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Islamophobia in Muslim Majority
Societies

In the last decade, Islamophobia in Western societies, where Muslims constitute

the minority, has been studied extensively. However, Islamophobia is not
restricted to the geography of the West, but rather constitutes a global phenom-
enon. It affects Muslim societies just as much, due to various historical, eco-
nomic, political, cultural and social reasons.
Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies constitutes a first attempt to open
a debate about the understudied phenomenon of Islamophobia in Muslim
majority societies. An interdisciplinary study, it focuses on socio-political and

­
historical aspects of Islamophobia in Muslim majority societies.
This volume will appeal to students, scholars and general readers who are
interested in Racism Studies, Islamophobia Studies, the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region, Islam and Politics.

Enes Bayraklı is a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at

Turkish–German University, Istanbul, and Director of European Studies at the
Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research – Turkey (SETA).

Farid Hafez is currently Senior Researcher in the Department of Political

Science and Sociology, University of Salzburg, Austria, and Senior Researcher
at Georgetown University, USA.
Routledge Advances in Sociology

247 Intergenerational Family Relations

An Evolutionary Social Science Approach
Antti O. Tanskanen and Mirkka Danielsbacka

248 Performing Fantasy and Reality in Contemporary Culture

Anastasia Seregina

249 The Philosophy of Homelessness

Barely Being
Paul Moran and Frances Atherton

250 The Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse

Investigating the Politics of Knowledge and Meaning-making
­
Edited by Reiner Keller, Anna-Katharina Hornidge, Wolf J. Schünemann
­
251 Christianity and Sociological Theory
Reclaiming the Promise
Joseph A. Scimecca

252 Ageing, Diversity and Equality

Edited by Sue Westwood

253 Cinematic Tourist Mobilities and the Plight of Development

On Atmospheres, Affects and Environments
Rodanthi Tzanelli

254 Bicycle Utopias

Imagining Fast and Slow Cycling Futures
Cosmin Popan

255 Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies

Edited by Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez

For more information about this series, please visit:

www.routledge.com/Routledge-Advances-in-Sociology/book-series/SE0511
­
­
­
Islamophobia in Muslim
Majority Societies

Edited by
Enes Bayraklı
and Farid Hafez
First published 2019
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2019 selection and editorial matter, Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez;
individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez to be identified as the authors
of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has
been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
­
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
­
A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-1-138-61300-3 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-429-46485-0 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
Contents

Notes on contributors vii


Acknowledgements xii

Introduction 1

E B F H z
nes
ayraklı
and
arid 
afe
1 Making sense of Islamophobia in Muslim societies 
5
E B , F H z Lé F
nes
ayraklı
arid
afe
and
onard
aytre 
2 ‘Religion-building’ and foreign policy 21
­

H B z
atem
a
ian 
3 Islamophobia in the contemporary Albanian
public discourse 45

R z B
e
art 
eka 
4 Post-coloniality, Islamization and secular elites: tracing
­
Islamophobia in Pakistan 59

S F A S
yed
urrukh
Zad
li 
hah
5 The politics of Islamophobia in Turkey 71

A A
li
slan 
6 Islamophobia in satirical magazines: a comparative case
study of Penguen in Turkey and Charlie Hebdo in France 93

Müş rr Yardı and na Easa - aas
e
ef
m
Ami
t
­D
7 Paradoxical Islamophobia and post-colonial cultural
­
nationalism in post-revolutionary Egypt 107
­

M K
ay
osba 
vi Contents

  
8 Old wine in new bottles: secularism and Islamophobia
in Egypt 125


D A E
eina
bdelkad
r
9 Internalized Islamophobia: the making of Islam in the
Egyptian media 137


S EL z
ahar
ahed 
10 The confluence of race and religion in understanding
Islamophobia in Malaysia 161

M N O
ohamed
awab 
sman
11 Securitization of Islam in contemporary Ethiopia 175


J M
emal
uhamed
12 Islamophobia from within: a case study on Australian
Muslim women 199

D I K N
erya
ner
and
aty
ebhan 
Index 216

Contributors

Deina Abdelkader is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department, a

Visiting Scholar at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University
(2016–current), previously a Visiting Scholar at Alwaleed Islamic Studies
Program, Harvard University (2014–2016). She is the author of Social Justice
in Islam (IIIT, 2000) and Islamic Activists: The Anti-Enlightenment Demo-

­
crats (Pluto Press, 2011). She has also authored a number of articles, includ-
ing ‘Coercion, Peace and the Issue of Jihad’ in the Digest of Middle East
Studies, and a book chapter, ‘Modernity, Islam and Religious Activism’, in
The New Global Order and the Middle East (Routledge, 2016). She served as
the chair of the Religion and International Relations Book Award for the
Religion and International Relations Section of the International Studies
Association (2015), and she is one of two women on the North American
Muslim Jurisprudential Council. She is a co-founder and co-director of the
­
­
Cohort for the Study of Islam and International Relations (COIRIS). Her
areas of foci are democratic transitions in the Muslim world and Islamic Polit-
ical Activism.
Ali Aslan studied Political Science and International Relations at the University
of Delaware, USA, where he received his PhD in 2012. He is a member of
faculty at Ibn Haldun University, and works as a researcher at Society and
Media Directorate at SETA Istanbul. His academic interests include Political
Theory and Turkish politics.
Enes Bayraklı earned his BA, MA and PhD from the Department of Political
Science at the University of Vienna, and conducted research for his PhD
thesis at the University of Nottingham in UK between 2009 and 2010. He
took office as a eputy irector at Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centre in
D
D
London in 2011–2013. He also served as the founding Director of Yunus
Emre Turkish Cultural Centres in Constanta and Bucharest during the period
of August–December 2012. He has been a faculty member in the Department
of Political Science at Turkish–German University since 2013. He is also dir-
ector of European Studies at the Foundation for Political, Economic and
Social Research (SETA). Since 2015 he is the co-editor of annual European
­
Islamophobia Report. He also has appeared on Turkish national and
viii Contributors

  
international media on numerous occasions to discuss various issues such as
anti-Muslim racism and Turkish Foreign Policy. His fields of research include

­
the Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Analysis and
Islamophobia.
Hatem Bazian is Provost, Co-founder and Professor of Islamic Law and Theo-

­
logy at aytuna College, the 1st Accredited Muslim Liberal Arts College in
Z
the United States. He is a teaching Professor in the Departments of Near
Eastern and Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Between
2002 and 2007, he also served as an adjunct Professor of law at Boalt Hall
School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley. In addition to
Berkeley, he served as a visiting Professor in Religious Studies at Saint
Mary’s College of California 2001–2007 and adviser to the Religion, Politics
and Globalization Centre at University of California, Berkeley. He is prolific
writer having authored four books (two more are underway), numerous chap-
ters in edited volumes, hundreds of articles and published studies on various
subjects. In spring 2009, he founded at Berkeley the Islamophobia Research
and Documentation Project at the Centre for Race and Gender, a research unit
dedicated to the systematic study of Othering Islam and Muslims. In spring
2012, he launched the Islamophobia Studies Journal, the only academic
journal dedicated to the slamophobia tudies field, which is published
I
S
bi-annually through Pluto Press.
­
Rezart Beka is currently a PhD student in Arabic and Islamic Studies at
Georgetown University. He obtained his first M (with summa cum laude)
A
in nterdisciplinary tudies of eligions and Cultures from the Pontifical
I
S
R
Gregorian University, Rome, Italy in 2011 and his second MA (with summa
cum laude) in the Study of Contemporary Muslim Thought and Societies at
Faculty of Islamic Studies (FIS) of Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU),
Doha, Qatar in 2016. He holds a BA in Sociology from University of
Tirana, Albania. He has authored three books in Albanian, The Pontifical
Man, (Erasmus Publishing, 2007) and ‘Critical Commentary’ (with foot-
notes) on Rahmatullah Al-Hindi’s Work Truth Revealed (Erasmus Publish-
­
ing, 2004) and a number of articles such as ‘Comunione Matrimoniale
Secondo i Testi Fondanti del Islam’ (in Italian) Periodica de Re Canonica,
Vol. 100, No. 3–4 2011, ‘Jesus and Muhammad: The New Convergences’
(in Albanian) Një No. 2 2010, ‘The Development of Islamic Medicine’ (in
Albanian) Pena No. 1 2008.
Amina Easat-Daas earned her PhD at Aston University, Birmingham, UK and
­
studied Muslim women’s political participation in France and Belgium. She
is currently part of the European Commission-funded Counter-Islamophobia
­
­
Kit research project team at the University of Leeds. Her research interests
include the study of Muslim women, Muslim youth, Islamophobia and
countering-Islamophobia in Europe, ‘European–Islam’. She has presented her
­
research findings to the European Parliament, The Carter Centre and the
 Contributors ix

  
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) among others

­
and has appeared on international media on numerous occasions to discuss
anti-Muslim current affairs.
­
Sahar El Zahed is a Candidate of Philosophy in Islamic Studies at University of
California, Los Angeles (UCLA). She is interested in Islamophobia, Orientalism,
the media representation of Islam and Muslims in countries with a Muslim
majority and social media.
Léonard Faytre graduated from Sciences Po Paris University with degrees in
both Political Science (BA) and Urban Policy (MA) in 2013. After moving to
Istanbul the same year, he continued his studies and completed a second MA
in Argumentation Theories (Münazara) at Alliance of Civilization Institute
(Ibn Haldun University) in 2018. His researches focus on Political Theory,
French Foreign Affairs and French Immigration Policy. Beside French, he
speaks fluently English, Turkish and rabic. Currently, he works as esearch
A
R
Assistant at the European Studies Department of SETA Foundation.
Syed Furrukh Zad Ali Shah is Assistant Professor at Faculty of Contemporary
Studies, National Defence University Islamabad Pakistan. He received PhD
as the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) doctoral candidate from
the University of Erfurt Germany in 2016 on cultural politics of Islamophobia
in Western Europe, which is titled ‘Spaces of Engagement: Relocating Euro-
pean Islamophobia in Muslim Diaspora Enclaves’. He holds a MPhil in Inter-
national Relations (2004) from Quaid-i-Azam University, researching on
­
‘Genocide: How to Reckon with Past Wrongs’. As Assistant Professor of
International Relations, he taught at National University of Modern Lan-
guages & Sciences, Quaid-i-Azam University, and Fatima Jinnah University
­
in Pakistan (1996–2011) and at University of Erfurt, Germany (2012–2016).
His research interests are focused on Muslims in the West, Islamophobia
Politics and Political Islam.
Farid Hafez is currently Senior Researcher at the University of Salzburg,
Department of Political Science and Sociology. He is also Senior
Researcher at Georgetown University’s ‘The Bridge Initiative’. In 2017, he
was Fulbright Visiting Professor at University of California, Berkeley and
in 2014, he was Visiting Scholar at Columbia University, New York. Since
2010 he has been the Editor of the Islamophobia Studies Yearbook, and
since 2016 the Co-editor of the European Islamophobia Report. He serves
­
as an adviser and reviewer for a number of boards and journals. He has
received the Bruno Kreisky Award for the political book of the year for his
anthology Islamophobie in Österreich (Studienverlag, 2009) co-edited with
­
John Bunzl. Currently, his research focuses on Muslim youth movements in
Europe. He earned his PhD in Political Science from the University of
Vienna. Hafez has more than 80 publications and regularly publishes in
leading journals and publishing houses.
x Contributors

  
Derya Iner is Senior Lecturer and Research Coordinator at the Centre for
Islamic Studies, Charles Sturt University, teaching and researching subjects
on contemporary issues related to Islam, Islamic cultures and Muslims. She
completed her PhD in Cultural Studies and Gender Studies in Wisconsin-

­
Madison (USA). Her research focus on Islamophobia, especially women and
children’s experience with Islamophobia, Western Muslim Youth and Reli-
gious identity, and early twentieth-century Ottoman intellectual history. She

­
is the chief investigator and editor of the Islamophobia in Australia
2014–2016 report, whose second issue is in progress.
May Kosba is a doctoral student in the Cultural and Historical Studies of
Religion at the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, CA, from which she
holds an MA in Islamic Studies at the Centre for Islamic Studies.
Jemal Muhamed is a PhD candidate in Political Science and International Rela-
tions at Istanbul Sabahattin aim University. He earned his undergraduate
Z
degree in Political Science and International Relations in 2013 from Dire-

­
Dawa University in Ethiopia. After working as a graduate assistant at Samara
University for two years, Muhamed joined Addis Ababa University, where he
obtained his master’s degree in Peace and Security Studies in 2017. Since
then, he has served as an instructor in the department of Civics and Ethical
Studies at Samara University in Ethiopia where he offered various courses for
undergraduate programs in International Relations, International Organiza-
tions and Law, Peace and Conflict, esearch Methods, Federalism and Local
R
Government, Politics of Development, and Civics and Ethics. While complet-
ing his PhD, he is also an Associate Researcher at the Centre for Islam and
Global Affairs at Istanbul Sabahattin aim University. His research interests
Z
include peace and security, conflict management, and democratization and
transnational politics in the North-East (Horn) of Africa in broader contexts
­
of the Middle East and international politics.
Katy Nebhan is a historian with a particular interest in Australian masculinities
and the development of minority communities within a distinctive Australian
culture. She has worked on heritage preservation in New South Wales and
has written on the Afghan cameleers, Australian Muslim history and popular
culture. She is currently working on a research project at Centre for Islamic
Studies and Civilisation, Charles Sturt University.
Mohamed Nawab Osman is the Coordinator of the Malaysia Program at RSIS.
He also coordinates RSIS’ Seminar Series on Muslim Societies in Asia. His
research interests include the domestic and international politics of Southeast
and South Asian countries, transnational Islamic political movements and
Islamophobia Studies. He has written various papers, books and journal
articles relating to his research interests. He is the author of Hizbut Tahrir
Indonesia: Identity, Ideology and Religo-Political Mobilisation (Routledge,
­
2018) and Islam and Peace-Building the Asia-Pacific (World cientific,
­
­
S
2017). Some of his articles have been featured in prominent journals such as
 Contributors xi

  
Contemporary Islam, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Islamophobia
Studies, Sociology of Islam, Southeast Asia Research, South Asia and Con-
temporary Southeast Asia.
Müşerref Yardım graduated from the Eastern Languages Department at the
Liège University (Belgium) and has an MA in Islamic Civilization from
orbonne University (France). fter completing her Ph in the field of
S
A
D
Sociology of Religion at Strasbourg University (France) in 2010, she worked
for three years at the nstitut Européen des Etudes eligieuses et cientifiques
I
R
S
in Brussels. Since 2014 she has been working as an Assistant Professor in the
Sociology Department of Necmettin Erbakan University, Faculty of Social
Sciences and Humanities. Her specialisms include Islamophobia, Colonialism,
Multiculturalism, Racism, Discrimination, Othering and Hate Speech within
European Media.
Acknowledgements

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to all scholars who contributed to
this book, and Hacı Mehmet Boyraz, Zeliha Eliaçık and eyda Karaoğlu for their

Ş
valuable assistance throughout the publication process of this book.
Introduction
Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez

In the last decade, many studies explored Islamophobia in Western societies,

where Muslims constitute the minority. Muslim societies, however, have been
nearly neglected as hotspots of Islamophobia. One of the reasons for this is the
obvious fact that Muslims make up the majority in most of these countries. But
can Islamophobia be exclusively explained based on a majority–minority
relation?
This book shows how anti-Muslim racism plays a significant role in predomi-
­
nantly Muslim societies and participates in Muslim countries’ public policy,
state ideology, elite/masse relations and media orientation. Therefore, Islamo-
phobia does not only define the relationship between majorities and minorities
(as it can be observed in Western societies), but more specifically, one between
the powerful versus the powerless. While this relationship is often manifested by
antagonizing Westernized Muslim elites versus conservative Muslim masses,
Islamophobia in the form of epistemic racism is as much existent within Islamic
discourses that are based on a Eurocentric outlook of the world.
Therefore, it can be argued that Islamophobia in the Muslim world and
Islamophobia in the West stem from similar ideological and epistemological
backgrounds. This can be seen from the similarity between the Islamophobic
discourse and debates of Muslim societies with those of Western societies.
Nevertheless, there are differences based on the historical, social, demographical
and political contexts of the respective societies as well.
Rich in case studies covering different Muslim majority countries, this book
constitutes an unprecedented attempt to make sense of Islamaphobia and a must
read for anyone interested in contemporary Muslim societies. It is a must read
for anyone interested in contemporary Muslim societies.
This book presents a critical perspective on an underexposed topic whose
importance is related to larger issues of international relations, emphasizing the
crucial role played by colonial power up to the present day.
In this study, Islamophobia is defined as anti-Muslim racism. It is about a
­
dominant group of people aspiring to seize, stabilize and widen their power by
means of defining a scapegoat – real or invented – and excluding this scapegoat
from the resources, rights and definition of a constructed ‘we’. Islamophobia oper-
ates by constructing a static ‘Muslim’ identity, which is attributed in negative terms
2 Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez

  
and is generalized for a whole group of Muslims, often placed in opposition to
ruling governments. In Muslim countries, Islamophobia can especially be under-
stood as a way of regulating and disciplining Muslim subjects who are perceived as
a threat to the dominant groups in power, thus framing Islamophobia as political.
Islamophobia, as a form of racialized governmentality, aims at undermining a
power-critical Muslim identity that especially questions the assumptions of a
­
Western epistemological hegemony that is shared by Muslim elites.
In the first chapter entitled ‘Making sense of Islamophobia in Muslim soci-
eties’, Enes Bayraklı from the Turkish German University, Farid Hafez from
Salzburg University and Georgetown University and Léonard Faytre from Ibn
Haldun University discuss different approaches that allow us to better under-
stand Islamophobia in Muslim majority societies. They argue that anti-Muslim

­
racism does not only result from a majority–minority relation, but from a power
relation between powerful and powerless groups as well. By focusing on the
ideological and political ruptures between Westernized secular Muslim elites
and conservative Muslim masses, the authors explain how Muslims can actually
be Islamophobes. They suggest to look at Islamophobia through the lenses of
world-systems theory, epistemic racism and secularism. They draw on the con-
­
cepts of self-Orientalization and self-Westernization to explain how some seg-
­
­
ments of Muslim societies approach their identity, their tradition and their own
world-view through an alien outlook, namely Western Orientalism. The authors
­
underline this process in order to explain the possibility of Muslim self-hatred.

­
The latter is not only rooted in colonization, but more generally in the encounter
with the powerful modern secular West at the turn of the nineteenth century. As
a result, Islamophobia is conceived here as a form of racialized governmentality
that aims to undermine a distinct Muslim identity.
The second chapter entitled ‘Islamophobia in Muslim majority states: ‘religion-
­
building’ and foreign policy’ written by Hatem Bazian from the University of
California, Berkeley advances debate drawing on Talal Asad’s critical reflections
on secularism. Hatem Bazian starts his chapter by proposing a distinct and histor-
ically focused notion of Islamophobia in Muslim majority societies. He locates
Islamophobia primarily as a ‘process emerging out and shaped by the colonial-
­
Eurocentric hegemonic discourses dating to late 18th century’, which also emphas-
izes the role of internalization by post-colonial elites.
­
In the third chapter entitled ‘Islamophobia in the contemporary Albanian
public discourse’, Rezart Beka from Georgetown University explores the ways
Islamophobia is manifested in the post-communist Albanian public discourse.
­
The chapter traces the extent to which Albanian public intellectuals have utilized
global Islamophobic paradigms, like Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, the
idea of ‘Islamofascism’ or the narrative of a ‘European Judeo-Christian identity’
­
to apply them to the Albanian context.
In the fourth chapter titled ‘Post-coloniality, Islamization and secular elites:
­
tracing Islamophobia in Pakistan’, Syed Furrukh Zad Ali Shah from the National
Defence University, Islamabad identifies how secular elites, influenced by the
Western episteme of secular modernity, carry Islamophobic prejudices towards
 Introduction 3

  
Islam in the Pakistani context, apart from its civic critique. The chapter is a valu-
able contribution to the book since, according to the author, Islam in Pakistan
has frequently and fervently been employed by the state establishment to develop
the ideological foundations of the post-colonial polity.

­
In the fourth chapter, Ali Aslan from Ibn Haldun University, with his contri-
bution titled ‘The politics of Islamophobia in Turkey’ argues that Islamophobia
was central to the construction and reproduction of a modern nation-state in

­
Turkey. The author contends that the politics of Islamophobia was specifically
exploited for that goal, constructing Islam and Muslims as the enemy of the
newly established secular regime and keeping religion and the religious outside
of the state. According to Aslan, Islamophobia first served to replace the
Ottoman Empire with the secular–nationalist Turkish Republic and was later
deployed to produce a secular–nationalist reality. However, this second phase
produced an autocratic and alienated political order, which was opposed by the
democratic bloc that included the religious–conservative masses and the notables
in the aftermath of the 1940s. As a result of this, this century-long political

­
struggle ended with the victory of the democratic forces and the dismantlement
of the Kemalist bureaucratic tutelage in Turkey in the 2000s.
The sixth chapter, ‘Islamophobia in satirical magazines: a comparative case
study of Penguen in Turkey and Charlie Hebdo in France’, written by Müşerref
Yardım from Necmettin Erbakan University and Amina Easat-Daas from Leeds
­
University, critically analyses and compares the nature of Islamophobic cartoons
from a Turkish magazine, Penguen, and a French magazine, Charlie Hebdo.
This chapter highlights the commonalities and the differences between Islamo-
phobia in Western and Muslim societies through the comparison of two cases.
May Kosba from the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley contributes to
the work with the seventh chapter titled ‘Paradoxical Islamophobia and post-
­
colonial cultural nationalism in post-revolutionary Egypt’. The chapter debates
­
that, in the years following the aftermath of Egypt’s 2011 revolution, the country
has witnessed a rise in the demonization of al-Ikhwan or the Muslim Brother-
­
hood. Kosba asserts that the current Egyptian government and its allies have
generated a fear of Islamists in the media and in religious institutions, particu-
larly a fear of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was the main force behind the
first freely elected s in the history of modern Egypt. She also argues that this
fear-mongering narrative has often resulted in Islamophobic language, policies
­
and actions, familiar to those in the West and that have contributed to the rise of
Islamophobia in the form of a widespread anti-Ikhwan sentiment.
­
Deina Abdelkader from Harvard University, in the eighth chapter titled ‘Old
wine in new bottles: secularism and Islamophobia in Egypt’, presents the
struggle between the secular and religious divide in Egypt, which culminated in
the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. The roots of Western liberal
democracy are also discussed in this chapter in juxtaposition to similar roots of
the principle of ‘the Common Good’. The last part of the chapter focuses on
tying the historical and ideological roots to what has transpired since the
Egyptian revolution of 2011.
4 Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez

  
In the ninth chapter entitled ‘Internalized Islamophobia: the making of Islam
in the Egyptian media’, Sahar El Zahed from the University of California inves-
tigates and elaborates on the ways in which various meanings of Orientalism
inform the making of Islam and Muslims among the secularized intelligentsia
and policy-makers in Egypt. Through an analysis of segments from five leading
­
Egyptian TV programmes and a presidential speech, El Zahed explores the ways
in which such programs and speeches engage in so-called ‘Self-Orientalism’.

­
­
The following chapter, titled ‘The confluence of race and religion in under-
standing Islamophobia in Malaysia’ and written by Mohamed Nawab Osman
from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, discusses Islamophobia
in the context of Malaysia by examining the historical and contemporary struc-
tures of power that enabled the rise of Islamophobia, the factors that rendered
Islamophobia increasingly normalized, as well as the manifestations of Islamo-
phobia in Malaysia. The chapter proposes that Islamophobia in the Malaysian
context needs to be understood from the lens of racism since previously held
cultural and racial biases against the Malay–Muslim majority populace in
Malaysia have now translated into bias against the Islamic faith.
In his chapter ‘Securitization of Islam in contemporary Ethiopia’, Jemal
Muhamed from Sabahattin Zaim University focuses on Islamophobia in Ethiopia.
He argues that Islam has been securitized in Ethiopia through the implementation
of legislative changes and institutional practices towards Ethiopian Muslims that
affect the latter in different ways.
In the last chapter entitled ‘Islamophobia from within: a case study on
Australian Muslim women’, Derya Iner and Katy Nebhan from Charles Sturt
University explore the internal Islamophobia within the Muslim community in
Sydney and thereby unpack the intersections between internal and external Islamo-
phobia. The chapter gives voice to those Australian Muslim women who are strug-
gling with Islamophobia from Muslims within a larger context of a minority status.
We hope this book will be a reference study to gain an insight into the various
aspects of Islamophobia in Muslim majority contexts and will encourage further
studies and debate in this area.
Istanbul and Salzburg, August 2018
1 Making sense of Islamophobia in
Muslim societies
Enes Bayraklı, Farid Hafez and Léonard Faytre

Introduction
The vast literature in the emerging field of Islamophobia Studies has been focus-
ing on Islamophobia in what many people refer to as the ‘West’ in a geographic
way of understanding. Or at least, Islamophobia was analysed in terms of
Western political forces, which represent powers that are located there such as
US foreign policy, although its scope reaches countries such as Iraq and Afghan-
istan. This book is a first attempt to shift the discussion to a different context. It
is not meant to redefine Islamophobia as such, but rather to look at how Islamo-
phobia plays a role in a context where Muslims are not the minority in a society,
but constitute the majority of a society. Muslims are in the minority status in
many ‘Western’ countries, where this goes hand in hand with less economic and
political power. Even in countries with a large Muslim population, however,
Islamophobia can play a significant role.
In this chapter, we try to disclose the main dynamics that make sense of
Islamophobia in predominantly Muslim societies. By ‘Muslim societies’, we
refer to societies with a Muslim majority population. First, we suggest framing
the notion of the ‘West’ not as a territorial category, but as one of power. With
the global hegemony of the United States as the super power on the globe, Islam-
ophobia can be understood as a continuation of an already existing global struc-
ture of racialization where ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ have replaced ‘biology’
(Mbembe, 2014, p. 7) The whole world is home to Islamophobia, especially in
the form of epistemic racism. The latter, which is seen as one of the most hidden
forms of racism, is defined by Ramón Grosfoguel as a tradition in which ‘the
“West” is considered to be the only legitimate tradition of thought able to
produce knowledge and the only one with access to “universality”, “rationality”,
and “truth” ’ (Grosfoguel, 2010, p. 29).
This does not mean, on the other hand, that Islamophobia is expressed in the
same form in every context. Obviously, in the political context of a kingdom or
an autocratic state, Islamophobia may function differently but, in essence, the
phenomenon is connected to the global political context that is very much struc-
tured by the post-colonial order and related to contemporary US hegemony in
­
the world. Second, since many of the political elites in Muslim societies have
6 Enes Bayraklı et al.

  
been educated in the centres, some even in the higher learning institutions, of the
global North, many among these Westernized elites think along the same pat-
terns as ‘white men’. This is true for formerly colonized countries such as Egypt,
Pakistan or Algeria, as well as self-Westernized countries such as Turkey and

­
Iran before the revolution. Therefore, the regulation of Islam in many Muslim
countries has become a way of regulating an identity that was regarded as a
threat to the Western-like secular nation-state. Third, this reflects a notion of

­
­
Islamophobia that was suggested by Salman Sayyid in his writings. According
to Sayyid, Islamophobia is about making it impossible for a Muslim political
identity to exist. For him, the challenge of being Muslim today is that there is no
epistemological or political space for its identity (Sayyid, 2014, p. 8). Accord-
ingly, the inclusion of Islam in Western epistemology as a concept would
destabilize the colonial order. Sayyid wants to introduce a post-positivist, post-

­
­
Orientalist and decolonial perspective to create exactly this space. Christian
political identity, such as Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Party, may be
regarded as part and parcel of our current political order, whereas this is not the
case on behalf of Islamic political identities. This aspect is strongly connected to
the fourth aspect of Islamophobia, which is self-Orientalization, meaning non-
­
­
Westerners’ appropriation of a Western understanding of the world. One could
here intervene to argue that this framing may support a non-critical support of

­
political Islam. This is not the case since both forms of Islamophobia – con-
ceived as a form of epistemic racism and self-Orientalization – can be found
­
among those actors propagating an ideology of political Islam or Muslim theolo-
gians who reproduce Western dominance by attempting to imitate it and hence
become nothing more than a reflection of Western patterns of thought.
While epistemic disobedience (Mignolo, 2009) becomes a necessity to relo-
cate the subaltern Muslim subject in the world, this also invited reductive –what
some called nativist or fundamentalist (Ali, 2002, p. 126) – perspectives to
counter the influence of colonialism and fight it back. We argue that the problem
at hand is more complex. Since racism, such as, in our case, anti-Muslim racism,
­
is not about an intentional act but is structural and works unconsciously, it can
also be part of Islamist discourses who often mirror the essentialist and reduc-
tionist identity politics of their Western counterparts.

World-systems theory, epistemic Islamophobia

­
and secularism
Islamophobia is another form of epistemic racism, since Islam is excluded and
denigrated and perceived as antithetic to the modern secular tradition by the
dominant West (Grosfoguel, 2010, p. 29). In his reflection on the Formations of the
Secular (2003), Talal Asad demonstrates how Muslims in Europe are both present
and absent from the secular Europe. Present on one side, because of Muslim immi-
gration to the Old Continent and their subsequent place in the European public life
(work, education, media etc.). Absent on the other, because Muslims are perceived
as carrying values that contradict those of the European sacrosanct principle,
 Islamophobia in Muslim societies 7

  
namely the subordination of the divine authority by the worldly power (i.e. secular-
ism). In this regard, ‘Muslims may be in Europe but are not of it’ (Asad, 2003,
p. 164). We argue that this observation does not only speak to Muslims in Europe,
but to those in many Muslim majority societies as well.
In Local Histories/global Designs (2000), decolonialist author Mignolo helps
us understand the roots of epistemic Islamophobia in Muslim societies through
his reflection on the notion of coloniality. By drawing on Quijano’s notion of
‘coloniality of power’ (Quijano, 2000) that assumes a hierarchical structure of
the whole world between the dominating-made product (from the white Western

­
man) and the dominated-made product (from any non-white Western man) in
­
­
every social sphere (ontology, epistemology, language, sign, economy, politics,
etc.), Mignolo introduces the concept of ‘world views in collision’. In fact,
Mignolo profoundly demonstrates how the encounter between European local
cultures and non-European worlds at the beginning of the sixteenth century did
­
not only lead to the ‘transition from one culture to another’ (that is Malinowski’s
concept of ‘acculturation’) or to the complex interbreeding of cultures (that is
Ortiz’s concept of ‘transculturation’) but rather to coloniality of power, which
‘presupposes the colonial difference as its condition of possibility and as the
legitimacy for the subalternization of knowledges and the subjugation of people’
(Mignolo, 2000, p. 16).
Mignolo describes this Europeanization of the world as an offensive process
that colonizes any sphere of the ‘being’ and that deeply reshapes the colonized’s
approach to the world, namely his understanding of ontology (definition of
human being and of its relation to the inner and supra-worlds), of psychology
­
(subconsciousness, self-representation), of linguistics (discourse, use of certain
­
concepts), of epistemology (definition of knowledge, divine and secular know-
ledge), to politics (state, nation, secularism), of economy (capitalism, industry,
centre–periphery) etc. At the end of this destructive process, the colonized is not
allowed to ‘be’ outside the Europeanized world. Put differently, Mignolo draws
an intrinsic link between Europeanism (i.e. Western colonial design of the
world), Orientalism (i.e. Western approach to the non-Western world), and self-
­
­
Orientalism (i.e. the adoption of an Orientalist approach by non-Westerners/
­
natives/indigenous).
Another decolonial author, Ramón Grosfoguel, argues that Islamophobia takes
root in Western imperialism at the global scale, leading to ‘self-valorisation’ of
­
Western epistemological tradition and rising it up to the rank of ‘universality’,
‘neutrality’, ‘rationality’ and ‘philosophy’. This is a global phenomenon. Starting
from the fifteenth century (the destruction of Al-Andalus and the conquest of the
­
American continent) onwards, the ‘West’ claimed intellectual superiority over
other civilizations following its growing political domination (slavery, coloniza-
tion, Westernization, etc.). One of the results of this long global process was the
creation of the ‘world-system’ we all live in, which is yet again designed and domi-
­
nated by the Western framework and world-view. For Grosfoguel, we all live in a
­
world-system characterized as the ‘modern colonial Westernized Christian-centric
­
­
capitalist patriarchal world-system’ (Grosfoguel, 2012).
­
8 Enes Bayraklı et al.

  
In this definition, globalization does not only involve ‘international division
of labour and a global inter-state system’ but also

­
as constitutive of the capitalist accumulation at a world-scale, a global

­
racial/ethnic hierarchy (Western versus non-Western peoples), a global

­
patriarchal hierarchy (global gender system and a global sexual system), a
global religious hierarchy, a global linguistic hierarchy, a global epistemic
hierarchy, etc.
(Grosfoguel, 2006)

This epistemic racism/sexism is the underlying discourse (in the Foucauldian

sense) of the world we live in. In this context, the Islamic civilization’s know-
ledge, values and way of life are automatically dismissed as ‘particularistic’,
‘provincialist’, ‘subjective’, ‘undemocratic’, ‘irrational’ and ‘non-universal’.

­
From this perspective, the Westernized political, cultural, etc. elites in Muslim
majority countries can either be regarded as part and parcel or as operating
within the epistemological framework of a racial structure. Indeed, post-colonial

­
political elites work within the frame of the nation-state, a system that goes back
­
to the Westphalian concept of sovereignty (seventeenth century). Again, the
broad context in which elites are involved represents itself in the European local
experience that became hegemonic on a global scale. This intellectual ‘depend-
ency’ or ‘captive mind’ (Alatas, 2005) is particularly obvious for those cultural,
political and other elites who were educated outside of their native homelands in
Western universities. With this hegemony of knowledge production in the
centres of the global North, a non-Muslim perspective on Islam has become the
­
starting point for many Muslim thinkers and policy-makers, as will be later dis-
­
cussed in this chapter.

Centre–periphery relations and the birth of Westernized

elites in Muslim societies
In what is often imagined as the ‘Muslim world’ (on the evolution of this term,
see Aydin, 2017), the collision of world-views during the modernization and
­
Westernization process (Mignolo, 2012) led to the decreasing role of Islamic
normative perspectives in favour of the modern nation-state world-view, with
­
­
more and less conflicts, resistance, and disturbance according to each country.
Hallaq argues that,

beginning in the nineteenth century and at the hands of colonialist Europe, the
socio-economic and political system regulated by the Sharīʿa was structurally
­
dismantled, which is to say that the Sharīʿa itself was eviscerated, reduced to
providing no more than the raw materials for the legislation of personal status
by the modern state. Even in this relatively limited sphere, the Sharīʿa lost its
autonomy and social agency in favour of the modern state.
(Hallaq, 2013)
 Islamophobia in Muslim societies 9

  
As a result, the establishment of European domination over other ontologies,
epistemologies and ways of life (materialized today by globalization) took place
in a geographic space where ‘the Islamic normative structure [is used to] serve
both as a religion and as a way of life for its adherents’ (Hussain, 1984). This
ontological contradiction between Western modernization and Islam is still
structuring most of the political conflicts in the region.
How did the anti-Islamic tradition of Westernization manage to prevail in
­
predominantly Muslim societies? The first answer is to point out the role of
colonization in the destruction of Islamic normative structures and the shift to
the European nation-state model through the establishment of modern admin-
­
istration, military and education by force. Yet Westernization took place in
non-colonized countries such as Turkey, Iran and – to a lesser extent –
­
Afghanistan as well. Therefore, besides colonization, one should underline the
decisive role played by secularized Muslim elites in the rise of the European
modern nation-state model as both a practice (establishment of modern institu-
­
tions, bureaucracy or schools for example) and an ideology (modernization as
civilizational path, discourse and world-view). Dahl defines a ‘ruling elite’ as
­
‘a group of people who to some degree exercise power or influence over other
actors in the system’ (Dahl, 1958) while Hussain adds that, according to elite
theory, it is those who concentrate political power and ‘who guide the destiny
of their country’ (Hussain, 1984).
The neo-Marxist centre–periphery perspective defines secularized and West-
­
ernized Muslim elites as intermediaries between European dominant powers and
Muslim dominated peoples. Indeed, in the centre–periphery theory, while

the metropolis expropriates economic surplus from its satellites and appro-
priates it for its own development, thereby creating the polarization of the
capitalist system into metropolitan centre and peripheral satellites, […] the
existence of the third category [here Muslim countries’ elites] means pre-
cisely that the upper stratum is not faced with the unified opposition of all
the others because the middle stratum is both exploited and exploiter.
(Hussain, 1984)

The centre–periphery perspective offers a useful framework to understand eco-

nomic relations between dominant and dominated countries worldwide. Com-
pleted by post-colonial considerations on European imperialism, the
­
centre–periphery perspective draws a general outlook in which predominant
Western countries directly or indirectly shape Muslim countries through the
complex mediation of secularized and Westernized Muslim upper-class elites. It
­
is possible to categorize the constitution of such elites in history through two
main dynamics:

a Colonization: Elites first suffered capitalization of the indigenous economy,

as well as Westernization of values through the occupation of their country
by a foreign power. Then, they either fought colonial power by reclaiming
10 Enes Bayraklı et al.

  
European Enlightenment values (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Senegal) or
worked with it to remain at the head of the country (Malaysia, Iraq, Jordan).
b Self-Westernization: Domestic elites got engaged in the capitalization of the
­
economy and Westernization of values without being subjected to any
foreign colonization in the long run because they believed it to be in the best
interest of their countries and they thought it impossible to resist the advance
of Western powers without modernizing and Westernizing their societies
(Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan).

Although the process of Westernization in each of these countries from the end
of the eighteenth century until today is complex and differs in every case, almost
all the secularized elites of these countries engaged in a radical reconsideration
of the Islamic tradition/world-view/way of life that they consequently considered
­
to be an obstacle to the establishment of a modern state, the only path to
civilization.
The Malaysian sociologist Syed Farid Alatas shows how Westernization (or
modernization) constitutes an ideological dynamic of change, an ‘attitude or
mentality that subordinates the traditional to the modern’ (Alatas, 2005). Even
though Muslim elites may have supported modernization in the last two centu-
ries in order to better protect indigenous regimes (military, administrative and
educational modernizations to balance European technological advance in Qajar
and Ottoman states), to reclaim independence (resistance movements in Algeria,
Senegal, Tunis, Egypt) or for purely pragmatic interests (exploitation of rubber
in Malaysia, elites of the brand new states of Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, etc.), their
engagement in reform has never gone without ideological motives, a burden of
civilizational rehab put by Muslim elites on their respective societies.
In other terms, the use of European modern state-based instruments to
­
reform political, economic and military apparatuses also involved a set of
moral principles that came with modernity (Hallaq, 2013.) For instance, an
assertive secularism against an ancient regime theocracy (Young Turks,
Kemalism, Reza Shah Iran), nationalism against the Islam-based Ummah
­
(pan-Arabism, race-based nationalist movements), modern military rule
­
­
against the Ulema clergy (Pakistan and Algerian armies), communist people’s
sacralization against divine sacralization (Afghan communist People’s Demo-
cratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) party, Iraqi and Syrian Baath parties)
being concomitantly carried on – often in paradoxical ways entangled with
references to Islam – in most Muslim countries. Therefore, after having been
the first subjects of European conquests and/or domination, Muslim elites
became the main agents of the diffusion of European standards over Muslim
societies. Put differently, the Muslim elites were in an ambivalent position as
both ‘exploited’ (by European countries) and ‘exploiter’ (of Muslim masses).
This position led to the violent opposition between secular Muslim elites and
conservative Muslim masses. In his article ‘Centre–Periphery Relations: A
Key to Turkish Politics?’, Şerif Mardin (1973) interprets this opposition as
continuity with the traditional Ottoman cleavage between urban orthodox
 Islamophobia in Muslim societies 11

  
dwellers (the centres of power) and rural heterodox nomads (the periphery).
According to Mardin, the traditional urban–elite/rural–masses opposition has
been replaced by one of the modern secular–elite/conservative–masse: ‘In this
newfound unity [the Kemalist Turkish modern state], the periphery was chal-
lenged by a new and intellectually more uncompromising type of bureaucrat’
(Mardin, 1973, p. 179).
Education and the military constituted two major institutions in the birth and
development of Westernized elites in Muslim countries. The historian Benjamin
Fortna (2002) demonstrated how the spread of European education in the
Ottoman Empire in the middle of the nineteenth century – through either Euro-
pean and US missionary schools or Westernized domestic schools (mekteb) – led
to the wide diffusion of materialism and positivism paradigms among Muslim
elites. This ontological shifting from divine authority (metaphysics) to mundane
priorities (physics) goes back to ‘a new psychology that emerged in Europe in
early modernity’ (Asad, 2014) and thus directly challenged the civilizational role
of Islam as a tradition that structures society upon spiritual and non-material

­
principles. Niyazi Berkes (1964) gives an account of the nineteenth-century

­
Westernized military, medicine and engineering schools. He describes Ottoman
students as progressively disconnected from traditional paradigms and values,
permissive to European ideas of anti-clericalism, scientism and distrust of
­
masses. Berna Kılınç (2005) notes that

it was in this period that a new system of schools for the education of
bureaucrats was introduced, which led to the eventual eclipse of the tradi-
tional religious school system (medrese) along with the diminution of the
political influence of the learned clergy (ulema).

Sarfraz Husain Ansari (2011) also underlines the impact of the elite’s education
upon the modernist and anti-clerical vision of Pakistan’s first statesmen
­
(Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, but also Ayub Khan who studied at
Sandhurst Military Academy in the UK). Similarly, Albert Hourani (1983) links
the French and military education of North African elites at the end of the nine-
teenth century to their liberal and modern stance (for instance, the Egyptian
Ismail Pasha who ascended to the throne in 1863 or Khayr al-Din who became
­
the Grand Vizier of the Beylik of Tunis (1873–1877)).
Since secularist and anti-traditionalist reforms were widely unpopular among
­
Muslim masses, the use of political violence by ruling elites became the main
instrument of holding grip on political power at the turn of the twentieth century
and onwards, materialized for example by the Kemalist regime in Turkey
(1923–1950), the Shah regime in Iran (1923–1946), the communist rule in
Afghanistan (1978–1989), the military rule in Algeria, Tunisia, Pakistan and
Egypt etc. This authoritarian turn of Westernized Muslim elites emphasized the
polarization between the secular military bureaucratic ruling class and the
Islamist conservative masses, resulting in an unresolvable dispute over funda-
mental values in those countries (secular versus religious, people’s authority
12 Enes Bayraklı et al.

  
versus elites authority). This was an unprecedented division in Muslim societies
since Islam constituted ‘the medium of communication between the elite and the
mass cultures’ until the beginning of the twentieth century (Kadıoğlu, 1998).
As a result, the birth and growth of Westernized elites encountered many con-
testations not only from the masses but also – and foremost – from a counter
elite that promoted the Islamic tradition. Those trends, commonly called ‘Islam-
ism’ or ‘political Islam’, contest the full imitation of the European modern state
and of its resulting paradigms. According to the country, the counter elite is
composed of Muslim clerics (Ulema), young revolutionaries and conservative
entrepreneurs or intellectuals (Weiner and Banuazizi, 1994). They are reclaim-
ing the right to define the collective ‘we’ and to rule the country. Yet, while
these movements claim a kind of restoration of the ancien régime – or at least
greater acceptance of Islam in the public and political space – they are all acting
within the framework of the modern state and politics (see the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and Development (AK) Party’s rule
­
in Turkey, Ennahdha Party in Tunisia, Muhammed Morsi’s Presidency in Egypt
etc.). For this reason, both Talal Asad and Wael Hallaq interrogate the capacity
of Islamic political movements to ‘restore’ or ‘recover’ the Islamic tradition as a
complete world-view against the Western nation-state model. (Asad, 2014;
­
­
Hallaq, 2013) In any case, conservative counter-elites contribute to the legitimi-
­
zation of the very existence of Muslim conservatists in the society and to their
reinclusion into the collective discourse and political arena, interrogating and
destabilizing the dominant global structure.

Self-Orientalization
­
According to Bezci and Çiftçi (2012), the notion of self-Orientalism refers to the
­
adoption of a Western Orientalist approach by non-Western indigenous people.
­
Accordingly, self-Orientalism reflects the continuation of colonialism in non-
­
­
Western countries. It is the reason why Georgiev (2012) discusses ‘self-
­
orientalization’ and not ‘self-Orientalism’, pointing out an ongoing process that
­
keeps shaping non-Western countries up to this day.
­
Discussing the psychological implications of colonialism upon the colonized,
Franz Fanon has already put an emphasis on what racism does with its victim
and explored how colonial subjects came to identify with their oppressors (see
his Black Skin, White Masks 2008([1952]) ). Hamid Dabashi (2011) draws on
Fanon’s insights and departs from where Fanon ended his work, analysing the
role of native informers in the imperial project of the United States and Europe
in his Brown Skin, White Masks. Dabashi especially looks at those intellectuals
who migrated to the West and were often used by the imperial powers to misrep-
resent their home countries. While Dabashi reveals the important strategic role
of native informants inside the ‘empire’, one cannot dismiss the important role
of those persons outside the empire who legitimize Western hegemony in
Muslim societies as Muslims. One can claim here that there is an intrinsic link
between the legitimizing of Western hegemony and Islamophobic discourse.
 Islamophobia in Muslim societies 13

  
In other terms, the promotion of the Western way of life in Muslim societies by
Westernized elites goes in parallel with hate attacks on Islam, which is con-
ceived as an ontological threat. Yassir Morsi shows through three case studies
presented in his Radical Skin, Moderate Masks – also drawing on Fanon’s epic
work – the complexity of navigating through the contemporary world that is
shaped by the norms of the white man as a Muslim (Morsi, 2017).
In fact, many of the most vocal Islamophobes within the global North have
been Muslims who regularly draw on their insider perspective to further support
Islamophobic discourses. This is also true when it comes to Muslim countries.
For decades, Muslim elite supporters of authoritarian governments continually
argued to Western leaders that free elections would bring Islamists to power.
They portrayed themselves as defenders of secular regimes. Paradoxically, this
rhetoric legitimizes extreme political violence against the Islamic conservative
opposition such as the massacre of Muhammad Morsi’s supporters in Egypt in
the summer of 2013. At that time, domestic elites such as the Egypt’s former
Mufti, Sheikh Ali Gomaa, called for the murder of the supporters of the first
freely elected president of Egypt, depicted as ‘heretics and traitors’ and ‘dogs of
hellfire’, (Osman, 2013; Asad, 2014) thus using a rather ‘religious language’.
Imogen Lambert (2017) underlines the paradox between the Western liberal
approach to secularism and its authoritarian implementation in Muslim coun-
tries. By discussing the notion of ‘liberal Islamophobia’, the author first shows
how European liberals/leftists are condemning racism in the West (including
anti-Muslim racism) while supporting authoritarian Islamophobic regimes in the
­
Middle East. She then demonstrates that this ambivalent position corresponds to
the hate of Islam among liberal intellectuals in Muslim countries:

Of course, Egyptian liberals are not alone in their hostility to social and
political groups with connections, however remote, to Islam. The Syrian and
Lebanese secular left are guilty of much of the same. They similarly
opposed the Muslim Brotherhood, were unapologetic about their support for
the 2013 coup, and slandered the Rabaa martyrs. While some claim to
support the Syrian revolution, for example, they continually disown Islamist
factions such as Ahrar Al-Sham, Jaysh Al-Islam, and other mainstream
­
­
‘Muslim groups’ in the Free Syrian Army (FSA) for no clear reason other
than their Islamic orientation.
(Lambert, 2017)

Yet, while Muslim Islamophobes operating in the West have been discussed
widely, there is little research on Muslim Islamophobia in Muslim majority
countries. One can argue here that this form of racism takes its roots from the
‘double-consciousness’ concept that is developed by W. E. B. Du Bois in his
­
The Souls of Black Folk (1903):

It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always

­
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by
14 Enes Bayraklı et al.

  
the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever
feels his two-ness, – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two

­
unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the American
Negro is the history of this strife – this longing to attain self-conscious

­
manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this
merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He does not wish to
Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and
Africa. He wouldn’t bleach his Negro blood in a flood of white
Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world.
He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an
American without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having
the doors of opportunity closed roughly in his face.

In other terms, the epistemic racism that comes with Western hegemony also
presents an irreconcilableness between being Muslim and being in the globalized
Western world today. This double-consciousness still plagues the Muslim
­
subject as any other subaltern subject, as it is constantly questioning its identity,
whether it belongs to a traditional world-view or to a globalized Western one.
­
The Muslim subaltern subject is continuously confronted with the question of
what is the place of the representative of a passive, backward, uncivilized and
primitive, or more specifically undemocratic, unmodern, radical and extremist
religion?
Facing this identity crisis between alien Western modernism and traditional
Islam, elites of many Muslim countries attempted to develop alternative senses
of belonging at the turn of the twentieth century. In his study on the discourse of
the Aryan race in Iran (2011), Reza Zia-Ebrahimi shows that domestic elites
­
constructed their nationalist discourse upon the Aryan origin myth. Zia-Ebrahimi
­
explains that one reason for the persistence of this narrative lies in the trauma of
the encounter with Europe and in the strategies designed to manage it. In the
same way, Egyptian secular elites stressed on the Pharaonic heritage and on Pan-
Arabic aspirations (Asad, 2014), Turkish Kemalists presented the pre-Islamic
­
­
Hittite and Sumerians as ancestors of Turks, (White, 2013) while Tunisian elites
underlined the non-Muslim legacy of the Phoenician civilization (Baram, 1990).
­
Self-Orientalism and double-consciousness are such powerful dynamisms that
­
­
they also impacted leading Muslim figures. Mehmet Akif Kireçci (2007) has
shown in his PhD thesis that nineteenth-century Muslim scholars such as Al-
­
­
Tahtawi, Taha Husayn and Ziya Gökalp adopted the paradigm of modernity in
their understanding of Islam. According to Kireçci, these supporters of ‘Islamic
Renaissance’ (Nahda) constitute examples of self-Orientalism among the Islamic
­
clergy. Yet, such intellectual imbrications are self-contradicting for Grosfoguel,
­
since he conceives ‘self-Orientalism’ (and the related notions of modernity,
­
civilization, secularism, etc.) as the epistemic roots of Islamophobia in Muslim
societies (2010). Likewise, in his article on the historical background of Islamo-
phobia in Turkey, Mencet (2018) identifies self-Orientalism as both the result of
­
 Islamophobia in Muslim societies 15

  
Western imperialism and the main cause of contemporary Islamophobia. He
argues that self-Orientalism is still widespread in many spheres of the Turkish

­
society such as literature, press, arts and bureaucracy. Consequently, one can
observe the open and constant expression of Islamophobia in this predominantly
Muslim country.

Governing Islam in Muslim countries

From the perspective of Muslim societies, the encounter with colonial powers
has been accompanied by ‘cultural imperialism’ (Laouri, 1976, p. 100). This
shaped the way Muslim societies entered into modernity and how the latter con-
strued their modern nation-states. (Akhbari et al., 2017) In the edited volume
­
Colonial and Post-Colonial Governance of Islam: Continuities and Ruptures,
­
(Maussen, Bader and Moors, 2011) the authors trace current post-colonialist

­
state policies towards Islam back to their colonialist experience and public policy
of Islam in use during this period. The authors map different configurations of
opportunities for Muslim life and distinguish between different modes in the
governance of Islam:

First, there is the regulation of religious education and religious authority

[…]. Second, there are institutional arrangements and practices that aim to
regulate property and facilities […]. Third, authorities in colonial and post-

­
colonial contexts contribute to arranging the relations between Islam, law
and social life. This includes the recognition and/or codification of Islamic
law and the balancing of religiously based legal claims with systems of cus-
tomary law (adat) […]. Fourth, there are attempts to create, recognise and
possibly institutionalise organisational platforms to speak for Islam and
Muslim populations, for example, in the form of Muslim councils.
(Maussen, Bader and Moors, 2011, p. 18)

All of these three dimensions reveal the central aspect of power relations and
suggest considering state agencies as actors that discipline their Muslim soci-
eties, from education (defining what the true Islam is from a bottom-up per-
­
spective) to economic power (property issues, especially of the classical
foundations that were monopolized by state bureaucracy), legal power (reducing
the role of Islamic law in social life), institutionalizing the representation of
Islam (who then define what the true Islam is from a top-down perspective). This
­
does not mean that there is a linear development in the governance of Islam, as
various articles in this book, as well as other studies, reveal (Feuer, 2018) There
are differences in the configuration of different factors such as regime ideology,
political opposition and the religious institutional endowment.
Often, the role of Islam and Muslims in politics in Muslim majority countries
is reduced to an ideological struggle. However, rather than a struggle between
the secular and the religious, as some portray it, we argue that this is a struggle
over the Western notion of secularism itself. Hakan Yavuz has revealed in his
16 Enes Bayraklı et al.

  
work Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere (2000) that Kemalists’ conception of
‘laïcism is not only a separation between religion and society’, but more a ‘regula-
tion of social life, education, family, economy, law, daily code of conduct, and
dress-code in accordance with the needs of everyday life and the Kemalist prin-
­
ciples’. As a result of this ideology, the Kemalist state attempted to shape a secu-
lar–national–Islam whose religiosity was confined at home and deprived of any
exterior expression and political role (Haken Yavuz, 2000). For years, the Kemalist
state used institutional tools in order to enforce this Islam policy through institu-
tions such as the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs), Imam Hatip schools
training young Muslim future imams, religious instruction in schools, etc. Sim-
ilarly, today, European governments try to regulate Islam and Muslims by institu-
tionalizing the Islamic religion (Bayraklı, Faytre and Hafez, 2018).

Similarities and differences between Western Islamophobia

and homegrown Islamophobia in Muslim countries
If we recognize Islamophobia to be ‘about a dominant group of people aiming at
seizing, stabilizing and widening their power by means of defining a scapegoat –
real or invented – and excluding this scapegoat from the resources/rights/
definition of a constructed “we” ’, (Bayraklı and Hafez, 2015) we then find many
similarities between Islamophobia in the West and in Muslim countries. Indeed,
in both contexts, Islamophobic discourses depict Muslims and their culture as a
threat to the modern secular way of life. Thus, many common anti-Muslim dis-
­
courses or/and policies can be found in both contexts.
For instance, fear-mongering about ‘creeping Sharia’ perceived as a judiciary
­
threat (‘Alcohol will be banned, and men and women will be separated in public
transport’); the manifestation of Muslim symbols in the public sphere such as
mosques, minarets, headscarves, burkinis, women beaches (headscarf ban
appeared first in Turkey and Tunisia before Europe); employment discrimination
against conservative Muslims; Halal slaughter of animals that is depicted as
cruel and barbaric; and, finally, the very presence of conservative Muslims in the
country (‘Turkey will become Iran’, ‘Egypt will become a theocracy’, ‘Europe is
invaded and will be soon Eurabia’) can be observed both in the global North and
in Muslim societies.
In sum, Islamophobia works in both Western and Muslim countries as a dis-
criminatory practice against what is perceived as ‘civilizational backwardness’
that legitimizes, if necessary, the use of violence, as can be seen with deadly
military crackdowns of free elections. This dynamic is intensified and strength-
ened by the constant humiliation of Muslims and Muslim life style in the media
and social media in Muslim countries.
Moreover, in both Western and Muslim countries, Islamophobia arises when
conservative Muslims become more visible in different aspects of social life
such as in education, employment and politics, thus challenging the establish-
ment either through civic movements or political parties. In this case, both
Western and Muslim Islamophobes often argue that they are only fighting
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utilised. In the matter of woods and plantations the county with its
105,931 acres stands next to Inverness-shire, which has 145,629.
The trees grown are mostly larch and pine and spruce, but the
deciduous trees, or hard woods, the beech, elm and ash, are not
uncommon in the low country, more especially as ornamental trees
around the manor-houses of the proprietors.
The crops chiefly cultivated are oats, barley, turnips and potatoes.
Wheat is not grown except now and again in an odd field. The
climate is too cold, the autumn heat never rising to the point of
ripening that crop satisfactorily. Oats is the most frequent crop, and
Aberdeenshire is the oat-producing county of Scotland. A fifth of the
whole acreage under this crop in Scotland belongs to
Aberdeenshire. Perth, which is next, has only one-third of the
Aberdeenshire oat-area. Twenty thousand acres are devoted to
barley, only one-tenth of the barley-area in Scotland. Over seven
thousand acres go to potatoes; the southern counties have a soil
better adapted to produce good potatoes; Forfar, Fife, Perth and
Ayrshire excel in this respect and all these give a larger acreage to
this crop. As regards turnips, however, Aberdeenshire is easily first.
Being a great cattle rearing and cattle feeding district, it demands a
large tonnage of turnip food. It is estimated that a million and a half
tons of turnips are consumed every year in the county.
As regards cattle and horses the county has first place in Scotland.
In 1909 there were 204,490 agricultural horses in the country and of
these 31,592 were in Aberdeenshire, while of 1,176,165 cattle it had
168,091. It has a quarter of a million sheep, but here it falls behind
other counties, notably Argyll, which has nearly a million, or one-
seventh of all the sheep in Scotland.
Aberdeenshire is a county of small holdings. No other county has so
many tenants. Over five thousand of these farm from five to 50
acres, while there are nearly four thousand who farm areas ranging
from 50 to 300. This is part of the secret of its success. Earlier, the
number of small farms was greater, the tendency being in the
direction of throwing several smaller holdings together to make a
large farm.
The industry has been a progressive one. Up to the Union in 1707
tillage was of the most primitive kind. Sheep-farming for the sake of
exporting the wool had been the rule, but the Union stopped that
branch of commerce. Later on, about the middle of the eighteenth
century, the droving of lean cattle into England was a means of
profit. Meantime the system of cultivation was of the rudest. A few
acres round the steading, called the infield, were cropped year after
year with little manuring, while the area beyond, called the outfield,
was only cropped occasionally. There was no drainage and
enclosures were unknown. Improvement came from the south. Sir
Archibald Grant of Monymusk and Mr Alexander Udny of Udny were
pioneers of better things; they brought labourers and overseers from
the Lothians and the south of England, to educate the people in new
methods of culture. At first a landlord’s, it by and by became a
farmer’s battle; and ultimately in the nineteenth century it was the
farmers who did the reclaiming. But the landlords set a good
example by sowing grasses and turnips.
Near Aberdeen, a boulder-strewn wilderness was converted into
fertile fields. The town feued the lands and the feuars cleared away
the stones, which they sold and shipped to London for paving
purposes; the process of clearing cost as much as £100 an acre, a
fourth of this being recovered by the sale of the stones. This is
typical of what was done elsewhere. Gradually the bleak moors were
absorbed. A famine in 1782 opened the eyes of all concerned.
Hitherto there was not as much as 200 acres in turnips. Hitherto also
the heavy work-oxen, ten or twelve of them dragging a primitive and
shallow plough, at a slow pace and in a serpentine furrow, had been
imported from the south. Now they began to be bred on the spot. By
and by cattle grew in numbers; by and by, two horses superseded
the team of oxen in the plough.
But the chief factor in evolving Aberdeenshire into a cattle-rearing
and beef-producing county was the turnip. Till turnips began to be
grown in a large acreage, no provision was possible for the cattle in
winter. Hence the beasts had to be disposed of in autumn. In 1820,
as many as 12,000 animals were sent in droves to England. The
advent of steam navigation in 1827 ended the droving. Then began
the trade in fat cattle, but it was years before the county gained its
laurels as the chief purveyor of “prime Scots” and the roast beef of
Old England. The turnip held the key of the position; but turnips will
not grow well without manure. The canal between Aberdeen and
Inverurie carried great quantities of crushed bones and guano to
raise this important crop.

Aberdeen-Angus Bull
Cattle-breeding began with McCombie of Tillyfour and the
Cruickshanks of Sittyton, one with the native black-polled cattle—the
Aberdeen-Angus—and the others with shorthorns. By dint of careful
selection, great progress was made in improving not only the
symmetry of the beasts but their size and beefy qualities. There
began a furore for cattle-rearing and prizes taken at Smithfield made
Aberdeen famous. Railway transit came in as an additional help, and
to-day the Christmas market never fails to give its top prices for
Aberdeenshire beef.
Every year the beef of 60,000 cattle leaves the county for the
southern markets, chiefly London; this in addition to supplying local
needs, and Aberdeen has now 162,000 of a population. Cattle-
rearing and cattle-feeding are therefore at the backbone of
Aberdeenshire agriculture.
A recent development is the export of pure-bred shorthorns to
America, more especially the Argentine Republic, for breeding
purposes. As much as £1000 has been given for a young bull, in this
connection.

Aberdeen Shorthorn Bull

In the matter of fruit culture, Aberdeen is far behind Perthshire and
Lanark, which have a richer soil and a superior climate. But the
Aberdeen strawberries, grown mostly on Deeside, are noted for size
and flavour. In 1909 only 219 acres were devoted to this crop. The
cultivation of raspberries, which is so great a feature of lower
Perthshire, has made only a beginning in Aberdeen, and the small
profits that have come to southern growers of this crop in recent
years have acted as a deterrent, in its extension.
 12. The Granite Industry.
Aberdeen has long been known as “The Granite City.” It is built of
granite, chiefly from its great quarries at Rubislaw. The granite is a
light grey, somewhat different in texture and grain from another grey
granite much in vogue, that of Kemnay on Donside. There are many
quarries in the county, and each has its distinctive colouring. The
Peterhead stone is red; Corrennie is also red but of a lighter hue.
The granite industry has made great strides of recent years. The
modern appliances for boring the rock by steam drills, the use of
dynamite and other explosives for blasting, as well as the devices for
hoisting and conveying stones from the well of the quarry to the
upper levels by means of Blondins have all revolutionised the art of
quarrying.
 Granite Quarry, Kemnay

It was long before Aberdeen people realised the value of the local
rocks for building purposes. The stone used in the early
ecclesiastical buildings was sandstone, which was imported by sea
from Morayshire and the Firth of Forth. The beginnings of St Machar
Cathedral and the old church of St Nicholas as well as the church of
Greyfriars, built early in the sixteenth century and recently
demolished, were all of sandstone. Not till the seventeenth century
was granite utilised. At first the surface stones were taken, then
quarrying began about 1604, but little was done till 1725. Between
1780 and 1790 as many as 600 men were employed in the
Aberdeen quarries. Great engineering works such as the Bell Rock
Lighthouse, the Thames Embankment, the foundations of Waterloo
Bridge, the Forth Bridge and London Bridge, where great durability
and solidity are necessary, were made possible by the use of huge
blocks from Aberdeenshire. The polishing of the stone made a
beginning in 1820, and now a great export trade in polished work for
staircases, house fronts, façades, fountains and other ornamental
purposes is carried on between the county and America as well as
the British Colonies.
Apart from building purposes, granite slabs are largely used for
headstones in graveyards. This monumental department employs a
great number of skilled workmen. There are over 80 granite-
polishing yards in Aberdeen. Here too the modern methods of cutting
and polishing the stones by machinery and pneumatic tools have
greatly reduced the manual labour as well as improved the character
of the work. Unfortunately the export trade in these monumental
stones has somewhat declined owing to prohibitive tariffs. In 1896
America took £55,452 worth of finished stones; in 1909 the value
had fallen to £38,000. The tariffs in France have also been against
the trade, but an average of nearly 10,000 tons is sent to continental
countries. Strangely enough, granite in the raw state is itself
imported to Aberdeen. Swedish, Norwegian and German granites
are brought to Aberdeen, to
 Granite Works, Aberdeen
be shaped and polished. These have a grain and colouring
absolutely different from what is characteristic of the native stone,
and the taste for novelty and variety has prompted their importation.
In 1909 as much as 27,308 tons were imported in this way. Celtic
and Runic crosses, recumbent tombs, and statuary are common as
exports.
The stone is also used for the humbler purpose of street paving and
is shipped to London and other ports in blocks of regular and
recognised sizes. These are called “setts,” and of them 30,000 tons
are annually transmitted to the south. Stones of a larger size are also
exported for use as pavement kerbs.
The presence of quarries is not so detrimental to the atmosphere
and the landscape as coal mines, and yet the heaps of débris, of
waste and useless stone piled up in great sloping ridges near the
granite quarries, are undoubtedly an eyesore. To-day a means has
been found whereby this blot on the landscape is partially removed.
The waste débris is now crushed by special machinery into granite
meal and gravel, and used as a surface dressing for walks and
garden paths—a purpose it serves admirably, being both cleanly and
easily dried. Not only so but great quantities of the waste are ground
to fine powder, and after being mixed with cement and treated to
great pressure become adamant blocks for pavements. These
adamant blocks have now superseded the ordinary concrete
pavement just as it superseded the use of solid granite blocks and
Caithness flags. This ingenious utilisation of the waste has solved
the problem which was beginning to face many of the larger
quarries, namely, how they could dispose of their waste without
burying valuable agricultural land under its mass.
Granite is the only mineral worthy of mention found in the county.
Limestone exists in considerable quantities here and there, but as a
rule it is too far from the railway routes to be profitably worked. It is,
however, burned locally and applied to arable land as a manure. In
the upper reaches of Strathdon, lime-kilns are numerous. By means
of peat from the adjoining mosses the limestone was regularly
burned half a century ago. To-day the practice is dwindling. A unique
mineral deposit called Kieselguhr is found in considerable quantity in
the peat-mosses of Dinnet, on Deeside. It is really the fossil remains
of diatoms, and consists almost entirely of silica with a trace of lime
and iron. When dried it is used as a polishing powder for steel, silver
and other metals; but its chief use is in the manufacture of dynamite,
of which it is the absorbent basis. It absorbs from three to four times
its own weight of nitro-glycerine, which is the active property in
dynamite. As found in the moss it is a layer two feet thick of cheesy
light coloured matter, which is cut out into oblong pieces like peats.
When these are dried, they become lighter in colour and ash-like in
character. The Dinnet deposits are the only deposits of the kind in
the country. Inferior beds are found in Skye. The industry employs 50
hands during the summer months, and has been in operation for 28
years. The beds show no sign of exhaustion as yet, and the demand
for the substance is on the increase.
 13. Other Industries. Paper, Wool, Combs.
The industries apart from agriculture, work in granite, and the
fisheries are mostly concentrated in and around the chief city. These,
although numerous, are not carried on in a large way, but they are
varied; and there is this advantage in the eggs not being all in one
basket that when depression attacks one trade, its effect is only
partial and does not affect business as a whole. Paper, combs, wool,
soap are all manufactured. The first of these engages four large
establishments on the Don and one on the Dee at Culter. Writing
paper and the paper used for the daily press and magazines as well
as the coarser kinds of packing paper are all made in considerable
quantity. Esparto grass and wood pulp are imported in connection
with this industry. Comb-making is also carried on, and the factory in
Aberdeen is the largest of its kind in the kingdom.
Textile fabrics are still produced, but the progress made in these is
not to be compared with the advances made in the south of
Scotland, where coal is cheap. Weaving was introduced at an early
period by Flemish settlers, who made coarse linens and woollens till
the end of the sixteenth century, when “grograms” and worsteds,
broadcloth and friezes were added. Provost Alexander Jaffray the
elder in 1636 established a house of correction—the prototype of the
modern reformatory—where beggars and disorderly persons were
employed in the manufacture of broadcloths, kerseys and other
stuffs. A record of this novelty in discipline survives in the Aberdeen
street called Correction Wynd.
In 1703 a joint-stock company was formed for woollen manufactures
at Gordon’s Mills on the Don, where a fulling-mill had existed for
generations, and where the making of paper had been initiated a few
years earlier. The Gordon’s Mills developed the manufacture of
cloths of a higher quality, half-silk serges, damask and plush, and
skilled workmen were brought from France to guide and instruct the
operatives. To-day high-class tweeds are made at Grandholm, and
such is the reputation of these goods for quality and durability that in
spite of high tariffs they make their way into America, where they
command a large sale at prices more than double of the home
prices.
In the olden days the cloth sold in the home markets was a product
of domestic industry. The farmers’ daughters spun the wool of their
own sheep into yarn, which was sent to county weavers to be made
into cloth. Aberdeenshire serge made in this way was sold at fairs
and was hawked about the county by travelling packmen.
The hosiery trade was worked on similar lines. The wool was
converted into worsted by rock and spindle, and the worsted was
knitted into stockings by the women and girls of the rural population.
One man employed as many as 400 knitters and spinners. In the
latter half of the eighteenth century this industry brought from
£100,000 to £120,000 into Aberdeenshire every year. Stockings
were made of such fineness that they cost 20s. a pair and
occasional rarities were sold at four or five guineas. In 1771 twenty-
two mercantile houses were engaged in the export trade of these
goods, which went chiefly to Holland. The merchants attended the
weekly markets and country fairs, where they purchased the
products of the knitters’ labour. Such work provided a source of
income to the rural population and was indirectly the means of
increasing the number of small holdings. These were multiplied of
set purpose to keep the industrious element in the population within
the county. The invention of the stocking-frame together with the
dislocation of trade due to the Napoleonic wars made the trade
unremunerative and it came to an end with the eighteenth century.
The linen trade began in 1737 at Huntly, where an Irishman under
the patronage and encouragement of the Duke of Gordon
manufactured yarn and exported it to England and the southern
Scottish towns. Silk stockings were also made there. By and by linen
works sprang up on the Don at Gordon’s Mills and Grandholm as
well as within Aberdeen itself. The linen trade in the form of spinning
and hand-loom weaving was carried on in most of the towns and
villages of the county and several new villages grew up in
consequence, such as Cuminestown, New Byth, Strichen, New
Pitsligo, Stuartfield and Fetterangus, in some of which the
manufacture is continued on a small scale to this day. Much flax was
grown in the county for a time to minister to this industry, but
gradually the crop disappeared as fibre of better quality was
imported from Holland. Yet the spinning of linen yarn was widely
practised as a domestic industry when the woollen trade declined,
and every farmer’s daughter made a point of spinning her own linen
as the nucleus of her future house-furnishings. The linen trade,
except as regards coarser materials such as sacking, has decayed.
There is still a jute factory in Aberdeen.
Another industry which employs a large number of hands is the
preserving of meat, fish, fruit, and vegetables. There are several of
these preserving works in Aberdeen. Dried and smoked haddocks,
usually called “Finnan Haddies,” from the village of Findon on the
Kincardineshire coast, are one of the specialities of Aberdeen. They
had at one time a great vogue, and are still largely in demand though
the quality has fallen off by the adoption of a simpler and less
expensive method of treatment.
Ship-building is another industry long established at Aberdeen. In the
days before iron steamships, fleets of swift-sailing vessels known as
“Aberdeen Clippers” were built on the Dee and made record voyages
to China in the tea trade and to Australia. The industry of to-day is
concerned, for the greater part, with the building of trawlers and
other fishing craft, but occasionally an ocean going steamer is
launched. The trade is meantime suffering from depression.
 Making smoked haddocks, Aberdeen
Other industries well represented are soap and candle making,
coach and motor-car building, iron-founding and engineering, rope
and twine making, the manufacture of chemicals, colours and
aerated waters. Besides, Aberdeen is a great printing centre and
many of the books issued by London publishers are printed by local
presses.
 14. Fisheries.
During the last quarter of a century the fishing industry has made
great strides, the value of fish landed in Scotland having more than
doubled in that period. Nowhere has the impetus been more felt than
in Aberdeenshire, which now contributes as much as one-third of the
whole product of Scotch fisheries. Since 1886 the weight of fish
caught round the Scottish coast has increased from five million
hundredweights to over nine millions, while the money value has
risen in even a greater proportion from £1,403,391, to £3,149,127.
To these totals Aberdeen alone has contributed over a hundred
thousand tons of white fish (excluding herrings), valued at over a
million pounds sterling. Peterhead and Fraserburgh are also
contributors especially as regards herrings, the former landing
739,878 hundredweights and Fraserburgh very nearly a similar
quantity. These three ports amongst them account for one half of all
the fish landed at Scottish ports. When we consider the number of
persons collaterally employed in handling this enormous quantity of
merchandise, the coopers, cleaners, packers, basket makers, boat-
builders, makers of nets, clerks and so on, apart altogether from the
army of fishermen employed in catching the fish, we see how far-
reaching this industry is, not merely in increasing the food-supply of
the country but in providing profitable employment for the population.
At Aberdeen, it is estimated, 13,512 persons are so employed and at
the other two ports combined, almost a similar number.
There are two great branches of the fishing industry—herrings and
white fish. The herrings are caught for the most part, though not
exclusively, in the summer, July being the great month. They are
captured with nets mostly by steam-drifters as they are called, but
also to some extent by the ordinary sailing boats of a smaller size
than the drifters. Fraserburgh and Peterhead land in each case
double the weight of herrings that come to Aberdeen. In recent years
a beginning has been made in May and June with gratifying success,
but July and August give the maximum returns. Later on in the year,
when the shoals have moved along the coast southwards, the
herring fleets follow them thither, to North Shields and Hartlepool, to
Yarmouth and Lowestoft; and bands of curers, coopers and workers
migrate in hundreds from one port to another, employing themselves
in curing the fish. The bulk of the herrings are cured by salting, and
are then exported to Germany and Russia, where they are much in
demand.
Even more important is the white fishing. Aberdeen is here pre-
eminent, being perhaps the most important fishing centre in the
world. The total catch for Scotland in 1909 was short of three million
hundredweights, of which Aberdeen with its large fleet of trawlers
and steam-liners accounted for 67 per cent. The most important of
the so-called round fish is the haddock, of which over a million
hundredweights are landed in Scotland, Aberdeen contributing the
lion’s share, three-fourths of the whole. Next to the haddock comes
the cod, of which nearly three hundred and forty thousand
hundredweights were handled in the Aberdeen fish market. The next
fish is ling, and then come whitings, saithe, torsk, conger-eels. The
flat-fish are also important, plaice, witches, megrims, halibut, lemon
soles and turbot. This last is the scarcest and most highly prized of
all flat fish, and commands a price next to that given for salmon. Ling
and halibut are still mostly caught by hook and line; the turbot and
the lemon sole on the other hand are distinctively the product of the
trawl net and were little known until trawling was begun.
A certain small percentage of this great weight of fish is consumed
locally, but the great bulk of it is packed in ice and dispatched by
swift passenger trains to the southern markets. The Aberdeen fish
market, extending for half a mile along the west and north sides of
the Albert Basin (originally the bed of the Dee) is the property of the
Town Corporation and is capable of dealing with large catches. As
much as 760 tons of fish have been exposed on its concrete floor in
a single day. In the early morning the place is one of the sights of the
city, with the larger fish laid out in symmetrical rows on the
pavement, and the smaller fish—haddocks, whiting and soles—in
boxes arranged for the auction sale at 8 a.m.
The majority of the fishing craft are still sailing vessels, but steam-
drifters and motor-boats and steam-trawlers

Fish Market, Aberdeen

are gradually driving the ordinary sail-boats from the trade, just as
the trawl net is superseding the old-fashioned mode of fishing with
set lines. Still about 86 per cent. of the number of boats employed is
made up of sailing vessels, but the tonnage is relatively small. The
quantity of fish caught by hook and line is only one-tenth of the
whole.
Fishwives, The Green, Aberdeen
North Harbour, Peterhead
 Herring boats at Fraserburgh
The amount of capital invested in boats and fishing gear for all
Scotland is estimated by the Fishery Board at over £5,000,000. Of
this total, Aberdeenshire claims very nearly two millions. It is now the
case that the value of fish discharged at the fish market of Aberdeen
is as great as the yearly value of the agricultural land of the whole
county—truly a marvellous revolution.