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Two studies investigated the effects of cognitive busyness on the activation and application of
stereotypes. In Experiment 1, not-busy subjects who were exposed to an Asian target showed
evidence of stereotype activation, but busy subjects (who rehearsed an 8-digit number during their
exposure) did not. In Experiment 2, cognitive busyness once again inhibited the activation of
stereotypes about Asians. However, when stereotype activation was allowed to occur, busy subjects
(who performed a visual search task during their exposure) were more likely to apply these activated
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
stereotypes than were not-busy subjects. Together, these findings suggest that cognitive busyness
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
may decrease the likelihood that a particular stereotype will be activated but increase the likeli-
hood that an activated stereotype will be applied.
Labels are devices for saving talkative persons the trouble of think- not mean that it is the only option available." Indeed, most
ing. (Morley, 1886, p. 142) theories of social inference acknowledge the predominance of
stereotypic thinking but also award a significant role to indi-
Of all the many observations that writers have made about
viduating thought (e.g., Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987;
human prejudice and preconception, one enjoys near-perfect
Brewer, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; see also Locksley, Hep-
consensus: A stereotype is the sluggard's best friend. As Allport
burn, & Ortiz, 1982). Under some circumstances, then, people
(1954, pp. 20-21) noted:
do think about others as unique individuals, and contemporary
We like to solve problems easily. We can do so best if we can fit theorists have debated at length about what those circum-
them rapidly into a satisfactory category and use this category as a stances might be.
means of prejudging the solution.... So long as we can get away One such circumstance falls neatly out of Allport's principle
with coarse overgeneralizations we tend to do so. Why? Well, it
takes less effort, and effort, except in the area of our most intense of cognitive economy: If a stereotype is, in fact, an energy-sav-
interests, is disagreeable. ing device, then people should be particularly prone to employ
that device when they are short on energy (e.g., Bodenhausen,
Modern theorists have raised Allport's notion of cognitive 1990; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen &
economy to the status of a first principle. Stereotypes and pre- Wyer, 1985; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Pratto & Bargh, 1991;
conceptions do not save people the trouble of thinking en pas- Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard, & Birrell, 1978). To the ex-
sant, but rather, as their cardinal function: "The task of cate- tent that individuals are cognitively busy (ije, simultaneously
gory systems is to provide maximum information with the least involved in several resource-consuming tasks), they should be
cognitive effort" (Rosch, 1978, p. 28). The ability to understand especially inclined to use stereotypes. This notion makes so
new and unique individuals in terms of old and general beliefs much sense, and has been advanced by so many sensible theo-
is certainly among the handiest tools in the social perceiver's kit rists, that it has become a hub of the conventional wisdom. The
(e.g., Andersen, Klatzky, & Murray, 1990; Hamilton, 1981; purpose of the present article is to argue that the state of affairs
Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). is not quite so simple: Cognitive busyness may indeed exacer-
Of course, the fact that people may employ such devices does bate the perceiver's tendency to use stereotypes, but it may also
not mean that they must always do so. As Fiske (1989, p. 277) abrogate precisely the same tendency.
has argued, "The idea that categorization is a natural and adap-
tive, even dominant, way of understanding other people does
Activation and Application of Stereotypes
Anyone who has ever lent a socket wrench to a forgetful
This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant neighbor knows that a tool is useful only if one can find it.
BNS-8819836 to Daniel T. Gilbert and a National Science Foundation Stereotypes are forms of information and, as such, are thought
predoctoral fellowship to J. Gregory Hixon. to be stored in memory in a dormant state until they are acti-
We thank John Bargh, Susan Fiske, Bill Swann, and several anony- vated for use. Many theorists have assumed that the activation
mous reviewers for their insightful comments on a previous version of of a stereotype is an automatic and inevitable consequence of
this article. We also thank Traci Giuliano, Jennifer Ho, Cheryl Irwin,
and Debbi Wagner for their kind help with the preparation of stimulus
encountering the object of that stereotype. Thus, for instance,
materials. Allport (1954, p. 21) argued that "Every event has certain marks
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to that serve as a cue to bring the category of prejudgment into
Daniel T. Gilbert, Department of Psychology, University of Texas, action.... A person with dark brown skin will activate what-
Austin, Texas 78712. Electronic mail should be sent to ever concept of Negro is dominant in our mind." Brewer (1989),
[email protected]. Devine (1989), Dovidio, Evans, and Tyler (1986), and Fiske and
509
510 DANIEL T. GILBERT AND J. GREGORY HIXON
Neuberg (1990) have all considered varieties of this argument, Caucasians who were native speakers ofEnglish were eligible to partici-
which (to strain the metaphor) suggests that stereotypes are pate.
tools that jump out of the toolbox when there is a job to be
done. In short, stereotypes are forms of information that must
be activated before they can be applied to perceptual or judg- Procedure
mental operations, and some theorists have argued that such Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were greeted by a male exper-
activation is an inevitable consequence ofexposure to the stereo- imenter who escorted them to an individual cubicle that was equipped
type object. with a video monitor and a taperecorder.The experimenter explained
There is no doubt that some mental operations require very that he was testing the hypothesis that people are capable of perform-
little effort or intent. Word meanings spring to mind when their ing two tasks simultaneously as long as the two tasks involve different
written referents are encountered (LaBerge & Samuels, 1974; cerebral hemispheres. Subjects in the busy condition were told that
Logan, 1980; Stroop, 1935); affective responses may overwhelm they would be asked to perform simultaneously a verbal and a nonver-
bal task that, according to the experimenter's ostensible hypothesis,
one with their speed and intensity (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Pow-
would not be mutually debilitating. Subjects in the not-busy condition
ell, & Kardes, 1986; Zajonc, 1980a); and even complex beliefs
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
were told that they had been assigned to a control condition and would
about others can be activated without one's awareness (Bargh &
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
subjects in the busy condition to rehearse an eight-digit number while It is worth noting that busyness did not itself impair any
they watched the videotape, whereas subjects in the not-busy condition obvious aspects of task performance. Busy and not-busy sub-
were not asked to rehearse a number. This and similar rehearsal tasks jects generated an equivalent total number of correct comple-
have been used with excellent results in a number of experiments to tions across all trials (Ms =41.50 and 41.29,respectively,t < 1)
deprive subjects of processing resources (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & and on critical trials (Ms = 11.77 and 12.09, respectively, t < 1).
Krull, 1988, Experiment 1; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989, Experiments 1 -4; Busy and not-busy subjects generated equally common or fre-
Osborne & Gilbert, 1990, Experiments 1-3; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Se-
roussi, & Gilbert, 1990, Experiments 1 and 3). After subjects finished
quently occurring words across all trials (Ms =75.17 and 76.52,
watching the videotape, the experimenter returned to the room and, if respectively, t < 1) and on critical trials (Ms = 77.76 and 75.79,
the subject had been assigned to the busy condition, asked the subject respectively, t < 1). Finally, busy and not-busy subjects showed
to report the eight-digit number. Next, subjects completed some filler equally good recall of the assistant's race (94.1% and 91.2%
items and were then asked to report the color of the ink in which the correct recall, respectively), x2(l) < 1, and of the color in which
fragments were printed and the race of the female assistant. Finally, the word fragments were printed (58.9% and 61.8% correct re-
subjects were probed for suspicion, thoroughly debriefed, and dis- call, respectively), %20) < 1- Taken together, these results sug-
missed. gest that cognitive busyness did not prevent subjects from per-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Results and Discussion tant's race, but that it did inhibit the activation of their
stereotypes about Asians.
Error Rates and Excluded Data
It is difficult to know how to interpret the errors that busy A Caveat
subjects made when reporting the eight-digit number. Large
errors may mean that busy subjects were not rehearsing the Given that busy subjects were presumably deprived of pro-
number (i.e., that they were not, in fact, busy), whereas small cessing resources, one might expect that they would perform
errors may mean that busy subjects were rehearsing the number more poorly than not-busy subjects on a variety of indices (e.g.,
and that this rehearsal was straining their resources. We faced memory for target's race, number of completions, and so on). In
this interpretative dilemma by establishing an a priori cutoff fact, they performed just as well as did not-busy subjects on
such that subjects who incorrectly reported four or more of the these indices and made few errors on the digit-rehearsal task
digits were considered to have made large errors and were ex- itself. Some authors have argued that substantial error rates on
cluded from the data set. Three of the 37 busy subjects were an overload task are necessary if one is to claim unequivocally
excluded by this criterion. Of the 32 busy subjects who re- that capacity was exceeded (e.g, Kantowitz, 1974). Thus, our
mained in the data set, 2 made small errors (i.e., they incorrectly data may be seen as suggesting that the busyness manipulation
reported one or two of the eight digits) and 30 made no errors. did not, in fact, usurp subjects' processing resources. Is it possi-
ble, for example, that busy subjects committed the number to
Analysis of Completions long-term memory prior to the experimental trials and subse-
quently made fewer stereotypic words forreasonsentirely unre-
We predicted that not-busy subjects would generate more ste- lated to resource deprivation?
reotypic completions when exposed to an Asian than a Cauca- We think not. Osborne and Gilbert (1990) showed that sub-
sian assistant, but that busy subjects would not. The number of jects who were given 20 s to memorize an eight-digit number
stereotypic completions generated by each subject was submit- responded more slowly to probes that occurred over the follow-
ted to a 2 (busyness: busy or not busy) X 2 (race: Caucasian or ing 2 min than did subjects who had not been asked to memo-
Asian) analysis of variance (ANOV\) that revealed only the pre- rize the number. This finding suggests that the typical subject
dicted Busyness X Race interaction, F(l, 64) = 4.52, p < .05. As does indeed rehearse the number (rather than merely store it in
Table 1 shows, not-busy subjects were more likely to generate long-term memory) and that thisrehearsaldoes usurp process-
stereotypic completions when exposed to an Asian than a Cau- ing resources. Nonetheless, our interpretation of the results of
casian assistant, Z(32) = 2.46, p < .05, but busy subjects were Experiment 1 would be more convincing if busy subjects had
not,f(32)<l. shown minor but ubiquitous errors on the digit-rehearsal task,
and future researchers should consider using more demanding
manipulations of load to avoid such interpretational difficul-
ties.
Table 1
1
Number of Stereotypic Completions in Experiment
Busyness Experiment 2
Assistant's race Not busy Busy
The Sufis teach that "If a pickpocket meets a holy man, he
will see only his pockets" (Dass, 1971, p. 10). The results of
Asian 3.82. 3.12,. Experiment 1 suggest that people can, in fact, be exposed to
Caucasian 3.00,, 3.24, others about whom they have stereotypic beliefs, and yet show
Difference 0.82 -0.12 no evidence of stereotype activation. Apparently, busy subjects
Note. N= 17 in each cell. Means that do not share a common sub- who encountered an Asian card turner saw only a card turner,
script differ with p < .05. Means that share a common subscript do not and not an Asian.
differ, all ft < 1 . Atfirstblush, thisfindingmay appear to contradict the doc-
512 DANIEL T. GILBERT AND I GREGORY HIXON
trine of cognitive economy—namely, that stereotypes ease the each letter (R through U), and the delay between letters (1,000 to 3,000
task of understanding others and should therefore be most ms) were randomly determined by the roll of a die prior to the experi-
readily employed by those in greatest need of easing. In fact, the ment.
contradiction disappears if one distinguishes between the acti- The subject was instructed to use a hand-held "clicker" with analog
vation and application of information. Although "activation readout to count the number of times the letter T was immediately
increases the likelihood of a constructs being used in subse- followed by the letter U. Letters were presented for the entire duration
of the assistant's description (approximately 2.6 min), and during that
quent judgments" (Higgins, 1989, p. 78), it does not mandate time the target sequence (i.e., T-Ihen-U) occurred on six occasions.
such use, nor does it determine the precise nature of its use. It is Visual search tasks such as this have been used with excellentresultsto
possible for activated information to exert no effect on subse- deprive subjects of processing resources (e.g., Gilbert & Krull, 1988,
quent judgments or to have a variety of different effects (e.g., Experiments 1 and 2). Theremainingsubjects were assigned to be not
contrast versus assimilation; see Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, busy during the application phase. These subjects did not perform the
1987; Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990; Newman & Uleman, 1990). visual search task, and the video screen remained black as they lis-
If activation involves finding a tool in the cognitive toolbox, tened to the assistant describe a typical day in her life.
then application involves using that tool to ease the processing Thus, about one quarter of the subjects in the experiment were as-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
of information. We suggest that whereas busyness may decrease signed to the always-busy condition (they performed a digit rehearsal
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
the likelihood of locating the tool (activation), it may increase task during the activation phase and a visual search task during the
the likelihood of using the tool once it has been found (applica- application phase), one quarter were assigned to the never-busy condi-
tion (they performed neither the digit rehearsal task nor the visual
tion). Experiment 2 was an attempt to demonstrate these ef-
search task), one quarter were assigned to the early-busy condition
fects. (they performed a digit rehearsal task during the activation phase but
not a visual search task during the application phase), and one quarter
were assigned to the late-busy condition (they did not perform the digit
Method rehearsal task during the activation phase, but they did perform the
Overview visual search task during the application phase).1
were excluded from the data set. Thirteen subjects made small 1.41, p = .24, and at recalling the color in which the fragments
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
errors (i.e., they incorrectly reported between one and two of the were printed (73% and 60% correct recall, respectively), x2(l) =
eight digits), and these subjects were retained in the data set. 1.88, p = .17. Finally, although busy subjects did make margin-
The remaining subjects made no errors on this task. ally more common words across all trials than did not-busy
In addition, two subjects made large errors when reporting subjects (Ms = 76.93 and 71.70, respectively), t(93) = 1.59, p =
the number of appearances of 7'-then-f/(i.e., they were incor- .11, the two groups made equally common words on the critical
rect by more than one of the six appearances), and they were trials (Ms = 75.49 and 75.64, respectively), t < 1.
excluded from the data set. Three subjects made small errors
when reporting the number of appearances of T-xhsn-U, and
these subjects were retained in the data set. The remaining Application Phase
subjects made no errors on this task. Subjects' ratings of the assistant on the nine trait dimensions
Finally, five subjects confessed to having misunderstood the were averaged to create a stereotypic perception index on which
instructions and one subject identified herself as a nonnative larger values indicated a perception of the assistant as possess-
speaker of English. These subjects were excluded from the data ing more stereotypically Asian traits (e.g, greater timidity, less
set. In summary, the data from 16 of 111 subjects were excluded sociability, and so on). Scores on this index were submitted to a 2
from all analyses. (activation: busy or not busy) X 2 (application: busy or not busy)
X 2 (race: Caucasian or Asian) ANOV\ that revealed only the
Activation Phase
predicted three-way interaction, F(l, 87) = 4.12, p < .05.
As in Experiment 1, busy and not-busy subjects were exposed As Table 3 shows, subjects who were not busy during the
to either an Asian or Caucasian assistant while they performed activation phase but who were busy during the application
a word-fragment completion test. We predicted that, as in Ex- phase (i.e, late-busy subjects) made more stereotypic ratings of
periment 1, not-busy subjects would generate more stereotypic the Asian assistant than of the Caucasian assistant, /(22) = 4.41,
completions when exposed to an Asian than a Caucasian assis- p < .001, and this was the only one of the four groups to do so
tant, but that busy subjects would not. (similar comparisons for the always-busy, never-busy, and early-
The number of stereotypic completions generated by each busy groups did not approach significance, all ts < 1). In other
subject was submitted to a 2 (activation: busy or not busy) X 2 words, busyness during the application phase increased sub-
(race: Caucasian or Asian) ANOV\ for unequal Nih&X revealed jects' tendency to view the Asian assistant in stereotypic terms,
a main effect of race, F(\, 91) = 5.36, p = .02, and the predicted but only if the corresponding stereotypes had been activated in
Activation X Race interaction, F(l, 91) = 7.48, p = .007. As the first phase. Busyness during the application phase had no
Table 2 shows, Experiment 1 was clearly replicated: Subjects discernible effect on subjects whose stereotypes were not acti-
vated earlier (i.e., always-busy subjects), and stereotype activa-
tion had no discernible effect on subjects who were not busy
Table 2 during the application phase (i.e., early-busy subjects). All sub-
Number of Stereotypic Completions in Experiment 2 jects showed superb memory for the assistant's description, al-
Busyness during activation phase
though, as might be expected, subjects who were busy during
the application phase showed somewhat poorer memory (mean
Not busy Busy d' = 2.55) than did subjects who were not (mean d' = 3.97),
*(93)= 6.55, p<. 001.2
No. of No. of
Assistant's race completions Cell n completions Celln
2
It is worth noting that of subjects who were not busy during the
Asian 3.71, 24 3.09b 23
Caucasian 2.88b 26 3.18b 22 activation phase, those who were subsequently assigned to the late-
Difference 0.83 -0.09 busy condition and those who were subsequently assigned to the never-
busy condition did not differ in terms of the number of stereotypic
Note. Means that do not share a common subscript differ with p < words produced during the word-fragment completion test. That is,
.05. Means that share a common subscript do not differ, all ps > .22. the (about to be) late-busy and the (about to be) never-busy subjects
514 DANIEL T. GILBERT AND J. GREGORY HIXON
Table 3
Ratings of Assistant on Stereotypic Perception Index in Experiment 2
Always busy Early busy Late busy Never busy
Assistant's race
Asian 6.15 13 6.59 10 7.30 11 6.36 13
Caucasian 6.35 12 6.77 10 6.07 13 6.42 13
Difference -0.20 -0.18 1.23* -0.06
Note. Early busy subjects were busy during the activation phase but not during the application phase; late
busy subjects were busy during the application phase but not during the activation phase; always busy
subjects were busy during both phases; and never busy subjects were busy during neither phase. Larger
values indicate perceptions of the assistant as possessing more stereotypically Asian traits. Only differ-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
ences marked with an asterisk are significant with p < .05. For all other differences, t < 1. The late
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
busy/Asian cell (M = 7.30) differs from all other cells with p < .05, except that it differs from the early
busy/Caucasian cell (M = 6.77) with p = .11.
It is interesting to consider the possibility that the three omy suggests that stereotypes are applied in order to ease the
groups of subjects who showed no evidence of stereotype appli- burden of information processing, and thus one should not
cation may have done so for very different reasons. The early- expect to observe such application when the information-pro-
busy and always-busy subjects should not have applied their cessing task is not particularly taxing. Although we cannot de-
stereotypes because busyness during the first phase should termine which of these accounts is correct in the present case,
have kept those stereotypes from being activated. As such, we one bit of evidence is suggestive. Two groups of subjects had
would not expect (and we did not observe) stereotypic re- their stereotypes of Asian-Americans activated (i.e., the never-
sponses from these subjects. Never-busy subjects, on the other busy and late-busy subjects who were exposed to an Asian assis-
hand, should have had their stereotypes activated, and evidence tant). Of those activated subjects, those who were busy during
from the word-fragment completion test suggests that they did. the application phase (i.e., the late-busy subjects) showed a mar-
Why, then, did these subjects show no evidence of stereotype ginally reliable correlation between the degree of stereotype
application? activation and application, r(9) = .45, p = .08. Those activated
There are at least two explanations for this finding: The be- subjects who were not busy during the application phase (i.e.,
havioral suppression account suggests that stereotype applica- the never-busy subjects) showed no such correlation, r(l 1) = .05,
tion did, in fact, occur, and the individuation account suggests p = .44. If never-busy subjects strategically adjusted their rat-
that it did not. First, Devine (1989) has argued that both the ings away from the stereotypic pole of the rating scale, one
activation and the application of stereotypes are automatic, but would expect the mean of these ratings to be lowered—but one
that overt responses are not. Although there is now reason to might also expect the correlation between activation and appli-
believe that no mental process is unconditionally automatic cation to be maintained. And it is not. This one shred of evi-
(Bargh, 1989), Devine's point about the greater controllability dence, then, suggests that never-busy subjects may not have
of stereotypic behavior is an important one. Individuals may applied their activated stereotypes because they did not need to
suppress stereotypic responses either because they consider do so. Ultimately, of course, we cannot know whether the never-
such responses immoral ("It would be wrong to say that the busy subjects failed to achieve stereotypic impressions (the in-
woman is unsociable just because she's Asian") or because they dividuation account) or simply failed to announce them (the
wish to manage their impressions ("If I say the assistant is unso- behavioral suppression account). This is a perdurable dilemma
ciable, the experimenter will think I'm a bigot"). This suggests that even the most inventive students of stereotyping have been
that never-busy subjects may well have achieved stereotypic unable to resolve (see Jones & Sigall, 1971).
impressions of the assistant, but that the lack of busyness dur-
ing the application phase allowed them to adjust their re-
sponses so as not to be or appear prejudiced. General Discussion
On the other hand, it is possible that the activated stereotypes Mental experience seems inexorably to involve the admixture
of never-busy subjects did not affect their judgments because of old and new information. People rely so strongly on prior
the surfeit of cognitive resources during the application phase information to ease the burden of ongoing perception that
enabled them to individuate (rather than stereotype) the assis- some of the greatest thinkers (e.g., Kant, 1781/1965) have
tant (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). The principle of cognitive econ- doubted whether perception could occur otherwise. As Durant
(1926, p. 272) wrote in characterizing this idealist position,
"The world as we know it is a construction, afinishedproduct,
made equally few stereotypic words when exposed to a Caucasian as- almost—one might say—a manufactured article, to which the
sistant (Ms = 2.92 and 2.85, respectively, t < 1) and equally many stereo- mind contributes as much by its moulding forms as the thing
typic words when exposed to an Asian assistant (Ms = 3.82 and 3.62, contributes by its stimuli." With few exceptions (e.g., Gibson,
respectively, t < 1). 1979), most modern psychologists have embraced this con-
ACTIVATION AND APPLICATION OF STEREOTYPES 515
structivist perspective (Neisser, 1976) and have attempted to actions at the same time that one draws inferences about others
articulate the circumstances under which percepts and judg- (Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988). As such, social interaction
ments will be more strongly determined by stimulus properties may cause interactants to become cognitively busy and thus
or by the mind's "moulding forms." reduce the likelihood that their stereotypes about each other
As the quotation that opened this article suggests, psycholo- will be activated. A faithful churchgoer who meets a newly
gists and pundits have generally agreed that it takes more work arrived Hispanic minister may not experience activation of his
to individuate a stimulus than to construe it in terms of well- or her beliefs about Hispanics, simply because the social de-
worn knowledge (cf. Britton & Tesser, 1982). Preexisting knowl- mands of the formal encounter may usurp resources that are
edge is meant to save people "the trouble of thinking" about necessary for the activation of those concepts. Of course, this
each new stimulus they encounter, and thus theorists have been does not mean that social interaction is a panacea for prejudice.
quick to assume that circumstances that preclude individuating Our results suggest that if stereotypes are activated prior to a
thought must increase the person's reliance on preexisting resource-consuming social interaction ("Let me take you over
knowledge. To the extent that stereotypes function like other and introduce you to Father Gonzales"), then the interactants
forms of preexisting knowledge (e.g., beliefs, constructs, catego- may be especially likely to view each other in stereotypic terms.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
ries, schemas, and scripts), our findings suggest that this as-
sumption is correct—but only in part. People aw more likely to critical in determining if and when social interaction will ame-
rely on activated stereotypes when conscious deliberation be- liorate or exacerbate stereotypy.
comes difficult, but the very conditions that interfere with
conscious deliberation may also interfere with the activation of The Inevitability of Stereotypy
the stereotypes. The metaphorical irony is that just when one
needs one's tool most, it may be hardest to find. Our findings suggest that the activation of racial stereotypes
is not an unconditionally automatic consequence of exposure to
a person; rather, a perceiver must have adequate processing
Social Interaction and Stereotypy resources for such stereotypes to be activated. Thisfindingbe-
To speak of stereotypes as tools is to overlook the fact that lies strong claims such as those of Brewer (1989, pp. 5-6), who
although they may ease the burden of perception, they may also suggested:
reduce its accuracy. Stereotypic beliefs about women's roles, for The mere presentation ofa stimulus person activatescertain classi-
example, may enable one to see correctly that a woman in a fication processes . . . that occur automatically and without
dark room is threading a needle rather than tying afishinglure, conscious intent.. . . Whenever a novel social object is encoun-
but they may also cause one to mistakenly assume that her goal tered, an initial identification stage is postulated to precede any
is embroidery rather than cardiac surgery. Although stereotypes conscious, goal-driven information processing. . .[and this] pro-
cess is one of "placing" the individual social object along well-es-
are psychologically fundamental, they may also be socially per- tablished stimulus dimensions such as gender, age, and skin color.
nicious, and psychologists have long searched for ways to re-
solve this dilemma. One remedy has been to encourage people This claim has considerable intuitive appeal. How can one see a
to spend the time and effort necessary to individuate others young Asian woman and yet fail to categorize her instantly as
rather than allowing their preconceptions to dominate their such? Our studies do not deny that such rapid categorizations
judgments (see especially Fiske, 1989). The second remedy has can and often do happen; they simply deny that they must
been to increase the accuracy of the preconceptions upon happen. Our busy subjects did not experience activation of ra-
which people rely. cial stereotypes about an Asian assistant to whom they were
One oft-prescribed means of accomplishing both ends is to exposed, and although these subjects were able to recall the
foster interaction between persons and the objects of their ste- assistant's race after the experiment was over, they apparently
reotypes (e.g., Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp, 1978; did not categorize her in terms of race during the experiment.
Brewer & Miller, 1984). When people interact with members of And why should they have? During the activation phase, sub-
out-groups, two things may happen. First, they may gain infor- jects had no reason to form any kind of impression of the Asian
mation that increases the accuracy of their preconceptions: An assistant, whose minimal role was more akin to that of furni-
unmusical Black, a generous Jew, or a sober Irishman may, at ture than to that of an interaction partner. We suspect that, as
the very least, undermine the certainty with which people em- Brewer claims, the mere presentation of a stimulus person does
brace such racial caricatures (Taylor, 1981, pp. 102-103; Weber initiate certain classification processes; however, we do not be-
& Crocker, 1983). Second, social interaction raises the practical lieve that these classifications are inevitably along certain di-
cost of inaccurate beliefs (Swann, 1984). It is one thing to mis- mensions or that they are unaffected by the perceiver's goals. In
construe a famous Black politician or a feminist opinion leader, fact, busyness may exert its effect on stereotype activation by
and quite another to misconstrue one's dentist, student, or causing subjects to classify others only along those dimensions
daughter-in-law. In other words, people are more accountable that are directly relevant to their current information-process-
for (and thus may craft more carefully) judgments about those ing goals: When the person's race is wholly inconsequential (as it
with whom they have true and enduring commerce (Tetlock & was in our studies), busy perceivers may not have the "luxury"
Kim, 1987). of activating preexisting information that is, in fact, irrelevant
Our studies suggest a third way in which social interaction to their concerns.
may affect the use of stereotypes. Social interaction is a com- Issues such as these may be obscured by studies that do not
plex business in which one must consciously regulate one's own expose subjects to stereotype objects, but rather, to words that
516 DANIEL T. GILBERT AND J. GREGORY HIXON
represent those objects. For example, Devine (1989, p. 5) con- Aronson, E., Blaney, N., Stephan, C, Sikes, X, & Snapp, M. (1978). The
cluded that a "stereotype is automatically activated in the pres- jigsaw classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
ence of a member (or some symbolic equivalent) of the stereo- Bargh, J. A. (1989). Conditional automaticity: Varieties of automatic
typed group," and supported this claim with data from several influence in social perception and cognition. In J. S. Uleman & J. A.
elegant experiments that demonstrate the ease with which Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 3-51). New York: Guilford.
words such as nigger can activate stereotypes about Blacks and Bargh, J. A., & Pietromonaco, P. (1982). Automatic information pro-
cessing and social perception: The influence of trait information
thereby affect judgments about a target whose race is not men-
presented outside of conscious awareness on impression formation.
tioned. Such studies are in keeping with social psychology's Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 43, 437-449.
tradition of treating words as the symbolic equivalents of per- Bassili, J. N., & Smith, M. C. (1986). On the spontaneity of trait attribu-
sons—a tradition so widespread that some topics in social psy- tion: Converging evidence for the role of cognitive strategy. Journal
chology are denned almost entirely by subjects' reactions to of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 239-245.
trait adjectives (e.g., person memory; see Hastie et al., 1980). Bodenhausen, G. Y(1990). Stereotypes as judgmental heuristics: Evi-
This methodological approach is quite reasonable when the dence of circadian variations in discrimination. Psychological
assumption of symbolic equivalence is true. But there may be Science, 1, 319-322.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
times when the assumption is unfounded, and thus times when Bodenhausen, G. V, & Lichtenstein, M. (1987). Social stereotypes and
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
the study of reactions to words may paint a misleading portrait information-processing strategies: The impact of task complexity.
of psychological processes. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 52, 871-880.
For example, it may be virtually impossible for a literate adult Bodenhausen, G. V, & Wyer, R. S. (1985). Effects of stereotypes on
decision-making and information-processing strategies. Journal of
to read the phrase Black fireman without experiencing activa-
Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 267-282.
tion of both the racial and occupational constructs (Logan, Brewer, M. B. (1989). A dual process model of impression formation.
1980; Stroop, 1935; cf. Kahneman & Treisman, 1984), and, in In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 1,
some sense, to do otherwise would be to fail to understand what pp. 1-36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
one has read. Nonetheless, it may be entirely possible for a Brewer, M. B., & Miller, N. (1984). Beyond the contact hypothesis:
literate adult to encounter a Black fireman and, given the ap- Theoretical perspectives on desegregation. In M. B. Brewer & N.
propriate information-processing goal (e.g., to find quickly Miller (Eds.), Groups in contact: The psychology ofdesegregation (pp.
someone who will enter a burning building to save a child), to 281-302). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
construe the Blackfiremanonly in terms of his occupation (see Britton, B. K., & Tesser, A. (1982). Effects of prior knowledge on use of
Taylor, 1981). Because words and phrases contain implicit cate- cognitive capacity in three complex cognitive tasks. Journal of Verbal
gorizations of the objects they describe, they effectively demand Learning and"Verbal Behavior, 21, 421-436.
that associates of these categories be activated. As Zarate and Dass, R. (1971). Be here now. New York: Crown.
Smith (1990, p. 162) noted: "Linguistic descriptions (e.g., 'a Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and
controlled components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
black person*) force a single categorization, in contrast to a real
ogy, 56, 5-18.
person, who is not only black but (perhaps) young, male, well- Dovidio, J. F, Evans, N. E., & Tyler, R. B. (1986). Racial stereotypes:
dressed, tall, speaking with a Southern accent, and so on." Our The contents of their cognitive representations. Journal of Experi-
subjects encountered someone who was an Asian and a card mental Social Psychology, 22, 22-37.
turner, and yet they showed no evidence of construing her as an Durant, W (1926). The story ofphilosophy. New "fork: Simon & Schus-
Asian. We would be very surprised to find similar results had ter.
subjects instead read the phrase Asian card turner. Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Powell, M. C, & Kardes, F. R.
After appraising the state of research in social cognition, Za- (1986). On the automatic activation of attitudes. Journal of Personal-
jonc (1980b, p. 192) offered this warning: "Because we cannot ity and Social Psychology, 50, 229-238.
assume a one-to-one correspondence between language and Fiske, S. T. (1989). Examining the role of intent: Toward understanding
its role in stereotyping and prejudice. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh
reality, we may not take it for granted that the same principles of (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 253-286). New York: Guilford.
social perception will be generated by studying words as by Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum model of impression
studying the actual social objects for which these words stand." formation, from category-based to individuating processes: Influ-
It is in this spirit that we offer a revision of the Sufi teaching: ences of information and motivation on attention and interpreta-
When a pickpocket reads the words holy man, he will probably tion. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychol-
think of a great deal more than pockets—and in so doing, he ogy (Vol. 23, pp. 1-74). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
will reveal little about how pickpockets construe holy men in Fiske, S. T, & Pavelchak, M. (1986). Category-based versus piecemeal-
their day-to-day lives. If we really want to know how persons based affective responses: Developments in schema-triggered affect.
think about persons, we may have to introduce our subjects to In R. M. Sorrentio & E. T. Higgins (Eds), Handbook of motivation
some. and cognition (pp. 167-202). New York: Guilford.
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin.
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trast as a function of people's willingness and ability to expend effort Received February 7,1990
in forming an impression. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychol- Revision received October 25,1990
ogy, 59, 27-37. Accepted October 30,1990 •