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i
Rethinking America
•
ii
iii
Rethinking
America
•
FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC
John M. Murrin
with an introduction by
Andrew Shankman
1
iv
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
v
Cont ents
•
Preface and Acknowledgments ix
Andrew Shankman
Part I. An Overview
1. The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison
of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688–1721)
and America (1776–1816) 31
vii
vi
viii Contents
•
I arrived at Princeton University in the summer of 1992 for my first
semester of graduate school, equally eager and overwhelmed to study with
John Murrin. One of my undergraduate professors, Stephen Foster, had
known Murrin since their days at Yale working with Edmund Morgan.
Another, Allan Kulikoff, had been Murrin’s colleague at Princeton for
several years. A third, Simon Newman, had been Murrin’s student. And
a fourth, Alfred F. Young, doubted Murrin’s political commitments,
but confirmed what the other three said: that Murrin seemed to know
everything. Murrin was, Young told me, co-writing an essay for the vol-
ume Young was currently editing, an essay that Young assured me was
stunning.1 Murrin, it seemed, fit well the description his Ph.D. adviser
Morgan had provided for Ezra Stiles, President of Yale College from 1778
to 1795: he was “a monstrous warehouse of knowledge” exhibiting “so
much energy in the sheer joy of learning.”2
That spring I had first sensed another equally important quality
of John Murrin’s when I read a brief note he had written to Kulikoff
and had enclosed with the final volume of the biographical dictionary
Princetonians. Princetonians ran to five volumes, published between 1976
and 1991, and covered the years 1748 to 1794. Murrin’s name appears
nowhere as an editor. Yet he devoted a great deal of time to the project
due to his deep interest in the history of the university where he worked
ix
x
for over thirty years, and because of his devotion to the memory and leg-
acy of Princeton’s previous early Americanist, Wesley Frank Craven. The
note, to the best of my memory, read “Dear Allan, here is the latest vol-
ume of Princetonians. I expect you to read every word. John. P.S. Andrew
Shankman is on the admit list.” And so, my life changed forever. As I tried
to absorb the note in a hallway outside a classroom, I could concentrate
enough to realize that it was a humorous little letter. It was funny, while
also being ingenuously modest, self-deprecating, and a little bit impish.
As I would come to know, Murrin is joyful both in learning and
mischief. Though Morgan’s quotation captures Murrin as well as it
does Stiles, equally revealing is a brief passage from one of Murrin’s
essays in Rethinking America, “No Awakening, No Revolution? More
Counterfactual Speculations.” It is one of the two essays in the volume that
are organized around a counterfactual question, a very difficult exercise
to do well, and one at which Murrin excels. In “No Awakening” Murrin
expunges the first Great Awakening from history to assess what differ-
ence that would make for the coming of the American Revolution. The
only way to erase the Awakening is to provide plausible explanations for
the disappearances of George Whitfield, Jonathan Edwards, and Gilbert
Tennant before they could cause any serious trouble. By imprisoning
Whitfield in a Spanish dungeon during the War of Jenkin’s Ear, reducing
Edwards to a permanent catatonic stupor, and killing off Tennant with
a bolt of lightning (after all, who didn’t know that Tennant was struck
by lightning in 1745 but survived?), Murrin dispatched the three with
wholehearted glee, explaining that it was “one of the forbidden delights
that such counterfactual musings can provide to any suitably degener-
ate mind.” Combining these Morgan and Murrin quotations brings one
closer to knowing Murrin for those who have not met him.
Within days of arriving at Princeton, I had heard about the collected
essays project. My fellow Murrin students (there were always many)
explained that he had written far more essays than I realized, over forty,
possibly more than fifty. Nobody seemed to know for sure, because some
of the best were published in obscure hard-to-find volumes, and some
of the very best were still in a drawer somewhere. I remember wanting
access to that drawer. But I was not to give up hope, for Murrin had a
contract with Oxford University Press and would be publishing his col-
lected essays in two volumes, or was it three? There was spirited debate
xi
about that and the details were hazy. But it was coming soon, quite soon,
and the erudition of this monstrous warehouse of knowledge would be
widely available. I remember that summer telling somebody that I hoped
it would all happen in time for my general exams.
Twenty three years after passing those exams, for me it is a momen-
tous occasion and an enormous pleasure to help make widely available
eleven of John Murrin’s essential essays treating the American Revolution
and the early American Republic. Rethinking America addresses essential
questions and controversies that have long shaped our understanding of
the nation’s origins and that should continue to inform the discussions
of current and future historians. In doing so, these essays deeply probe
themes and issues that are central to the surprising, awe-inspiring, and
often deeply troubling formation and development of the United States.
I am grateful to Anthony Grafton and William Chester Jordan of
Princeton University, Daniel K. Richter of the McNeil Center for
Early American Studies and the University of Pennsylvania, and David
Waldstreicher of the CUNY Graduate Center, who read my introduc-
tion and helped me with their encouragement to improve it. I also thank
Susan Ferber of Oxford University Press, who remained devoted to
Rethinking America and who imagined that I could be of use to its com-
pletion. And above all, my enduring thanks to my adviser and friend John
Murrin, the author of the feast.
Notes
1. The essay, “The Making and Unmaking of an American Ruling Class,” is
included in this volume.
2. Edmund S. Morgan, The Gentle Puritan: A Life of Ezra Stiles, 1727–1795
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), 134.
xi
xi
Rethinking America
•
xvi
1
i nt roduct ion
•
The Revolutionary Republic
of a Radical, Imperial, Whig
The Historical and Historiographical
Imagination of John M. Murrin
Andrew Shankman
1
2
2 Rethinking America
of social and economic inequality in the early republic; and the great
gulf between outcome and intention produced by those who sought a
republic, created a democracy, and talked in bold ways about expanding
liberty and equality.
To explore these themes, and to bring them together in a coherent
whole, Murrin begins where Edmund Morgan insisted historians should
start, by paying careful attention to how the people of the past explained
what they were doing and why they thought it mattered. On numerous
occasions Murrin has described his excitement about making the move in
the 1950s from the Midwest to Yale to study with Morgan. He was stimu-
lated by Morgan’s fresh approach to the revolutionary period to treat the
ideas and convictions of that era as respectfully as his own mentor Perry
Miller had taught him to treat the ideas of the Puritans.
Yet like Morgan, Murrin knew it was not a simple prospect to listen
to what people of the past said. Statements of the past have a tricky way
of being false friends, as Murrin explained in “The French and Indian
War, The American Revolution, and the Counterfactual Hypothesis,”
which is included in Rethinking America. In this essay Murrin demol-
ishes the claim that defeat of the French in North America in 1763
directly caused the colonists to seek independence. Historians had
long argued that no longer needing to fear the French was the key rea-
son for the movement for independence. In “The French and Indian
War” Murrin quoted many eighteenth-century statements that insisted
that the colonists would seek independence if the French should ever
be defeated. As a result, Murrin wrote, “because the empire did col-
lapse not long after the Peace of Paris, historians ever alert for an apt
quotation” built arguments on these statements, “endowed them with
prophetic power” since they were “neatly lodged in the sources them-
selves,” and so gravely misunderstood the primary causes of the imperial
crisis due to the entirely understandable and “unexceptionable device of
quoting what they read.”
Murrin’s scholarship is shaped by letting the sources guide him and
by taking seriously the statements of his subjects. Yet he was not misled
by these particular statements, because his understanding of the imperial
crisis and the world it produced was part of his vast and deep knowl-
edge of the English-speaking world of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. That understanding allowed him to see the ways in which the
3
Introduction 3
American Revolutionary era and the Early Republic were shaped by the
colonial period and the British imperial system of which the thirteen
colonies were such a vital part. To possess the context to explore the
main themes of the essays in Rethinking America necessitates spending
some time in the earlier colonial period. To understand the American
Revolution and the Early Republic requires gaining a fuller understand-
ing of the British colonial and British imperial world from which they
emerged.
It is becoming less and less common for scholars to achieve mastery
of both the colonial period and the eras of the American Revolution and
the Early American Republic. But Murrin’s scholarship on the history
of British North America before 1750 shows how essential it is to resist
treating the American Revolution as a dividing line. In over two dozen
essays treating the colonial era, Murrin has shown that in their origins the
North American English colonies participated in a sustained seventeenth-
century conversation about how best to order political and social relations
in the Anglophone early modern world. Over the course of the seven-
teenth century, what England was and should be was hotly contested. The
conflicts were driven by heated disagreements about how best to order
and structure Crown/Parliament relations and by bitter divisions among
the varieties of English Protestantism. These arguments could overwhelm
the realm when constitutional conflicts (which were further intensified
by chronic fiscal crisis and the challenge of governing multiple kingdoms)
overlapped with religions tensions—which happened with increasing fre-
quency after the start of the Thirty Years War in 1618.1
Most of the English North American colonies were founded by groups
that were actively participating in these English conflicts. The non-separat-
ing Congregationalists of Massachusetts hoped to push the early Stuart
church into a much greater assault on church hierarchy. In the Restoration
period, the Duke of York (the future James II) sought to use New York to
provide an example of a purer and more vital form of Absolutism to moti-
vate his brother Charles II to improve on the anemic English version. In
Pennsylvania William Penn hoped to show that the surviving remnant
of the countercultural values of the Civil War and Interregnum could
still be the basis for a more just and edifying society. And in Carolina the
Earl of Shaftesbury and his secretary John Locke tried to fuse the talents
of a patriotic landed aristocracy with the cutting-edge social theory of the
4
4 Rethinking America
Introduction 5
and finally the Glorious Revolution and the creation of the limited-
constitutional monarchy, beginning in 1689.3 For Murrin, the simul-
taneity of the transatlantic crises was essential for understanding why
the eighteenth-century British colonies were so different from their
seventeenth-century pasts. Between 1689 and the 1720s the Glorious
Revolution and the limited-constitutional monarchy and fiscal-military
state it enabled began to fundamentally resolve the conflicts over Crown/
Parliament relations and among the varieties of English Protestantism that
had plagued the seventeenth century.
As Murrin discusses in “The Great Inversion, Or Court Versus Country:
A Comparison of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688–1721) and
America (1776–1816),” included in this volume, the British state and soci-
ety that developed by the 1720s offered a far more attractive and impressive
prospect than the seventeenth-century Stuart state or than any of the sev-
enteenth-century “American” colonial experiments. Britain was becoming
capable of mobilizing considerable resources and projecting its will out-
ward as never before. Just as it was becoming able to, in Murrin’s phrase,
“discover its colonies” by enforcing its Navigation Acts and structuring
and governing an empire, the colonies it was discovering were looking for
alternatives to the ideas and practices that had brought them all to crisis.4
Liberty, property, prosperity, and Protestantism protected and nurtured
by a limited-constitutional monarchy seemed much more attractive than
the ordeals of the seventeenth century.
The eighteenth-century colonies all experienced a complex process
at once political, social, cultural, and economic that Murrin has dubbed
Anglicization.5 What he meant by Anglicization would more accurately
be called “Britishization,” but Murrin coined the term while writing his
1966 Yale Ph.D. dissertation “Anglicizing an American Colony: The
Transformation of Provincial Massachusetts,” well before thinking in
terms of a British history was common.6 Yet his concept of Anglicization
resulted from doing British history long before that approach had a con-
stituency. Anglicization revealed that British history had an essential
North American dimension.
Murrin’s work on the golden age of colonial America (roughly the forty
years after 1720) fits well with the scholarship on Britain that explains the
formation of a British identity and a rising British nationalism.7 Indeed,
by focusing only on the British Isles, historians of eighteenth-century
6
6 Rethinking America
Britain often did not emphasize just how imperial and transatlantic the
nationalist story they were telling was. In the royal New England colo-
nies, a political culture developed in which the royal governors, following
the example of Whig parliamentary leaders such as Robert Walpole, used
the patronage at their disposal to build majorities in their colonial leg-
islatures. Beginning particularly during the 1720s and 1730s, these New
England colonies began to replicate the economic diversity and complex-
ity of Britain and to reproduce the social relations and legal culture this
sort of economy encouraged. More extensive and widespread commercial
relations often extended beyond town boundaries, which led to the rising
significance of county government. The growing importance of county
government produced a vast increase in offices beyond the town level,
such as Justice of the Peace, which were in the royal governors’ gift, and
those offices became a vital source of this patronage. These social and eco-
nomic relations produced in New England a more stratified society where
provincial elites monopolized local and county offices and dominated
colonial legislatures. By the end of the 1730s the royal colonies of New
England were producing an emerging ruling class that could realistically
aspire to the polite commercial gentility of the British gentry and the ris-
ing British middle class.
These interlocking social, political, cultural, and economic develop-
ments were a prime example of the process of Anglicization. These devel-
opments show the crucial imperial and transatlantic dimension of the
formation of eighteenth-century British identity and British national-
ism grounded in polite gentility and consumer culture. One of the more
effective and powerful depictions of this formation, which also provides
a sense of its suddenness and timing, can be found in a passage from Paul
Langford’s A Polite and Commercial People: “The architect John Wood,
writing in 1749, listed the novelties introduced since the accession of
George II. Cheap and dirty floorboards gave way to superior deal covered
with carpets. Primitive plaster was concealed with smart wainscoting.
Stone hearths and chimney-pieces, customarily cleaned with white-
wash which left a chalk debris on the floor, were abandoned for hard-
wood embellished with brass locks. Mirrors had become both numerous
and elegant. Walnut and mahogany, in fashionable designs, superseded
primitive oak furniture. Leather, damask, and embroidery gave seating a
comfort unobtainable with cane or rush.”8 Wood dated these tremendous
7
Introduction 7
changes, the stuff of polite commercial gentility, and the source of intense
national pride and a sense of superiority, as taking place between 1727
and 1749. The English, lowland Scots, and Protestant Irish converged on
this polite, commercial, and British culture, and became Britons during
the decades of the 1730s and 1740s, at the same time as those living in
New England. British identity was a transatlantic development. To a great
extent, those living in New England embraced it because they were not
simply following a long-established set of behaviors, but were participat-
ing in their formation from the start.
This coeval development of British identity in Britain and the New
England colonies—this process of Anglicization—was a crucial part of
the making of a colonial ruling class, as Murrin discusses in the essay co-
written with his former student Gary J. Kornblith, “The Making and
Unmaking of an American Ruling Class.” In the royal New England
colonies, this ruling class increasingly embraced the post–Glorious
Revolution British identity that celebrated limited-constitutional mon-
archy, the accomplishments of the fiscal-military state, and the ideals of
liberty, property, and a broad-bottomed pan-Protestantism. This ruling
class attached no stigma to accepting offices from royal governors. As
Murrin has pointed out, in 1763, on the eve of imperial crisis, fully 71% of
the Massachusetts General Court also held the office of JP, a royal office
in the governor’s gift. Here in New England was J. H. Plumb’s explana-
tion for the growth of English political stability with a vengeance.9
The messy mid-Atlantic colonies reveal a similar story. Royal New York
took longer than Massachusetts and New Hampshire to achieve
Anglicized, court-Whig-inspired political stability. But the relations
between the royal governor and the elite New Yorkers who dominated
local politics and the colonial assembly improved dramatically begin-
ning in the early 1750s with the rise of men such as James Delancey.10
Murrin has shown that a colony riven by ethnic conflict and divisions
within the English community as late as 1710 or so could by the 1740s
produce home-grown, highly respectable, and impeccably credentialed
British gentlemen such as Delancey.11 These elites constituted a colonial
ruling class that had every confidence the solutions to any pressing issues
or problems lay within the British Empire, as evidenced by their ability
to rise to positions of prominence as local magnates and thoroughgoing
empire men.
8
8 Rethinking America
In the decade before the Stamp Act Crisis New York’s place within
the empire had never been more stable and secure, and the political rela-
tions between the royal executive and the colonial legislature were more
harmonious than they had been in forty years. A similar trend occurred
in Pennsylvania. There, colonial American–born British gentlemen
and consummate empire men, such as Benjamin Franklin and Joseph
Galloway, longed for the King to replace Pennsylvania’s proprietary gov-
ernment with royal government. For men such as Franklin, royal govern-
ment connoted modern, professional administration and the security of
British liberty.12
Anglicization meant for Murrin the process by which the eighteenth-
century colonies converged upon a British identity of polite com-
mercial gentility, the new mainstream institutions and values of
limited-constitutional monarchy, a broad Protestant unity, and the
dynamic, fiscal-state-driven economic diversity that fueled economic
growth in Britain and the empire. Thus, Murrin has shown that the
model Bernard Bailyn proposed in The Origins of American Politics did
not explain the political culture of the northern colonies. Bailyn had
argued that royal governors in the colonies had extensive authority on
paper, but very little practical power, such as sources of patronage with
which to build majorities in colonial legislatures. Colonists believed they
had reason to fear over-mighty executives, who were in fact far weaker
than was executive authority in Britain. For Bailyn, this unnecessary fear
of executive power encouraged devotion to country ideology, a belief sys-
tem designed to denounce and discredit executive authority. A language
of opposition that was marginal in Britain by the 1730s became central
to the political culture of the colonies. Thus, colonial politics was brit-
tle and combustible, combining weak executives with a dominant polit-
ical idiom that encouraged extreme suspicion of central authority. This
political structure strongly suggested the inevitability of the American
Revolution.13
Murrin has shown that Bailyn’s model does not explain the royal colo-
nies in New England where governors possessed ample patronage, success-
fully practiced Walpoleon court Whig methods of political management,
and forged harmonious relations with their legislatures prior to the mid-
1760s. Nor did the model explain the mid-Atlantic where New York,
though never as completely, moved in the direction of New England, and
9
Introduction 9
10 Rethinking America
planters insisted they were.15 One could expect to find intense political
instability and a deep suspicion of and hostility toward royal government
in societies where powerful local ruling classes took country ideology so
seriously.
Yet as Murrin has shown, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia
became the most harmonious political societies in the English-speaking
world.16 They became so once the royal governors (in Virginia as early
as the years just before 1720) learned to take planter elites at their word.
Royal governors began to treat their local ruling classes as the respectable,
genteel, and patriotic patriarchs they believed they were and to forge a
political culture of mutual admiration, respect, and country harmony. The
process of Anglicization in the south also showed that widespread access
to country ideology, even where it became the dominant political idiom,
did not make political conflict or anti-crown sentiment inevitable. Thus,
by the mid-eighteenth century the British North American colonies were
benefiting greatly from their presence in the empire and had produced
confident ruling elites who, in their various ways, took their cues from
British society and culture, ruled their provinces, shared mutual respect
and harmony with their royal governors, and were far more British in
thought and deed than ever before.17
It is essential to have some understanding of this process of eighteenth-
century Anglicization to fully appreciate Murrin’s essays exploring the
American Revolution and the early American republic. Understanding
the complex, overlapping developments that produced Anglicization
allows us to follow Murrin’s discussion of how vital cooperation could
produce spectacular triumph in North America by 1763. That same
understanding is essential to comprehending how this vital cooperation
could end with revolutionary violence thirteen years later, and eventually
produce a society by the 1820s that none could have imagined in 1776 and
that few would have wanted.
The essays in Rethinking America treating the Seven Years War (called
by the British North Americans the French and Indian War) and the impe-
rial crisis, “The French and Indian War, The American Revolution, and
the Counterfactual Hypothesis,” “1776: The Countercyclical Revolution,”
and significant parts of “The Great Inversion, Or Court Versus Country,”
and “Feudalism, Communalism, and the Yeoman Freeholder: The
American Revolution Considered as a Social Accident,” show that prior
1
Introduction 11
to the late 1760s the default mainstream colonial position was one that by
1776 would be viewed as loyalist. Murrin explains that the gloomy years
of defeat in the Seven Years War prior to 1759 resulted primarily because
British military officials such as Lord Loudon did not know how to work
with confident, prideful, and increasing self-confident, Anglicized colo-
nial Americans. These colonists did not doubt that they were British sub-
jects fully entitled to all the rights and liberties that came with that status.
Britain’s imperial enterprise had succeeded by 1750 in producing a
sprawling population of aggressive colonial landowners capable of rep-
licating British institutions, society, and culture. On a far greater scale
than the other European early modern Atlantic world empires, British
imperial policymakers had to consider how to incorporate into their
triumphal empire a substantial population of subjects who were locally
producing many of their own institutions and methods of governance.
The Anglicizing thirteen colonies were, in Murrin’s phrase, voluntary-
cooperative societies. Inside the colonies the actual coercive power of
the British state—best represented by the navy—could not intrude as
it could on the oceans. In the colonial interior, to administer imperial
policies—to govern the empire—required figuring out how to convince
the colonists to voluntarily cooperate with the policies.
This need for voluntary cooperation meant that the British Empire
was in reality a federal system, and the critical line dividing power in it
was the North American coastline. Britain had coercive power on the
oceans that it did not possess in the interior. Murrin shows that in the
first phase of the Seven Years War the British betrayed no knowledge of
the critical role the coastline played in the practical reality of running
the empire. Yet the Seven Years War, Murrin explains, in fact provided
two models for the empire—the first showing how it could be lost, the
second revealing how it could triumph and expect to enjoy continued
harmony and success. The imperial crisis of 1764–1775 began due to three
sources of conflict: first, Britain’s demand that the colonists pay some of
the military costs of defending North America; second, Britain’s insist-
ence that the colonists quarter troops; and third, the frustrations, which
grew into hatreds, that colonists felt toward the British soldiers in their
midst. Murrin explains how from 1759 to end of the Seven Years War
William Pitt structured imperial policies that led the colonists to eagerly
and voluntarily tax themselves to pay military costs and quarter troops.
12
12 Rethinking America
The policies also encouraged genuine support and even affection for
British soldiers. Murrin’s argument fits well with the conclusions of Fred
Anderson and John Shy. Victory in 1763 was very much a joint British
and colonial affair, and in 1763 the majority of colonists had never been
prouder of their British identity and had never felt more secure in their
British liberties. The result of six decades of Anglicization was that in 1763
the British Empire reached its apex.18
In “The French and Indian War, The American Revolution, and the
Counterfactual Hypothesis” and “1776: The Countercyclical Revolution”
Murrin explains how, with some exceptions, particularly the brief but
effective ministry from 1765 to 1766 of Charles Watson Wentworth,
the Marquis of Rockingham, British imperial policymakers drew all the
wrong lessons from the war and failed “to think triumphantly.” The three
great imperial crises of 1764–1766, 1767–1770, and 1773–1775 cumula-
tively destroyed the colonial willingness to provide voluntary cooper-
ation. British policy, from the perspective of the colonists, seemed to
contemptuously deny that they were British subjects and part of the
Glorious Revolution legacy that protected liberty and property, prima-
rily by connecting taxation to representation.19
Though the empire was a federal system where the critical axis that
divided power was the coastline, the twelve years after 1764 also showed
that it was a federal system without a justifying federal ideology. As impe-
rial policymakers and their colonial critics were forced into clearer and
clearer, and angrier and angrier, conversation (a conversation that Pitt’s
voluntary-cooperative methods avoided and that Rockingham’s strategies
in 1765–1766 temporarily ended), they found that they disagreed about
the empire’s structure. Yet neither the British nor the colonial position
could explain how the empire worked. His Majesty’s government main-
tained that it was sovereign. It could tax and legislate throughout Britain
and the empire. The colonial critics insisted that, because they were
British, they enjoyed liberty and property and so taxation connected to
representation. The power to tax, if unchecked, could leach away all prop-
erty and so too liberty. Therefore, it was a uniquely dangerous power, a
power that threatened liberty in a way that the power to legislate (govern
behavior but not take a subject’s property) did not. Special constraints
had to be placed on the power to tax that did not have to be placed on the
power to legislate. Thus colonial critics of imperial policy accepted that
13
Introduction 13
Parliament could legislate for the colonies. It could govern their behavior
with the Navigation Acts, the Iron Act, and the Hat Act. But only their
own colonial legislatures could tax them. Only the colonial legislatures
met the two requirements necessary for taxation to be connected to rep-
resentation: that the taxers were elected by the taxpayers, and that the
taxers were required to pay the same taxes they levied on the taxpayers.
Yet in reality, Parliament could for the most part impose its will on
the oceans with both legislation, such as the Navigation Acts, and taxa-
tion, such as the Sugar Act, especially in its amended 1766 form. Indeed,
even the external Townshend duties proved hard to resist. A boycott
movement took two years to develop, and only truly got going after Lord
Hillsborough ordered the colonial governors to dissolve the colonial leg-
islatures should they dare to discuss a letter from the Massachusetts leg-
islature urging them to denounce the Townshend Acts. It seems unlikely
that most legislatures would ever have endorsed the Massachusetts
Circular Letter (hardly any had even begun to discuss it several months
after receiving it) until they were ordered not to do so, which made it a
vital principle regarding the legislatures’ freedom and autonomy.20
While Parliament could tax and legislate on the oceans, it could only
conduct policy in the interior with the colonists’ voluntary cooperation.
Pitt had shown that the colonists would voluntarily do pretty much all
of what the post-1763 coercive measures were demanding that they do.
But the Stamp Act Crisis showed that the colonists would withhold their
voluntary cooperation from a measure that they believed threatened to
destroy their British liberties. And if they did withhold their cooperation,
they could quickly nullify and render moot any internal measure. The
colonists’ sense of an imperial constitution acknowledged Parliament’s
authority to legislate. Yet internal legislation also required voluntary
cooperation in a way that external legislation did not, even though such
legislation did not provoke the clear and consistent ideological rejection
that taxation did. Neither imperial policymakers nor their colonial critics
could imagine a federal ideology that identified the coastline for what it
was: the true axis of a separation of powers. Because they could not, the
acrimonious conversation continued.21
As it did, Murrin argues in “The Great Inversion” and “1776: The
Countercyclical Revolution,” country ideology began to have the impact
Bailyn had mistakenly granted to it for an earlier period. By the late 1760s,
14
14 Rethinking America
Introduction 15
grew less and less confident by the final months of 1765 that they were in
fact leading anything.22
As the need to confront Britain grew more acute after 1770, colonial
elites had to balance their fear of power above them with their fear of
challenge to their own power from below. “Feudalism, Communalism,
and the Yeoman Freeholder” and “The Making and Unmaking of an
American Ruling Class” fully endorse Carl Becker’s powerful insight that
a battle for home rule quickly provoked a sustained, internal conflict over
who would rule at home. By 1776 what had begun as a constitutional con-
flict had become an overwhelming crisis. Constitutional disagreements
intensified beyond containment due to the heavy reliance on country ide-
ology to explain Britain’s actions. That ideological dimension galvanized
elite colonists to continue to encourage resistance. The more they did so,
the more they opened up space for those below them in the social order
to force their own grievances and concerns into the midst of the impe-
rial crisis. By 1775–1776 the situation was revolutionary as the Coercive
Acts, for the first time, provoked the vast majority of colonists to reject
Parliament’s authority to legislate as well as tax. Yet by 1775–1776 the
movement to declare independence could not help but become a wide-
spread argument about existing social, cultural, political, and economic
arrangements and relations within the colonies. Country ideology had
now produced a virulent hatred and disgust for British government and
British institutions. Yet the social upheaval of the previous decade also
meant that whatever replaced the world produced by Anglicization, colo-
nial elites would be sharply challenged as they sought to conceive, create,
and control it.
Murrin’s discussion of the decade of imperial crisis reveals much about
the nature of the British Empire and suggests a valuable model for how
to draw together and learn from the disparate historiographies that
have attempted to explain the coming of the American Revolution. By
bringing together all of these issues, themes, and developments, Murrin
draws omnivorously on the three historiographical traditions that in the
twentieth century vied to explain the Revolution’s origins. By taking seri-
ously each of these historiographies, Murrin made himself into what he
has often described as a radical, imperial, Whig. As he discusses in “Self-
Immolation: Schools of Historiography and the Coming of the American
Revolution,” and as is implicit in so many of his essays, Murrin has seen
16
16 Rethinking America
great benefit in the classic work of the imperial school best represented
by Herbert Levi Osgood, Charles McLean Andrews, George Louis Beer,
and later Lawrence Henry Gipson. From them Murrin learned to think
carefully about the British Empire as an empire, to pay close attention
to its structures and policies and to the men who administered it, and
to consider all the challenges and complexities they faced. At the same
time, as he studied with Edmund Morgan, read and admired Bailyn and
Gordon Wood, and worked alongside John Pocock for many years at
Washington University in St. Louis, Murrin was a virtuoso contributor
to the neo-Whig historiography that took principles and ideas so seri-
ously. This historiographical school produced Morgan’s careful constitu-
tional discussion of imperial relations and Bailyn’s, Wood’s, and Pocock’s
recovery of the rich ideological world that explained the significance of
country ideology and, eventually, the republican synthesis.23
Yet it was clear to Murrin as he earned his Ph.D. and began his career
in the late 1960s, as the New Left or neo-Progressive historians began to
publish their vital work, that the internal cleavages and class conflicts they
were recovering had a central place in the American revolutionary story.
The only way to explain how a constitutional conflict in 1764–1765, one
that virtually all colonial participants were confident could be resolved
within the empire, became a violent, bloody revolutionary upheaval by
1776–1778, was to tell a complete and synthetic story that the imperial,
neo-Whig, and neo-Progressive historians could not fully or adequately
explain without the others. To more completely explain the emergence
and impact of the American Revolution, one had to become a radical,
imperial, Whig, which was a sophisticated, complex, and flexible schol-
arly project that required synthesizing institutional, intellectual, constitu-
tional, social, cultural, political, and economic history—in other words,
the project laid out by the concept of Anglicization.
During his career, Murrin’s pleas for synthesis, his urging of his fel-
low scholars to join him in becoming radical, imperial, Whigs, went
unheeded. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, Murrin would begin his grad-
uate seminar on the American Revolution and the Early Republic with a
lecture setting out the dire consequences for a field in which three highly
valuable historiographical literatures refused to engage with one another.
By 2005 he was alarmed enough about the impact that refusal had on the
study of the origins of the American Revolution that he agreed to give
17
Introduction 17
this lecture in public at the McNeil Center for Early American Studies.
Then in 2007 John Murrin wrote his final essay, unpublished until now.
In “Self-Immolation: Schools of Historiography and the Coming of
the American Revolution” he assesses in print the consequences of the
three dominant historiographical traditions that sought to explain the
American Revolution failing to engage with each other. The result was
the self-immolation of each school and, for the previous two decades,
almost no work on the causes of the Revolution. “Self-Immolation” was a
final plea that scholars become radical, imperial, Whigs. When he deliv-
ered the paper at the Columbia Seminar, Murrin noted that this lack of
scholarly interest might be changing. In the decade since Murrin wrote,
it has. Several books and essays have revived interest in the causes of the
Revolution, and recently others have called for synthesis and integration.24
Yet we have been here before. Murrin’s “The Great Inversion” was an
earlier plea that the neo-Whig and neo-Progressive schools talk to one
another. And, as Murrin pointed out in a William and Mary Quarterly
forum assessing Gordon Wood’s Creation of the American Republic,
Wood’s book is mischaracterized as solely a history of ideas and ideol-
ogy.25 Wood drew heavily on the themes of the neo-progressive school
and sought to integrate the material with the ideological. That Creation
of the American Republic is often assigned to the neo-Whig school, with
little awareness of its real debt to the progressive historiographical tradi-
tion, makes evident that earlier pleas for integration and synthesis went
unheeded.
Despite recent developments, there are reasons to be less than hopeful.
Much of the recent scholarship still seems to be re-creating earlier choices
and for now, emphasizing economic causes and downplaying ideologi-
cal and constitutional issues.26 Indeed, at the conference in Philadelphia
that produced The American Revolution Reborn, the editors of the 2012
The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution noted that none of the
thirty-three essays dealt with the ideological world recovered by Bailyn,
Wood, and Pocock and that had played such a vital part in Murrin’s rad-
ical, imperial, Whig synthesis. The editors certainly did not celebrate the
absence; they noted it and thought we should ponder it.27
Murrin developed his insight of Anglicization only by crossing meth-
odological boundaries. These crossings led him to creatively synthesize
the American Revolutionary era’s disparate historiographies. Explaining
18
18 Rethinking America
the imperial crisis and the American Revolution requires the scholar-
ship of the radicals, the imperials, and the Whigs, and the concept of
Anglicization allows that scholarship to be woven together. Murrin
believes that it is impossible to understand the colonial reaction to
the shift in British imperial policy after 1763 without taking seriously the
insights of the constitutional and ideological perspective provided by the
neo-Whig scholars. Yet doing so should convince us to stop seeking to
distinguish between what was constitutional/ideological and what was
material/economic in the colonial reaction. The leading colonial crit-
ics of the Sugar and Stamp Acts, such as James Otis and Daniel Dulany
(Dulany became a loyalist in 1776), were thoroughly Anglicized subjects.
Their critique, insisting on the connection of taxation to representation,
was possible only because their identity and consciousness was funda-
mentally shaped by post-1688 ideas, ideals, and categories. At the heart of
this Glorious Revolution–inspired mentality was the absolute confidence
that Britons enjoyed the natural right to private property and its protec-
tion in ways that were denied to everybody else. The constant refrain “lib-
erty and property” is a reminder that these eighteenth-century subjects
did not distinguish between the constitutional/ideological and the mate-
rial/economic in the ways that we so often still insist they must.
Such distinctions never existed in the early modern era. Public politics,
a public sphere, really began in England with arguments over how far the
Protestant Reformation should go.28 From the 1570s, and certainly by the
reign of James I, the English could associate the ability to continue this
conversation, and push their monarchs in a more purely Protestant direc-
tion, with their monarchs’ need to frequently summon Parliaments. And
it was easy for them to understand that monarchs summoned Parliaments
when they needed to tax. Those who controlled taxation had a tremen-
dous impact on whether critical religious conversations could happen.
It was in reaction to charged Parliaments and those sorts of questions
that the early Stuarts began to more vigorously champion Divine Right
and prefer prelates who preached in support of it.29 Strident defense of
Divine Right led in response to clearer and more frequent articulation of
Parliament’s customary role and the possibilities for limits to monarchi-
cal authority. As the early Stuarts faced chronic fiscal crisis, more frequent
Parliaments led to more charged encounters and greater entrenchment in
the arguments for Divine Right and limited monarchy.
19
Introduction 19
20 Rethinking America
Introduction 21
22 Rethinking America
“the economy was driven forward by the state rather than the state being
driven by the economy.”34
The early Republic’s far less nation-state managed and frenzied scram-
ble for wealth produced much more wealth and a far greater concentra-
tion of wealth than had ever been present in the colonial period. This
society and economy produced a great deal of social stratification among
white male heads of household. Fluid social mobility went both upward
and downward; in effect greater emphasis on freedom, autonomy, and
egalitarianism for white men produced among them a great deal of
uncertainty, fluctuation, status anxiety, and the broad democratization
of marginalization and inequality. Boom and bust and wealth and pov-
erty characterized a republic in which citizens were deeply suspicious of a
powerful nation-state, though perhaps it might have been able to alleviate
some of the most savage of the hard times. Instead, the solutions offered
were usually greater glorification of the yeoman freeholder, the violent
seizure of more western land, more intense identification with region,
and a growing demand to push each region’s core institutions and prac-
tices across space. By the 1830s and 1840s these cores had been organized
around free labor in the north and slave labor in the south.
The early American Republic had managed to unleash the energies of
white men by creating a profoundly democratized political culture built
on the autonomy of each citizen from his neighbors, the autonomy of the
locality, state, and region from the nation, and the near-total authority
of the head of household over the social relations within his household
walls. The assumption was that egalitarianism among heads of household
would be maintained as hierarchy was banished from the public realm and
retreated behind those walls. Yet the result was a society in which equality
among white men proved increasingly elusive, which caused ever more
frenzied efforts to secure that autonomy and equality through relent-
less economic growth and geographical expansion. The feverish effort
to maintain equality, and the glorification of the yeoman freeholder that
drove that effort, grew only more desperate as equality moved further out
of reach. The more expansion occurred, the more this bottom-up process
of growth and development produced material resources that were ineq-
uitably distributed. In the early American Republic, the methods used to
lessen inequality among white men were often the most potent sources of
inequality among them.
23
Introduction 23
This democratic culture ever more shrilly insisted that white men must
be equal when they manifestly were not. White male citizens increas-
ingly found some solace in their whiteness and maleness as many of them
could no longer rely on the traditional markers of citizenship: land own-
ership and material independence. A society of intensely regional locali-
ties, which hated dependence and bred suspicion that inequality resulted
from the use of corrupt and concentrated power held by somebody
somewhere, marched relentlessly across the continent. By the mid-1840s
it began to produce an uncontainable crisis. Murrin has said that in the
early American Republic the nation-state could primarily seize land from
Indians and give it away to citizens but that by the 1850s it could no longer
even peacefully manage that. The American Revolution, as he explains it,
was a profoundly countercyclical rupture of almost everything that had
come before it. The Civil War was an even more violent but logical culmi-
nation of a republican experiment whose ideals produced a society where
outcomes moved ever further from the best version of intentions.
The U.S. Civil War exposed with overwhelming and bloody violence the
dilemmas and challenges of the republican experiment and American iden-
tity, the pain of promises and dreams deferred, and the momentous expecta-
tions that American citizens of every variety had of their public institutions
and civic culture. John Murrin’s towering scholarly achievement available in
Rethinking America help us to better comprehend the origins and develop-
ment of the tragedies and possibilities produced by the republican revolu-
tion that made the United States. This obligation of rethinking is ongoing,
indeed perpetual, and never has it been more urgent.
Notes
1. J. P. Sommerville, Royalists and Patriots: Politics and Ideology in England,
1603–1640 (London: Longman, 1999); Richard Cust and Ann Hughes,
eds., Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics
(London: Longman, 1989); Robert Ashton, The Crown and the Money
Market (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); P. G. Lake, “Calvinism and the
English Church, 1570–1635,” Past and Present 114 (1987): 32–76; Kenneth
Fincham and Peter Lake, “The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James I,” Journal
of British Studies 24 (1985): 169–207; Conrad Russell, The Fall of the British
Monarchies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
2. John M. Murrin, “Colonial Government,” in Jack P. Greene, ed., Encyclopedia
of American Political History, 3 vols. (New York: Scribner’s, 1984), 1:293–315;
24
24 Rethinking America
Introduction 25
——
CHAPTER IV.
“In the cold, damp earth we laid her,
When the forest cast its leaf,
And we sighed, that one so beautiful
Should have a lot so brief.”