India and Central Europe: Perceptions, Perspectives, Prospects 1st Edition Rajendra K. Jain Download PDF
India and Central Europe: Perceptions, Perspectives, Prospects 1st Edition Rajendra K. Jain Download PDF
India and Central Europe: Perceptions, Perspectives, Prospects 1st Edition Rajendra K. Jain Download PDF
com
https://ebookmeta.com/product/india-and-central-
europe-perceptions-perspectives-prospects-1st-
edition-rajendra-k-jain-2/
OR CLICK BUTTON
DOWLOAD EBOOK
https://ebookmeta.com/product/india-and-central-europe-
perceptions-perspectives-prospects-1st-edition-rajendra-k-jain/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/specific-relief-act-law-india-by-a-
k-jain-2nd-edition-dr-ashok-k-jain/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/cambridge-igcse-and-o-level-
history-workbook-2c-depth-study-the-united-states-1919-41-2nd-
edition-benjamin-harrison/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/mechanical-and-industrial-
measurements-3rd-edition-r-k-jain/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/primary-mathematics-3a-hoerst/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/drug-induced-neurological-
disorders-kewal-k-jain/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/asymmetrical-threat-perceptions-in-
india-china-relations-2014th-edition-tien-sze-fang/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/diversity-of-migration-in-south-
east-europe-interdisciplinary-studies-on-central-and-eastern-
europe-mirjam-zbinden/
India and Central Europe
Perceptions, Perspectives, Prospects
Edited by
Rajendra K. Jain
India and Central Europe
Rajendra K. Jain
Editor
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Dedicated to
Sunita, Ruchika, Anekant and Jigyasa
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Rajendra K. Jain
2 India and Central Europe: From the Margins
to the Centre in Three Stages 13
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri
3 Indian Perceptions of Central Europe 29
Rajendra K. Jain
4 India and the Czech Republic 79
Rajendra K. Jain
5 India and Hungary 137
Rajendra K. Jain
6 India and Poland 181
Rajendra K. Jain
7 India and Slovakia 235
Rajendra K. Jain
8 India’s Trade and Economic Relations with the V4
Countries 267
Karina J˛edrzejowska and Anna Wróbel
vii
viii CONTENTS
ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
World (Palgrave, 2020) and India, Europe and Asia: Convergence and
Divergence (Palgrave, 2021).
Karina J˛edrzejowska is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and
Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies,
University of Warsaw. She is a graduate of the University of Manch-
ester (M.Sc. Globalization and Development, 2008), Warsaw School of
Economics (M.A. in Finance and Banking, 2007), and an M.A. in Inter-
national Relations from the Institute of International Relations, Warsaw
University 2005. Since April 2017, she is a Governing Board Member and
Treasurer of the World International Studies Committee (WISC). She is
co-editor of The Future of Global Economic Governance: Challenges and
Prospects in an Age of Uncertainty (2020).
Patryk Kugiel is the Head of the International Economic Relations and
Global Issues Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs
(PISM), Warsaw. He is a specialist on South Asia and international devel-
opment cooperation. His research in PISM focuses on the foreign policy
of India and Pakistan, the security situation in South Asia, United States
and EU policies towards the region, implications of India’s rise on the
global order as well as the development cooperation policy of Poland and
the EU. He is the co-editor of India-Poland Relations in the 21st Century:
Vistas for Future Cooperation (Vij Books, 2014) and India’s Soft Power:
A New Foreign Policy Strategy (Routledge, 2017).
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri is a Distinguished Fellow and Head, Strategic
Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre and the Foreign Editor of the Hindustan
Times. He writes on political, security and economic issues. He was a
member of National Security Advisory Board of the Government of India
(2011–2015) and is a member of the Asia Society Global Council and the
Aspen Institute Italia, the International Institute of Strategic Studies and
the Mont Pelerin Society.
Konrad P˛edziwiatr is Senior Researcher at the Centre for Advanced
Studies of Population and Religion at the Cracow University of
Economics and in the Centre for Migration Research at the University
of Warsaw. His publications include Transformation of Islamism in Egypt
and Tunisia in the Shadow of the Arab Spring (2019), Polish Migration
Policy—In Search of New Model (2015), The New Muslim Elites in Euro-
pean Cities (2010) and From Islam of Immigrants to Islam of Citizens
(2007).
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xi
xiii
xiv ABBREVIATIONS
xvii
List of Tables
xix
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Rajendra K. Jain
From the mid-1950s till the end of the Cold War, India’s relations with
the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) were an adjunct of
Indo-Soviet relations. Having been let down by the West, India turned
to the Soviet Union in 1955 as a partner in economic and industrial
cooperation. The CEECs followed suit after Moscow offered economic,
financial and technical assistance for large public sector projects. There
was no serious conflict of interest and almost identical views on most
international issues. The CEECs also did not have any colonial hangovers
and were indifferent to some of the issues that troubled West European
lobbies when dealing with India such as human rights, Kashmir, treatment
of minorities and so on (Sibal, 2019: 78).
Central Europe figured in parliamentary debates only on critical issues
which received wide publicity. During the relatively well-informed debates
on the Hungarian uprising (1956) and the Czechoslovak crisis (1968),
the Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s government faced substantial criticism.
No debates on Central Europe took place subsequently in the Indian
Parliament though references to individual countries did resurface peri-
odically. The West usually gave no credit either to the Indian Parliament
R. K. Jain (B)
Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Outline of Chapters
India’s postwar relationship with Central Europe, argues Pramit Pal
Chaudhuri in the second chapter, has undergone three distinct phases.
The first phase, during the communist period, was a subset of India’s
relations with the Soviet Union. The collapse of communism left New
1 INTRODUCTION 3
Economic Engagement
The low levels of trade and investment present an opportunity for both
India and the Visegrad Four to widen and deepen economic ties. The
V4 tend to be viewed by many Indian companies as a bridgehead for
investments in the much larger West European economies. Indian IT soft-
ware majors have been ramping up their operations in the region to tap
the intellectual calibre and language skill-sets of the engineering talent of
the region to tap West European markets. Indian entrepreneurs tend to
look to bigger markets in Western Europe and recognize that there are
structural limits to what is possible in Central Europe. As the storehouse
of niche technologies, Central European technologies are more attuned
to Indian conditions. As repositories of frontier technologies and exper-
tise in clean technology, skill development and education, the Visegrad 4
are complementary partners for many flagship programmes of the Modi
government. To a certain extent, the challenge is of overcoming lack of
information and simply making the connection.
The first India-Central Europe Business Forum (ICEBF) (now India-
Europe29) has not led to a structured business dialogue and continues
to face the perennial problem of lack of adequate follow-up. While the
idea is inherently good, it is too large a body bringing together 30 coun-
tries under the geographical scope of the Ministry of External Affairs’
Central Europe Division with diverse interests from very different regions
and with different expertise.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
India-V4+ Engagement
Central Europe has not figured prominently in Indian foreign policy
priorities for decades even though it has become politically stable and
economically prosperous due to mutual indifference and neglect. As a
political grouping, the Visegrad countries have lost their earlier distinc-
tiveness and failed to get enough political attention in the capital. All of
them except perhaps Poland are political lightweights within the Euro-
pean Union. New Delhi tends to perceive them as having little impact
on EU foreign policy and of being of marginal importance in India-EU
relations since they tend to get submerged in EU structures. Observers
caution that the shared direction of the V4 within the EU is not ‘stable
or permanent’ and that ‘separate interests and issues disrupt the coher-
ence of the group and weaken it in terms of unified promotion of these
interests in the EU’ (Bauerova, 2018: 134).
The Slovak Presidency of the Visegrad Group in 2014 proposed a new
V4+1 format for India’s engagement with the region. This led to the first-
ever engagement at the Joint Secretary level with the V4 in Bratislava
Modi’s Re-engagement
India’s re-engagement of Central Europe by the Narendra Modi govern-
ment in recent years reflects how the region is slowly being gradually
recognized as a region of promise and potential. In view of a proactive
Chinese overdrive around the world, New Delhi has sought to show its
flag in a kind of competitive diplomatic engagement in consonance with
its resources and capabilities to reach out to various countries where few
ministers or senior officials had travelled for decades. Between 2014 and
2020, there nearly a dozen visits by senior Indian dignitaries, including
the President and the Vice-President, to Central and Eastern Europe took
place. These were not merely goodwill/ceremonial visits. They required
a certain degree of preparation and led to tangible results. The robust
engagement with the region could also have possibly been the result of
the fact that for the first time since Independence, S. Jaishankar is the first
Foreign Secretary/Foreign Minister to have spent two cycles in Central
and Eastern Europe—in Budapest (1990–1993) and as Ambassador to
Prague (2001–2004).
Central Europe is an important constituency for the reform of the
United Nations Security Council and support of the Indian candidature.
With the Visegrad 4 being members of all four export control regimes,
their support has been crucial to secure membership since decisions in
them are by consensus and a single negative vote can stop any move in
favour of India. While the V4 do not often form a unified bloc or vote
in unision in the EU or other global forums, they can be of interest in
raising India’s profile (Kugiel & Upadhyay, 2018: 138).
In the future, the primary focus will continue to be on economy and
trade. Different Visegrad Group countries will develop their relationships
with India at different speeds, with varying levels of engagement and
commitment, and with different trajectories and results.
1 INTRODUCTION 11
Further Research
For decades, India-Central Europe relations has been an under-researched
and neglected area of research. There are many gaps in existing schol-
arly research. There is a glaring lack of archival research on India-Central
Europe relations. The National Archives of India contain recently declas-
sified MEA documents, which primarily comprise monthly reports from
Indian Embassies, diplomatic cables, transcript of conversations involving
foreign leaders or interlocuters as well as policy memoranda by officials
based in Delhi and overseas embassies. No research has yet been done on
the archives of the Ministry of External Affairs, which have been recently
digitized, but access continues to be problematic. Similarly, archives of
the Central European countries have yet to be fully explored to provide
insights into V4 perceptions and approaches towards India.
Secondly, there is hardly any research on the making of India’s foreign
policy towards Central Europe and vice versa, including the role of various
ministries as well as the dynamics and constraints of inter-ministerial
interaction and coordination.
Thirdly, apart from a few studies of Indian perceptions of Poland
(Kugiel, 2019), there are no meaningful studies of how mainstream
Indian newspapers, electronic media and elites perceive Central Europe
and vice versa.
Fourthly, scholars continue to be seriously hampered by the lack of
primary source material on the subject. A comprehensive documentary
study on India-Central Europe relations would undeniably encourage
further research.
The editor and the contributors hope that this pioneering volume
would foster greater scholarly research of India’s relations with Central
Europe, which has been an orphaned subject for far too long.
References
Bauerova, H. (2018). The V4 and European integration. Politics in Central
Europe, 14(2), 121–139.
Chhabra, R. (2015, March 3). Keynote Address by Joint Secretary (Central
Europe), Ministry of External Affairs, at a seminar on ‘India and Central
Europe’ organized by the Centre for European Studies, School of Interna-
tional Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Damodaran, A. K. (2000). Beyond autonomy, India’s foreign policy. Somaiya
Publications.
India, MEA. (2020a). Annual report 2019–2020. New Delhi.
12 R. K. JAIN
India, MEA. (2020b, September 28). Joint statement for India-Denmark green
strategic partnership. Retrieved 12 May 2021 from https://mea.gov.in/bilate
ral-documents.htm?dtl/33069/joint+statement+for+indiadenmark+green+str
ategic+partnership.
India, MEA. (2021). Annual report 2020–2021. New Delhi.
Jaishankar, S. (2020, November 5). Remarks by foreign Minister at the India-
Nordic-Baltic CII Enclave. Retrieved 12 May 2021 from https://mea.gov.
in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33165/eams+remarks+at+the+india++nor
dic++baltic+cii+conclave.
Kugiel, P. (2019). Indian perceptions of Poland. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Changing
Indian images of the European Union: Perception and misperception (pp. 151–
154). Palgrave Macmillan.
Kugiel, P., & Upadhyay, D. K. (2018). India and Central Europe: Post-cold war
engagement. International Studies, 54(1–4), 127–143.
Sibal, K. (2019). India and the European Union: Perceptions and mispercep-
tions. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Changing Indian images of the European Union:
Perception and misperception (pp. 61–78). Palgrave Macmillan.
CHAPTER 2
Cold War eruptions in the decades to come (Nayudu, 2019). But the
aftermath of the Hungarian uprising did make Nehru more sceptical of
the Soviet Union.
involved in the promotion of trade with India (Tatke, 2017). The collapse
of the Soviet bloc wiped out the rupee-rouble payments system and took
the entire state-driven economic relationship between India and Central
Europe with it.
‘Prime Minister Rao realised that the road to Washington DC ran through
Tel Aviv’, writes his biographer (Sitapati, 2015). Israeli diplomats say he
was also interested in Israel as an alternative source of weapons as Russia
slipped into disarray.1 Central Europe was simply not part of this world-
view. India was quick to recognize the newly democratized regimes of
the Central European countries but had no vision beyond this. Rao even
visited two Central Asian countries en route to Russia for a state visit
to kick-off a new era of relations with these ex-Soviet republics but gave
Moscow’s European satellite countries a miss.
Central Europe, for its part, was in the throes of its own economic
restructuring as it sought to purge itself of Soviet era planning and state
dominance. Most of the former Soviet satellites were completely focussed
on bringing their economies, security arrangements and political systems
in line with the standards set by the EU under the Charter of Paris for a
New Europe, membership in the Organization of Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe and the requirements for adopting the Euro (European
Commission, 2014). India and much of the world barely registered in
all this. The economic restructuring that many of these countries had to
undergo—the term ‘shock therapy’ was used to describe some of the more
drastic versions—was far more painful than the dislocation India endured
from its own economic reforms (see Blanchard, 1991). The collapse
of Yugoslavia and the ethnic wars that followed were another distrac-
tion. Much of the Central European membership, including many of the
spinoff nations born out of the former Yugoslavia, left the Nonaligned
Movement to join NATO. It says something about how distracted India
was that this barely registered.
Normal diplomatic relations began to be restored from about 1992
onwards. Indian diplomats who served or dealt with Central Europe
say there was minimal ill-will over New Delhi’s support for Moscow. It
was largely understood India had been a marginal player in that part of
the world. When Lech Walesa, leader of the Solidarity movement which
helped overthrow Poland’s communist regime, came to India in 1994 on
a five-day presidential visit he bluntly asked the then Minister of State
for External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh, ‘Tell me where was India all these
10 years?’ Singh responded by saying, ‘I want to talk to you about the
future, not the past’. Singh admitted India no longer had any contacts in
1 Private conversation with senior Israeli diplomat, New Delhi, December 2006.
2 INDIA AND CENTRAL EUROPE: FROM THE MARGINS … 19
the region and had been caught unawares by what happened (Rasgotra,
1998: 154). However, Walesa made it a point to visit Jodhpur to see
the palace murals in Umaid Bhavan painted by Stefan Norblin, a Polish
artist who fled to India during the Second World War and stayed there
for a number of years rather than live under Stalinist rule (Marek, 2017;
Hamilton, 2019).
Similar acts of support by individual Indians are still remembered.
For example, M. N. Rahman, the Indian Charge d’Affaires during the
Hungarian uprising took the initiative to intervene with Moscow to save
the life of one of the participants of the uprising, the intellectual Arpad
Goncz. Goncz was imprisoned for six years, but survived and later served
as Hungary’s president from 1990 to 2000. Goncz later expressed the
view he was saved by India’s diplomatic intervention and made it a point
to have a delegation to India personally meet Rahman, by then retired
(Mohan, 2013). Similarly, H. P. Singh, a second secretary at the Indian
Embassy in Prague resigned in protest against the weakness of Indira
Gandhi’s response to the Soviet repression and achieved minor folk hero
status.2
2 Interview with Ronen Sen, former Indian ambassador to Russia and the United States,
who happened to be in Prague during the crisis, New Delhi, 2 August 2020.
20 P. PAL CHAUDHURI
Lodz in 2007. By the time it celebrated its first decade in Poland, Infosys
had 2,700 employees and was being praised by Lodz business leaders for
having established their city’s reputation as a centre for business services
(infosysbm.com, 2017). The two firms served as trailblazers for the third
and most recent phase in India’s relationship with Central Europe, one
that revolves around investment.
In the decade before the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subse-
quent global financial crisis, there was a surge in Indian overseas corporate
investment. Indian firms, buoyed by double-digit growth at home and
hefty profits, began expanding overseas. The EU, India’s single largest
trading partner, was an obvious point of interest. Indian manufacturing
industries and information technology service companies, looking to
invest in countries that gave them access to the EU market but also
offered low taxes and low labour costs, began looking at Central Europe
(Pradhan, 2008).
The Czech Republic was the largest investment hub for India in
Central Europe, in part because of corporate relationships that went back
to the communist era and when Czechoslovakia existed. One well-known
Czech firm, the shoe firm Bata, has had a commercial presence in India
since the British Raj. Czech strength in machinery, engineering and auto-
mobile components and its close integration with German industry have
been major attractions for Indian firms. Indian investment to the Czech
Republic largely reflect this competitive edge and now include a number
of major Indian heavy industrial manufacturers. Today, Indian firms like
Motherson Sumi Systems, Lloyd Electric and Engineering, and Ashok
Leyland have plants there. Indian FDI totalled $4.1 billion in 2017, up
from $1.67 billion in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2020; India, Embassy in Czech
Republic, 2020).
In Poland, thanks perhaps to Infosys’s success there, has seen a more
diversified portfolio of investment with a substantial portion in the
service sector including other IT service firms like Wipro. In manufac-
turing, Indian investment includes firms like Videocon, Escorts, Strides
Arcolab, Reliance Industries, Essel Propack, Zensar Technologies and
Berger Paints. Indian FDI into Poland is in the region of $3 billion (India,
Embassy in Poland, 2020a).
The second chapter in the investment story was the spread of Indian
firms into Hungary, Slovakia and to a lesser extent Romania, Bulgaria
and Croatia. Hungary has been a remarkable investment story for Indian
firms with Indian FDI rising from $9 million in 2012 to $1.5 billion in
2 INDIA AND CENTRAL EUROPE: FROM THE MARGINS … 21
2018. In 2014, India was the largest greenfield investor in the country.
Hungary has seen the entry of a large number of Indian IT service compa-
nies and specialized industrial acquisitions by Indian firms. Indian IT firms
who have set up in Hungary include Tata Consultancy Services (TCS),
Tech Mahindra, Genpact and Cognizant. The industrial investors include
Crompton Greaves, Apollo Tyres, SRF and Bakony Wipers. There have
been other, smaller stories of success including Indian small-scale agri-
cultural investments in Bulgaria and two-way pharmaceutical investments
with Croatia (India, Embassy in Hungary, 2020; Business Standard, 2019;
India, Embassy in Slovakia, 2020).
One set of Indian firms that have developed a footprint throughout
Central Europe were the pharmaceutical companies, many of which had
a presence dating back to the Soviet era. All of the major Central
European countries have Indian pharmaceutical investments with Sun
Pharma/Ranbaxy and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals having the largest pres-
ence.
The most recent accelerator for Indian investment has been the Brexit
referendum, the 2016 vote by the British public in favour of having their
country leave the EU. Britain has traditionally been overwhelmingly the
favourite destination of Indian corporate investment to Europe. Before
the Brexit referendum, Indian firms invested more in Britain than they
invested in the rest of Europe combined. This was despite trade relations
between India and Britain being relatively weak. Indian firms used Britain
as their gateway to the rest of the EU, a role threatened by the Brexit vote
and the uncertainty about the future trade relationship between Britain
and the EU. Many new Indian investors began to consider relocating to
the European continent. At the very least, the larger Indian firms began
adopting a ‘Britain plus one’ strategy: even if they retained their offices
or factories in Britain they would set up alternative centres of economic
activity in another EU member-state. The most prominent consequence
has been the decision of Jaguar Land Rover to build its newest factory in
Slovakia, reflecting the country’s emergence as a major automobile manu-
facturing hub. The $1.6 billion factory opened up in Slovakia in 2018. As
it is carried out by the British firm, the investment is tabulated as British
FDI into Slovakia even though Jaguar Land Rover is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Tata Motors (Deutsche Welle, 2019).
There has been some Central European investment in India as well,
albeit on a smaller scale than the flow of investments in the other direc-
tion. Much of this has been by Czech firms, reflecting its advanced
22 P. PAL CHAUDHURI
industrial sector. Skoda Auto and Skoda Power have high brand recog-
nition in India. Vitkovice Machinery Group, ZKL Bearings, Bonatrans
and Tatra are among the other prominent Czech firms that have invested
in India. A variety of Polish firms, representing about $600 million in
investment, operate in India (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020b).
Two decades after the communist era, Central European govern-
ments now see India primarily as a major source of investment and, to
a lesser extent, trade in their countries. The larger more advanced coun-
tries of the region, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia,
have become aggressive about wooing Indian companies and developing
people-to-people exchanges. The largest Indian chambers of commerce
have released studies about the potential of business in Central Europe
(FICCI, 2015; Deloitte-CII, 2014).
Indian students, businessmen and tourists are actively wooed and a
number of airlines now have direct flights between Central Europe and
India. Ambassadors from countries like Poland and Hungary which have
seen the rise of nativist, right-wing governments privately stress that none
of the anti-immigrant sentiment in their countries has ever been directed
against Indians. Some of these countries have also seen a minor resur-
gence in the study of Indian culture and language, an echo of the strong
academic tradition of Indology that has existed in Central Europe for
centuries.
Strategic Era?
Indian foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made a
deliberate attempt to reach out to parts of the world that have tradition-
ally received little attention from the Indian Government. This outreach
has included part of the Indian Ocean littoral region, the Pacific islands,
segments of Africa and the smaller countries of continental Europe. This
reflected the Modi government’s view that India’s interests had reached
the point the country needed to engage beyond the same 20 or so
countries that dominated New Delhi’s worldview.
The Brexit vote and Britain’s imminent departure from the EU has
also led to a re-evaluation of India’s overall European policy. Until the
Brexit vote, India was satisfied in having Britain serve as its primary inter-
locutor in Europe with subsidiary relationships with France and Germany.
London having removed itself from the picture, New Delhi began to
contemplate a European policy in which it maintained several points of
2 INDIA AND CENTRAL EUROPE: FROM THE MARGINS … 23
3 Private conversations with senior Indian diplomats, New Delhi, June 2017.
24 P. PAL CHAUDHURI
References
Blanchard, O. et al. (1991). Reform in Eastern Europe MIT Press.
Business Standard. (2019, 27 August). ANI, Hungary seeks more investments
from India. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.business-standard.
4 Without explicitly invoking non-alignment, Prime Minister Modi had taken an iden-
tical position on the problem of Crimea, an erstwhile Russian-majority province of Ukraine
that broke away and declared its intention to join Russia in early 2014. Modi has said
that India’s effort will be ‘to sit together and talk, and to resolve problems in an ongoing
process’. Indeed, Modi has also referred to nations who ‘want to give advice’ and has
obliquely said, ‘they too have sinned in some way’. The remarkable parallel with 1956
is Nehru’s utter disdain for the West’s censure of Russia because Britain and France had
simultaneously attacked Egypt in what came to be known as the Suez Canal Crisis. In
both cases then, and now again vis-à-vis Crimea, India has made it amply clear that her
position on any issue was rooted in her assessment of the issue, and was independent of
Western or American thinking.
2 INDIA AND CENTRAL EUROPE: FROM THE MARGINS … 25
com/article/news-ani/hungary-seeks-more-investments-from-india-119082
701518_1.html.
Deloitte-CII. (2014, February). Trade and investment relations between
India and Central Europe: A study of opportunities. Retrieved July
20, 2020 from https://www2.deloitte.com/in/en/pages/tax/articles/trade-
and-invest.ment-relations-between-india-and-centraleurope.html.
Deutsche Welle. (2019, 30 April). Jaguar Land Rover Defender assembly moved
from UK to Slovakia. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.dw.com/
en/jaguar-land-rover-defender-assembly-moved-from-uk-to-slovakia/a-485
52552.
Dixit, J. N. (1998). Across borders: Fifty years of India’s foreign policy. Picus
Books.
European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation.
(2014). 25 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain: The State of inte-
gration of East and West in the European Union. European Commission,
2014. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-
sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/east-west_integration.pdfFICCI.
FICCI. (2015). India and Central Europe: Harnessing business complementaries.
October 2015, Retrieved July 20, 2020 from http://ficci.in/spdocument/
20704/India-&-Central-Europe-Harnessing-Business-Complementarities.pdf
Hamilton, B. (2019, January 8). The Maharaja of Jodhpur. The renaissance of
portrait. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from http://basiahamilton.blogspot.com/
2008/10/maharaja-of-jodhpur.html.
India, Embassy in Czech Republic. (2020, July). India-Czech Republic economic
relations. eoiprague.gov.in. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.eoi
prague.gov.in/docs/1594892647India-Czech%20Economic%20Relations%
20(1).pdf.
India, Embassy in Hungary. (2020). India-Hungary relations. eoibu-
dapest.gov.in. Retrieved July 20, 2020 from https://www.eoibudapest.gov.
in/page/india-hungary-relations/.
India, Embassy in Poland. (2020a). Indian Companies in Poland. Retrieved July
20, 2020 from https://www.indianembassywarsaw.gov.in/eoi.php?id=com_
india.
India, Embassy in Poland. (2020b). Polish Investment in India. Retrieved July
20, 2020 from https://www.indianembassywarsaw.gov.in/eoi.php?id=pol_inv
estment.
India, Embassy in Slovakia. (2020). India-Slovakia economic relations. Retrieved
July 20, 2020 from http://www.eoibratislava.gov.in/economic-relations.php.
India, Ministry of External Affairs. (2019, August 29). Joint statement of
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of India and Poland. Retrieved July
20, 2020 https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/31777/joint+sta
tement+of+the+ministers+of+foreign+affairs+of+india+and+poland.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Cotton
Kingdom, volume 2 (of 2)
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.
Language: English
Download Volume 1 at
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/72676.
JOURNEYS AND
EXPLORATIONS
IN
COTTON KINGDOM:
BASED UPON THREE FORMER VOLUMES OF JOURNEYS AND INVESTIGATIONS BY THE SAME
AUTHOR.
BY
IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. II.
NEW YORK:
PUBLISHED BY MASON BROTHERS,
5 and 7 MERCER STREET.
LONDON: SAMPSON LOW, SON & CO., 47 LUDGATE HILL.
1861.
Entered, according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1861, by
MASON BROTHERS,
In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United States for the
Southern
District of New York.
PRINTED BY
C. A. Alvord,
15 Vandewater-st.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
SOUTH-WESTERN LOUISIANA AND EASTERN 1
TEXAS
CHAPTER II.
A TRIP INTO NORTHERN MISSISSIPPI 55
CHAPTER III.
THE INTERIOR COTTON DISTRICTS—CENTRAL 84
MISSISSIPPI, ALABAMA,
ETC.
CHAPTER IV.
THE EXCEPTIONAL LARGE PLANTERS 143
CHAPTER V.
SLAVERY IN ITS PROPERTY ASPECT.—MORAL AND 184
RELIGIOUS
INSTRUCTION OF THE SLAVES, ETC.
CHAPTER VI.
SLAVERY AS A POOR LAW SYSTEM 236
CHAPTER VII.
COTTON SUPPLY AND WHITE LABOUR IN THE 252
COTTON CLIMATE
CHAPTER VIII.
THE CONDITION AND CHARACTER OF THE 272
PRIVILEGED CLASSES
OF THE SOUTH
CHAPTER IX.
THE DANGER OF THE SOUTH 338
APPENDIX (A.)
THE CONDITION OF VIRGINIA.—STATISTICS 364
APPENDIX (B.)
THE SLAVE TRADE IN VIRGINIA 372
APPENDIX (C.)
COST OF LABOUR IN THE BORDER STATES 380
APPENDIX (D.)
STATISTICS OF THE GEORGIA SEABOARD 385
Houston County.—This day’s ride and the next were through a very
poor country, clay or sand soil, bearing short oaks and black-jack.
We passed one small meadow, or prairie, covered with coarse grass.
Deserted plantations appeared again in greater numbers than the
occupied. One farm, near which we stopped, was worked by eight
field hands. The crop had been fifty bales; small, owing to a dry
season. The corn had been exceedingly poor. The hands, we
noticed, came in from the fields after eight o’clock.
The deserted houses, B. said, were built before the date of Texan
Independence. After Annexation the owners had moved on to better
lands in the West. One house he pointed out as having been the
residence of one of a band of pirates who occupied the country thirty
or forty years ago. They had all been gradually killed.
During the day we met two men on horseback, one upon wheels,
and passed one emigrant family. This was all the motion upon the
principal road of the district.
The second day’s camp was a few miles beyond the town of
Crockett, the shire-town of Houston County. Not being able to find
corn for our horses, we returned to the village for it.
We obtained what we wanted for a day’s rest, which we proposed for
Sunday, the following day, and loaded it into our emptied hampers.
We then looked about the town for current provisions for ourselves.
We were rejoiced to find a German baker, but damped by finding he
had only molasses-cakes and candies for sale. There was no flour in
the town, except the little of which he made his cakes. He was from
Hamburgh, and though he found a tolerable sale, to emigrants
principally, he was very tired of Crockett, and intended to move to
San Antonio among his countrymen. He offered us coffee, and said
he had had beer, but on Christmas-day a mass of people called on
him; he had “treated” them all, and they had finished his supply.
We inquired at seven stores, and at the two inns for butter, flour, or
wheat-bread, and fresh meat. There was none in town. One
innkeeper offered us salt beef, the only meat, except pork, in town.
At the stores we found crackers, worth in New York 6 cents a pound,
sold here at 20 cents; poor raisins, 30 cents; Manilla rope, half-inch,
30 cents a pound. When butter was to be had it came in firkins from
New York, although an excellent grazing country is near the town.