islamic resurgence and sense of grievance; the
established reasonableness of the core grievances; the political interest of
non-Islamic leaderships to avoid a hostile inter-civilisational encounter and to
neutralise any Islamic threat; the similarity of these grievances to the claims of
indigenous peoples. Thus, the moral and political preconditions for normative
adjustment have been met to some degree but, as suggested, formidable
obstacles remain.

Why human rights? Why a civilisational right?

A characteristic of the last half of the twentieth century has been to translate
grievances into a legitimating process for their recti® cation by way of an
acknowledgement of rights. This has occurred generally in relations between
individuals and their governments, and then with respect to more speci® c
categories of claims relating to group discrimination, children, women, environ-
ment and even food, peace, life and development. Embodiment in the setting of
human rights does not ensure behavioural implementation and enforcement.
Reliance on human rights to alter conditions of perceived and actual injustice in
the world involves all of the ambiguities and frustrations of ` soft law’ .37
The main argument for suggesting a civilisational level of protection for
human rights at this stage of history arises from the empirical circumstances that
have been described, which have given rise to serious claims of grievance and
pose dangers of con¯ ict. The articulation of a right of civilisational participation
would itself be a consciousness-raising educative process. An additional bene® t
would be to challenge the false universalism of globalisation and suggest an
alternative in the form of an inter-civilisational world order that combines the
ecological and biological conditions of unity with the civilisational conditions of
difference and self-de® nition.
There exists one important cost associated with the analysis of false univer-
salism. It weakens democratic forces in existing Islamic states in their efforts to
uphold a secular conception of relations between religion and the state, and to
protect the freedoms and autonomy of individuals. In this regard, even if the
human rights framework is vulnerable to the civilisational level of criticisms set
forth, it is still valuable, even indispensable, in relation to struggles being
enacted at the level of the sovereign state in such countries as Turkey and Egypt.
20
 ISLAM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EXCLUSION

In my view, this tension is essentially a creative one, invoking human rights

norms as relevant, but ® xing the framework to overcome the neglect of
non-Western civilisations.

Notes

This is a revised version of a paper originally presented at a conference on ` Universalizing from Particulars:
Islamic Views of the Human and the UN Declaration of Human Rights in Comparative Perspective’ , under
the auspices of the Institute for the Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East, North Africa, and
Central Asia, Princeton University, 24±26 May 1996.
1
Of course, this orientation was hardly original to Huntington, but rests upon a civilisational exploration by
many others, most notably the extraordinarily important depiction of civilisational reality by Fernand
Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, New York: Harper
Collins, 1972, pp. 545±596. See also the monumental achievement of Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History.
For a negative perception of the impact of resurgent Islam see Adda B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in
International History, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994, esp. pp. xix±xxi. For a favourable Islamic
orientation and perspective see Ahmet Davutoglu, Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World,
Kuala Lumpur: Mahir Publications, 1994.
2
Stephen C Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, New York: Free Press, 1990. For other
presentations of contemporary world order see James N Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory
of Change and Continuity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990; RBJ Walker, One World/Many
Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace, London: Zed Press, 1988; and Richard Falk, On Humane
Governance: Towards a New Global Politics, College Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1995.
3
The character of ` signi® cant difference’ is substantively complex, but procedurally relatively simple,
referring to relatively equal access, representation and status in principal arenas of formal authority, as well
as relatively equal treatment in the application of norms of behaviour and regimes of prohibition, for
instance, the regime prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. The quali® cation of a civilisation as
`major’ is also potentially troublesome, raising the question of ` what counts as a civilisation?’ .
4
David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance,
Cambridge: Polity, 1995, esp pp 219±286; and Daniele Archibugi & David Held (eds), Cosmopolitan
Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, Cambridge: Polity, 1995.
5
The argumentative assertion here is the insistence on the word `essential’ , re¯ ecting a psycho-political, as
well as a legal and moral, assessment. There is, of course, no implication that Islam (or any other
civilisation) is monolithic, but only that the collective identity expressed by the label ` Islam’ is a meaningful
category in a manner analogous to the label ` Britain’ or ` France’ .
6
An eloquent and persuasive Muslim expression, both critical towards the West and visionary in relation to
Islamic contribution to an enhanced world order, is that of Chandra Muzaffar. See Muzaffar, Human Rights
and the New World Order, Penang: Just World Trust, 1993. In his role as founder and director of Just World
Trust Muzaffar has convened a series of meetings and issued many commentaries on world policy issues
that react against what I am describing as ` the geopolitics of exclusion’ . A particularly notable effort was
an international workshop, ` Images of Islam: Terrorising the Truth’ , 7±9 October 1995, Penang: Malaysia.
See also the publication of a collection of his essays that is more geopolitical than inter-civilisational in tone
under the title Dominance of the West over the Rest, Penang: Just World Trust, 1995.
7
For rather enlightened examples of recent literature, invoking as well the deep historical roots of the
encounter, see Graham E Fuller & Ian O Lesser, A Sense of Siege, Boulder, CO: Westview/RAND, 1995; John
L Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; and Fred
Halliday, Islam & the Myth of Confrontation, London: IB Tauris, 1996. In the context of human rights, the
uncritical call for universal human rights, without reference to inter-civilisational agency, is problematic. See
for example, Ralf Dahrendorf, The Modern Social Con¯ ict, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988, p 181.
8
But see an important caveat relating to their contention that overlooking the inter-ideological cleavages of
the Cold War was a dangerous instance of false universalism. Harold D Lasswell & Myres S McDougal,
`Diverse and contending public order systems, in McDougal & Associates, Studies in World Public Order,
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1960, pp. 3±42.
9
These efforts involved trying to insist upon sovereignty rights as a balance against interventionary claims
whose identity was associated with the jurist or diplomat responsible for the assertionÐ as, for instance, ` the

21
 RICHARD FALK

Calvo clause’ , `the Drago doctrine’ Ð as well as efforts to put foreign and domestic investors on a level of
parity in relation to expropriation controversies.
10
The most prominent of these were the Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order,
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Charter on the
Economic Rights and Duties of States. For convenient texts see Burns H Weston et al (eds), Basic
Documents in International Law and World Order, St Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1990, pp. 550±575.
11
For the most authoritative formulation see `Declaration on the Right to Development’ , adopted as UNGA
Res. 41/128, 4 December 1986, text in ibid, note 10, pp 485±488.
12
For a powerful argument along these lines that emphasises the importance of the acceptance of the right to
development as an integral element of human rights at the UN Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna,
June 1993, see Upendra Baxi, Mambrino’ s Helmet?: Human Rights for a Changing World, New Delhi:
Har-Anand Publications, 1994, pp 1±17, 22±54.
13
See Rosanne Ortiz, Indians of the Americas: Human Rights and Self-Determination, London: Zed Press,
1984.
14
See ILO Convention No 107, ` Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and
Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries’ , text in Weston et al, note 10, pp 335±340, for a prime
instance of paternalism; compare ILO Convention No 169 for a vastly improved formulation that re¯ ects
pressure from and participation by representatives of indigenous peoples, completed in 1989, text in Weston
et al, note 10, pp 489±497. For a sensitive account of the consequences over a period of centuries see James
Anaya’ s contribution to the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1995.
15
For a helpful account of the obstacles in the path of acceptance within the UN system see Nouvelles
Internationales (newsletter), 4 (1±2), 1996, pp 2±5.
16
The comparison is meaningful along a number of axes, including the tendencies toward ` orientalism’ and
`occidentalism’ , that is, the mutually demeaning, if not demonising, stereotypic images of the other that are
characteristic of inter-civilisational encounter, especially if combined with relations of domination and
subordination. Basic here, of course, is Edward Said’ s Orientalism, New York: Pantheon, 1978. Also
suggestive is Jean-FrancËois Lyotard, ` The other’ s rights’ , in Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley (eds), On
Human Rights, New York: Basic Books, 1993, pp 135±146. Also of relevance may be the shared element
of anti-modernism in both the indigenous/traditional and Islamic challenges, which may be one aspect of an
explanation for their co-emergence. For valuable varying perspectives on Islamic attitudes, see Akbar S
Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise, London: Routledge, 1992; and Fatima
Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male± Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society, Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1987.
17
Davutoglu, Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World.
18
Ibid, p 101; see also the discussion in immediately subsequent paragraphs.
19
Ibid, pp 103±104.
20
Ibid, p 27.
21
Ibid, pp 114±117.
22
It should be noted that leading thinkers of indigenous peoples make similar claims.
23
Esposito, The Islamic Threat; and Fuller & Lener, A Sense of Seige.
24
It is true that the Bosnian government understated their Islamic identity throughout the war, emphasising
their pluralistic character and their own refusal to emulate the ethnic cleansing of their Serbian and Croatian
adversaries.
25
On media bias see Edward Said, Covering Islam, New York: Pantheon, 1981.
26
For an excellent overall presentation of the non-proliferation regime that accords with my analysis see
Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, New York: Hill & Wang, 1995. Klare points out that
Pakistan’ s strategic relationship with the West de® nitely moderated to some extent efforts to obstruct
Pakistan’ s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. See Klare, pp 156±157. On the Israeli weapons
programme as facilitated by anti-proliferation states see Seymour Hersh, The Sampson Option, New York:
Random House, 1991.
27
For a balanced analysis that supports this assessment, although not phrased in civilisational categories, see
Janna Nolan’ s ` Sovereignty and collective intervention: controlling weapons of mass destruction’ , in Gene
M Lyons & Michael Mastanduno (eds), Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International Interven-
tion, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp 170±187. Nolan’ s conclusion is pertinent:
`The Achilles heel of nonproliferation initiatives, as such, is emerging regional powers’ perception of
discrimination in a system that continues to place a high value on weapons of mass destruction as an
indicator of state power and prestige, even while trying to promote the global prohibition of such weapons.’
(p 187)
28
See especially the Harvard report based on ® eld assessments by health specialists, International Study Team,
Health and Welfare in Iraq after the Gulf War: An In-Depth Assessment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University, October 1991. See also the report prepared by Eric Hoskins, Calvin Bauman & Scott Harding
of Gulf Peace Team Special Mission to Iraq: Health Assessment Team, Amman, Jordan, 30 April 1991; and

22
 ISLAM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EXCLUSION

Francis A Boyle, ` Indictment, complaint, and petition by the 4.5 million children of Iraq for relief from
genocide by President George Bush’ , document, 18 September 1991. A useful discussion is to be found in
Sarah Graham-Brown’ s ` Intervention, sovereignty and responsibility’ , Middle East Report, 25, pp 2±12, 32.
For a more general condemnation by way of international law see Hans Kochler, The United Nations
Sanctions Policy and International Law, Kuala Lumpur: Just World Trust, 1995. An excellent overview,
with useful chapters on the impact of sanctions on Iraq is contained in David Cortright & George A Lopez
(eds), Economic Sanction: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, Boulder, CO: Westview,
1995; and Fred Tanner (ed), Effects of International Sanctions, Malta: Mediterranean Academy of
Diplomatic Studies, January 1996.
29
Nolan, ` Sovereignty and collective intervention’ , p 175.
30
This impression is supported by the unquestionably hostile treatment of the scandal by two sophisticated
books written by leading writers for the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times, which nonetheless
make the striking point that many of BCCI’ s most dubious practices were in most respects identical with those
of mainstream international banking. See Peter Truell & Larry Gurwin, False Pro® ts: The Inside Story of
BCCI, the World’ s Most Corrupt Financial Empire, Boston, MA: Houghton, Mif¯ in, 1992; and Jonathon
Beaty & SC Gwynne, The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI , New York: Random
House, 1993. Also relevant is the much less traumatising approach taken to deal with the savings and loan
scandal of the 1980s in the USA. See Kathleen Day, S & L Hell: The People and the Politics Behind the
$1 Trillion Savings and Loan Scandal, New York: Norton, 1993.
31
For a fuller discussion see Richard Falk, ` Contradictory images and conceptions of international terrorism’ ,
unpublished paper, 1994.
32
For a critique of Libyan policy by a non-Muslim, see Fan Yew Teng, The Continuing Terrorism Against
Libya, Kuala Lumpur: Egret Publications, 1993.
33
See Fuller & Lesser, A Sense of Seige, pp 49±50.
34
This gambling metaphor is borrowed from Mary Catherine Bateson’ s illuminating use of it in connection
with bias against and demoralisation of women. See Bateson, Composing a Life, New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 1989, p 205.
35
For the complexity of this latter extension of Westphalian thinking, see James Crawford (ed), The Rights
of Peoples, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988; and William Felice, Taking Human Rights Seriously: The
Importance of Collective Human Rights, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996.
36
A recent discussion of these conceptual issues in relation to the alleged erosion of sovereignty, with
particular reference to intervention under the auspices of the international community, is to be found in
Lyons & Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia?.
37
For important extensions of the scope and orientation of human rights see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’ im (ed),
Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1992, esp ch by An-Na’ im, pp 19±43; Smitu Kothari & Harsh Sethi (eds), Rethinking
Human Rights: Challenges for Theory and Action, New York: Horizons, 1989; Myres S McDougal, Harold
D Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order, New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1980; and Felice, Taking Human Rights Seriously.

23