Herz IdealistInternationalismSecurity 1950

Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma
Author(s): John H. Herz

Source: World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jan., 1950), pp. 157-180
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009187
Accessed: 26-10-2024 23:47 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to World Politics
This content downloaded from 128.148.206.181 on Sat, 26 Oct 2024 23:47:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
IDEALIST INTERNATIONALISM AND THE
SECURITY DILEMMA
By JOHN H. HERZ
T HE heartbreaking plight in which a bipolarized and atom

bomb-blessed world finds itself today is but the extreme
manifestation of a dilemma with which human societies have
had to grapple since the dawn of history. For it stems from a
fundamental social constellation, one where a plurality of
otherwise interconnected groups constitute ultimate units of
political life, that is, where groups live alongside each other
without being organized into a higher unity.
Wherever such anarchic society has existed--and it has
existed in most periods of known history on some level-there
has arisen what may be called the "security dilemma" of men,
or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such
a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their
security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or anni-
hilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain se-
curity from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and
more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others.
This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels
them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely
secure in such a world of competing units, power competition
ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumula-
tion is on.
Whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or domi-
neering and aggressive, is not the question. The condition that
concerns us here is not a biological or anthropological but a
social one. This homo homini lupus situation does not preclude
social cooperation as another fundamental fact of social life.
But even cooperation and solidarity tend to become elements
in the conflict situation, part of their function being the con-
solidation and the strengthening of particular groups in their
competition with other groups. The struggle for security, then,
is merely raised from the individual or lower-group level to a
158 WORLD POLITICS
higher-group level. Thus, families and tribes may overcome the
power game in their internal relations in order to face other
families or tribes; larger groups may overcome it to face other
classes unitedly; entire nations may compose their internal con-
flicts in order to face other nations. But ultimately, somewhere,
conflicts caused by the security dilemma are bound to emerge
among political units of power.
Such findings, one might agree with Henri Bergson, "ont de
quoi attrister le moraliste," and men have reacted to them in
dissimilar ways. The two major ways of reacting will here be
called Political Realism and Political Idealism. Political Real-
ism frankly recognizes the phenomena which are connected
with the urge for security and the competition for power, and
takes their consequences into consideration. Political Idealism,
on the other hand, usually starts from a more "rationalistic"
assumption, namely, that a harmony exists, or may eventually
be realized, between the individual concern and the general
good, between interests, rights, and duties of men and groups
in society; further, that power is something easily to be chan-
neled, diffused, utilized for the common good, and that it can
ultimately be eliminated altogether from political relationships.
The distinction is thus not simply one between thought con-
cerned with the actual and the ideal, "what is" and "what
ought to be." It is true that Realism, frequently, is more con-
cerned with description and analysis of what is than with po-
litical ideals, while Idealism often neglects factual phenomena
for political ideals. But Realism may well, and often does,
glorify "realist" trends as the desirable ones, while Idealism
may take notice of power phenomena. The distinction is rather
one of emphasis: Realist thought is determined by an insight
into the overpowering impact of the security factor and the en-
suing power-political, oligarchic, authoritarian, and similar
trends and tendencies in society and politics, whatever its ulti-
mate conclusion and advocacy. Idealist thought, on the other
hand, tends to concentrate on conditions and solutions which
are supposed to overcome the egoistic instincts and attitudes of
individuals and groups in favor of considerations beyond mere
security and self-interest. It therefore usually appears in one or
another form of individualism, humanism, liberalism, pacifism,
IDEALIST INTERNATIONALISM 159
anarchism, internationalism-in short, as one of the ideologies
in favor of limiting (or, more radically, eliminating) the power
and authority which organized groups claim over men. As one
author has expressed it, if "the children of darkness" are real-
ists, pessimists, and cynics, the "children of light" sin through
a facile optimism that renders them blind and sentimental.'
The distinction here suggested, while frankly inadequate in
the realm of more refined political theory, seems to be a fertile
one for the study of the great social and political movements of
history. Its importance becomes evident when one starts to
analyze the characteristic attitude-patterns and emotions of
leaders and followers in such movements. Either the approach
has been expressive of a utopian and often chiliastic Political
Idealism, or-when disillusionment with the ideal's ability to
mold the "realist" facts frustrates expectations it has taken
refuge in an equally extreme, power-political and power-glori-
fying Political Realism. This fatal reversal time and again has
constituted the tragedy of Political Idealism, which, paradoxi-
cally, has its time of greatness when its ideals are unfulfilled,
when it is in opposition to out-dated political systems and the
tide of the times swells it toward victory. It degenerates as soon
as it attains its final goal; and in victory it dies. One is tempted
to sum up the history of the great modern social and political
movements as the story of the credos of Political Idealism and
their successive failures in the face of the facts observed and
acclaimed by Political Realism. Nowhere, perhaps, has this been
more striking than in the field of the relations among the
"sovereign" units of organization and power, i.e., in modern
times, in the "international" realm.2
There is some typical "Idealism" in the very exclusion, or

comparative disregard, of international problems from political
thought. Unlike thought regarding form and structure of gov-
ernment, theories in the realm of international relations have
traditionally formed a side issue. Systems and theories centered
1 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Jindication
of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense, New York, Scribner, 1944.
2 The following, under I through VII, condenses a chapter of a larger manuscript, en-
titled "Political Realism and Political Idealism, A Study in Theories and Realities."
160 WORLD POLITICS
around units of government were considered in isolation from
their international milieu. A state of peace, in which the fact
of international relationships could be eliminated from theo-
retical consideration, was assumed to be "normal." Thus, most
of the well-known utopias located their ideal commonwealth
upon some island, wilderness, or similarly isolated place, and
even less utopian theorists devoted their main attention to
problems of internal politics and the internal improvement of
the community.
A lover of the paradoxical might say that the absence of
theories of international relations constitutes in itself the most
typical idealist theory of international relations. It implies, in-
deed, that with the solution of the internal political problems
no other problems remain; interrelations of political units then
automatically become harmonious. But with the passing of the
relative self-sufficiency of the highest political units, with their
increasing interdependence in a world-wide international so-
ciety, theories of international relations have at last been given
more significant expression and have come to constitute the
basis of political movements and political action. Among them,
nationalism and internationalism will be analyzed here with
regard to their basic idealist assumptions and their failure in
the world of "realist" phenomena.
II
With the rise of sovereign nation-states there emerged the

idea and ideal of a system of equal, free, and self-determining
nationalities, each organized into its own state, and all living
peacefully side by side in harmonious mutual relations. This
"idealist" nationalism stands in contrast to the nationalism
that developed with the rise of exclusive, aggressive, expansion-
ist, and imperialistic national policies, and which will be called
here "integral" nationalism. Integral nationalism represents
Political Realism in its extreme: a Realism which starts by
analyzing political tendencies in order to evaluate them, and
which, through their glorification, then becomes the ideological
foundation of the resulting movements. Idealist nationalism,
on the other hand, has proved to be utopian in its expectation
of an ideal international society which runs counter to actual
tendencies of international politics.
As is well known, nationalism as an "ism" hardly existed
prior to the French Revolution. The Revolution established
the People as a self-conscious unit; foreign attack upon the
Revolution created the nation-in-arms and, thereby, French
nationalism, revolutionary, missionary, and visionary; resist-
ance to French Caesarism on the part of subjugated countries
created a love of nationality in these countries; and in the Wars
of Liberation the revolutionary principle of national self-deter-
mination was victor over the very nation which had made the
Revolution.
Idealist nationalism as a system of thought amalgamated
pacifist-humanitarian with liberal-democratic elements. The
doctrine of national self-determination had as its source the
same ideology that produced the idea of the right of individual
self-determination. Rationalistic individualism was opposed
not only to restrictions enforced upon the individual but also
to "cabinet politics" that disposed of populations without their
consent. Thus, the "fundamental" rights of nationalities were
considered to be the same as those of man, namely, freedom
from interference and oppression. Once such freedom had been
achieved in a system of self-determining nation-states, there
would no longer be any reason or justification for international
friction and war. Freedom of nations was to be the common
concern of all humanity; witness the famous decree of Novem-
ber 19, 1792, in which the French National Convention declared
that France would "come to the aid of all peoples who are
seeking to recover their liberty." But the most significant
spokesmen of humanitarian nationalism came from nationali-
ties which were still seeking unification. Because of the later
transformation of Germany and Italy from nationalities seek-
ing redemption in a world-wide humanitarian nationalism to
power states that were violently aggressive and authoritarian,
early nationalists such as Herder, Fichte, and Mazzini, have
been widely misrepresented as forerunners of integral national-
ism; this obviously does them great injustice. Yet in a deeper
sense it may not be without significance that the countries
whose early aspirations expressed themselves in these authors
162 WORLD POLITICS
later produced a Treitschke and a Hitler, a Corradini and a
Mussolini. In both countries it reflects the transformation of
idealist utopianism in the realm of theory into the stark reality
of power politics for which integral nationalists like Treitschke
merely shaped the ideology and the apologetics.
Although in Herder's concept of nationality, nationalism was
mixed with elements of romanticism (each nationality having
its peculiar "soul" and worth among the "flowers in God's gar-
den"), the emphasis put on the necessity of political freedom
was as strong as the expectation that self-determination would
make for peace and harmony: It is the cabinets that make wars
upon each other, but not so the Vaterlaender.3 One and a half
centuries later, with the history of the coexistence of these
Vaterlaender in mind, a French author, sadder but wiser, could
speak of them as "these merciless fatherlands, full of greed and
pride."' But it was Fichte in whose political philosophy the idea
of peculiar "missions" of nations assumed a central importance.
In conformity with his philosophy of history, which conceived
that an age of utilitarian individualism was being succeeded by
one of rational freedom under law and moral norms, Fichte
ascribed to Germany a mission to become the model of a Kul-
turnation, a country which for the first time in history would
combine political liberty with that social and economic equality
without which the dignity of man as a rational being cannot be
realized. Patriotism was still the means toward the higher end
of the realization of free man and free humanity. To Mazzini,
likewise, nationality was not only the natural unit in an asso-
ciation of free peoples, but also the only unit in which the in-
ternal task of emancipation from tyranny and exploitation
could be performed. God, he maintained, has, in a kind of pre-
established harmony, divided humanity into distinct groups on
the basis of language. This natural division has been disfigured
by the arbitrary boundaries of the "countries of Kings and
privileged classes." National unification thus simply means
restoration of preordained harmony; and between nations so
established "there will be harmony and brotherhood."' The
3See Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Riga and Leipzig, 1784,
Book IX, Chapter IV.
4 Georges Bernanos, Journal d'un cure de campagne, Paris, 1936, p. 300.
5 The Duties of Man, New York, Everyman's Library, Dutton, 1907 p. 52.
battle symbol, so often applied by Political Realists for their own
purposes, is utilized by Mazzini for such harmonizing conclu-
sions:
Humanity is a great army moving to the conquests of unknown
lands, against powerful and wary enemies. The Peoples are the differ-
ent corps and divisions of that army. Each . . . has a special operation
to perform, and the common victory depends on the exactness with
which the different operations are carried out. Do not disturb the
order of battle.'
The unanswered question as to whom these divisions were to

do battle with was soon to be answered by history itself: not
perceiving a common enemy, they would turn against each
other.
This turning against each other had as one of its major rea-
sons the security dilemma of politically unintegrated units, and
their ensuing competition for power. Nationalities inevitably
became competing units after having abandoned their state of
innocence and established themselves as nation-states. Na-
tionalism in the major nation-states now became allied with
ideas of national or racial inequality and superiority; liberal-
humanitarian nationalism wandered to the East. Theories of
integral nationalism, which now blossomed, had forerunners in
certain earlier theories, especially political romanticism, which
had ridiculed the concepts of "man" and "humanity" as mere
abstractions. Thus the same author who had opposed Rous-
seau's ideology of the spontaneous formation of the general will
with an emphasis on an elite's capacity for "instilling the right
prejudices" opined: "I have seen, in my time, Frenchmen,
Italians, and Russians; I even know, thanks to Montesquieu,
that one may be a Persian; but as for Man, I declare that I have
never met him in my life; if he exists, it is without my knowl-
edge."7 It was through this elimination of the concept of hu-
manity that the universalist ideology was taken out of national-
ism.
What remained was either pseudo-Realism, such as that
found in theories of racialism (of white, or Nordic, or Aryan
6Ibid., p. 55.
7Joseph de Maistre, Considerations sur la France, Lyon, 1843, p. 88.
164 WORLD POLITICS
superiority, etc.), or genuine Political Realism with a recogni-
tion of the inevitabilities of power politics in an age of sovereign
states. How did it happen that earlier nationalism, with its vision
of international peace and harmony, could have so completely
overlooked this central phenomenon? Some explanation may be
found in the chiliastic character of all Political Idealism, its
inclination to expect the millennium, the "totally and radically
different situation" on the other side of the great divide which
in such thought separates the present evil world from the brave
new world of the future. Thus, the "heavenly city of the eight-
eenth-century philosophers" (which turned out to be the bour-
geois revolution) was expected to follow the abolition of feudal-
ism and absolutism. Socialism expected, and still expects, the
"altogether different" to become real, once the capitalistic re-
gime is overthrown. And humanitarian nationalism expected
the golden age of international brotherhood to come true once
nationalities were set free to determine their fate in liberty.
Final victory over the power policies of "kings and privileged
classes" was supposed to constitute these nations' "leap into the
realm of freedom." But in some respects the mechanical bal-
ance-of-power politics of the absolutist cabinets, which na-
tionalists blamed for most international evils, was more suitable
for safeguarding peaceful, if not permanently stable, relations
than was a policy based on the more emotional impulses, aims,
and claims of nation-states whose foreign policy was influenced
by the nationalism of the masses.
III
Among movements expressive of idealist internationalism we

may count those revolutionary movements which were genu-
inely universalist, those which, in the conception and pro-
grams of their leaders as well as during the early stages of their
implementation, tended to bring about a general transforma-
tion of society. In the cases of the French or the Bolshevik
Revolutions, birthplace and actual theater of the movement
were regarded as merely accidental starting points of what
was conceived as a world-embracing development; such move-
ments were thus world-revolutionary in the strict sense.
The Puritan revolution in England did not, in the main,
conceive of itself as a world-revolutionary movement aimed at
changing feudal-monarchical institutions all over the world.
Similar ideological isolationism characterized the American
Revolution, where even the appeal to "the opinions of man-
kind" was made for what was considered the cause of one
single nation. But world-revolutionary appeal and propaganda
were of the essence of the French Revolution. It is true that,
except for some radical cosmopolitans like Anacharsis Clootz,
neither Girondists nor Jacobins advocated internationalization
of world society in the sense of blotting out countries and peo-
ples; but they all foresaw an impending expansion of the revo-
lutionary ideas over the world; it was France's mission to help
other nations to achieve their freedom and to join with France
in a society of free nations. "The Revolution is a universal re-
ligion which it is France's mission to impose upon humanity."8
This religious fervor was characterized by two convictions:
one, that the revolutionary ideas, being the expression of un-
doubted truth, were bound to prevail, so to speak, by them-
selves, by the sheer force of their truth and reason; the other,
that the total transformation of society, which these ideas were
bound to bring about, was imminent. This belief in the abso-
lute truth of the gospel and the imminence of the coming of
the Savior puts French revolutionary enthusiasm alongside
similar universalist-idealistic movements of chiliastic utopian-
ism. This attitude, in the first stage of the Revolution, was
common to all groups, leaders, and factions. Said Brissot:
"The American Revolution engendered the French Revolu-
tion; the latter one will constitute the sacred spot whence will
spring the spark that shall put all nations to fire."' And Lebrun
wrote to Noel: "It is without doubt that our principles will
spread everywhere by themselves sooner or later, simply be-
cause they are principles of pure reason for which the major
part of Europe is now ripe."10 Robespierre, in the Convention,
exclaimed: "What! You have an entire nation behind you,
reason as your aid, and you have not yet revolutionized the
8 Albert Sorel, L'Europe et la revolution francaise, Paris, 1889, Vol. II, p. 109.
9July 10, 1791, quoted in F. Laurent, Histoire du droit des gens, Paris, 1868, Vol. XV,
p. 24.
10 November 11, 1792, quoted in Sorel, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 165.
166 WORLD POLITICS
world? ... In England, the party of freedom awaits you . . . If
only France starts marching, the republicans of England will
reach out their hands to you, and the world will be free."1 Ad-
herents of the revolutionary gospel in other countries were im-
bued with the same chiliasm. An address of English republi-
cans to the Convention contained this statement:
Frenchmen, you are already free; the Britons expect to be free
soon. The Triple Alliance, not of crowned heads, but of the peoples
of America, France, and Great Britain, will bring liberty to Europe
and peace to the world. After the example set by France, revolutions
will be easy. We should not be surprised if very soon an English
National Convention will likewise receive congratulations.12
In the unhistoric fashion characteristic of chiliastic move-

ments, conditions prevailing elsewhere were considered as mere
replicas of those in France, hence bound to undergo the same
development. While overestimating fantastically the importance
of revolutionary movements and sympathizing groups abroad,
however insignificant or isolated, one vastly underestimated
the hostile reaction the Revolution was bound to evoke in a
Europe still largely feudal and monarchist. The war against the
coalition thus appeared as a fight against toppling old powers,
while appeals to the masses of the people would suffice to win
them as allies on the side of the Revolution. The war would thus
become one of propaganda:
Let us tell all Europe . . . that the battles which the people fight
at the orders of the despots resemble blows which two friends, incited
by a mean instigator, exchange in the dark; as soon as they see the
light, they will drop their arms, embrace each other, and punish their
deceivers. So the peoples, when suddenly at the moment of the battle
between the enemy armies and ours the light of philosophy strikes
their eyes, will embrace each other before deposed kings and a satis-
fied heaven.13
And Robespierre, in 1793, intoned: "Might heaven at this

moment allow us to have our voice heard by all peoples: Imme-
diately the flames of war would be extinguished and all peoples
would form a nation of brothers."14
Thus the Dutch, the Belgians, the Germans were addressed
as potential allies. The war against the tyrants was to be the
' March 10, 1793, ibid., p. 344.
12 November 7, 1792, ibid., Vol. II, p. 214.
13 Isnard, quoted in Laurent, op. cit., p. 82.
14 Quoted in Laurent, op. cit., p. 174.
last war. But until ultimate victory was won, there could be no
neutrals: "The Republic recognizes only friends or enemies !"15
Ideological movements carry their own idea of legitimacy, and
the established order appears as mere brute force, without
foundation in law or morals.
The new movement claimed a "legitimate" right to carry the
war to those whose only title was force. Then, when the peoples
of Europe failed to respond to the message, disillusioned revolu-
tionaries claimed the right to force them to be free. Expectation
of universal revolution was postponed: "Prejudice, unfortu-
nately, spreads like a torrent, while truth arrives at a snail's
pace."" Napoleon had to report from Italy: "Love of the people
for liberty and equality has not been my ally ... All this is good
for proclamations and speeches but it is imaginary."17 Propa-
ganda was now used as a weapon of national warfare, a sure
sign that the stage of universalist idealism was over and Real-
politik had taken its place.
The rejection of the principle of revolutionary intervention
by the declaration of the National Convention of April 17, 1793
-a declaration which stated that France "will not interfere in
any way in the government of other powers"'8- marked the
real end of the world-revolutionary period and the beginning
of national Realpolitik. Nothing makes clearer this transforma-
tion than Danton's explanation of the new policy:
It is time that the Convention makes known to Europe that it
knows how to ally political wisdom with Republican virtues. In a
moment of enthusiasm, you issued a decree whose motive was no
doubt beautiful, and which obliged you to assist peoples desirous of
resisting the oppression of their tyrants. This decree would have in-
volved you if some patriots had wanted to make a revolution in China.
But we must think above all of the preservation of our own body
politic and of laying the foundation for French greatness.19
Genet now was instructed, in the typical terms of classical

diplomacy ("government," "party,") etc., as compared with the
15 Kersaint, January 1, 1793, quoted in Sorel, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 244.
16 Baraillon, January 13, 1793, quoted in Albert Mathiez, La revolution et les Strangers,
Paris, 1918, p. 88.
17 Quoted in Laurent, op cit., p. 268.
18 See Vernon Dyke, "The Responsibility of States for International Propaganda,"
American Journal of International Law, Vol. XXXIV, (Jan. 1940), p. 61.
19 Jules Basdevant, La revolution francaise et le droit de la guerre continentale, Paris,
1901, p. 164.
168 WORLD POLITICS
revolutionary vocabulary of "sovereign peoples," "tyrants,"
etc.) "to treat with the government, and not with a faction of
the people; and to be the representative of the French Republic
at the [American] Congress, not the head of an American
Party."20 The Revolution had now become the "revolution in
one single country," and, with Bonaparte's appearance quite
definitely "le jour de gloire est arrive," with the glory and might
of one's own country as the aim. Napoleon coolly denied that
the French Republic had ever "adopted the principle of making
war for other peoples. I would like to know what philosophical
or moral rule demands the sacrifice of 40,000 Frenchmen
against the well-understood interest of the Republic.' With
the establishment of French hegemony over Europe, propa-
ganda became of the well-known "co-prosperity sphere" type,
as when it spoke of France's mission to unify Europe in "one
family," where "civic dissensions constitute attacks on the
common weal."22 The oppressed nations, on the other hand,
having started a war of conservative intervention, ended by tak-
ing over much of the original French revolutionary ideology,
which they now were able to turn against its creator. A Prussian
general could now appeal to the people in the name of the liber-
ties of 1789: "It is for Germany's freedom that we shall win or
die.... Any distinction of rank, birth, or origin is banned from
our ranks. We are all free men."23 The circle had become com-
plete.
IV
The history of the Workers' Internationals is yet another

confirmation of the prevalence of power-political, "realist"
phenomena over too facile assumptions of a utopian Political
Idealism. The idea of a classless society, which was to result
from the concerted international action of the proletarians of
all countries, combined internal and international utopianism
in one comprehensive structure. The Second International con-
ceived the task of the different Socialist parties as one of oppos-
ing "capitalistic" wars or of turning them into struggles for the
overthrow of the capitalistic system:
20 Sorel, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 431.
21 Ibid., Vol. V, p. 66.
22 Laurent, op. cit., p. 308.
23 Ibid., p. 467.
If war threatens to break out, it is the duty of the working class
in the countries concerned, and of their parliamentary representatives,
with the aid of the International Socialist Bureau, to do all in their
power to prevent war by all means which seem to them appropriate,
and which naturally vary according to the sharpness of the class strug-
gle and the general political situation. Should war, nevertheless, break
out, it is their duty to cooperate to bring it promptly to a close and
to utilize the economic and political crisis created by the war to arouse
the masses of the people and to precipitate the downfall of capitalist
domination.'
But despite its apparent strength on the eve of the World

War, the Second International, with its millions of well-organ-
ized adherents, proved impotent in 1914. The great majority of
workers' representatives in practically every country concerned,
with only feeble and scattered resistance, voted for war. Even
if it were true that this volte-face was engineered by bureauc-
ratized and "treacherous" leaders against the will of the
masses, this would only prove the impotence of "party democ-
racy" in the face of oligarchic tendencies in the organization.
But such an explanation is of doubtful adequacy. What Social-
ist party could, in good conscience, have assumed the responsi-
bility of paralyzing the war effort in its own country, unless it
could be sure that its "opposite number" in the enemy country
would be equally successful? Might not the outcome then simply
have been the sacrifice of the independence of one's own coun-
try, including its proletariat, in favor, not of the cause of inter-
national revolution, but of the capitalists of the enemy country?
The allegation of self-defense was certainly more than a mere
fraud. It was indicative of the profound dilemma connected
with the security factor.25
While the realities connected with the security and power
factors led the Second International to founder in impotence,
they eventually turned the Third International, and the move-
ment it carried, into instrumentalities of power politics. There
is a striking similarity between the structure and fate of the
world-revolutionary ideology of the French revolutionaries and
that of its counterpart, the Bolshevik ideology. Even prior to
the October Revolution this ideology had been fully established.
24 Resolution adopted by the Congress of the Second International at Stuttgart, 1907;
see Lewis L. Lorwin, Labor and Internationalism, New York, Macmillan, 1929, pp. 91 ff.
25 Nowhere, perhaps, has the tragic situation confronting internationalists during those
days been more poignantly portrayed than in Martin du Gard's Les Thibaults.
170 WORLD POLITICS
In April, 1917, Lenin declared that, owing merely to historical
accident, the Russian proletariat would be chosen to be the
"skirmishers of the world proletariat," and that its action would
be only a "prelude to and a step towards the socialist world
revolution." World-wide expansion of the revolution he con-
sidered as imminent, the preconditions for its outbreak being
present in all countries, and the responsibility of the Russians
for the fate of the oppressed everywhere was stressed.26 In strik-
ing parallel to the French decree of November 19, 1792, a Bol-
shevist party resolution of August 1917, stated that "with the
liquidation of imperialist domination the workers of that coun-
try which will first set up a dictatorship of proletarians and
semi-proletarians will have the duty to render assistance,
armed, if necessary, to the fighting proletariat of the other coun-
tries."27 Even more striking is the fact that the revolution itself
was undertaken only because world-wide revolution was con-
sidered a certainty,28 a fascinating example of how ideologies,
by the very fact of being accepted by leaders of a movement,
create world-historic events. Even after the establishment of
Soviet power in Russia, the interest of the Bolshevist Party was
considered as subordinate to that of the world-proletariat. In-
deed, it was thought the duty of any particular revolutionary
movement or party to sacrifice its specific interests if and when-
ever broader international interests demanded such sacrifice.
Inevitability as well as imminence of world revolution were
taken for granted even when events seemed to shatter such
belief. The slightest indications became proofs; some strikes
in Germany and Austria in early 1918, were taken as sure signs
of imminent revolution, not only in these countries, but in Eng-
land, France, and Spain. The year 1919 constituted the peak of
utopian enthusiasm. Following events in Germany, Austria,
Hungary, Lenin predicted the imminent birth of an "All-World
Federative Soviet Republic"; in July he promised that that
month would be the last of the "difficult" July's, and that July
1920 would witness the final victory of the Communist Inter-
26 See V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, London, 1936, Vol. VI, pp. 17 f., 230, 288, 297.
27 Resolution on "The Present Situation and the War," adopted by the Sixth Party
Congress. I owe this and the following references to Ossip K. Flechtheim, who kindly
made available to me a manuscript entitled "The Struggle of Bolshevism for World Do-
minion."
28 Cf. resolution of the Central Committee of the Party of October 23. 1917.
national. About the same time an article by Zinoviev expressed
the chiliastic hopes of that period:
As these lines are being written, there exist already three Soviet
Republics as the main basis of the Third International: Russia,
Hungary, and Bavaria. Nobody will be surprised if, when these lines
are published, there will be not three, but six or even a greater number
of Soviet Republics. With dizzying speed Old Europe rushes toward
the proletarian revolution.'
When the article appeared the number of Soviet Republics

had been reduced to one. But its author, not to be discouraged,
now predicted a development of such speed and dimensions
that "a year hence we shall already begin to forget that Europe
once witnessed a fight for Communism; for a year hence all
Europe will be Communist, and the fight for Communism will
have begun to extend to America and perhaps also Asia and
other continents."30 It took about thirty years, and the trans-
formation of the regime into the autocratic rulership of a
country which now had become one of the two poles of world-
power, to bring this prediction to a beginning of truth, though
in a very different sense. Stalinism adapted the international
ideology of Bolshevism to the "realist" fact that the one country
in which the revolution had succeeded was forced to live in the
same world with its non- or counter-revolutionary neighbors.
Realistic appraisal of power phenomena led the regime to aban-
don its world-revolutionary ideology, except for propaganda
purposes. As a unit in international affairs the Soviet Union
now acts with at least the same degree of insistence on self-
preservation, "sovereignty," security, and power considerations
as do other countries. Whereas world-revolutionary ideology
upheld the primacy of international over "national" proletarian
considerations, Stalinism acts on the assumption that no in-
terest anywhere can possibly be above the existence and main-
tenance of Soviet rule in Russia. Whatever appears today as
Soviet internationalism has in reality become subservient to a
primarily "national" cause, or rather, the maintenance of the
regime of one specific "big power." From the point of view of
genuine internationalism, this attitude, with its cynical and
unabashed misuse of internationalist idealism, constitutes Po-
2 Quoted in Flechtheim MS cited above.
30 Ibid.
172 WORLD POLITICS
litical Realism in the extreme. Moreover, the facts and the
struggle connected with the phenomenon of "Titoism" tend to
refute the allegation that this Realism is going to last only as
long as the entire globe is not yet Communist, and that with the
transformation of all countries into Soviet or "popular-demo-
cratic" republics, genuine federation on the basis of equality
will replace insistence on Russian predominance. The Political
Idealism contained in this "federalistic" ideology seemingly is
foundering upon the rock of realities inherent even in a system
of plural Communist entities. Such questions as "Who will be
industrialized first and at whose cost in regard to living stand-
ard of the masses ?" or "Who will form the 'colonial' raw ma-
terial basis for exploitation by a more 'advanced' comrade-re-
public?"-questions which are at the very basis of the Tito
conflict-show that the security and power dilemma would have
its impact on actual policies in a collectivized world as it has
had in capitalistic and pre-capitalistic aeons.
Besides the universalism of "world-revolutionary" ideologies,

internationalism in the field of political thought has even more
commonly taken the form of a general idealism, which has been
relatively independent of specific social-political creeds and
movements and has centered around what may be broadly de-
scribed as pacifism. Arising in an age that witnessed an increas-
ing international integration of society in a wide variety of
fields, such as communications, trade, finance, this type of Po-
litical Idealism had the same traces of rationalist utopianism
as were characteristic of humanitarian nationalism. Its chili-
astic nature is apparent from its assumption that international
integration in certain fields of society will inevitably be fol-
lowed and implemented by the socio-political integration of
mankind into one community. All the more radical among the
well-known recent schemes for world government assume the
"directedness" of history, as progress toward internally ever
more democratic, internationally ever more comprehensive so-
cieties, which will eventually constitute one great community.
Belief in the desirability of the political oneness of the world
leads to the assumption of its virtual oneness in fact. All that
remains to be done is to lay technical-organizational founda-
tions. Wars and power politics are considered as anachronisms.
The philosophy of this school is perhaps nowhere more neatly
expressed than in a resolution passed by the North Carolina
legislature in 1941:
Just as feudalism served its purpose in human history and was
superseded by nationalism, so has nationalism reached its apogee in
this generation and yielded its hegemony in the body politic to inter-
nationalism. . . . The organic life of the human race is at last indis-
solubly unified and can never be severed, but it must be politically
ordained and made subject to law."'"
This was said at the time of the greatest and most "total" war
in history, a war which resulted in the polarization and concen-
tration of power in "super-powers" to an extent never witnessed
before. The theory of the anachronism of state and sovereignty,
of wars and power politics, simply overlooks the opposite tend-
ency growing out of the technical interdependence of the sover-
eign units in the world: Faced with this growing interdepend-
ence but also with the security dilemma, their attempted way-
out is to expand their individual power, economically (in order
to be self-sufficient in war), strategically (in order to safeguard
its defense requirements), etc. This may be international pro-
vincialism, but it is hard to see how to escape it in a still anarchic
international world. The facile proposal of the world federalists
that all that is needed is to abolish sovereignty by fiat of inter-
national law, simply "takes legal symbols for social realities."32
Such an unrealistic attitude is responsible for what has been
aptly called "the unreality of international law and the unlaw-
fulness of international reality."33 In view of the security dilem-
ma of competing powers, attempts to reduce power by mutual
agreement, for instance through disarmament, were bound to
fail, even if there had not been additional, economic factors
driving them into the direction of imperialism. If Marxism
maintains that political relations and developments form the
"superstructure" over the systems and developments of the
means of production, for the sphere of international relations
it might rather be said that political developments have consti-
tuted a superstructure over the developments of the means of
destruction.
31 Text in International Conciliation, No. 371, June 1941, pp. 585 ff.
32 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government," Nation, March 16, 1946.
33 Gerhard Niemeyer, Law W~ithout Force, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1941.
174 WORLD POLITICS
VI
It was partly these additional factors driving states in the

direction of imperialism that accounted for the failure of yet
another type of idealistic internationalism, the one connected
with economic, or laissez-faire liberalism. Whenever and wher-
ever the trading class with its commercial interests came to the
fore in competition with feudal groups, it developed an inter-
nationalist-pacifist ideology based on the assumption that once
the "irrational" monopolistic, militaristic, and nationalist ob-
stacles to free exchange of goods among nations were elimi-
nated, all nations would readily realize their common interest
in peace. We hear even before 1400 from a contemporary ob-
server of Florentine policies that these policies were "not deter-
mined by ambitions, which are typical of the nobility, but by the
interests of trade; and since nothing is more hostile and detri-
mental to merchants and artisans than the disturbance and con-
fusion of war, certainly the merchants and artisans who rule us
love peace and hate the waste of war."34 England in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries was filled with the pacifist ide-
ology of commercialism; and similar enthusiasm was expanded,
in the work of an early poet of a nation whose very origin was a
fight for freedom of trade, into the vision of a world federation
"by commerce joined":
Each land shall imitate, each nation join
The well-based brotherhood, the league divine,
Extend its empire with the circling sun,
And band the peopled globe within its federal zone.
Till each remotest clan, by commerce join'd,

Links in the chain that binds all humankind,
Their bloody banners sink in darkness furl'd
And one white flag of peace triumphant walks the world.35
While philosophers such as Comte and Spencer later de-

veloped this ideology into a more general philosophy of history
according to which an age of science, technology, industrial-
ism, and peace would follow upon eras of more warlike tradi-
tionalism, militarism, and aristocracy-it found its more fac-
34 Salutati, quoted by Felix Gilbert in his chapter "Machiavelli," in Makers of Modern
Strategy, ed. by Edward M. Earle, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1943, p. 21.
35 From Joel Barlow's "Columbiad," as quoted in Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism,
New York, Macmillan, 1944, p. 299.
tual-economic, though more pedestrian, elaboration in the the-
ories of economic internationalism of the Manchester School.
Thus Cobden was an active protagonist of the peace movement,
which he tried to ally with his anti-colonial free trade crusade:
"The efforts of the Peace Societies, however laudable, can never
be successful as long as the nations maintain their present sys-
tem of isolation. . . . The Colonial System of Europe has been
the chief source of war for the last 150 years." "I see in the Free
Trade principle that which shall act on the moral world as the
principle of gravitation in the Universe-drawing men together,
thrusting aside the antagonism of race and creed and language,
and uniting us in the bonds of peace."36
The reality was imperialism and world war. The economic
system of industrial capitalism, while internationalist in its
early theory, was put into practice in national economic units:
"Economic theory is cosmopolitan, but political fact is national-
istic."" But it was in the economic as well as in the political
realm that the "realist" obstacles to the implementation of the
laissez-faire gospel were found. Exactly as in internal economies
accumulation of economic power by monopolies, etc. has pre-
vented a genuinely "free enterprise" system from functioning,
so in the international realm complete freedom of interchange
of goods, of migration, etc. could not prevail over the tendencies
of monopoly and exclusiveness. Thus tariffs (while at first per-
haps justified in certain countries in order to protect rising in-
dustries from older ones in other countries-such as England,
which otherwise might have frozen the economic status quo in
her exclusive favor just by utilizing the free trade principle)
became powerful instruments for the preservation of vested
economic interests. Also, liberal economic theory overlooked
the fact that, side by side with trades and industries interested
in peace, such as export or investment banking, there are power-
ful interests in actual war or at least in conditions under which
war always threatens, such as those of the armaments manu-
facturer. Even with regard to foreign investments, which appar-
ently flourish better in peace than in war, need for protection
and desire for better exploitation have often resulted in conflicts
36 From addresses in 1842 and 1846, quoted in Lorwin, op. cit., pp. 21 f.
37 Frank D. Graham, "Economics and Peace," in The Second Chance: America and the
Peace, ed. by John B. Whitton, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944, p. 126.
176 WORLD POLITICS
among countries backing the respective interests. Political and
economic causes here are inextricably intertwined. Just as eco-
nomic interests would induce governments to intervene on be-
half of business, alleged business interests would be used by
governments as a pretext for power politics, for instance for
strategic aims.38 For, even if capitalism had not developed in-
herent oligarchic and imperialistic trends, the security dilemma
inherent in the system of sovereign nation-states as such would
have prevented capitalism from forming a genuinely free-enter-
prise system on an international basis. It seems unnecessary to
enumerate all of the different power-political factors con-
nected with "security," "defense," etc. which have borne upon
the national economic policies of the various nation-states.
ViI
If the theory of economic liberalism in its international as-

pects proved to be utopian, one might assume that its opposite,
the theory of economic collectivism, with its strong and real-
istic criticism of liberal fallacies, would be expressive of Po-
litical Realism. But an analysis of collectivist assumptions
shows that, as in the case of nationalism and internationalism,
opposed ideologies may each partake of realist and idealist ele-
ments. Realistic in their criticism of the opponent, they turn
utopian-idealist when their own positive program is involved.
Thus a laissez-faire liberal like Hayek criticizes the collectivist
for believing that in a system of planned economies the causes
of international friction and wars would be eliminated, pointing
with good reason to the fact that "if the resources of different
nations are treated as exclusive properties of these nations as
wholes . . . they inevitably become the source of friction and
envy between whole nations. . . . Class strife would become a
struggle between the working classes of the different countries."39
Positively, however, his brother-in-arms among latter-day spec-
imens of "classical" liberalism, von Mises, asserts that "within
38 While liberal economic theory has tended to play down the economic factor, Marxist
criticism of "finance capitalism" and imperialism has tended to overlook the power factor.
Both are realistic in their critique but reveal the harmonistic tendencies of their general
doctrines by their respective de-emphasis. Cf., e.g., the writings of Eugene Staley, notably
his War and the Private Investor, New York, Doubleday, 1935, and Wolfgang Hallgarten's
book Yorkriegsimperialismus, Paris, 1935.
3 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1944,
p. 221.
a world of pure, perfect, and unhampered capitalism" there
are "no incentives for aggression and conquest."' To this the
collectivist, Laski, retorts, also with good reason, that "in any
capitalist society which has reached the period of contraction
every vested interest must be aggressive if it wishes to maintain
its ground," and yet he simultaneously denies that the same
factor can play a role in a system of planned economy: "The
motive of aggression, except on grounds of external security, is
ruled out by the nature of the Russian system."'" This, of course,
is begging the question; for it is plain that the "exception" em-
bodies the very problem, that of the impact of security and com-
petition factors on the policies of collectivist societies. It has
been observed above (section IV) that, in view of recent devel-
opment within the Soviet "sphere" itself, there is no reason to
assume that even in a system of socialist commonwealths all
causes for friction among the units of the system would sud-
denly disappear. But those among the ideologists of collectiv-
ism who now bewail the unbrotherly power politics of a social-
ist fellow-nation,42 may take some consolation in the fact that
even in classical antiquity the representative of economic ma-
terialism had been color-blind with respect to the power and se-
curity factor facing a Communist state, an omission for which
he was criticized by no less a critic than Aristotle.43
VIII
The foregoing may have created the impression that the two
extremes-utopian idealism, with its chiliastic approach and
its failure in practice, on the one hand, and cynical realism,
with its cool acceptance or even idealization of power, on the
other hand-were the only existing and possible approaches to
40Ludwig von Mises, Omnipotent Government: The Rise of the Total State and Total
Far, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944, p. 5.
41 Harold J. Laski, Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, New York, Viking, 1943,
p. 245.
42Thus Moshe Piyade, of the Yugoslav Politbureau, complains: "They have betrayed
socialism . . . They accuse us of meddling in their internal affairs, but they have brought
back their diplomacy . . . to the line that existed in Russia before the October Revolution
... We have learned that even the great principles of Socialism and international Socialist
solidarity can become business phrases in the mouths of Socialist statesmen. We have
learned that behind the phrases of Socialist internationalism there can be hidden the most
selfish interests of the great powers toward the small." (From a speech made July 7, 1949,
as reported in New York Times, July 9, 1949.)
4 Aristotle, Politics, Book II, Chapter 7, with regard to the theories of Phaleas the
Chalcedonian.
178 WORLD POLITICS
the problem of politics. If so, a corrective statement in a how-
ever brief paragraph is called for. True, time and again these
approaches and corresponding movements have been recurring
in the history of the last few centuries, or even millenia, one
leading to, and provoking, the other in what appears as an end-
less chain or a vicious circle. But there have also been possi-
bilities and actualities of synthesis, of a combination of Po-
litical Realism and Political Idealism in the sense that the
given facts and phenomena were recognized which Realism has
stressed, coupled with an attempt to counteract such forces
within the realm of the possible on the basis of the ideals of
Political Idealism. We suggest to call such an approach, and
the policies based upon it, Realist Liberalism. The term "Real-
ist" indicates that the system or policy in question must start
from, and accept, the factual insights of Political Realism as
its firm basis and foundation, lest it turn into unrealizable uto-
pianism. The term "Liberalism," on the other hand, points to
the type of aims or ideals which are to be the guiding stars of
such an attitude. As proposed here, the term "Liberalism" is
broader than the liberalism of the nineteenth-century free
traders and constitutionalists. It includes all socialism that is
not totalitarianism, all conservatism that is not authoritarian-
ism or mere defense of some status quo. It is not pledged to any
specific economic theory, nor to any particular theory of the
"best" form of government. It is derived from the ideal of free-
dom that underlies the major idealistic theories, thus accepting
the age-old ideals that center around terms such as "liberal,"
"democratic," "humanitarian," 'socialist." Negatively it tends
to combat all use of power that is not put into the service of the
liberal ideal but serves to establish or maintain privilege and
oligarchism, exploitation and the infliction of violence; in short,
it opposes all the natural forces and trends which are the direct
or indirect consequence of the security and power dilemma.
In order to avoid mere eclecticism in the juxtaposition of the
"realist" insights and the aims of Idealism it is very necessary
to keep this basic difficulty in mind. Liberalism in this sense is,
to quote Ortega y Gasset, "paradoxical," "acrobatic," "anti-
natural."' It partakes of the general antinomy between ethical
44 Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, London, 1932, p. 83.
ideals and natural trends and forces which was already clearly
perceived at the heyday of Darwinism (both biological and
social):
The practice of that which is ethically best involves a course of
conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to suc-
cess in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-asser-
tion, it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading
down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely
respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so
much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as
possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence.
. . . The ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the
cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it.45
In following this advice, Realist Liberalism must, above all, be

conscious of the limits which the "gladiatorial" facts put to its
endeavors. Realist Liberalism is the theory and practice of the
realizable ideal. As Koestler once put it, "the difference between
utopia and a working concern is to know one's limits." Such
policy is the most difficult of arts, and to formulate its principles
the most difficult of sciences. But if successful, Realist Liberal-
ism will prove to be more lastingly rewarding than utopian
idealism or crude power-realism. While less glamorous than
Political Idealism, it is also less utopian; while less emotional,
it is more sober; while less likely ever to become the battle-
ground of great political movements which stir the imagination
of the masses, it has more of a chance to contribute to lasting
achievements for human freedom. Even though it will be at-
tacked from both sides-for it can say, with Ibsen, "I have
within me both the Right and the Left"-it may be able to lend
to both Realism and Idealism some measure of attenuation,
thus rendering the former more humane and the latter less
chimerical. A kind of "second liberalism," it emerges as syn-
thesis from the "thesis" of utopian idealism and the "antithesis"
of cynical realism.
While it is impossible here to convey a more precise impres-
sion of the great variety of approaches, devices, and institutions
which Realist Liberalism would suggest for the realm of internal
government and politics, it may be remarked in conclusion that
in international relations the mitigation, channeling, balancing,
4' Thomas H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays, New York, Appleton,
1896, pp. 81 ff.
180 WORLD POLITICS
or control of power has prevailed perhaps more often than the
inevitability of power politics would lead one to believe. Thus,
a conscious balance-of-power policy, despite the opprobrium
attached to the term, has in modern times maintained a system
of major and smaller nations which, while not able to prevent
wars, injustice, or even the independence of all units in the sys-
tem, at least preserved many of them from total subjugation at
the hands of one hegemonial power. A system of collective se-
curity, as rationalization of the balance principle (automatic
formation of the "Grand Alliance" whenever a member turns
aggressor), perhaps came closer to practical realization in the
interwar period than debunking of the League-of-Nations ex-
periment would have us assume. Concessions, even if made out
of "enlightened self-interest" (such as made by the British in
respect to the Dominions and now India) may substitute rela-
tions of cooperation and comparative equality for those of en-
forced domination. Today, it is true, any such devices seem to
incur even greater difficulties in view of the bipolarity of the
present power-system, which, lacking the traditional balancing
power or group of powers, renders the maintenance of the bal-
ance more precarious and excludes collective security; for,
while one may have collective security with ten, or five, or pos-
sibly even three units of power, it cannot be achieved with two.
The use of a terminology of collective action then becomes mere
ideology and subterfuge in order to provide bloc-building with
a semblance of legality; thus, collective self-defense becomes a
pretext, however understandable and justified such regionalism
may be, in East or West, from the standpoint of security. For
the security dilemma today is perhaps more clear-cut than it
ever was before. It would appear that from the point which con-
centration of power has now achieved, it can only either proceed
to actual global domination by one power-unit or recede into
diffusion and disintegration. But the greater the difficulties, the
greater is the task of a policy of restraint and the merit of those
who, as Realist Liberals, would know how to forego the "easy"
solution, the "Gordian knot" solution of force, in favor of a
peace that would be neither appeasement and abdication nor
the Carthaginian result of a war which might spell the destruc-
tion of our civilization.

Herz IdealistInternationalismSecurity 1950

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Herz IdealistInternationalismSecurity 1950

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Herz IdealistInternationalismSecurity 1950

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma

Author(s): John H. Herz

T HE heartbreaking plight in which a bipolarized and atom

There is some typical "Idealism" in the very exclusion, or

With the rise of sovereign nation-states there emerged the

The unanswered question as to whom these divisions were to

Among movements expressive of idealist internationalism we

In the unhistoric fashion characteristic of chiliastic move-

And Robespierre, in 1793, intoned: "Might heaven at this

Genet now was instructed, in the typical terms of classical

The history of the Workers' Internationals is yet another

But despite its apparent strength on the eve of the World

When the article appeared the number of Soviet Republics

Besides the universalism of "world-revolutionary" ideologies,

It was partly these additional factors driving states in the

Till each remotest clan, by commerce join'd,

While philosophers such as Comte and Spencer later de-

If the theory of economic liberalism in its international as-

In following this advice, Realist Liberalism must, above all, be

You might also like