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Philosophical
Perspectives
on Suicide
Kant, Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein
Paolo Stellino
Philosophical Perspectives on Suicide
Paolo Stellino
Philosophical
Perspectives on
Suicide
Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche,
and Wittgenstein
Paolo Stellino
Nova Institute of Philosophy
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
LISBOA, Portugal
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
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The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface
According to Baruch Spinoza, “a free person thinks about death less than
anything, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life”
(Ethics, IV, 67). Writing a book on the philosophy of suicide does not
necessarily mean to meditate on death. This is what I tried to explain—
often with no success—to all those friends and colleagues that in recent
years kept asking me why I had chosen to work on such a gloomy subject.
Of course, I could have reminded them of Camus’ well-known opening
words of The Myth of Sisyphus: “There is but one truly serious philosophi-
cal problem and that is suicide.” But the fact is that whereas I am not
persuaded by Camus’ claim, I am truly convinced that meditating on
suicide means, to a great extent, meditating on fundamental questions
that directly concern life, not death. Among others, these questions are:
How do we conceive our obligations to society, friends, and family?
Which is the set of moral values according to which we choose to orien-
tate our life? Which is the value that we give to our autonomy and free-
dom? Is this value non-negotiable? And how do we conceive dignity? Is it
a “property” that, in specific situations, can be undermined or
deteriorated?
I began to take interest in these questions almost fifteen years ago
when, almost accidentally, I attended a session of the seminar of the
Bioethics Research Group of the University of Valencia. At the time, I
was still a PhD student and the subject of my dissertation (on Nietzsche
v
vi Preface
LisbonPaolo Stellino
23 April 2020
Acknowledgements
I owe a great debt to the following friends and colleagues who read single
chapters of this book and provided me with extremely valuable feedback:
Roberta Pasquarè and Lorena Cebolla Sanahuja (chapter on Kant),
Christopher Janaway and Vilmar Debona (chapter on Schopenhauer),
Marta Faustino and Maria Cristina Fornari (chapter on Nietzsche), and
Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte and Modesto Gómez Alonso (chapter on
Wittgenstein). I am also most grateful to the anonymous reviewer for
providing very useful critical and constructive comments on the entire
manuscript.
I would like to thank Brendan George and Lauriane Piette, from
Palgrave Macmillan, and Charanya Manoharan, from Springer, for their
help and support. I would also like to thank João Constâncio for kindly
supporting my work since the first day I arrived in Lisbon. I should also
mention that this book would not have been possible without the sup-
port of the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT).
A part of this book was written during my stay in Montpellier. I would
like to thank Pascal Nouvel for welcoming me at the Centre d’Éthique
Contemporaine. A special thought goes to Nadia El Eter and Guillaume
Bagnolini, who shared with me the daily routine at the Centre.
A word of gratitude goes to all the friends who, inside and outside
academia, near and far, have accompanied me during this journey. I can-
not help mentioning Maria Cristina Fornari, Luca Lupo, and Pietro
vii
viii Acknowledgements
Gori. In particular, I shared with Pietro all the ups and downs of the
academic life as well as the experience of building a new life in a new
country with our respective families.
Finally, I am deeply thankful to my family for their constant support,
and to Audrey for her love and for sharing her life with me (despite the
fact that I am a philosopher). E lucevan le stelle…
Contents
ix
x Contents
Index243
About the author
xi
Abbreviations
Kant
References to Kant’s writings are cited according to the volume and page
number of the Academy Edition (Kants gesammelte Schriften).
A Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
CPR Critique of Pure Reason [1781 cited as A/1787 cited as B]
CPrR Critique of Practical Reason
LE Lectures on Ethics
G Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
MM The Metaphysics of Morals
NF Notes and Fragments
R Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
Schopenhauer
References to Schopenhauer’s writings are cited according to the follow-
ing abbreviations and the page number of the editions listed in the
bibliography.
xiii
xiv Abbreviations
Nietzsche
References to Nietzsche’s works are cited by abbreviation, chapter (when
applicable) and section number. For the sake of brevity, the chapter might
be identified only by a key word (for instance, Clever instead of Why I Am
so Clever). Nietzsche’s posthumous fragments are cited by year, group,
and fragment number according to the standard Colli and Montinari
edition. Nietzsche’s letters are quoted using the symbol # plus the stan-
dard reference number of the letter.
A The Anti-Christ
BGE Beyond Good and Evil
BT The Birth of Tragedy
EH Ecce Homo
GM On the Genealogy of Morality
GS The Gay Science
HH Human, All Too Human
HL On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life
L Letters
NW Nietzsche contra Wagner
PF Posthumous Fragments
SE Schopenhauer as Educator
TI Twilight of the Idols
WS The Wanderer and His Shadow
Z Thus Spoke Zarathustra
Wittgenstein
Quotes from the Tractatus are cited by reference to the number of the
section. Quotes from the Notebooks and the Geheime Tagebücher are cited
by reference to the day of the entry.
In Ancient Greece death was seen as an exit door that led “from here to
yonder”, as Socrates puts in Plato’s Phaedo (117c/Plato 1997), that is,
from life on earth to the afterlife. One of the key philosophical questions
concerning death was whether man had the right to open the door. In an
earlier passage from the same dialogue, Socrates explains to Cebes that
“we men are in a kind of prison, and that one must not free oneself or run
away” (Phaedo, 62b)—at least, not “before a god has indicated some
necessity to do so” (Phaedo, 62c). Some centuries afterwards Epictetus,
the Stoic philosopher, expressed a different opinion. Life should be pre-
served as long as it is beneficial, but if it becomes unbearable, one can give
it up. As he writes in a well-known passage from the Discourses, “[h]as
some one made a smoke in the house? If he has made a moderate amount
of smoke I shall stay; if too much, I go outside. For one ought to remem-
ber and hold fast to this, that the door stands open” (Discourses I, XXV,
18/Epictetus 1956).
Since antiquity, the arguments put forward by philosophers have
become more solid and sophisticated. Nevertheless, the main question to
be answered remains the same: do we have a right to voluntarily put an
end to our life? This question can be essentially declined in two different,
but strictly related, questions: (1) is suicide morally permitted? and (2)
can suicide be considered (at least in certain situations) a rational act? An
analytic approach to this question is typical of recent, contemporary phi-
losophy of suicide, which is now treated as an independent branch of
philosophy. With few exceptions (like St. Thomas Aquinas and Hume),
past philosophers have considered the question of the morality and/or
rationality of suicide in a rather fragmentary way, so that their arguments
in favour or against suicide, often to be found in detached passages of
different works, must be pieced together in order to get a general view. As
will be shown, this is precisely the case with the four philosophers consid-
ered in this book.
Nowadays, there are several valuable studies that offer an overview of
the several philosophical (and religious) arguments that can be put for-
ward in support or against one’s right to commit suicide. The works of
Cosculluela (1995), Battin (1996), Wittwer (2003), and Cholbi (2011)
are good examples of this. The scope of these studies is often introduc-
tory. This means that, in presenting the several arguments pro and con
they gain in comprehensiveness, but inevitably lack in depth.1 The aim of
this book is to address some of the same questions that these studies
address. To this end, however, a different approach is followed. Attention
is focused on four modern perspectives, which can be considered as rep-
resenting or illustrating four different views of suicide. Putting forward
seven different arguments against suicide and defending a strict prohibi-
tion of this act, Kant is a representative of the anti-libertarian view.
Schopenhauer also essentially opposes suicide, but he does it as a conse-
quence of his metaphysical view of the world, which is thoroughly pes-
simistic. His stance exemplarily shows that a pessimistic worldview does
not necessarily go hand in hand with a pro-attitude towards suicide.
Contrary to Kant, Nietzsche is rather favourable to voluntary death, at
least in certain specific situations. His stance, reminiscent of the Stoics’,
can be thus considered as representative of the libertarian view. Finally,
Wittgenstein considers suicide from the standpoint of his mystical–reli-
gious worldview, conceiving it as the elementary sin. Addressing these
1
Due to its length, Wittwer’s study combines, to a certain extent, comprehensiveness and depth.
1 Introduction: Bringing Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche… 3
References
Battin, M. P. (1996). The Death Debate. Ethical Issues in Suicide. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Birnbacher, D. (1985). “Schopenhauer und das ethische Problem des
Selbstmords”, Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 66: 115–129.
Cholbi, M. J. (2011). Suicide. The Philosophical Dimension. Peterborough, ON:
Broadview Press.
Cosculluela, V. (1995). The Ethics of Suicide. New York/London: Garland
Publishing.
Epictetus. (1956). The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and
Fragments (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London:
Heinemann (Loeb Classical Library).
Fox, M. (1980). “Schopenhauer on Death, Suicide and Self-Renunciation”, in:
id. (ed.), Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement. Brighton:
Harvester Press.
Gómez Alonso, M. (2018). “Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer and the Metaphysics
of Suicide”, Revista de Filosofia Aurora, 30 (49): 299–321.
Jacquette, D. (1999). “Schopenhauer on Death”, in: C. Janaway (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 293–317.
10 P. Stellino
1
See Cosculluela (1995: 39), James (1999), Cholbi (2000, 2010, 2015), Brassington (2006),
Cooley (2006, 2007a, 2013, 2015), Rhodes (2007), and Harter (2011). See also Gregor (1963:
led Michael Cholbi (2015: 607) to claim that, “thanks to recent scholar-
ship, Kant is no longer seen as the dogmatic opponent of suicide that he
appears to be at first glance.” Scholars have argued that, in certain situa-
tions, Kant’s moral philosophy can be read as justifying not only a right
but even a duty to suicide. Dennis R. Cooley (2007a, 2007b, and 2015),
for instance, defends a Kantian moral duty for the soon-to-be demented
to commit suicide. Other scholars focus attention on the casuistical ques-
tions presented in the Metaphysics of Morals (MM, 6: 423f.), arguing that
some of them seem to permit suicide.2
One may wonder why, if Kant thought that in some occasions suicide
could be permitted or even be considered as obligatory, he is reported to
have said that suicide is not permitted “under any condition” (LE, Collins
27/1997: 372) and “under any circumstances” (LE, Vigilantius 27: 603).
That Kant was unsympathetic to suicide is also shown by his cold and
almost indifferent reply to Maria von Herbert, an Austrian woman and a
student of his philosophy who, on the verge of suicide, wrote to him ask-
ing for his help and advice. Von Herbert was desperate because of a
heartbreak and sought comfort in Kant’s philosophy but could not find
it. As a result, in August 1791 she wrote to Kant asking for help, for com-
fort or for counsel to prepare her for death. Kant answered in spring 1792
but was unable to relieve the young woman’s grief. Von Herbert wrote
again in January 1793 but Kant never replied. Eventually, the woman
took her life in 1803.3
To this, one must add that Kant’s views of suicide are very derogatory.
In the Lectures on Ethics, suicide is described as “the most abominable of
the crimes that inspire horror and hatred [das abscheulichste Laster des
Grausens und des Haßens]” (LE, Collins 27: 347) and as “the most dread-
ful thing [das schrecklichste] that a man can do to himself ” (LE, Collins
27: 391). By committing it, the human being “puts himself below the
135–136) and Battin (1996: 108–112). On the other hand, for a reading of Kant as opposing
suicide in all circumstances, see de Vleeschauwer (1966), Brandt (1975), Wittwer (2001), Unna
(2003), and Schüssler (2012). Hill (1991: 85) ascribes to Kant a “rigoristic opposition to suicide.”
He nonetheless finds Kant’s position untenable and claims that “the spirit of his idea of humanity
as an end in itself […] leads to a more tenable position.”
2
See, particularly, James (1999).
3
On this, see Langton (1992).
2 Immanuel Kant: The Moral Duty of Self-Preservation 13
beast” (LE, Collins 27: 372) and “makes himself into a monster” (A, 7:
259). How can these categorical and harsh claims be reconciled with the
reading according to which “Kant does implicitly and explicitly allow
exceptions to the general rule” (Cooley 2007a: 38)?
In reality, some of the interpretations that defend the view according
to which Kant would have allowed exceptions to his categorical prohibi-
tion of suicide are based on misunderstandings deriving either from
incomplete information or from a lack of philological accuracy. Kant’s
consideration of Cato’s suicide is, in this sense, paradigmatic.4 In the
Lectures on Ethics, Kant introduces Cato’s suicide by claiming that “sui-
cide can also come to have a plausible aspect [scheinbare Seite], whenever,
that is, the continuance of life rests upon such circumstances as may
deprive that life of its value; when a man can no longer live in accordance
with virtue and prudence, and must therefore put an end to his life from
honourable motives” (LE, Collins 27: 370). Cato had only two options
available to him: either to fall into Caesar’s hands—something which he
considered dishonourable—or to take his life and preserve his honour. As
Kant puts it, “he viewed his death as a necessity; his thought was: Since
you can no longer live as Cato, you cannot go on living at all” (LE,
Collins 27: 370f.).
According to Kant, Cato’s suicide constitutes “the one example [das
einzige Beyspiel] that has given the world an opportunity of defending
suicide” (LE, Collins 27: 371). Scholars often refer to this passage to
show that Kant’s attitude towards suicide is not as dogmatic as it prima
facie appears to be.5 Surprisingly, the same scholars have failed to remark
that later in the same lecture Kant again discusses Cato’s suicide. If on the
one hand Kant claims that Cato’s suicide was a mark of heroism and
courage, he also adds, on the other, that “if Cato, under all the tortures
that Caesar might have inflicted on him, had still adhered to his resolve
with steadfast mind, that would have been noble; but not when he laid
hands upon himself. Those who defend and teach the legitimacy of
4
Cato the Younger or “Uticensis” (95–46 BC) was a Roman statesman and Stoic, known for his
moral integrity. He was one of the defeated of the Great Roman Civil War (49–45 BC). Unwilling
to live in a world governed by Caesar, whom he considered a tyrant, Cato decided to commit sui-
cide, thus becoming a symbol of virtue.
5
See Battin (2006: 107), Cooley (2006: 333, 336; 2007a: 38; 2013: 367), and Harter (2011).
14 P. Stellino
6
On this, see Seidler (1983 : 446).
7
The first three questions refer to the following historical figures: Curtius (hurling oneself to certain
death to save one’s country), Seneca (killing oneself to preserve one’s honour), and Frederick the
Great (carrying lethal poison in war to be able to commit suicide rather than be captured and
forced to agree to conditions that would prove harmful to the state). The fourth question is about
a man bitten by a mad dog, who prefers to take his life rather than cause harm to others. The fifth
and final question concerns the moral permissibility of smallpox inoculation, which at that time
could cause death.
8
See also Schüssler (2012: 77–81).
2 Immanuel Kant: The Moral Duty of Self-Preservation 15
the man bitten by the rabid dog (MM, 6: 423f.) not only morally permis-
sible but also morally obligatory.9 This cannot be the case, for as Unna
(2003: 461f.) rightly points out, Kant dismisses this possibility in a pas-
sage from the Lectures on Ethics.10 It is, therefore, not true that “Kant the
casuist was more conciliatory than Kant the doctrinarian”11 (De
Vleeschauwer 1966: 254) nor that “many ‘casuistical questions’ remain”12
(Cholbi 2000: 172).
As this brief analysis shows, there has been some misunderstanding on
Kant’s attitude towards suicide in past years due to partial reading of
Kant’s writings, lectures, and Nachlaß, incomplete information on exist-
ing bibliography, and lack of philological accuracy in reading the texts,
among other factors. Needless to say, this does not mean that all studies
that aim to refute Kant’s alleged rigorism are based on false premises or
lack philological accuracy. On the contrary, there exist plausible interpre-
tations that point to concrete difficulties in Kant’s view of suicide. One of
these difficulties particularly concerns the fact that some of the examples
chosen by Kant to strengthen his argumentation are in reality ad hoc
examples. Another problem concerning Kant’s stance on suicide is linked
to the intricate relation between suicide and concepts such as dignity and
9
See Cooley (2006: 333; 2007a: 38–39; 2013: 367; 2015: 284). In his reply to Cooley’s paper
(2007a) on a Kantian moral duty for the soon-to-be demented to commit suicide, Stephen
R. Latham (2007: 50) draws the attention to Unna’s paper. Apparently, this reference has gone
unobserved by Cooley.
10
See LE, Vigilantius 27: 603: “To destroy oneself, therefore, through an act voluntarily under-
taken by the sensory being, can never be permitted, so that a suicide (autocheiria) can never, under
any circumstances, be regarded as allowable. Suppose, if you will, such cases as that of a slave, for
example, who should lose his life in consequence of an attempted but abortive bid for freedom; or
that one bitten by a mad dog should feel quite plainly the effects of madness; can either of them
take his own life? The first considers a life of slavery to be no such life as is suited to humanity; the
second foresees his own death, and the possibility, likewise, of harming others through his urge to
bite. Nevertheless, they both frustrate all attempts whereby they might be freed from their unhappy
condition and are preserved from harm, e.g., by having themselves tied up at the appropriate time;
quite recently a remedy for the mad dog’s bite has been found, in administering oil to the victim
internally, and trying to anoint him completely on the outside.”
11
As a general rule, I have personally translated all citations in languages other than English.
12
I acknowledge my mistake in Stellino (2015: 98, n. 48; due to an unfortunate misunderstanding
with the publisher, this article was not published in its final and revised version). According to
Schmidt and Schönecker (2017: 164–165), “The crucial point of [Kant’s] casuistry is not the ques-
tion whether there are exceptions to the rule, that is, whether suicide ‘in specific cases’ can be per-
mitted, but rather whether concrete cases of self-disembodiment [Selbstentleibung] entail self-murder
[Selbstmord].”
16 P. Stellino
13
See G, 4: 421–422, 429; CPrR, 5: 44; MM, 6: 422–424; LE, 27: 190–192, 208–210, 342–347,
369–378, 601–603, 627–630; NF 6801, 19: 165–166. See also § 77 of the Anthropology from a
Pragmatic Point of View (7: 258–259).
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