Caves PatentExpirationEntry 1991
Caves PatentExpirationEntry 1991
Caves PatentExpirationEntry 1991
Pharmaceutical Industry
Author(s): Richard E. Caves, Michael D. Whinston, Mark A. Hurwitz, Ariel Pakes and
Peter Temin
Source: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics , 1991, Vol. 1991 (1991),
pp. 1-66
Published by: Brookings Institution Press
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to Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics
MICHAEL D. WHINSTON
Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research
MARK A. HURWITZ
Columbia Law School
We would like to thank Joshua Angrist, Zvi Griliches, Andrea Shepard, and members
of the National Bureau of Economic Research productivity group for helpful comments
and discussion; numerous individuals in the industry who generously gave their time to
provide us with background information; Denise Neumann for research assistance; and Ann
Flack and Claudia Napolilli for their help in preparing this manuscript. Whinston thanks
the National Science Foundation for financial support (SES-8921996).
1. Temin (1980, chaps. 1-4).
2. As Nordhaus (1969) showed, the patent's life can then be set to optimize the trade-
off between surplus from consuming the innovative good and deadweight losses due to
monopoly pricing.
3. As Comanor (1986) pointed out, most modern research on the industry was motivated
by the 1962 amendments to the Pure Food Act (requiring drug innovators to demonstrate
effectiveness as well as safety) and the extensive congressional hearings that preceded them.
Dominated by efforts to measure and evaluate the rate of new-drug introduction, this research
consequently slighted the market behavior of patent recipients.
issue is not without link to the first, because the nature of the promo-
tional process in these markets may strongly influence the course of
events expected once a patent expires and generic competitors enter the
market. To the extent that an innovative company's promotion merely
disseminates information about the benefits of the chemical entity, ge-
neric entrants are unlikely to be particularly disadvantaged. In contrast,
persuasion activities that incline providers toward prescribing the brand
of the innovating company may serve to attenuate the welfare gains
arising from postpatent generic competition.
In addition to these important issues for public policy, the phar-
maceutical industry offers an excellent site for examining some general
issues in industrial organization. Because a legal monopoly of an in-
novative product in this industry commonly depends on a single patent
(that on the chemical entity itself), the industry provides a setting in
which the conditions of entry and competition change radically on a
given date set by the terms of the patent law. This natural experiment
offers a unique opportunity to study both the process and effects of
entry.
In this paper we report on an exploratory analysis of the patterns of
competition surrounding patent expiration and subsequent generic entry
in ethical pharmaceutical markets.4 We identify the patterns displayed
by branded and generic drugs' prices, market shares, and quantities
sold as well as branded drugs' advertising over the years 1976-87 for
a panel of thirty drugs that lost patent protection during this period.
The use of a panel data set permits us to follow these variables over
time and to employ controls for changes in these variables that would
occur with the natural unfolding of a drug's life cycle and with changes
in market conditions in either its therapeutic class or the industry in
general.
Given the exploratory nature of our investigation, our approach here
is nonstructural, focusing on the "semireduced" form relationship be-
tween the occurrence of patent expiration and generic entry and these
various endogenous variables. Such an approach is responsive to the
difficulty of imposing any single a priori theoretical model on the pro-
cess of generic entry and postentry competition. The literature of in-
4. A few previous researchers have also addressed parts of this issue. We discuss this
work and its relation to our own in our review of market structure.
effect has been in the hands of the physician. The physician's primary
choice is what drug (that is, chemical entity) to prescribe. The physician
then can designate that drug by either a brand or its generic name. The
trademarked brand name attached to a pioneering drug by the innovator
is short and easier to remember than its generic name, which in turn is
a shorter, simpler version of the chemical name that describes the
molecular structure of the active chemical entity to scientists.
Physicians may not be well positioned to choose drug therapies that
maximize value for their patients. Evidence on this point pertains to
choices among similar but distinct drugs as well as to choices between
branded and generic versions of the same drug. As Temin showed, the
physician lacks ready and well-organized information on the compar-
ative effectiveness and riskiness of substitute chemical entities, and the
choice is based strongly on custom as evolved in the peer community
of prescribers.S Customary prescribing behavior not only minimizes
effort but also provides a legal defense.
When the choice lies between a branded pioneer drug and its generic
competitors, the physician may not be sensitive to price differences.
Physicians do not ordinarily have information on the drug prices charged
by pharmacists, and that information is certainly not pressed upon them
in the promotional information supplied by makers of branded drugs.
Surveys accordingly have found physicians ill-informed about the prices
of competing drugs.6 Furthermore, except possibly in the treatment of
chronic conditions, prescribing a drug therapy in the most cost-effective
way is a relatively minor aspect in the overall performance of the
physician's function. Correspondingly, patients seem unlikely to select
or change physicians simply because they do not prescribe the lowest-
cost drugs. In addition, physicians may be concerned about the quality
or therapeutic equivalence of generic drugs (evidence on this point is
noted below). Confirming the low priority that minimizing prescription
costs holds for physicians, Masson and Steiner found that the incidence
of generic prescribing depends strongly on a seemingly trivial factor:
5. Temin (1980, chap. 5). Temin pointed out that the individual physician typically
does not obtain a great deal of experience with the effects of any particular drug and that
the available published research on competing drugs tends to deal with bioavailability rather
than actual effects.
6. Temin (1980, pp. 102-06).
1980 1989
9. Combined with the prescription distribution data presented above, these substitution
figures imply that the generic market share for multisource drugs in 1989 was approximately
42 percent (based on the number of new prescriptions filled).
10. Tabulation provided by IMS America (from National Prescription Audit). Masson
and Steiner (1985, pp. 41-47) placed significant weight on drug consumers' own resistance
to generic substitution as a reason why it had not proceeded farther. Note also that the
increased ease of generic substitution may possibly have contributed to the decrease in
generic prescribing observed above.
11. Masson and Steiner (1985, chap. 4). Private insurers have stepped up their efforts
to contain drug costs (Milt Freudenheim, "Insurers Press Use of Cheaper Drugs," New
York Times, November 18, 1990, sec. 1, p. 1).
12. Carroll, Siridhara, and Fincham (1987, pp. 11-18).
13. For more detail and sources, see Hurwitz and Caves (1988, pp. 306-7).
14. Leffler (1981, pp. 53-54); and Hurwitz and Caves (1988, pp. 316-17).
15. Temin (1979). See also Grabowski and Vernon (1976).
16. According to data from IMS America, the largest firm's sales in 1989 accounted
for 7.4 percent of total sales, the largest four firms 23.8 percent.
17. U.S. Food and Drug Administration (annual).
ical entities are batch processes carried out on small scales. Both quality-
control considerations and the small absolute quantities of active in-
gredients produced discourage large-scale continuous-process technol-
ogies. 18 Production capacity for assembling active and inert ingredients
into pills or capsules is largely fungible. Thus, although actual com-
petitors for a given drug or therapy may be few, potential entrants are
numerous.
Although manufacturing and distribution are not generally inte-
grated, the research-oriented drugmakers are partly integrated forward.
These firms (members of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion) make 68 percent of their sales to wholesalers, 32 percent directly
to hospitals, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and pharmacy
chains. The wholesale percentage has increased from 45 percent in
1972.19 Because the major drug manufacturers vary greatly in their
reliance on arm's-length wholesalers, the choice of integration is ap-
parently a close call. The increased role of independent wholesalers
stems from computerization that allows specialist wholesalers to provide
extensive services for pharmacies (including hospital pharmacies) that
they supply exclusively. While the largest wholesaler accounts for one-
fourth of the U.S. wholesale market, many small firms also exist.20 The
generic producers depend entirely on full-line marketing and wholesaling
firms, some of which are large and themselves take an active role in postpatent
entry into the markets of innovative drugs.21
The innovation process has been studied intensively since the 1962
amendments to the Pure Food Act (also known as the Kefauver amend-
ments) required that effectiveness as well as safety be demonstrated for
approval by the FDA. Each of the twenty or so new molecular entities
introduced each year was estimated in 1987 to incur total development
costs of $125 million.22 The profitability of pharmaceutical innovation
may have been reduced by the 1962 legislation, not only because of the
cost of compliance to the manufacturer but also because of the delay that
the approval process causes between the time patent protection is granted
and the time the new drug can be placed on the market. For the typical
23. Grabowski and Vernon (1983, p. 50). On the other hand, drug innovators have
sometimes forestalled this costly shortening of their period of monopoly by using amended
applications to stretch out the process of the patent's consideration and delay approval, or
by securing patent protection with broad claims for therapeutic usefulness that are focused
by subsequent applications making narrower and more specific claims. A study prepared
by the generic drug producers claimed that the effective patent life for the leading twelve
products in 1980 was 18.5 years, more than the statutory life of a patent. For the next
thirteen products the mean was 15.1 years, suggesting that innovators invest in prolonging
patent lives in proportion to the expected value of potential rents. The tactics employed by
drug innovators are apparently no different from those used by other inventors. See U.S.
House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (1982, pp. 206-21,
236-49).
24. See, for example, Peltzman (1974); Grabowski (1980); Temin (1980); and Wiggins
(1981).
25. Grabowski and Vernon (1986).
26. Schwartzman (1976, pp. 260-64).
27. Two specific quality issues arise. One is that of bioequivalence, which prevails
when different producers' versions of the drug have the same bioavailability at the site of
therapeutic effect. Information disseminated by the Food and Drug Administration now
seems adequate to establish where bioequivalence does and does not prevail. In any case
differences in bioavailability where found do not appear to be therapeutically significant
(Temin, 1980, pp. 96-102). The second issue is that of quality control. Schwartzman
(1976, pp. 215-23, 226-50) noted that small generic producers may have less to lose in
reputational assets than large producers from suboptimal quality control. However, the
evidence does not seem to indicate any therapeutically significant differences in quality
control between branded and generic producers.
28. See the case studies by Schwartzman (1976, pp. 273-92) of pricing behavior in
antibiotics and some other drugs.
29. The term "detailing" has apparently fallen out of use in the industry but is retained
here because of its prevalence in the academic research literature.
30. Temin (1979). During this period the previously common practice of licensing new
chemical entities to other producers dried up as the innovators sought to capture for them-
selves all rents generated by the information disseminated by their detailing forces.
31. Observers taking these positions are cited by Comanor (1986).
32. Promotional audits by IMS America.
33. Walker (1971, p. 47); Hurwitz and Caves (1988, pp. 313, 316); see also Temin
(1980, pp. 115-18). Leffler (1981) found no reactions of incumbents' advertising levels
to new entry, but his analysis pertained to members of a therapeutic class and not to
producers of the same chemical entity.
34. Data from the Senate Judiciary Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee (known as
the Kefauver Committee) hearings are quoted by Steele (1962, pp. 159-60).
35. Statman (1981); and Schwartzman (1976, pp. 257, 273-92). Diversity in pricing
competition was also suggested by Cocks and Virts (1974).
36. Employment and employee-compensation information for Standard Industrial Clas-
sification (SIC) industry 2834 was taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982 Census of
Manufacturers, Industry Statistics, section 28C, tables lB and 7, and U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Annual Survey of Manufactures, various years. A weighted index of employment
costs based on data for production and nonproduction workers was then converted to an
index of unit labor costs using information on productivity growth from U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Productivity Measures for Selected Industries, 1958-84, Bulletin No.
2256, extrapolated to later years. The index of pharmaceutical input costs is simply the
output price index for SIC 2833, taken from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Producer
Prices and Price Indexes. In 1982 inputs purchased from SIC 2833 made up 42.5 percent
of the costs of material inputs purchased by SIC 2834. The output price index for SIC
2834 is also taken from Producer Prices and Price Indexes.
37. For a recent work investigating the accuracy of the pharmaceutical price index, see
Berndt, Griliches, and Rosett (1990).
Figure 1. Pharmaceutical Prices, Labor Costs, and Material Input Costs, 1976-87
1.6 -
1.5 -
1.4 -
Pharmaceutical , '
1.3 - prices /
1.2 - ,
0.7
0.6 -
0.5
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1987
Data
Our data base covers thirty pharmaceuticals that had enjoyed patent
protection as new chemical entities but went off-patent during the period
1976-87. We constructed our sample by identifying therapeutic classes
known to contain important drugs that had lost patent protection. 38 Then
we examined the other drugs in these classes, picking up all drugs that
were marketed by a single innovating firm and experienced a loss of
38. Our data source (a leading pharmaceutical company) and the fact that we had to
work from original hard copies required that we confine our data collection to a limited
number of therapeutic classes.
39. Occasionally, new drugs are sold by more than one firm, due either to licensing
by a foreign innovator or to simultaneous discovery combined with a cross-licensing agree-
ment.
40. The therapeutic classes used to obtain the sample were not these broad, two-digit
classes but finer, five-digit classes. The specific drugs included are: Aldomet, Apresazide,
Catapres, Combipres, Diutensen, Harmonyl, Inderal, Ismelin, Minipress, Norpace, and
Salutensin (cardiovasculars); Ativan, Haldol, Mellaril, Serax, Transxene, Valium, and
Vesprin (psychotherapeutics); Declomycin, Keflex, Keflin, and Minocin (anti-infectives);
Diabinese, Dymelor, Orinase, and Tolinase (diabetes therapy); Indocin and Meclomen
(antiarthritics); Hygroton (diuretic); and Reglan (antispasmodic).
41. None of our drugs were affected by the patent extension or exclusive marketing
provisions of the Waxman-Hatch Act.
42. For most products the information on warehouse withdrawals comes from a virtually
complete sample of warehouses; for the remainder we rely on a sample of twenty-four
warehouses that is then used to provide population estimates. The panels of pharmacy and
hospital purchasers are used to capture direct sales that do not go through wholesalers.
Thus, if volume discounts are applied to a total order rather than to the
purchase of an individual drug or if manufacturers offer rebates directly
to purchasers, these discounts are missed. Second, for pharmacy chains
that utilize their own warehouses, the recorded price is an intrafirm
transfer price. Because of our study's focus on the change in prices
over time and with respect to patent expiration, these issues will present
problems for our conclusions only to the extent that the biases involved
vary in a manner related to these variables.
This information on sales revenues and quantities is reported in each
year for each seller of a given drug, both branded and generic, and by
individual dosage. Following most previous researchers, we chose to
work with the most popular dosage of each drug for the purpose of
measuring prices, sales volumes, and market shares.43
The data from IMS America also distinguish between sales to phar-
macies and sales to hospitals. We retained this distinction because of
the bases, indicated above, for expecting that the willingness of pre-
scribers and consumers to switch to lower-priced generics might differ
between the sectors. Finally, the IMS data provide the month and year
that each innovative drug was first marketed.
The generic sellers of record in the IMS data are commonly generic
drug distributors rather than the actual manufacturers. The number of
recorded distributors for a given drug may not be the best measure of
the degree of generic threat to a drug innovator, because a typical
generic manufacturer may supply several generic distributors whose
number is relatively independent of the conditions of competition in
any one drug.4 We therefore obtained information on entry into generic
manufacturing of each drug by looking at the dates of approval by the
FDA of all pertinent NDAs and ANDAs.45
Sales-promotion information was also taken from IMS America tab-
ulations, which are in turn obtained from a survey of the medical jour-
43. Occasionally, minor generic sales are recorded before the date of patent expiration
and regulatory approval of any generic competitor's New Drug Application. We ignored
these sales, concluding that they must have been made, probably indirectly, by the innovator.
44. An additional problem with using the information on distributors arises because
different divisions of a single generic distributor may be recorded with different names.
45. Approval dates after 1982 were taken from U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(annual); approval dates prior to 1982 were obtained through a Freedom of Information
Act request.
Drugs with
patents expiring
Number of drugs 30 9 21
nals for journal advertising and a panel of physicians for time spent by
detailers in the direct promotion of individual drugs. This information
is converted by IMS to estimated expenditures on the basis of quoted
advertising rates of the publications and dollar conversions of minutes
spent by sales representatives.
Table 1 reports a number of descriptive statistics about our sample
of drugs. The total size of the market for the pioneering drug was
observed in the year before expiration of its patent, as was the proportion
of units sold in that year in the pharmacy market (out of the total of
hospital and pharmacy sales). On average, a drug in our sample had
sales revenues of $67.3 million (1982 dollars) in the year before its
patent expired. The dispersion in market sizes is large: the standard
deviation is $76.1 million, and the drug sales range in size from a
minimum of $0.3 million to a maximum of $268.5 million. Consistent
with the overall distribution of drug sales, our sample was marketed
chiefly through pharmacies, with the average drug making 87 percent
of sales through pharmacies. Indeed, twenty-five of the thirty drugs had
pharmacy shares over 80 percent, four had shares between 50 and 80
percent, and one had a pharmacy share of only 2 percent. Sales-
46. Thus, for each of the seven drugs whose patents expired in 1984, the average
number of generics active in 1985 (averaged across the seven drugs) is 2.9. The number
of active generics for a given drug in a given year is calculated by attributing to each
approved generic producer of that chemical entity the number of months remaining in the
year from the time of approval.
Number of
drugs
Year whose Number of years after year of patent expiration
patent patents
expired expired 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1976 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1978 2 0.5 1.6 3.6 4.9 5.4 5.9 6.1 6.8 7.0 7.3 ... ...
1979 2 0 0 3.6 5.4 7.6 8.1 9.0 13.6 15.6 ... ... ...
1980 0 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1981 2 0 0 0 1.6 3.6 5.6 8.5 ... ... ... ... ...
1982 4 0 0.1 0.2 1.3 4.4 7.3 ... ... ... ... ...
1983 3 2.0 4.4 5.6 6.5 6.7 ...... ... ............
1984 7 1.2 2.9 5.7 9.3 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1985 1 2.7 15.1 19.7 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1986 3 2.4 7.7 ... ... ... .... ... ... ... ...
1987 3 2.7 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Average cumulative
number of entrants
across all drugsa 1.1 2.8 3.8 4.9 4.4 5.3 5.3 5.8 6.6 3.1 0.3 0
Proportion of drugs
with some entrants 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 0
a. An entrant is counted as present in the year of its approval for only the fraction of the year's m
The average cumulative number of approved generic producers for a given cohort (for example, dru
in 1984) in a given year (for example, two years after the year of patent expiration) is computed by a
the drugs in the cohort in that year.
47. This could be true for several reasons. First, the marginal value of an entrant
investing a little earlier is the expected incremental profits achieved by doing so (the marginal
cost is the time value of the investment funds). This marginal benefit depends, however,
on how many other entrants are already in the market. Hence, in some circumstances,
investment may be staggered since the marginal value is higher for a first entrant than for
subsequent ones. Second, if information about market opportunities for generics is uncertain,
some potential entrants may wait to see how early entrants fare. Third, if the overall market
for a drug evolves stochastically, then entrants may enter over time when there turns out
to be an unanticipated growth in the market's size.
second point of interest is the marked shift in the rate of entry in the
three years (1985-87) following the passage of the Waxman-Hatch Act.
While one explanation for this change is surely the change in regulations
governing generic entry that accompanied passage of the act, the fact
that large drug markets were losing protection during this period (recall
table 1) is likely also to have been important.
The bottom of table 2 reports two additional pieces of information
regarding the flow of entrants into these markets. First, the average
number of approved generics by years after the year of patent expiration
is averaged over all cohorts. This cumulative total rises until roughly
eight years after expiration and then declines; the decline is explained
by the fact that only drugs whose patents expired in the 1970s have
postpatent experiences of more than eight years in our sample, and
overall these drugs attracted fairly little competition from generics en-
tering the market, which is why it is important to look at entry by
cohort. Second, the last row in table 2 reports on the proportion of
drugs for which one or more generics entered the market by any number
of years after the year of the patent expiration. For similar reasons, this
proportion first rises and then declines. Overall, for six of the thirty
drugs no generic competition entered the market during our sample
period.
Finally, for our sample of drugs, the average number of approved
generic producers across postpatent expiration observations is 3.66.
Restricting attention to those drugs and years in which entry actually
occurred (that is, conditional on entry), the average number of entrants
is 7.28. By the end of the sample period, of course, the average cu-
mulative number of entrants is larger, equal in 1987 to 7.63 over all
of the drugs and to 9.54 for those drugs that actually experienced generic
entry.
One omission from the data is any measure of the closeness of sub-
stitution between the sampled drugs and others in their therapeutic
classes. Although we sought to develop controls for this important factor
influencing the elasticity of demand for a drug, we found the problem
of quantifying the closeness of substitutes a daunting one. The familiar
relevant concepts are not easily applied to the available information on
medical practice. A given pharmaceutical might represent the therapy
of choice for certain symptoms, although not in the face of side con-
ditions that occur in unknown proportions of patients. A drug may be
one of several used to treat a given condition, with the selection resting
on trial-and-error with individual patients or local preferences among
prescribers. A drug used for several conditions might face different
substitutes in each use. Furthermore, these patterns change continually
as competing drugs enter a therapeutic class, large shifts occur in their
relative prices, and accumulations of evidence shift prescribers' pref-
erences. Reluctantly, we abandoned our effort to reduce this information
to some summary measure of closeness of substitution in the therapeutic
class.
48. We introduce some further controls for changes in the competitive environment
shortly. Subsequently we discuss the possible biases that may be introduced by imprecise
controls for these events.
49. Suslow (1986).
50. In fact, the overall prices for our sample of drugs seem to have been rising at a
rate even faster than the price index for SIC 2834: the price index implied by a simple
regression of pi, on drug and year dummy variables yields year effects of 0.54 in 1976 and
1.71 in 1987 (1982 = 1.0).
51. Doing so causes us to effectively lose the two drugs that are "orphans" in their
therapeutic classes (Hygroton and Reglan). Nonetheless, the step is unavoidable, because
a test called strongly for rejecting the hypothesis that year effects are the same for each
therapeutic class.
bination. The data for various drugs are stacked and the qc para
are estimated by including class-specific year dummies in addition to
the variables in lAh(-) and lAf ().53 In all of our reported estimations
we employ a weighted regression technique to control for drug-specific
differences in the variance of uit. In this procedure equation 8 is first
estimated, consistent estimates of the variance of uit are then computed
from the residuals for each drug over time, and then Generalized Least
Squares estimates are computed using these weights.
ESTIMATES FOR COMBINED DRUG AND HOSPITAL MARKETS. Table 3
presents our basic results for the prices of branded drugs in the drugstore
and hospital submarkets combined (that is, total revenue in the most
popular dosage divided by total sales). Specification 1 in the table
represents a very simple form for the functions h(-) andf(-) introduced
above. In this equation, the effect of a drug's age on its price is effec-
tively captured through three variables: TAFSit, the time (in year t)
since first sale of drug i; TAFS2it, its square; and FSit, a dummy variable
for drug i that is "on" during the first two years of the drug's sales.54 We
say "effectively" because the class-specific year effects (estimates omitted
from table 3) implicitly incorporate the linear time effect TAFSit. The
effect of generic entry, on the other hand, is captured through the
variable NN. NN is constructed as follows: if drug i in year t has a positive
level of generic sales, then NN is equal to the average number of approved
generic NDAs (or ANDAs) in existence over years t and t - 1 (measured
Specifications
Variablea 1 2 3 4 5
ATAFS2C 0.2 E-3 0.2 E-3 0.2 E-3 0.3 E-3 0.6 E-4
(0.3 E-3) (0.3 E-3) (0.3 E-3) (0.3 E-3) (0.3 E-3)
55. We use the numbers of NDAs and ANDAs in existence over all dosage forms for
a drug.
56. Unfortunately, estimates without this instrument are fairly imprecise.
From regression
Hospital share 2 3 2D 2H
57. The same comments with regard to exogeneity apply here as in our discussion of
the use of market size as an instrument.
58. A regression for the restricted sample using only /NN yields a coefficient on ANN
of 0.013 (0.003).
59. To calculate the total price decline for any given level of NN, we take exp(A) wher
A is the value attained by the estimated effects for that level of NN.
60. This could occur if doctors become price-sensitive in their prescribing patterns only
when they can choose among several roughly equivalent drugs. A related point is that
doctors may be hesitant to switch patients who are already successfully using the branded
drug. If advertising largely serves to stimulate demand for new prescriptions, for which
there is greater price sensitivity, more advertising may lead to lower prices.
61. Thus, TAPTR captures any effects that accumulate during the period between patent
expiration and generic entry. The truncation casues the entry variables (NN and NN2) to
measure the effect of entry from the price level in existence at the time of first generic
entry. Note that TAPTR is a function of the endogenous variable NN, so it too is instru-
mented.
62. Overall, in our sample, the mean ratio of branded hospital to drugstore prices is
0.93.
63. Interestingly, prices in the hospital market do seem to have a somewhat different
age profile than do prices in the drugstore market.
Variablea 2D 2H 4D 4H SD SH
ATAFS2 0.2 E-3 0.2 E-2 0.1 E-3 0.18 E-2 -0.5 E-4 0.16 E-2
(0.3 E-3) (0.3 E-3) (0.3 E-3) (0.4 E-3) (0.3 E-3) (0.4 E-3)
ANN2 ... ... 0.43 E-3 0.55 E-3 0.49 E-3 0.70 E-3
(0.31 E-3) (0.44 E-3) (0.31 E-3) (0.49 E-3)
Number of
observations 299 289 258 246 258 246
Source: Authors' calculations.
a. Dependent variable: A log (price); weighted IV estimates with class-specific year effects.
64. Some preliminary work by Berndt, Griliches, and Rosett (1991) suggests a close
correspondence in average price movements between IMS data and data received directly
from some leading pharmaceutical manufacturers for a sample of drugs produced by these
companies. Their comparison, however, averages over pharmacy and hospital sales and so
Submarket
1 -0.018 -0.030
2 -0.034 -0.056
3 -0.049 -0.081
5 -0.076 -0.126
10 -0.125 -0.209
15 -0.151 -0.258
20 -0.156 -0.280
is likely to be more informative about the accuracy of the data from the much larger
pharmacy submarket.
65. This problem would not be solved by looking at the entire sample; for the full
sample we have only four drug-years with generic entrants before 1982 (out of a total of
sixty-five over all years).
66. It should be pointed out, however, that even with this instrumental variables pro-
cedure, a potential selection bias still exists here since equation 11 can only be estimated
for periods in which we observe generic entry. Put differently, conditional on observing
generic sales in period t, qi, will potentially be correlated with our instruments for NN.
This selection problem may not be too severe in the present instance, however, because
of the delay between the decision to invest in regulatory permission to enter and the actual
event of entry. Indeed, the desire to eliminate any persistent component of q is one of the
reasons for yi, the generic "discount" for drug i, to be drug-specific even though it costs
us several observations on drugs with only one year of generic sales in our sample.
For this estimation we actually altered the definition of NN somewhat. In particular,
we altered any observation in which NN was less than one to set it equal to one. The reason
we did this is that the average generic price recorded in a year in which one generic producer
was active but only entered in, say, October will be the generic price associated with the
presence of one generic, not 0.25 generics. Given the small extent of branded price move-
ments in response to generic entry, this alteration is unlikely to cause much of a misspec-
ification in terms of the branded price.
Finally, we estimated equation 11 in levels because in this case we are interested in the
drug-specific constants 8i, which are needed to measure the extent of the generic discount.
For this equation, whose dependent variable is a ratio of prices rather than a price level as
in equation 7, no significant serial correlation is present.
Dependent variable
NN -0.0722 -0.0825
(0.0151) (0.0081)
Number of observations 45 45
Source: Authors' calculations.
a. Weighted IV estimates with drug-specific dummies.
PG ~ ( PG QB__
of existing generic producers much more severely than the price of the
original innovator. The ratio of generic drug prices to the branded drug's
price that would have prevailed absent any reaction to entry can be
obtained by adding the estimated coefficients from table 8 and the
estimated coefficients from specification 5 of table 3 to calculat
and ,G . The implied ratios as a function of NN are given in the se
column of table 9. With one entrant this ratio is 0.588, and with three
it drops to 0.496; by the time ten generic drug producers are in the
market, this ratio falls to 0.294, and with twenty it is 0.171. The decline
shown is consistent with one point that industry experts have repeatedly
made to us: generic drug companies make money by being the first to
enter after patent expiration.67 Yet, at the same time, this pattern is
still far from what would arise with Bertrand pricing. The third fact is
clear from these figures: preentry price-cost margins of branded drugs
are very large, and the decline in branded prices caused by entry of
generics represents a very small fraction of this margin.
Given these striking differences between branded and generic drug
prices, it is of some interest to examine the effects of generic entry on
the sales of the branded producer. The second column of table 8 reports
a regression in the same form as that for the generic/branded price ratio,
but with the log of the branded producer's market share (of quantity
sold) as the dependent variable. It is estimated over the same set of
observations as the generic/branded price regression; the implied market
shares as a function of NN are depicted in the third column of table 9.
This tabulation shows that although branded drug producers do sacrifice
significant market shares to low-priced generic substitutes, these re-
ductions are fairly small given the size of the price differentials. For
example, with five generic competitors the generic/branded price ratio
is 0.456, but the branded drug's share falls only to 0.748.68 These
estimates are also fairly consistent with the aggregate data on the generic
share of multisource drug markets cited above for 1989. The average
level of NN in 1987 for those branded drugs in our sample facing generic
competition, for example, is 8.61.69 Our estimates would then imply
a generic market share of 36 percent, a number fairly close to the
67. This fact seemed to have played an interesting role in the recent generic drug
scandal in which generic producers attempted not only to advance their own drug appli-
cations but also to slow down those of rivals. See, for example, U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce (1989).
68. One point worth noting is that there is a fair amount of variation across our drugs
in the level of their estimated fixed effects. In the generic price/branded price regression,
the standard deviation of the estimated fixed effects is 0.283, while it is 0.091 in the branded
market share equation. We made some attempt to explain this variance but were not very
successful with the limited number of drug-specific characteristics that we possessed. We
did detect some tendency for branded share to decline less the longer the drug was on the
market and if it was used for "chronic" conditions. Given more data and better measures
of drug characteristics, further exploration of the possibility of differing effects of entry
across drugs would seem desirable.
69. This average is slightly lower than the 9.54 reported in the data section for 1987
because here we are using NN, which for any year t is an average of the number of approved
generic producers for years t and t - 1.
70. At least two factors may explain this slightly lower share figure. First, aggregate
generic market shares were likely to be lower in 1987 than in 1989 (indeed, for 1988 the
aggregate generic share was roughly 38 percent), and second, the 42 percent figure is the
generic share of new prescriptions, which are likely to show a higher generic share than
do refill prescription sales (if experienced users of branded drugs are less likely to be
switched). In addition, note that our sampling procedure excluded multisource drugs whose
patents expired before 1976. This selection could also lead to a difference between generic
shares in our sample and in the market as a whole: entrants may have been less willing to
enter markets for drugs expiring in those years when entry costs were high. At the same
time, the selection excludes some drugs (for example, antibiotics such as penicillin) with
traditionally high generic shares.
71. We also explored (for the total market) whether there seemed to be any effect of
generic entry that accumulates over time independent of whether additional generic entry
occurs. Such effects could arise because physicians or consumers become more familiar
with the possibility of prescribing or purchasing the generic version of the drug or, alter-
natively, because generic entrants increase their productive capacity over time. We did find
some evidence for this type of effect. Introducing a constant into the first-differenced form
for the generic/branded price equation yields a parameter value of - 0. 11 (0. 03) and lowers
the coefficient of NN to - 0.048 (0.020). For a similar change to the branded share equation
the estimated constant is - 0.059 (0.023), while the estimate of NN is essentially unchanged
(without the constant, these first-differenced forms yield estimates almost identical to those
in table 8). With more data and longer postentry time series, a more thorough examination
of this type of effect would seem desirable.
Advertising
72. The quasi-likelihood ratio test for inclusion of year dummies in the estimations
reported in table 10 comes nowhere near rejecting the hypothesis of no year effects (we
could reject the hypothesis only at a significance level of roughly 0.50).
These findings reveal two points about advertising for branded drugs.
First, the significant declines in advertising levels due to impending
and actual entry of generic drugs strongly suggest that expanding the
overall market for the chemical entity is a significant function of branded
drug advertising; the arrival of generic entrants reduces the payout to
the innovator's investments in market expansion because benefits will
now be shared with these entrants. While this finding does not bear
directly on the degree to which the advertising of branded drugs is
73. Of course, this finding does not preclude such market-share shifting aspects to
branded drugs' advertising. Indeed, the content of the remaining advertising expenditures
may well shift toward loyalty-inducing messages ("Isn't quality important?") and away
from messages designed to expand the overall use of the chemical entity. This finding does,
however, limit the degree of the market-share shifting aspects.
74. The results also reveal another point: some branded drugs' advertising levels are
quite noisy. That can be seen from the low levels of R2 and the sizable difference betw
its weighted and unweighted levels. In the regressions that distinguish between large and
small markets, discussed below and reported in table 10, we shall see that this noise is due
mostly to the drugs that supply small markets.
75. Note that the effect of actual entry is very imprecisely estimated for the small
markets because so few generics entered these markets compared with the large ones.
76. Note, in particular, that the interaction of the "anticipation effects," BPE, APE,
and TAPTR, with variables that affect entry rates (such as market size) cannot ultimately
be a viable modeling strategy (despite our use of this strategy here to get a crude look at
Total Quantity
the anticipation issue), because as we include these interactions we lose the ability to
identify the effect of actual entry (such interaction terms are exactly our instruments for
NN). In principle, the correct procedure is to include explicit terms for expected entry that
we then instrument. However, incorporation of anything beyond very short anticipations
would dramatically reduce our sample.
77. As in table 10, we omit year dummies. A quasi-likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis
that they are not needed overwhelmingly supports this hypothesis: we only could reject at
a significance level of 0.95.
Variablea Estimate
AFS - 0.3476
(0.1067)
ATAFS 0. 1734
(0.0236)
ANN 0.0130
(0.0193)
ABPE 0.0024
(0.0384)
AAPE -0.0993
(0.0609)
R2 (weighted) 0.40
R2 (unweighted) 0.28
the branded producer's preentry price. The effect of additional generic com-
petitors is also noticeably stronger on generic prices than on branded ones.
The share commanded by generic producers increases with their number,
but the striking fact is the relatively small shares generics gain in light of
the discounts they offer from branded firms' prices: when the ratio of generic
to branded price is 0.456, we estimate that the generics capture a share of
only 25.2 percent.
Besides price, the main decision variable of the drug innovator is the
level of sales-promotion outlays. Although innovators' promotional pat-
terns for individual drugs are more diverse than their pricing decisions,
it is clear that both anticipated and actual entry of generic drugs lead to
substantial declines in the innovators' sales promotion activities.
To check implications of the changes in innovators' prices and sales
promotion, we undertook a parallel analysis of changes in total quantity
sold in each drug market. We found that quantity sold falls after the
patent's expiration and before generics enter the market, with the lower
prices offered by generic entrants failing to compensate for the demand
contraction apparently caused by the branded producer's reduction in ad-
vertising expenditures.
Less clear is the interpretation of our findings regarding the differences
between the pharmacy and hospital submarkets. In all of our results, the
hospital market seems more susceptible to generic competition: branded
drug price reductions are larger, the generic price discount is smaller, and
the market share of the branded drug falls more in the hospital than in
the pharmacy segment of the market. At the same time, however, these
differences are smaller than we might have expected. The difficulty in
interpreting these findings arises because we may be missing price dis-
counts that serve as an important means by which producers of branded
drugs respond to generic entry in the hospital segment. The small differ-
ence in branded market shares between the two segments (which have no
corresponding data problem) suggests two possibilities. Either, on aver-
age, the differences between these two segments are smaller than is com-
monly believed or, alternatively, significant enough unobserved discounts
are being offered to keep the branded drug share reasonably close across
the two segments. In this light, our finding concerning the effects of the
overall hospital share of the market on branded price response may be
suggestive of the latter possibility, since the use of selective direct dis-
counts may be lower for drugs sold primarily to hospitals. Examination
The research design that yielded these conclusions does not embody
any particular model of competitive interaction between producers of
branded and generic drugs. Nevertheless, it does seem to suggest a
number of preliminary conclusions regarding structure and behavior in
these markets. First, the goodwill stock that the drug innovator develops
over the course of the period of exclusive marketing clearly seems to
provide a significant degree of differentiation from later generic en-
trants. The extent of this differentiation can be seen in the relatively
small share that generic drug firms achieve despite their significant price
discounts, the relatively muted price response of the branded producer
to generic entry, and the quite different effects that successive generic
entries have on branded and generic prices.
Second, while the branded producer does accumulate loyalty-inducing
goodwill during the period of patent protection, the marked decline in
promotional activity caused by patent expiration and generic entry, as
well as the accompanying decline in quantities sold, suggests that a
significant component of sales promotion activity for branded drugs is
of the "market expansion" variety. While this fact does not lead to any
direct conclusions regarding the relative share of "informative" and "per-
suasive" messages in sales promotion activities for branded drugs, it does
reduce the extent to which those activities can be viewed as limiting the
opportunities faced by generic competitors. One possible reading of these
two findings is that the advantage achieved by the innovative drug relative
to later generic entrants is in large part tied to doctors' habitual use of the
brand name; after generic entry, however, a large share of possible pro-
motional activities by the branded producer would have positive spillovers
to generic producers, not only by increasing prescriptions written for
generics, but also through generic substitution of brand-written prescrip-
tions.
Third, we see little in this evidence that suggests any very active attempt
by producers of branded drugs to deter the entry of rivals. Although such
concerns about deterrence may still affect branded producers' prices and
78. This discussion has focused only on the welfare impact of generic entry gross of
any fixed entry costs. A second welfare concern surrounds the issue of whether there is
excess entry of generics relative to these fixed costs. See, for example, Mankiw and
Whinston (1986). The relatively small increases in overall generic market share achieved
as the number of generic competitors increases might suggest some concern in this regard.
The lowering of these fixed entry costs that accompanied the passage of the Waxman-Hatch
Act, however, seems likely to have lowered the extent of any welfare losses arising from
this problem, as discussed in Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
Comment by Ariel Pakes: This paper is the first cut at analyzing the
data on an interesting and important problem. This problem is "cleaner"
than most related industrial organization problems for several reasons.
First, there is a legal monopoly for the first T years of the product's
existence, and then free entry occurs at a fixed sunk cost thereafter (the
cost of approval by the Federal Drug Administration), giving us a well-
defined set of rules to determine possible market interactions. Second,
we are probably willing to believe that there are common and fairly
constant costs of production for the drugs being sold. Third, after in-
troduction of the branded drug, there seems to be only one major type
of investment (advertising), and we have reasonably detailed data on
it. There is, however, a difficult set of economic problems in modeling
demand and in defining precisely what we mean by "brand loyalty."
I come back to this concern later in my comments, but I would like to
say at the outset that we probably do not have much chance of gaining
a more detailed understanding of demand without data that follow in-
dividual doctors, or users, over time. So at least at this level of gen-
erality we are going to have to make some simplistic approximations.
The authors have, rightly in my opinion, started with an intuitive
"reduced-form" analysis. One can do this in many ways. Clearly theirs
has been careful and productive. I have only two comments on what
has actually been done. First, I did not understand the logic of elimi-
nating therapeutic class-specific time effects. It is hard to believe that
much of the variance in movements over time in these effects is caused
by changes in production cost (and what there is could probably be
handled in a much less drastic way), so I am worried that they are
eliminating precisely that part of the variance that their models ought
49
Does the share of hospital to drugstore sales of the branded drug affect
entry?, and so on).
Finally, I would have liked more information on the relationship of
hospital share to advertising and more detail on the distribution of
different characteristics (in contrast to sufficing with the mean). This
need for information is particularly true regarding the relationship of
the price of generics to the price of branded alternatives (are generics
always a lot cheaper, or is there significant variance that might be
attributable to more detailed economic analysis?), and of the relation-
ship of the price of branded drugs to hospitals to the price of branded
drugs to drugstores.
The authors have done a good job of summarizing their basic findings,
so there is no need for me to be repetitious. However, I would like to
stress a few results because of their impact on subsequent model choice.
First, as Michael Whinston stressed in his discussions with me, there
is a lot of dispersion when the generics enter as well as dispersion in
the quantities of generics. Though there is a problem of truncation here,
it seems that the data favor a mode for the entry distribution at about
three to four years after patent expiration. One can apply for approval
for the generic before the expiration of the patent on the branded al-
ternative, so the first moment of the FDA approval lag should not, in
itself, cause this kind of delay in the entry process, though some of it
may be explained by variance in the time of approval. I would have
liked more information on the amount of that variance. We seem,
therefore, to be largely left with explanations for the delay in the timing
of entry that stem from uncertainty about the value of the generic
(because of the possible appearance of substitute drugs, uncertainty in
the extent of attachment to the branded alternative, or, possibly, general
uncertainty about demand conditions). The uncertainty would allow for
a generic, which looked marginally unprofitable in one period, to look
marginally profitable in the next. To obtain some idea of the nature and
importance of such uncertainty, it might have been useful to know if
any of the new entrants failed and exited shortly after entering-or,
more generally, to know something about the distribution of profits
actually earned by the new entrants. There are references in the paper
to the availability of such information, but none is really presented. If
my reading is correct, however, a model that accounts for the data is
80. Ericson and Pakes (1989); and Berry and Lutz (1989).
so that
p = c + F(w-p)/f(w-p),
and price cost margins will be large when the demand elasticity is small
or in the tail case discussed above. The price cost margin will depend
on the value of w and will fluctuate over time as w fluctuates. This,
and the related effect on demand, will allow us to estimate the impact
of advertising on w. (Second-order conditions will be satisfied provided
that af() ' 0).
Given price, quantity is determined from demand, and the combi-
nation of price and quantity gives us r()r. So that is all we need for the
static profit function. This is a simple model of the differentiated product
model derived and analyzed in Berry and in Berry, Levinson, and
Pakes.81 These papers show how the parameters determining static prof-
its (M, c, and the parameters of the distribution of e) can be estimated
from information on price and quantity sold.
For the dynamics two stories are needed. One is the effect of ad-
vertising on w, and the other is the effect of advertising for the branded
good on the perceived quality index of a generic substitute. We let the
perceived quality of a generic, if it were to be introduced in the current
period, be w*. Then, for period t<T, where T is the statutory limit to
patent protection, the value of the firm is determined by the recursion
changes that have occurred in the time covered by the data, including
the Waxman-Hatch act and the institution of renewal fees on patents.
The model is not only rich enough to calculate effects on prices, quan-
tities, advertising, and so on, but it can also be used to calculate the
effects of the change on the welfare derived from the drugs that have
been produced. 86 These calculations do not, however, capture the effect
of the change in the environment on the amount of research done by
the drug companies, that is, the incentive effects on research (though
we can calculate the effect of the change in the environment on the
profits of marketed drugs).
Finally we can also evaluate the effects of policy changes that might
be feasible in the future. These include possible changes in the cost of
obtaining FDA approval (indeed, it may well be the case that we should
be subsidizing generic entry), the time that needs to be spent before
that approval can be obtained, changes in the statutory limit to the
length of patent lives, and changes in institutional structure that affect
either the cost or the efficacy of advertising.
Of course, the quality of all of our analysis will depend on the quality
of our estimates, and robustness analysis will be needed. However,
these issues are very complicated, and it is unlikely that one can figure
out the interrelationship between policy in this area and its implications
without some coherent, logical framework.
Comment by Peter Temin: This paper takes aim at one of the most
difficult markets for economists to understand. The market for phar-
maceutical drugs does not fulfill many of the conditions necessary to a
well-functioning market, and it has been a difficult market to model.
Many of the problems are common to the various markets involving
health, but some are unique to drugs. Two in particular may be used
as a summary. First, the market for prescription drugs is characterized
by pervasive uncertainty. By definition, these drugs are chosen by one
group of people (physicians) and purchased and consumed by another
(patients). I documented the extreme difficulty any physician would
have in informing himself or herself about choices between drugs. 87
And, as Richard Caves, Michael Whinston, and Mark Hurwitz docu-
86. See Pakes and McGuire (1991) for examples of such calculations.
87. Temin (1980).
ment, the pace of change is rapid. For all these reasons, information
relevant to the choice between drugs and between suppliers of drugs is
scarce. Second, a complex and multilayered regulatory structure has
been constructed to deal with this uncertainty. Regulation removes some
of the hazards arising from scarce information, but it creates problems
of its own.
Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz have resisted the impulse to propose
a fancy model of this complex industry and then see if there is any
reason to believe it. Instead, they have started from the data and at-
tempted to construct some "stylized facts" for model-builders to use.
The new data collected and analyzed by these authors expand our knowl-
edge of competition in prescription drugs.
The data come, as data on this industry generally do, from IMS
America. We must be grateful to this data-collecting firm for its en-
couragement of academic research. And we also need to ask about the
appropriateness of the data used by Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz.
Keflin seems to be an outlier in the proportion of sales to hospitals.
Are there other outliers in other dimensions? In particular, in light of
the product life of drugs described in the paper, it would be interesting
to know about newer drugs that compete with the sample. Caves, Whin-
ston, and Hurwitz say it is hard to know which drugs are competitors,
but it cannot be impossible. They also discuss the problems of distin-
guishing distributors and manufacturers, but they assume this veil is
transparent to pharmacists. Is it actually so sheer?
Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz distill "two basic facts" from the
aggregate data. They characterize generic substitution as "relatively
infrequent," restricted to 29 percent of multisource brand-written pre-
scriptions. The force of this observation is that doctors and pharma-
cists-faced with a choice-do not exercise it.
The data reveal a more complex pattern. Twenty percent of pre-
scriptions for multisource drugs are generic; 20 percent prohibit sub-
stitution. Only 60 percent therefore are up for grabs at the pharmacy.
About 40 percent of these prescriptions are filled with generic drugs.
In other words, doctors make explicit choices in 40 percent of pre-
scriptions for multisource drugs, dividing equally between brand name
and generic. Pharmacists make the choice in the remaining 60 percent,
dividing their choices 60-40 in favor of the brand-name drugs.
Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz attempt to explain this variation as
sample. The time trend in the regressions is a proxy for entry of pa-
tented, as opposed to generic, drugs. Entry comes, in other words, at
both ends of the market.
Second, the price response of branded drugs to new (generic) entry
is small. Generic drug prices respond more strongly to entry than brand-
name prices. Third, advertising for a specific drug already has started
its decline by the time there is entry and is depressed sharply in addition
when entry does occur. Fourth, despite the lack of price response of
brand-name drugs and despite the reduction of advertising, the market
shares for generics remain embarrassingly small. With a price differ-
ential of 40 percent, the first generic captures an average market share
of 5 percent. With two generic suppliers, the price ratio drops slightly,
and their combined market share rises to only 10 percent.
To show how striking this last observation is, let me contrast it with
one from another of my favorite industries: telecommunications. With
a price differential that has been declining over time from around 10
percent to 2 or 3 percent, "generic" entrants have reduced AT&T's
share of interstate telecommunication by about 40 percent.88
As Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz note, this figure is close to the
42 percent aggregate share that generics hold in the multisource drug
market. The low market share of the initial entrants then is a description
of the process by which the generic market grew, not a statement about
a stable equilibrium. It would be interesting to learn if the path was
determined by forces on the demand side (strong brand loyalty) or
supply side (low capacity of the initial generic entrants).
Can these curious characteristics be combined into a coherent view
of this industry? Here is a rough cut. Competition, let us assume, is
an entirely different process for brand-name and generic manufacturers.
The differences in prescribing and dispensing patterns noted above are
not noise. They are related to characteristics of the market: to the
regulation of doctors and compensation of pharmacists. What appears
to be variations in a single market is in fact the aggregation of two
separate, but related, markets.
The major drug companies engage in Schumpeterian competition in
which the rewards are for innovation. Advertising informs the medical
community about new innovations. It is socially useful, creating rather
with patent expiration and generic entry is due simply to new chemical
entities coming into the marketplace. Michael Whinston said it is not
clear a priori what the direction of any bias would be, if there is one,
and that the issue is by no means simple.
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