What is a crime?

A crime is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law

forbidding or commanding it. (Reyes)

What are felonies?

Felonies are acts or omissions punishable by the Revised Penal Code. It is

committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault
(culpa). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent;
and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. (Art. 3, RPC)

Knowing that felonies are acts or omissions punishable by the Revised Penal Code
only, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that offenses are acts or omissions
punishable by special penal laws.

In People v. De Gracia,4 good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid
defenses in offenses punished by a special law. Conversely, when the act is
punished by the RPC, then good faith and absence of criminal intent are valid
defenses.

Crimes mala in se and mala prohibita

Speaking of crimes punished by the Revised Penal Code, on one hand, and special
penal laws, on the other, it is only prudent for us to know and understand crimes
which are considered mala ils se and mala prohibita.

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4 G.R. Nos. 102009-10, 6 July 1994

rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause
of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtains redress for their invasion. As applied to criminal law, substantive
law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for
committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step
taken in a criminal prosecution. (Supra)
In People v. Lacerna,7 the Supreme Court has settled that criminal intent need
not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala prohibita but this, however, does not
lessen the prosecution's burden because it is still required to show that the
prohibited act was intentional, viz .:

It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts
mala prohibita. On grounds of public

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5 G.R. No. 209464, 1 July 2015
6 G.R. No. 212738, 9 March 2022
7 G.R. No. 109250, 5 September 1997

In Dungo v. People,5 the Supreme Court had the occasion to discuss acts mala in
se and mala prohibita in this wise, viz .:

Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala
in se; and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids
them, called acts mala prohibita. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se,
the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been
violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. When the
doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and
the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.

A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the RPC, while all
mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there
may be mala in se crimes under the special laws, such as plunder under Republic
Act No. 7080, as amended. Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in
the RPC, such as technical malversation.

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The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita
crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the
penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it
is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but
there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy,
then it is mala prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves
moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.

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policy and compelled by necessity, courts have always recognized the power of the
legislature, as "the greater master of things," to forbid certain acts in a limited class
of cases and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the
doer. Such legislative enactments are based on the experience that repressive
measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge or
of his intent are of little use and rarely accomplish their purposes; besides, the
prohibited act is so injurious to the public welfare that, regardless of the person's
intent, it is the crime itself.

This, however, does not lessen the prosecution's burden because it is still
required to show that the prohibited act was intentional. Intent to commit
the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may
not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he did intend to
commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime
itself, then he can be held liable for the malum prohibitum. Intent to
commit the crime is not necessary, but intent to perpetrate the act
prohibited by the special law must be shown.

XXX

In illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs

Act, the prosecution is not excused from proving that the possession of the
prohibited act was done "freely and consciously," which is an essential
element of the crime.

In Valenzona v. People,8 the Supreme Court, citing Lacerna, held that for acts
regarded as mala prohibita, there is a recognition that the prohibited act is so
injurious to the public welfare that, regardless of the person's intent, it
is in itself the consummated crime but, nonetheless, dispensing with proof
of criminal intent does not, in any way, discharge the prosecution of its
burden to show that the prohibited act was done intentionally by the
accused, viz .:

The Court, in People v. Lacerna, explained that "[o]n grounds of public policy and
compelled by necessity, courts have always recognized the power of the
legislature ... to forbid certain acts in a limited class of cases and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. For this type of
offenses, there is a recognition that the prohibited act is so injurious to the public
welfare that, regardless of the person's intent, it is in itself the consummated crime.

That said, dispensing with proof of criminal intent for crimes mala prohibita does
not, in any way, discharge the prosecution of its burden to show that the prohibited
act was done intentionally by the accused. On this note, it is important to
distinguish between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act -
while a person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime
regarded as malum prohibitum, he or she may still be held liable if he or
she did intend to commit an act that is, by the very nature of things, the
crime itself. Thus, for acts that are mala prohibita, the intent to perpetrate the
prohibited act under the special law must nevertheless be shown.

In contrast to crimes mala in se, which presupposes that the person who did the
felonious act had criminal intent in doing so, crimes mala prohibita do not require
such knowledge or criminal intent; rather, what is crucial is volition or the intent to
commit the act. While volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being
done (as opposed to knowledge of the nature of the act), criminal intent is the state
of mind that goes beyond voluntariness, and it is this intent which is punished by
crimes mala in se. To hold an offender liable for an offense that is malum prohibitum
it is sufficient that there is a conscious intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the
special law, for the essence of mala prohibita is voluntariness in the commission of
the act constitutive of the crime.

Succinctly put, for crimes mala in se, there must be proof of criminal
intent, while for crimes mala prohibita, it is sufficient that the prohibited
act is done freely and consciously. As applied here, even if a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 is malum prohibitum, it must be established that the
accused had the volition or intent to commit the prohibited act, which is non-
registration of the subject contracts.

Theories in Criminal Law

Let us now discuss the theories or philosophies or schools of thought underlying

criminal law. There are four of them currently recognized by the Supreme Court to
wit: (1) classical theory; (2) positivist theory; (3) eclectic or mixed theory;
and (4) utilitarian theory.

In People v. Estrada,9 cited in People v. Racal,10 the Supreme Court explained

the classical theory in this wise:

The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony
committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is
mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is
essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose
between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act
(delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e.,
with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged
or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of
sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. The moral and legal presumption under
our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person.
This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is
insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability.
8 G.R. No. 248584, 30 August 2023
9 G.R. No. 130487, 19 June 2000
10 G.R. No. 224886, 4 September 2017
11 G.R. Nos. 159418-19, 10 December 2003
12 Boado, Compact Reviewer in Criminal Law, 2023 Edition; In Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, 8 August 2017, Boado was cited as one of
the reasons why penalties are imposed, i.e., for both retribution and reformation pursuant to the
eclectic theory. (Note 157, supra)
13 G.R. No. 134847, 6 December 2000

In De Joya v. Jail Warden of Batangas City,11 the Supreme Court explained the
positivist theory in this wise:

However, in imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that
Philippine penal law is based on the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of
the positivist theory of criminal law. The positivist theory states that the basis
for criminal liability is the sum total of the social and economic
phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The adoption of the aspects of
the theory is exemplified by the indeterminate sentence law, Article 4, paragraph 2
of the Revised Penal Code (impossible crime), Article 68 and Articles 11 to 14, not to
mention Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (penalties for heinous and quasi-
heinous crimes). Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of society.
Among the important factors to be considered in determining the penalty to be
imposed on him are (1) his relationship towards his dependents, family and their
relationship with him; and (2) his relationship towards society at large and the
State. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of
protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness
and other social ends. The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The
penalties imposed must not only be retributive but must also be
reformative, to give the convict an opportunity to live a new life and rejoin
society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the community. The
court has to consider not only the primary elements of punishment, namely, the
moral responsibility of the convict, the relation of the convict to the private
complainant, the intention of the convict, the temptation to the act or the excuse
for the crime - was it done by a rich man in the insolence of his wealth or by a poor
man in the extremity of his need? The court must also take into account the
secondary elements of punishment, namely, the reformation of the offender, the
prevention of further offenses by the offender, the repression of offenses in others.
As Rousseau said, crimes can be thoroughly repressed only by a system of penalties
which, from the benignity they breathe, serve rather than to soften than to inflame
those on whom they are imposed. There is also merit in the view that punishment
inflicted beyond the merit of the offense is so much punishment of innocence.
According to Boado,12 eclectic (or mixed) theory combines the good
features of both the classical and the positivist theories. Ideally, the classical
theory is applied to heinous crimes, whereas, the positivist works on economic and
social crimes. In People v. Mariano,13 heinous crimes are grievous, odius and
hateful offenses which, by reason of their inherent wickedness, viciousness,

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11 G.R. Nos. 159418-19, 10 December 2003
12 Boado, Compact Reviewer in Criminal Law, 2023 Edition; In Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, 8 August 2017, Boado was cited as one of
the reasons why penalties are imposed, i.e., for both retribution and reformation pursuant to the
eclectic theory. (Note 157, supra)
13 G.R. No. 134847, 6 December 2000

According to Boado, atrocity and perversity, are repugnant to the common

standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.

In Magno v. Court of Appeals,14 cited in Sama v. People,15 the Supreme Court

explained the utilitarian theory in this wise:

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that
the primary function of punishment is the protection of society against
actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether the petitioner could be
considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the
offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of
Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should
also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be
falling prey to such a vicious transaction.

Power to define and punish crimes

In United States v. Pablo,16 the right of prosecution and punishment for a crime
is one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power
instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society to look after,
guard and defend the interests of the community, the individual and social rights
and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.

In People v. Santiago,17 the Supreme Court held that the legislature has the
power to power to define and punish crimes.

Constitutional limitations on legislative power to enact penal laws

Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that the legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines. Accordingly, pursuant to
its plenary power, the legislature has the broad and extensive power to
regulate ALL MATTERS which in its discretion are for the common of the
people - including the maintenance of peace and order and protection of life and
liberty - which the Constitution deems indispensable for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessing of democracy.18

That said, however, the plenary power of the legislature is still subject to the
conditions set forth by the very same source from which it originated - the 1987
Philippine Constitution. Hence, when the legislature enacts a penal law that defines
a crime, treats of its nature, and provides for its penalty, the same must conform to
the following constitutional limitations.

1. Due process clause where it states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process" (Sec. 1, Art. III);

2. Equal protection clause where it states that no person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws" (Sec. 1, Art. III);

3. Prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment where it states that

"[e]xcessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty19 be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua." (Sec.
19 [1], Art. III); and

4. Prohibition on ex post facto law or bill of attainder where its

states that no ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. (Sec. 22, Art.
III).

Due Process in Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985

A penal law must be published pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines being a requirement of due process to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Prohibition against infliction of cruel, degrading, or inhumane punishment

in Fuertes v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, 7 January 2020

This constitutional prohibition had generally been aimed at the "form or

character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration
or amount," such as "those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning
at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like." It is thus
directed against "extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that
strips the individual of [their] humanity."
In line with this, this Court has found that the penalty of life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua does not violate the prohibition. Even the death penalty in itself
was not considered cruel, degrading, or inhuman.

Nonetheless, this Court has found that penalties like fines or imprisonment
may be cruel, degrading, or inhuman when they are "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community." However, If the severe penalty
has a legitimate purpose, then the punishment is proportionate and the
prohibition is not violated.

19 In 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 was enacted which prohibit the imposition of
death penalty in the Philippines and, in lieu thereof, imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code, or the penalty of life imprisonment, when the
law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code.

Punishment of death is not cruel in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R.

No. 132601, 12 October 1998

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of
Prisons, this Court held that "[plunishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details
involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or
inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the
competence and expertise of administrative officials.

The process of administering lethal injection:

In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and

wheeled into the execution room. A trained technician inserts a needle into a vein in
the inmate's arm and begins an intravenous flow of saline solution. At the warden's
signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the intravenous line. The deadly
concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a nonlethal dose of sodium
thiopenthotal, a sleep inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal doses of pancuronium
bromide, a drug that paralyzes the muscles; and (3) potassium chloride, which
stops the heart within seconds. The first two drugs are commonly used during
surgery to put the patient to sleep and relax muscles; the third is used in heart
bypass surgery.
Ex post facto law in People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101724, 3 July 1992

To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would
alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime
that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.
An ex post facto law is defined as:

"A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which
retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. By
Art. I, Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass 'any ex post facto law.'
Most all state constitutions contain similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws.

"An 'ex post facto law' is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of
punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was
innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes the rules
of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of
the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which,
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or
the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives
persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the
proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage."

Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article III, 1987
Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that
Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in
1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new
prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those offenses which were
committed after the approval of B.P. Blg. 195.

Bill of attainder in People v. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, 27 December

1972

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its
essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of quilt. The
constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of
separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills
of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities,
and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling
out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent,
suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.