Trump Willis Monday
Trump Willis Monday
Trump Willis Monday
Jennifer L. Little
Georgia Bar No. 141596
400 Galleria Pkwy, Suite 1920
Atlanta, Georgia 30339
Counsel for President Trump
Matthew K. Winchester
Georgia Bar No. 399094
Garland Law Building
3151 Maple Drive, NE
Atlanta, Georgia 30305
Appellate counsel for President Trump
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
.
Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
.
Part Three: Argument and Citations to Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
..
I. The State’s standing argument should be deemed abandoned. Alternatively,
President Trump was aggrieved by Willis’ church speech, a severe violation
of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
.
II. Forensic Misconduct: the State’s reliance on the Billings dissent is at odds
with precedent, deviates from Williams, and fails to support its own prejudice
argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
.
A. Williams and prior precedent do not require prejudice to disqualify
Willis for her severe ethical rule violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
.
B. If prejudice were required, the State ignores that pretrial prejudice may
be presumed from the presence and participation of a biased prosecutor
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
.
C. The Billings dissent has no persuasive value, nor does it help the State:
Justice Billings endorsed a pretrial prejudice standard that President
Trump has met . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
.
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C – 1
.
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ii
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iii
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The State’s ephemeral reference to standing fails for two reasons. First, due
to an absence of any citation to authority, this Court’s local rules dictate that response
argument III (A) be deemed “abandoned.” 1 Ga. Ct. App. L. R(s). 25 (b) (2) & (c)
(2). Second, President Trump was aggrieved by the trial court’s failure to disqualify
Willis and suffered adverse personal impact from Willis’ church speech.
A party has standing 2 when it has suffered an adverse impact to its own rights.
Reid v. Samsung SDI, Co., Ltd., 366 Ga. App. 570, 575 (2023). Specifically, “[t]o
severe to call in question the fair and efficient administration of justice.” Cohen v.
1
This Court has applied its abandonment rules to the appellee. See e.g., Zelda Enterprises, LLLP
v. Guarino, 343 Ga. App. 250, 251 n.3 (2017). Local Rule 25 (b) (2) provides: “Part Two [of
appellee's brief] shall contain appellee's argument and the citation of authorities as to each
enumeration of error.” Local Rule Rule 25 (c) (2) provides: “Any enumeration of error that is not
supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.” With no
citation to authority, the response in Section III (A) fails to comply. State’s Br. at 61-62.
2
A plaintiff with standing is necessary to invoke a court’s judicial power to resolve a dispute, and
the power of Georgia courts — as with any power possessed by a branch of state government —
is conferred by our state Constitution. Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry Cnty Bd. of Comms.,
315 Ga. 39, 45 (2) (2022).
1
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(GRPC) – specifically, Rule 3.8(g). The Opening Brief explained why Willis’ speech
did not serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, and why the language Willis
accused.” Trump at 34-36. The State’s response does not dispute the trial court’s
finding that the church speech was “legally improper.” State’s Br. at 68. Willis’
undoubtedly severe enough “to call in question the fair and efficient administration
Courts recognize that “few forms of prejudice are so virulent,” Miller v. North
Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978), so much so that state and federal courts
Weddington v. State, 545 A2d 607, 614-15 (Del. 1988) (right to a fair trial free from
harmless error); State v. Kirk, 339 P23d 1213, 1218-19 (Idaho 2014) (vacating
conviction and noting relaxed standards for prejudicial error where “prosecution
invoked racial consideration”); United States v. Cabrera, 222 F.3d 590, 597 (9th Cir.
2
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irrespective of harm). Willis wrongly labeled defendants and their counsel as racists:
Moreover, Willis’ speech remark that her prosecution of the defendants was
“God’s work” essentially inverted the presumption of innocence and thus shifted the
Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680, 686 (2012) (plain error where verdict form
required jury to find defendant “not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”); cf. Debelbot
v. State, 305 Ga. 534, 544 (2019) (Bethel, J., concurring) (describing prosecutor’s
from these cases show that Willis’ violation of GRPC 3.8(g) is “serious enough to
call into question the fair administration of justice.” Cohen, 338 Ga. App. at 166.
Standing is shown.
improper” speech because national and local media outlets broadcast and reported
Willis’ claim as an attack against the defense. Willis falsely declared that allegations
against her stemmed from racism to hide the fact that they were true. Willis
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obviously intended that every potential Fulton County juror who heard or read
The State’s “interpretation” of the speech (i.e., that Willis was vague, or that
it was debatable to whom she referred) is disingenuous at best. Willis’ purpose was
plain: to obscure her misconduct by falsely accusing the defense of racism. Willis’
strategic use of pronouns was neither innocuous nor vague—Willis repeatedly used
“them,” “they,” and linked these terms to her antagonist: “white male republicans.”
[No. A24A1596 (Shafer) at 1677]. The only “white male republicans” included in
Willis’ perception of “[God’s] work” (her prosecution of this case) were President
Trump and the other defendants. Contrary to the State’s attempt to elevate form over
substance, “so many others” (plural) could not refer only to Roman (singular).
and the other defendants. Willis knew what she was doing and got precisely the
reaction she wanted:3 the overwhelming media coverage of her false and pernicious
3
Here is how the Washington Post described her appearance: “Sunday was the first time Willis
had been seen in public since Roman’s motion. Her appearance at Big Bethel AME as part of a
special Sunday service honoring King ahead of the holiday that honors him Monday had been
previously scheduled, and though her office suggested she intended to honor the invitation as the
church’s keynote speaker, it was not clear Willis would talk about the controversy. News of her
impending appearance was the leading news story on local television Sunday, and as Willis entered
the church sanctuary to the soaring soundtrack of a choir and an archival audio of a sermon from
King urging followers to keep strong in their faith, her every move was trailed by a bank of local
news cameras set up in the church balcony”. See Fani Willis, Trump Georgia case prosecutor,
ends silence on misconduct accusations, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/2024/01/14/fani-willis-georgia-trump/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2024).
4
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subterfuge would slander the defendants before the entire nation. Willis calculated
this result despite her duty to protect the presumption of innocence, due process, and
a fair trial. In re: J.S., 140 Vt. 230, 232 (1981) (“It is unconscionable for a prosecutor
. . . to undermine the rights specifically granted in the Constitution [s]he has taken
an oath to uphold.”)
This Court has held that individuals criticized in grand jury reports suffer
injury to personal rights, and that applies equally to individuals who are not named
County Grand Jury, 166 Ga. App. 258 (1983) (unnamed individuals injured and
Thompson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 246 Ga. 777 (1980) (individual rights
implicated by report that criticized but did not indict); In re Hensley, 184 Ga. App.
4
Notably, the State’s Amicus Curiae does not join the State’s standing argument, nor advances a
standing argument of its own, instead merely citing (in a footnote) the trial court’s footnote alluding
to the standing question. Amicus Br. at 21, n. 12.
5
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II. Forensic Misconduct: the State’s reliance on the Billings dissent is at odds
with precedent, deviates from Williams, and fails to support its own
prejudice argument.
against presumptively innocent defendants, for her personal and political gain. To
side-step damaging facts, the State seeks to narrow the law; it incorrectly restricts
Williams, as the trial court did, to reach only comments on the guilt of the accused.5
guilty,” a prosecutor may do and say anything, no matter how defamatory, unethical,
or widely reported it is, because time is a sufficient cure for harm. The State
contends this Court is without recourse to punish the offending prosecutor and must
disregard the deliberate ethical violations, false allegations of racism, and claims to
“do[ing] God’s work,” because the case will not be tried soon. Nonsense.
The State’s response errs in three ways: (1) Williams and prior precedent do
not require prejudice; (2) even if prejudice were required, the State ignores that
prejudice results from a biased prosecutor; and (3) the Billings dissent has no
5
The State’s argument omits that forensic misconduct decisions in other states have included
appeals to racial or religious bias. See State v. Farokhrany, 259 Ore. App. 132 (2013) (prosecutor’s
discussion of Sharia law constituted forensic misconduct because it involved issues of “racial,
ethnic, or religious bias”).
6
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persuasive value, nor does it help the State: Justice Billings in fact endorsed a pretrial
the guilt of the accused or misconduct that prejudices the defendant’s trial is
foreclosed by numerous cases. State v. Registe, 287 Ga. 542 (2010) (despite
disqualified for ethical rule violation); Clos v. Pugia, 204 Ga. App. 843, 844–845(1)
(1992) (rather than mechanically applying disqualification rules, trial court must
weigh the degree to which public trust may be eroded and should examine facts
peculiar to each case to balance the need to ensure attorneys ethical conduct and
other social interests); Ford Motor Co. v. Young, 322 Ga. App. 348, 356-57 (3)
(2013) (pro hac vice admissions revoked based on ethical rule violations regarding
candor to the court and fairness to opposing counsel and finding the attorney’s
[W]e have previously held that trial courts may disqualify attorneys for
violations of the disciplinary rules. For example, in Piedmont Hosp. v.
Reddick, 267 Ga. App. 68 (2004), we held that the trial court erred in
ruling that, because sanctions for violations of disciplinary rules appear
to be the exclusive province of the Supreme Court of Georgia, not of
the trial court, it lacked authority to determine whether plaintiff's
counsel violated Rule 4.2 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct
7
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Neither these cases nor Williams require prejudice. The Williams Court
analyzed the ethical rule and considered the facts and circumstances surrounding the
comments. 258 Ga. at 313-14. Williams then explained that improper prosecutorial
holding that the line between the two is not clear and “a given ground for
disqualification might be classified as either.” Id. at 314 n.4. First, Williams clarified
interest or stake in the conviction. 258 Ga. 305, 314 (citing Hohman (personal bias
disqualifying forensic misconduct, and courts should look to the motive and intent
Williams did not hold that a trial court is prohibited from nor lacks discretion
6
The trial court truncated the conflict analysis by restricting it to a financial interest. Consistent
with Williams, other states hold that misconduct demonstrating bias, improper influence, or
partiality creates a disqualifying conflict due to a personal interest or stake. State v. Nicholson, 7
S.W.2d 375, 378 (Mo.Ct.App. 1928)(any influence that impacts fairness); see State v. Snyder, 256
La. 601 (La. 1970)(bias might impact impartiality); State v. Gonzales, 138 N.M. 271, 273
(2005)(bias might influence professional judgment).
8
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partiality, bias, or personal interest. Instead, Williams pointed to each factor and held
the improper comments in that case were not so “egregious” that disqualification
was required. Thus, the trial court erred by restricting Williams to comments on guilt
and by restricting its conflict analysis to the financial benefit Willis received. Ethical
violations, bias, and personal interest are factors warranting disqualification under
The State accepts the finding that Willis’ speech was “not inadvertent.” As
for the argument that Willis’ speech, viewed together with her prior (and subsequent)
jurors, the State argues that “Find Me the Votes” and Willis’ slew of other nationally
animus towards appellants. “Welded together” by defense attorneys, says the State,
to overstate the appeal. Id. Overstated? Courts across this Nation go to tremendous
lengths to keep racial considerations out of the criminal justice system. Yet, it was
Willis who “welded together” this theme by consistently and publicly injecting the
As the State’s brief essentially conceded Williams’ first two factors (improper
remaining is whether Willis’ intentional injection of racism into this historic case, on
9
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national television, “of such egregious nature as to require [her] disqualification” Id.
at 314. Of course it was. The elected District Attorney of Fulton County,7 with
news outlets trailing her every move, intentionally injecting false racist claims in a
Black church, before potential Black jurors who were celebrating MLK, Jr. (blocks
“egregious.” Willis calculated and deliberate plan to prejudice the accused through
disqualification.
Given the “structural” concerns noted by the citations in Part I, supra, Willis’
intentional injection of racist allegations against the defendants was among the most
“inimical to the integrity of the judicial system,” courts must correct the wrong and
“send a message that such conduct will not be tolerated.” See e.g., State v. White,
285 A.3d 262 (Me. 2022) (citing Berger, impartiality, and the higher standards
because the “prosecutor should have taken great pains” to ensure the focus remained
7
Most respectfully, it is important for the record to reflect that the DA who is falsely claiming
President Trump and the other appealing defendants are racists, is also Black.
8
Tellingly, the State does not even attempt to respond to President Trump’s argument that Willis’
“legally improper” speech violated GRPC 3.8(g).
10
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surrounding, or the actual conduct of, a trial.” United States ex. Rel. Haynes v.
accused.” The purpose of the rule is to safeguard the integrity of the justice system
publicly and falsely labeling President Trump and the other defendants as racists in
a historic Atlanta Black church celebrating the birthday of MLK, Jr. was
3.8(g). Under these circumstances, the mere verbal rebuke of Willis by the trial
jeopardize the proceedings at a later time when the prospects of delay would be
multiplied and the consequences probably more drastic with respect to the rights of
11
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the defendant or the people of the State of [Georgia] or both.” In re: J.S., 140 Vt.
230, 232 (1981). In In re: J.S., also an interlocutory appeal, the majority presumed
statement showed the prosecutor’s inability to act “impartially and with the objective
of doing justice without regard to his personal feelings.” Id. at 231. Like in White,
conduct.” Id. In the face of this compelling analogy, the State pivots focus to a
dissent.
But even if this Court accepts the State’s incorrect argument that prejudice is
required to disqualify, the State (unlike the dissent it relies upon) mistakenly ignores
the Williams Court’s clear acceptance of the legal proposition that the burden may
be met by an accused at the pretrial stage. The State does not engage the compelling
reasons given by the In re: J.S. majority to presume prejudice from the participation
of a biased prosecutor.
Those reasons are fully applicable here. J.S. relied on Hohman 11 and Berger
to find pretrial prejudice from the mere presence and participation of a biased
11
Notably, Hohman found that disqualification was required due to the “personal bias” and
“attitude” shown via the prosecutor’s improper comments, and it pointed to the manipulation of
prosecutorial power for personal or political profit, the obligation to govern impartially, and the
“serious questions” regarding the ethical propriety of the prosecutor’s conduct.
12
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Nevertheless, the State dubiously protests that Williams must have imported
into its forensic misconduct definition the views expressed in Justice Billings’
dissent. Not so. There is no evidence in Williams division 2 that the Georgia
Supreme Court adopted anything beyond Billings’ citation to the Columbia note and
the note’s broad definition. Rather than restrict disqualification to misconduct with
tangible prejudice at trial, Williams omitted the dissent’s language and reasoning.
The Williams Court had every opportunity to adopt Billings dissent, or select
views expressed therein, but it did not.13 The State echoes Justice Billings’
“emphatic” argument that misconduct can disqualify only when it deprives a fair
trial or influences the trier of fact, State’s Br. at 72-73, but Williams never used the
terms “fair trial,” “fairness at trial,” or “prejudice”—much less influence on the fact
finder. 258 Ga. at 313-14. Likewise, Williams did not incorporate the “cumulative
effect upon the jury” language from United States v. Pierce, 86 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
1936),14 instead retaining only the “calculated plan” concept into the pretrial stage
disqualification analysis.
13
Viewing these distinctions, the Williams Court’s’ cite to Billings’ dissent is nothing more than a
reference to the general acceptance of two separate grounds to disqualify a prosecuting attorney.
14
The State’s quote from Pierce supports appellants: “That it was intended to prejudice the jury is
sufficient ground for a conclusion that it in fact did so.” State’s Br. at 75-76. Here, the trial court’s
finding that Willis’ speech was “not inadvertent” leaves little doubt as to her intent to prejudice.
13
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C. The Billings dissent has no persuasive value, nor does it help the
State: Justice Billings endorsed a pretrial prejudice standard that
President Trump has met.
Sound reasons explain why Williams did not limit disqualification to only the
trial circumstances described by the State. First, Justice Billings used disjunctive
potential for prejudice. In re: J.S., 140 Vt. at 235-36 (Billings, J., dissenting) (“To
joined Justice Hill’s dissent, which advocated for a pretrial prejudice standard to
In a death knell here for the State’s argument, Justice Hill wrote:
14
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network,15 appellants have shown that there is not only a “real chance,” but a
political) interest in the proceedings. Id. at 239-40 (Hill, J., dissenting). Justice
Billings notes that (1) the key aspect of Hohman is “the awesome power to prosecute
Unlike the distinction Justice Billings raised when analyzing political interest
(i.e., no campaign at the time), Willis was engaged in a re-election campaign when
she made her church speech, participated in “Find Me the Votes,” testified
unprofessionally in court, and has repeatedly commented to the media. Like the
voters) that defendants were racists, she was doing God’s work while acting
ethically, and the allegations against her were untrue. Willis thereby tied her personal
15
The Washington Post noted that a bank of local news cameras trailed Willis’ every move and
comment.
15
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and political interests to the outcome of these proceedings and publicly commented
The trial court found that the effect of Willis’ January 14, 2024 MLK church
speech was to cast racial aspersions, that an “odor of mendacity” lingered over
deliberately chose to “play the race” card, 17 in a calculated effort to bring public
condemnation against the accused and deflect public attention away from herself.
Even to this day, Willis shows no remorse: “They don’t want me to talk about race,
classifiable as either.” Williams, 258 Ga. at 314, n.4. Whether this Court focuses on
Willis’ calculated “play[ing] the race” card to engender public condemnation, her
16
The trial court stopped short of making a finding regarding Willis’ testimony or her GRPC
violations because it incorrectly determined it was unable to disqualify for such conduct.
17
“O Lord, they going to be mad when I call them out on this nonsense. First thing they said, "oh
she going to play the race card now. But no, God, isn’t it them playing the race card when they
only question one?”
16
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Conduct, and her forensic misconduct was calculated and egregious. Willis must
therefore be disqualified.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, President Trump respectfully requests this Court to
VACATE in part the order denying his motion to disqualify the prosecutor and
REMAND his case to the trial court with instructions that indictment 23-SC-188947
17
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have this day served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF upon Mr. Alex Bernick, by filing the foregoing via the
Court of Appeals E-Fast service, and by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail with
Pursuant to Court of Appeals Rule 24(f), undersigneds hereby certify that this
brief does not exceed the criminal case word limit imposed by Rule 24(a).
C-1