note OBSERVATOIRE CHINE 2017/2018

A Pakistani Overview of
Pakistan-China Relations:

From Geopolitical
Compulsions to a
Strengthening Co-operation

S. Kanwal Hassan
PhD student at the department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist
University. Her research is about Pakistan’s relations with China. She can be reached at
[email protected]

Note d’actualité n°19/24 de l’Observatoire de la Chine, cycle 2017-2018, Juillet 2017

Historic relations between the Islamic Republic of The resulting analysis helps understanding the current
Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China have been status of the relationship between Pakistan and China.
based on common interests; their security and defense The paper looks at various dimensions of China Pakistan
cooperation has been enhanced due to their common Economic Corridor and highlights its political, security
animosity with India. But as China’s relationship with India and strategic implications for Pakistan and China. It also
changed course for the better in the 1990s Pakistan and finds that military cooperation has deepened in the past
China have searched for new avenues of co-operation. decade. However, a similar trend in trade/commerce
Maison de la This paper traces Pakistan’s bilateral relationship with has yet to follow if both countries want to become
Recherche de l’Inalco China in a geopolitical context while commenting on strategic partners in the true spirit of the term.
2 rue de Lille the changes which occurred in the South Asian region.
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 the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)1. Pakistan’s
diplomatic agility at the time was such that these
pacts and its alliance with the US at the time did not
Pakistan’s independence from British colonial inhibit it from forming a friendly and non-confrontational
sub-continent happened just two years before relationship with China. Also, Pakistan navigated
the Communist Party drove out the Kuomintang (KMT) cautiously to avoid participation in the Korean War and
to the island of Taiwan at the end of the civil war, refrained from criticizing China’s annexation of Tibet2.
establishing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. It also supported the “One China Policy” while it received
This paper aims to trace the roots of the relationship and diplomatic backing from China on Kashmir, which is a
provides an overview of Pakistan-China relations as they disputed territory partly administered by India and partly
stand today. It does so with an international geopolitical by Pakistan, and also on the Bangladesh issue almost
perspective. To achieve that, understanding the overall twenty years later. Hence for reasons stated above
nature of the relationship through a historic outlook is a number of observers see the first decade as a decade
essential. Though asymmetric by almost all scales of of “correct” Pakistan-China relations.
measurement, the relations between Pakistan and It was in the 1960s that relations began to shift from
China have outlived many formal alliances. Both states “correct” into the domain of regional compulsions,
play significant regional and international roles in their which were primarily targeted to tip the balance of power
own respective capacities. As powerful and influential away from India. Border tensions increased causing a
China is today, Pakistan too in its own region has been limited war in 1962. The Sino-Indian border dispute is
and still continues to be an “environment-determining” still unresolved and still causes tensions. China claims
actor. Will the new China-Pakistan Economic Corridor India-controlled Arunachal Pradesh and India claims
bring both countries even closer to each other? China-controlled Aksai Chin.
In 1963, Pakistan and China signed a border agreement
in which 5,180 sq. kilometres of Pakistan-controlled
Kashmir was ceded to China, triggering a strong Indian
protest.
In Pakistan’s 1965 war with India, Pakistan was
disappointed when the US imposed an arms embargo
A Historical Analysis of the Bilateral Relationship on Pakistan and also on India. However, China provided
Pakistan with not only diplomatic but also military
An overview of the first sixty-three years of Pakistan- support without entering the war, yet posing credible
China Relations threat of a two-front war with India.
Structural changes in Pakistan-China relations began
Between the two neighbors, multiple contrasts have to occur in the early 1970s. Through secret diplomacy
existed at many levels since the very beginning. Henry Kissinger was flown into Beijing via Islamabad
Ideologically, China was on a path to establish a strong to work out US relations with China. Pakistan utilized
socialist state under the supreme leader Mao Zedong the Sino-American rapprochement to develop military
whereas Pakistan under its founding father M. A. and even nuclear co-operation with China. Although
Jinnah was clearly tilted towards the United States. Washington was aware of the nuclear cooperation
The whole idea behind establishing Pakistan was to between Pakistan and China3, it overlook it due to
create a federation with autonomous provinces based Pakistan’s high utility in U.S’s own South Asia policy.
both on Islam and liberal democratic principles. These In December 1971 the Eastern Wing of Pakistan,
obvious differences, however, did not keep them from which is Bangladesh today, became independent
establishing diplomatic relations in 1951, as Pakistan from the Western Wing. Earlier in the summer of 1971,
withdrew its recognition for the Republic of China an Indo-Soviet Treaty of Strategic Cooperation had
(Taiwan). already alerted China. However, China’s reactions to the
In early Cold War years, US concerns of Soviet expansion 1971 Indo-Pakistan war were measured and no credible
in Asia coupled with Pakistan’s India compulsions threats towards India were made as it had been the
provided incentive and opportunity for US and Pakistan case in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war4.
to form a close relationship. However, Pakistan was As a result of Bangladesh’s independence, a downward
careful not to antagonize China by engaging in direct or trend was recorded in Pakistan’s share of total Chinese
indirect conflict with it. assistance and loans to third world from 1970-1978
In this regional context, China was establishing close with the exception of the year 1977- when it grew by
ties with socialist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe
(the Soviet Union and its satellites) as well as in South
and East Asia, with countries like India, North Vietnam,
North Korea and Laos. On the other hand, Pakistan’s 1 - Muhammed Ayub Khan, «The Pakistan-American Alliance,»
diplomatic and political ties with the US were growing. Foreign Affairs (June 8, 2017).
Despite Pakistan’s efforts to stress its neutrality to 2 - “The Foreign Policy of Liaquat Ali Khan”, Dawn, (Oct 17,
China during the Bandung Conference 1955, Beijing 2010).
was well-aware of Pakistan’s growing dependence on 3 - Paul, Thazha V. «Chinese-Pakistani nuclear/missile ties and
US - for aid and military assistance. Pakistan grasped balance of power politics,» The Non-proliferation Review, 10,
No. 2 (2003): 21-29.
the opportunity to sign the Mutual Defense Assistance 4 - Rudhura Chaudhuri, “The Making of an ‘All Weather
Agreement when U.S extended its security assistance Friendship’ Pakistan, China and the History of a Border Agreement:
package in 1954 followed soon by regional treaty pacts: 1949–1963”, The International History Review, (6/3/2017): 1-24.

2
3.4%5. In 1974, India successfully tested its first nuclear The co-operation expanded gradually over the years as
device which shifted the balance of power significantly China began to build its own capacity to produce and
in its favour. export arms. In 1992 China sold 34 short-range ballistic
M-11 missiles to Pakistan12. When Pakistan conducted
Evidence suggests that as early as mid-1970s its first nuclear tests in May 1998, China condemned
the Pakistani military was getting involved with the the tests but it continued its nuclear cooperation by
Afghan Mujahedeen for achieving geopolitical objectives. assisting Pakistan setting up the Khushab reactor facility
It was laying the groundwork needed for cultivating in Islamabad13. The facility is a 40-50 MW production
a “Strategic Depth” in Afghanistan - a process that sped reactor of weapon grade plutonium.
up after the Soviet invasion and throughout the period Three incidents underscored China’s support for Pakistan
of 1980’s and 1990’s. The vision was to have a pliant in the years 1990-2001: 1) The 1990 confrontation
government in Kabul which would serve Pakistan’s between Pakistan-India forces on the line of control in
goal’s vis-à-vis India and Central Asia6. Kashmir; 2) The 1999 Kargil mini war; and 3) The stand-
off in Kashmir in the aftermath of 2001 Indian Parliament
Through the 1980s, after the Soviet invasion and attacks. High-level Chinese officials visited Pakistan
occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979, US and after each of the confrontations listed above assuring
Saudi money poured into Pakistan to spread religious Pakistan that China’s “comprehensive cooperative
war doctrine (Jihad) against the “godless” Soviet threat partnership with Pakistan would continue and so will the
using the Jihadi syllabus developed and distributed by aid and military cooperation”14. Furthermore, Stockholm
the University of Nebraska7. The separatist elements in International Peace Research Project (SIPRI) yearbooks
Muslim population of Xinjiang were directly influenced reveal a number of new orders of arms that were placed
by this new strategic environment and Pakistan became by Pakistan during the timeline of the above mentioned
one of the many recruiting and training grounds for confrontations15. While Pakistan-China defence, nuclear
the East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement8. But China and diplomatic ties grew in scope and strength, areas
utilized Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence’s leverage of co-operation as trade relations and people-to-people
with the Afghan Taliban to keep Uighur separatists contacts remained weak.
out of Xinjiang. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan For China, Pakistan was a gateway to the world, e.g. the
had ushered a convergence of interests between US, US and the Muslim world. It was a safe regional balancer
Pakistan and China. Pakistan became a frontline state for countering India, and it was a reliable neighbor which
in countering the Soviet military in Afghanistan and took had refused to engage in war with China despite being
advantage of this new context to extract resources from a US ally. China’s geopolitical environment and regional
the US and China which it then invested in building its dynamics brought it closer to Pakistan in the aftermath
own defence capacity against India. During the Afghan of its clash with India. Moreover, Pakistan was the only
Jihad, China permitted over-flights from its territory and UN member country besides Cuba to support China in
provided anti-tank rockets to Pakistan9. the aftermath of Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.
In South Asia the results of the end of the Cold War - just For Pakistan, as time went on, it viewed the US as a
nine months after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan less reliable ally, whereas China was considered as a
(1989) - complicated the existing structure. Following regional reliable partner which offered material and non-
this withdrawal, Pakistan’s utility for the US in its material support.
South Asian policy had dropped and it imposed harsh
sanctions, due to Pakistan’s nuclear program that China
had helped developing considerably10. US suspended A period of deepening Cooperation (2001-2012)
all military sales and economic aid to Pakistan in 1990
by invoking the Pressler Amendment. Pakistan-US Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on twin
relations were so strained by mid 1990s that US was towers and the Pentagon, Pakistan was given an
on the verge of declaring Pakistan a state sponsoring ultimatum to either get on board with the War against
terrorism11. Then, China became Pakistan’s leading Terror or to face it. Pakistan chose the former. Since
arms supplier. then, civilian and military death toll in the War against
Pakistan kept a close military cooperation with China. Terror in Pakistan has crossed 80,00016 as of March
2017. The country has faced direct and indirect losses
5 - Samina Yasmeen, “Chinese Economic and Military Aid to
Pakistan 1969-1979”, Working Paper No.6, The Research School of of more than $118 billion17. Pakistan encountered
Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1987. multi-dimensional crisis during this period. This section
6 - Christine Fair, C., «Pakistan’s Relations with Central Asia: Is provides an overview of the evolution of Pakistan-China
Past Prologue?» Journal of Strategic Studies, 31, No. 2 (2008): 12 - Curtis, Lisa, “China’s military and security relationship with
201-227; also see Ajay Behera, “Pakistan’s strategic vision: with Pakistan, in “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and
and without the Taliban”, Op-ed, Brookings, (22/03/2002). Security Review Commission on May 20, 2009, The Heritage Foun-
7 - The Economist, “Not Yet History”, (29/11/2012). dation, (2009).
8 - Liza Steele & Raymond Kuo, “Terrorism in Xinjiang?” , Ethno 13 - T. V. Paul, “Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the
Politics, (2007): 1-1. Balance of Power”, The Non-proliferation Review, Summer,
9 - Carl Bernstein, “How CIA Provides Arms for Afghan Rebels,” (2003): 1-9.
Manchester Guardian Weekly, (August 9, 1981): 7. 14 - “PRC: Jiang Zemin Interviewed by Pakistani Correspondent
10 - Roy, Meena Singh. «Where is the China-Pakistan Relationship on Ties, Afghanistan,” Xinhua (English), (December 18, 2001).
Heading- Strategic Partnership or Conditional Engagement?» Asia 15 - Garver, John W, “China’s Kashmir Policies,” India Review,
Policy, No. 21 (2016): 160. Vol 3, (2004): 1-24.
11 - Sarita, Dwivedi, Sangit, “Exploring Strategies and Implica- 16 - Tribune, “80,000 Pakistanis killed in US ‘War on Terror’:
tions of an Opportunistic Alliance: A Case Study of Pakistan and report”, The Express Tribune, (29/03/2017).
China” Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol 21, No.3 (2013): 17 - “‘War on terror’ has cost Pakistan $118bn: SBP”, Dawn,
306-327. (19/11/2016).

3
political, military and economic relations from 2001 until 2000 and 2013 was US$5,107 million, making China
2012. its largest source of arms and equipment during that
In 2001 the then chief of Army staff, Musharraf, visited period22.
China. During a press conference he said “the total The above overview of the developments in Pakistan-
trade between Pakistan and China is not even $1 billion, China from 2001 to 2012 shows a deeper cooperation
which really is regrettable in the context of trade between in political, economic and security/defence arenas.
two very close partners and very close countries”18. Just Then, the scope of co-operation between the two also
five years later China’s trade volume with Pakistan was gradually expanded beyond the earlier India-centric
US$ 4 billion (2006-07). A Preferential Trade Agreement slant. However, economic and trade relations remained
(2005) and Free Trade Agreement (2006) came into the weakest pillar of the Pakistan-China strategic
effect in 2007 and Pakistan’s exports to China crossed partnership.
$1 billion that year. The total value of imports of goods
from China between December 2006 and August 2010
was $11 billion, whereas exports to China were merely
$0.25 billion in the same period19. Aside from these
official figures tax-free arrangements of containers
carrying goods from China remained undocumented
due to presence of smuggling rackets.
Pakistan-China Relations since 2012: The
During the Musharraf and Zardari regime, Pakistan Economy Takes the Lead?
reportedly asked Beijing to formalize the relationship but
China was opposed to concluding an alliance even with In 2013, President Xi Jinping put forward his One Belt
its “long standing strategic partner” of five decades20. One Road Initiative (OBOR). It comprises of physical
China termed Pakistan a “Strategic Partner” in 200521. and non-physical components of connectivity and
China’s counter-terrorism co-operation with Pakistan development across more than 65 countries to be
also strengthened between 2001 and 2012. Terrorists linked to China. It aims to achieve the world largest
and separatist activities in Xinjiang during this period economic cooperation network along with policy
were found to have links with groups and individuals in coordination, socio-cultural cooperation, financing and
terrorist training camps operating in Pakistan. Some of trade collaboration. OBOR has a land route, i.e. the
them were also involved in the 2008 attack at the time Silk Road Economic Belt, and a maritime route, i.e. 21st
of the Beijing Olympics, the 2010 Uighur separatist riots Century Maritime Silk Road. The Fig. 1 below illustrates
and the 2010 Kashgar knife attacks. Pakistani officials both components. Although the Bangladesh-China-
have admitted that members of separatist group as the India-Myanmar Corridor is unlikely to materialize as talks
East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the remain stalled, it still features in official maps.
Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) had links with the Tehrik e
Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In 2010 Abdul Haq, the head of
ETIM, was killed in a U.S drone strike. His predecessor
Hassan Mahsum was killed by Pakistani security forces
earlier in 2003.
Pakistan’s proximity and its links to certain factions of
Afghan Taliban have their merits and demerits. These
links have benefited Pakistan and China in their defense
capabilities. For instance, after U.S. attacked an al
Qaeda camp in Afghanistan (1998) one Tomahawk
cruise missile went off course and landed in Baluchistan,
with Pakistan’s facilitation, many of these missiles were
sold to the Chinese and reverse-engineered, helping the
conception of the Pakistani Babur cruise missile and
also the Chinese DH-10. Furthermore, Chinese-inspired
short-range Shaheen I and medium-range Shaheen II
ballistic missiles are integral part of Pakistan’s delivery Figure 1: Source: Hong Kong Trade Development
system, which are inspired from Chinese designs. Council (2017)23
Pakistan has returned the favor in its own capacity by
allegedly allowing Chinese engineers to access Western The initiative has immense significance for China for a
technology, e.g. the black hawk stealth helicopter that number of reasons. The aim is to boost development,
crashed in Abbottabad during the Osama Bin Laden connectivity and trade via infrastructure and transport
raid in May 2011. networks, in regions traversed by OBOR. It will also
Pakistan’s total arms import from China between provide China with the opportunity to expand its
18 - “Musharraf for strong trade ties with China”, Dawn, economic, political and even military presence across
(24/12/2001). the globe to take on a proactive role in world affairs to
19 - Tribune, “Does Pakistan China trade reflect mutual benefit?”, secure its interests abroad.
The Express Tribune, (11/10/2010). President Xi’s 2015 visit to Pakistan was the occasion
20 - Lisa Curtis, and Derek Scissors, “Limits of the China- for both countries to launch a new initiative, the China
Pakistan Alliance”, Expert Zone, Reuters Blog, (20/1/ 2012).
21 - Feng Zhongping, and Jing Huang, “China strategic partnership 22 - SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, TIVs of Arms Exports to
diplomacy: engaging with a changing world”, European Strategic Pakistan 2000-2013.
Partnerships Observatory, Working paper number 8, (June 2014). 23 - HKTDC, “The Belt and Road Initiative”, (16/05/2017).

4
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Memorandums of The CPEC: A Closer and Unprecedented Economic
Understanding (MoUs) worth of $46 Billion were then Partnership
signed. But the envelope later increased: as of May
2017 local Pakistani news sources inflated the figure to Although Pakistan does not fall into top 15 of China’s
as high as $62 billion24 (United States total financial and trading partners, there is a cautious optimism on both
military assistance to Pakistan from 1948-2010 equals sides that the investment China has made in Pakistan
$61.7 billion25). via CPEC projects is going to expand bilateral trade.
Nevertheless, Pakistan’s internal controversies have
The CPEC is a collect ion of projects related to energy, drawn scepticism to the viability of the project, even at
infrastructural and agricultural/industrial development, this early stage.
along with various other development projects aimed Pakistan is not a small country in terms of its population,
at boosting Pakistan’s economy and bringing political it is the 6th largest population in the world. A population
and economic stability. The CPEC comprises of a land census is underway as of June 2017, after a gap
and maritime route connected by the port of Gwadar, as of 19 years, the estimation is above 200 million.
is illustrated in Fig.1 above. The CPEC is an important Instability, mismanagement and incompetency coupled
component of the OBOR as it constitutes a considerably with rampant corruption have resulted in crisis in almost
shorter route to the Arabian Sea from Western China. every sector. Business ranking prepared by the World
And in the event of tension or conflict in the South China Bank places Pakistan at number 144 out of 190.
Sea, this alternative route can help China overcome A commodity such as electricity is in short supply
its “Malacca Dilemma”. Gwadar lies east of Strait of and the energy sector is in shackles; blackouts (load-
Hormuz through which much of the Middle East’s crude shedding) of up to 18 hours a day (in rural areas) have
production passes. become the norm. Power black-outs and expensive
energy have weakened Pakistani local industry in the
However, there are security concerns over much of last two decades.
the plan, especially in developing Gwadar. This port is Hence, more than $35 billion has been allocated to
located at the tip of Pakistan’s most unstable province energy generation projects in CPEC, with the aim to
that has gone through episodes of medium to low revive the local industry. Reports suggest that a 17%
intensity separatist insurgency. In the past, ethnic return rate has been promised to Chinese State Owned
Baloch rebels have blown up numerous gas pipelines, Enterprises (SOEs) investing in all CPEC related projects;
trains and even attacked Chinese engineers. As a result, if that is true, the electricity generated would be very
the CPEC land route has an Eastern route (proposed expensive for a common man. Pakistan GDP per capita
alternative) and Western route (original proposed) as is $1,561 (2016) (China is above $8,000) and more than
shown in Fig. 2. 40% of its total population lives in acute poverty27.

Fig 2. Source: Gandhara 2015 Illustration of China

Pakistan Economic Corridor26

24 - “CPEC investment pushed from $55b to $62b”, Tribune,

(12/04/2017).
25 - “Can Pakistan Survive without US aid”, Dawn, (15/02/, 2012). 27 - “40% Pakistani’s live in Poverty ”, The Express Tribune, (21st
26 - Khalifah Gandhara, “CPEC Illustration” (March 2017). June 2016).

5
Four of the five poorest districts are in Baluchistan,
where Gwadar’s bottleneck deep sea port is located.
Fig. 3 shows the major power projects that are expected
to be completed in 2019.

Fig. 3. Source: Council on Foreign Relations, Behind They are expected to exceed $3.546 billion31. These
China’s Gambit in Pakistan, 201628 loans which fall under the Foreign Directed Investment
schemes have a 17 % guaranteed return32. However,
In the aftermath of the launching of the CPEC, Pakistan’s due to insufficient information it is speculated that
exports to China have grown over the years, but the Pakistani’s are still unaware of how much the CPEC
growth has been a very slow. The total trade volume would actually cost them33.
reached an all-time high at US$ 13.77 billion in 2015-16 In February 2017 Shanghai Electric Power acquired for
and Pakistan’s exports have jumped to US$ 1.69 billion $1.8 billion K-Electric which is one of Pakistan’s biggest
in 2015-16 from US$ 575 million in 2006-07. energy producers.
The economic partnership between Pakistan and
For the sake of comparison, in 2016 India-China bilateral China may be unprecedented but the level of secrecy
trade amounted to $70.8 billion29 with a trade deficit in governments handling invites accusations and
of $46 billion; whereas Pakistan-China total trade stood misconceptions which cause panic. These concerns
at $10 billion with a trade deficient of $6.2 billion30. are highlighted under the next heading. With Chinese
Out of a total 7,550 tariff lines under the China Pakistan citizens traveling to Pakistan more often since 2013,
Free Trade Agreement, Pakistan only exported 253, a Pew research survey of population of both countries
with an average export value of $500, reported Dawn reveals favourable views of one another. With 78% of
in June 2016. Although major deals have been signed the respondents in Pakistan see China as an ally and
between China and Pakistan, very limited information is 57% US as a threat34.
available. For instance, even the rates of return on the Chinese products and people can be seen in all big
loans, repayment methods and terms of agreements and some small cities across Pakistan. Recently, there
have not been made public. has been a boom in Mandarin classes, both in schools
The CPEC loans are of two main types: 1) Government and private centres. Local advertisements on television
to government loans and 2) Commercial loans. and even movies featuring Chinese actors spreading
The former having a lower interest rate only make up messages about the need to increase connectivity
one third of the total loans. Special concessions given to 31 - Ghulam Ali, “What we get right and wrong on CPEC”,
Chinese investors (state-owned companies and private The Friday Times, (23rd June 2017)
investors) have made people speculate Pakistan’s 32 - Op. cit., p. 16.
annual dues once the commercial operations begin. 33 - Christine Fair, “Pakistan Can’t Afford China’s Friendship”,
Foreign Policy, (03/07/2017)
34 - Pew Research Center, “Which Country is greatest ally/
28 - Op. cit., p. 8. threat?”, Global Attitudes and Trends, http://www.pewglobal.
29 - “India’s trade deficit with China climbs to $46.56 billion”, org/2014/07/14/chapter-2-chinas-image/ ;
The Economic Times, (13th Jan 2017). http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-
30 - “Trade deficit with China swells to $6.2bn”, Dawn News, s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/
(16th Aug 2016). pg_14-07-10_alliesthreats_640px/

6
are on the rise. In May 2017 Pakistan launched its first journalists suggest the contrary39.
Chinese language newspaper for its estimated 10,000 A Senate committee on the CPEC was formed by
Chinese population. the government in 2015, which includes members
from various political parties. During an interview
in the summer of 2016 with a leading journalist,
the chairman of the committee expressed serious
concerns of governments “duplicity” on the CPEC route
while revealing that the Gwadar port itself remains a “non-
starter”40. In November 2016, the first cargo shipment
consisting of hundreds of trolleys was transported
The Political, Military and Geo-strategic across 3,000 kilometres from China to Gwadar port and
Implications of the CPEC then escorted by Pakistan navy vessels on its way to
Middle-East and Africa. If each caravan and shipment
China’s economic and geo-strategic ambitions with has to be escorted by army and navy the costs for the
its power projections have had an inevitable spill over corridor would be very high for Pakistan to sustain.
effect on its South Asia policy. Pakistan’s current elite In geostrategic terms, South Asia is a highly volatile
views itself as the biggest beneficiary of China’s rise region. Pakistan’s historic animosity with India and
and the CPEC. Aside from bilateral engagement China growing tension in Kashmir along with Pakistan’s
has sought to engage Pakistan on a broader scale. deteriorating relations with Afghanistan are serious
For instance, in June 2017, Pakistan (and India also) impediments to the CPEC. A report published in June
were accepted as full members of the Shanghai 2017 by the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for
Corporation Organization35. Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) stated that the project is
The CPEC is part development scheme, part strategic likely to ignite further political instability in the region41.
gambit36. But according to a document “leaked” by This seems likely given that India has remained outside
Pakistani leading newspaper, Dawn News, in May of OBOR and boycotted the Belt and Road Initiative held
2017, it seems as though China has positioned itself in Beijing in May 2017. It has also protested that the
to make the most of the deal37. Also, the project has raised CPEC passes through Pakistan-administered Kashmir,
multiple controversies within Pakistan. Politicization of presented as a violation of its sovereignty by China.
such a vast plan is inevitable even in a weak democracy A month later India inaugurated an Air Corridor with
like Pakistan. It has polarized the political elite as well as Afghanistan, a route that by-passes Pakistan42. Indian
the society. In May 2017, a Pentagon report suggested media outlets have been quick to report the slightest
that Chinese forces are likely to be stationed at Gwadar, hint of rattle between Pakistan and China. For example,
something that has been in discussion for some time, when Xi Jinping did not meet Nawaz Sharif on the
especially in Indian policy circles38. As India expands its sidelines of the June Shanghai Corporation Organization
navy into the Indian Ocean, fears that China is infringing (2017), the move was reported as a “snub” to Pakistan
on its rights by stationing warships in Gwadar, comes (allegedly due to the killing of two Chinese teachers by
as an alarm. However, China has on multiple occasions ISIS in Pakistan). However, Chinese Foreign Ministry
indicated that Gwadar is a civilian project. was quick to dismiss these reports43. Despite China’s
The CPEC also has political implications on the provincial economic engagement with India, border disputes are
level. There have been allegations from Baluchistan, KPK a usual source of contention. As recent as June 2017
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), FATA (Federally Administered China lodged a solemn protest to Indian government
Tribal Areas) and Sindh that Punjab wants to maximise for allegedly “trespassing into its territory Sikkim Sector”
its own share and benefits of the project on the expense and also barred Indian pilgrims from entering Tibet44.
of other provinces. Their allegations are well founded, China’ relationship with India has improved over the
given that contrary to the public announcements and years in trade and political terms but is not free of
consensus built during the meeting of the CPEC Joint tensions. As one China expert stated: China has
Coordination Committee, there has been little on- “sustained its strategic entente cordiale with Pakistan,
ground infrastructural development in the Western route. while navigating toward ever-deeper cooperation
These objections to altering the initial Western with India”45. China’s much deeper trade, social and
(Baluchistan) route to the Eastern (Punjab) route economic ties with India have not upset Pakistan due
have been labelled as anti-CPEC propaganda by the to China’s repeated diplomatic support for Pakistan.
government spokespersons repeatedly. The central For instance, Prime Minister Modi’s charm offensive
government has also stated that it was the Chinese launched at president Xi to accept India’s membership
companies that preferred the Eastern route for security
reasons, whilst documents obtained by certain television 39 - CPEC Official, “Ahsan Iqbal Declares Western Route As Inte-
gral Part Of CPEC, Rejects Misconceptions About Changes”, (11th
35 - “Xi Jinping snubs Nawaz Sharif by skipping bilateral meet November 2016).
after murder of Chinese nationals”, Times of India, (10/6/2017). 40 - Senator Taj Haider’s interview with Saleem Saafi, Jirga, Geo
36 - Markey, Daniel, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan,” Council News, (2016).
on Foreign Relations, (5/12/2016). 41 - UN ESCAP, “The Belt and Road Initiative and the Role of
37 - “CPEC Master Plan Revealed”, Dawn, (21/06/2017). ESCAP”, (June 2017).
38 - It states: “China most likely will seek to establish 42 - Associated Press, “Afghan president inaugurates first air
additional military bases in countries with which it has corridor with India”, (19th June 2017).
a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic inte- 43 - “China says PM Sharif not snubbed”, Hindustan Times, (12th
rests, such as Pakistan”, Pentagon Report to Congress on Chinese June 2017).
Military Development, (6th June 2017), https://www.defense.gov/ 44 - “China lodges protest over ‘crossing of border’ by Indian
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report. troops in Sikkim”, The Times of India, (27th June 2017).
PDF?ver=2017-06-06-141328-770 45 - Op. cit., p. 4.

7
to the nuclear suppliers group (NSG) of 48 countries has to the operationalization of the CPEC. Security of
not been fertile. Chinese engineers and personnel has always been
The CPEC has also contributed to improving Pakistan- a point of concern in the past and still remains to be so.
Russia relations. A Russian military delegation, headed Since 2013, more Chinese citizens have been visiting
by Chief of General Staff Colonel General Israkov Sergi Pakistan than ever. From June 2016 to June 2017 at
Yuryevich visited Pakistan in April 2017 and this was least 75,000 visas were issued to Chinese citizens
seen as a hint of Pakistan switching course. In 2016 revealed the spokesperson of the Pakistani Interior
soon after the India’s claims of conducting a “surgical Ministry. Chinese engineers have been kidnapped in the
strike” in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, 200 Pakistani past and, as a counter-measure, security for foreigners
and Russian military personnel conducted joint exercises in sensitive areas such as Baluchistan has been upped.
codenamed (Druzhbha-2016 meaning friendship) In the most recent case, in June 2017, a Mandarin
to India’s anxiety. Modi’s meeting with the American teaching Chinese couple which was later found to be
President Trump in June 2017 further strengthens on a secret missionary agenda went missing and was
the idea that India has orbited closer to Washington. later found to have been killed by ISIS. Following this,
Moscow has suggested its support for the project in the 10 Chinese working staff were sent back to China as a
spirit of regional connectivity and its interest in a closer security precaution49.
engagement with Pakistan is likely driven by concerns Insurgency in the restive region of Baluchistan is as
over Afghanistan security46. However, India remains to troublesome for Pakistan as Xinjiang is for China.
be CPEC’s largest critic. According to a leaked document on Pakistan from 2017
Pakistan is convinced that India is determined titled “Long-Term Plan On China-Pakistan Economic
to subjugate the project and in March 2016 an Corridor”, China aims to extend a control system and
alleged Indian self-confessed serving naval officer, electronic monitoring of the Khunjerab border which
Kulbushan Jadhav was arrested by Pakistan. He was connects it to Pakistan.
sentenced to death by Pakistani military court in 2017. During a visit to Beijing in 2016, Pakistan’s President
In a confessional video, which Indian authorities believe assured President Xi Jinping that most if not all the
to be a forced confession, he revealed he was funding ETIM training camps in Pakistan have been eliminated
Baloch Liberation Army and was involved in certain following a military crackdown in the restive region of
terrorist attacks in Baluchistan to the derail economic Waziristan50. Despite such assurances, China has
development there. repeatedly expressed concern of rising terrorist threats
There is a wide range of challenges to the CPEC but in neighboring countries, all the while appreciating
if Pakistan and China want this plan to be sustainable, Pakistan’s counter insurgency and counter terrorism
it must be made public, so that it can become a national efforts. Chinese and Pakistani forces held a joint
project and not a party slogan, as some suggest in anti-terror training in Ningxia in 2015 as Pakistan forces
Pakistan47. are experienced in fighting terrorists and insurgencies.
China also aims to promote the Quadrilateral
Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM)
Defense Co-operation and Security Risks: Terrorism in Counter Terrorism. This platform was developed by
and Xinjiang Afghanistan-China-Pakistan-Tajikistan in 2016, and
China seems to be taking the lead. China’s decision
As the CPEC aims for more cross-border movement to launch a “shuttle diplomacy” between Pakistan and
and business opportunities for people on either side, Afghanistan in June 2017, after a tumultuous year
China’s primary concern is cross-border terrorism and (June 2016- June 2017) indicates China’s desire to:
instability in Xinjiang. A report published by Dawn News a) safeguard its investments in Pakistan by promoting
of Pakistan speculated that China’s covert pressure on peace; and b) promote regional stability for the viability
Pakistan to get tough with the terrorists at home has of the CPEC51.
been more fruitful than that of the US, citing the Lal
Masjid (Red Mosque) operation of 200748. However, to
secure its investments and ensure return for its loans the An Ever Closer Military Cooperation
report suggested that Beijing’s pressure had increased
on Pakistan after Nawaz Sharif’s first state visit to China In 2011, China and USA had a relatively similar
in 2013. This pressure played a part in the unanimous proportion of Pakistan’s arms import: 38 % and 39%
decision of Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership to respectively. However, in 2016 imports from China
launch Zarb-e-Azb, a military operation countrywide to account for 63% of Pakistan’s total arm imports52. In
destroy terrorist hubs in 2014. 2014, a two week long Pak-China Joint military exercise
The starting and ending point of the entire land- “Peace Angel 2014” was held in Pakistan. In 2016,
route is from Kashgar to Gwadar and Xinjiang to Pakistan Navy (PN) guided missile frigate Shamsheer
Baluchistan. Therefore, a tense security environment and fleet replenishment vessel Nasr held joint navy drills
in either region or in between could be detrimental with a pair of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy
46 - Aparna Pande, “Pakistan’s ‘Love us or Hate us’ Strategy”, ships, the Type-054A Jiangkai II frigates Xuzhou and
Huffington Post, (01/07/2017) 49 - “Chinese couple abducted in Pakistan has been killed”,
47 - On the limitations and challenges of the CPEC, cf. also The New York Times, (12/06/ 2017).
Zahid Hussain, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the 50 - “Pakistan says ‘almost all’ Uighur militants eliminated” Dawn,
New Regional Geopolitics”, Paris, Ifri, https://www.ifri.org/sites/ (8th April 2016).
default/files/atoms/files/hussain_china_pakistan_economic_corri- 51 - “China to carry out shuttle diplomacy between Afghanistan
dor_2017.pdf (June 2017). and Pakistan”, The Economic Times, (26th June 2017).
48 - Michael Kugelman, “China, not America, likely behind Hafiz 52 - “China behind Pak’s growing confidence, supplies 63% of
Saeed’s house arrest”, (1/2/2017). Islamabad’s arms need”, Hindustan Times, (30th September 2016).

8
Yangzhou. Earlier in 2016, Islamabad signed a deal with
Beijing that includes the supply of 8 new stealth attack
submarines by 202853, four to be made in China and the
remaining four in Pakistan.
According to the media wing of the Armed Forces of
Pakistan (ISPR), China and Pakistan have held 12
rounds of medium to high-level security and defence
talks between early 2016 and June 2017. These include
Pakistan’s Chief of Army’s Staff’s meetings with Chinese
civilian and military leadership.
In May 2016 a PLA nuclear-powered attack submarine
made a port call in Karachi when the Chinese Navy
Commander, was in Pakistan for a visit. This was China’s
first ever port call not only in Pakistan but in South Asia.
In 2016, China built its first overseas base in Djibouti
and is moving towards a military build up in Spratly
Islands of South China Sea. However, an international
security professor at Nanjing University, Zhu Feng,
said “it is not a military base, it’s a military supply base.
The characterisation is wrong,”54 in an attempt to play Figure 4. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database57
down the scope of the facility just as the Chinese official
state machinery does.
In March 2017, for the first time in Chinese military history
PLA sent a 90-member contingent to march alongside
their Pakistani counterparts joined by a contingent of
Saudi special forces and Turkish forces on Pakistan Day
parade. The parade carried great significance as it had
been discontinued for past seven years owing to an Conclusion
unstable internal security situation. The aim was to send
a strong signal of solidarity across the region55. For Pakistan’s ruling elite, a sustained diplomatic military
Speculations about China’s intentions to station PLA and now economic support from China seems to be at
forces in Gwadar, if they materialise would only deepen the core of the country’s long-term objectives. Pakistan
a military cooperation that has become much closer in has always seen China as a bulwark against India and
the past few years56. will continue to do so. In the absence of other reliable
Fig. 4 shows Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) of Pakistan’s partners and friends, Pakistan’s limited options in the
imports from China and other countries. These data neighbourhood has forced it to put all its eggs in the
generated by Stockholm International Peace Research China basket. For China, Pakistan’s internal stability is
Institute (SIPRI) underline Pakistan’s reliance on Chinese crucial for the sake of its investments and interests there.
goods. Note that there is now a huge gap between China’s primary concern is regional stability and security
Pakistan’s imports from China and the US. The figures which is vital for its own growth and connectivity, as well
are in US$ million. as the whole OBOR initiative. Hence the launching of the
CPEC. Furthermore, while military cooperation between
China and Pakistan, after CPEC was announced, has
increased, a similar trend in trade and commerce is yet
to be seen. Most of early-harvest projects are due for
completion in 2018 and 2019.
All in all, this paper finds that co-operation between
Pakistan and China has expanded beyond their
traditional defence oriented ties into a new broad-based
realm in which economy is going to play a larger role.
However; this evolution is going to be a gradual one and
the CPEC progression remains subjected to Pakistan’s
internal stability and security. In order to fulfil China’s
interests in Pakistan, a conducive environment has to
be guaranteed by Pakistan. This paper also finds that
although the relationship between Pakistan and China
is based on mutual interests, China is more prepared
and capable of extracting benefits for it than Pakistan.
The relationship is lopsided and China clearly bargains
53 - “China to provide eight submarines to Pakistan”, The News, with a much stronger hand.
(27/08/2016).
54 - Op. cit., p. 7
55 - “Chinese troops march with Pakistani soldiers for first time”,
Financial Times, (24/03/2017).
56 - “As overseas ambitions expand, China plans 400 per cent
increase to marine corps numbers, sources say”, South China 57 - SIPRI Arms transfer Database, SIPRI Trend Indicator Values
Morning Post, (13/03/2017). (TIVs) 2013-2016.

9
 Dawn, “Pakistan says ‘almost all’ Uighur militants
eliminated”, 8th April 2016, https://www.dawn.com/
news/1204443

Dawn, “The foreign policy of Liaquat Ali Khan”, Oct 17,

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