The Two Natures of Christ

By Prince

I’m here to explain greatly what it means to be a Dyophysite; essentially we

as Dyophysites believe in Christ the Person, there are two natures one
human and divine these are how we contemplate God as one Person of and
in two natures. I’ll be defending Leo, Chalcedon, and defending dyophysis
in this document. “Truth is the beginning of every good to the gods, and of
every good to man”- the Plato
What is Hypostasis?
What is a hypostasis? Commonly, the biggest question we get as Dyophysites well a
hypostasis originally was a ὑπόστασισ (hypóstasis), is the underlying state or underlying
substance and is the fundamental reality that supports all else. It was used primarily to
explain the intellect and nous in plotinus works; now we as Christians/Catholics use it as an
individual, complete substance existing entirely in itself; an incommunicable substance. The
term used by the church to identify the persons in the Trinity and the union of two natures in
one divine person in Christ. A person is a hypostasis endowed with reason. Moreover,
hypostasis and nature are related to each other in such a manner that the hypostasis is the
bearer of the nature and the ultimate subject of all being and acting, while the nature is that
through which the hypostasis exists and acts. (etym. Latin hypostasis, basis; single substance;
rational single substance, person; Greek hypostasis, support, foundation, substance,
sediment). Now you may bring up Maximus the Confessor which says this about hypostasis
“beings that are united according to one and the same nature or essence (that is, beings that
are of one and the same nature) are distinguished one from another according to hypostasis or
person, as is the case with angels and men, and with all the created beings that are considered
in species (εδοσ) and in genus (γνοσ).” Simply, an extension of the universal and the
particular is the pair logos– tropos. The Cappadocian distinction between the logos of nature
and the tropos of existence within the trinitarian theology, tropos often expresses the
individual aspect, that which differentiates the particular from the general, while logos stands
for the universal. With rational beings endowed with free will, this differentiation can be
viewed also within the moral context.

Sin and virtue are a matter of what one makes of one’s natural capacities; they are the tropoi
of the application of one’s logos. Although the usage of tropos in trinitarian theology, on the
one hand, and in the moral context, on the other, are closely related, it can be misleading to
take tropos as a straightforward synonym of tropos hyparxeôs. This becomes more evident
when speaking of tropos more ‘ontologically’, for example, in the context “of the fall and
restoration” where the tropos represents the state or the condition of a nature. The renewing
effect of the incarnation on humanity, and in particular with respect to virgin birth, is seen to
take place at the level of tropos rather than of logos. The logos remains unchanged. He takes
over from the Cappadocian fathers one of their ways of explaining the difference between
subsistent being (hypostasis) and nature in a trinitarian context, and uses it much more

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widely: in fact, it becomes for him a fundamental metaphysical distinction. To express what
is distinctive about the subsistent beings of the godhead the cappadocians had used the term
‘mode of existence’ (=tropos tes hyparxeos). This leads maximus to suggest that at the level
of being, we find natures defined by their principles, meanings or definitions (all of which
can be represented in greek by the term logos)–ousia, physis, and logos belong together;
whereas at the level of person we find ‘modes of existence’–hyparxis, hypostasis, and tropos
belong together. Now that we thoroughly explain the Greek on hypostasis, we can now
explain the latin on hypostasis. St Boethius on hypostasis says this “an individual substance
of a rational nature). He says that insofar as it’s excluded from accidents substantia --
"substance" is used to exclude accidents: "we see that accidents cannot constitute person"
(boethius, op. Cit.). Substantia is used in two senses: of the concrete substance as existing in
the individual, called substantia prima, and of abstractions, substance as existing in genus
and species, called substantia secunda. It is disputed which of the two the word taken by
itself here signifies. It seems probable that of itself it prescinds from substantia prima and
substantia secunda, and is restricted to the former signification only by the word individua.

We say individua insofar as it cannot be divided in sub-divisions, simply the term tends to
indicate the concrete singularity and reality of things insofar as the ousia individualizes and
takes shape in them. Any intelligible single substance is considered a hypostasis in the Latin
church thought. Since some substances are simple, others are composite, and both sorts have
their essence, but the simple ones in a more genuine and excellent way, just as they have a
more excellent way of being. For they are the cause of the composite ones; at least this is true
of the first, simple substance, which is god. However, since the essences of these substances
are quite hidden from us, we should begin with the essences of composite substances, so that
our discussion may more suitably proceed from the easier subjects. In composite substances,
therefore, form and matter are known [components], 11 as are soul and body in man. But it
cannot be said that one of these alone should be called the essence of the thing. That matter
alone is not the essence of the thing is clear, because the thing is knowable through its
essence, and it is on account of its essence that it falls under its proper species and genus; but
its matter is not the principle of cognition of the thing, and it is not on account of its matter
that a thing is determined to be its proper genus or species, but that on account of which it
actually exists.

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What is Nature/Essence? (Ousia)

Commonly a nature is seen as a totality of properties that can be a particular or a

common (general). This thought goes so far into the neoplatonic and platonic thought to
express how one particular can share properties with another of it is an abstract object(that
exists prior to the particular) or it only exists in the concrete (doesn’t exist outside the
particular). Properly; this argument is been seen as the problem with universals but we aren’t
targeting that right now but explaining what a nature/essence, is all aspects of a thing is
considered a essence essentially for example Christ’ human nature as actions that the divine
nature cannot do in its essence such as death and hungered these are all predicative of a
subject which is Christ but in its propriety it’s the human essence as a whole. Nothing cannot
exist without essence that we can know by the properties any particular has, such as the rock
having propriety of rockiness. But a nature or essence so taken can be considered in two
ways.

In one way, according to its proper notion; and this is its absolute consideration. And in this
way nothing is true of it except what pertains to it on account of what it is; therefore, if
anything else is attributed to it, then the attribution is false. For example, to a man, on
account of being a man, it pertains to be rational and animal and anything else that is in his
definition; to be white or black, however, and anything else that is not involved in the notion
of humanity does not pertain to a man on account of being a man. Therefore, if it is asked
whether this nature considered in this way can be said to be one or many, neither alternative
should be accepted, because both are outside of the understanding of humanity, and neither
can pertain to it. For if plurality were included in its understanding, then it could never be
one, although it is one insofar as it is in Socrates. Likewise, if unity were included in its
notion and under- standing, then Socrates and Plato would have [numerically] one and the
same nature, and it could not be multiplied in several things. In the other way nature is
considered accord- ing to its existence in this or that thing. And in this way something can be
predicated of it accidentally [per accidens], on account of the thing in which it is. For
example, it is said that a man is white, because Socrates is white, although this [i.e., being
white] does not pertain to a man on account of being a man. This nature has two sorts of
existence [esse]: one in the singular, another in the soul, and accidents follow upon this nature
on account of each. And in the singulars it has several acts of existence [esse] according to
the diversity of singulars. But the nature itself, according to its proper, that is absolute,

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consideration, does not have to have any of these. For it is false to say that the nature of man
as such should have existence in this singular, for then it could never exist outside this
singular [i.e., in another singular]; likewise, if it pertained to [the nature of] man as such not
to exist in this singular, then it would never exist in this singular. But it is true to say that to
[the nature of] man as such it does not pertain that it should exist in this singular or in that
one or in the soul. It is clear, therefore, that the nature of man absolutely considers abstracts
from all existence, without, however, excluding any of them. And it is the nature considered
in this way that is predicated of all the individuals [that have this nature]. forms are not
actually intelligible, unless they are separated from matter and its [individuating] conditions,
and they are not rendered actually intelligible, except by the power of an intelligent
substance, insofar as it receives them and works on them. Therefore, an intelligent substance
has to be immune from matter in every way, so that it neither has matter as its part, nor does it
exist as a form impressed in matter, as is the case with material forms. The difference,
therefore, between the essence of a simple substance and that of a com- posite substance is
that the essence of a composite substance is not only the form, but it comprises both form and
matter, whereas the essence of a simple substance is its form only. And this gives rise to two
other differences.

The first is that the essence of a composite substance can be signified either as a whole
or a part, which results from the designation of matter, as has been explained. Therefore, the
essence of a composite thing is not predicated in every way of the composite thing itself, for
we cannot say that a man is his own quiddity.41 But the essence of a simple thing, which is
its form, can only be signified as a whole, for there is nothing there apart from the form, so
there is nothing that could receive the form. Therefore, no matter how we consider the
essence of a simple substance, it is predicated of the simple substance of a simple substance
is the simple substance itself, for there is nothing else [in the simple substance] to receive
it.The second difference is that the essences of composite things, since they are received in
designated matter, are multiplied by the division of designated matter, whence in their case it
happens that there are numerically distinct things in the same species. However, since the
essence of a simple thing is not received in matter, in their case there cannot be this kind of
multiplication; therefore, in the case of these substances, there cannot be several individuals
in the same species, but there are as many species as there are individuals.

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What is Person?

The biggest cause of controversy is this very question: What is a person? This has caused
many to question the church of Christ simply on this very question - the constitution for a
person, and what is a person itself. Well, to make it simple, a person is an individual
substance of a rational nature. This was in defense of St. Boethius ' explanation (Q. 29) we
state that a person is an individual substance insofar as it is self-subsisting and is a complete
whole (substance). Thomas Aquinas defends it as so when he says “Person signifies a certain
nature (quaedam natura) with a certain mode of existence (quidam modus existendi ). Now,
the nature which person includes in its signification is the most worthy (dignissima) of all
natures, namely, the intellectual nature according to its genus; and likewise the mode of
existing signified by person is the most worthy (dignissimus), namely, such that something be
existing by itself ( per se existens).

Therefore, since all that is most worthy (dignissimum) in creatures should be attributed to
God, this name person can fittingly be attributed to God, like other names which are said of
God in a proper way”. We know what a person is by its completeness and it’s intelligibility,
one could argue the human nature is a person as many argue as I have seen but the issue
arises on rather we see the human nature as a substance or not and we don’t insofar as it is a
completed substance we say that Christ human nature has subsistence insofar as the Word
communicated subsistence to it. Now, we know that the Greeks/Alexandrians simply seen
person as a particular concrete reality that isn’t much different insofar as a particular being
existent as concretely one reality is why Cyril believes that Jesus was one Physis because he
existed concretely as one subject/reality rather then two because the natures cannot have
reality without union.

He made an insistence that the union of the Word and flesh wasn’t a union of essence or
operations but a union of Hypostasis since the physis(of the flesh) became the reality of the
word insofar as existing becoming a compounded entity(subject) as why we say compounded
hypostasis(subsistence). Since the Word subsists before the flesh and gives the flesh its
subsistence by unification. St. Maximus sees person as an activity that characterizes a nature
that isn’t necessarily incorrect as a person would be distinguishable by its tropos(mode of
activity) as I have stated earlier. Note, the Greeks see hypostasis as particular and they state

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any hypostasis that is particularize from a commonality necessarily is a person insofar as it
too a genus as Aquinas argues, now if In a union between natures or essences, if the natural
integrity is to be preserved, the ‘essential difference’ of each constituent must necessarily
remain. As we shall see later, there is in such a case union according to one and the same
hypostasis or person, but differentiation according to nature. The logos of nature, its essential
difference and its integrity go hand in hand. That would keep the integrity of Maximus' view
on Person and Hypostasis and not lead it to Nestorianism as they would argue.

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The Hypostatic Union And Dyophysis

The Hypostatic Union this is what we all trying to Understand; we try to understand it in the
correct light of the Council of Chalcedon who says the Person of Christ is in two natures
without separation and change, how do we as Christians understand this well I propose a
semantic and metaphysical strategy for addressing the problem. The human nature relates to
the divine person according to a relation of ontological dependence that is entirely unique,
and the sense in which the person may be said to be the subject of human properties is one
that is irreducibly qualified by this unique dependence-relation. The Word is thus the subject
of both divine and human properties, though the sense of ‘property exemplification’ that is at
work is not univocal, and therefore does not give rise to contradiction. I associate this
semantic strategy with a renovated habitus theory of the hypostatic union, which understands
the human nature’s relation to the Word as one that is entirely extrinsic to the divine person,
bringing about no internal change to the Word in its divinity, while maintaining, contra
compositional accounts, that the Incarnation does not give rise to a product which includes
the divine person and human nature as parts.

Thus, my approach preserves a strong identity between ‘Christ’ and ‘the Word’. Importantly,
the human nature’s dependence upon the person is unique in a sense that satisfies the
requirements of ‘mystery’, for it does not reduce the hypostatic union to an instance of a
more general metaphysical phenomenon, the way us as Catholics come to complete reason on
how Christ becomes one incarnate nature as Cyril says this is explicitly speaking on the
individuation of human nature in subsistence from the Divine word or in Greek terms as he
completes the human nature by making it particularize as one concrete reality. The biggest
issue we gotta attack as Christians is that the natures do not become numerically identical but
remain distinct thus why we say in two natures because in the subject of Christ person
communicates subsistence to the human nature which would keep the completeness of
actions and intellect of both but all require subject which is one by union. We say
analogously as the body-soul analogy by composition, the soul being a potential
principle(prime matter) requires the soul to give it being, and the soul needs the body to
modify it that unification is the composition as one, similarly we would say Christ human
nature requires a complete communication of subsistence as a soul communicates subsistence
to the body that union by composition isn’t like potency-act but a relation between person
and modification in human it’s real similarly in Christ person he is really distinct from his
human nature which gives us the common claim in two natures. Dyophysites don’t believe
that the humanity its own concrete reality insofar as a nature with its own completeness as a
substance but rather it has reality insofar as existing distinguishable from the divine person
and requires the divine person for modification for its subsisting: since the human nature

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cannot subsist without communication of subsistence from the divine Word. Of course during
Leo’s Tome it speaks about the flesh doing what the flesh does and the Word doing what the
Word does… note: that Leo spoken directly from St. Hilary of Poitiers, he’s speaking insofar
as the nature of the Word has proper operations distinguishable from the fleshes this doesn’t
necessitate nestorianism because Natures can have operations without subjects insofar as
having particular properties.

This, isn’t something foreign to the church as many we believe an aspect of the person and
nature are not identical and also that there is a numerical distinction between the human
nature and the person because we don’t believe the completeness is synonymous to that as a
part to whole since insofar that the human nature is a constituent of a composite whole,
where the identity of the composite whole is dependent on one of its parts, and the divine
nature doesn’t exist outside the person since the divine nature(form) is subsistent and the
human nature isn’t because assumed insofar as a truth maker not as a mode of accident that is
completed by the subsistence of the Word by the human nature existing in virtue of its
relation to the divine person: the person communicates its esse to the assumed nature.

God the Son/Word manifested and became flesh. He appropriates “to make one’s own or
assumed” the human nature’s properties to himself according to its own laws and functions.
Like when his flesh is undergoing suffering. He doesn’t prevent the suffering, but allows
human nature to go through the suffering itself while experiencing it in order to be our High
Priest. That is economically submitting himself to his own flesh. So when the human nature
communicates to the Personal Subject (he) only operates in accordance to the laws of human
characteristics with infirmities, restrictions, and limitations by the normal constraints of his
humanity without sin. Basically, God the Son economically submitted himself to his own
flesh and allowed the flesh to go naturally through the course of his own biological laws of
nature. Son was manifested in and became flesh by a permanent transcendent personal
subsisting connection called “one subsistence”. And through this connection from the Son
then the Divine Nature is established in union with the human nature by the logical
disjunction of the Son. The Divine Nature is not ontological one “in” the human nature but
only in union by a permanent transcendent personal subsisting connection of the Son. The
Persons simply cannot be separated from the Divine Nature.

This doesn’t mean the Son stopped his subsistence in the Divine Nature then transferred to
the human nature. The subsistence in the Divine Nature is eternally permanent. There is only
One Subsistence of the Son existing in both natures. And both the Father and the Holy Spirit
cannot subsist in the human nature too. They didn’t manifest and became flesh. It was only
the Son/Word who became the One Person of Christ and not two or three Christs we would
say that there isn’t any individuation in a simple substance, but as far as wat is considered
constituting a human nature insofar as We only can say that it is ''quasi-formal'' because it
falls short of being properly formal: the Son is not the formal cause of the incarnation

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because the Son does not ''inform'' the human nature, the Son is not a substantial or accidental
form of the incarnation or of its term. We say that it is ''quasi'' formal because ''form'' and
''matter'' are intrinsic causes, and whatever is intrinsic to something [say, the Incarnation] is
either determining and then we call it formal constitutive or determinable and then we call it
material. The Son is a determined principle of the incarnation, while the human nature is a
determinable principle so it is the quasi-material cause of the Incarnation. We say ''quasi'' in
this respect simply to indicate that there is only an analogous we're not using the words
formal and material in the same sense as we use it when we say that the rational soul is the
formal cause of man and an animal body is its material causes because they’re
distinguishable in their formal causes from that of a simple substance.

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