G.R. No. L-64037 August 27, 1987 The decision became final and executory.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SORSOGON, petitioner, Shortly afterwards, the petitioner manifested its willingness to pay to the private
vs. respondents the value of the subject parcels of land as mandated in the court's decision.
ROSA E. VDA. DE VILLAROYA, et. al., GODOFREDO VILLAROYA, et al., AURORA On September 13, 1974, the Provincial Board of Sorsogon enacted Resolution No. 340
VILLAROYA, et. al., and NICOLAS GALING, Presiding Judge of the Court of First appropriating the amount of P49,500.00 for the payment of the subject parcel of land. (p.
Instance, Branches II & III, of the Province of Sorsogon (Now the Regional Trial Court 44, Rollo)
No. 54 and 52, respectively), respondents.
In turn, the writs of execution issued by the lower court ordered the petitioner to pay
P49,500.00 to the private respondents. However, the writ of execution issued on July 27,
1975 and the alias writ of execution issued on November 24, 1975 were returned
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: unsatisfied.

The main issue in this petition centers on the manner of execution of the final judgment of The delay in the payment was caused by the requirements prescribed by the Provincial
the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 50 for recovery of real Auditor before payment could be effected. The private respondents questioned the
property . requirements prompting the Provincial Auditor to refer the matter to the Acting Chairman of
the Commission on Audit (COA).
The subject matter of Civil Case No. 50 was a 16,500 square meter lot occupied by the
Gubat High School and developed as its athletic ground. In a lst indorsement dated October 14, 1975, the Acting Chairman of COA through Raul C.
Ferrer, Assistant Manager, Local Government Audit Office wrote the Provincial Auditor
stating that the following requirements should be complied with:
On March 28, 1974, the lower court promulgated a decision in the recovery of real property
case in favor of the plaintiffs and intervenors, the private respondents herein, and against
the defendant, the petitioner herein. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: 1. Submission of competent documentation to show ownership of the
properties including the covering tax declarations of the same issued in
the name of the vendors;
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment: (a) declaring the
plaintiffs and the two sets of intervenors, the owners of the land in litigation
indicated in the sketch plan (Exhibits "A" and "A-I" ); (b) ordering the 2. Submission of evidence that taxes on the properties have been fully
Province of Sorsogon to pay to the plaintiffs and intervenors the sum of paid or that the properties are free from any lien or encumbrance;
Forty- Nine Thousand Five Hundred P49,500.00) Pesos representing the
value of the land at P3.30 per square meter, within one (1) year from 3. Submission of the corresponding Deed of Sale of subject properties in
receipt of this Decision, or in alternative, if the said defendant fails to pay, favor of the Province of Sorsogon executed by the claimants as basis for
the plaintiffs and intervenors within the period granted, then the defendant payment thereof;
Province of Sorsogon is hereby ordered to vacate the land in litigation and
deliver the same to the plaintiffs and intervenors; (c) ordering the plaintiffs 4. Submission of the corresponding sketch plan of the portions, being
and intervenors to execute a conveyance in favor of the defendant sold, which should be attached to and made an integral part of the Deed
Province of Sorsogon over the land in litigation upon payment of the value of Sale;
of the land; (d) ordering a division of the amount of P49,500.00
representing the value of the land on a two-to-one (2 to 1) basis, or two
shares each for the acknowledged natural children, or if the defendant 5. Submission of a copy of the Provincial Board resolution appropriating
the amount of P49,500.00 for payment of the land; and
shall fail to pay to the plaintiffs and intervenors the amount representing
the value of the land on the same ratio of two-to-one (2 to 1), and each
heir entitled to take possession of his/her share - should the heirs so 6. Submission of the certificate as to the availability of funds to cover the
desire. they may avail of the services of a surveyor for purposes of an total consideration. (Rollo, p. 137).
accurate partition of the land on a proportionate sharing of the survey
expenses; and (e) dismissing the complaint as to the defendant In an order dated August 24, 1977, the lower court through then Presiding Judge Aquilino
Municipality of Gubat. With costs against the defendant Province of Bonto ordered the private respondents to comply with the requirements set up by the COA.
Sorsogon. (Rollo p. 2) The lower court stated that the requirements were made purely in consonance with auditing
rules and regulations and were not a whim or caprice designed to cause a protracted delay
in the actual payment. Moreover, the lower court stated that the requirements were not This was the last straw. The private respondents (plaintiffs) in the belief that the petitioner
beyond compliance considering that some of the required documents were available in the was not serious in paying for the parcel of land it had acquired, took possession of some
records of the case. portions of the land, using the decision as basis for their action.

Notwithstanding the private respondents' compliance with the stated requirements, no When the petitioner tried to disturb the respondents' possession of the land they had re-
payment was effected by the petitioner. entered, the latter, on July 15, 1982, filed a "MOTION TO RESTRAIN INTERFERENCE BY
DEFENDANTS WITH POSSESSION OF PLAINTIFFS" before the lower court.
Instead, in a 2nd Indorsement dated January 15, 1980 the COA imposed additional
requirements to wit: In their Comment to the Motion, the private respondents-intervenors manifested that the
status quo in this case should be observed, namely, that the parcel of land remains in the
RE: Three (3) Deeds of Quitclaim and Conveyance of Real Property possession of the petitioner but conditioned on the payment by the petitioner of the value of
executed by Rosita, Rosa and Clemente, all surnamed Villaroya the land; provided however, that in the event that the petitioner fails to pay, the definite
respectively, in favor of the Province of Sorsogon. shares in the property of each heir should first be determined before the possession is
delivered to the plaintiffs and intervenors.
2nd Indorsement
The petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion and at the same time filed a "Motion to
Order the plaintiffs to file their claim with the office of the Provincial Auditor."
January 15,1980
In an Order dated October 7, 1982, the lower court through Presiding Judge Nicolas Galing
Respectfully returned to the Regional Director, COA Regional Office No. granted the private respondents' Motion. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
V, Legaspi City, requesting that the following requirement be caused to be
complied with:
WHEREFORE, the defendants are hereby restrained from interfering with
the possession of the property in question by the plaintiffs and the
1. Consolidation of the herein three (3) Deeds of Quitclaim and
intervenors who are hereby required to cause a partition thereof on a two-
Conveyance by all the claimants into one (1) agreement in order to
to-one basis as stated in the decision. (Rollo, p. 69).
facilitate processing thereof and for reasons of economy; and
The petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the lower court to act on the motion to restrain
2. Submission of a certificate of availability of funds, duly verified by the
filed by the private respondents. It cites two grounds: (1) by virtue of the finality of judgment,
Auditor concerned, indicating the particular source and nature of the funds
the lower court no longer had jurisdiction to rule on said motion; and (2) the decision having
to be used in the within transaction. (Rollo, P. 119) became final in 1974 and not having been enforced for almost eight (8) years due to the
fault of the private respondents, it had already become dormant; hence it can no longer be
Upon representations of the Provincial Auditor and the COA Regional Director, the enforced by a mere motion but requires an independent action pursuant to section 6, in
requirement regarding the consolidation of quitclaim was abandoned by the COA. The COA Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.'
Regional Director, in a 3rd Indorsement dated October 28, 1980 forwarded the required
certificate of availability of funds duly verified by the Provincial Auditor. These arguments are not well-taken.

Despite all these efforts, the private respondents waited in vain for the payment of the At the time the private respondents filed the questioned motion, the judgment in Civil Case
subject parcels of land. No. 50 was yet to be executed. In fact, the motion entitled "A MOTION TO RESTRAIN
INTERFERENCE BY DEFENDANTS WITH POSSESSION OF PLAINTIFFS" was precisely
In a 5th Indorsement dated November 5, 1980, the COA Director informed the Provincial intended to enforce the judgment. Hence. the lower court at this stage of the proceedings
Auditor, of a 4th Indorsement dated October 30, 1980 from the COA General Counsel was not divested of its jurisdiction over the case. In the case of Cabrias v. Adil (135 SCRA
"Allowing payment thereof, subject to the availability of funds and the usual audit, provided 354) we ruled:
that the Deed of Conveyance and the affidavit of quitclaim are registered with the Register
of Deeds and that steps are taken to have the corresponding title issued in the name of the ... every court having jurisdiction to render a particular judgment has
Municipality free from all liens and encumbrances." (p.122, Rollo, Emphasis supplied) inherent power and authority to enforce it, and to exercise equitable
control over such enforcement. The court has authority to inquire whether
The last requirement was an additional and a new requirement imposed on the private its judgment has been executed, and will remove obstructions to the
respondents. enforcement thereof. Such authority extends not only " to such orders and
 such writs as may be necessary to carry out the judgment into effect and In computing the time limited for suing out an execution, although there is
render it binding and operative, but also to -such orders as may be authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be
necessary to prevent an improper enforcement of the judgment. If a included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the
judgment is sought to be perverted and made the medium of parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ
consummating a wrong the court on proper application can prevent it, (31 of error so as to operate as a supersedeas by the death of a party, or
Am. Jur., Judgments, Sec. 882, pp. 363-364). otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend
the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. (at pp.
In the eight (8) years that elapsed from the time the judgment became final until the filing of 227-228).
the restraining motion by the private respondents, the judgment never became dormant.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not apply. We have outlined in detail We, however, agree with the petitioner that the procedure undertaken by the private
the incidents which transpired from the issuance of the writ of execution to the filing by the respondents (plaintiffs) in executing the judgment which was condoned by the lower court is
private respondents of the restraining motion with the lower court. The records indicate that not sanctioned by law.
the delay in the execution of the judgment, more specifically, in the payment of the land by
the petitioner to the private respondents was due to the piecemeal requirements imposed When, on the basis of successive new requirements imposed on them, the private
by the COA as condition for effecting payment. respondents "lost hope" that the petitioner would ever pay them, they should have filed a
motion to declare the petitioner in default of payment and asked for an alias writ of
When the alias writ of execution was returned, the accompanying report stated that the execution for the enforcement of the other alternative found in the judgment. The decision
parties had chosen to await the opinion of the COA in connection with the additional states that after the failure of the petitioner to pay within one (1) year from receipt of the
requirements questioned is the private respondents. In fact, in the return of service of the decision, the petitioner is ordered to vacate the land in litigation and deliver the same to the
writ of execution, the Deputy, Sheriff reported that on two occasions in the Office of the plaintiffs and intervenors after which the subject land would be partitioned among them on
Provincial Auditor, the latter in the presence of a board member and the board secretary the ratio of 2 to 1.
verbally told him to await the opinion of the COA. This controversy, reached the court. Upon
order of the court, the private respondents complied with the requirements imposed by the Another option which the private respondents could have taken when the COA issued
COA. However, after complying with these requirements, more requirements were imposed another new requirement to take steps in titling the subject parcel of land in the name of the
anew by the COA. This necessarily prolonged the already delayed payment by the petitioner was to file a motion to declare such requirement unreasonable. It must be noted
petitioner. All these delays transpired between November 24, 1975, when the alias writ of that the judgment only ordered the respondents to execute a conveyance in favor of the
execution was issued, until 1980 when the COA through the Provincial Auditor imposed Province of Sorsogon upon payment of the value of the land. It was the problem of
another requirement upon the private respondents before payments could be released to Sorsogon to have the title registered in its name.
them.
Whatever feelings they had against the petitioner in relation to the shabby treatment
It was the new condition requiring the private respondents "to take steps to have the accorded them by the COA cannot justify the respondents taking the law into their hands
corresponding title issued in the municipality, free from all liens and encumbrances" which and taking possession of some portions of the subject parcel of land, much less allowing
impelled them to conclude that the petitioner was not serious in paying and which led them third persons to occupy the property.
to take possession of some portions of the subject parcel of land pursuant, according to
them, to the terms of the judgment.
Consequently, the lower court's questioned Order granting the restraining motion of the
private respondents, the end result of which was the execution of the judgment, appears to
Was the petitioners' restraining motion filed within the 5-year period to execute judgment by be improper and irregular.
motion pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court?
At the same time, we cannot blame the private respondents for their drastic action. As aptly
We rule that under the circumstances of this case, the delays occasioned by the summarized by the lower court:
controversy over the auditor's requirements before payment could be effected should not
be included in computing the 5-year period to execute a judgment by motion. The delays
were through no fault of the private respondents. ..... a writ of execution was issued on July 21, 1975, upon motion of
plaintiffs, but said writ was returned unsatisfied, although with the report
that the parties had chosen to await the opinion of the Commission on
Excluding, therefore the period between 1975 and 1980, the restraining motion filed by the Audit. Even so, the plaintiffs exerted efforts to comply with the
petitioner on July 15, 1982 was well within the 5-year period to execute a judgment by requirements which were allowed by the court. Be that as it may,
motion. This conclusion is in consonance with our ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals, additional requirements were imposed one after the other to the extent of
(137 SCRA 220) citing the earlier cases of Bien v. Sunga, 117 SCRA 249); Potenciano v. asking for absurd, (sic) i.e., "to have the corresponding title issued in the
Hon. Mariano, ([96 SCRA 463] and Lanchita v. Magbanua (117 SCRA 39). We ruled that: name of the Municipality, free from all liens and encumbrances." This was
 in the later part of 1980, or more than six (6) years after defendant The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their land which
province's receipt of the decision by which it was ordered to effect was taken for use as a public high school. As a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the
payment within one (1) year only from said receipt. Clearly, we have here Government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to supply all
an instance of a suitor who, instead of wooing his heartthrob, would rather required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation. The imposition of
dictate his wish to the latter in pursuing his interest. He would rather unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays before effecting payment is not only
impose upon the object of his concern such terms and conditions that galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent with government. There should be some
would suit him, even if in so doing time inexorably marches on against his kind of swift and effective recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or lower
favor. Certainly, this cannot be allowed to remain unreined. level bureaucrats.

It should be noted that the last communication the defendant province Under ordinary circumstances, immediate return to the owners of the unpaid property is the
admits to have knowledge of relative to this matter is an indorsement to obvious remedy. In cases where land is taken for public use, public interest however, must,
the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit dated October 27, 1980. be considered. The children of Gubat, Sorsogon have been using the disputed land as their
Yet, it never bothered to follow up with an inquiry as to the action that was high school athletic grounds for thirty years.
taken thereon. On the contrary, it blames the plaintiffs for its non-receipt of
any reply thereto. This supine attitude is hardly in keeping with human In the execution of this decision, the Provincial Government of Sorsogon is expected to
experience relative to the exercise of one's duty to protect his interest. immediately pay as directed. Should any further delays be encountered, the trial court is
Here the defendant province harps on its allegation that the land at issue directed to seize any of the patrimonial property or cash savings of the province in the
involves public interest. This being so, it should have helped facilitate the amount necessary to implement this decision.
approval of the vouchers, considering that it has the bounded (sic) duty to
uphold and protect public interest. This the defendant never did, despite
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon is SET
the time element that it had to meet inasmuch as item (b) in the above-
ASIDE. The original judgment dated March 28, 1974 is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
quoted dispositive portion of the decision expressly states that payment
Court of Sorsogon is ordered to immediately execute the final judgment in Civil Case No. 50
was to be made within one (1) year from receipt, in failure of which said
and effect payment of the P49,500.00 with interests at the legal rate from March 27, 1975.
defendant had to vacate and deliver the land to the prevailing parties. This
alternative should have alerted the defendant to take the necessary steps The court is further ordered to restore possession to the Gubat High School of any portion
to comply with the decision if only to preserve its prior right and thus of the disputed property which was taken away from it.
uphold public interest. It opted, on the other hand, to reverse its side of the
coin and place the obligation on the plaintiffs shoulders. (Rollo, pp. 66-67). SO ORDERED.

The complaint in the instant case was filed on March 30, 1957. lt was only on March, 1974
or seventeen years later that a decision was promulgated. When the private respondents
expected the payment of the value of their land occupied by the Gubat High School, they
still were unable to collect such payment eight years after the promulgation of the decision.

For these reasons and in the interest of justice, we resolve the remaining issue and
facilitate the execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 50. Hence, we declare as
unreasonable the additional requirement charging the private respondents with the duty to
have the corresponding title issued in the name of the municipality free from all liens and
encumbrances as a condition before the release of the payment for the value of the land.
The dispositive portion of the decision explicitly states that in case the petitioner favors
payment of the value of the land, the private respondents are ordered to execute a
conveyance in favor of the petitioner. The respondents have complied with all the
requirements originally imposed by COA. The petitioner cannot, therefore, deny payment to
the private respondents.

This case is a classic example of a common problem besetting hapless citizens in varying
degrees. Because of insistent but distorted application of administrative rules and
regulations, persons dealing with government are often placed in unfair predicaments which
require needless expenditure of their time, money, and patience.
G.R. No. L-22061 January 31, 1968 16028, affirming the appealed judgment of the Court of First Instance, without
modification.
DALMACIO URTULA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. The Supreme Court had affirmed, as aforesaid, the decision of the trial court
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by the Land Tenure fixing the amount of just compensation for P213,094.00; thus, at the time the
Administration), defendant-appellant. decision became final, the balance still due was P95,404.00. Of this balance,
the Republic paid Dalmacio Urtula the sum of P5,404.00 on 17 April 1961; but
Luciano M. Maggay for plaintiffs-appellants. on the same day, Urtula deposited same amount with the Land Tenure
Judicial Cases Division of Land Tenure Administration for defendant-appellant. Administration in payment of taxes and penalties for prior years up to 1958 on
the expropriated land and for the surveyor's fee for segregating one hectare
REYES, J.B.L., J.: donated by condemnee Urtula for a school site. On liquidation at a later date,
an excess in the amount of P423.38 was found, and the Republic refunded this
Direct appeals, by both the plaintiffs, Dalmacio Urtula, et al. and the defendant excess to Urtula on 25 September 1961. On 3 May 1961, the Republic paid the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Tenure Administration, remaining balance of P90,000.00.
now Land Authority, from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, in its Civil Case No. 5306, ordering the defendant to pay The taxes due and unpaid, including penalties, on the land for the years 1959,
interest upon a sum determined by final judgment as compensation for the 1960 and 70% of 1961 were computed at a total of P3,534.23 as of 28
property expropriated in a previous case of eminent domain between the same February 1962. The interest of 6% on P95,404.00 from 11 October 1958, the
parties, Civil Case No. 3837 of the same court. date when the condemnor Republic took possession of the land to May 1961,
when the final balance was paid to Urtula was also computed at a total of
The facts, as stipulated by the parties, and as found by the court a quo are as P14,633.52.
follows:
On 26 January 1961, the plaintiff demanded payment of said interest
The Court of First Instance had rendered judgment on 16 November 1957 in its (P14,633.52) but the defendant Republic refused, on the ground that no
Civil Case No. 3837, for the expropriation of the Hacienda Quitang, owned by payment of interest had been ordered in the decision in Civil Case No. 3837,
Dalmacio Urtula by the Republic of the Philippines, for the sum of the expropriation proceedings, or in the affirmatory decision of the Supreme
P213,094.00, "and upon making the payment the plaintiff shall take full Court in G.R. No. L-16028.
possession of the land." The Republic appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals, raising the sole issue of whether the amount fixed by the trial court The parties further stipulated as a fact that the plaintiff had agreed to pay his
was a just compensation for the property. While the appeal was pending before counsel 10% of the amount recoverable from the defendant, as attorney's fees.
the Court of Appeals, the Republic of the Philippines deposited on 29 July
1958, with the Philippine National Bank the sum of P117,690.00 as provisional Upon the foregoing stipulated facts, the trial court rendered judgment for
value of the land, in accordance with an order of the trial court dated 3 January plaintiff Urtula and ordered the defendant Republic to pay P14,633.52 as
1958, and this deposit was withdrawn by Dalmacio Urtula in August of 1958. interest on the balance of P95,404.00 from 11 October 1958 to 3 May 1961
and to pay the costs, but denied the plaintiff's claim on the land taxes 1 and
Thereafter, on 10 September 1958, the Court of Appeals granted the attorney's fees.
Republic's petition to be placed in possession of the property; and under a writ
of possession issued by the provincial sheriff of the province, the Land Tenure Both parties were not satisfied with the decision; hence, both appealed to this
Administration took actual physical possession of the land on 11 October 1958. Court.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals found that the issue between the parties Against the defendant Republic's defense that the final judgment in the
was purely one of law and thereby elevated the appeal to the Supreme Court. expropriation case, which did not provide for interest, operates to bar the
This Court rendered judgment thereon on 29 November 1960 in case No. L-
present case, by res judicata, the theory of plaintiff Urtula is that there is no follows that interest upon the unrecoverable interest, which plaintiff also seeks,
identity of causes of action in the said cases. cannot, likewise, be granted.

Thus, Urtula relates his predicaments as follows: that while the expropriation It is not amiss to note that Section 3 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
case was pending before the trial court, he could not claim interest because (Sec. 4, Rule 69 of the old Rules), in fact, directs the defendant in an
the Republic had not as yet taken possession of the land and the rule is that expropriation case to "present in a single motion to dismiss or for other
interest accrues from the time of such taking; but when the Republic took appropriate relief, all of his objections and defenses . . ." and if not so
possession, the case was already on appeal and he could not ask relief presented "are waived." (Emphasis Supplied.) 2 As it is, the judgment allowing
because he was not an appellant nor could he raise the issue of interest for the the collection of interest, now under appeal in effect amends the final judgment
first time on appeal, aside from his being impeded by the rule that proof with in the expropriation case, a procedure abhorrent to orderly judicial
respect to the taking of possession had to be adduced before the trial court, proceedings.
not the appellate court.
The Republic took possession on 11 October 1958. From this date, therefore,
Urtula's dilemma lies in his mistaken concept of the nature of the interest that the owner, while retaining the naked title, was deprived of the benefits from the
he failed to claim in the expropriation case and which he now claims in this land and it is just and fair that realty taxes for the years 1959 and onward
separate case. Said interest is not contractual, nor based on delict or quasi- should be borne by the entity exercising the right of eminent domain. (City of
delict, but one that — Manila vs. Roxas, 60 Phil. 215).

runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from the right Costs in cases of eminent domain, except those of rival claimants litigating
of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can their claims, are charged against the plaintiff. (Sec. 12, Rule 67, Rules of
accomplish, as of the date of the taking (30 C.J.S. 230). Court; Sec. 13, Rule 67 of the old Rules.) But the present case is not one of
eminent domain but an ordinary civil action where the Republic of the
Understood as such, Urtula, as defendant in the expropriation case, could have Philippines is a party. Section 1 of Rule 142 provides that no costs shall be
raised the matter of interest before the trial court even if there had been no allowed against it, unless otherwise provided by law. No provision of law
actual taking yet by the Republic and the said court could have included the providing the contrary has been cited; hence, costs should be charged against
payment of interest in its judgment but conditioned upon the actual taking, Urtula.
because the rate of interest upon the amount of just compensation (6%) is a
known factor, and it can reasonably be expected that at some future time, the FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed judgment is reversed and
expropriator would take possession of the property, though the date be not the case dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs Dalmacio Urtula, et al.
fixed. In this way, multiple suits would be avoided. Moreover, nothing
prevented appellee from calling the attention of the appellate courts (even by
motion to reconsider before judgment became final) to the subsequent taking
of possession by the condemnor, and asking for allowance of interest on the
indemnity, since that followed the taking as a matter of course, and raised no
issue requiring remand of the records to the Court of origin.

As the issue of interest could have been raised in the former case but was not
raised, res judicata blocks the recovery of interest in the present case. (Tejedor
vs. Palet, 61 Phil. 494; Phil. Engineering Corp., et al. vs. Ceniza, etc., et al., L-
17834, 29 Sept. 1962). It is settled that a former judgment constitutes a bar, as
between the parties, not only as to matters expressly adjudged, but all matters
that could have been adjudged at the time (Rule 39, sec. 49; Corda vs.
Maglinti, L-17476, Nov. 30, 1961; Rodriguez vs. Tan, 48 Off. Gaz. 3330). It
G.R. No. 161656 June 29, 2005 For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons’
successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA, COMMODORE Panerio,2 filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages
EDGARDO GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA, DOROTEO MANTOS & FLORENCIO against the Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of
BELOTINDOS, petitioners, the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.
vs.
VICENTE G. LIM, respondent. In the interim or on November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and
939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio, respectively.
RESOLUTION Annotated thereon was the phrase "subject to the priority of the National Airports
Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a
reasonable market value."
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio,
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions.1 When the state wields its power of eminent
holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and
domain, there arises a correlative obligation on its part to pay the owner of the expropriated
939 because of the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of ₱4,062.10, adjudged in the
property a just compensation. If it fails, there is a clear case of injustice that must be
expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were
redressed. In the present case, fifty-seven (57) years have lapsed from the time the ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In view of "the differences in
Decision in the subject expropriation proceedings became final, but still the Republic of the money value from 1940 up to the present," the court adjusted the market value at
Philippines, herein petitioner, has not compensated the owner of the property. To tolerate
₱16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the
such prolonged inaction on its part is to encourage distrust and resentment among our
expropriation proceedings, until full payment.
people – the very vices that corrode the ties of civility and tempt men to act in ways they
would otherwise shun.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and Panerio appealed from
the CFI Decision, in view of the amount in controversy, directly to this Court. The case was
A revisit of the pertinent facts in the instant case is imperative.
docketed as No. L-21032.3 On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its Decision affirming the
CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic.
action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to show that the Republic paid the
Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu owners or their successors-in-interest according to the CFI decision. While it deposited the
City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 amount of ₱9,500,00, and said deposit was allegedly disbursed, however, the payees could
was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) not be ascertained.
No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia
Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164 square meters. Notwithstanding the above finding, this Court still ruled that Valdehueza and Panerio are
not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair
After depositing ₱9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order of the market value, ratiocinating as follows:
CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on
May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the
"Appellants would contend that: (1) possession of Lots 932 and 939 should be restored to
sum of ₱4,062.10 as just compensation. them as owners of the same; (2) the Republic should be ordered to pay rentals for the use
of said lots, plus attorney’s fees; and (3) the court a quo in the present suit had no power to
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed on March fix the value of the lots and order the execution of the deed of sale after payment.
11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a
In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports transfer of said lots in favor of the Government. The records do not show that the
Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." Government paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the 1940 CFI
Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to the Office of then President Carlos decision although, as stated, ₱9,500.00 was deposited by it, and said deposit had been
Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National disbursed. With the records lost, however, it cannot be known who received the money
Defense to expedite action on said claim. On September 6, 1961, Lt. Manuel Cabal (Exh. 14 says: ‘It is further certified that the corresponding Vouchers and pertinent Journal
rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a and Cash Book were destroyed during the last World War, and therefore the names of the
reasonable time. payees concerned cannot be ascertained.’) And the Government now admits that there
is no available record showing that payment for the value of the lots in question has made to wait for a decade or more, in this case more than 50 years, before actually
been made (Stipulation of Facts, par. 9, Rec. on Appeal, p. 28). receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. To allow the taking of the
landowners’ properties, and in the meantime leave them empty-handed by
The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what withholding payment of compensation while the government speculates on whether
amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse, for government to subsequently decide
executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as to abandon the property and return it to the landowners, is undoubtedly an
part of an airport, and ordered sold to the Government. In fact, the abovementioned oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be sanctioned. (Land Bank of
title certificates secured by plaintiffs over said lots contained annotations of the right the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404).
of the National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay for and acquire them. It xxxxxx
follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or
well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have
recover possession of their expropriated lots – which are still devoted to the public a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property, which is the subject matter of the
use for which they were expropriated – but only to demand the fair market value of action. Also the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as cloud on
the same." plaintiff’s title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA
97). In view of the foregoing discussion, clearly, the claim of defendant-appellant
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein
Republic constitutes a cloud, doubt or uncertainty on the title of plaintiff-appellee
respondent,4 as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had
Vicente Lim that can be removed by an action to quiet title.
the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof,
TCT No. 63894 was issued in his name.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the appealed May
4, 2001 Decision of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-
On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the
12701, the said decision is UPHELD AND AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, against General Romeo Zulueta, as
is DISMISSED for lack of merit."
Commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as
Commander of Naval District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo Mantos
and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the complaint to Undaunted, petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court a
implead the Republic. petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Republic has remained the owner of Lot
932 as held by this Court in Valdehueza vs. Republic.6
On May 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus:
In our Resolution dated March 1, 2004, we denied the petition outright on the ground that
the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error. Petitioners filed an urgent motion for
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Vicente Lim and against reconsideration but we denied the same with finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004.
all defendants, public and private, declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and
exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the
right to possession. The monetary claims in the complaint and in the counter claims On May 18, 2004, respondent filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an entry of
contained in the answer of defendants are ordered Dismissed. judgment. We only noted the motion in our Resolution of July 12, 2004.

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. CV No. On July 7, 2004, petitioners filed an urgent plea/motion for clarification, which is actually
72915. In its Decision5 dated September 18, 2003, the Appellate Court sustained the RTC a second motion for reconsideration. Thus, in our Resolution of September 6, 2004, we
Decision, thus: simply noted without action the motion considering that the instant petition was already
denied with finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004.
"Obviously, defendant-appellant Republic evaded its duty of paying what was due to
the landowners. The expropriation proceedings had already become final in the late On October 29, 2004, petitioners filed a very urgent motion for leave to file a motion for
1940’s and yet, up to now, or more than fifty (50) years after, the Republic had not yet reconsideration of our Resolution dated September 6, 2004 (with prayer to refer the case to
paid the compensation fixed by the court while continuously reaping benefits from the En Banc). They maintain that the Republic’s right of ownership has been settled
the expropriated property to the prejudice of the landowner. x x x. This is contrary to in Valdehueza.
the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only
the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also The basic issue for our resolution is whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot
the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt 932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being
Initially, we must rule on the procedural obstacle. Corollarily, in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya,9 similar to the
present case, this Court expressed its disgust over the government’s vexatious delay in the
While we commend the Republic for the zeal with which it pursues the present case, we payment of just compensation, thus:
reiterate that its urgent motion for clarification filed on July 7, 2004 is actually a second
motion for reconsideration. This motion is prohibited under Section 2, Rule 52, of the 1997 "The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their land
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides: which was taken for use as a public high school. As a matter of fair procedure, it is the
duty of the Government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will,
"Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. – No second motion for reconsideration of a to supply all required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation. The
judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." imposition of unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays before effecting
payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent with
government. There should be some kind of swift and effective recourse against
Consequently, as mentioned earlier, we simply noted without action the motion since
unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or lower level bureaucrats."
petitioners’ petition was already denied with finality.
We feel the same way in the instant case.
Considering the Republic’s urgent and serious insistence that it is still the owner of Lot 932
and in the interest of justice, we take another hard look at the controversial issue in order to
determine the veracity of petitioner’s stance. More than anything else, however, it is the obstinacy of the Republic that prompted us to
dismiss its petition outright. As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated
the Republic to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the sum of ₱16,248.40 as
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived "reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not comply and
of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential
allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. Such prolonged
element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property
obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law, which we
is taken for public use.7 Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates:
cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that
"Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take
them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the
The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay Constitution guarantees that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The shall be attended by compensation.10 From the taking of private property by the government
length of time and the manner with which it evaded payment demonstrate its arbitrary high- under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the
handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings owner for his loss.11
(Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has passed,
yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed.
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not
Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of
is more so when such delay is accompanied by bureaucratic hassles. Apparent the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of
from Valdehueza is the fact that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest were given a "run the individual’s rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore
around" by the Republic’s officials and agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from
be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of
the use of the two lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of
the property owner.12
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil
Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite the payment,
failed in granting relief to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the Ironically, in opposing respondent’s claim, the Republic is invoking this Court’s Decision
Armed Forces expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing in Valdehueza, a Decision it utterly defied. How could the Republic acquire ownership over
happened.lawphil.net Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more
than 50 years? The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from
the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules of fair Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic
play, as "just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the jurisdictions. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs. Secretary
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within of Agrarian Reform,13 thus:
a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered ‘just.’" In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated
property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation "Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest
is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.8 the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but
the condemnor’s title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent
Domain Act, or the commissioner’s report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.
x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the
the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is expropriation process incomplete.
actually made. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of course, we
property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. are aware of the doctrine that "non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation
In fact, the decisions appear to be uniform to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the
McLure, it was held that ‘actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was expropriated lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs.
a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State’ albeit Court of Appeals, et al.,17 and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority.18 However, the facts of
‘not to the appropriation of it to public use.’ In Rexford v. Knight, the Court of Appeals of the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was
New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings and
State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but
appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that ‘both on construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on
principle and authority the rule is . . . that the right to enter on and use the property is its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several
complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had when property has
for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the power of
until just compensation has been made to him." eminent domain19 or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses
to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon;20 or fails or
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, that: refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid.21

‘If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are The Republic also contends that where there have been constructions being used by the
attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in military, as in this case, public interest demands that the present suit should not be
this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can sustained.
be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is
paid...’"(Emphasis supplied.) It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property for the public
convenience.22 In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the Agrarian Reform,23 we ruled:
landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republic’s acquisition of ownership is
conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time.14 "One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the
individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be
Significantly, in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia15 this Court ruled that the expropriation of a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping
lands consists of two stages, to wit: with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no
question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public
need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
"x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against
facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint" x x x. The right covers the person’s life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of
Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added
protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by
not be taken for public use without just compensation."
the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the
court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x.
The Republic’s assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave danger if we shall
order the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
to operate as an airport. What remains in the site is just the National Historical Institute’s
completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation,16 we ruled that, "the process is
marking stating that Lot 932 is the "former location of Lahug Airport." And second, there are
not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic
only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight (8) of which are residence
apartments of military personnel. Only two (2) buildings are actually used as training
centers. Thus, practically speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent will only affect a It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent in
handful of military personnel. It will not result to "irreparable damage" or "damage beyond 1964, they were still the owners thereof and their title had not yet passed to the petitioner
pecuniary estimation," as what the Republic vehemently claims. Republic. In fact, it never did. Such title or ownership was rendered conclusive when we
categorically ruled in Valdehueza that: "It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered
We thus rule that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor of the
recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic. Unless this form of swift and Government."
effective relief is granted to him, the grave injustice committed against his predecessors-in-
interest, though no fault or negligence on their part, will be perpetuated. Let this case, For respondent’s part, it is reasonable to conclude that he entered into the contract of
therefore, serve as a wake-up call to the Republic that in the exercise of its power of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio fully aware of the extent of his right as a
eminent domain, necessarily in derogation of private rights, it must comply with the mortgagee. A mortgage is merely an accessory contract intended to secure the
Constitutional limitations. This Court, as the guardian of the people’s right, will not stand still performance of the principal obligation. One of its characteristics is that it
in the face of the Republic’s oppressive and confiscatory taking of private property, as in is inseparable from the property. It adheres to the property regardless of who its owner
this case. may subsequently be.25 Respondent must have known that even if Lot 932 is ultimately
expropriated by the Republic, still, his right as a mortgagee is protected. In this regard,
At this point, it may be argued that respondent Vicente Lim acted in bad faith in entering Article 2127 of the Civil Code provides:
into a contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio despite the clear annotation in
TCT No. 23934 that Lot 932 is "subject to the priority of the National Airports "Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements,
Corporation [to acquire said parcels of land] x x x upon previous payment of a growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes due,
reasonable market value." and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from the insurers
of the property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use, with the
The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is immaterial considering that the declarations, amplifications, and limitations established by law, whether the estate
Republic did not complete the expropriation process. In short, it failed to perfect its title over remains in the possession of the mortgagor or it passes in the hands of a third
Lot 932 by its failure to pay just compensation. The issue of bad faith would have assumed person.
relevance if the Republic actually acquired title over Lot 932. In such a case, even if
respondent’s title was registered first, it would be the Republic’s title or right of ownership In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation
that shall be upheld. But now, assuming that respondent was in bad faith, can such does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated
fact vest upon the Republic a better title over Lot 932? We believe not. This is because lots,26 however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five
in the first place, the Republic has no title to speak of. (5)27 years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the
owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in
At any rate, assuming that respondent had indeed knowledge of the annotation, still nothing consonance with the principle that "the government cannot keep the property and dishonor
would have prevented him from entering into a mortgage contract involving Lot 932 while the judgment."28 To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to
the expropriation proceeding was pending. Any person who deals with a property subject of pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is
an expropriation does so at his own risk, taking into account the ultimate possibility of the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their
losing the property in favor of the government. Here, the annotation merely served as will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals,29 we
a caveat that the Republic had a preferential right to acquire Lot 932 upon its payment of defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to
a "reasonable market value." It did not proscribe Valdehueza and Panerio from exercising the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without
their rights of ownership including their right to mortgage or even to dispose of their prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."
property. In Republic vs. Salem Investment Corporation,24 we recognized the owner’s
absolute right over his property pending completion of the expropriation proceeding, thus: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72915 is
AFFIRMED in toto.
"It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the The Republic’s motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated March 1, 2004 is
property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings will be allowed.
completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with
the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an Let an entry of judgment be made in this case.
owner, including the right to dispose of his property subject to the power of the State
ultimately to acquire it through expropriation.
SO ORDERED.