Sociology Notes (2) - Updated
Sociology Notes (2) - Updated
Sociology Notes (2) - Updated
DEVELOPMENT
SOCIOLOGY
1
Table of contents
1. Introduction to sociology………………………………...……………..4-74
2. The individual and the society………………………….…………….75-79
3. Social interaction………………………………………………………80-82
4. Social structure and organization…………………………………….83-86
5. Social change and development8………………………………………7-92
6. Social problem in Kenya……………………………………………...93-96
2
INTRODUCTION
Sociology is a social science whose study helps us to understand the relationship between people as
individual and as group and the influence of social conditions on these relationships.
The purpose of teaching sociology to social work trainees is to introduce them to sociology issues which
are considered relevant to understanding social problems and social change in the society.
Learning sociology will help the trainee to conceptualize the social position and roles of individuals,
groups and communities within social institution and in the social process.
GENERAL OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, the trainees should be able to;
a) Identify the various sociological concepts that explain the behavior of individual, group and
communities.
b) Understand and explain the concept of social organization.
c) Understand and explain the various social structures in the society.
d) Identify social process in that an individual is subjected to in society.
e) Acquire general knowledge of sociological traits that explain human behavior.
f) Identify major social problems in Kenya.
g) Identify the various elements of culture and explain how they are passed on in the society.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
Specific objectives
By the end of this topic, the trainee should be able to;
a) Define the meaning of sociology
b) Trace the origin and development of sociology as a discipline.
c) Explain the scope of sociology
d) Distinguish sociology from other social science.
e) Acquire general knowledge of sociological theories.
INTRODUCTION
Sociology; is the scientific study of human behavior. As the study of humans in their collective aspect,
sociology is concerned with all group activities, economic, social, political and religious. sociology study
such areas as bureaucracy, community deviant behavior , family , public opinion , social change , social
mobility , social stratification and such specific problems as crime , divorce child abuse and substance
addiction . Sociology tries to determine the law governing human behavior in social contexts.
Sociology as a science
Sociology can be considered a science as it involves systematic methods of empirical research analysis of
data and assessment of theories. In addition, it asks questions which can be quantified. Sociology uses
scientific methods such as experimental method, historical methods, comparative, structural functional
methods.
3
With the help of methods, sociology studies abstracts as well as concrete facts. It is viewed as science for
the following reason.
a) Facts
On of the main objective of science is the seeking of facts and keeping of high level of objects so that
those facts that are sought for all scientist are independent of their subjects that is inclination. In this case
therefore sociology is a science which bases its studies on objectivity as opposed to subjectivity in its
search for facts for example in administration of questionnaires. Sociology keeps high level of objectivity
in seeking facts from the respondent.
The society
It is a group of people related to each other through persistent relations such as social status, roles and
social networks. It can be also a large social grouping that shares the same geographical territory and is
subject to the same political authority and dominant cultural expectation.
The family
Is a group of people affiliated by consanguinity, affinity or co- residence. In most societies, it is the
principal institution for socialization of children. Extended from human ‘family unit ‘by affinity,
economy, culture, tradition, honour and friendship and the concept of the family that are metaphorical or
that grow increasingly inclusive extending to natural hood and humanism.
4
The world sociology was coined by French thinker Augustine Comte in 1938 from Latin word socins
(companion or associate) and Greek (logos) meaning believe.
Early interview approach into sociology led by Comte was to treat it as much manner as natural science
applying the same method and methodology used in natural science to the study of phenomena.
In the early 20th Century sociology expanded in USA including both the development macro sociology
interested in the evaluation of societies and micro sociology i.e. study of every day human interaction on
a small scale basis.
In the 1930’s in the US Talcott Person developed the structural functionalist theory which integrated the
study of social order and objective aspect of micro and macro structural factors.
Branches of Sociology
a) Social psychology
This is a discipline that incorporates sociology and psychology in the study of human interaction and
behavior. It tries to identify the mental process that take place in the course of interaction and how they
influence human behaviuor.
b) Rural sociology
It tries to understand the social interaction of people from the rural areas. It is a result of unique social
problem that people face e.g. unemployment, gender, poverty mobiliosation.
c) Medical sociology
Studies social and mental cause of disease It is a discipline that shows that disease is caused by germs e.g.
bacteria, some are caused by social problem e.g. stresses, isolation. It studies lifestyle disease e.g. cancer
cause by smoking. It is a discipline that stresses prevention rather than treatment.
d) Industrial sociology
It is a discipline that studies the interaction between the factors of production.
e) Criminology
It studies criminal possession and nature of crime from social point of view.
f) Political
Is a branch that studies how power is shared and distributed in a society? It attempts to understand the
various form of leadership that existed through history.
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
5
In sociology, sociological perspectives, theories, or paradigms are complex theoretical and
methodological frameworks used to analyze and explain objects of social study. They facilitate
organizing sociological knowledge. Sociological theory is constantly evolving, and can never be
presumed to be complete.
Theory is informed by epistemological discussions as to the most reliable and valid social research
methods to use in the conduct of social science. Perspectives also relate to core assumptions regarding the
ontological nature of the social world. Theory is thus informed by historical debates over positivism and
ant positivism, debates over the primacy of structure and agency, as well as debates relating to other
fundamental key concepts in the social sciences and humanities in general (e.g. materialism, idealism,
determinism, dialecticism, modernity, globalization, post modernity, and so on).
Sociological theory is different from social theory. Social theory focuses on commentary and critique of
modern society rather then explanation and its goals are intensively political. Prominent social theorists
include Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, Erving Goffman, Michel Foucault,
Dorothy Smith, Alfred Schutz, Jeffrey Alexander, and Jacques Derrida.
Sociological theory, on the other hand, is centered on the attempt to understand the society. [2] Whereas
sociological theory relies heavily on the scientific method, is objective, and does not presume to judge the
society, social theory is closer to philosophy, more subjective, and is much more likely to use the
language of values and judgment, referring to concepts as "good" or "bad". prominent sociological
theorists include Talcott Parsons, Robert K. Merton, Randall Collins, James Samuel Coleman, Peter Blau,
Immanuel Wallerstein, George Homans, Harrison White, Theda Skocpol, Gerhard Lenski, Pierre van den
Berghe and Jonathan H. Turner.
Blurry boundaries affect social science, and there are prominent scholars who could be seen as being in
between social and sociological theories, such as Harold Garfinkel, Herbert Blumer, and Claude Lévi-
Strauss.
Sociological theory is constantly evolving, and can never be presumed to be complete. New sociological
theories built on their predecessors and add to them, but classic sociological theories are still considered
important and current.
Whereas the field of sociology itself and sociological theory by extension is relatively knew, dating to
18th and 19th centuries (see history of sociology), it is closely tied to a much older field of social sciences
(and social theory) in general. Sociology has separated itself from the other social sciences with its focus
on society, a concept that goes beyond nation, and includes communities, organizations and relationships.
Some of the key developments that influenced sociological theory were: the rise of individualism, the
appearance of the modern state, industrialization and capitalism, colonization and globalization, and the
world wars. Those and similar developments challenged contemporary thinkers, inspiring them to
6
question whether existing theories can explain the observed reality, and to built on them, creating
alternate theories, in search for the explanation of the observed society.
Some of the major general sociological theories (and their variants) include:
Conflict theory: focuses on the ability of some groups to dominate others, or resistance to such
domination.
Critical theory: aims to critique and change society, not simply to document and understand it.
Ethnomethodology: examines how people make sense out of social life in the process of living it,
as if each were a researcher engaged in enquiry.
Feminist theory: focuses on how gender inequality has shaped social life.
Functionalism: focuses on how elements of society need to work together to have a fully
functioning whole.
Interpretive sociology: This theoretical perspective, based on the work of Max Weber, proposes
that social, economic and historical research can never be fully empirical or descriptive as one
must always approach it with a conceptual apparatus.
Network theory: A structural approach to sociology, most closely associated with the work of
Harrison White, which views norms and behaviors as embedded in chains of social relations.
Social phenomenology: The social phenomenology of Alfred Schütz influenced the development
of the social constructionism and ethnomethodology.
Positivism: Social positivists believe that social processes should be studied in terms of cause and
effect using 'the' scientific method.
o Also: Sociological positivism
Postcolonial theory
Rational choice theory: models social behavior as the interaction of utility maximizing
individuals.
Social constructionism: is a sociological theory of knowledge that considers how social
phenomena develop in particular social contexts.
Structural functionalism: also known as a social systems paradigm, addresses the functions that
various elements of the social system perform in regard to the entire system.
Symbolic interactionism: examines how shared meanings and social patterns are developed in the
course of social interactions.
o Dramaturgical perspective - a specialized symbolic interactionism paradigm developed
by Erving Goffman, seeing life as a performance
EVALUATION THEORY
Evaluation is part and parcel of educating – yet it can be experienced as a burden and an unnecessary
intrusion. We explore the theory and practice of evaluation and some of the key issues for informal and
community educators, social pedagogues youth workers and others. In particular, we examine educators
as connoisseurs and critics, and the way in which they can deepen their theory base and become
researchers in practice.
7
A lot is written about evaluation in education - a great deal of which is misleading and confused. Many
informal educators such as youth workers and social pedagogues are suspicious of evaluation because
they see it as something that is imposed from outside. It is a thing that we are asked to do; or that people
impose on us. As Gitlin and Smyth (1989) comment, from its Latin origin meaning 'to strengthen' or to
empower, the term evaluation has taken a numerical turn - it is now largely about the measurement of
things - and in the process can easily slip into becoming an end rather than a means. In this discussion of
evaluation we will be focusing on how we can bring questions of value (rather than numerical worth)
back into the centre of the process. Evaluation is part and parcel of educating. To be informal educators
we are constantly called upon to make judgements, to make theory, and to discern whether what is
happening is for the good. We have, in Elliot W. Eisner’s words, to be connoisseurs and critics. In this
piece we explore some important dimensions of this process; the theories involved; the significance of
viewing ourselves as action researchers; and some issues and possibilities around evaluation in informal
and community education, youth work and social pedagogy. However, first we need to spend a little bit of
time on the notion of evaluation itself.
On evaluation
Much of the current interest in evaluation theory and practice can be directly linked to the expansion of
government programmes (often described as the 'New Deal') during the 1930s in the United States and the
implementation of various initiatives during the 1960s (such as Kennedy's 'War on Poverty') (see Shadish,
Cork and Leviton 1991). From the 1960s-on 'evaluation' grew as an activity, a specialist field of
employment with its own professional bodies, and as a body of theory. With large sums of state money
flowing into new agencies (with projects and programmes often controlled or influenced by people
previously excluded from such political power) officials and politicians looked to increased monitoring
and review both to curb what they saw as 'abuses', and to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their
programmes. A less charitable reading would be that they were both increasingly concerned with micro-
managing initiatives and in controlling the activities of new agencies and groups. Their efforts were aided
in this by developments in social scientific research. Of special note here are the activities of Kurt Lewin
and the interest in action research after the Second World War.
Evaluation is the systematic exploration and judgement of working processes, experiences and outcomes.
It pays special attention to aims, values, perceptions, needs and resources.
First, evaluation entails gathering, ordering and making judgments about information in a methodical
way. It is a research process.
Second, evaluation is something more than monitoring. Monitoring is largely about 'watching' or keeping
track and may well involve things like performance indicators. Evaluation involves making careful
judgements about the worth, significance and meaning of phenomenon.
8
Third, evaluation is very sophisticated. There is no simple way of making good judgements. It involves,
for example, developing criteria or standards that are both meaningful and honour the work and those
involved.
Fourth, evaluation operates at a number of levels. It is used to explore and judge practice and programmes
and projects (see below).
Last, evaluation if it is to have any meaning must look at the people involved, the processes and any
outcomes we can identify. Appreciating and getting of flavour of these involves dialogue. This makes the
focus enquiry rather than measurement - although some measurement might be involved (Rowlands
1991). The result has to be an emphasis upon negotiation and consensus concerning the process of
evaluation, and the conclusions reached.
Basically, evaluation is either about proving something is working or needed, or improving practice or a
project (Rogers and Smith 2006). The first often arises out of our accountability to funders, managers and,
crucially, the people are working with. The second is born of a wish to do what we do better. We look to
evaluation as an aid to strengthen our practice, organization and programmes (Chelimsky 1997: 97-188).
To help make sense of the development of evaluation I want to explore three key dimensions or
distinctions and some of the theory associated.
Programme or practice evaluation? First, it is helpful to make a distinction between programme and
project evaluation, and practice evaluation. Much of the growth in evaluation has been driven by the
former.
Programme and project evaluation. This form of evaluation is typically concerned with making
judgements about the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of pieces of work. Here evaluation is
essentially a management tool. Judgements are made in order to reward the agency or the workers, and/or
to provide feedback so that future work can be improved or altered. The former may well be related to
some form of payment by results such as the giving of bonuses for ‘successful’ activities, the invoking of
penalty clauses for those deemed not to have met the objectives set for it and to decisions about giving
further funding. The latter is important and necessary for the development of work.
Practice evaluation. This form of evaluation is directed at the enhancement of work undertaken with
particular individuals and groups, and to the development of participants (including the informal
educator). It tends to be an integral part of the working process. In order to respond to a situation workers
have to make sense of what is going on, and how they can best intervene (or not intervene). Similarly,
other participants may also be encouraged or take it upon themselves to make judgments about the
situation. In other words, they evaluate the situation and their part in it. Such evaluation is sometimes
described as educative or pedagogical as it seeks to foster learning. But this is only part of the process.
The learning involved is oriented to future or further action. It is also informed by certain values and
commitments (informal educators need to have an appreciation of what might make for human
9
flourishing and what is ‘good’). For this reason we can say the approach is concerned with praxis – action
that is informed and committed
These two forms of evaluation will tend to pull in different directions. Both are necessary – but just how
they are experienced will depend on the next two dimensions.
Evaluations can be summative or formative. Evaluation can be primarily directed at one of two ends:
To enable people and agencies make judgments about the work undertaken; to identify their
knowledge, attitudes and skills, and to understand the changes that have occurred in these; and to
increase their ability to assess their learning and performance (formative evaluation).
To enable people and agencies to demonstrate that they have fulfilled the objectives of the
programme or project, or to demonstrate they have achieved the standard required (summative
evaluation).
Either can be applied to a programme or to the work of an individual. Our experience of evaluation is
likely to be different according to the underlying purpose. If it is to provide feedback so that programmes
or practice can be developed we are less likely, for example, to be defensive about our activities. Such
evaluation isn’t necessarily a comfortable exercise, and we may well experience it as punishing –
especially if it is imposed on us (see below). Often a lot more is riding on a summative evaluation. It can
mean the difference between having work and being unemployed!
Last, it is necessary to explore the extent to which evaluation is dialogical. As we have already seen much
evaluation is imposed or required by people external to the situation. The nature of the relationship
between those requiring evaluation and those being evaluated is, thus of fundamental importance. Here
we might useful employ two contrasting models. We can usefully contrast the dominant or traditional
model that tend to see the people involved in a project as objects, with an alternative, dialogical approach
that views all those involved as subjects. This division has many affinities to Freire’s (1972) split between
banking and dialogical models of education. The characteristics of the traditional (banking) approach to
evaluation:
a) A search for objectivity and a ‘scientific approach’, through standardized procedures. The values used
in this approach… often reflect the priorities of the evaluator.
b) An over-reliance on quantitative measures. Qualitative aspects…, being difficult to measure, tend to
be ignored.
c) A high degree of managerial control, whereby managers can influence the questions being asked
Other people, who may be affected by the findings of an evaluation, may have little input, either in
shaping the questions to be asked or reflecting on the findings.
d) Outsiders are usually contracted to be evaluator in the belief that his will increase objectivity, and
there may be a negative perception of them by those being evaluated’.
10
The characteristics of the alternative (dialogical) approach to evaluation
a) Evaluation is viewed as an integral part of the development or change process and involves ‘reflection-
action’. Subjectivity is recognized and appreciated.
b) There is a focus on dialogue, enquiry rather than measurement, and a tendency to use less formal methods like
unstructured interviews and participant observation.
c) It is approached as an ‘empowering processes rather than control by an external body. There is recognition
that different individuals and groups will have different perceptions. Negotiation and consensus is valued
concerning the process of evaluation, and the conclusions reached, and recommendations made
d) The evaluator takes on the role of facilitator, rather than being an objective and neutral outsider. Such
evaluation may well be undertaken by ‘insiders’ - people directly involved in the project or programme.
We can see in these contrasting models important questions about power and control, the way in which those
directly involved in programmes and projects are viewed. Dialogical evaluation places the responsibility for
evaluation squarely on the educators and the other participants in the setting (Jeffs and Smith 2005: 85-92).
The key part of evaluation, some may argue, is framing the questions we want to ask, and the information
we want to collect such that the answers provide us with the indicators of change. Unfortunately, as we
have seen, much of the talk and practice around indicators in evaluation has been linked to rather crude
measures of performance and the need to justify funding (Rogers and Smith 2006). We want to explore
the sort of indicators that might be more fitting to the work we do.
In common usage an indicator points to something; it is a sign or symptom. The difficulty facing us is
working out just what we are seeing might be a sign of. In informal education – and any authentic
education – the results of our labours may only become apparent some time later in the way that people
live their lives. In addition, any changes in behaviour we see may be specific to the situation or
relationship (see below). Further, it is often difficult to identify who or what was significant in bringing
about change. Last, when we look at, or evaluate, the work, as E Lesley Sewell (1966) put it, we tend to
see what we are looking for. For these reasons a lot of the outcomes that are claimed in evaluations and
reports about work with particular groups or individuals have to be taken with a large pinch of salt.
Luckily, in trying to make sense of our work and the sorts of indicators that might be useful in evaluation,
we can draw upon wisdom about practice, broader research findings, and our values.
We want to suggest four possible areas that we might want indicators for:
The number of people we are in contact with and working with. In general, as informal educators we
should expect to make and maintain a lot of contacts. This is so people know about us, and the
opportunities and support we can offer. We can also expect to involve smaller numbers of participants in
groups and projects, and an even smaller number as ‘clients’ in intensive work. The numbers we might
expect - and the balance between them - will differ from project to project (Jeffs and Smith 2005: 116-
11
121). However, through dialogue it does seem possible to come some agreement about these - and in the
process we gain a useful tool for evaluation.
The nature of the opportunities we offer. We should expect to be asked questions about the nature and
range of opportunities we offer. For example, do young people have a chance to talk freely and have fun;
expand and enlarge their experience, and learn? As informal educators we should also expect to work
with people to build varied programmes and groups and activities with different foci.
The quality of relationships available. Many of us talk about our work in terms of ‘building relationships’.
By this we often mean that we work both through relationship, and for relationship (see Smith and Smith
forthcoming). This has come under attack from those advocating targeted and more outcome-oriented
work. However, the little sustained research that has been done confirms that it is the relationships that
informal educators and social pedagogues form with people, and encourage them to develop with others,
that really matters (see Hirsch 2005). Unfortunately identifying sensible indicators of progress is not easy
- and the job of evaluation becomes difficult as a result.
How well people work together and for others. Within many of the arenas where informal education
flourishes there is a valuing of working so that people may organize things for themselves, and be of
service to others. The respect in which this held is also backed up by research. We know, for example,
that people involved in running groups generally grow in self-confidence and develop a range of skills
(Elsdon 1995). We also know that those communities where a significant number of people are involved
in organizing groups and activities are healthier, have more positive experiences of education, are more
active economically, and have less crime (Putnam 1999). (Taken from Rogers and Smith 2006)
For some of these areas it is fairly easy to work out indicators. However, when it comes to things like
relationships, as Lesley Sewell noted many years ago, ‘Much of it is intangible and can be felt in
atmosphere and spirit. Appraisal of this inevitably depends to some extent on the beholders themselves’
(1966: 6). There are some outward signs – like the way people talk to each other. In the end though,
informal education is fundamentally an act of faith. However, our faith can be sustained and strengthened
by reflection and exploration.
Informal education involves more than gaining and exercising technical knowledge and skills. It depends
on us also cultivating a kind of artistry. In this sense, educators are not engineers applying their skills to
carry out a plan or drawing, they are artists who are able to improvise and devise new ways of looking at
things. We have to work within a personal but shared idea of the ‘good’ – an appreciation of what might
make for human flourishing and well. What is more, there is little that is routine or predictable in our
work. As a result, central to what we do as educators is the ability to 'think on our feet'. Informal
education is driven by conversation and by certain values and commitments (Jeffs and Smith 2005).
Describing informal education as an art does sound a bit pretentious. It may also appear twee. But there is
a serious point here. When we listen to other educators, for example in team meetings, or have the chance
to observe them in action, we inevitably form judgments about their ability. At one level, for example, we
might be impressed by someone's knowledge of the income support system or of the effects of different
12
drugs. However, such knowledge is useless if it cannot be used in the best way. We may be informed and
be able to draw on a range of techniques, yet the thing that makes us special is the way in which we are
able to combine these and improvise regarding the particular situation. It is this quality that we are
describing as artistry.
For Donald Schön (1987: 13) artistry is an exercise of intelligence, a kind of knowing. Through engaging
with our experiences we are able to develop maxims about, for example, group work or working with an
individual. In other words, we learn to appreciate - to be aware and to understand - what we have
experienced. We become what Eisner (1985; 1998) describes as 'connoisseurs'. This involves very
different qualities to those required by dominant models of evaluation.
Connoisseurship is the art of appreciation. It can be displayed in any realm in which the character, import,
or value of objects, situations, and performances is distributed and variable, including educational
practice. (Eisner 1998: 63)
The word connoisseurship comes from the Latin cognoscere, to know (Eisner 1998: 6). It involves the
ability to see, not merely to look. To do this we have to develop the ability to name and appreciate the
different dimensions of situations and experiences, and the way they relate one to another. We have to be
able to draw upon, and make use of, a wide array of information. We also have to be able to place our
experiences and understandings in a wider context, and connect them with our values and commitments.
Connoisseurship is something that needs to be worked at – but it is not a technical exercise. The bringing
together of the different elements into a whole involves artistry.
However, educators need to become something more than connoisseurs. We need to become critics.
If connoisseurship is the art of appreciation, criticism is the art of disclosure. Criticism, as Dewey pointed
out in Art as Experience, has at is end the re-education of perception... The task of the critic is to help us
to see.
Thus… connoisseurship provides criticism with its subject matter. Connoisseurship is private, but
criticism is public. Connoisseurs simply need to appreciate what they encounter. Critics, however, must
render these qualities vivid by the artful use of critical disclosure. (Eisner 1985: 92-93)
Criticism can be approached as the process of enabling others to see the qualities of something. As Eisner
(1998: 6) puts it, ‘effective criticism functions as the midwife to perception. It helps it come into being,
then later refines it and helps it to become more acute’. The significance of this for those who want to be
educators is, thus, clear. Educators also need to develop the ability to work with others so that they may
discover the truth in situations, experiences and phenomenon.
Schön (1987) talks about professionals being ‘researchers in the practice context’. As Bogdan and Biklen
(1992: 223) put it, ‘research is a frame of mind – a perspective people take towards objects and activities’.
For them, and for us here, it is something that we can all undertake. It isn’t confined to people with long
and specialist training. It involves (Stringer 1999: 5):
13
• A problem to be investigated.
• A process of enquiry
Within the action research tradition there have been two basic orientations. The British tradition -
especially that linked to education - tends to view action research as research oriented toward the
enhancement of direct practice. For example, Carr and Kemmis provide a classic definition:
The second tradition, perhaps more widely approached within the social welfare field - and most certainly
the broader understanding in the USA - is of action research as 'the systematic collection of information
that is designed to bring about social change' (Bogdan and Biklen 1992: 223). Bogdan and Biklen
continue by saying that its practitioners marshal evidence or data to expose unjust practices or
environmental dangers and recommend actions for change. It has been linked into traditions of citizen’s
action and community organizing, but in more recent years has been adopted by workers in very different
fields.
In many respects, this distinction mirrors one we have already been using – between programme
evaluation and practice evaluation. In the latter, we may well set out to explore a particular piece of work.
We may think of it as a case study – a detailed examination of one setting, or a single subject, a single
depository of documents, or one particular event (Merriam 1988). We can explore what we did as
educators: what were our aims and concerns; how did we act; what were we thinking and feeling and so
on? We can look at what may have been going on for other participants; the conversations and
interactions that took place; and what people may have learnt and how this may have affected their
behaviour. Through doing this we can develop our abilities as connoisseurs and critics. We can enhance
what we are able to take into future encounters.
When evaluating a programme or project we may ask other participants to join with us to explore and
judge the processes they have been involved in (especially if we are concerned with a more dialogical
approach to evaluation). Our concern is to collect information, to reflect upon it, and to make some
judgements as to the worth of the project or programme, and how it may be improved. This takes us into
the realm of what a number of writers have called community-based action research. We have set out one
example of this below.
A fundamental premise of community-based action research is that it commences with an interest in the
problems of a group, a community, or an organization. Its purpose is to assist people in extending their
understanding of their situation and thus resolving problems that confront them….
14
Community-based action research is always enacted through an explicit set of social values. In modern,
democratic social contexts, it is seen as a process of inquiry that has the following characteristics:
Look - building a picture and gathering information. When evaluating we define and describe the problem
to be investigated and the context in which it is set. We also describe what all the participants (educators,
group members, managers etc.) have been doing.
Think – interpreting and explaining. When evaluating we analyse and interpret the situation. We reflect
on what participants have been doing. We look at areas of success and any deficiencies, issues or
problems.
Act – resolving issues and problems. In evaluation we judge the worth, effectiveness, appropriateness,
and outcomes of those activities. We act to formulate solutions to any problems.
We could contrast with a more traditional, banking, style of research in which an outsider (or just the
educators working on their own) collect information, organize it, and come to some conclusions as to the
success or otherwise of the work.
In recent years informal educators have been put under great pressure to provide ‘output indicators’,
‘qualitative criteria’, ‘objective success measures’ and ‘adequate assessment criteria’. Those working with
young people have been encouraged to show how young people have developed ‘personally and socially
through participation’. We face a number of problems when asked to approach our work in such ways. As
we have already seen, our way of working as informal educators places us within a more dialogical
framework. Evaluating our work in a more bureaucratic and less inclusive fashion may well compromise
or cut across our work.
There are also some basic practical problems. Here we explore four particular issues identified by Jeffs
and Smith (2005) with respect to programme or project evaluations.
The problem of multiple influences. The different things that influence the way people behave can’t be
easily broken down. For example, an informal educator working with a project to reduce teen crime on
two estates might notice that the one with a youth club open every weekday evening has less crime than
the estate without such provision. But what will this variation, if it even exists, prove? It could be
15
explained, as research has shown, by differences in the ethos of local schools, policing practices, housing,
unemployment rates, and the willingness of people to report offences.
Those who may have been affected by the work of informal educators are often not easily identified. It
may be possible to list those who have been worked with directly over a period of time. However, much
contact is sporadic and may even take the form of a single encounter. The indirect impact is just about
impossible to quantify. Our efforts may result in significant changes in the lives of people we do not work
with. This can happen as those we work with directly develop. Consider, for example, how we reflect on
conversations that others recount to us, or ideas that we acquire second- or third-hand. Good informal
education aims to achieve a ripple effect. We hope to encourage learning through conversation and
example and can only have a limited idea of what the true impact might be.
Change can rarely be monitored even on an individual basis. For example, informal educators who focus
on alcohol abuse within a particular group can face an insurmountable problem if challenged to provide
evidence of success. They will not be able to measure use levels prior to intervention, during contact or
subsequent to the completion of their work. In the end all the educator will be able to offer, at best, is
vague evidence relating to contact or anecdotal material.
Change of the sort with which informal educators are concerned does not happen overnight. Changes in
values, and the ways that people come to appreciate themselves and others, are notoriously hard to
identify - especially as they are happening. What may seem ordinary at the time can, with hindsight, be
recognized as special.
Workarounds
There are two classic routes around such practical problems. We can use both as informal educators.
The first is to undertake the sort of participatory action research we have been discussing here. When
setting up and running programmes and projects we can build in participatory research and evaluation
from the start. We make it part of our way of working. Participants are routinely invited and involved in
evaluation. We encourage them to think about the processes they have been participating in, the way in
which they have changed and so on. This can be done in ways that fit in with the general run of things
that we do as informal educators.
The second route is to make linkages between our own activities as informal educators and the general
research literature. An example here is group or club membership. We may find it very hard to identify
the concrete benefits for individuals from being member of a particular group such as a football team or
social club. What we can do, however, is to look to the general research on such matters. We know, for
example, that involvement in such groups builds social capital. We have evidence that:
16
In those countries where the state invested most in cultural and sporting facilities young people responded
by investing more of their own time in such activities (Gauthier and Furstenberg 2001).
The more involved people are in structured leisure activities, good social contacts with friends, and
participation in the arts, cultural activities and sport, the more likely they are to do well educationally, and
the less likely they are to be involved even in low-level delinquency (Larson and Verma 1999).
There appears to be a strong relationship between the possession of social capital and better health. ‘As a
rough rule of thumb, if you belong to no groups but decide to join one, you cut your risk of dying over the
next year in half. If you smoke and belong to no groups, it’s a toss-up statistically whether you should
stop smoking or start joining’ (ibid.: 331). Regular club attendance, volunteering, entertaining, or church
attendance is the happiness equivalent of getting a college degree or more than doubling your income.
Civic connections rival marriage and affluence as predictors of life happiness (Putnam 2000: 333).
This approach can work where there is some freedom in the way that you can respond to funders and
others with regard to evaluation. Where you are forced to fill in forms that require the answers to certain
set questions we can still use the evaluations that we have undertaken in a participatory manner – and
there may even be room to bring in some references to the broader literature. The key here is to
remember that we are educators – and that we have a responsibility foster learning, not only among those
we work with in a project or programme, but also among funders, managers and policymakers. We need
to view their requests for information as opportunities to work at deepening their appreciation and
understanding of informal education and the issues and questions with which we work.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of evaluation, as Everitt et al (1992: 129) is to reflect critically on the effectiveness of
personal and professional practice. It is to contribute to the development of ‘good’ rather than ‘correct’
practice.
Missing from the instrumental and technicist ways of evaluating teaching are the kinds of educative
relationships that permit the asking of moral, ethical and political questions about the ‘rightness’ of
actions. When based upon educative (as distinct from managerial) relations, evaluative practices become
concerned with breaking down structured silences and narrow prejudices. (Gitlin and Smyth 1989: 161)
Evaluation is not primarily about the counting and measuring of things. It entails valuing – and to do this
we have to develop as connoisseurs and critics. We have also to ensure that this process of ‘looking,
thinking and acting’ is participative.
Social exchange theory is a social psychological and sociological perspective that explains social change
and stability as a process of negotiated exchanges between parties. Social exchange theory posits that all
17
human relationships are formed by the use of a subjective cost-benefit analysis and the comparison of
alternatives. The theory has roots in economics, psychology and sociology.
Social exchange theory features many of the main assumptions found in rational choice theory and
structuralism.
Basic Concepts
The basic concepts addressed in social exchange theory are: Cost, Benefit, Outcome, Comparison Level,
Satisfaction, and Dependence. Benefits include things such as material or financial gains, social status,
and emotional comforts. Costs generally consist of sacrifices of time, money, or lost opportunities.
Outcome is defined to be the difference between the benefits and the costs:
Note that because individuals have different expectations of relationships, an individual's satisfaction with
a relationship depends on more than just the outcome. For any two people with the same outcome, their
level of satisfaction may differ based on their expectations. One person may not expect very large
outcomes, and therefore would be more easily satisfied in relationships than someone who expects more.
This notion of satisfaction is formalized as the difference between the outcome and the comparison level:
Satisfaction is not enough to determine whether a person stays within a relationship or leaves for an
alternative. That is to say, there are people who stay in unhappy relationships as well as those who leave
happy relationships. What determines whether an individual stays in a relationship or leaves is the set of
alternate relationships available. If there are many alternatives available to an individual, than that
individual is less dependent on the relationship. This notion of dependence is formalized as the difference
between the outcome and the "comparison level of alternatives":
Note that the set of potential alternatives can be governed both by extrinsic and intrinsic factors. An
example of an extrinsic factor would be that the person is from a sparsely populated town, and an
example of an intrinsic factor would be that a person is very shy about meeting new people. Both intrinsic
and extrinsic factors affect the set of people available to an individual for forming an alternate
relationship, and thus affect the level of dependence of the individual on his or her current relationship.
When deciding whether to leave the relationship, an individual considers the alternatives. There are other
considerations, such as the barriers to leaving the relationship. Such barriers include things such as
avoiding a fight, dealing with a shared financial account, etc. There are also considerations of the
investments that an individual has made in the relationship. For instance, a couple that has spent many
years together have invested a lot of time into a relationship, and this must be weighted against the
benefits gained from an alternative relationships.
18
Critiques
Katherine Miller outlines several major objections to or problems with the social exchange theory as
developed from early seminal works (Miller 2005):
The theory reduces human interaction to a purely rational process that arises from economic
theory.
The theory favors openness as it was developed in the 1970s when ideas of freedom and openness
were preferred, but there may be times when openness isn’t the best option in a relationship.
The theory assumes that the ultimate goal of a relationship is intimacy when this might not
always be the case.
The theory places relationships in a linear structure, when some relationships might skip steps or
go backwards in terms of intimacy.
It also is strongly seated in an individualist mindset, which may limit its application in and description of
collectivist cultures.
Applications
Currently, Social Exchange Theory materializes in many different situations with the same idea of the
exchange of resources. Homans once summarized the theory by stating:
Social behavior is an exchange of goods, material goods but also non-material ones, such as the
symbols of approval or prestige. Persons that give much to others try to get much from them, and
persons that get much from others are under pressure to give much to them. This process of
influence tends to work out at equilibrium to a balance in the exchanges. For a person in an
exchange, what he gives may be a cost to him, just as what he gets may be a reward, and his
behavior changes less as the difference of the two, profit, tends to a maximum ("Theories Used in
Research").
Other applications that developed include fields such as anthropology, as evidenced in an article by
Harumi Befu, which discusses cultural and social ideas and norms such as gift-giving and marriage.
Exchange theory has become one of the most ambitious social, especially socio-psychological,
theories. Social exchange theory’s fundamental premise is that human behavior is an exchange of
rewards between actors. This is the rationale for the claim that social exchange can serve as a
general paradigm for sociology and anthropology as well as social psychology. The present
critique is aimed at rational choice and behaviorist variants of social exchange theory rather than
at the theory as such. First, the main assumptions of (these variants of) social exchange theory are
19
presented. This is followed by a critique of these assumptions at two levels. The first level
pertains to the treatment of social interaction as an exchange, and the second to the status of
social exchange as an economic or psychological phenomenon. Other criticisms of exchange
theory are also presented.
The exchange approach in sociology [is] the economic analysis of noneconomic social
situations (Emerson, 1976, p. 336).
In recent years, one of the most ambitious sociological, particularly socio-psychological, theories has
been social exchange theory (Alexander, 1990; Cook, 2000), in turn a subset of the rational choice model
predicated on a “paradigm of rational action borrowed from economics” (Coleman, 1986, p. 10), viz.
expected utility models imported from microeconomics (Macy and Flache, 1995). Notably, some of its
proponents see social exchange theory as a prominent instance of “sociological miniaturism” (or
1
sociological social psychology ) that ostensibly allows the “examination of large-scale social issues by
means of the investigation of small-scale social situations”, or simply “seeing the big through the small”
(Stolte, Fine, and Cook, 2001, p. 388).
The question can arise as to the reasons readers need to know about social exchange theory. An important
reason is exchange theory’s ambition to be a sort of integrative theoretical paradigm for social science,
social psychology in particular, which derives from the corresponding claim of the rational choice model
and behaviorism, as its key bases and sources. Another reason is exchange theory’s self-description as an
interdisciplinary theoretical endeavor putatively spanning social-science disciplinary boundaries,
especially those between sociology, economics, psychology and political science. So is the moment that
exchange theory, especially its economic variant, is intimately linked with “public choice” or “rational
choice” approaches, which are more familiar to social and political theorists. A corollary reason is then
that exchange theory involves or revolves around the issue of how standard economic frameworks,
notably market metaphors and analogies, are applied to social analysis in recent times.
This paper scrutinizes these approaches and claims of exchange theory. The examination is organized in
three parts. The first part contains the key concepts and assumptions of social exchange theory as
presented by its representatives. The second part involves a critique of social exchange theory at two
levels, viz. the treatment of social interaction as exchange, and then of social exchange as an extension of
economic and/or behavioral (psychological) phenomena. Adduced in the third part are some other
criticisms of exchange theory. A key criticism is that modern exchange theory is neither a completely
original nor satisfactory paradigm for social science in virtue of being a mixture of elements from
psychological behaviorism and orthodox economics as more or less discredited theoretical traditions, as
well as (unwittingly) restating and misinterpreting some classical sociological and anthropological ideas
(e.g. Simmel, Mauss). On the account of that mixture, the theory appears as an attempt to resurrect the
double ‘ghost’ of behaviorism and utilitarianism, in respect of this restatement, a sort of déjà vu
expedition to ‘rediscover America.’
20
Concepts and Assumptions of Social Exchange Theory
The complex of interdependent exchange processes constitutes the market functioning within a definite
social and institutional structure, though admittedly the latter has not been systematically examined
within rational choice theory. Since these processes are assumed to be governed by reciprocal relations—
viz. exchange is defined as social interaction characterized by reciprocal stimuli—they would not
continue in the long-run if reciprocity were violated. The concept of exchange ratio or balance-imbalance,
leading to the concepts of power, dependence, and cohesion, is implied in the attribute of reciprocal
reinforcements (Emerson, 1969, pp. 387-9). In consequence, exchange theory examines the processes
establishing and sustaining reciprocity in social relations, or the mutual gratifications between
individuals. The basic assumption of exchange theory is that individuals establish and continue social
relations on the basis of their expectations that such relations will be mutually advantageous. The initial
impetus for social interaction is provided by the exchange of benefits, intrinsic and extrinsic,
independently of normative obligations (Blau, 1994, pp. 152-6).
By contrast, social exchange is characterized by unspecified personal obligations and trust as well as
intrinsic--in conjunction with extrinsic--rewards, thus occupying the middle ground between pure
21
calculation of advantage and pure expression of love (Blau, 1994, p. 91). The persistence and extension of
social exchange are conditioned by bonds based on personal trust, unlike economic transactions that rely
on impersonal markets and legal regulations. Moreover, unlike economic exchange, this bond created by
reciprocal benefits of extrinsic character is the principal output rather than side-effect of social exchange
(Blau, 1994, pp. 152-6). Hence, exchange theory is said to center on “enduring long-term social
relations”, as distinguished from “one-shot transactions” in the market realm (Cook, 2000, p. 687).
Still, economic models of social exchange (and rational choice) are not immune to internal contradictions,
which can admittedly (Markovsky et al. 1997, p. 833) be self-defeating. Thus, while recognizing the
differences between market and social exchange (Cook, 2000, Stole et al., 2001), making the latter a
distinct phenomenon vis-à-vis the former, exchange theorists do not see them as an impediment to
applying standard economic models of rational choice. Further, some regard models of economic
exchange as universal and so applicable to “extra-economic exchange” (Macy and Flache, 1995) or
“social situations” (Emerson, 1977). Admittedly, modern social exchange theory uses “concepts and
principles borrowed from microeconomics” (Cook, 2000, p. 687). For example, the principle of
diminishing marginal utility originally pertaining to market transactions is extended to extra-economic
relations on the ground that the present realization of expectations has a dampening effect on future
attainment, though such effects are counteracted by rising aspirations (Blau, 1964, pp. 148-9; Coleman,
1990, pp. 37-42).
Adopting the rule of diminishing marginal utility, social exchange theory sees the underlying assumption
of utility maximization (i.e. optimum or equilibrium) in its domain as little different from that in
economics, though admittedly no exact price can be attached to ‘invaluable goods’ (Arrow 1997) and
their utility is not independent or separable. Since for social exchange theorists the principle of marginal
utility is applicable to exchanges of non-economic character (Blau, 1994, pp. 158-9), they extend the
assumption of utility optimization (and satisficing) beyond the market. Thus, some (Coleman, 1994, p.
159) argue that maximization of utility is a universal engine of action for both economic and non-
economic actors (individual or corporate) that leads to the attainment of equilibrium in which the
divergence between utility and control of events/goods is minimized. Because actors are assumed to aim
at gaining utility by relinquishing control, power is attained not for its own sake but is instrumental in
2
obtaining wealth, thus seeking the first is the means to gaining the second (Coleman, 1973).
Arguably, they attempt to maximize their realization of interests as a single action principle and a
reduction in the discrepancy between utility and control ensues from exchanges to the point where
equilibrium is reached (Coleman, 1990, p. 39). In retrospect, this is a restatement of Pareto’s definition of
market equilibrium as the outcome of an opposition between tastes (demand) and the obstacles for their
attainment (resource scarcity). At first sight, this extension of standard economic concepts like utility,
equilibrium and optimum into non-economic domains suggests that exchange theory purports to erase or
mitigate social-science disciplinary boundaries, especially those between economics and other disciplines.
However, in most cases the underlying rationale or (un)intended outcome of such an extension is
subsuming these disciplines under economics as the ‘queen of social science’, which epitomizes academic
22
economic imperialism rather than an interdisciplinary project. Then, the extension of marginal utility and
other marginalist concepts indicate that social exchange theory is primarily a more specific variation of
the rational choice model—notably, closely tied to public choice as the economic analysis of politics--
rather than an autonomous theoretical paradigm. So does the extension of other related economic
concepts.
Thus, social exchange theorists also transplant the concepts of supply-demand, market and just price,
imperfect competition, costs, profits, etc. from economic to extra-economic phenomena. They view the
equilibrium between supply and demand as determining the exchange ratio between two non-economic
3
goods by analogy to market exchange . Also, they treat the concept of elasticity of market supply and
demand as also applicable to social relations, particularly interrelations in and structures of groups. Some
extend the theory of imperfect and monopolistic competition, with its assumptions of market
imperfections (e.g. product differentiation, small numbers of firms, entry constraints, incomplete
information), to competition in status and other social rewards. Other examples of extending economic
concepts to ‘non-economic situations’ include (direct, fixed, variable, marginal, investment, opportunity)
costs, benefits, profit, income, etc. (Blau ,1994, pp. 158-159; Coleman, 1990, pp. 719-769; Homans,
1990, pp. 77-81).
Such attempts to ground social exchange on market principles introduce variables, such as material
interests and initial control of goods, used in turn to predict the value of events, the resources obtained
and the patterns of control at equilibrium (Coleman, 1972). They borrow their assumptions or parameters
from the standard theory of market exchange or perfect competition premised on the assumptions of
product homogeneity, multiple firms, perfect information, rational self-interest in gains, stable
homogenous interests or preferences, divisible goods, etc. Still, some exercises (Michener et al., 1977) in
what critics see as indiscriminate borrowing (Lie, 1997) realize that such assumptions are too stringent
when applied to social (and even economic) relations suggesting the need for their qualification or
relaxation. For example, they acknowledge that imperfect knowledge or incomplete information is
present in social relations (and economic exchanges) and leads to inefficiencies. Also, they allow that
actors have motivations or purposes other than self-interest, viz. altruism, equity, or status, though by
relaxing this assumption the (rational choice) model admittedly loses some of its predictive power.
Finally, they admit that the proposition of foregoing ownership or power--by giving up control for the
sake of gaining utility (Coleman, 1994, p. 169)--through market transactions, while plausible for material
goods, is dubious for non-material variables, including information (Michener et al., 1977)
23
resources are a broader category than wealth). Specifically, they treat power as a derivative of
unreciprocated exchange transactions in respect of ‘resources’.
While assuming that social bonds result from reciprocated benefactions, they see unilateral services are
the ultimate source of differentiation in power (and status). This simultaneous generation of social bonds
and power differentiation is called the paradox of social exchange. The ultimate form of the first is pure
expression of love, and the extreme case of the latter is potlatch in its primitive and modern variations
(Blau, 1994, pp. 158-9; Nisbet, pp. 1970:65-6). This process of power differentiation has social structural
effects like asymmetries in relations between members of different groups, as superiority in group
resources is transmitted into the superior prestige of individuals accruing to them by membership
independently of personal factors (Blau, 1994, pp. 146-7). In conventional economics, market exchange is
a primary determining phenomenon in relation to power as secondary and derivative. In a similar vein,
economic-behavioral models of social exchange treat exchange as more fundamental than power,
explicitly (Emerson, 1969, pp. 385-6) or implicitly (Cook, 1990, pp. 115-6) on the market-style
assumption that the latter largely emerges and evolves in a complex structure of exchanges of resources.
Arguably, since these exchanges are governed by the objective structure of alternatives, the latter
determines power (and dependence) and gives it the character of a structural variable residing within
exchange networks. No doubt, power has been a subject of intense interest among social theorists for long
time and an organizing concept for much of their theory, classical (viz. Marx, Weber, Simmel) and (post-)
modern (e.g. Bourdieu, Habermas, Foucault) alike. Social exchange theory purports to provide some
additional insights that would ostensibly enhance our, including public choice, understanding of power
and related phenomena, which can be intriguing to readers. As hinted above and elaborated below,
exchange theory’s key insights in this respect are, first, the equation of power with resources or wealth
and, second, the association between power and dependence. While to many readers these insights may
appear déjà vu—viz. the first in orthodox economics, including public choice, the second in behaviorist
psychology--social exchange theory entertains high ambitions about its contribution to the theoretical
(and empirical) analysis of power, which justifies and clarifies how the latter fits into this study.
As regards its second key insight, specifically for exchange theory the inverse association between power
and dependence characterizes their relations, so (non)reciprocity in the latter generates the problem of
(in)equality or (a)symmetry in power (Emerson, 1962, pp. 31-41). In recent exchange theory, this
perspective has become known as the “power-dependence theory of Emerson” (Molm and Peterson,
1999). In this view, reciprocal or balanced exchange relations do not always imply the absence of power,
however. Power (though not domination) may still be operative rather than neutralized in such relations
because actors can continue to exercise control over each other’s actions. Two or more power-dependence
relations constitute a power network that tends to closure. A major process in such networks is the
legitimation or transformation of power into authority as balanced and directed power exerted only in
ways specified by group norms (Emerson, 1969, pp. 395-397) and thus a social structural rather than
personal phenomenon residing in dyads. Arguably, the nature of network connections--positive, negative
and mixed--and resource scarcity by virtue of being factors altering dependency relations determine the
locus of power in exchange networks, a view that seeks to go beyond dyadic social exchange to more
24
‘macro’ levels (Yamaguchi, Gillmore and Cook, 1988). This shift of attention from isolated dyads to
exchange networks (attributed to Emerson 1972) is a key feature of modern social exchange theory for its
recent advocates (Molm, 1991, p. 475). However, some modify or replace such network models by a
process view that advances an identity model of power associated with a participation level in exchange
networks, as set by actors’ standards of identities (Burke, 1997, pp. 135-7).
In rational choice versions of exchange theory, the distribution of power among actors is determined by
the ‘availability of resources from alternative exchange relations’ in networks consisting only of negative
connections like competition and conflict (Yamaguchi et al., 1988, p. 851). In turn, the ‘local scarcity of
resources’ determines power distribution in exchange networks with solely positive connections such as
cooperation. And, in networks of mixed connections, the distribution of power is conditional on a
conjunction of network positions--e.g., the distance from the sources--and the control of resources.
Overall, rational choice models of exchange typically equate power with the total value of economic
resources (Yamaguchi, 1997, p. 840) or wealth. Specifically, the power ratio between actors is the
reciprocal magnitude of the exchange rates between them--the less resources actor A exchanges with B,
the higher A’s power over B--with these rates (or marginal utilities of exchanges with alternative
partners) being equal in market-like equilibrium (so optimum). Attaining the latter implies establishing
uniform power ratios or approximately symmetrical power-dependence relations between actors in
networks.
According to some exchange theorists, actors can exercise both reward and punishment or coercive
power, though the first is a more likely strategy for powerful actors, and the second for the weak, in
exchanges (Molm, 1989, pp. 1417-8). In this view, the risk of retaliation and fear of loss, however,
discourage the strategic use of coercive power (Molm, 1997, p. 130) on the part of weak actors since they
are too dependent on their powerful counterparts to use such strategies. Arguably, the dynamics of power
in social exchange, expressed in the frequency and distribution of outcomes, is governed by two
variables. One is the structure of power in exchange networks--i.e., a structural equivalent to the potential
power derived from dependence relations--the other its strategic use. Reportedly, structural power and
strategic action are weakly correlated, though both have strong effects on exchange outcomes.
Specifically, strategic action is observed to have a more profound impact on punishment power, and
structural power on its reward counterpart. In turn, strategic action, viz. the strategic use of coercive
power, is employed to recompense for the lack of structural power rather than intensify or mediate its
effects, for powerful actors have less need to utilize such strategies (Molm, 1990, p. 447).
In this view, the frequency and distribution of exchange is the indicator of satisfaction from exchange
relations, which is determined by the amount and balance of power. The greater average power or
balance, the more symmetrical distribution of exchange and so the greater satisfaction, and vice versa.
Hence, this satisfaction derives from relative power positions via the expectation entailed in each
position, with higher (lower) ‘nodes’ producing high (low) expectations (Molm, 1991, p. 493). As to the
effect of the degree of reciprocity vs. negotiation in social exchange on power distribution within
networks, presumably reciprocal exchanges exhibit lower strategic power uses (Molm and Peterson,
1999), just as greater perceptions of fairness (Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi, 2003).
25
In some variants of exchange theory, power exhibits a direct correlation to the centrality of actors’
network positions (Bonacich, 1987), with exceptions where central positions do not necessarily imply
superior power, which is either a proposition (Markovsky et al., 1990, p. 300; Willer, 1986, p. 441) or a
concession (Cook and Yamaguchi, 1990, p. 297). By contrast, some conceive power as a function not so
much of actors’ position in exchange networks as of their actions, viz. identity models of network
exchanges in which power is linked with participating in these based on certain participation reference
standards (Burke, 1997, pp. 135-6). These models differ from their structural counterparts in that power
does not inhere to any particular position in an exchange network but expresses the capacity of one actor
to control those resources the others seek, so the equation has two parts (Burke, 1997, p. 149).
By contrast, structural theories assume that power differentiation is determined more by ‘transitive
power’ in organized networks or hierarchies than by that in dyadic exchange relations (Friedkin, 1991).
These theories denote exchange relations positive if they are contingent on each other or mutually
reinforcing, and negative if they preclude one another. They derive measures of centrality within
exchange networks from process models of social influence assuming that such processes generate and
shapes the societal organization of network status. For instance, an integrated variant of these models
applies a social-structural perspective on choice shifts by linking these to interpersonal interactions or
polarization in small groups, thus making influence network the crucial construct in the analysis of group
dynamics (Friedkin, 1999).
Some exchange theorists relax the rational choice argument for the determination of power by exchanges
of resources within network structures (Willer et al., 1989). Describing it as a relational and unobservable
phenomenon, they view power as determined by multiple rather than single structural conditions,
including resource exchanges. They suggest that a substantial departure from some baseline value of
expected outcomes is indicative of power use in exchange relations, thus of grounding power in a
resource flow linking any pair of positions in a network. In such networks, power transitivity exists if a
resource flow between at least three positions is operative. Overall, power is structurally generated in
exchange networks via exclusion and inclusion, or hierarchy and mobility, and is proportional to the
ability to avoid being excluded. In this rendition of exchange theory, excludability becomes the major
factor determining individual and network realms or power positions, though critics (Cook and
Yamaguchi, 1990, pp. 297-300) object that the connection between power-dependence and exclusion is
not articulated. It defines exclusion in the sense that some actors are effectively prevented from obtaining
valuable resources like wealth (and so power and status) by social-structural conditions that affect (and
stem from) resource availability, valuation and transfers between individual and collective actors
(Markovsky et al., 1988).
Thus, the power of micro-units within exchange networks to access these resources is to some degree the
function of macro-social structures. Technically, this version of exchange theory assumes that to every
network position and its holder accrues relative power analytically predicted by a graph-theoretic power
index (GPI) that indicates the number of points earned and distributed in resource exchanges and is based
26
on the equation of power to the availability of alternative exchange relations. GPI calculations in multi-
exchange networks are simplified by using the concept of network domains as independent (sub)
networks in the sense that power use and change in one domain do not have impact on that in the others.
In sum, both exchanges of resources and configurations of network positions determine power and its use,
as manifested in resource distributions. Yet, some exchange theorists object that this procedure of power
estimation via the accumulation and distribution of resource points may perpetuate the rational-choice
myth that social actors wish solely to accumulate wealth (Burke, 1997, p. 149).
Instead, they redefine social (and economic) exchange as a type of choice behavior. Presumably, actors in
social exchange make choices freely in regard to other interactants or alternative courses of action while
guided by cost-benefit considerations, though no formal bargaining and explicit contracts on reciprocation
are involved (Molm, 1990, pp. 427-9). The satisfaction of actors’ preferences becomes the prime mover
of exchanges: exchange processes are outcomes of their attempts to satisfy their needs (Cook, 1990, pp.
115-116) rather than live up to social expectations, values, and rules. Admittedly, alternatives for
exchange transactions as well as their outcomes are influenced by a group’s network that prevents or
mitigates by various social sanctions, including moral disapproval, failures of reciprocation.
Yet, exchange theory typically treats these sanctions and the underlying social norms as secondary
explanatory factors in relation to expected returns in the belief that they do not generate (though may
sustain) such transactions (Blau, 1994, p. 158). Generally, it, especially its rational-choice rendition,
conceives exchange behavior as mostly, to use Weber’s terms, instrumental-rational rather than (also)
value-rational well as traditional and affective (or emotional) action, despite some recent attempts in the
second direction, e.g. affect theories (Lawler, 2001; Molm, 1991). In Paretian terms, it conceptualizes
social exchange as driven largely by logico-rational elements such as material interests in resources, while
downplaying non-rational variables like sentiments and their rationalizations (residues and derivations).
27
This feature of exchange theory helps explain why its advocates avoid reference to, or criticize and
dubiously reinterpret, Weber, Pareto and other classical sociologists and anthropologists (as implicitly
admitted by Cook, 2000).
However, some of them see the rational choice approach as but a special case of behavioral psychology
(Homans, 1990, pp. 85-6), a view that the exponents of this approach (e.g. Coleman 1990, p. 11) reject. In
this view, among social laws only economic ones approach level of generality in virtue of being grounded
on universal behaviorist psychological principles (Homans, 1990, pp. 77-81), though they admittedly
emerge and function solely within definite institutional conditions like markets, property rights, legal
guarantees, or cultural rules (Elster, 1989; Willer et al., 1989). Thus, early exchange theorists (like
Homans) describe such market laws as the law of supply and demand as derivations from psychological
propositions or behavioral propensities, though under certain institutional parameters. They explicitly
pursue and justify psychological reductionism on the ground that sociological laws are not very general or
pertinent. Notably, they treat the rational choice propositions about social exchange, by virtue of referring
to individual actions and treating institutions as their aggregate outcomes, as psychological and thus
universal, and not sociological.
If so, then these propositions assume on the heroic function of explaining and predicting virtually all
social phenomena, economic and non-economic alike. For example, some exchange theorists propose that
social status--denoted as a special capital (Blau, 1994, pp. 160-1) whose function is to obtain material
gains--is subject to the operation of the law of supply and demand, just as are economic variables. The
role of wealth or money in economics is in social exchange theory matched by status (Blau, 1994, pp.146-
7), approval (Homans, 1990, pp. 77-9), reputation and related non-economic variables assumed in turn to
be rationally used for obtaining efficiency gains within exchange systems (Raub and Weesie, 1990, pp.
653-4).
Overall, for leading exchange theorists (Homans, 1971), the key propositions of their theory are much
like those of economics, viz. rational pursuit of self-interest, by assuming that actors are more likely to
engage in an action, the more valuable its reward, and conversely. In turn, by virtue of making no
reference to the conditions and positions of a social system’s integration or equilibrium, they are not
functional or macro-sociological propositions. Relatedly, like general sociological theory, that of social
exchange becomes a set of explanations and predictions using psychological propositions, of which
28
rational choice is (as seen) a special case. Presumably, the only general propositions in sociology are
psychological, not social, because no general sociological propositions holding for all societies or groups
exist (Homans, 1990). Since its perceived psychological, including individualistic, foundations make
rational choice theory a branch of behavioral psychology, exchange theory cum the “economic analysis of
noneconomic social situations” (Emerson, 1976, p. 336) is an application of the behaviorist approach.
(This is a sort of anathema for economists and rational choice theorists in sociology, e.g. Coleman 1990).
The initial behavioral approach--as pioneered by Homans, as perhaps the first modern exchange and even
rational choice theorist (Coleman and Lindenberg, 1989; Fararo, 2001—is elaborated in the model of
operant psychology treated as the theoretical foundation. The model uses concepts such as operant
stimulus, discriminatory stimulus and reinforcing stimulus, and views not the actor but the relationship as
the unit of analysis (Emerson, 1969, pp. 379/95). It distinguishes exchange networks from groups in that
they are structures created by exchange processes among different individual and collective actors--i.e., as
sets of two or more connected exchanges—thus extending these processes from direct dyadic to indirect
multi-agent forms. In an extension of this model, exchange networks meet individual needs and cause or
constrain the emergence of social structures--rather than vice versa--by producing differentiation among
individuals and groups on the basis of asymmetrical access to valuable resources like wealth, power,
prestige, or privilege (Cook, 1990, pp. 115-6). A further related claim is that the assumption that
institutional structures are “generated” via the concatenation of individual exchanges makes exchange
theory a “theory of social structure [sic!]” (Cook, 2000, p. 687).
Another key behavioral assumption of social exchange theory is that of distributive justice, equity or
fairness in non-economic relations. In neoclassical economics, the principle of distributive justice implies
equivalence of the marginal productivity or efficiency and the earnings of production factors like labor
(wages), capital (interest), and entrepreneurship (profit). By analogy, early social exchange theory defines
distributive justice in terms of equivalence or proportionality between the investment in and the (money
or psychic) profit from non-economic exchanges (Homans, 1961, p. 264) and contending a la economics
that only if both parties make profit will such transactions continue. In modern social exchange theory
(and social psychology), most definitions of (distributive) justice or fairness are mainly variations on this
theme (e.g., Jasso, 1999; Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi 2003; Younts and Mueller, 2001). For
illustration, some redefine distributive justice in terms of ‘how people evaluate the fairness of the reward
distributions that result from allocations or exchange, typically by comparing actual rewards to some
standard of ‘just reward’” (Molm, et al. 2003:128-9).
In social exchange theory, most analyses of distributive justice emphasize its subjective dimensions or
actors’ perceptions of the relation of rewards to a certain distribution rule of ‘just reward’ (Alwin, 1987).
In short, the equation or proportion between actual and subjectively expected rewards measures
distributive justice. This approach rests on the premise that equity or fairness is ‘in the eye of the
beholder’ (Molm et al., 2003), thus making distributive justice a sort of socio-psychological phenomenon.
Arguably, individuals’ expected and actual rewards from exchange constitutes the socio-psychological
process of justice evaluation (Shepelak and Alwin, 1986). Reportedly, actors perceive inequalities in
exchange as legitimate and just to the extent that their cause is attributed to themselves rather than others
29
(Shepelak, 1987). Since social factors affect individual expectations, admittedly both objective and
expected level--influenced by subjective reference groups and standards--of well-being determine the
assessment of satisfaction or distributive justice as subjectively experienced.
The relationship between the criteria of evaluation (e.g., skills, performance, or seniority) and the
distribution of valuable resources, which expresses or approximates distributive justice, is specified by a
distributional rule by analogy to the marginal productivity principle in economics. For example, the
fairness of earnings is estimated according to criteria like merit and need affecting actors’ judgment of
perceived equity (Jasso and Rossi, 1977). Overall, this view makes the extent of perceived injustice—e.g.
‘unjust under-reward’ and ‘unjust over-reward’--in rewards a function of scarcity and inequality (Jasso
1999). Arguably, since (if) the distribution rule is adopted or subjectively perceived as legitimate, the
relations between evaluation criteria and distributive rewards will be perceived as equitable or not
depending on whether or not individual reward expectations, based on the rule, are fulfilled or frustrated.
This implies the expectation that the psycho-social unrest due to distributive injustice will arise only if the
distribution standard is (perceived as being) violated (Cook, 1975). In addition, some exchange theorists
reintroduce procedural distributive justice stating that ‘judgments of fairness are a function not only of
outcomes in relation to some standard but of the processes or procedures through which outcomes are
obtained’ (Molm et al. 2003:129). Thus, they examine how the processes of negotiation and reciprocation
—i.e. negotiated and reciprocal exchange with their different ‘procedural dimensions’--affect perceptions
or judgments of fairness. Their finding is that negotiations as putatively ‘fair procedures’ produce the
’untended consequence of reducing the perception that exchange is fair and just’, and reciprocal exchange
is a ‘process for building relationships in which other actors are perceived as fair and cooperative’ (Molm
et al. 2003:129). In general, social exchange theory predicts that definite behavioral consequences will
ensue from (in)justice perception and experience (Markovsky et al., 1984).
In this regard, some exchange theorists propose social comparison functions (Markovsky et al., 1984) on
the ground that judgments of distributive justice are based on comparisons across individuals, groups,
societies, or distributional standards. In this view, social comparisons cause perceptions or emotions of
(in)justice as well as justice-restoring mechanisms and actions. Used in modern social psychology, such
functions reflect the idea that justice (and happiness) as well as affect and identification are comparative
categories or outcomes of interpersonal and inter-group evaluations, a generalization of Veblen’s theme
of ‘invidious comparison’. The social comparison function has a domain of ordinal and ratio-measured
investments and rewards unlike that of economic distribution where these variables are numerical
(Markovsky et al., 1984). Finally, as to the relationship of distributive justice to power, equity or fairness
norms reportedly legitimate behavioral inequality in exchange relations and thus favor powerful actors
rather than neutralize such effects to the advantage of the weak (Molm, Quist, and Wiseley, 1994). This
finding thus supports the legitimation hypothesis of distributive justice vs. the balance hypothesis
30
Two Levels of Critique
Social exchange theory can be examined and criticized at two levels of analysis. The first level pertains to
the treatment of human behavior or social life as exchange; the second to the reduction of social
interaction or ‘exchange’ to economic transaction or a psychological process.
At the first level, contemporary social exchange theory is far from being fully original and novel. Many
exchange theorists, knowingly or (more often) not, just restate some classical sociological ideas, notably
those of Simmel, and to that extent their theory might be designated ‘rational choice crossed with
4
classical sociology’ . For instance, Simmel posits that many interpersonal relations can be interpreted as
exchange, that the latter is the “purest and most developed kind of social interaction based on reciprocity”
to the effect “every interaction is an exchange” and is founded on the “scheme of giving and returning
equivalence.” It is curious that many of modern exchange theorists seem either unaware of the origins or
anticipations of their theory in classical sociology—thus appearing as if trying to ‘discover America’
again--or are prone to disregard these in favor of those from neoclassical economics or behavioral
psychology.
As some of its adherents admit, most of social exchange theory “combines roots in behaviorism [...] with
concepts and principled borrowed from microeconomics” (Cook, 2000, p. 687), a combination that
virtually excludes relevant sociological and anthropological ideas as incongruent. For example, economic
and psychological versions of exchange theory hardly contain relevant references to classical sociological
(and anthropological) works, including even those of Simmel and Weber as putative early ‘rational
choice’ sociologists (Kiser and Hechter 1998). Contrast this negligence with their numerous references to
(neo)classical economics (e.g. Smith, Bentnam, Marshall, Edgeworth, etc.) and behavioral psychology
(e.g. Skinner). In one respect, social exchange theory tends to ground itself in standard and partly
discredited economic concepts and models like homo economicus, self-interest, profit, utility
maximization, cost-benefit calculation, complete information, cognition, and foresight, etc. In another, it
places itself in the equally compromised behaviorist frame of reference, e.g. ‘Skinner’s box’ (Deutsch,
1971), with its reliance on the operant psychology of stimuli, responses, mutual reinforcements, rewards
and punishments, etc. The first applies to rational choice models of exchange, second to behavioral ones,
though a synthesis mixing both is found in many exchange theorists starting with Homans and Emerson.
Modern exchange theory cum a mix of behaviorism and microeconomics justifies its disregard of
sociological ideas on meta-theoretical or doctrinaire grounds that their holist or cultural crust is
incompatible with its individualist, utilitarian and behaviorist core. It neglects or dismisses the classical
sociological-anthropological conception of generalized, ‘rule-governed’ (Weber’s expression) and
symbolic social exchange (e.g. Durkheim, Mauss, Malinowski) in favor of that of restricted, normatively
independent, and pseudo-market exchanges. The issue is not whether which conception is more adequate
but the disjuncture of an ostensibly sociological theory with the tradition of sociology and its curious
continuity with (and borrowing from) orthodox economics and behaviorism. Still, this path makes the
modern exchange paradigm appear less adequate as a sociological (or socio-psychological) theory than
perhaps would have been the case if the other route were followed. In particular, admittedly “one
limitation of [social exchange theory] is the relative inattention to issues of cultural context and cross-
31
cultural variations in the norms and rules that regulate social exchange. Ironically, this is the strength of
early studies of social exchange within anthropology” (Cook, 2000, 688).
What prominent exchange theorists (Emerson) call the ‘economic analysis of noneconomic social
situations” as the presumed differentia specifica of their theory transforms the latter into a particular
subtype of the rational choice model (Coleman, 1990; Cook, 2000; Macy and Flache, 1995), though some
of those instrumental in this transformation (Blau, 1994) recently reject this view. Admittedly, rational
choice models, as originating in standard micro-economics, “form the basis” (Cook, 2000, p. 687) for
social exchange theory. In conjunction with this economic basis, the latter has also evolved into a sort of
sub-field of behavioral or operant psychology in Emerson-Homans’ formulations, amid some misgivings
(Coleman, 1990, pp. 11-16) favoring an exclusively rational choice model. In either case, like most of the
rational choice model, social exchange theory is, for its viability and validity, subservient to or ‘parasitic’
on these two sociologically extraneous and alien paradigms rather than being a truly sociological
endeavor. Consequently, it stands and falls with utilitarian economic theory and psychological
behaviorism, as partly discredited or revised paradigms even within their own fields. In this sense,
exchange theory (to quote Schumpeter’s comment on welfare economics) ‘only revives Benthamite [and
the Skinnerian] tradition.’ That social exchange theory’s proclivity for economic-behavioral roots and
formulations vs. sociological-anthropological ones is dubious is elaborated below. Notably, the flaws of
its economic and behavioral versions can be exposed by comparing and contrasting with them the
exchange theory presented, anticipated, or inspired by classical sociology/anthropology. So, this is not a
critique of social exchange theory as such but only of its economic-behaviorist variants.
Despite its claim to be a sociological paradigm, exchange theory in its rational choice and behavioral
varieties fails to recognize the distinctive social character of exchanges that are not fully reducible to their
particular economic and/or psychological dimensions. It overlooks that social exchange represents, as
Simmel puts it, a sociological phenomenon sui generis by virtue of being originally determined by society
as well as subsequently socially regulated by inter-personal and inter-group commitments eventually
conducive to impersonal rules and institutions. As critics object, based on its central proposition that the
rational operation of economic and psychological processes defines social behavior as an exchange of
rewards, and that institutional structures arise and exist as just more complex forms or outcomes of such
processes, exchange theory misconceives the societal framework of exchanges by offering a mechanistic
portrayal of human action (Mitchell, 1978, p. 168). In this view, its depiction of actors as motivated by
32
reward vs. punishment and profit vs. cost reflects social exchange theory’s parasitic reliance on reductive
psychology and economics. Alternatively, it overlooks or dismisses the self-emergent or pre-existing
properties of macro-phenomena relative to individual units and their actions in favor of ‘ad hoc quality of
utilitarian rationalities’ (Mitchell, 1978, p. 168) as the presumed prime mover of social structures
regarded as collections or results of these unit acts. Admittedly, exchange theory treats social structures as
“generated through the formation of [individual] exchange relations” (Cook, 2000, p. 687).
For critics, what is at issue, however, is not only this rational choice micro-aggregation to generate
macro-outcomes—even for some economists (Arrow 1994) a dubious procedure--but also, to paraphrase
Weber, co-determination of individual actions by (what Blau calls) the large social structure, including
institutions, thus beyond interpersonal networks as ‘substructures’. If these processes are intertwined
with, or co-determined by, each other, a key problem exchange theory overlooks, yet needs to solve,
pertains to the ways thereby macro-social structure affect actors in their exchanges and pursuit of interest
within networks. Admittedly, a possible solution is linking individual actions, via relations in networks of
exchanges or micro-structures, with macro-social structures instead of assuming--as most economists do--
that the latter are generated by ingrained individual propensities like some ‘propensity to exchange’
(Willer, Markovsky, and Patton, 1989).
Thus, even some exchange theorists (Willer, et al., 1989) consider the macro-to-micro approach from
social structure (not local networks) to individual exchange (agency) more in accordance with the
sociological tradition, particularly Marx and Weber, than the micro-to-macro model characteristic of
rational choice theory. Such an approach treats outcomes from exchanges like exchange rates as
generated by connecting individual actions with macro-social structures as different from network sub- or
micro-structures. This admits that just as it is implausible to reduce human interaction to an exchange of
rewards, so is it to treat ‘large social structure’ as an aggregate outcome or composition effect of
individual exchanges propelled by utilitarian or behavioral considerations. If so, then this casts doubt on
the claim that exchange theory “offers significant insights about the nature and operation of social
structure” (Stolte et al., 2001, p. 410), even that it is “a theory of social structure” (Cook, 2000, p. 687).
(In fact, what modern exchange theorists, following Emerson, call ‘structure’ is what Blau denotes as sub-
or micro-structures, like exchange networks, distinguished from large or macro-social structure.) Also, it
doubts the general argument of ‘sociological miniaturism’ (or social psychology) that the phenomena
usually ‘taken as characteristic of the microbehavioral level of analysis transcend that level of analysis
and apply on macrolevels of analysis as well” (Stolte et al., 2001, p. 409).
33
that social exchanges are subsumed under the latter. A related claim is that exchange theory brings to
sociology a “clear conception of the material and resource basis of social action” (Cook, 2000, p. 688).
These claims assume or imply that not just economic but social exchange is induced by pursuit of
material resources (wealth) and/or hedonistic motives (pleasure). As some exchange theorists (Homans,
Emerson) suggest, the economic postulate of utility maximization is a special case of the general
hedonistic ‘law’ of pleasure optimization, as is loss minimization relative to pain avoidance. This
highlights their project for, even most of modern, social exchange theory as an extension and combination
of behaviorist, including hedonistic, psychology and utilitarian microeconomics (Cook 2000).
A critical alternative to the reduction of social exchange to economic and behavioral laws is explaining
market transactions (and psychological tendencies) by sociological principles in light of the societal
organization and embeddedness of the economy, including markets. This explanation is the mark of
economic sociology, notably sociology of markets, which thus differs from social exchange (and rational
choice) theory. In retrospect, the reduction of non-economic to market exchanges commits, for better or
(more likely) worse, an inversion of the traditional sociological and anthropological treatment (e.g.
Simmel, Malinowski) of the latter as a particular form of social exchange. Notably, rational choice
models extend the ‘economic approach’ from market to social exchange and reduce the latter to the
former, while ‘stirring a bit of [behavioral psychology] to improve the flavour’ (Hodgson 2000).
However, this economic reductionism seems dubious even to some rational choice theorists (Boudon
1996) on the underlying premise social exchange is a distinct phenomenon not reducible to its particular
market elements. In addition to the fundamental difference in comprehensiveness, underscored in early
sociology (Simmel) and anthropology (Malinowski) but neglected in rational choice and behaviorist
models, the differences between economic and social exchange are numerous and substantial.
Thus, even the exchange of material goods in the market is, as Simmel stresses, not a purely economic
fact as treated in orthodox microeconomics. For, as he puts it, “such a fact--i.e. one whose content would
be exhausted in the image of economics--does not exist [but is one of] the purest and most primitive
forms of socialization”. Further, Simmel observes that even when considered an economic phenomenon,
market exchange far from exhausting analysis becomes the subject of sociological (and psychological)
analyses examining its “preconditions in non-economic concepts and facts and its consequences for non-
economic values and relationships”. In some views, economic and social exchange differ in that in the
former the focus is on material goods and the associated gains and sacrifices in contrast to the latter where
relationships are central mostly regardless of such benefits (Burns, 1990). In Simmel’s words, if the
exchange of economic values entails the notion of sacrifice of a useful good and cost-benefit calculation,
most social exchanges involve no such sacrifices and calculations. For instance, when, as he puts it, “we
exchange love for love, we do not sacrifice any [material] good”.
Unlike market exchange involving an objective appraisal of the goods exchanged in the form of a definite
value or money price, social exchanges are based on what Simmel calls a purely subjective impulse
independent of an exact exchanging rate. Inter alia, this is evidenced by the indefinite ‘subjective
impulse’ and reciprocity in gift exchange, including Christmas presents (Solnick and Hemenway, 1996)
34
as (in Levi-Strauss’ words) a ‘gigantic potlatch’, in which determining an accurate economic value or
monetary price is not feasible or sensible. As Simmel argues, to the extent that it involves equivalence of
power and balanced relations, economic exchange is the typical instrument for combining distributive
justice, though formal and relative, with changes in ownership by multiplying the number of values
experienced.
By contrast, he suggests that distributive justice in social exchanges is more difficult to attain or ascertain
given its ‘pure subjectivity’ and indefinite terms of exchange like rates and time of transactions (Burgess
and Nielsen, 1974). If so, then various attempts at transplanting the concept of distributive justice from
economic to social exchange are just analogies and metaphors at best. Reportedly, while in economic
exchange inequality or injustice can be measured with great precision, this is not so in social exchanges
(Curtis, 1986).
35
rather than individual profit calculi. These observations clearly contradict the claim of most economists
and rational choice theorists that economic and social exchange such considerations are irrelevant relative
to cost-benefit calculations. In particular, they are inconsistent with some rational choice theorists’
estimation that between 1/10 and 1/3 of Christmas gifts’ market-economic value is destroyed by giving,
since people supposedly do not particularly value what they receive (Waldfogel, 1996, p. 1306). Overall,
they indicate that in modern Western (and other) societies generalized exchange is far from irrelevant
relative to its restricted type, thus suggesting that the theory of the latter is not only self-contradictory but
also empirically unsupported.
In addition, social exchange can be conceived in terms of interchanges between various groups,
organizations, or systems, not only of individual transactions. Thus, each social system, e.g. economic,
political, communal, and cultural, can be, as Pareto, Parsons and others suggest, assumed to exchange
‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ with the other systems. Notably, these interchanges between social systems
represent multilateral or collective rather than bilateral or individual exchange. In Parsons’ formulation
(the AGIL scheme), the interchanges between the media of exchange, such as wealth, power, influence,
and solidarity, correspond to and mediate those between macro-social systems like economy, politics,
community, and culture, respectively. In light of these macroscopic attributes of social interchanges, no
wonder some insiders criticize exchange theory for attributing primacy to exchanges at micro levels (e.g.
Coleman, 1988).
In this view, social exchange theory confines itself to individual-level relations and so fails to establish
the micro-macro transition—seen as a key virtue of neoclassical economics--from dyadic to generalized
exchanges (yet see Bearman 1997), in addition to introducing dubious ad hoc hypotheses. Admittedly,
‘[there are] two deficiencies in work that introduced ‘exchange theory’ into sociology. One was the
limitation to microsocial relations, which abandons the principal virtue of economic theory, its ability to
make the micro-macro transition from pair relations to system. The other was the attempt to introduce
principles in and ad hoc fashion [e.g. ‘distributive justice’ and ‘norm of reciprocity]” (Coleman, 1988:96).
If so, such versions of exchange theory are unable to establish an analytical compromise, by taking into
account the empirical interplay, between restricted or micro and generalized or macro exchanges. This
interplay can lead to dual or plural social exchange. Reportedly (Uehara, 1990), exchange networks of
low density and intensity correspond to dyadic or restricted exchanges, and those of high-density/intensity
to generalized or multilateral exchange ones. Though individual dyadic exchange can be the starting
point, it is influenced by collective considerations and so immersed in diffuse systems or networks of
generalized exchanges (as Malinowski classically shows for the Kula system.) Relatedly, in such systems
market exchange takes on the form of socio-cultural interaction --just as in Weber’s framework economic
behavior is a special case of social action--rather than the other way round, as in rational choice models.
The reality and possibility of such relations between social interaction and market transactions suggest the
need for reconsidering, if not turning on its head, current exchange theory. Instead of construing all
human behavior as quasi-market exchange, it may be sociologically more sensible to conceptualize the
later (and other economic activity) as a particular form of social action (Weber) or interaction (Simmel),
an approach taken in economic sociology, including sociology of markets.
36
Socio-Psychological Assumptions
Even if all the propositions of social exchange theory are valid, it seems handicapped by its behavioral
assumptions derived from reductive psychology. Just as rational choice versions of exchange theory stand
or fall with neoclassical economics and utilitarianism, so is the destiny of its psychological variants tied
with behaviorism. A critique of behaviorist as well as rational choice models may even seem redundant in
light of the partly discredited place of utilitarianism and behaviorism, as ostensibly universal theoretical
paradigms, in social science and philosophy, thus casting doubt on a social exchange theory based on
them. This particularly holds true insofar as social exchange, like rational choice, theory seeks to become
“an inclusive and universally applicable [utilitarian-behaviorist] construct that simultaneously explains
everything and therefore nothing” (Smelser, 1992, p. 403), i.e. a ‘theory of everything [under the sun]’
(Hodgson, 1998:178).
Like rational choice, exchange theory can hardly be deemed more satisfactory than its initial target,
structuralism-functionalism or macro-sociology overall (Mulkay, 1971, p. 225), as even by some of its
exponents admit recently (Blau, 1994). One reason is that behavioral models of exchange (Homans,
Emerson et al.) lack explanatory value vis-à-vis macro-social phenomena, especially institutions, because
it neglects or downplays the impact of structural variables, viz. institutional (as distinguished from
personal) power, authority relations, coercion, stratification, and political centralization, on individual
exchanges (Mitchell, 1978, pp. 46-48). Since these models perform conceptual insulation of (pairs of)
actors from this macro-social reality, they can deal only with the simplest forms of exchange like dyadic
direct exchanges.
As noted, for many exchange theorists since Homans, their behavioral assumptions make for a universal
model of human nature in the image of (as utilitarian economists like Edgeworth put it) a ‘pleasure
machine’, rational egoist, or optimizing agent, so a sort of homo economicus.
A problem with such a model is that over-rational actors can degenerate into irrational subjects (‘rational
fools’), since admittedly ‘hyper-rationality [is] irrationality’ (Elster 1989, p. 9). Generally, a major
6
problem of social exchange theory, just as catallactics or the pure economic model of markets, is socio-
psychological or behavioral, because human beings have a “hard time doing what homo economicus does
so easily: [optimizing, calculating]” (Blinder, 1997, p. 9).
Another problem with the behavioral-rationalist model of actors is that economic and other exchanges
cannot be treated, as economists do since Smith, as the result of some ingrained human ‘propensity to
truck, barter, and exchange’ but as embedded in society. Notably, market exchange is historically and
culturally contingent, emerging under certain social conditions, including institutionalized markets,
private property and legal systems, as shown by various cases of negation of these preconditions,
especially private property (Willer et al., 1989). Yet, the behavioral treatment of social exchange as the
outcome of the operation of operant psychology, viz. reinforcement stimuli as incentives (Emerson,
1969), misconstrues its nature as, in Simmel’s words, a sociological category sui generis inhering to
society rather than isolated individuals.
As critics object, behavioral models first eliminate macro variables like structures and institutions and
then reconstruct them on psychical grounds, and thus have constricted scope (Willer et al., 1989), almost
37
equivalent to that of Skinner-type behaviorism (Deutsch 1971). Consequently, not much is really
structural in ostensibly ‘structural’ models of social exchange. What they call social structures are sets of
interpersonal relations, notably clusters of exchanges or exchange networks, and thus micro-categories
rather than macro, systemic, and impersonal phenomena as, ironically, defined in some non-behavioral
models (Blau, 1994, pp. 140-152). Behavioral ‘structural’ models of exchange give the impression as if
exchange networks were the only social structures, just as their rational choice counterparts reduce
‘structure’ to markets.
Both models gloss over or downplay the fact that exchange processes admittedly take place within a
setting of complex institutional structures (Blau, 1994, p. 151). This admission leads some exchange-
turned-structural theorists (e.g. Blau) to reject the behavioral (Homans) and rational choice (Coleman)
argument that the study of how individual exchange relations at the micro-level form macro-structures is
the man task of social theory in favor of examining how these latter affect the former in a process of
societal structuring. In this view, macro variables are not only influenced by micro relations, but shape
individual life chances in all their components like wealth, health, power, autonomy, identity, leisure,
cultural variety, or secure family life. If so, then the life chances of individuals represent structural effects
in the sense of opportunities supplied or denied by social structure. Admittedly, the latter governs not
only individual life chances by providing opportunities for and placing restraints on social exchange, but
also shapes socio-psychological or interpersonal processes contrary to behaviorist models a la Homans.
The adequacy of behavioral models also can be questioned with respect to the postulated motivations for
exchange. Typically, both rational choice and behavioral models postulate that utilitarian, hedonistic,
egoistic, or extrinsic motivations are primary in social exchange relative to opposite motives. Further,
they tend to dissolve the latter into the former, as exemplified by the dissolution of altruism and related
motivations into egoism, which even some rational choice theorists suspect (e.g. Elster, 1998). To
counteract such tendencies, some (formerly) exchange theorists (Blau) state that, as distinguished from
material rewards in economic exchange, approval is a basic reward of social exchanges and cannot be
gained by a selfish disregard for others, so consistent egoistic behavior a la rational-choice is discredited
by seeking approbation. This leads to the suggestion that social exchange theory cannot be treated as
simply a variant of rational choice theory (Blau, 1994, p. 152) contrary as the latter’s exponents claims. In
this view, though exchange operates on the basis of some rational pursuit of rewards, social relations with
their rewarding experience are the prime benefit or primary outcome relative to which material gains are
incidental. Admittedly, the motivations for such relationships, such as the ‘pleasure of socializing’, for
their own sake rather than just for material gain govern most social exchange.
Critics object that material and ideal interests can be mutually exclusive forces, and thus hardly
reconciled in the juxtaposition of Spencerian-Benthamite utilitarianism with its economic model of self-
interest and Durkhemian normativism based on moral code (Mitchell, 1978, pp. 75-78). Alternatively,
they suggest that, despite some metaphysical collectivist implications, Durkheim-Mauss’ morality
postulate may prove more satisfactory as the analytical solution to the problem of social order than post-
hoc utilitarian rationalities, since (if) ‘rational construction of society’ based on Benthamite utilitarianism
can be self-defeating, so ultimately irrational, in accordance with the ‘hyper-rationality = irrationality’
equation (Elster 1989:8-9).
Both behavioral and rational choice models tend to minimize the role of non-economic motivations like
power and status in social exchange compared to that of economic ones (profit). In a more plausible
alternative, some sociologists (Kemper and Collins, 1990) suggest that power and prestige be considered
38
two basic generative processes, relational dimensions or motives of micro-social interaction, including
exchange, that are aggregated into macro-structures. In this view, material, variables, by not indicating
relations between actors, are not social in the same way as power and status, and thus incapable of
aggregation into structures at the macro level, which in turn differ from exchange networks. This shows
again that it is inaccurate to treat networks of exchanges as structures, as done in ‘structural’ exchange
theory, but as instances of personal interaction, micro- or sub-structures, miniature social structures
(Burke, 1997, p. 134). As some structural exchange theorists (Blau) imply, treating exchange networks as
‘structure’ can be contradictory if social structures are understood as macro and impersonal phenomena.
Further, the existence and operation of micro exchange networks, just as macro structures, can be
predicated on power and status rather only wealth or materialistic ends. Thus, analyses suggest that a
positive interaction exists between high group cohesion and the transformation of power into authority
and prestige (Kemper and Collins, 1990). Notably, as even some economists admit, the ‘assumption that
individuals pursue their own materialistic ends, which economists employ to explain individual behavior
in the marketplace, pales in innocence alongside the actions those who seek political power have taken to
achieve their ends’ (Mueller 1996:405). The same can mutatis mutandis be said of the pursuit of
materialistic ends compared to status seeking, as Veblen and others contend and demonstrate.
As critics suggest, though the main motivating force of utilitarianism and behaviorism—seeking utility or
reward in economic as well as social exchange--can be included as a particular ingredient in a general
theory of motivation (Turner, 1987; Zetterberg, 1966), it is too simplistic. This resurfaces the limitations
of an exchange theory that extends utilitarian-behavioral models of motivation beyond economic
transactions to social exchange admittedly (Blau 1994) premised on relations rather than material gain,
thus remaining a version of rational choice utilitarianism. As critics observe, the theory essentially retains
the principal motivational mechanism of the latter in one form or another, viz. maximization of utility (or
profit), diminishing marginal utility, cost-benefit calculus (Turner, 1987), despite some attempts at
positing generic classes of utilities, by including both material and symbolic motives or resources.
39
networks construed as ‘structure’. Admittedly, the first type of power emerging and located at the micro-
level of face-to-face interactions in essence differs from the second inhering to the macro-level of
institutions (Blau, 1994, pp. 163). In this view, the second type, as epitomized in economic and political
domination, does not hinge on personal interactions but on social-structural processes, and thus implies
impersonal and indirect power in contrast to the first. Prima facie, this view attempts to rehabilitate
classical sociological theories of power, notably Weber’s ideas of economic and political power, viz.
‘domination by virtue of a constellation of interest’ and ‘domination by virtue of authority, as well as
Marx’s class-based conceptions. So do other exchange theorists (Willer et al., 1989) by restating Marx-
Weber’s arguments to the effect that sociologically power is an agent-social structure rather than intra- or
inter-agency problem and suggesting that only in this sense can power be considered a relational
phenomenon as its prevalent classical meaning.
Even when dealing with exchange networks, rational choice and behavioral models fail to reach a concept
of structural impersonal power, as they construe these clusters of micro-interaction as ‘structures’.
Dubiously treating exchange networks as ‘structure’, these models overlook those genuine, macro-
structures and processes, viz. institutions, beyond micro-interaction settings. To see how dubious this
approach is, imagine an economics that is only microscopic dealing with processes within exchange
networks or ‘structures’ like markets and firms while neglecting or excluding macro-economic structure
or economy as a whole. By doing so rational choice and behavioral models make it appear as if nothing
(relevant) exists outside networks of exchanges or explicit and implicit ‘markets’ and the power deriving
from them. In particular, rational-choice exchange theory, by extending the economic theory of markets
to non-economic phenomena, views market-like exchanges of ‘resources’ and their distribution as the
generator of power differentiation as well as institutions and other social structures. Like the neoclassical
(Edgeworth) “pure catallactics” of markets, social exchange theory via a sort of market-style alchemy
converts power and institutions into derivations of resource exchanges between individuals within
networks. And, even some of its early advocates (e.g. Blau) try to go beyond current exchange theory
(and market catallaxy) by proposing that impersonal power as rooted in macro-social structures crucially
affects exchanges of resources and their distribution. This implies that exchange/distribution is, to use
Weber’s terms, a set of ‘power constellations’ or what J. S. Mill calls a ‘matter of human institution’
rather than the other way round.
Distributive Justice. As hinted, the principle of distributive justice in social exchange seems highly
questionable. Transplanted from neoclassical economics--where it has the definite form of equivalence or
proportionality between productive contributions and distributive rewards, viz. marginal productivity of
labor and wages—admittedly (Coleman 1988), it becomes an ad hoc principle or indefinite criterion in
social exchange theory. This admission indirectly concedes that the principle of distributive justice is
virtually inapplicable to social as opposed to economic exchange. Thus, in economic exchange greater
productive contributions than rewards (e.g. wages) signify distributive injustice or exploitation: for
instance (as a neoclassical economists, Pigou, puts it), workers are “exploited in the sense that they are
paid less than the value which their marginal net product has for the firms which employ them”.
However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain and measure precisely such variables as wages and
marginal net product and thereby the degree of distributive justice or fairness in social exchange. Hence,
though some subjective elements are present in its economic form, distributive justice in social exchange
40
becomes a pseudo-psychological, indefinite, and imprecise concept that, like most concepts borrowed
from economics, is to be used as a metaphor at best.
CONCLUSION
The principal objective of this paper has been to reexamine social exchange theory, as one of the more
ambitious contemporary sociological or socio-psychological theories by presenting and reassessing the
arguments of its adherents and those of its critics. The key conclusion is that exchange theory has become
a variant or mutant of the rational choice model and behaviorism given the predominance of its economic
and behavioral versions often combined (Cook 2000). In essence, it embraces the “basic behavioral
assumptions of operant psychology and utility theory in economics regarding utility maximization,
rationality, learning and deprivation-satiation” (Baron and Hannan, 1994, p. 1133). In particular, social
exchange (like rational choice) theory in its “efforts to extend microeconomic models to extraeconomic
exchange” (Macy and Flache, 1995, p. 73), claims, for example, that group pressure and member
conformity “better be viewed as two sides of a transaction involving the exchange of utility or reward”
(Emerson, 1976, p. 336). Admittedly, the perceived “rigor, parsimony, and analytic power of rational
choice has prompted sociologists to extend the theory beyond market transactions to exchanges of
symbolic and nonfungible resources such as social approval, security, and even love” (Macy and Flache,
1995, p. 73). The outcome of such efforts has been social exchange theory, notably its rational choice
version. Prima facie, this makes exchange (and rational choice) theory ‘parasitic’ on utilitarian economics
and psychological behaviorism as partly compromised paradigms in social science rather than an
autonomous theoretical endeavor.
A possible alternative to these formulations of social exchange theory can be a more sociological
perspective drawing upon the insights of classical sociology and anthropology--in conjunction with,
rather than subordinated to, those of utilitarian economics and behaviorism—and more empirically-
historically grounded. For illustration, a key assumption of this perspective is that, as Weber states, non-
economic exchange and other ‘forms of social action follow "laws of their own", and even apart from this
fact, they may always be co-determined by other than economic causes.’ Moreover, market-economic
exchange itself is often ‘influenced by the autonomous structure of social action within which it exists’.
However, a further elaboration of these issues is outside the scope of this paper.
Stolte et al. (2001, p. 388) argue that since (sociological) social psychology’s distinctive contribution is
sociological miniaturism, it is “not fundamentally social psychological, but, in contrast, is a form of
microsociology”, seemingly a far cry from Homan and in part Emerson. Further, it is argued that
sociological social psychology thus understood “will be linked inexorably to concerns of
macrosociology” (Stolte et al., 2001, p. 388).
A possible implication of Coleman’s assertion that seeking power or control is instrumental to gaining
wealth or money would be that social actors (including American millionaires and billionaires) run for
political office (including the presidency) to maximize their economic assets. Thereby, they are no more
than rent-seekers, as asserted by public choice as the economic theory of politics.
Blau (1964, pp. 155-6) asserts that the relationship between the fair rate and the going rate in social
exchange parallels that between just, normal or equilibrium price and market or average price in
economic transactions.
41
One might describe exchange theory as ‘rational choice crossed with classical sociology’. Still, as a
matter of proportion, exchange theory is admittedly (Cook 2000) more rational choice (and behaviorism)
than classical sociology.
Podolny and Baron (1997, p. 691) examine the bearing of social networks on intra-organizational
mobility (in a corporation) and report that individuals can experience “negative reputational consequences
in an organization by dropping person-to-person ties no longer valuable. The individual may need to
preserve ties no longer instrumentally valuable because of norms against the breaking of ties. The
presence of such constraints calls into question the value of conceptualizing workplace networks in highly
strategic and voluntary terms.”
Edgeworth defines catallactics as the “mathematics of a perfect market.” In this sense, he sees
economic science as resting on the “mathematical theory of catallactics” or market exchange.
Social learning theory is derived from the work of Albert Bandura which proposed that social learning
occurred through four main stages of imitation:
close contact,
imitation of superiors,
understanding of concepts,
role model behavior
For the article on social learning theory in psychology and education see social cognitive theory. It
consists of three parts: observing, imitating, and reinforcements
Julian Rotter moved away from theories based on psychosis and behaviorism, and developed a learning
theory. In Social Learning and Clinical Psychology (1945), Rotter suggests that the effect of behavior has
an impact on the motivation of people to engage in that specific behavior. People wish to avoid negative
consequences, while desiring positive results or effects. If one expects a positive outcome from a
behavior, or thinks there is a high probability of a positive outcome, then they will be more likely to
engage in that behavior. The behavior is reinforced, with positive outcomes, leading a person to repeat the
behavior. This social learning theory suggests that behavior is influenced by these environmental factors
or stimulus, and not psychological factors alone.
Albert Bandura (1977) expanded on Rotter's idea, as well as earlier work by Miller & Dollard (1941), and
is related to social learning theories of Vygotsky and Lave. This theory incorporates aspects of behavioral
and cognitive learning. Behavioral learning assumes that people's environment (surroundings) cause
people to behave in certain ways. Cognitive learning presumes that psychological factors are important
for influencing how one behaves. Social learning suggests a combination of environmental (social) and
psychological factors influence behavior. Social learning theory outlines three requirements for people to
learn and model behavior include attention: retention (remembering what one observed), reproduction
(ability to reproduce the behavior), and motivation (good reason) to want to adopt the behavior.
42
Criminology
In criminology, Ronald Akers and Robert Burgess (1966) developed social learning theory to explain
deviancy by combining variables which encouraged delinquency (e.g. the social pressure from delinquent
peers) with variables that discouraged delinquency (e.g. the parental response to discovering delinquency
in their children).
The first two stages were used by Edwin Sutherland in his Differential Association Theory. Sutherland’s
model for learning in a social environment depends on the cultural conflict between different factions in a
society over who has the power to determine what is deviant. But his ideas were difficult to put into
operation and measure quantitatively. Burgess, a behavioral sociologist, and Akers revised Sutherland’s
theory and included the idea of reinforcement, which increases or decreases the strength of a behavior,
and applied the principles of Operant Psychology, which holds that behavior is a function of its
consequences and can be really bad in some cases.(Pfohl, 1994).
Functionalism had been the dominant paradigm but, in the 1960s, there was a shift towards Social Control
Theories, Conflict Criminology, and Labeling Theories that tried to explain the emerging and more
radical social environment. Moreover, people believed that they could observe behavior and see the
process of social learning, e.g., parents watched their own children and saw the influence of other
children on their own; they could also see what kind of effect they had on their own children, i.e. the
processes of differential association and reinforcement. The conservative political parties were advocating
an increase in punishment to deter crime. Unlike Labeling Theory, Social Learning Theory actually
supports the use of punishment which translates into longer sentences for those convicted, and helps to
explain the increase in the prison population that began in the early 1970s (Livingston, 1996).
Unlike situational crime prevention, the theory ignores the opportunistic nature of crime (Jeffery, 1990:
261-2). To learn one must first observe criminal behavior, but where was this behavior learned? The
theory does explain how criminal behavior is ‘transmitted’ from one person to another, which can explain
increases in types of crimes, but it does not consider how criminal acting can be prevented (Jeffery, 1990:
252) although it may be fairly assumed that the processes of learning behaviors can be changed.
There is also a definite problem. What may be reinforcement for one person may not be for another. Also,
reinforcements can be both social involving attention and behavior between more than one person, and
non-social reinforcement would not involve this interaction (Burgess & Akers: 1966) Social Learning
Theory has been used in mentoring programs that should, in theory, prevent some future criminal
behavior. The idea behind mentoring programs is that an adult is paired with a child, who supposedly
learns from the behavior of the adult and is positively reinforced for good behavior (Jones-Brown, 1997).
In the classroom, a teacher may use the theory by changing the seating arrangements to pair a behaving
child and a misbehaving child, but the outcome may be that the behaving child begins not satisfying
Hale (1993) applied the social learning theory to serial murder using Amsel's frustration theory. In
frustration theory, humiliation is the result of a no reward situation, which is a reward that is not given
when a reward had been given in the past. When an individual is conditioned to be rewarded they
43
anticipate it to happen in the future, but when they are presented with a no reward situation this creates an
unconditioned frustration response, otherwise called humiliation. Signs associated with the humiliating
experience form a conditioned anticipatory frustration response, which triggers specific internal stimuli.
These stimuli prevent an individual from future humiliation. During childhood, serial killers experience
many humiliating situations and with unbalanced nonreward situations and no reward situations, they
perceive all situations as nonreward and develop the inability to distinguish between the two. They
anticipate humiliation in every encounter that they come across. When it comes to choosing their victims
serial killers do not go back to the person who caused the humiliation. According to Dollard and Miller's
(1939, 1950) theory of learning, the individual is “instigated” toward a behavior, which is some
antecedent condition of which the predicted response is the consequences. For a serial killer, frustration
gets in the way of an instigated goal and their built up aggression must be released. Their behavior is seen
as a delayed and indirect release of aggression. They are unable to release their aggression on their source
of frustration and are forced to choose more vulnerable individuals to act on (Singer and Hensley, 2004).
The child learns to expect humiliation or a negative situation from the past, which then causes frustration
or aggression. Jerome Henry Brudos felt he was never accepted by his mother. Brudos transferred his
hatred for his mother to other women through his mutilation of their bodies. For Brudos, the murder of
strange women served as a catharsis for the humiliation he endured through his mother's rejection (Hale,
1993). In all of these instances the serial killer was presented with some form of humiliation as a child,
and learned to vent their anger through aggression.
Applications
The applications of social learning theory have been important in the history of education policies in the
United States. The zone of proximal development is used as a basis for early intervention programs such
as Head Start. Social learning theory can also be seen in the TV and movie rating system that is used in
the United States. The rating system is designed to let all parents know what the programs that their
children are watching contain. The ratings are based on age appropriate material to help parents decide if
certain content is appropriate for their child to watch. Some content may be harmful to children who do
not have the cognitive ability to process certain content; however the child may model the behaviors seen
on TV.
Locus of Control is an important consideration when helping students in higher education environments
perform better academically. Cassandra B. Whyte indicated in the 1970's and 1980's that by encouraging
students to accept personal responsibility for their educational outcomes, better academic performance
will usually be forthcoming if ability levels are present. More frequent successful academic performance
will result as thoughts and belief in the need for personal effort toward the academic task is rewarded. As
successful experiences increase in frequency, the student usually incorporates the confidence that hard
work often can be rewarded with positive academic outcomes.
Guided participation is seen in schools across the United States and all around the world in language
classes when the teacher says a phrase and asks the class to repeat the phrase. The other part to guided
44
participation is when the student goes home and practices on their own. Guided participation is also seen
with parents who are trying to teach their own children how to speak.
Portraitising is another technique that is used widely across the United States. Most academic subjects
take advantage of portraitising , however mathematics is one of the best examples. As students move
through their education they learn skills in mathematics that they will build on throughout their scholastic
careers. A student who has never taken a basic math class and does not understand the principles of
addition and subtraction will not be able to understand algebra. The process of learning math is a
portraitising technique because the knowledge builds on itself over time.
Bandura’s Social Learning Theory posits that people learn from one another, via observation, imitation,
and modeling. The theory has often been called a bridge between behaviorist and cognitive learning
theories because it encompasses attention, memory, and motivation.
People learn through observing others’ behavior, attitudes, and outcomes of those behaviors. “Most
human behavior is learned observationally through modeling: from observing others, one forms an idea of
how new behaviors are performed, and on later occasions this coded information serves as a guide for
action.” (Bandura). Social learning theory explains human behavior in terms of continuous reciprocal
interaction between cognitive, behavioral, and environmental influences.
1. Attention — various factors increase or decrease the amount of attention paid. Includes
distinctiveness, affective valence, prevalence, complexity, functional value. One’s characteristics
(e.g. sensory capacities, arousal level, perceptual set, past reinforcement) affect attention.
2. Retention — remembering what you paid attention to. Includes symbolic coding, mental images,
cognitive organization, symbolic rehearsal, motor rehearsal
3. Reproduction — reproducing the image. Including physical capabilities, and self-observation of
reproduction.
4. Motivation — having a good reason to imitate. Includes motives such as past (i.e. traditional
behaviorism), promised (imagined incentives) and vicarious (seeing and recalling the reinforced
model)
Bandura believed in “reciprocal determinism”, that is, the world and a person’s behavior cause each
other, while behaviorism essentially states that one’s environment causes one’s behavior, Bandura, who
was studying adolescent aggression, found this too simplistic, and so in addition he suggested that
behavior causes environment as well. Later, Bandura soon considered personality as an interaction
between three components: the environment, behavior, and one’s psychological processes (one’s ability
to entertain images in minds and language).
Social learning theory has sometimes been called a bridge between behaviorist and cognitive learning
theories because it encompasses attention, memory, and motivation. The theory is related to Vygotsky’s
45
Social Development Theory and Lave’s Situated Learning, which also emphasize the importance of social
learning.
Social learning theory focuses on the learning that occurs within a social context. It considers that people
learn from one another, including such concepts as observational learning, imitation, and modeling.
Among others Albert Bandura is considered the leading proponent of this theory.
1. People can learn by observing the behavior is of others and the outcomes of those behaviors.
2. Learning can occur without a change in behavior. Behaviorists say that learning has to be represented
by a permanent change in behavior, in contrast social learning theorists say that because people can learn
through observation alone, their learning may not necessarily be shown in their performance. Learning
may or may not result in a behavior change.
3. Cognition plays a role in learning. Over the last 30 years social learning theory has become
increasingly cognitive in its interpretation of human learning. Awareness and expectations of future
reinforcements or punishments can have a major effect on the behaviors that people exhibit.
4. Social learning theory can be considered a bridge or a transition between behaviorist learning theories
and cognitive learning theories.
People are often reinforced for modeling the behavior of others. Bandura suggested that the environment
also reinforces modeling. This is in several possible ways:
1, The observer is reinforced by the model. For example a student who changes dress to fit in with a
certain group of students has a strong likelihood of being accepted and thus reinforced by that group.
2. The observer is reinforced by a third person. The observer might be modeling the actions of someone
else, for example, an outstanding class leader or student. The teacher notices this and compliments and
praises the observer for modeling such behavior thus reinforcing that behavior.
3. The imitated behavior itself leads to reinforcing consequences. Many behaviors that we learn from
others produce satisfying or reinforcing results. For example, a student in my multimedia class could
observe how the extra work a classmate does is fun. This student in turn would do the same extra work
and also receive enjoyment.
46
4. Consequences of the model’s behavior affect the observers behavior vicariously. This is known as
vicarious reinforcement. This is where in the model is reinforced for a response and then the observer
shows an increase in that same response. Bandura illustrated this by having students watch a film of a
model hitting a inflated clown doll. One group of children saw the model being praised for such action.
Without being reinforced, the group of children began to also hit the doll.
1. Contemporary theory proposes that both reinforcement and punishment have indirect effects on
learning. They are not the sole or main cause.
2. Reinforcement and punishment influence the extent to which an individual exhibits a behavior that has
been learned.
3. The expectation of reinforcement influences cognitive processes that promote learning. Therefore
attention pays a critical role in learning. And attention is influenced by the expectation of reinforcement.
An example would be, where the teacher tells a group of students that what they will study next is not on
the test. Students will not pay attention, because they do not expect to know the information for a test.
Social learning theory has cognitive factors as well as behaviorist factors (actually operant factors).
1. Learning without performance: Bandura makes a distinction between learning through observation and
the actual imitation of what has been learned.
2. Cognitive processing during learning: Social learning theorists contend that attention is a critical factor
in learning.
3. Expectations: As a result of being reinforced, people form expectations about the consequences that
future behaviors are likely to bring. They expect certain behaviors to bring reinforcements and others to
bring punishment. The learner needs to be aware however, of the response reinforcements and response
punishment. Reinforcement increases a response only when the learner is aware of that connection.
4. Reciprocal causation: Bandura proposed that behavior can influence both the environment and the
person. In fact each of these three variables, the person, the behavior, and the environment can have an
influence on each other.
5. Modeling: There are different types of models. There is the live model, and actual person
demonstrating the behavior. There can also be a symbolic model, which can be a person or action
portrayed in some other medium, , such as television, videotape, computer programs.
47
Many behaviors can be learned, at least partly, through modeling. Examples that can be cited are, students
can watch parents read, students can watch the demonstrations of mathematics problems, or seen
someone acting bravely and a fearful situation. Aggression can be learned through models. Much research
indicate that children become more aggressive when they observed aggressive or violent models. Moral
thinking and moral behavior are influenced by observation and modeling. This includes moral judgments
regarding right and wrong which can in part, develop through modeling.
Bandura mentions four conditions that are necessary before an individual can successfully model the
behavior of someone else:
2. Retention: the observer must be able to remember the behavior that has been observed. One way of
increasing this is using the technique of rehearsal.
3. Motor reproduction: the third condition is the ability to replicate the behavior that the model has just
demonstrated. This means that the observer has to be able to replicate the action, which could be a
problem with a learner who is not ready developmentally to replicate the action. For example, little
children have difficulty doing complex physical motion.
4. Motivation: the final necessary ingredient for modeling to occur is motivation, learners must want to
demonstrate what they have learned. Remember that since these four conditions vary among individuals,
different people will reproduce the same behavior differently.
Self efficacy:
People are more likely to engage in certain behaviors when they believe they are capable of executing
those behaviors successfully. This means that they will have high self-efficacy. In layman's terms self-
efficacy could be looked as self confidence towards learning.
Joy of activities: individuals typically choose activities they feel they will be successful in doing.
48
Effort and persistence: individuals will tend to put more effort end activities and behaviors they consider
to be successful in achieving.
Learning and achievement: students with high self-efficacy tend to be better students and achieve more.
In general students typically have a good sense of what they can and cannot do, therefore they have fairly
accurate opinions about their own self-efficacy. In my multimedia program, the challenge is to increase
student self-efficacy. There are many factors which affect self efficacy. Some of these factors can be;
previous successes and failures, messages received from others, and successes and failures of others. Note
example of ACS and Cliff & Vanessa.
Self regulation:
Self-regulation has come to be more emphasized in social learning theory. Self-regulation is when the
individual has his own ideas about what is appropriate or inappropriate behavior and chooses actions
accordingly. There are several aspects of self regulation:
Promoting self-regulation can be an important technique. This is usually done by teaching the individual
to reward himself after doing the needed behavior. For example, a graduate student will tell himself to
complete a certain chapter before taking a break and relaxing.
Self instructions:
An effective strategy is to teach learners to give themselves instructions that guide their behavior. There
are five steps to achieve this goal:
Cognitive modeling
Overt external guidance
Overt self guidance
Faded, overt self guidance
covert self instruction
49
These are two ways that people can control their own behavior. First they monitor and observe their own
behavior, sometimes even scoring behavior. Secondly, people are also able to change their behavior by
reinforcing themselves, by giving are withholding reinforcement.
2. Describing the consequences of behavior is can effectively increase the appropriate behaviors and
decrease inappropriate ones. This can involve discussing with learners about the rewards and
consequences of various behaviors.
3. Modeling provides an alternative to shaping for teaching new behaviors. Instead of using shaping,
which is operant conditioning; modeling can provide a faster, more efficient means for teaching new
behavior. To promote effective modeling a teacher must make sure that the four essential conditions exist;
attention, retention, motor reproduction, and motivation.
4. Teachers and parents must model appropriate behaviors and take care that they do not model
inappropriate behaviors.
5. Teachers should expose students to a variety of other models. This technique is especially important to
break down traditional stereotypes.
6. Students must believe that they are capable of accomplishing school tasks. Thus it is very important to
develop a sense of self-efficacy for students. Teachers can promote such self-efficacy by having students
receive confidence-building messages, watch others be successful, and experience success on their own. .
7. Teachers should help students set realistic expectations for their academic accomplishments. In general
in my class that means making sure that expectations are not set too low. I want to realistically challenge
my students. However, sometimes the task is beyond a student's ability, example would be the cancer
group.
STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM
Structural functionalism is a broad perspective in sociology and anthropology which sets out to interpret
society as a structure with interrelated parts. Functionalism addresses society as a whole in terms of the
function of its constituent elements; namely norms,] customs, traditions and institutions. A common
50
analogy, popularized by Herbert Spencer, presents these parts of society as "organs" that work toward the
proper functioning of the "body" as a whole. In the most basic terms, it simply emphasizes "the effort to
impute, as rigorously as possible, to each feature, custom, or practice, its effect on the functioning of a
supposedly stable, cohesive system." For Talcott Parsons, "structural-functionalism" came to describe a
particular stage in the methodological development of social science, rather than a specific school of
thought. Parsons called his own theory for action theory and argued again and again that the term
structural-functionalism was a misleading and inappropriate label to use as a name of his theory.
Theory
Classical functionalist theories are defined by a tendency towards biological analogy and notions of social
evolutionism:
Functionalist thought, from Comte onwards, has looked particularly towards biology as the science
providing the closest and most compatible model for social science. Biology has been taken to provide a
guide to conceptualizing the structure and the function of social systems and to analyzing processes of
evolution via mechanisms of adaptation ... functionalism strongly emphasizes the pre-eminence of the
social world over its individual parts (i.e. its constituent actors, human subjects).
Whilst one may regard functionalism as a logical extension of the organic analogies for society presented
by political philosophers such as Rousseau, sociology draws firmer attention to those institutions unique
to industrialized capitalist society (or modernity). Functionalism also has an anthropological basis in the
work of theorists such as Marcel Mauss, Bronisław Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. It is in Radcliffe-
Brown's specific usage that the prefix 'structural' emerged.[5]
Durkheim proposed that most stateless, "primitive" societies, lacking strong centralised institutions, are
based on an association of corporate-descent groups. Structural functionalism also took on Malinowski's
argument that the basic building block of society is the nuclear family, and that the clan is an outgrowth,
not vice versa. Durkheim was concerned with the question of how certain societies maintain internal
stability and survive over time. He proposed that such societies tend to be segmented, with equivalent
parts held together by shared values, common symbols or, as his nephew Marcel Mauss held, systems of
exchanges. In modern, complicated societies, members perform very different tasks, resulting in a strong
interdependence. Based on the metaphor above of an organism in which many parts function together to
sustain the whole, Durkheim argued that complicated societies are held together by organic solidarity.
These views were upheld by Radcliffe-Brown, who, following Comte, believed that society constitutes a
separate "level" of reality, distinct from both biological and inorganic matter. Explanations of social
phenomena had therefore to be constructed within this level, individuals being merely transient occupants
of comparatively stable social roles. The central concern of structural functionalism is a continuation of
the Durkheimian task of explaining the apparent stability and internal cohesion needed by societies to
endure over time. Societies are seen as coherent, bounded and fundamentally relational constructs that
function like organisms, with their various parts (or social institutions) working together in an
unconscious, quasi-automatic fashion toward achieving an overall social equilibrium. All social and
51
cultural phenomena are therefore seen as functional in the sense of working together, and are effectively
deemed to have "lives" of their own. They are primarily analyzed in terms of this function. The individual
is significant not in and of himself but rather in terms of his status, his position in patterns of social
relations, and the behaviours associated with his status. The social structure, then, is the network of
statuses connected by associated roles.
It is simplistic to equate the perspective directly with political conservativism. The tendency to emphasise
"cohesive systems", however, leads functionalist theories to be contrasted with "conflict theories" which
instead emphasise social problems and inequalities.
Prominent Theorists
Herbert Spencer, a British philosopher famous for applying the theory of natural selection to society, was
in many ways the first true sociological functionalist; [7] in fact, while Durkheim is widely considered the
most important functionalist among positivist theorists, it is well known that much of his analysis was
culled from reading Spencer's work, especially his Principles of Sociology (1874-96).
While most avoid the tedious tasks of reading Spencer's massive volumes (filled as they are with long
passages explicating the organic analogy, with reference to cells, simple organisms, animals, humans and
society), there are some important insights that have quietly influenced many contemporary theorists,
including Talcott Parsons, in his early work "The Structure of Social Action" (1937), Cultural
anthropology, too, uses functionalism consistently.
This evolutionary model, unlike most 19th century evolutionary theories, is cyclical, beginning with the
differentiation and increasing complication of an organic or "super-organic" (Spencer's term for a social
system) body, followed by a fluctuating state of equilibrium and disequilibrium] (or a state of adjustment
and adaptation), and, finally, a stage of disintegration or dissolution. Following Thomas Malthus'
population principles, Spencer concluded that society is constantly facing selection pressures (internal and
external) that force it to adapt its internal structure through differentiation.
Every solution, however, causes a new set of selection pressures that threaten society's viability. It should
be noted that Spencer was not a determinist in the sense that he never said that
In fact, he was in many ways a political sociologist, and recognised that the degree of centralised and
consolidated authority in a given polity could make or break its ability to adapt. In other words, he saw a
general trend towards the centralisation of power as leading to stagnation and, ultimately, pressure to
decentralise.
52
More specifically, Spencer recognised three functional needs or prerequisites that produce selection
pressures: they are regulatory, operative (production) and distributive. He argued that all societies need to
solve problems of control and coordination, production of goods, services and ideas, and, finally, to find
ways of distributing these resources.
Initially, in tribal societies, these three needs are inseparable, and the kinship system is the dominant
structure that satisfies them. As many scholars have noted, all institutions are subsumed under kinship
organisation, but, with increasing population (both in terms of sheer numbers and density), problems
emerge with regards to feeding individuals, creating new forms of organisation — consider the emergent
division of labour —, coordinating and controlling various differentiated social units, and developing
systems of resource distribution.
The solution, as Spencer sees it, is to differentiate structures to fulfill more specialised functions; thus a
chief or "big man" emerges, soon followed by a group of lieutenants, and later kings and administrators.
Perhaps Spencer's greatest obstacle to being widely discussed in modern sociology is the fact that much
of his social philosophy is rooted in the social and historical context of Ancient Egyptian times. He
coined the term "survival of the fittest" in discussing the simple fact that small tribes or societies tend to
be defeated or conquered by larger ones. Of course, many sociologists still use him (knowingly or
otherwise) in their analyses, as is especially the case in the recent re-emergence of evolutionary theory.
Talcott Parsons
Talcott Parsons was heavily influenced by Durkheim and Max Weber, synthesising much of their work
into his action theory, which he based on the system-theoretical concept and the methodological principle
of voluntary action. He held that "the social system is made up of the actions of individuals. His starting
point, accordingly, is the interaction between two individuals faced with a variety of choices about how
they might act, choices that are influenced and constrained by a number of physical and social factors.
Parsons determined that each individual has expectations of the other's action and reaction to his own
behavior, and that these expectations would (if successful) be "derived" from the accepted norms and
values of the society they inhabit. As Parsons himself emphasised, however, in a general context there
would never exist any perfect "fit" between behaviours and norms, so such a relation is never complete or
"perfect."
Social norms were always problematic for Parsons, who never claimed (as has often been alleged) that
social norms were generally accepted and agreed upon, should this prevent some kind of universal law.
Whether social norms were accepted or not was for Parsons simply a historical question.
As behaviors are repeated in more interactions, and these expectations are entrenched or institutionalised,
a role is created. Parsons defines a "role" as the normatively-regulated participation "of a person in a
concrete process of social interaction with specific, concrete role-partners." Although any individual,
theoretically, can fulfill any role, the individual is expected to conform to the norms governing the nature
of the role they fulfill.
53
Furthermore, one person can and does fulfill many different roles at the same time. In one sense, an
individual can be seen to be a "composition" of the roles he inhabits. Certainly, today, when asked to
describe themselves, most people would answer with reference to their societal roles.
Parsons later developed the idea of roles into collectivities of roles that complement each other in
fulfilling functions for society. Some roles are bound up in institutions and social structures (economic,
educational, legal and even gender-based). These are functional in the sense that they assist society in
operating and fulfill its functional needs so that society runs smoothly.
A society where there is no conflict, where everyone knows what is expected of him, and where these
expectations are consistently met, is in a perfect state of equilibrium. The key processes for Parsons in
attaining this equilibrium are socialisation and social control. Socialisation is important because it is the
mechanism for transferring the accepted norms and values of society to the individuals within the system.
Perfect socialisation occurs when these norms and values are completely internalised, when they become
part of the individual's personality.
Parson states that "this point [...] is independent of the sense in which [the] individual is concretely
autonomous or creative rather than 'passive' or 'conforming', for individuality and reativity, are to a
considerable extent, phenomena of the institutionalization of expectations"; they are culturally
constructed.
Socialisation is supported by the positive and negative sanctioning of role behaviours that do or do not
meet these expectations. A punishment could be informal, like a snigger or gossip, or more formalised,
through institutions such as prisons and mental homes. If these two processes were perfect, society would
become static and unchanging, and in reality this is unlikely to occur for long.
Parsons recognises this, stating that he treats "the structure of the system as problematic and subject to
change," and that his concept of the tendency towards equilibrium "does not imply the empirical
dominance of stability over change." He does, however, believe that these changes occur in a relatively
smooth way.
Individuals in interaction with changing situations adapt through a process of "role bargaining." Once the
roles are established, they create norms that guide further action and are thus institutionalised, creating
stability across social interactions. Where the adaptation process cannot adjust, due to sharp shocks or
immediate radical change, structural dissolution occurs and either new structures (and therefore a new
system) are formed, or society dies. This model of social change has been described as a "moving
equilibrium," and emphasises a desire for social order.
Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore (1945) gave an argument for social stratification based on the idea
of "functional necessity" (also known as the Davis-Moore hypothesis). They argue that the most difficult
jobs in any society have the highest incomes in order to motivate individuals to fill the roles needed by
the division of labour. Thus inequality serves social stability.
54
This argument has been criticized as fallacious from a number of different angles: the argument is both
that the individuals who are the most deserving are the highest rewarded, and that a system of unequal
rewards is necessary, otherwise no individuals would perform as needed for the society to function. The
problem is that these rewards are supposed to be based upon objective merit, rather than subjective
"motivations." The argument also does not clearly establish why some positions are worth more than
others, which they may benefit more people in society, e.g., teachers compared to athletes and movie
stars. Critics have suggested that structural inequality (inherited wealth, family power, etc.) is itself a
cause of individual success or failure, not a consequence of it.
Robert Merton
Robert K. Merton was a functionalist and he fundamentally agreed with Parsons’ theory. However, he
acknowledged that it was problematic, believing that it was too generalized [Holmwood, 2005:100].
Merton tended to emphasise middle range theory rather than a grand theory, meaning that he was able to
deal specifically with some of the limitations in Parsons’ theory. He identified 3 main limitations:
functional unity, universal functionalism and indispensability [Ritzer in Gingrich, 1999]. He also
developed the concept of deviance and made the distinction between manifest and latent functions.
Merton criticised functional unity, saying that not all parts of a modern, complex society work for the
functional unity of society. Some institutions and structures may have other functions, and some may
even be generally dysfunctional, or be functional for some while being dysfunctional for others. This is
because not all structures are functional for society as a whole. Some practices are only functional for a
dominant individual or a group [Holmwood, 2005:91]. Here Merton introduces the concepts of power and
coercion into functionalism and identifies the sites of tension which may lead to struggle or conflict.
Merton states that by recognizing and examining the dysfunctional aspects of society we can explain the
development and persistence of alternatives. Thus, as Holmwood states, “Merton explicitly made power
and conflict central issues for research within a functionalist paradigm” [2005:91].
Merton also noted that there may be functional alternatives to the institutions and structures currently
fulfilling the functions of society. This means that the institutions that currently exist are not
indispensable to society. Merton states that “just as the same item may have multiple functions, so may
the same function be diversely fulfilled by alternative items” [cited in Holmwood, 2005:91]. This notion
of functional alternatives is important because it reduces the tendency of functionalism to imply approval
of the status quo.
Merton’s theory of deviance is derived from Durkheim’s idea of anomie. It is central in explaining how
internal changes can occur in a system. For Merton, anomie means a discontinuity between cultural goals
and the accepted methods available for reaching them.
Conformity occurs when an individual has the means and desire to achieve the cultural goals
socialised into him.
Innovation occurs when an individual strives to attain the accepted cultural goals but chooses to
do so in novel or unaccepted method.
55
Ritualism occurs when an individual continues to do things as proscribed by society but forfeits
the achievement of the goals.
Retreatism is the rejection of both the means and the goals of society.
Rebellion is a combination of the rejection of societal goals and means and a substitution of other
goals and means.
Thus it can be seen that change can occur internally in society through either innovation or rebellion. It is
true that society will attempt to control these individuals and negate the changes, but as the innovation or
rebellion builds momentum, society will eventually adapt or face dissolution.
The last of Merton’s important contributions to functionalism was his distinction between manifest and
latent functions. Manifest functions refer to the conscious intentions of actors; latent functions are the
objective consequences of their actions, which are often unintended [Holmwood, 2005:90]. Merton used
the example of the Hopi rain dance to show that sometimes an individual’s understanding of their motive
for an action may not fully explain why that action continues to be performed. Sometimes actions fulfill a
function of which the actor is unaware, and this is the latent function of an action. 2.14.08
In the 1970s, political scientists Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell introduced a structural-
functionalist approach to comparing political systems. They argued that, in order to understand a political
system, it is necessary to understand not only its institutions (or structures) but also their respective
functions. They also insisted that these institutions, to be properly understood, must be placed in a
meaningful and dynamic historical context.
This idea stood in marked contrast to prevalent approaches in the field of comparative politics — the
state-society theory and the dependency theory. These were the descendants of David Easton's system
theory in international relations, a mechanistic view that saw all political systems as essentially the same,
subject to the same laws of "stimulus and response" — or inputs and outputs — while paying little
attention to unique characteristics. The structural-functional approach is based on the view that a political
system is made up of several key components, including interest groups, political parties and branches of
government.
In addition to structures, Almond and Powell showed that a political system consists of various functions,
chief among them political socialisation, recruitment and communication: socialisation refers to the way
in which societies pass along their values and beliefs to succeeding generations, and in political terms
describes the process by which a society inculcates civic virtues, or the habits of effective citizenship;
recruitment denotes the process by which a political system generates interest, engagement and
participation from citizens; and communication refers to the way that a system promulgates its values and
information.
56
In their attempt to explain the social stability of African "primitive" stateless societies where they
undertook their fieldwork, Evans-Pritchard (1940) and Meyer Fortes (1945) argued that the Tallensi and
the Nuer were primarily organised around unilineal descent groups. Such groups are characterised by
common purposes, such as administering property or defending against attacks; they form a permanent
social structure that persists well beyond the lifespan of their members. In the case of the Tallensi and the
Nuer, these corporate groups were based on kinship which in turn fitted into the larger structures of
unilineal descent; consequently Evans-Pritchard's and Fortes' model is called "descent theory". Moreover,
in this African context territorial divisions were aligned with lineages; descent theory therefore
synthesised both blood and soil as two sides of one coin (cf. Kuper, 1988:195). Affinal ties with the
parent through whom descent is not reckoned, however, are considered to be merely complementary or
secondary (Fortes created the concept of "complementary filiation"), with the reckoning of kinship
through descent being considered the primary organising force of social systems. Because of its strong
emphasis on unilineal descent, this new kinship theory came to be called "descent theory".
Before long, descent theory had found its critics. Many African tribal societies seemed to fit this neat
model rather well, although Africanists, such as Richards, also argued that Fortes and Evans-Pritchard
had deliberately downplayed internal contradictions and overemphasised the stability of the local lineage
systems and their significance for the organisation of society. However, in many Asian settings the
problems were even more obvious. In Papua New Guinea, the local patrilineal descent groups were
fragmented and contained large amounts of non-agnates. Status distinctions did not depend on descent,
and genealogies were too short to account for social solidarity through identification with a common
ancestor. In particular, the phenomenon of cognatic (or bilateral) kinship posed a serious problem to the
proposition that descent groups are the primary element behind the social structures of "primitive"
societies.
Leach's (1966) critique came in the form of the classical Malinowskian argument, pointing out that "in
Evans-Pritchard's studies of the Nuer and also in Fortes's studies of the Tallensi unilineal descent turns
out to be largely an ideal concept to which the empirical facts are only adapted by means of fictions."
(1966:8). People's self-interest, manoeuvring, manipulation and competition had been ignored. Moreover,
descent theory neglected the significance of marriage and affinal ties, which were emphasised by Levi-
Strauss' structural anthropology, at the expense of overemphasising the role of descent. To quote Leach:
"The evident importance attached to matrilateral and affinal kinship connections is not so much explained
as explained away."
Decline of functionalism
Structural functionalism reached the peak of its influence in the 1940s and 1950s, and by the 1960s was in
rapid decline. By the 1980s, its place was taken in Europe by more conflict-oriented approaches, and
more recently by 'structuralism'.[30] While some of the critical approaches also gained popularity in the
United States, the mainstream of the discipline has instead shifted to a myriad of empirically-oriented
middle-range theories with no overarching theoretical orientation. To most sociologists, functionalism is
now "as dead as a dodo".
57
As the influence of both functionalism and Marxism in the 1960s began to wane, the linguistic and
cultural turns led to myriad new movements in the social sciences: "According to Giddens, the orthodox
consensus terminated in the late 1960s and 1970s as the middle ground shared by otherwise competing
perspectives gave way and was replaced by a baffling variety of competing perspectives. This third
'generation' of social theory includes phenomenologically inspired approaches, critical theory,
ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism, structuralism, post-structuralism, and theories written in the
tradition of hermeneutics and ordinary language philosophy."
While absent from empirical sociology, functionalist themes remained detectable in sociological theory,
most notably in the works of Luhmann and Giddens. There are, however, signs of an incipient revival, as
functionalist claims have recently been bolstered by developments in multilevel selection theory and in
empirical research on how groups solve social dilemmas. Recent developments in evolutionary theory—
especially by biologist David Sloan Wilson and anthropologists Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson—have
provided strong support for structural functionalism in the form of multilevel selection theory. In this
theory, culture and social structure are seen as a Darwinian (biological or cultural) adaptation at the group
level.
Criticisms
In the 1960s, functionalism was criticized for being unable to account for social change, or for structural
contradictions and conflict (and thus was often called "consensus theory"). The refutation of the second
criticism of functionalism, that it is static and has no concept of change, has already been articulated
above, concluding that while Parsons’ theory allows for change, it is an orderly process of change
[Parsons, 1961:38], a moving equilibrium. Therefore referring to Parsons’ theory of society as static is
inaccurate. It is true that it does place emphasis on equilibrium and the maintenance or quick return to
social order, but this is a product of the time in which Parsons was writing (post-World War II, and the
start of the cold war). Society was in upheaval and fear abounded. At the time social order was crucial,
and this is reflected in Parsons' tendency to promote equilibrium and social order rather than social
change.
Furthermore, Durkheim favored a radical form of guild socialism along with functionalist explanations.
Also, Marxism, while acknowledging social contradictions, still uses functionalist explanations. Parsons'
evolutionary theory describes the differentiation and reintegration systems and subsystems and thus at
least temporary conflict before reintegration (ibid). "The fact that functional analysis can be seen by some
as inherently conservative and by others as inherently radical suggests that it may be inherently neither
one nor the other." (Merton 1957: 39)
Stronger criticisms include the epistemological argument that functionalism is tautologous, that is it
attempts to account for the development of social institutions solely through recourse to the effects that
are attributed to them and thereby explains the two circularly. However, Parsons drew directly on many
of Durkheim’s concepts in creating his theory. Certainly Durkheim was one of the first theorists to
explain a phenomenon with reference to the function it served for society. He said, “the determination of
function is…necessary for the complete explanation of the phenomena” [cited in Coser, 1977:140].
However Durkheim made a clear distinction between historical and functional analysis, saying, “when…
58
the explanation of a social phenomenon is undertaken, we must seek separately the efficient cause which
produces it and the function it fulfills” [cited in Coser, 1977:140]. If Durkheim made this distinction, then
it is unlikely that Parsons did not. However Merton does explicitly state that functional analysis does not
seek to explain why the action happened in the first instance, but why it continues or is reproduced. He
says that “latent functions …go far towards explaining the continuance of the pattern” [cited in Elster,
1990:130, emphasis added]. Therefore it can be argued that functionalism does not explain the original
cause of a phenomenon with reference to its effect, and is therefore, not teleological.
Another criticism describes the ontological argument that society can not have "needs" as a human being
does, and even if society does have needs they need not be met. Anthony Giddens argues that
functionalist explanations may all be rewritten as historical accounts of individual human actions and
consequences (see Structuration theory).
A further criticism directed at functionalism is that it contains no sense of agency, that individuals are
seen as puppets, acting as their role requires. Yet Holmwood states that the most sophisticated forms of
functionalism are based on “a highly developed concept of action” [2005:107], and as was explained
above, Parsons took as his starting point the individual and their actions. His theory did not however
articulate how these actors exercise their agency in opposition to the socialisation and inculcation of
accepted norms. As has been shown above, Merton addressed this limitation through his concept of
deviance, and so it can be seen that functionalism allows for agency. It cannot, however, explain why
individuals choose to accept or reject the accepted norms, why and in what circumstances they choose to
exercise their agency, and this does remain a considerable limitation of the theory.
Further criticisms have been levelled at functionalism by proponents of other social theories, particularly
conflict theorists, Marxists, feminists and postmodernists. Conflict theorists criticised functionalism’s
concept of systems as giving far too much weight to integration and consensus, and neglecting
independence and conflict [Holmwood, 2005:100]. Lockwood [in Holmwood, 2005:101], in line with
conflict theory, suggested that Parsons’ theory missed the concept of system contradiction. He did not
account for those parts of the system that might have tendencies to mal-integration. According to
Lockwood, it was these tendencies that come to the surface as opposition and conflict among actors.
However Parsons’ thought that the issues of conflict and cooperation were very much intertwined and
sought to account for both in his model [Holmwood, 2005:103]. In this however he was limited by his
analysis of an ‘ideal type’ of society which was characterised by consensus. Merton, through his critique
of functional unity, introduced into functionalism an explicit analysis of tension and conflict.
Marxism which was revived soon after the emergence of conflict theory, criticised professional sociology
(functionalism and conflict theory alike) for being partisan to advanced welfare capitalism [Holmwood,
2005:103]. Gouldner [in Holmwood, 2005:103] thought that Parsons’ theory specifically was an
expression of the dominant interests of welfare capitalism, that it justified institutions with reference to
the function they fulfill for society. It may be that Parsons’ work implied or articulated that certain
institutions were necessary to fulfill the functional prerequisites of society, but whether or not this is the
case, Merton explicitly states that institutions are not indispensable and that there are functional
alternatives. That he does not identify any alternatives to the current institutions does reflect a
conservative bias, which as has been stated before is a product of the specific time that he was writing in.
59
As functionalism’s prominence was ending, feminism was on the rise, and it attempted a radical criticism
of functionalism. It believed that functionalism neglected the suppression of women within the family
structure. Holmwood [2005:103] shows, however, that Parsons did in fact describe the situations where
tensions and conflict existed or were about to take place, even if he did not articulate those conflicts.
Some feminists agree, suggesting that Parsons’ provided accurate descriptions of these situations.
[Johnson in Holmwood, 2005:103]. On the other hand, Parsons recognised that he had oversimplified his
functional analysis of women in relation to work and the family, and focused on the positive functions of
the family for society and not on its dysfunctions for women. Merton, too, although addressing situations
where function and dysfunction occurred simultaneously, lacked a “feminist sensibility” [Holmwood,
2005:103], although I repeat this was likely a product of the desire for social order.
Postmodernism, as theory, is critical of claims of objectivity. Therefore the idea of grand theory that can
explain society in all its forms is treated with skepticism at the very least. This critique is important
because it exposes the danger that grand theory can pose, when not seen as a limited perspective, as one
way of understanding society.
Jeffrey Alexander (1985) sees functionalism as a broad school rather than a specific method or system,
such as Parson's, which is capable of taking equilibrium (stability) as a reference-point rather than
assumption and treats structural differentiation as a major form of social change. "The name
'functionalism' implies a difference of method or interpretation that does not exist." (Davis 1967: 401)
This removes the determinism criticized above. Cohen argues that rather than needs a society has
dispositional facts: features of the social environment that support the existence of particular social
institutions but do not cause them. (ibid)
CONFLICT THEORY
Conflict theories are perspectives in social science which emphasize the social, political or material
inequality of a social group, which critique the broad socio-political system, or which otherwise detract
from structural functionalism and ideological conservativism. Conflict theories draw attention to power
differentials, such as class conflict, and generally contrast historically dominant ideologies.
Certain conflict theories set out to highlight the ideological aspects inherent in traditional thought. Whilst
many of these perspectives hold parallels, conflict theory does not refer to a unified school of thought,
and should not be confused with, for instance, peace and conflict studies, or any other specific theory of
social conflict.
In classical sociology
Of the classical founders of social science, conflict theory is most commonly associated with Karl Marx
(1818-1883). Based on a dialectical materialist account history, Marxism posited that capitalism, like
previous socioeconomic systems, would inevitably produce internal tensions leading to its own
destruction. Marx ushered in radical change, advocating proletarian revolution and freedom from the
ruling classes.
60
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician
and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in
constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that
each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the
contending classes.
Two early conflict theorists were the Polish-Austrian sociologist and political theorist Ludwig
Gumplowicz (1838-1909) and the American sociologist and paleontologist Lester F. Ward (1841-1913).
Although Ward and Gumplowicz developed their theories independently they had much in common and
approached conflict from a comprehensive anthropological and evolutionary point-of-view as opposed to
Marx's rather exclusive focus on economic factors.
Gumplowicz, in "Outlines of Sociology" (1884), describes how civilization has been shaped by conflict
between cultures and ethnic groups. Gumplowicz theorized that large complex human societies evolved
from the war and conquest. States become organized around the domination of one group by another:
masters and slaves. Eventually a complex caste system develops. Horowitz says that Gumplowicz
understood conflict in all it's forms: "class conflict, race conflict and ethnic conflict", and calls him one of
the fathers of Conflict Theory.
What happened in India, Babylon, Egypt, Greece and Rome may sometime happen in modern Europe.
European civilization may perish, over flooded by barbaric tribes. But if any one believes that we are safe
from such catastrophes he is perhaps yielding to an all too optimistic delusion. There are no barbaric
tribes in our neighborhood to be sure — but let no one be deceived, their instincts lie latent in the
populace of European states.
Ward directly attacked and attempted to systematically refute the elite business class's lassiez faire
philosophy as espoused by the hugely popular social philosopher Herbert Spencer. Ward's "Dynamic
Sociology" (1883) was an extended thesis on how to reduce conflict and competition in society and thus
optimize human progress. At the most basic level Ward saw human nature itself to be deeply conflicted
between self-aggrandizement and altruism, between emotion and intellect, and between male and female.
These conflicts would be then reflected in society and Ward assumed there had been a "perpetual and
vigorous struggle" among various "social forces" that shaped civilization. Ward was more optimistic than
Marx and Gumplowicz and believed that it was possible to build on and reform present social structures
with the help sociological analysis.
Durkheim (1858-1917) saw society as a functioning organism. Functionalism concerns "the effort to
impute, as rigorously as possible, to each feature, custom, or practice, its effect on the functioning of a
supposedly stable, cohesive system", The chief form of social conflict that Durkheim addressed was
crime. Durkheim saw crime as "a factor in public health, an integral part of all healthy societies." The
collective conscience defines certain acts as "criminal." Crime thus plays a role in the evolution of
morality and law: "[it] implies not only that the way remains open to necessary changes but that in certain
cases it directly prepares these changes."
61
Weber's (1864-1920) approach to conflict is contrasted with that of Marx. While Marx focused on the
way individual behavior is conditioned by social structure, Weber emphasized the importance of "social
action," i.e., the ability of individuals to affect their social relationships.
Modern approaches
C. Wright Mills has been called the founder of modern conflict theory. In Mills's view, social structures
are created through conflict between people with differing interests and resources. Individuals and
resources, in turn, are influenced by these structures and by the "unequal distribution of power and
resources in the society." The power elite of American society, (i.e., the military-industrial complex) had
"emerged from the fusion of the corporate elite, the Pentagon, and the executive branch of government."
Mills argued that the interests of this elite were opposed to those of the people. He theorized that the
policies of the power elite would result in "increased escalation of conflict, production of weapons of
mass destruction, and possibly the annihilation of the human race."
Gene Sharp (born 21 January 1928) is a Professor Emeritus of political science at the University of
Massachusetts Dartmouth and Nobel Peace Prize nominee. He is known for his extensive writings on
nonviolent struggle, which have influenced numerous anti-government resistance movements around the
world. In 1983 he founded the Albert Einstein Institution, a non-profit organization devoted to studies and
promotion of the use of nonviolent action in conflicts worldwide. Sharp's key theme is that power is not
monolithic; that is, it does not derive from some intrinsic quality of those who are in power. For Sharp,
political power, the power of any state - regardless of its particular structural organization - ultimately
derives from the subjects of the state. His fundamental belief is that any power structure relies upon the
subjects' obedience to the orders of the ruler(s). If subjects do not obey, leaders have no power. Sharp has
been called both the "Machiavelli of nonviolence" and the "Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare." Sharp's
scholarship has influenced resistance organizations around the world. Most recently the protest movement
that toppled President Mubarak of Egypt drew extensively on his ideas, as well as the youth movement in
Tunisia and the earlier ones in the Eastern European color revolutions that had previously been inspired
by Sharp's work. The Albert Einstein Institution's web site offers many of Gene Sharp works for
download, in English and in over sixty translations.
A recent articulation of conflict theory is found in Alan Sears' (Canadian sociologist) book A Good Book,
in Theory: A Guide to Theoretical Thinking (2008):
Societies are defined by inequality that produces conflict, rather than which produces order and
consensus. This conflict based on inequality can only be overcome through a fundamental
transformation of the existing relations in the society, and is productive of new social relations.
The disadvantaged have structural interests that run counter to the status quo, which, once they
are assumed, will lead to social change. Thus, they are viewed as agents of change rather than
objects one should feel sympathy for.
Human potential (e.g., capacity for creativity) is suppressed by conditions of exploitation and
oppression, which are necessary in any society with an unequal division of labour. These and
other qualities do not necessarily have to be stunted due to the requirements of the so-called
62
"civilizing process," or "functional necessity": creativity is actually an engine for economic
development and change.
The role of theory is in realizing human potential and transforming society, rather than
maintaining the power structure. The opposite aim of theory would be the objectivity and
detachment associated with positivism, where theory is a neutral, explanatory tool.
Consensus is a euphemism for ideology. Genuine consensus is not achieved, rather the more
powerful in societies are able to impose their conceptions on others and have them accept their
discourses. Consensus does not preserve social order, it entrenches stratification, e.g., the
American dream.
The State serves the particular interests of the most powerful while claiming to represent the
interests of all. Representation of disadvantaged groups in State processes may cultivate the
notion of full participation, but this is an illusion/ideology.
Although Sears associates the conflict theory approach with Marxism, he argues that it is the foundation
for much "feminist, post-modernist, anti-racist, and lesbian-gay liberationist theories.
Symbolic interactions is a major sociological perspective that places emphasis on micro-scale social
interaction, which is particularly important in subfields such as urban sociology and social psychology.
Symbolic interactions is derived from American pragmatism, especially the work of George Herbert
Mead and Charles Cooley. Herbert Blumer, a student and interpreter of Mead, coined the term and put
forward an influential summary of the perspective: people act toward things based on the meaning those
things have for them; and these meanings are derived from social interaction and modified through
interpretation. Blumer was also influenced by John Dewey, who insisted that human beings are best
understood in relation to their environment.
Sociologists working in this tradition have researched a wide range of topics using a variety of research
methods. However, the majority of interactionist research uses qualitative research methods, like
participant observation, to study aspects of (1) social interaction and/or (2) individuals' selves. Participant
observation allows researchers to access symbols and meanings, as in Howard S. Becker's Art Worlds
(1982) and Arlie Hochschild's The Managed Heart (1983). Sociological areas that have been particularly
influenced by symbolic interactionism include the sociology of emotions, deviance/criminology,
collective behavior/social movements, and the sociology of sex. Interactionist concepts that have gained
widespread usage include definition of the situation, emotion work, impression management, looking
glass self, and total institution. Semiology is connected to this discipline, but unlike those elements of
63
semiology which are about the structures of language, interactionists typically are more interested in the
ways in which meaning is fluid and ambiguous.
Symbolic interaction theory describes the family as a unit of interacting personalities. This theory focuses
attention on the way that people interact through symbols:
The symbolic interaction perspective is based on how humans develop a complex set of symbols to give
meaning to the world (LaRossa & Reitzes, 1993). Meaning evolves from their interactions in their
environment and with people. These interactions are subjectively interpreted through existing symbols.
Understanding these symbols is important in understanding human behavior. Interactions with larger
societal processes influence the individual, and vice-versa. It is through interaction that humans develop a
concept of larger social structures and also of self concept. Society affects behavior through constraints
by societal norms and values. Self concept also affects behavior. Symbolic interactionism’s unique
contributions to family studies are
2. that individuals develop both a concept of self and their identities through social interaction.
Symbolic interactionism is the way we learn to interpret and give meaning to the world though our
interactions with others.
Individuals are not born with a sense of self but develop self concepts through social interaction. Self
concept is developed through the process of interaction and communication with others. Self concept is
shaped by the reactions of significant others and by our perceptions of their reactions. Self concept, once
developed, provides an important motive for behavior. Self fulfilling prophecy is the tendency for our
expectations, and/or other’s expectations of us to evoke expected responses. Humans interact and develop
roles in the family according to symbols used to describe the family. These roles are based on the
symbolic meaning attached to each role.
How family members react to a situation is determined by how they interpret the situation. So, it is
important to understand the symbols the family uses to understand their interactions and behaviors.
In a family, complicated sets of meanings are transmitted through symbols that permit each member to
communicate with each other and share experiences (Peterson, 1986).
64
Core Principles of Social Interaction Theory
1. Meaning
Meaning itself is not inherent in objects. Human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings
that they have assigned to them. Meaning arises in the process of interaction between people. That is, it
takes place in the context of relationships whether with family or community
Meanings are handled in and modified through an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with
things him or her encounters. Once people define a situation as real, it's very real in its consequences
2. Language
As human beings we have the unique ability to name things. As children interact with family, peers, and
others, they learn language and, concurrently, they learn the social meanings attached to certain words.
That is, language is the source of meaning. Meaning arises out of social interactions with one another, and
language is the vehicle. In Mead’s view, social life and communication between people are possible only
when we understand and can use a common language, (Wood, 1997).
3. Thought or “Minding”
Ability distinctly different from animals in that we have the ability to think about things rather than
simply reacting instinctually. An inner conversation with oneself. A reflective pause through which we
modify our interpretation of symbols as an ability to take the role of “The Other”
1. Human beings act toward things on the basis of the meaning they have;
Rather, their meanings differ depending on how we define and respond to them
how we define, or give meaning to the things we encounter will shape our actions toward them
Therefore, if we wish to understand human behavior we must know how people define the things
— objects, events, individuals, groups, structures—they encounter in their environment
2. The meaning attributed to those things arises out of social interaction with others
We don’t learn these meanings simply through individual experiences, but rather through the
interactions with others
the meanings of the things we encounter, though formed by social interaction, are altered through
our understandings
65
An individual’s interpretation of the meaning will guide and determine action
c. People are conscious and self-reflective beings who actively shape their own behavior.
f. The ‘social act’ should be the fundamental unit of social psychological analysis.
g. To understand people’s social acts, we need to use methods that enable us to discern the
meanings they attribute to these acts.
Language – A system of symbols shared with other members of society, used for the purposes of
communication and representation
Looking Glass Self - the mental image that results from taking the role of the other. Imaging how
we look to another person.
Mind – A process of mental activity consisting of self, interaction, And reflection, based on
socially acquired symbols. Does not refer to an inner psychic world separated from society.
Roles refer to “collections of expectations that define regularized patterns of behavior within
family life” (Peterson, 1986, p. 22).
Roles within the family may include but not be limited to the following: nurturer, socialize,
provider, and decision-maker.
Role-taking is the ability to see oneself as an object, in other words, to be able to see how others
perceive oneself.
66
Role-taking allows the individual to monitor and coordinate personal behavior in order to facilitate
interaction with others and also to anticipate the responses of other individuals.
Role conflict refers to the situation in which there are conflicting expectations about a specified
role.
Role making is the “process of improvising, exploring, and judging what is appropriate on the
basis of the situation and the response of others at the moment” (Peterson, 1986, p. 23).
The Self
o According to Mead, self does not exist at birth but is developed through interaction with others
o emerges from the social interaction of humans in which the individual takes on the role of the
"other" and internalizes the attitudes and perceptions of others through those interactions
The interaction of an individual’s self-conception ("I") and the generalized, perceived view that others
have of the individual ("Me")
“I”
o An individual’s self-conception
o The mental image of oneself that is based on expectations and responses from others
Self-concept
The image we have of who and what we are (formed in childhood by how significant others treat/respond
to us). The self-concept is not fixed and unchanging – if in childhood your teachers tell you you’re
stupid, but later in life your teachers and friends begin to treat you as if you’re very bright, your self-
concept is likely to change.
Self-fulfilling prophecy
67
The tendency for our expectations to evoke responses in others that confirm what we originally
anticipated. Each one of us affects how others view themselves. Our expectations evoke responses that
confirm what we originally anticipated. Phenomenon: The way I choose to see the world creates the
world I see.
Significant symbol
Social Act
Behavior that in some way takes into account the “other” person, group or social organization, and is
guided by what they do. It emerges through the process of communication and interaction.
Symbol manipulation
The means through which we motivate others to action through the use of symbols
b) Economics.
Seeks to analyze and describe the production and distribution of goods and services. It deals with how
man distributes the scarce resource in the society. They are related in that it shows how man allocates
scarce resource interns of distribution affects human behaviuor in the society.
68
It’s the study of human behavior and mental process. It entails the application of knowledge of human
mental activities, its causes and treatment of mental illness. Sociology depends on psychology for the
explanation of deviant behavior and external mental process.
b) Economics.
Seeks to analyze and describe the production and distribution of goods and services. It deals with
how man distributes the scarce resource in the society. They are related in that it shows how man
allocates scarce resource interns of distribution affects human behaviuor in the society.
69
History is the study of past human activities and events and how they have shaped the
development of society. Sociology analysis human action, association, group, institution and
how they have shaped human behavior.
70
iv. A student may study sociology for his own sake, just to know more about society and
culture. But mere knowledge does not satisfy him. He may probably seek sociological
knowledge just to apply it to the social situations in which he finds himself.
v. In general, it may be said that sociological knowledge lends itself to helping an individual
and his society achieve results in terms of better social relations. But, a very few students
pursue the subject of sociology to either seek knowledge for knowledge sake or applying
it in the solution of their own day-to-day life problems.
vi. Positions in teaching, salesmanship, business administration or local bodies
administration, law, journalism and even in politics and other fields, where an essential
occupational activity is ‘dealing with people’, require more than ordinary knowledge of
human relations in society. Reliable knowledge about social phenomena is an essential
and basic prerequisite for better human relationships and, in turn, for a better society.
Uses of sociology:
1. It provides a basic understanding of human society, how social system work, how people’s
behaviour is modified by their circumstances.
2. It broadens the range of our perspective from which we try to understand the social world.
5. The world we live in is in trouble. It besets with many dilemmas. Sociology guides us in
sorting out such dilemmas. The world is shrinking in many ways too—satellite TV, cell phone
networks and Internet have created many new conditions and problems. Contact between
culturally different groups has increased enormously in the present time. Sociology helps in
studying cultures of different societies in various circumstances.
71
7. It helps us understand ourselves and our positions in society. It is a source of self-
enlightenment and increases self-understanding.
i. Teaching
ii. Social research
iii. Social work
iv. Professions—medicine, law, engineering, business, etc.
v. Industry
vi. Rural and urban planning
vii. Public administration—civil services
viii. Policy making
i. Social work is the field in which the principles of the social sciences, especially
sociology, are applied to actual social problems in the same way the principles of
physiology are applied in medicine or the principles of economics are applied in business
management.
ii. A social worker might, for example, use information obtained from family research to try
to place children in foster homes or to establish centres of spouse abuse.
iii. The term ‘social work’ is applied to the various organized methods for promoting human
welfare through the prevention and relief of suffering. In the late 19th century, social
work was largely voluntary (notably as a charitable activity).
iv. Since the Second World War, social work practice has become increasingly
professionalized. In India, many institutions of social work training and education were
established; notable among them is the renowned Tata Institute of Social Work, Mumbai.
Many state governments have also started such institutions on its pattern. These
institutions have the aim to train people to step out into society and to assist in the
solution of its immediate problems.
72
REVISION QUESTION
1. Define the meaning of sociology
2. Trace the origin and development of sociology as a discipline.
3. Explain the scope of sociology
4. Distinguish sociology from other social science.
5. Acquire general knowledge of sociological theories.
REVISION QUESTION
6. Define the meaning of sociology
7. Trace the origin and development of sociology as a discipline.
8. Explain the scope of sociology
9. Distinguish sociology from other social science.
10. Acquire general knowledge of sociological theories.
73
74
CHAPTER TWO
THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE SOCIETY
Specific objectives
At the end of this topic, the trainee should be able to;
a) define the concept of society
b) Describe how the society can be studied scientifically.
c) Define the concept of culture
d) Identify the various element of culture
e) Explain how culture is passed from one generation to another.
f) Explain the concept of socialization
g) State the function of socialization
h) Identify the various agents of socialization
i) Explain how individual behaviuor is controlled in the society.
Society
Society refers to a totally of human grouping i.e. independent , large and having its own culture and
line between physical bound group which give them identification for example in the society.
The community is a group of people bound together by physical boundaries for example by lakes,
valleys and having the same interest.
Culture
Culture is the totally of land, socially transmitted. It includes the ideas, values and customs of groups
of people. It simplifies much today interaction.
Components of culture
They are also known as elements of culture of a society and they include;
i) social norms
They are standard behavior maintained by the society. For a norm to become significant it must be
widely shared and understood. They can be classified into two;-
Formal norms- are established standard of behaviour written down and involve strict rules for
punishment of violations. Informal norms - are generally understood but are precisely recorded e.g.
standard of proper dressing.
ii) language
75
Language is an absence system of word meaning and symbol for all aspect and culture. It include speech,
symbol gestures etc. it is not exclusively human speech. People depend upon language for the use and
transmission of culture.
iii) values
Are collective conceptions of what is considered good, desirable and proper. They indicate what people in
a given culture prepare as well as what the final important and morally right or wrong.
Value influence people behaviour and measure of evaluating the action of others. It is a from value
attached to something in culture that laws are derived for example value of private property given
meaning for every society.
iv) symbols
It refers to anything that cause a particular meaning recognized by people who share culture. Every
symbol has a given meaning for every society.
v) customs
Are socially transmitted norms regarded by a given group of people who share a given belief. It is
regarded as a social life in that no body would want to face the sanctions with its violation.
vii) moves
Are taboos governing group behaviour and action. They serve to restrain individuals from act and
behaviour considered to be improper by those members for fear of meeting social sanctions by group
members i.e. cursor of member from society.
Concept of Cultural
Cultural assimilation
Is the process where by authority group adopting the custom and attitude of prevailing culture for
example language assimilation is the processive process for where by a speech community of a language
shift to speaking of the other language.
Cultural assimilation
Is the exchange of cultural features that result when a group comes into continuous first hand. The origin
cultural patterns of either both groups remain distinct.
76
Cultural shock
It refers to the anxiety feeling (surprise, uncertainty and confusion) feel people have when they enter into
a different culture or social environment such as foreign country.
Cultural relativism
It’s the principle that an individual human belief and activities should be understood in terms of his or her
own culture.
Cultural continuity
Can be defined as the absence of social change i.e. things remain the same because social change is a
continuous process in all society, however when society, their structure which are inherently resistance to
change and in this sense we talk about them being social continuity.
SOCIALIZATION
Is a complex, lifelong process. The socialization is a process of social interaction by which people acquire
the knowledge, attitude values and behavior essential for effective participation in society. It’s a process
of becoming a social being, a process that is continuous throughout ones life. The cases of children reared
under condition of extreme isolation illustrate importance of socialization.
THEORIES OF SOCIALIZATION
While the social scientist acknowledges that are biological organism, biological factors have not been
fully integrated into psychological theory. The theories of socialization emphasized in sociology today
continue to emphasize social structures, learning and social interaction.
Conditional learning
Is a form of learning in which the consequence of behavior determines the probability of its future
occurrence. Consequences of behavior that increases the chance of a behavior are reinforcement;
constituencies that reduce the probability of its future are punishment. Socialization occurs when a
person‘s behavior is shaped by the reinforcement and punishing activities of other people and groups.
Observational learning
Through observation, people may learn both a certain mode of behavior and that of behaviour and that of
behavior may elicit certain rewards or punishment. Bandura (1965) observational learning also referred to
as modeling or imitation occurs hen people reproduce the response they observe in other people either
real or fictional.
77
Another view emphasize that a child development occurs in step with his / her cognitive development.
Through learning is fundamental part of socialization what and how a person learns depends on his or
her ability to understand and interpreter the world, something that progresses through several stages by
Swiss psychologist jean Piaet ( 1926/ 1955)
Agents of socialization
Every social experience, we have affects us in at least a small way, however, several familiar setting have
special importance in the specialization process. These include;
- The family.
- Peer group
- School
- Mass media
i) the family
The family has the greatest impact o socialization, infants totally dependent on others and the
responsibility totally falls on parents and other family member to socialize the young ones teaching skills
and values, beliefs.
REVISION QUESTIONS
1. Describe how the society can be studied scientifically.
78
2. Define the concept of culture
3. Identify the various element of culture
4. Explain how culture is passed from one generation to another.
5. Explain the concept of socialization
6. State the function of socialization
7. Identify the various agents of socialization
8. Explain how individual behavior is controlled in the society.
79
CHAPTER THREE
SOCIAL INTERACTION
Specific objectives
At the end of this topic, the trainee should be able to;
a) define social interaction
b) describe the role of the family in social interaction
c) appropriate and relate to various ethnic and kinship groups in the processes of interaction
d) Identify social institution and their functions.
INTRODUCTION
The family
A family is a social institution found in alls societies that unit people in a cooperative group to oversee the
bearing and rising of children.
Functions of a family
ii) socialization
The family is the first and most important setting for child rearing. It continues throughout the life cycle
iv) social
Legitimate birth into a family gives the individual a stable place in the society children inherit from their
parents not only the maternal goods but also social status . they belong to the same race , ethnicity
religion and social class.
Types of family
Extended family
80
It is a family unit that includes parents, children as well as other kin.
Nuclear family
This is a family unit composed of one or two parents and their children. It is also called conjugal family
meaning it’s based on marriage.
Marriage
Is a sanctioned relationship usually involving economic operation as well as sexual activity and child
bearing that people expect to be enduring.
Types of marriage
- Monogamous marriage. It is a type of marriage involving two parties that is husband and wife.
- Polygamous marriage. This is a type of marriage that takes two forms
(a) Polygyny marriage. This is a type of marriage that unites one man with two or more females.
(b) Polyandry. This is a type of marriage that unite one female and the two or more males.
Marital roles
It refers to duties and responsibilities that one undertakes in the marriage that is role of husband and wife
in marriage.
Descent
This is a system by which members of a society traces kinship over generations. Lower income countries
trace kinship through the father and mother side of the family.
Forms of descent
i) Patrilineal descent.
This is a form of descent that traces kinship through the males so that property flows room father to son.
81
We have two types of group dynamics;
- primary group
- Secondary group.
i) Primary group
Is a small group whose member share personal and enduring relationship? In this group people spend
a great deal of time together engaging in a wide range of activities and they know one another pretty
well. Members of primary group help one another in many ways, but they generally think of their
group as and end in its self rather than as a means of other ends.
REVISION QUESTIONS
1. define social interaction
2. describe the role of the family in social interaction
3. Discuss the appropriate and relate to various ethnic and kinship groups in the processes of
interaction
4. Identify social institution and their functions.
82
CHAPTER FOUR
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION
Specific objectives
By the end of this topic, the trainee should be able to;
1. define social structure and organization
2. identify various types of social organization
3. discuss the functions of social organization
4. define social satisfaction
5. explain social stratification
6. explain the functions of social stratification
7. explain the concept mobility
8. Identify various types of social mobility.
INTRODUCTION
Social Organization
Social organization is a state of being or condition in a society in when various institution function in
accordance with implied purpose.
It is characterized by different elements in the society such as family, politics, and religion economics
among others. It is the interdependence of social institution groups and society that assist to achieve social
order and stability in the society.
They are governed by norms, values and beliefs. They have subgroup within large units for example
institution such as political, economic and religion which have subgroup in the society.
83
- By the use of rules and regulation by formal organization individuals and group behavior are
shaped in expected and accepted ways.
- It assist in social interaction in that thy give people the opportunity to interact, socialize and share
their diverse social problems.
- It brings about operation of different element of the society in that family plays its part in
procreations and socialization.
- Provides a sense of belonging and identify to its members e.g. Schools, families, hospitals.
- They are a major source of employment to many people e.g. from such places as schools,
hospitals, prisons, military.
- It determines social structure of a given society and plays the role of relating the society with the
outside world.
- Acts as a source of unity in. they bring people together and improve their social, economic,
cultural and psychological well being.
Social structure
It’s a pattern of social relation that arises from people roles and status when people interact. The pattern
of social relation that emerge reflects to a larger extent their social status and roles.
Social status
This is the social position that an individual holds in a group or social ranking of a group when compared
to other groups.
An individual status dictates the rights and privileges to which the person is entitled. It is usually based
income, prestige, education.
Types of status
We have two types of status
- ascribed status
- achieve status
Ascribed status
It is acquired by an individual at birth through wealth, religion, race, age, social studying. This form of
status is attained by who you are rather than what you have done. An example is the son of president. He
enjoys privileges not because he has done something that makes him enjoy but because he is from royal
family.
Achieved status
This is mainly acquired because of what you have done through your own efforts or choice. For example
the student who works hard and completes the necessary further studies or experience to attain a desired
position is said to be his / her way to achieve specific status position in the society like being a lawyer,
doctor, pilot, teacher or even an accountant. Another example is a poor man in a village assisting people
and later being rewarded as an area member of parliament. His status will have been achieved through is
hard work.
84
Social role
Social role is the behavior or appropriate to a given status, that is the part one played patterns of behavior
rights and duties e.g. the person notifying the role of a mother should show love and commitment to the
duties of a house while at the same time should expect obedience and cooperation from their children and
spouse.
Social stratification
AC Ogburn & Nimkoft view social stratification as the process by which individuals and group are
ranked into more as less enduring of status.
Is the diffusion of population into two or more layers of which is relatively homogenous and between
which are different in privileges restriction reward and obligation. It demonstrates ranking order in a
society often demonstrates social inequality.
Researches generally agree that the population of any society or country can be divided into upper class,
lower, middle class, working class.
Education
Determines upward mobility in a society e.g. a person who owns a degree in society is seen to hold a high
status than a primary level education.
Social mobility
Is the ability of persons to move upward or down ward within social classes that exist in the society.
i) vertical mobility
refers to changes in status of an individual as he/ she moves up or down the social ladder e.g the manager
of the department in a supper market has achieved upward
mobility.
The mobility is accompanied by an increase in income overall responsibility. On the other hand an
headmaster of a certain school who is demoted to ordinary teacher faces downward vertical mobility.
85
ii) horizontal mobility
It refers to social movement on the same social plane an individual who makes an occupational change
that does not affect his or social status displays horizontal mobility e.g. Provincial Commissioner of rift
valley province is transferred to be a pc of Nyanza province.
After college graduation the 5th child enters cooperative of a higher level and after there years, he is
promoted to a top management position while he has attained upward mobility, his brother and sister have
remained at the same social – economic level.
Positive factors
- Division of labour. People are employed based on their skills and expertise.
- Marriage. One can be married to a rich family hence moved from lower class to high class.
- Family background. It is seen in terms of inheritance. Those from rich families will acquire
available resource hence upward mobility.
- Different fertility rate. Seen in terms of children people have. People with more children are
seen to be senior and those with no children are seen to be misfits in the society.
- Economic progress. The performance in the economy in terms of profitability. If the economy is
progressing, more people will be promoted and hence will be employed hence social mobility.
Negative factors
- Gender discrimination
- Religious belief
- Class discrimination. Rich people discriminate the poor ones.
REVISION QUESTION
1. define social structure and organization
2. identify various types of social organization
3. discuss the functions of social organization
4. explain social stratification and explain the functions of social stratification
5. Explain the concept mobility and identify various types of social mobility.
6.
86
CHAPTER FIVE
INTRODUCTION
Social change ,
It refers to gradual transformation of individual group and behaviour of those groups and behavior of that
group in the society.
It comprises transformation of social belief norms attitude and values.
It is an inevitable phenomenon or situation in human societies because these human societies are not
static i.e. dynamic (change from time to time.)
87
- Political leadership. It is a source of social change in that leadership is endorsed, has the power to
decide for the community power refers to ability of an individual or group of individual to
influence the behavior of others wither willingly or unwillingly e.g the change of government
system from communism to democracy i.e. one party state to multiparty democracy.
- Economic factors. Such as change from agricultural to manufacturing the mode of production of
goods in society has changed so that people do not depend on subsistence agricultural but instead
deal with commercial.
- Environmental factor. Can occur through natural calamities.
- Religion. Where one person changes from one denominator to the other.
THEORIES CHANGE
Conflict theory
- Karl max is usually tough as one of the greatest writer on social conflict.
- He saw conflict in economic terms based on struggle for scarce resources between the rulings
classing (bourecreoisie).
- The rule called (proletarian) is stressed that each group share common ethnic status basing
ground political value which conflict with either group.
- In most cases social change in conflict perspectives is marked by an equal balance of groups such
as ruling class the other one as the ruled class.
- The ruled class will continually seek gained recognition by the ruling class and the leader of the
ruling class will seek to denier that recognition and organize activity which demonstrates that is
delayed.
- The power situation between the ruling and ruled class may change as a result of change in
increase the possibility of society resistance or actual revolution by the ruled class.
- These factors that can lead to social change are leadership, aspiration, capacity of organization,
their rule in spear heading their interest into the ruling class.
Modernization Theory
- Is the recent theory which has been used to explain the disparity between development of country
in terms of wealth and political progress.
- It stress that the world is divided into major division i.e. traditional and modern.
- The traditional is characterized by underdevelopment poverty and people in this area do not strive
to improve their well being . In traditional society, work is done in circular form as opposed in
linear form. It is done in a way in which our fore fathers have been doing it and no attempt.
- The modern society is characterized by individual’s handwork and attempt to change wellbeing.
They use modern society and it’s done in a linear form as opposed to circular form.
- They are open to change and flexible to adopt new ways of life.
- They are illiterate and look forward to improve the situation of their lives since work is not done
the way in which our forefathers used to do it.
88
- Modernization theories argued that traditional society (3rd world countries) can only develop if
they apply the ways in which modern society (developed countries) used to develop. In this case
emphasis is laid down on transfer of new from developing to developed courtiers so as to spread
up social change.
- _Developing countries should follow the foot steps of developed countries by emphasizing
individualism handwork, literacy and open mindness in tackling their problems
89
- It is not practical especially where unit is not available i.e. the theory work in system where
people have a common goal.
- It ignores the presence of conflict as a source of social change. Since it insist in interaction among
the parts of the society.
Critics
It neither does nor takes into account correction of social change from outside within the society (internal)
cause of social change.
90
- It is characterized by abrupt changes in social system or in the way in which people behave or
believe in as a result of spontaneous change.
- It is usually manifested by natural calamities such as floods, fire, suicide bomb etc which cause
diverse changes in society.
REVISION QUESTIONS
91
CHAPTER SIX
INTRODUCTION
Problems in Kenya are multi-folded. There are social problems, economic problems, health problems and
education problems as well. These problems are interrelated. Kenyans have problems in their social
fields that are in most cases associated with health problems as well. In this topic we are going to discus
social problems which include the following among others;
Poverty
Political problems
Unemployment
Drug abuse
POVERTY
Poverty is a condition in which a person or a community lacks essential for minimum standards of
living .These essentials include material resources such as access to information, education, health care
among others.
Causes of poverty
1. Social causes
There are many social causes of poverty. For example disable people may not be able to do activities
likely to give them income. This will lead to poverty due to the inability to work. This may result to
borrowing as a means of sustaining their livelihood.
2. Individual problems.
These are caused by individual perception about life in general. This may lead to individual dropping out
of school which may later result to poverty.
3. Discrimination by gender or ethnic community
In some Kenyan communities, it is not easy for women to obtain formal employment as men are
favoured. This has contributed to a great poverty to women. Discrimination by ethnicity also prevents
people from marginalized communities from access to the national resources. These leads to poverty
among the marginalized ethnic communities in that they lack infrastructure for economic development
iv) Brain Drain
Most taught Kenyan people especially the youth leave the country as well as their communities to look
for better jobs outside. This makes the exploitation of available recourses that need export knowledge
remain unutilized leading to poverty in community as well as the country
Political problems
92
Lack of transparency in the management of resources on the country contribution to political problems.
The recent political problems in Kenya are the elections that took place in 2007-2008.
The caused massive destructions among Kenyans. Many people were killed and thousands were displaced
becoming internally displaced people and the famous IDPs. This has contributed to a lot of poverty
especially among the displaced people and those who lost the property including individuals whom they
were depending for their livelihood.
Unemployment
If the government does not provide job opportunities for its people, their living condition or standards
may not improve. This will lead to people moving to urban areas looking for employment. Because of
the little or lack of money, they end up living in urban slums which is mainly characterized by a lot of
poverty, people living bellow a dollar by day. This may also lead to other social problems.
1. Leads to high crime rate. Poor individuals struggle to obtain basic needs such as food by stealing
or through corrupt deeds.
2. Leads to the increase suicide cases in Kenya. This is mainly because of the hopelessness in the
life of people.
UNEMPLOYMENT
Kenya is a country with many obstacles to overcome. Despite being the regional hub for commerce, it’s
economic and health situations are dire. Unemployment is high and life expectancy is low. The
unemployment rate in Kenya was estimated as 40% as of 2008. This is the same as of 2001 estimates.
Economic process in Kenya has been slow and plaque with corruption. The economy is also relevant on
several goods whose prices have remained low. Kenyans unemployment rate is 188 th in the world.
This unemployment has affected the youth. This has forced the government to increase youth
development trust fund and kazi Kwa vijana to reduce this rate. But corruption and nepotism is still
affecting the initiative. This has forced a number of youth to move to urban slums. Unemployment is a
social problem in Kenya.
CRIME AND DELIQUENCY
There is a high rate of crimes in all regions in Kenya, particularly in Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu. Car
jacking is among the urban areas. Pickpockets’ and thieves carry out “snatch and run” crimes on the city.
All these are caused by lack of employment and young people are forced to look for other ways of
country a living. It is very common in urban poor and in rural areas is characterized by cattle rustling. It is
a social problem which needs attention from stalk holders.
DRUG ABUSE
Drug abuse has become a major social issue in Kenya especially in Mombasa is affected by issue of drugs
more than any other part of the country. Young in the early 20s have been affected by the drugs in
demographic. Women in Mombasa have held public protests, asking the government to more quickly to
arrest young people using narcotics.
In Mombasa and Kilindini, there are approximately 40 masking 9meaning places in Kiswahili) where
drug abusers meet to share drugs. Bhang smoking until recently has been drug of choice, but heroin
93
injection is becoming increasingly popular. 70% of the drug abusers have been admitted that they are
using heroine.
In addition and drug abuse, the trafficking of illegal drugs in the country has become a major issue as
well. An estimated 100 million dollars is trafficked within the country each year.
Cattle raiding
The northern Kenya and eastern Uganda regions are very insecure. For a number of years there have
been a number of cattle raids going on, terrorizing the civilian population and killing hundreds of people.
This has affected the economy of those regions and poor living conditions in such areas.
Violence against women and girls is one of the most widespread violations of human rights. It includes
physical, sexual, psychological and economical abuse and it cuts across all boundaries of age, race,
culture, wealth and geography. It takes place at home, streets, schools, workplace, farm fields, during
conflicts and crisis. It has many manifestations from the most universally prevalent forms of domestic
and sexual violence to harmful practices, abuse during pregnancy, so-called honour killings and other
types of feticides.
Child abuse
This is the physical, sexual, emotional mistreatment or neglect of children. It can also be defined as the
maltreatment or any act or series of commission or commission by parents or care givers that results to
harm potential for harm or threat of harm to a child abuse in Kenya occurs in child’s homes. With the
smaller amount occurring in the organization schools, or the community the child interacts with. In Kenya
there are four major categories of child abuse.
Neglect
Physical abuse
Psychological/emotional abuse`
Child sexual abuse.
REVISION QUESTION
94