Book One Criminal Law Concepts With New Insertions
Book One Criminal Law Concepts With New Insertions
Book One Criminal Law Concepts With New Insertions
Chapter One
PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
1) Criminal law is that branch or division of public law which defines crimes, treats
of their nature, and provides for their punishment. Penal laws are those acts of
the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations,1 or those define crimes, treat of their nature and provide for their
punishment.2
4) The law is PENAL if the following are present: (a) The law must define the
criminal act; (b) It must prescribe a penalty; and (c) It must be an act of the
legislature.
1) Classical or Juristic Theory. The classical theory posits that a human person is
essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good
and evil. It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for
wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. The basic postulate of
the classical penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings
who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain.
They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to
2) Positivist or Realistic Theory. This theory posits the view that man is subdued
occasionally by a strange and morbid phenomenon which conditions him to do
wrong in spite of or contrary to his volition. It adheres to the belief that man is
inherently good but his acts or behavior may be conditioned by his
environment. Because of his upbringing, social environment and associations
he may become socially ill or an offender. This legal philosophy provides that
criminal laws must be viewed as means to reform and that the penalties must
be corrective or curative. There is great respect for the human element because
the offender is regarded as socially sick who needs treatment, not punishment.
Crimes are regarded as social phenomena which constrain a person to do
wrong although not of his own volition. Unlike the classical theory which
emphasizes on the offense itself, positivistic theory emphasizes on the offender
and not on the offense.6
3) Police power refers to the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its
scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.11
5) In upholding the constitutionality of the Anti-Bouncing Check Law (BP 22), the
Court stated it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se
are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered
by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally
13 Lozano v. Martinez (and allied cases), G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986.
14 Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 13, 2013.
15 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005.
d) Void-for-vagueness doctrine. In exercising its power to declare what acts
constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable
precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain
understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. 16
This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness
doctrine which states that a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law.17
i) Exceptions to the rule. Notice and hearing are the essential requirements
of procedural due process. However, there are many instances under our
laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not
necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process. Among the instances are
the cancellation of the passport of a person being sought for the commission
of a crime, the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative
charges, the distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies, the
padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing
obscene movies, and the abatement of nuisance per se, and the arrest of a
person in flagrante delicto.24
25 Ibid.
26 People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997.
27 U.S. v. Borromeo, et al., G.R. No. L-7150, October 16, 1912.
its mode of infliction, and that "the legislative discretion in determining the
severity of the punishment for crime is not to be interfered with by the courts,
so long as all forms of torture are avoided." Another group of authorities,
however, hold that this constitutional provisions is broad enough to confer
upon the courts the power to review legislative discretion concerning the
adequacy of the punishment "in very extreme cases; where the punishment
proposed is so severe and out of proportion of the offense as to shock public
sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people." In the case of
Weems v. United States,28 the court sustained the latter view.
d) Death penalty is not cruel. Punishments are cruel when they involve torture
or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.29
e) Duty of judicial officers to apply the law and impose penalty. As long as that
penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law
provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers
to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. Courts are
not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death
sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined
criminal acts. 30
a) R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of death penalty. In lieu of the death
penalty, the following shall be imposed:
i) The penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
ii) The penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
i) piracy in general;
ii) mutiny on the high seas;
iii) simple rape;
iv) qualified piracy;
4) Bill of attainder.
35 Bureau of Customs Employees Asso. (BOCEA) v. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011.
36 People v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-32613, December 27, 1972.
37 BASECO v. PCGG, G.R. No. G.R. No. 75885 May 27, 1987.
a) By jurisprudence, an ex post facto law is one:
i) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and
which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
ii) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; or which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;38
or
iii) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony that the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense on order to convict the defendant;39 or
iv) a law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage;40
v) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was
lawful; or deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection
to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of an amnesty.41
1) Generality.
a) Nature and basis. Criminal law is binding on all persons who live or sojourn
in Philippine territory. This is the explicit mandate of Article 14 of the New
Civil Code which states that “penal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippines
territory subject to the principles of international law and treaty stipulations.”
b) Applies to both citizens and aliens. Our penal laws apply to both citizens
and aliens. They are bound to follow our laws. Citizens owe the State
obedience for the protection the latter is providing the former. Aliens, on the
c) Exceptions.
(2) Examples.
44 People v. Galacgac, C.A., 54 O.G. 1027, cited by Luis Reyes, Criminal Law, Book I, 2012 ed.
45 Taňada, et al. v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997.
46 Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623 (2000).
in the Philippines. It has exclusive jurisdiction over its personnel
with respect to offenses including those relating to the security of
the US punishable under the US law and also offenses solely
against the property or security of the US or offenses against the
property or person of US personnel and offenses arising out of
any act or omission done in performance of official duty.47
47 Ibid.
48 Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000.
49 http://www.lawgiants.com/2010/05/diplomatic-immunity-in-operation/ Visited: 24 June, 2018.
(3) Violations of Articles of War. Under Republic Act No. 7055, members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other person’s subject of
the military law including CAGFU are under the jurisdiction of the
proper civil court unless the offense charged, as determined before
arraignment by the civil court, is “service-connected offense or
crime.” When it is service-connected offense or crime, C.A. No. 408
(Articles of War) applies in which case the military courts have
jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.50 Since the proceedings
before the court martial are criminal in nature and not administrative
proceedings, the offender cannot be charged in a civil court as he
would be placed in double jeopardy.51
(4) Presidential Decree No. 1083 or the Muslim Code of the Philippines
provides that penal laws relative to bigamy do not apply to persons
married pursuant to Muslim laws where the requirements provided
therein are complied with.
50 Navales, et al. vs. Abaya, et al., G.R. Nos. 162318-41, October 25, 2004.
51 Marcos, et al., vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil. 246.
52 Minucher v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003.
(3) Classes of heads of diplomatic missions under the Vienna
Convention. The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic
missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the
heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the
heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers
of foreign affairs. Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission"
are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and
service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the
diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative,
technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic
rank.53
(4) Who are entitled to immunity under the Vienna Convention? Even
while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for
immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so,
nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively
applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention,
are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal
suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of
missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly
withholding the same privileges from all others. It might bear
stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in
concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain
administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports
and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths,
do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and
privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not
charged with the duty of representing their states in political matters.
Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a
diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not
he performs duties of diplomatic nature.54
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any
disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its
dignity." The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land." To the extent that
the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted
principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the
land.55
(6) Consuls, however, are not included. They do not possess the status
of and cannot claim the privileges and immunities accorded to
ambassadors and ministers. Consuls are not exempt from criminal
prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he
resides.56
(7) State immunity from suit. International law is founded largely upon
the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of
States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article
II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.8 The rule that a State may not
be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States.57 The practical
justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can
be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends.58 In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived
from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed
in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.59 A
contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations."60
d) Concepts.
iii) A Danish national may be held liable for violation of RA 9262 for
withholding support on the minor child. The Territoriality Principle69 in
criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the
instant case, which provides that: penal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.70
2) Territoriality.
a) This principle enunciates two (2) concepts: One, that our penal laws are
enforceable within the Philippine territory; and two, that our penal laws
cannot be enforced outside the Philippine territory. The basis of this
principle is Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that its
provisions shall be enforced within the Philippine archipelago including its
atmosphere, its internal waters, and maritime zone.
i) First concept: Penal laws are enforceable within the Philippine territory.
The principle simply states that penal laws are enforceable within the
Philippine territory. These laws undertake to punish acts committed in
the Philippine territory. In other words, all crimes committed within the
territory of the Philippines are triable by our local courts.
Principle in this case. What is applicable is the Generality Principle as it pertains to the persons
covered by criminal law.
70 Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014.
(1) Exceptions: In the following instances, our local courts cannot try the
crimes committed even within the territory of the Philippines:
(v) If the foreign vessel is not in transit and a Philippine port is its
destination, any crime committed on board is triable in the
Philippines except those concerning internal management of
the vessel. Hence, mere possession of opium is triable here.75
ii) Second concept: Penal laws cannot be enforced outside the Philippine
territory. In this principle, the rule enunciates that our penal laws cannot
be enforced beyond our territorial jurisdiction. This simply means that
our local courts cannot try those crimes if committed outside our territory.
(1) Exceptions.
(a) The exceptions to this rule are found in Article 2 of the Revised
Penal Code. Article 2 amplifies the protective principle which
states that the Philippines has jurisdiction over the crimes
committed abroad by nationals or foreigners which are prejudicial
to its security and interest. In the following instances, penal laws
shall be enforced even outside the Philippine territory against
those who:
3) Prospectivity.
a) As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest
they acquire the character of an ex post facto law.79 An exception to this
rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According
to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but
founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and
the combination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception
based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict
justice."80
b) The law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new
law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that
favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given
retroactive effect. These are the rule, the exception and exception to the
exception on effectivity of law.81
i) Exceptions:
(1) Article 22 of RPC provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not
a habitually delinquent.
(2) If favorable to the accused, a penal law may be given retroactive
effect.
(3) Even if favorable to the accused, a penal law cannot be given
retroactive effect if the accused is a habitual delinquent or when the
law expressly so provides.
iii) The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does
not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that "a
retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of
transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create
new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the
legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes." 84
82 People v. Langit, 392 Phil. 94 (2000); Gonzales v. CA, 343 Phil. 297 (1997).
83 People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607.
84 Tan, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002.
85 Go v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005.
i) Nature of express repeal. A declaration in a statute, usually in its
repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its
number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied
repeals. The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or
not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers
may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing
provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or
laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed.86
ii) Effect of express repeal. If by express repeal the crime is obliterated, all
pending cases at the time of repeal are to be dismissed. The repeal even
extends to those who are already convicted and serving sentence under
the repealed law unless they are habitually delinquents or the repealing
law provides otherwise. The repeal of a statute defeats all actions and
proceedings pending under the repealed statute at the time of its repeal,
including those cases which are still pending appeal.87
iii) Condition for this rule. The enactment of new penal laws,
notwithstanding the fact that they contain general repealing clauses,
does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence
persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the date when the
repealing law goes into effect, unless the new law wholly fails to penalize
the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the
repealed law.88 Where the repealing law wholly fails to penalize the acts
which constitute the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law,
the repeal carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try
the persons charged with violation of the old law. 89
iv) Rule where repeal is absolute. Where the repeal of a penal law is total
and absolute and the act with was penalized by a prior law ceases to be
criminal under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated.90 It is a
recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts
of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violation
of the old law prior to the repeal.
v) Example of absolute repeal. R.A. No. 7636 expressly repealed R.A. No.
1700 (Anti-Subversion Law), as amended. The repeal was categorical,
definite and absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal. The
ix) Second category is by codifying or revising the old laws. The second
category of repeal is the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the
former laws on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if the
revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject to be a
complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent
statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole
subject matter of the former statute. When both intent and scope clearly
evidence the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior
act that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed.
Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal under this category,
and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815,
Otherwise Known as “The Revised Penal Code”, as Amended. (Passed August 27, 2017).
99 Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, December 5, 2017.
doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to a
criminal statute. This canon of interpretation has been accorded the status
of a constitutional rule under principles of due process, not subject to
abrogation by statute.100
4) Doctrine of in dubio pro reo. The doctrine of in dubio pro reo (literally, when
in doubt, for the accused) means that whenever a penal law is to be
construed or applied and the law admits of two interpretations – one lenient
to the offender and one strict to the offender – that interpretation which is
lenient or favorable to the offender will be adopted. The fundamental
principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts
in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the
5) Rule of lenity. Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule
of lenity. The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible
interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and
another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an
interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.106
1) Nature. Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions
of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.
2) Article 10 explained. The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides
that offenses which in the future are made punishable under special laws are
not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC
supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are
contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be
reconciled.107
3) First clause of Article 10. The first clause should be understood to mean only
that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein
specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory
construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. Lex
specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a
superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause
contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is
4) Concepts.
a) Generally, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code are not applied on
special penal laws. However, if the special penal laws use the
nomenclatures of the penalties of the Code, then it has a suppletory
application.109 The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special
laws cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of,
or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in
and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually
taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and,
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system
of penalties native to said Code. While these are special laws, the fact that
the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised
Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions
on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application to
said special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in
these special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible
judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the Code and
its allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment of
Congress. Where the special law expressly grants to the court discretion in
applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the
application of the provisions of the Code.110
b) However, these rules are inapplicable to P.D. No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974), P.D. No. 533 (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974), and P.D. No. 534 (Defining Illegal Fishing and Prescribing Stiffer
Penalties Therefor), in those cases, the lawmaker clearly intended a single
integrated offense or a special complex offense because the death therein
occurs as a result or on the occasion of the commission of the offenses
therein penalized or was not the primary purpose of the offender.111
108Ibid.
109 People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994.
110 People v. Quijada, G.R. No. 115008-09, July 24, 1996.
111 Ibid.
old, was convicted for violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165. Under
Sec. 98 of the law, where the offender is a minor, the penalty to be imposed,
instead of life imprisonment, should be reclusion perpetua. Since the
nomenclature of the Code was used, the provisions can now be used in
suppletory manner. Hence, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be
imposed. Applying the rules, the proper penalty should be one degree lower
than reclusion perpetua, i.e. reclusion temporal. Applying the ISLAW, the
minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree in
which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance. Initially, the ISLAW is inapplicable because the
penalty is indivisible. By virtue of the privileged mitigating circumstance, the
penalty became divisible.112
e) Cases where the provisions of the Code were applied to special laws:
i) Article 22 of the RPC, which concerns the retroactive effect of penal laws
if they favor the accused, was applied suppletorily by the Court to
violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law;114
vi) The Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to
define the words principal, accomplices and accessories under R.A. No.
8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, because said words were not defined therein, although the
special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable
for the crime of illegal recruitment;119
viii) The Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article
8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision
therein;121
ix) The principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC was applied
suppletorily to Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.122
Felonies
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by
means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence,
lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
2) Classification of felonies.
i) Consummated;
ii) Frustrated;
iii) Attempted.124
c) According to gravity.
i) Grave felonies – those to which the law attaches the capital punishment
or penalties which in any of their periods is afflictive;
ii) Less grave felonies - those to which the law punishes with penalties
which in their maximum period are correctional;
i) Elements:
(1) Freedom. The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with
deliberation and with power to choose between two things. 128 If a
person has no freedom, he is not human but a mere tool. It is negated
by irresistible force or uncontrollable fear.
(4) However, there are crimes that exist even without actus rea (unlawful
act). In case of conspiracy or proposal as a felony, mere conspiracy
or proposal consummates the crime. It need not overt acts to be
committed as the law punishes the criminal intent (mens rea). Also
in case of impossible crime, the law punishes not the resulting crime
but the propensity of the offender to commit crime. Finally, mere
possession of picklock, even without actual theft, is already
punishable under Article the penal code.
(2) Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a definite
result while intent is the purpose to use to particular means to effect
such result.140 Intent is an element of crime while motive is not.
(3) Motive may mitigate, but does not totally exculpate, criminal
liability. Motive, in criminal law, consists of the special or
personal reason which may prompt or induce a person to
perform the act constituting a crime. It is the moving power
which impels one to act for a definite result, as distinguished
from "intent" which is the purpose to use a particular means to
effect such result. The foregoing distinction has gained wide
acceptance among our criminal law commentators. In relation
to the "particular means" employed — the overt acts committed
by a person — motive, unlike intent, is quite materially removed.
One motive can give rise to one of several possible courses of
action, lawful or unlawful, as one act could have been actuated
by one of several possible motives, good or bad.141
(5) Motive is not essential where the identity of the perpetrator is not in
doubt.143 But if the evidence is circumstantial, proof of motive is
essential. Motive is essential only when the offender cannot be
identified, and not when he is positively identified by a witness.
i) Elements:
(1) Freedom;
(2) Intelligence; and
(3) Negligence/imprudence.
142 Ibid.
143 People v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-33907, January 31, 1984.
144 Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, December 01, 2014.
(1) Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. Using the aforementioned philosophy, it may be
reliably concluded that there is no hard and fast rule whereby such
degree of care and vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent upon the
circumstances in which a person finds himself. All that the law
requires is that it is perpetually compelling upon a person to use that
care and diligence expected of sensible men under comparable
circumstance.145
145 PNR, et al., v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 157658, October 15, 2007.
146 U.S. v. Barias, G.R. No. L-7567, November 12, 1912
147 ANECO v. Balen, et al., G.R. No. 173146, November 25, 2009
malum prohibitum. While intentional felonies are always malum
prohibitum, it does not necessarily follow that prohibited acts done in
violation of special laws are malum prohibitum. Even if the crime is
punished under a special law, if the act punished which is inherently
wrong, the same is malum in se, hence the defense of good faith and
lack of criminal intent is a valid defense unless it is the product of criminal
negligence of culpa.
ii) When the special laws require that the act be committed knowingly and
willfully, criminal intent is required to be proved before criminal liability
may arise. When the act penalized is not inherently wrong, but it is wrong
only because a law punishes the same, the act is malum prohibitum. For
example, piracy and brigandage are punishable under PD 532, a special
law. Although these acts are punished under special law, piracy and
brigandage are inherently wrong, thus they are mala in se. Hence, good
faith is a defense.
iii) A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided
by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se
crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended.148 Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the
RPC, such as technical malversation.149
iv) Test to determine whether the law is malum prohibitum. The rule on the
subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?150 When an act
is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.151 When the doing of
an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public welfare,
and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.152
(1) As to the moral trait of the offender, in malum in se, the basis of
criminal liability is the moral fiber of the offender. The criminal liability
would only arise if there is dolo or culpa in the commission of the
punishable act; while in malum prohibitum, the moral trait of the
(2) As to the defense of good faith, in malum in se, good faith or lack of
criminal intent is a defense, whereas good faith/criminal intent is not
a defense in malum prohibitum (except when intent is an element of
the crime such as in Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 which requires that the
prohibited act be committed by a public official with evident bad faith.)
(1) This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a
wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in
se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is,
has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the
offender is immaterial.153 When the doing of an act is prohibited by
(3) The exception to the rule is when the special penal law (SPL)
expressly allows such absorption. If SPL’s allow absorption, then
only one crime is committed. For example, under RA 7610, if the
lascivious conduct or sexual abuse is committed against a minor who
is less than 12 years of age, the offender shall be charged and
prosecuted for rape or acts of lasciviousness. However, the penalty
is the one provided by the SPL.158
(5) When an act violates the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and
a special law, the offender can be prosecuted for two crimes:
(c) Anti-torture and the resulting crime like physical injuires. Torture
as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by any other
crime or felony committed as a consequence, or as a means in
the conduct or commission thereof. In which case, torture shall
be treated as a separate and independent criminal act whose
penalties shall be imposable without prejudice to any other
criminal liability provided for by domestic and international
laws.162
(d) There is no absorption when the special law bars the prosecution
for other crimes, for example, terrorism absorbs the predicate
crimes, or child abuse under RA 7610 absorbs acts of
lasciviousness or rape;
(f) Article 365 of the RPC cannot absorb the charges for violation of
PD 1067 (Philippines Water Code), PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law),
and RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act). A mala in se felony (such
as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property)
cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD
1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is
criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter
crimes are the special laws enacting them.163
a) The basis for incurring criminal liability is found in Article 4 of the Code.
While Article 3 refers to the manner by which criminal act is committed,
Article 4 deals with the person committing the act resulting in criminal
liability.
2) “By committing a felony even if the crime is different from what intended.”
163 Loney, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006.
a) This rule is based on the Spanish maxim “El que es causa de la causa es
causa del mal causado”164 which literally means “he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused.” The similar rule in American
jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused was the cause of the cause
of death, no more is required."165
i) First requisite. The act committed must be a felony. It follows that if the
act committed is lawful, even though an injury results, there is no
criminal liability except if the act committed is through negligence. 168 In
negligence case, the liability is anchored not on Article 4 but under
Article 365 of the Code which provides that one is criminally liable for
culpable felony.
(1) If the act of firing although committed in self-defense was not aimed
at the assailant but indiscriminately fired upon innocent persons, the
act of self-defense was not exercised with due care, hence, there is
criminal liability.169
(3) Exception. When there is intervening cause, the felony is not the
direct and proximate cause of the injury.
d) “Although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.”
(3) If there is negligence, mistake of facts is not exempting and the actor
is liable for committing a felony by means of culpa.175
171 People v. Page, 77 SCRA 348 cited by Luis Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, page 71, 2012
ed.
172 U.S. v. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497, Ibid.
173 U.S. v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910.
174 People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
175 Gregorio, Antonio; Fundamentals of Criminal Law, page 22, 1997 ed.
(4) Mistake of facts due to negligence as when the accused did not first
verify the identity of the victim before firing at him as he had
opportunity to do so is not exempting.176
(1) Any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended is criminally liable.
(2) Essential requisites: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting
act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong
was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.
(1) Proximate cause is that cause which, in its natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.181
(3) Thus, anyone who inflicts injuries voluntarily and with intent is liable
for all the consequences of his criminal act, such as death that
supervenes as a consequence of the injuries. Here, accused-
appellant is liable for the demise of the victim for such was caused
by the violent kicks which he inflicted on the vital parts of the victim’s
body. The foot jabs delivered by accused-appellant to the victim were
(4) Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart
disease, or tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused: is the
efficient cause of death; or it accelerated his death; or is the
proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability.183
(5) Even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any external
wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and
peritonitis and cause death, and even though the victim may have
been previously affected by some internal malady, yet if the blow with
the fist or foot accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration
is responsible for the death as the result of an injury willfully and
unlawfully inflicted.184
(7) A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if
there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury
a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such
3) Impossible crime.
c) Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.188
d) To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must
be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either
e) Requisites:
f) Two (2) kinds of impossibility: (a) Legal impossibility; and (b) Factual
impossibility.
189 Ibid.
190 Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193 People v. Callao, G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018.
194 People v. Gumimba, G.R. No. 174056, February 27, 2007.
attending, collective liability attaches to the conspirators and the
Court shall not speculate on the extent of their individual
participation in the Murder. Accused defense of impossible crime
is thus completely unavailing.195
h) Concepts.
i) One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.198
ii) Another example is when the offender shoots the place where he
thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not
present in said place and thus, he failed to accomplish his end.199
195 Ibid.
196 Intod v. CA, supra.
197 Article 59, RPC.
198 U.S. v. Berrigan, 482 F. 2nd. 171.
199 Intod v. CA, supra.
200 Jacinto v. People, Ibid (5)
iv) If the crime is not produced although there is adequate or effectual
means employed, it cannot be impossible crime but a frustrated
felony.201
Stages of Execution.
1) Phases of execution.
2) Stages of execution.
205 Ibid.
206 U.S. v. Eduave, G.R. No. 12155, February 2, 1917.
207 Gregorio, Idem. supra.
a) Attempted felony. There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.208
(1) Elements:
(3) It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step
towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the
first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made. The act
done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is
necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to
the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have
vi) There is no attempted felony by omission because overt acts are not
performed.216
b) Frustrated felony. There is frustrated felony when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator.217
212 Ibid.
213 People v. Lizada, supra.
214 Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007.
215 Ibid.
216 Gregorio, supra.
217 Article 6, supra.
i) Nature. In case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase is completely
passed. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the
offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime,
however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to
commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was
due to something beyond his control.218
(1) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony as a consequence;
whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform
all the acts of execution.
(2) Rape. In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from
that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished.222 Rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ223 because not all acts of execution was
performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature,
elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and
jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the
frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
(1) Offenses punishable by special penal laws, unless the law provides
otherwise;
(2) Formal crimes, or those crimes which are always consummated.
Examples of formal crimes: (a) acts of lasciviousness, threats,
coercion, slander, and alarms and scandals;
(3) Impossible Crimes;
(4) Crimes consummated by mere attempt (e.g. attempt to flee to an
enemy country, treason, corruption of minors);
(5) Felonies by omission;
(6) Crimes committed by mere agreement (e.g. PD 1602, gambling or
betting in sports: “ending,” corruption of public officers).
Chapter Three
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT CRIMES
1) Definition.
b) Proposal – when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes
its execution to some other persons.
a) Requisites:
b) Kinds of conspiracy:
d) Conspiracy as a crime.
ii) Conspiracies and proposals punishable under the Revised Penal Code:
i) Nature.
(1) Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically
provides a penalty therefor. The crime of conspiracy known to the
common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An
agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-
point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt
acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the
State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains
undisturbed.231
(5) In a conspiracy, the act of one becomes the act of all and the
particular act of an accused becomes of secondary relevance.
Thus, it is essential that an accused must know from the
information whether he is criminally accountable not only for
his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well. An
indictment for conspiracy is sufficient if: (1) it follows the words
(2) Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to
a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.239
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
239 People v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18, 2012.
240 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002; Macapagal-Arroyo v.
Sandiganbayan, supra.
(a) An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one
conspiracy involved was the conspiracy alleged in the information
for plunder filed against former President Estrada and his co-
conspirators. Former President Estrada was the hub while the
spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that
enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall
conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth.241
241 Ibid.
242 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
243 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
244 Contemporary Criminal law. Concepts, Cases, and Controversies. Third Ed., Lippman, M. R.,
iv) Concepts.
(2) An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown
to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment.248
(3) In implied conspiracy, overt act is required before one can be held
criminally liable. To be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of
the accused must be shown to have performed at least an overt act
in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being
shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and
each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts.
The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for
(5) Thus, the conclusion that former Pres. Arroyo had been the
mastermind of plunder (when she affixed her unqualified "OK" on the
requests for the additional Confidential and Intelligence Funds) was
plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the
information did not aver at all that she had been the mastermind;
hence, the Sandigabayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily.
In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her
handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder was
absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common
legal and valid practice of signifying approval of a fund release by the
President.252
253 People v. Alejandro Marquita, et al., G.R. Nos. 119958-62, March 1, 2000.
254 People v. Aquino, G. R. No. 126047, September 16, 1999.
255 People v. Buluran, et al., G.R. No. 113940, February 15, 2000.
256 People v. Sosing, 111 SCRA 368 (1982).
257 Rimando v. People, G.R. No. 229701, November 29, 2017.
of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime
itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so
long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with
certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that
the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the
consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the first or
some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made. The
act done need not constitute the last proximate one for
completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must
have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words
of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary
relation to the offense.258 It is necessary that a conspirator
should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt
act may consist of active participation in the actual commission
of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his
co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the
crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the
discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any
active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of
conviction.259
(9) The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over
the other co-conspirators.260
(14) Conspiracy has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt to hold all
six accused as co-principals in the crime of murder if the stabbing
happened in the "spur of the moment." Conspiracy means, however,
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and a decision
to commit it. If the tragedy was a chance stabbing, there can be no
conspiracy to speak of.268
Justifying Circumstances
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
1) Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
2) Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers
or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and
second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are
present, and the further requisite, in case the revocation was given by
the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.
4) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which
causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are
present;
1) Nature. Those acts of the actor are in accordance with law and, hence, he
incurs no criminal and civil liability. Since the act is in accordance with law,
there is no criminal liability incurred by the actor nor any civil liability because
the crime as the source of obligation is not present.278
i) Self-defense;
ii) Defense of relative;
iii) Defense of stranger;
iv) State of necessity;
v) Fulfillment of duty;
vi) Obedience to superior order.
2) Self-defense.
a) Nature.
iii) The burden of proof is on the accused when he admits committing the
crime. The burden is shifted to him and he must prove clearly and
convincingly the elements of self-defense.280
279 Velasquez, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 195021, March 15, 2017.
280 People v. Mondigo, G.R. No. 167954, January 31, 2008.
281 People v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18, 2012.
ii) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent
or repel the unlawful aggression; and
iii) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused
claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the
accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and
immediate cause of the victim’s aggression.282
c) Unlawful aggression.
ii) Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element
of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful
aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself.284
iii) The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the
circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril
the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must
not be an imagined or imaginary threat. 285
vi) Test. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the
circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real
peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the
peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.291
vii) Concepts.
292 People v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 219848, June 7, 2017 citing Guevarra, et al. v. People, G.R.
No. 170462, February 5, 2014.
293 Tangaiin v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. 133799, February 5, 2002.
294 People v. Iglesia, G.R. No. 132354, September 13, 2001.
295 People v. Caratao, 451 Phil. 588 (2003).
296 People v. Raytos, G.R. No. 225623, June 7, 2017 citing People v. Escarlos, 457 Phil. 580
(2003).
it to stab the latter. Accused insists that under the
circumstances, he was legally justified in using the knife to
ward off the unlawful aggression. For him to wait for the knife
to be raised and to fall on him before acting to defend himself
would be asking too much, he argues. While the victim may be
said to have initiated the confrontation, we do not subscribe to
the view that the former was subjected to an unlawful
aggression within the legal meaning of the phrase. The alleged
assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a
heated exchange of words between the two parties who had a
history of animosity. Moreover, the alleged drawing of a knife
by the victim could not have placed the life of accused in
imminent danger. The former might have done it only to
threaten or intimidate the latter.297
(5) Assuming that the victim had a gun and pulled it, however, he
did not manifest any aggressive act which may have imperiled
the life and limb of the accused. It is axiomatic that the mere
thrusting of one’s hand into his pocket as if for the purpose of
drawing a weapon is not unlawful aggression. Even the cocking
of a rifle without aiming the firearm at any particular target is
not sufficient to conclude that one’s life was in imminent
danger. Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or the
belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient.
It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act
of aggression or by some external acts showing the
commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression.298
297 Ibid.
298 People v. Rubiso, G.R. No. 128871, March 18, 2008.
299 People v. Sabio, G.R. No. L-23734, April 27, 1967.
(7) The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when
the accused’s defense is self-defense he thereby admits being
the author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent
upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court. The rationale for the shifting of the
burden of evidence is that the accused, by his admission, is to
be held criminally liable unless he satisfactorily establishes the
fact of self-defense. But the burden to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is not thereby lifted from the shoulders of the
State, which carries it until the end of the proceedings. In other
words, only the onus probandi shifts to the accused, for self-
defense is an affirmative allegation that must be established
with certainty by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He must now
discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own
evidence, not on the weakness of that of the Prosecution,
considering that the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak,
cannot be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing.300
300 People v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18, 2012.
301
People v. Batungbacal, 37 Phil. 382; People v. Hitosis, 55 Phil. 298.
302 People v. Quening, G.R. No. 132167, January 8, 2002.
aggression presupposes an actual or imminent danger on the
life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, and intimidating or
threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has
actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly
imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a
threatening stance or posture.303
iii) Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the
law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will
enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which
the person attacked is exposed, the instinct, more than the reason, that
moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does
not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of
such injury.306
vii) The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized
world finds justification in man's natural instinct to protect, repel and save
his person or rights from impending danger or peril; it is based on that
impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a
human being.310
vii) The repeated blowing of horns, assuming it was done by the victim,
may be irritating to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be
considered as creating so powerful an inducement as to incite
provocation for the other party to act violently.319
g) Self-defense in libel. When a person is libeled, he may hit back with another
libel, which, if adequate, will be justified. Once the aspersion is cast, its sting
clings and the one thus defamed may avail himself of all necessary means
to shake it off.322
316 Velasquez, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 195021, March 15, 2017.
317 People v. CA, G.R. No. 103613, February 23, 2001 citing People v. Naboro, 73 Phil. 434.
318 People v. Tangan, supra.
319 Ibid.
3) Defense of Relative.
a) Requisites:
i) Unlawful aggression;
ii) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and
iii) In case provocation was given by the person attacked, the person
making the defense had no part in the provocation.
b) Relatives covered:
i) Spouses;
ii) Ascendants;
iii) Descendants;
iv) Legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or sisters;
v) Relatives by affinity of the same degree and those by consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree.
c) Concepts.
i) Mere honest belief on the part of the person defending that the relative
being defended was a victim of unlawful aggression is enough.325
4) Defense of Stranger.
a) Requisites:
i) Unlawful aggression;
ii) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and
b) Concepts.
a) Requisites:
b) Concepts.
ii) The person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which may have been
received. This is the only justifying circumstance which provides for the
payment of civil indemnity. Under the other justifying circumstances, no
civil liability attaches. The courts shall determine, in their sound
discretion, the proportionate amount for which law one is liable.
a) Requisites:
b) Concepts.
329 People v. Oanis, et al., G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943.
330 Ibid.
331 Ibid.
332 RAMON C. AQUINO AND CAROLINA C. GRIO-AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
1997 ED., VOL. I, p. 205, citing United States v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784 (1922).
333 Gregorio, supra. note 202.
334 46 Phil. 738 (1922).
policeman with his bamboo lance. The policeman dodged the lance and
fired his revolver at the fugitive. The policeman missed. The fugitive ran
away still holding the bamboo lance. The policeman pursued the fugitive
and again fired his revolver, hitting and killing the fugitive. The Court
acquitted the policeman on the ground that the killing was done in the
fulfillment of duty.
a) Requisites:
335 LUIS B. REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 15th ED., 2001, BOOK ONE, p. 202.
336 Ibid.
337 83 Phil. 150 (1949).
338 Baxinela v. People, G.R. No. 149652, March 14, 1006.
iii) The means to be used to carry out said order is lawful. 339
b) Concepts.
i) The order and means to be used must be both lawful. While the order
for Adalim’s transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then
Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner
Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial
Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor
Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, transported
him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Apelado cannot avail of the
justifying circumstance under Article 11, par.6 of the RPC.340
ii) Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate was
not aware of its illegality, he is not liable.341
iii) Acquitted for the crime of malversation, the Court stated that the
accused could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with
the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier
said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuenas superior the former
being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised
control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. And
as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official
of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena’s compliance,
without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum.
Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience
to superior order. What is more significant to consider is that the
MARCOS Memorandum is patently legal (for on its face it directs
payment of an outstanding liability) and that Tabuena acted under the
honest belief that the P55 million was a due and demandable debt and
that it was just a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC.342
iii) Women suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any
criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Code.
b) Cycle of violence.
iii) Tranquil (loving) phase. This phase begins when the acute battering
incident ends. The couple experience profound relief. The batterer may
show a tender and nurturing behaviour towards his partner. The illusion
of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman’s
psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally
dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her
forgiveness.344
Chapter Five
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Exempting Circumstances
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has
acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded
against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.
346 Ibid.
shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he
shall be committed to the care of some institution or person
mentioned in said Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes
an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
1) Nature.
a) Those circumstances which the law exempts the offender from criminal
liability due to the absence any of all the conditions that would make an act
voluntary. There is, however, civil liability.
a) In justifying circumstances:
b) In exempting circumstances:
ii) It is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the
exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the
absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The second element
of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime
can exist, and because the infant has no intelligence, the law exempts
him from criminal liability."349
a) Insanity or Imbecility;
b) Minority;
c) Accident;
d) Compulsion of Irresistible Fear;
e) Impulse of Uncontrollable Fear;
f) Insuperable or Lawful Cause.
4) Insanity or imbecility.
352 Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, 7th Ed., 216
353 People v. Ambal, G.R. No. L-52688, October 17, 1980.
354 People v. Roa, G.R. No. 225599, March 22, 2017 citing People v. Madarang, GR. No. 132319,
l) Tests of insanity.
Procedure, William D. Raymond, Jr. and Daniel E. Hall, 1999 ed., pp. 227-228.
on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time
of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such
a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten
rule is a cognitive measure of insanity as the accused is required
to know two things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the
act was wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was
debated whether the word "wrong" referred to moral or legal
wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by
Stephen as follows: A kills B knowing that he is killing B and it is
illegal to kill B but under an insane delusion that God has
commanded him to kill B to obtain the salvation of the human race.
A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but it is not a
crime if the word "wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know"
was also assailed as it referred solely to intellectual reason and
excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that
the accused may know in his mind what he is doing but may have
no grasp of the effect or consequences of his actions. M'Naghten
was condemned as based on an obsolete and misleading concept
of the nature of insanity as insanity does not only affect the
intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality of the
patient, including his will and emotions. It was argued that reason
is only one of the elements of a personality and does not solely
determine man's conduct.368
368 Ibid.
criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist commission of
the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it is difficult to prove
whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse.369
iii) The Durham "product" test - It postulated that "an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or defect." Critics of this test argued that it gave too much
protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution in a difficult
position of proving accused's sanity beyond reasonable doubt as
a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the result
of a mental disease leaves the judge with no choice but to accept
it as a fact. The case thus becomes completely dependent on the
testimonies of experts. 370
iv) The ALI "substantial capacity" test – This test integrated by the
American Law Institute (ALI) in its Model Penal Code Test, which
improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. The new
rule stated that a person is not responsible for his criminal act if,
as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law. Still, this test has been
criticized for its use of ambiguous words like "substantial
capacity" and "appreciate" as there would be differences in expert
testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness was
sufficient. Objections were also made to the exclusion of
psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are manifested only
by repeated criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths
cannot be deterred and thus undeserving of punishment. 371
369 Ibid.
370 Ibid
371 Ibid.
372 Ibid.
suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable
tests: (a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test of
volition — "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will."
But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition,
rather than on a test relating to "freedom of the will;" examination
of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has
exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally
deprived of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying
"complete deprivation of intelligence." This is perhaps to be
expected since a person's volition naturally reaches out only
towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence,
whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy.373
m) Formigones doctrine. Although the Court has ruled many times in the
past on the insanity defense, it was only in People v. Formigones that
the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity. In
order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it
is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of
reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts
without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of
the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of
the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at
the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of
his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.374
p) Accused has the burden of proof to prove insanity. Insanity is the exception
rather than the rule in the human condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil
Code, the presumption is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear
and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of confession and avoidance.
An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims
that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. 378 An accused invoking the
insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing
the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time
of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone
and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any
trial on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime.379
i) The fact that accused threatened the victim with death in case she
reported her ravishment indicated that he was aware of the
reprehensible moral depravity of that assault and that he was not
deprived of intelligence.385
ii) The accused knew the nature of what he had done negated his claim
that he was insane when he fatally stabbed his victim. This was
manifested at the time of the incident when he shouted “Napatay ko si
Mrs. Sigua.”386
382 Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R. 2d. 1430 [1954] cited in People v.
Ambal, G.R. No. L-52688. October 17, 1980.
383 People v. Racal, supra.
384 People v. Dungo, G.R. No. 894240, July 31, 1991.
385 People v. Rafanan, supra.
386 People v. Dungo, supra.
iii) The accused took 120 cc of cough syrup and consumed three sticks of
marijuana before raping his victim and hitting her head with a stone, had
some form of mental illness which did not totally deprive him of
intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, enabling him to
exercise sound judgment and to satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid
matters, sufficiently discounted any intimation of insanity when he
committed the felony.387
ix) Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is
insane.393
x) The fact that immediately after the incident the accused thought of
surrendering to the law-enforcing authorities is incontestable
proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he
was going to be punished for it.394
iii) Somnambulism. If it had been proven in the case that the defendant
when he committed these crimes was really asleep, or in a state of
somnambulism, or unconscious of his acts, then instead of coming
under paragraph 1 of article 8 of the Penal Code this case would come
under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal code, because a
somnambulist does not act voluntarily and therefore his acts do not
constitute a crime.402
iv) The defense that the offense charged was committed by the accused
during the prevalence of or in a state of somnambulism has been
recognized; but the latest holding of courts is to the effect that it does
not constitute a defense other than that embraced in a plea of insanity. 403
a) Nature of the law. Enacted into law on April 28, 2006, and took effect
b) Its intent is to promote and protect the rights of a child in conflict with the
law or a child at risk by providing a system that would ensure that children
are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being through a variety
of disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders,
counseling, probation, foster care, education and vocational training
programs and other alternatives to institutional care.405
c) This law modifies as well the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility
for minor offenders; it changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, previously provided i.e., from
under nine years of age and above nine years of age and under fifteen (who
acted without discernment) to fifteen years old or under and above fifteen
but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption
from criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new law as the old
paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did presumes that the minor
offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right from wrong, so
that their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they cannot be held
accountable.406
d) Definition of child. (a) Child - refers to a person under the age of eighteen
(18) years; (b) Child at risk – refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the
risk of committing criminal offenses because of personal, family and social
circumstances enumerated in Section 2 (d) of the law; (c) Child in conflict
with the law (CICL) – refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of or
adjudged as having committed an offense under Philippine laws.
h) In both cases, the exemption does not carry with it the civil liability.
i) Obtain documents that show proof of the child’s age, such as:
(1) Interviewing the child and obtaining information that indicate age
(e.g. date of birthday, grade level in school);
(2) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that indicate[s] age
of the child (e.g. relatives, neighbors, teachers, classmates);
ii) This was followed by U.S. v. Roxas,414 where the defendant’s statement
about his age was considered sufficient, even without corroborative
evidence, to establish that he was a minor of 16 years at the time he
committed the offense charged.
iv) Then, in People v. Villagracia,416 the court found the testimony of the
accused that he was less than 15 years old sufficient to establish his
minority.
k) Burden of proof. The burden of evidence has now shifted to the defense
which now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused, even if guilty,
should be exempt from criminal liability because of his age when he
committed the crime. The defense, therefore, not the prosecution, has the
burden of showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less
412 Ibid.
413 3 Phil 59, 61 (1903).
414 5 Phil 186, 187 (1905).
415 G.R. No. 44773, December 4,1991.
416 G.R. No. 94471, September 14, 1993.
417 G.R. No. 129295, August 15, 2001.
418 G.R. Nos. 11168-69, June 17, 1998.
when he committed the rape charged.419
i) Any person contesting the age may file a case in a summary proceeding
for the determination of age before the Family Court.420
ii) Serious Crimes Committed by Children Who Are Exempt from Criminal
Responsibility. A child over 12 up to 15 is deemed a neglected child
under PD 603 and shall be placed in youth care facility (Bahay Pag-asa),
in the following crimes; parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention where the victim is killed or raped, robbery with
homicide or rape, destructive arson, rape, carnapping where the driver
or occupant is killed or raped, and offenses under RA 9165.423
m) Exempting provisions.
iv) Exemption from the Application of Death Penalty. - The provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and other
special laws notwithstanding, no death penalty shall be imposed upon
children in conflict with the law.427
ii) Who should undergo intervention? CICL who is less than 15 years old
or below, or CICL who is 15 years old and one day to 17 years who did
not act with discernment. If the minor acted with discernment, he should
undergo diversion program.
iii) Diversion Program. It refers to the program that the child in conflict with
the law is required to undergo after he/she is found responsible for an
offense without resorting to formal court proceedings.
iv) Who should undergo? Where the imposable penalty is not more than 6
years and there is a victim – the diversion program shall be before the
law enforcement officer or the Punong Barangay and shall be in the form
of mediation, family conferencing and conciliation attended by the CICL
and his family.428 If there is NO victim, the diversion program shall be
conducted by the local social welfare and development officer with the
CICL and his parents or guardians.
v) Where the imposable penalty is more than 6 years, the diversion shall
be undertaken by the courts only. In case the penalty imposable is not
more than 12 years, regardless of the fine or fine only regardless of the
amount, and before arraignment of the CICL, the court shall determine
whether or not diversion is appropriate.429
vi) If the offense does not fall under any of the above or if the CICL, his
parents or guardians does not consent to a diversion, the authority
handling the case shall forward the records to the prosecutor or court
within three days from the determination of absence of jurisdiction or
termination of the proceedings and shall be filed according to the regular
process.
viii) If the CICL reached 18 while under suspended sentence, the court shall
ix) Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child below 18 years
of age who committed a crime (acted with discernment) and was found
guilty, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence even if such child has reached 18 years or more
at the time of judgment. The suspension of sentence is made without
the need of application.432 The court, however, is mandated to determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed.
xi) Further, although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in
conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time the
judgment of conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is only
until the minor reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under
Section 40. However, in order to give meaning to the legislative intent of
the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law
should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-
one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was
still a child.434
xii) Upon conviction and upon order of the court, the minor offender may be
made to serve his/her sentence in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD, in lieu of
xiii)Probation. Upon application at any time, the court shall place the child
on probation in lieu of service of sentence. The application shall be filed
within 15 days from the promulgation of decision.
6) Accident.
a) Accident is something that happens outside the sway of our will, and
although it comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the
bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. If foreseeable, it will be a
case of negligence.436
b) Requisites:
c) Concepts.
ii) Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm
to the victim was not due to the fault or negligence of the accused, but
to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or
controlled.439 Thus, in determining whether an "accident" attended the
incident, courts must take into account the dual standards of lack of
intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence.440
435 Sec. 51; People v. Deliola, G.R. No. 200157, October 31, 2016.
436 Reyes, Luis B., supra.
437 Toledo v. People, 482 Phil. 292.
438 Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, 464 Phil. 650.
439 People v. Cariquez, 373 Phil. 877.
440 Pomoy v. People, G.R. No. 150647, September 29, 2004.
lack of intention to commit the wrong done.441
iv) In raising the defense of accident, the accused has the inescapable
burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, of accidental
infliction of injuries on the victim. In so doing, the accused has to rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence.442
a) Requisites:
b) Concepts.
ii) Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from
criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force,
or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury,
because such person does not act with freedom. For such defense to
prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done. A threat of future injury is not enough.445
a) Requisites:
b) Concepts.
i) Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. “Any act done by me against
my will is not my act.” The force contemplated must be so formidable as
to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will
but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act
be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must
be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for
escape or self-defense in equal combat.448
iii) The person using force or causing fear is the one liable. The actual
a) Requisites:
b) Basis.
c) Concepts.
a) An absolutory cause is present "where the act committed is a crime but for
reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed."451 The
act committed constitutes of a crime but the law does not punish the
offender by reason of public policy.
c) Instigation.
ii) The law deplores instigation or inducement, which occurs when the
police or its agent devises the idea of committing the crime and lures the
accused into executing the offense. Instigation absolves the accused of
any guilt, given the spontaneous moral revulsion from using the powers
of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that
(2) The objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of
the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately
shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-
buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment
of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which
the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant,
the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money,
and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or
the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit
an offense.456
In instigation, where
law enforcers act as
Entrapment cannot bar
Legal effect co-principals, the
prosecution and conviction.
accused will have to
be acquitted.
Instigation is a "trap
Entrapment is a "trap for
Also known as for the unwary
the unwary criminal."
innocent.”
vi) In United Sates v. Phelps, the accused was acquitted from the offense
of smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR
personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime in order to
persecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps apprehension
came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he like smoking
opium on some occasions. Smith’s testimony was disregarded. The
court accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the
accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where
both of them could smoke this drug. The conduct of the BIR agent was
condemned as most reprehensible.458
vii) In People v. Abella, the accused was acquitted of the crime of selling
explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police
Chapter Six
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Mitigating Circumstances
i) Basis. Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "A penalty lower
by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if
the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability
in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the
majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the
penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the
number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking."464
iv) Unlawful aggression must emanate from the victim. There can be no
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense.469 This mitigating circumstance is inapplicable when the
unlawful aggression started from the accused.470
vi) Incomplete defense of a stranger. Absent either or both of the last two
(2) requisites, the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of
stranger may be appreciated. However, in either case, unlawful
aggression is always an essential element. It has been held that without
unlawful aggression, there could never be a defense, complete or
incomplete.472
i) General rule. Sec. 6 of RA 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years
but below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the
child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, "the
appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be
observed.474
iv) Rationale. The rationale of the law in extending such leniency and
compassion is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to have
acted with less discernment.482
vi) Minority preferred. Even if minority was not proven during the trial as the
birth certificate was belatedly presented, minority should be considered
since to rule accordingly will not adversely affect the rights of the state,
the victim and his heirs.484 In the interest of justice, the Court allowed
the presentation of and admitted the birth certificates of the accused to
prove the mitigating circumstance of minority although said birth
certificates were not presented or offered in the trial court.485 The claim
of minority has been upheld even without any other proof to corroborate
such testimony, especially when coupled with the fact that the
prosecution failed to present contradictory evidence.486
2003.
484 Ibid.
485 Co v. CA, et al., 99 SCRA 321 (1980).
486 People v. Villagracia, 226 SCRA 374 (1993); People v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 (1991); People
ii) The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule
that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.491
vi) No mitigating circumstance. The inflicting by the accused of five (5) stab
wounds in rapid succession brings forth in bold relief the intention of the
accused to snuff the life of the deceased, and definitely negated any
pretense of lack of intention to commit so serious an injury.496 The act of
the accused in pouring kerosene on the body of his wife and was burned
as her body was wet 90% of the chemical cannot be considered lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong where it was established that he had
full possession of the container with kerosene.497 When a person stabs
another with a lethal weapon such as a fan knife upon a part of the body,
for example, the head, chest, or stomach, death could reasonably be
anticipated, and the accused must be presumed to have intended the
natural consequences of his wrongful act. The means employed
contradict the claim that accused had lack of intention to commit the
crime of homicide.498
vi) Sufficient provocation was present in the following cases. The victim,
before the killing, had challenged the accused’s family with a bolo and
an "indian pana." After this attack, the victim went home. The accused
thereafter grabbed a bolo, pursued the victim, and killed him. The Court
did not consider the victim’s act as an unlawful aggression for the
purpose of self-defense. However, such was considered a provocation
sufficient to mitigate the crime.513 The Court had likewise disregarded
the violent act of the victim before the shooting incident as an unlawful
aggression, but appreciated it as a mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation.514 The retaliation of the accused, although not considered
an unlawful aggression, was nevertheless deemed as sufficient
provocation. The Court explained, "Thrusting his bolo at petitioner,
threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are,
in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and
iii) The two accused were provoked to commit two murders because of the
indecent propositions made to the women by Jalumio and his
companions. For Mario Aninias, this is the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation or vindication of a grave offense to his wife.518
i) Requisites:
(1) That there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and
(2) That said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time
during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. 521
(1) There is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due
to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason.522
(2) Passion and obfuscation as affecting the mind and resulting in lack
of reason and self-control must originate from lawful sentiments.523
The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or
fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the
mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive
him of his sanity and self-control, because the cause of this condition
of mind must necessarily have preceded the commission of the
offense.524 If the only provocative act came from the parents who did
not approve of the accused proposal to marry their daughter, this act
was not unlawful. Neither was it sufficient to sustain passion and
obfuscation. Accused was actuated more by a spirit of lawlessness
and revenge rather than any sudden and legitimate impulse of
natural and uncontrollable fury.525
(3) The only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss
of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not
those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.526
If the accused acted with jealousy out of illicit romantic relationship,
there is no passion and obfuscation. However, there is passion and
obfuscation if the impulse upon which defendant acted and which
naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was not that the
woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden
revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in
flagrante in the arms of another.527
(4) Moreover, the act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might have recovered his normal
(6) The attack, made 30 minutes between the fistfight and the killing,
cannot be said to be the result of a sudden impulse of natural and
uncontrollable fury. Having been actuated more by the spirit of
revenge or by anger and resentment for having been publicly berated
cannot be credited with the extenuating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.530
(7) Acts done in the spirit of revenge cannot be considered acts done
with passion and obfuscation.531
g) Voluntary Surrender.
(2) Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the
supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to
ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore,
cannot be characterized as voluntary surrender to serve as a
mitigating circumstance.535
(3) The fourth requisite. In Cagas, after the stabbing incident, the
accused ran to the upper portion of the cemetery where a police
officer caught up with him. Thereupon, he voluntarily gave himself
up. The Court held that if the accused did then and there surrender,
it was because he was left with no choice. Thus, the surrender was
not spontaneous.536
(4) In Taraya, when the accused learned that the police authorities were
looking for him (because of a warrant for his arrest), he immediately
went to the police station where he confessed that he killed the
victim. Notwithstanding such surrender and confession to the police,
the Court refused to appreciate the mitigating circumstance in his
favor.537
vi) If both circumstances are present in the same case they have the effect
of two independent circumstances539 and in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, they will reduce divisible penalties by one degree.
ii) Basis. One suffering from physical defect which restricts him does not
have complete freedom of action and therefore, there is diminution of
that element of voluntariness.
i) Requisites:
(1) Illness of the offender must diminish the exercise of his will-power;
and
(2) Such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his
acts.
ii) Concepts.
(1) When the offender completely lost the exercise of will-power, it may
i) Examples:
Aggravating Circumstances
8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons
who insure or afford impunity.
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of this Code.
21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its
commissions.
1) Nature. Those which serve to increase the penalty without exceeding the
maximum provided by law because of the greater perversity of the offender as
shown by the motivating power of the commission of the crime, the time and
place of its commission, the means employed or the personal circumstances
of the offender.544
ii) Effect. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its
maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher
degree.
ii) Examples:
iii) Effect. It does not change the character of the offense charged.547
iv) Need to allege in the information. It must always be alleged and charged
in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be
appreciated.
6) The “aggravating circumstances” on the civil liability of the accused. The term
"aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having
specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance
of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that
should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability
of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
i) Requisites:
ii) Concepts.
(1) The essence of the matter is presented in the question: Did the
accused abuse his office in order to commit the crime? If the accused
could have killed the victim without having occupied his position of
confidential agent, then there is no abuse of public position.550
i) Requisites:
ii) Concepts.
(2) If the crime is committed against the public authority, the crime
committed is direct assault. This circumstance is absorbed.552
c) Disregard of rank, age, or sex and dwelling of the offended part (generic).
i) Requisites:
(1) Act of deliberate intention to disregard or insult age, sex, or rank; and
(2) Proof of fact of disregard and deliberate intent.
ii) Concepts.
(6) The aggravating circumstances of age, sex and rank are considered
in crimes against persons, security, and honor but not in crimes
against property. Robbery with homicide is a crime against property.
i) Requisites:
ii) Concepts.
(2) This circumstance is present when the accused was treated like a
member of the family,560 or who was living in the house of the victim
employed by the victim as an overseer and had free access in the
house of the victim who was very kind to him.561
i) Concepts.
(2) The public authority is in his office, or the place dedicated to the
worship of God.
(4) Offender must have the intention to commit a crime when he entered
the place.
(5) It is necessary to show that the offender must have sought any of the
places for the commission of the crime.562
(6) If any of the said places was not sought for as the crime was casually
committed therein, this circumstance is not present.563
i) Nighttime.
(1) Nighttime is that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and
ending at dawn.564
(5) Nocturnity lures those who crave for blood to yield to their baser
impulses with the false courage borne out of the belief that their
identity would not be brought in the open.569
566
People v. Alcala, 46 Phil. 739; People v. Matbagon, 60 Phil. 887; People v. Pardo, 79 Phil.
658.
567 People v. Boyles, G.R. No. L-15308, May 29, 1964.
568 U.S. v. Paraiso, 17 Phil. 142.
569 People v. Arizobal, G.R. No. 135051-51, December 14, 2000.
570 Gregorio, supra. Page 126.
571 People v. Arizobal, supra.
572 People vs. Enot, L-17530, October 30, 1962.
are scattered at a great distance from each other.573
(1) A distance of 200 yards to the nearest house is sufficient to make the
scene of the crime uninhabited.574 What the Supreme Court
considered as uninhabited is a place about a kilometer from the
nearest house or other inhabited place.575
(2) The place is not uninhabited when the crime was committed on the
railroad tracks, within 90 yards of inhabited houses. The houses were
sufficiently near for the inmates to have heard calls for help if the
deceased had cried out in a loud voice.576
i) Requisites:
(1) The offender must take advantage of the calamity or misfortune; and
(2) The crime was committed during the conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.
ii) Concepts.
(2) The term “misfortune” does not include the development of engine
trouble at sea. It does not come within the phrase "other calamity or
misfortune" as used in Article 14, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal
Code, which refer to other conditions of distress similar to those
precedingly enumerated therein, namely, "configuration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic", such as the chaotic conditions resulting from
war or the liberation of the Philippines during the last World War.580
(3) The reason for the provision of this aggravating circumstance "is
found in the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst
of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted adds to their
suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them."581
i) Requisites:
(1) That armed men or persons took part in the commission of the crime,
directly or indirectly; and
(2) That the accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them
when the crime was committed.
ii) Concepts.
(1) The armed men present must take part, either directly or indirectly,
in the commission of the crime by the offender but it must not appear
that the offender and those armed men acted under the same plan
and for the same purpose as there will be conspiracy.582
(2) Aid of armed men or persons affording immunity requires that the
armed men are accomplices who take part in minor capacity, directly
or indirectly.583
580 People v. Arpa, et al., G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969.
581 U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150, 157.
582Gregorio, supra. Citing People v. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417; People v. Piring, 63 Phil. 546; People v.
(4) This circumstance is not present when it is shown that the accused
as well as those who cooperated with him in the commission of the
crimes in question acted under the same plan and for the same
purpose.585
i) Recidivism (generic).
i) Requisites:
ii) Concepts.
(1) A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of this Code.
(2) It is necessary that the first conviction must be by final judgment and
must take place prior to the second conviction. The second
conviction should not be for the offense committed before the
commission of the offense prior conviction.586
(4) It is not correct to assume that recidivism is twice taken into account
when the accused is declared an habitual delinquent and when it is
deemed to aggravate the crime in fixing the principal penalty to be
(5) For recidivism to exist, it is sufficient that the accused, on the date of
his trial, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title. For the existence of
habitual delinquency, it is not enough that the accused shall have
been convicted of any of the crimes specified, and that the last
conviction shall have taken place ten (10) years before the
commission of the last offense. It is necessary that the crimes
previously committed be prior to the commission of the offense with
which the accused is charged a third time or oftener.589
a. Requisites:
b. Concepts.
Recidivism Habituality
Nature There is a previous The offender is previously
conviction. punished.
Crimes The crimes are embraced The crimes are not necessarily
covered in the same title of the embraced in the same title of
code. the code.
Effect Not always aggravating. Its
If present, it is always
appreciation depends upon the
aggravating.
sound discretion of the court.
iii. If the two offenses are embraced in the same title of the Code,
irrespective of whether the law attaches a greater penalty for
the first offense, recidivism and not reiteracion is present.591
a. Requisites:
b. Concepts.
590 Ibid
591 Gregorio, supra., page 136.
i. In this circumstance, there are two persons affected: the one
giving the price or reward and the one receiving it. The new
rule is it affects both the offeror and the receiver. The offeror
is principal by inducement while the receiver is principal by
direct participation.
b. Concepts.
a. Requisites:
b. Concepts.
September 2017.
words, must be preceded by cool thought and reflection. As
here, there must be showing of a plan or preparation to kill, or
proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his
decision to execute the crime.600
vii. When it is not shown as to how and when the plan was
hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out,
evident premeditation cannot be considered.603
a. Requisites:
b. Concepts.
a. Requisites:
b. Concepts.
ii. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with
abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative
strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must
establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage,
or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.608
p. Treachery (qualifying).
a. Requisites:
b. Concepts.
viii. A frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The
qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack
was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no
time to prepare for his or her defense.628
q. Ignominy (qualifying).
a. Nature.
ii. The clause "Which add ignominy to the natural effects of the
act" contemplates a situation where the means employed or
the circumstances tend to make the effects of the crime more
humiliating or to put the offended party to shame.636
b. Concepts.
i. There was ignominy because the accused used not only the
missionary position, i.e. male superior female inferior, but also
"The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The
accused claims there was no ignominy because "The studies
of many experts in the matter have shown that this 'position'
is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by
couples in the act of copulation. This may well be if the sexual
act is performed by consenting partners but not
otherwise.There is ignominy in rape committed through “dog
634 People v. Fuertes, et al., G.R. Nos. 95891-92, February 28, 2000.
635 People v. Fuertes, et al., supra.
636 Ibid.
style” position.637
ii. In a case, the Court held there was ignominy when the
accused forced the man to rape the victim, and laughed as
the latter was being raped by the man, and when they ordered
victim’s siblings to look at their naked sister after the accused
had raped her.638
a. Nature.
b. Concepts.
a. Concepts.
u. Cruelty (qualifying).
a. Requisites:
b. Concepts.
ii. Although the accused stabbed the victim several times, the
same could not be considered as cruelty because there was
no showing that it was intended to prolong the suffering of the
victim.642
i) If the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm carries a maximum
penalty LOWER THAN that prescribed for illegal possession, the penalty
for ILLEGAL POSSESSION shall be imposed.
ii) If the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized with
a maximum penalty EQUAL to that imposed for illegal possession, the
penalty of PRISION MAYOR, minimum period shall be imposed IN
ADDITION to the penalty for the crime committed with the use of loose
firearm.
Chapter Eight
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
Alternative Circumstances
Article 15. Their concept. - Alternative circumstances are those which
must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to
the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its
commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of
instruction and education of the offender.
1) Concepts.
a) Relationship.
(1) Spouse;
(2) ascendant;
(3) descendant;
(4) legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister; or
(5) Relative by affinity in the same degree.
(6) Relationship of stepfather or stepmother and stepson or
stepdaughter is included by analogy as similar to ascendant or
descendant.648 But relationship between uncle and niece is not
included.
ii) Outside of these enumerations and consistent with the doctrine that
criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused, no
other relationship, kinship or association between the offender and the
victim may aggravate the imposable penalty for the crime committed.
The fact, then, that the offended party is the granddaughter or
descendant of appellants’ live-in partner cannot justify the imposition of
death upon the rapist.649
(2) In the crimes against chastity due to the nature of the crime.651
(2) Accessories who conceal or destroy the body of the crime or effects
or instruments thereof, or harbour, conceal or assist in the escape of
the principal of the crime.652
vii) Concepts.
b) Intoxication.
i) Nature.
(2) Mere drinking of liquor prior to the commission of the crime does not
ii) Rules.
iii) Concepts.
i) Concepts.
(4) Lack of instruction must be proved positively and directly and cannot
be based on mere deduction or inference.663
Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The following are criminally
liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
1. Principals
2. Accomplices.
i) Principals.
ii) Accomplices.
iii) Accessories.
i) Principals.
ii) Accomplices.
b) Reasons:
i) The RPC requires that the offender should have acted with personal
malice or negligence.
ii) A juridical person cannot commit a crime in which a wilful purpose or a
malicious intent is required. It cannot be arrested and imprisoned.664
iii) Penalties like imprisonment and deprivation of liberty can only be
executed by natural persons.
d) Special penal laws which specifically provide for the criminal liability of
corporate officers.
iii) Corporation Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 68) – Corporations may
be fined for certain violations of the Code.
a) Nature.
ii) When two or more persons are principals by direct participation, the
following are the requisites:
b) Concepts671
iii) Where there are several accused and conspiracy has been established,
the prosecution need not pinpoint who among the accused inflicted the
fatal wound.674
iv) Where conspiracy has been established, evidence as to who among the
accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and character of their
participation because the act of one is the act of all.675
3) Principals by inducement.
b) Ways of inducement:
i) Requisites:
677 Ibid.
commission of the crime; and
ii) Concepts.
(1) In this kind of principal, there are two (2) actors involved: the one
inducing is called principal by inducement and the one executing or
committing the crime is principal by direct participation.
(2) To constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the induced
the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure
the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the
person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation to commit
the crime.679
(5) With respect to words of command, both the inducer and the person
who committed the crime are collectively liable.684 The requisites are:
1969.
681 People v. Batin, G.R. No. 177223, November 28, 1997.
682 Gregorio, supra, page 137 citing People v. Alincastre, 40 SCRA 391, and People v. Otero, et
(8) The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the
hands of the principal by direct participation.688 Words of command
of a father “Sige, banatan mo na” may induce his son to commit a
crime.689 The moral influence of the words of the father may
determine the course of conduct of a son in cases in which the same
words coming from a stranger would make no impression.690
(9) Not all inducement falls within the purview of the law. A chance word
spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an
ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or
even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent
reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or
performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would
be followed or any real intention that it produce a result.692
(10) The remark of the accused to "take care of the two" does not
constitute the command required by law to justify a finding that she
is guilty as a principal by inducement.693
(11) The utterance "Kill him and we will bury him" amounts but to
imprudent utterances said in the excitement of the hour or in the heat
of anger, and not, rather, in the nature of a command that had to be
obeyed.694
b) Requisites:
c) Concepts.
iii) Examples.
(1) Providing the weapon or tools, or the key to open the building.
(2) Providing the mode of transportation to enable the accused to reach
the place of the scene of the crime.
(3) Dragging he victim to the place of execution.
(4) Leaving open the doors, giving the key to open the building.
(5) Holding on to a victim to preventing him victim from resisting or
drawing a weapon.
1) Nature. Accomplices are those, not being principals, who cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
2) Requisites:
c) That there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and
those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.699
3) Concepts.
g) The liability of one whose participation was limited to looking for a banca
and providing one to a gang of bank robbers,703 or one who went with the
actual perpetrators of a crime without conspiring with them, is only that of
an accomplice,704 or where the quantum of proof required to establish
conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused acted as
principal or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of
liability, that of a mere accomplice.705
ii) The accused participated in the commission of the crime even before
complainant was raped. He was present when co-accused abducted
complainant and when he brought her to the barn. He positioned himself
outside the barn together with the other accused as a lookout. When he
heard the shouts of people looking for complainant, he entered the barn
and took complainant away from the rapist. Having known of the criminal
design and thereafter acting as a lookout, petitioner is liable as an
accomplice.710
iii) In People v. Corbes,711 the Court noted that Manuel Vergel knew of the
criminal design to commit a robbery, and that he cooperated with the
robbers by driving the vehicle to and from the crime scene. In convicting
him as an accomplice and not as a conspirator, the Court observed that
he was merely approached by one of the robbers who was tasked to
look for a getaway vehicle. He was not with the robbers when they
resolved to commit a robbery. When his services were requested, the
decision to commit the crime had already been made.
vii) In People v. Doble,715 the Court held that Cresencio Doble did not
become a conspirator when he looked for a banca that was eventually
used by the robbers. Ruled the Court: Neither would it appear that Joe
Intsik wanted to draft Crescencio into his band of malefactors that would
commit the robbery more than just asking his help to look for a banca.
Joe Intsik had enough men, all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the
crime, the commission of which needed planning and men to execute
the plan with full mutual confidence of each other, which [was] not shown
with respect to appellants by the way they were asked to look and
provide for a banca just a few hours before the actual robbery.
Conspirators Accomplices
Accomplices come to know
Conspirators know the
about it after the principals
criminal intention because
Knowledge of have reached the decision,
they themselves have
criminal intent and only then do they
decided upon such course
agree to cooperate in its
of action.
execution.
Accomplices do not decide
whether the crime should
Who decides the Conspirators decide that a
be committed; they merely
commission of crime should be
assent to the plan and
the crime. committed.
cooperate in its
accomplishment.
Accomplices are merely
Conspirators are the their instruments who
Participation
authors of a crime. perform acts not essential
to the perpetration of the
1) Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the
execution of either the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as an accomplice.
1) Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 5 hereof, cooperates in the
execution of either the crime of financing of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit the crime of financing of terrorism by previous or simultaneous acts
is liable as an accomplice.
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
(RA 6713).
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042, as amended
by RA 10022
2) The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories.
Accessories
1) Nature. An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate
in the commission of the felony, but, with knowledge of the commission of the
crime, he subsequently takes part in three ways:
a) By profiting or assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the crime;
b) By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, the effects or instruments
of the crime in order to prevent discovery; and
c) By harbouring, concealing, or assisting in the escape or concealment of the
principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions,
OR the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or attempt to take
the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually delinquent. 723
d) “Takes part subsequent to its commission” – the accessory takes part after
the crime has been committed.
723 People v. Verzola, et al., G.R. No. L-35022, December 21, 1977.
724 Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. L-46484, January 29, 1988.
i) Two acts are punished:
iii) The accessory should materially benefit from the act. Riding in a stolen
vehicle is not considered “profiting” since it does not improve his
economic condition. Profiting is not synonymous with intent to gain as
element of theft.725
iv) The accessory should not take the property without the consent of the
principal. He must receive the property from the principal. He should not
take it without the consent of the principal. If he took it without the
consent of the principal, he is not accessory but principal in the crime of
theft.726
vi) The accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted
as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612.
However, in the latter case, the accused ceases to be a mere accessory
but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Otherwise stated, the
crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other,
are separate and distinct offenses.727
vii) The State may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised
Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter
would seem inevitable considering that fencing is malum prohibitum and
725 Gregorio, supra. citing People v. Morales, (CA) 71 O.G. 529 (1974).
726 Reyes, supra.
727 People v. de Guzman, 227 SCRA 64 (1993).
the law prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property
728
viii) Mere possession of any goods, article, item, object, or anything of value
which has been the subject of robbery or thievery is prima facie
evidence of fencing.729
ix) The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in
the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in
the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.730
i. Examples:
ii) The subject may be the body of the crime, the effects, or instrument
thereof.
i. Body of the crime refers to the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti refers to
the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
iv) There is no accessory when the offender took away the truck used in
illegal possession of lumber (under PD 705). In order to be considered
as accessory, the act of concealing or destroying the body of the crime,
the effects or instruments thereof must be for the purpose of preventing
its discovery. When the crime has already been discovered and the truck
was taken, the offender can no longer be charged as accessory but he
is liable for obstruction of justice under PD 1829.735
ii) First class of accessory. The accessory here is a public officer who
abuses his public functions.
i. Requisites:
i. Requisites:
iv) The Revised Penal Code does not penalize a person who harbors,
conceals or assists in the escape of an author of a crime other than
those specifically enumerated therein – treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt on the life of the President. The Code does not penalize private
persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the author of
crimes other than those mentioned thereunder. However, he is still
criminally liable under PD 1829 (Obstruction of Justice), the act of
harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of any person he
knows or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed
any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest,
prosecution and conviction.
vi) Evasion of arrest is not a violation of PD 1829. The failure on the part
of the arresting officer/s to arrest the person of the accused makes the
latter a fugitive from justice and is not equivalent to a commission of
another offense of obstruction of justice.736
736 Angeles v. Gaite, et al., G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009.
of the principal has not yet terminated. The accessory may be held for
trial since the corresponding responsibilities for principal, accomplice, or
accessory are distinct from each other.
i. In the U.S. v. Villaluz et al.,737a case involving the crime of theft, the
Court ruled that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to
the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity (Article 12,
Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted
if the crime was in fact established.
ii. In U.S. v. Mendoza,738 where this Court held in an arson case that
the acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of
the accessory where it was shown that no crime was committed
inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there was
no basis for the conviction of the accessory.
iii. Where the crime and the responsibility of the accused as accessory
are established, the accessory can be convicted notwithstanding the
acquittal of the principal.739
iii) Does death of the principal who is charged with murder before trial
extinguish the liability of the accessory? Yes, because had he been
alive, he would have been found guilty of homicide.
Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The
penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who
are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the
same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
a) By profiting themselves; or
b) By assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
4) Illustration. Since Ruby’s act of driving the car where the corpse of Michelle
was hidden, her resistance to stop the car when chased by the police and to
immediately open the luggage compartment as requested by the police, her act
of lying to the police by claiming that the box in the compartment contained only
dirty clothes, and her refusal to open said box sufficiently indicate knowledge
of the crime and assistance to Ruth in concealing the corpus delicti to prevent
its discovery. Ruby is an accessory to the murder committed by her sister, Ruth.
However, under Article 20 of the Code, she is exempt from criminal liability
since they are sisters.741
740 People v. Mariano, et al., G.R. No. 134847, December 6, 2000 (per curiam).
741 Ibid.
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery;
c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal
or conspirator of the crime.
2) The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those
who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity
within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling
within the provisions of subparagraph (a).
2) The penalty of reclusion temporal and its accessory penalties shall also be
imposed upon persons who, having knowledge of the act of enforced or
involuntary disappearance and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, took part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manner:
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
(RA 6713).
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042, as amended
by RA 10022).
Chapter Ten
MULTIPLE OFFENDERS/HABITUAL OFFENDERS
b) In the Philippine setting, it has been held that in order that an accused may
be legally deemed an habitual criminal, it is necessary that he should have
been convicted three times of any of the crimes enumerated in the law, or
of three such crimes, and that the second crime was committed after the
first conviction, and the third after the second conviction, then, in order to
apply the additional penalty for the fourth commission of crime, he must also
have been convicted or have served the sentence for the third crime, and
Recidivism;
Habituality (Reiteracion);
Quasi-recidivism;
Habitual Delinquency.
i) Recidivism.
(3) Provision: Article 14, par. (9), Revised Penal Code. “A recidivist is
one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of this Code.”
(4) Requisites:
(c) That both the first and second offenses are embraced in the same
title of the Code;
(5) Concepts.
(b) Both convictions must be embraced in the same title of the Code.
(6) Effect
(4) Requisites:
(5) Concepts.
(6) Effect
(a) If considered, it has the effect of increasing the penalty for the
crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to
the next higher degree.
iii) Quasi-Recidivism.
(1) Nature. Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance
where a person, after having been convicted by final judgment, shall
commit a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence, or
while serving the same.
(4) Requisites:
(5) Concepts.
753 People v. Peralta, et al., G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968.
during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.754
(6) Effect.
(a) This has the effect to increasing the penalty for the new felony to
its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to
the next higher degree.
(1) Nature.
(b) The purpose is to prevent those who for the second time or more
commit the crimes from relapsing thereafter at least during the
period fixed thereby.756
(d) Provision: Article 62, par. (5), Revised Penal Code. “Habitual
delinquency shall have the following effects:
(2) Requisites:
(c) Each conviction must take place within ten years from the last
conviction or release.
(3) Concepts.
(4) Effect.
759 Ibid.
760 People v. Tolentino, et al., G.R. No. L-48740, August 5, 1942.
761 People v. Tapel, G.R. No. 45220, September 18, 1936.
762 People v. Bernal, supra.
30 years.
(5) Distinctions.
Quasi Habitual
Recidivism Reiteracion
Recidivism Delinquency
Previous
punishment or Crimes are
service of sentence Offender specified:
of an offense with previously robbery, theft,
Involves two
equal or greater convicted by estafa,
Situation convictions
penalty than the final falsification,
of crimes.
second offense, or judgement serious or less
for two or more light with offense. serious physical
offenses which have injuries.
lighter penalty.
There must be at
least 3
The crimes convictions, the
He commits a
must be last conviction to
Requires the felony before
embraced in take place within
offender to have he has served
Requisite the same 10 years from last
served the penalty the penalty, or
title of the conviction or
of the first offense. while serving
Revised release (each
the same.
Penal Code. conviction to take
place within 10
years.)
Cannot be
Mere
offset by
generic Not always
ordinary Cannot be offset;
aggravating aggravating; court
mitigating imposition of
circumstanc has discretion to
Effect circumstance; additional
e; increases apply; increases the
punished by penalty.
the penalty penalty to maximum
maximum
to maximum period.
period of the
period.
penalty new
felony.
Chapter Eleven
PLURALITY OF CRIMES
Plurality of Crimes
1) Concepts.
a) Formal/Ideal plurality. Ideal plurality occurs when a single act gives rise to
various infractions of law. This is illustrated by Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code which states: (a) when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies (compound crime); and (b) when an offense is
a necessary means for committing another offense (complex proper).764
763 Gamboa, et al., v. CA, G.R. No. L-41053, November 28, 1975.
764 Ibid.
765 Ibid.
3) Complex crimes
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
(a) Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period. Although two or more crimes
are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes
of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Hence,
there is only one penalty imposed for the commission of a
complex crime.766
(a) The classic example of the first of kind is when a single bullet
results in the death of two or more persons, or the single act of
throwing a grenade resulting in the death of another person and
injuring four others produced the complex crime of murder and
multiple attempted murders.770 In another case, it was held
there was complex crime when the offender hurled a grenade
into the bedroom of the victims causing the death of three
persons and injuries to one person which constituted the
complex crime of multiple murder and attempted murder.771
(b) The single act of burning the house of the victim, with the main
objective of killing the latter and his daughter, resulting in their
deaths resulted the single act of accused-appellant in the
complex crime of double murder.772
(d) There is complex crime if the killing was the result of a single
impulse, which was induced by the order of the leader to fire, and
continued with the intention to comply therewith, as the firing
(e) The single act of accused in burning the house of his aunt
which resulted in her death and her partner produced the
complex crime of double murder.775
(g) When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes. For Article 48 to apply,
there must be singularity of criminal act; not singularity of
criminal impulse because it is not written into the law. Thus,
where the six defendants, with others (armed with pistols,
carbines and also a submachine gun and Garand rifles), fired
volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding several others,
each of the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder
as there were deaths.777
(a) Nature. The second part of Article 48 deals with complex crime
proper. This refers to a situation that the offender commits a crime
to insure and facilitate the commission of another crime. The first
crime is resorted to give way to another crime.
(b) Requisites:
(c) Concepts.
779 People v. Tabaco, G.R. No. 100382-385, March 9, 1997, citing People v. Desierto, C.A. 45 O.G.
4542 [1948].
780 Ivler v. San Pedro, supra.
(i) The two crimes must be punished by the same statute
otherwise, there is no complex crime.781 A felony cannot be
complexed with a special penal law.
(ix) When two or more crimes are committed but not by a single
act or one is not necessary means for committing the other,
there is no complex crime. e.g. the accused compelled the
pilot to change the course of flight, and when the pilot refused,
shot the latter. 2 crimes: frustrated coercion and murder.
(a) Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called
a special complex crime.785 It is composed of two or more crimes
but is treated by law as a single indivisible and unique offense for
being the product of one criminal impulse.786 It is not of the same
legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crime in Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code, since it does not consist of a single act
giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies (compound
crimes) nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means
to commit another (complex crime proper). Just like the regular
complex crimes, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such
composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses.787
(d) Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal
Code are (a) robbery with homicide, (b) robbery with rape,
(c) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (d) kidnapping with
murder or homicide, and (e) rape with homicide.
(1) Concepts.
(c) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same
occasion.816
(a) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period
from January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January
1956 to July 1956.820 The said acts were committed on two
different occasions.
Chapter Twelve
PENALTIES
1) Penalties in general
a) Concept
ii) Correction or reformation – this is shown by the rules which regulate the
execution of the penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty.
iii) Social defense – this is shown by its inflexible severity to recidivist and
habitual delinquents.831
ii) Elastic – the elasticity lies in the range of each class, period or degree
a) Classification
i) Principal
(i) Fine
(ii) Bond to keep the peace
ii) Concepts.
(2) Fine under Article 26 merely classifies fine and has nothing to do with
the definition of light felony.838
Duration of penalties
Penalty Duration
Preventive imprisonment
1) Nature.
2) Requisites:
a) if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of
the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel;
ii) When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they
have failed to surrender voluntarily.
iii) If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with
the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his
sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone
preventive imprisonment.
i) If the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial,
the court may motu proprio order the re-arrest of the accused:
c) A habitual delinquent is not entitled to the full time or 4/5 of the time of
preventive imprisonment because a habitual delinquent is necessarily a
recidivist or that at least he has been convicted previously twice or more
times of any crime.840
Effects of penalties
5) Civil interdiction
a) The offender must present two sufficient sureties which shall undertake that
the offender will not commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that in
case such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined by
the court; or
b) The offender must deposit such amount with the clerk of court to guarantee
said undertaking; or
c) The offender may be detained, if he cannot five the bond, for a period not
to exceed 6 months of prosecuted for grave or less grave felony, or for a
period not to exceed 30 days, if for a light felony.
Subsidiary imprisonment
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered
by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his
financial circumstances should improve." (As amended by Republic Act
No. 5465, which lapsed into law on April 21, 1969.)
1) Nature.
a) If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine, he shall be subject
to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount
equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at
the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court, subject
to the following rules:
ii) When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen
days, if for a fight felony.
iii) When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional,
no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
v) The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by
reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his
financial circumstances should improve.
iii) Subsidiary penalty is not expressly stated in the sentence to take the
place of fine in case of insolvency;
1) Concepts.
ii) May the convict choose to serve the subsidiary imprisonment in lieu of
paying the fine? No. If the convict has properties, he has no option to
serve the subsidiary imprisonment because subsidiary imprisonment is
applied only in case of insolvency.
Application of penalties
a) Complex crime – the penalty to be imposed is for the most serious crime;
i) If penalty for felony committed is higher than the crime intended – the
penalty of the crime intended to be imposed in maximum period;
ii) If penalty for felony committed is lower than the crime intended – the
penalty for the crime committed to be imposed in maximum period;
d) Penalty for impossible crime – arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to
500 pesos.
Graduation of penalties
Article 71. Graduated scales. - In the case in which the law prescribed
a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty,
the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such
penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in
which is comprised the given penalty.
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Destierro,
8. Arresto menor,
9. Public censure,
10. Fine.
SCALE NO. 2
a) Death;
b) Reclusion perpetua;
c) Reclusion temporal;
d) Prision mayor;
e) Prision correccional;
f) Arresto mayor;
g) Destierro;
h) Arresto menor;
i) Public censure; and
j) Fine.
2) Concepts.
i) In a case, the Court held that the 1987 constitution does not abolish
death penalty. It merely suspends the imposition of death penalty. A
reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua..846
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible,
the penalty next lower in degrees shall be that immediately following
that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in
Article 71 of this Code.
5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not
especially provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts,
proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon
those guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to
commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories.
2) Second Rule.
a) When the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties (reclusion
perpetua to death) – the next penalty lower is reclusion termporal;
a) When the penalty has two periods – the penalty next lower is formed
by two periods to be taken from either the penalty prescribed, if
possible, or from the period of next lower divisible penalty;
b) When the penalty has one period, the penalty next lower in degree
shall be that period next following the given penalty. For example, the
penalty immediately lower to prision mayor in its maximum period is
prision mayor in its medium period.
3) Fifth Rule. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some
manner not specially provided for in the foregoing rules – the court by
analogy shall impose the corresponding penalties upon those guilty as
principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same,
and upon accomplices and accessories.
Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three
periods. - In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three
periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three
different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application
of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent
of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the
evil produced by the crime.
1) The rules apply only when the prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal,
prision mayor, prision coreccional, arresto mayor, arresto menor, or
prision correccional to reclusion temporal because they contain three
periods.
2) Rules to be observed:
a) No aggravating and no mitigating – medium period;
b) Only a mitigating – minimum period;
c) Only an aggravating – maximum period;
d) When there are aggravating and mitigating – offsetting of
circumstances will be made;
e) Two or more mitigating and no aggravating – penalty next lower
depending on the number and nature of circumstances;
f) No penalty greater than the maximum period of the penalty prescribed
by law shall be imposed, no matter how may aggravating
circumstances present;
g) The court can determine the extent of the penalty within the limits of
each period, according to the number and nature of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the
evil produced by the crime.
Article 66. Imposition of fines. - In imposing fines the courts may fix
any amount within the limits established by law; in fixing the amount in each
case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.
1) The court may fix any amount within the limits set by law.
2) The court also must consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
and the wealth or means of the offender.
Successive Service of Sentences or the Three-Fold Rule (Article 70)
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10 Temporal absolute disqualification,
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for,
the right to follow a profession or calling, and
12. Public censure.
1) Under Article 70, when the offender has to serve two or three penalties, he
shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties so permit.
Otherwise, he has to serve them successively in the order of their
respective severity. The maximum duration of the sentence should not be
more than three times the most severe penalty. However, the maximum
period cannot exceed 40 years.
2) This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty
but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed 848. Article 70
speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to be
inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the
"imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made
to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the
maximum of which is forty years.849
3) The correct rule is to multiply the highest principal penalty by 3 and the
result will be the aggregate principal penalty which the prisoner has to
serve plus the payment of all the indemnities (fine) which he has been
sentenced to pay. This does not include subsidiary penalty. So, if the
offender after serving the three-fold maximum penalty cannot pay the fine,
he has still serve the subsidiary imprisonment.850
4) The three-fold rule applies although the penalties were imposed for
different crimes at different times and under separate information.851’
5) Court must impose all the penalties for all the crimes of which the accused
is found guilty, but in the service of the same,
they shall not exceed three times the most severe and shall not
exceed 40 years.852
7) Material accumulation system provides that all the penalties for all the
violations were imposed even if they reached beyond the natural span of
human life. Juridical accumulation system provides that the convict must
serve sentence to not more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe and in no case to exceed 40 years. The
latter is adopted in the Philippines.
1) Nature.
2) Purposes.
3) Coverage.
853
Reyes, supra. at page 768.
854
Communications Insurance Company, Inc. v. Villaluz, et al., G.R. No. L-36721-27, August 29,
1980.
a) Revised Penal Code
2) Exceptions.
3) Concepts.
a) Whenever any prisoner who shall have served the minimum penalty
imposed on him, said Board of Indeterminate Sentence may, in its
discretion, and in accordance with the rules and regulations adopted
thereunder, authorize the release of such prisoner on parole. If during the
period of surveillance, such parolee shall show himself to be a law-
abiding citizen and shall not violate any of the laws of the Philippines, the
Board may issue a final certificate of release in his favor. Whenever
any prisoner released on parole shall, during the period of surveillance,
violate any of the conditions of his parole, the Board may issue an order
for his re-arrest and shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the
maximum sentence.
d) How to compute:
c) With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison term which
consists of a minimum and maximum term called the indeterminate
sentence. Thus, the maximum term is that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the RPC.
In other words, the penalty actually imposed under the pre-ISL regime
became the maximum term under the ISL regime. Upon the other
hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to the prescribed penalty. To illustrate, if the case
of Saadlucap was decided under the ISL regime, then the maximum
term would be 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión
temporal and the minimum term could be anywhere within the range
of prisión mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) which is the penalty
next lower to reclusión temporal. Consequently, an indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prisión mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusión temporal as maximum could have
possibly been imposed. If we use the formula as proposed by the
dissent, i.e., to compute the minimum term based on the maximum
term after the attending or modifying circumstances are considered,
the basis for computing the minimum term, under this interpretation,
is the imposable penalty as hereinabove defined. This interpretation
is at odds with Section 1 of the ISL which clearly states that the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be "within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
Consequently, the basis for fixing the minimum term is the prescribed
penalty, and not the imposable penalty. In People v. Gonzales, the
Court held that the minimum term must be based on the penalty
prescribed by the Code for the offense "without regard to
circumstances modifying criminal liability." The Gonzales’ ruling that
the minimum term must be based on the prescribed penalty "without
regard to circumstances modifying criminal liability" is only
a restatement of Section 1 of the ISL that the minimum term shall be
taken from within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty (and from nowhere else).861
861 People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008 (en banc).
A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed
by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly
authorized thereby.
The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes
in different institutions, or at least into different departments and also for the
correction and reform of the convicts.
a) The judgment must be final before it can be executed. The penalty can be
executed in the form prescribed by law or with circumstances or incidents
expressly authorized by law.
b) Thus, if the judgement is silent as regards subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, the convict cannot be required to suffer the same in case of
inability to pay the fine imposed on him.862
a) Insanity/Imbecility
i) When the convict becomes insane or imbecile after the final
sentence has been pronounced, the execution of the sentence is
suspended as regards personal penalty.
ii) Upon his recovery, his sentence shall be executed unless the penalty
has already prescribed.
iii) The same rule applies if the convict becomes insane while serving
the sentence.
iv) Only the execution of personal penalty is suspended. The payment
of civil liability is not suspended.
ii) A child in conflict with the law is a person who at the time of the
commission of the offense is below eighteen (18) years old but not
less than fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old.863 Under RA 9344,
a minor who is above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years
of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability unless he/she
has acted with discernment.864 Discernment has been defined as the
mental capacity of a minor to fully grasp the consequences of his act,
known and determined by taking into account all the facts and
circumstances presented by the records in each case.865 The
surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew
what he was doing and that it was wrong.866 Such circumstance
includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning
and shrewdness.867
iii) Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child below 18
years of age who committed a crime and was found guilty, the court
shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence even if such child has reached 18 years or more at the time
of judgment. The suspension of sentence is made without the need
of application. The court, however, is mandated to determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed.
vii) Upon conviction and upon order of the court, the minor offender may
be made to serve his/her sentence in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD, in lieu
of confinement in a regular penal institution.871
1) Nature.
2) Purposes.
3) Exceptions.
(4) Espionage; (5) Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals; (6) Violation of neutrality; (7)
Correspondence with hostile country; (8) Flight to enemy’s country; (9) Piracy and mutiny; and (10)
Qualified piracy.
d) Who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
e) Who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of
this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
2) When to file.
a) As a rule, the application for probation within a period to appeal, i.e. within
15 days after the promulgation of sentence.
4) Where to file.
a) The application for probation shall be filed in the trial court where the
judgement of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty was
rendered, or in the trial court where such case has been re-raffled.
a) In a case several defendants where some have taken further appeal, the
other defendants may apply for probation by submitting a written application
attaching thereto a certified copy of the judgment of conviction.
a) The trial court shall suspend the execution of sentence imposed in the
judgment.
b) Report himself to the probation officer at least once a month during the
period of probation;
c) The court, after considering the nature and seriousness of the violations of
probation (if any), may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer. He
is then brought to the court immediately for hearing, which is summary;
b) When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is made to serve
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the period of probation shall
not be less than nor to be more than twice the total number of days of
subsidiary imprisonment as computed at the rate established, in Article
thirty-nine of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
a) After the period of probation and upon consideration of the report and
recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final
discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
b) The final discharge of probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil
rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to totally extinguish
his criminal liability as to the offense for which probation was granted.
13) Concepts.
a) Except for the reasons specified by the law, a trial court should not deny a
petition for probation, especially when the probation officer has favorably
recommended the grant of probation. The denial must be based on the fact
that the accused falls within any one of the disqualification.876 Although an
order granting or denying probation is not appealable, an outright denial by
the court is a nullity which is correctible by certiorari.877
b) A penalty of six years and one day is not entitled to the benefits of the law.
In case of multiple prison terms, the totality of the prison terms should not
be taken into account for the purposes of determining the eligibility of the
accused for the probation. The law uses the word “maximum term”, and not
total term. It is enough that each of the prison term does not exceed 6
years. The number of offenses is immaterial for as long as the penalties
imposed, when taken individually and separately, are within the
probationable period.878
c) Even if at the time of conviction the accused was qualified for probation but
at the time of his application for probation, he is no longer qualified, he is
not entitled to probation. The qualification for probation must be determined
as of the time the application is filed in court.879
g) The accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed
upon the accused were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
Thus, during the period of probation, the probationer is not disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension
from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.883
881 Santos v. Hon. Paňo, G.R. No. L-55130, January 17, 1983.
882 Baclayon v. Hon. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148.
883 Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006 (En Banc).
884 Ibid.
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right
to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC. Some in the
Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by
the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation
law (PD 968) provides: That no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. Since the accused appealed his conviction for frustrated
homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for
probation. But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the
point is not that he has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not
have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds
that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court
allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still
up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of
probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case. Secondly,
it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the
judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted
out to him: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial
court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the
Supreme Court. If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard
position, it will apply the probation law on the accused based on the trial
courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More,
the Supreme Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter
penalty will also have to bend over to the trial courts judgment even if this
has been found in error. And, worse, he will now also be made to pay for
the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply
for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the
horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?885
j) The conditions listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law are not
exclusive. Courts are allowed to impose practically any term it chooses, the
only limitation being that it does not jeopardize the constitutional rights of
the accused. Courts may impose conditions with the end that these
conditions would help the probationer develop into a law-abiding
individual.886
885 Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011 (En Banc). This decision paved
the amendment of the Probation Law in 2015.
886 Baclayon v. Mutia, G.R. No. 59298, April 30, 1984.
a) Under the Probation Law what is suspended is the execution of the
sentence, while RA 9344, what is suspended is the pronouncement of the
sentence upon request of the youthful offender. The suspension of the
sentence, however, has no bearing on the civil liability, which is separate
and distinct from the criminal action.887 Although the execution of sentence
is suspended by the grant of probation, it does not follow that the civil liability
of the offender, if any, is extinguished.888
b) If the accused appeals the civil liability, he can still apply for probation.
Suspension of sentence is only true with criminal liability. Probation does
not extinguish civil liability.889
Chapter Thirteen
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
4. By absolute pardon;
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty
shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first,
second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by RA 4661,
approved June 19, 1966).
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine Archipelago.
Article 92. When and how penalties prescribe. - The penalties imposed
by final sentence prescribe as follows:
1) Total extinction
a) Death;
b) Service of sentence;
c) Amnesty;
d) Absolute pardon;
e) Prescription of crime;
f) Prescription of penalty; and
g) Marriage.
2) Partial extinction.
a) Conditional pardon;890
b) Commutation of sentence;
c) For good conduct allowances.
d) Other causes of partial extinction (not listed in Article 94) are parole and
probation.
a) Death
i) Concept.
890 The discussion on conditional pardon is found under the preceding sub-title on Pardon.
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.891
(2) The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
i) Law
ii) Contracts
iii) Quasi-contracts
iv) x x x x x x
v) Quasi-delicts
(3) Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number (2) above,
an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
(4) Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with [the] provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation
(a) It is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil
liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant
to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case.893
(b) Whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime charged had
become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did
incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were
totally extinguished by his death, following the provisions of
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code.894
(c) Except when the claim for civil liability survives the death of the
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict, such as law, contract, quasi-contracts
and quasi-delicts. Examples of cases where civil liability survives
the death of the accused:
(ii) In the crime of estafa, when the civil liability arises from a civil
contract as in the contract of sale.
(iii) Death of the offended party does not extinguish the criminal
liability of the offender.
Service of sentence
892 People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994; People v. Culas, G.R. No. 211166,
June 5, 2017.
893 People v. Romero, 365 Phil. 531 (1999).
894 People v. Bayotas, supra.
895 Reyes, supra.
a) Concepts
ii) Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal liability.
Article 89 (on total extinguishment) and Article 94 (on partial
extinguishment) of the Revised Penal Code list down the various
grounds for the extinguishment of criminal liability. Not being included in
the list, novation is limited in its effect only to the civil aspect of the
liability, and, for that reason, is not an efficient defense in estafa. This is
because only the State may validly waive the criminal action against an
accused.898 The role of novation may only be either to prevent the rise
of criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic
transaction, whether or not it was such that the breach of the obligation
would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is
made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to.899
(1) The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the
criminal information in court by the state prosecutors because up to
that time the original trust relation may be converted by the parties
into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the
complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust. But after the
justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and instituted
action in court, the offended party may no longer divest the
prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, as
distinguished from the civil. The crime being an offense against the
state, only the latter can renounce it.900
1) Amnesty
b) Concepts.
(1) Amnesty cannot be invoked, where the accused actually denies the
commission of the offense charged. He must admit that he
committed the crime.904
(2) In the grant of amnesty, the Constitution itself provides that it can be
granted by the President only with the concurrence of the Congress.
The concurrence must be given by a majority of all the members of
the Congress.905
(3) Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely
2) Pardon.
a) Nature of pardon.
i) Pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is
bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended
and not communicated officially to the court.908
b) Kinds of pardon.
i) Absolute pardon;
ii) Conditional pardon.
c) Concepts.
ii) Conditional pardon is one under which the convict is required to comply
with certain requirements. The pardonee has the right to reject it since
he may feel that the condition imposed is more onerous than the penalty
sought to be remitted.911
iii) Conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the the Chief
Executive and the convicted criminal. By his consent, he has placed
himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who
i) Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties
and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless
expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot
bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.916
ii) Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although
such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that
office.917
912 In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong, G.R. No. 122338, December 29,
1995.
913 People v. Salle, G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995.
914 Torres v. Gonzales, supra.
915 People v. Casido, et al., G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997.
916 Monsanto v. Factoran, supra.
917 Ibid.
iii) A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends
for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to
make reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required."918
vi) Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences
of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or
forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and
it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence (article 36, Revised Penal
Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.919
vii) Pardon and amnesty do not extinguish the civil liability. Petitioner's civil
liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the
debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and
novation.920
918 Ibid.
919 Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642 [1949]; People v. Casido, et al., G.R. No. 116512,
March 7, 1997.
920 Ibid.
Prescription of crime
1) Prescription of crime is the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to prosecute
the offender after the lapse of a certain time fixed by law. 921
20 years
Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
Afflictive 15 years
Correctional 10 years
Light 2 months
5) Rules to be observed:
b) For violations of special laws, prescription shall begin to run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.922
b) In computing, the first day is to be excluded and the last day included. When
the last day falls on legal holiday or a Sunday, the information can no longer
be filed on the next day as the crime has already prescribed. The waiver or
loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation
of law. Where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a
d) Interruption of the period prescription. Under Article 91 of the Code, the filing
of the complaint or information interrupts the running of the period of
prescription. For purposes of interrupting the period, the said article, in
declaring that the prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed
for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the
merits.926 The filing of the complaint even with the fiscal’s office suspends
the running of the statute of limitations.927
e) The rule applies to both crimes under the Revised Penal Code and special
penal laws. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and
those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period
of prescription.928 The institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation
against the accused interrupts the period of prescription.929 Even
investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for
violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations
Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent
to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases. 930
Commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged.931
October 2008.
931 Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008.
charge for violation of a municipal ordinance, is governed by that rule and
not by Section 1 of Rule 110. Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation.
Although this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a
preliminary investigation if he wants to, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running
of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actual filed
in court and not on any date before that. This interpretation is in consonance
with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are
"judicial proceedings." In conclusion, the Court held that if there be a conflict
between the Rule on Summary Procedure (creation of Sec. 36 of BP Blg.
129) and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between
Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter
must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Prescription in criminal
cases is a substantive right.932
j) As to the issue whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the
investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper criminal
information against respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor, the
answer is in the negative. The proceeding is not terminated upon the City
Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation
that an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains
tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor
until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper
court.935
934 Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua, et al., G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013.
935 People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168641, April 27, 2007.
k) For violation of special penal laws, the absence of the offender from the
Philippines does not toll the running of the prescriptive period. Section 2 of
Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the
offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period.
The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act
No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike the
explicit mandate of Article 91. In the prosecution for violation of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), the law on prescription is found in
Act 3326 which does not provide for the interruption of the period based on
the absence of the offender. The only inference that can be gathered from
the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not
consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to
the running of the prescriptive period.936
l) The Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the absence of the accused
from the Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive
period while Act No. 3326 does not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must
prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies to special
laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to special laws only
suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the contrary. Indeed,
elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that special legal
provisions must prevail over general ones.937
936 Romualdez v. Marcelo, et al., G.R. No. 165510-33, July 28, 2006.
937 Ibid.
938 Section 410, RA 7160.
939 Uy v. Contreras, et al., G.R. No. 111416 September 26, 1994.
940 People v. Basalo, 101 Phil. 57.
26), and hence, prescribes in two months under Article 90. Article 26 has
nothing to do with the definition of offenses, but merely classifies fine, when
imposed as a principal penalty, whether singly or in the alternative into the
categories of afflictive, correctional, and light penalties.941
Prescription of penalties.
1) Prescription of penalty is the loss of the right of the State to execute the final
sentence after a lapse of a certain time.
a) Requisites:
b) Rules to be observed:
941
People v. Hai, G.R. No. L-9598, August 15, 1956.
942 People v. Bellasillo, 81 Phil. 190.
v) Goes to foreign country with which the Philippines has no extradition
treaty;
vi) Commits another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.
c) Concepts
iii) Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of
penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall
commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his
sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service
of sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted
by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence. "Escape"
in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC
means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.
Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to
have escaped therefrom.945
Marriage.
1) Marriages contracted between the offender and the offended party in the crime
of rape, as well as in the crime of abuse of chastity (seduction, abduction, acts
of lasciviousness), to totally extinguish the criminal liability of and the
corresponding penalty that may have been imposed upon those found guilty of
the felony.947 The marriage was entered into in bad faith.
2) Bases of the extinction are Articles 89 and 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
Commutation of sentence
2) Parole consists in the suspension of the sentence of a convict after serving the
minimum of the sentence imposed without granting a pardon, prescribing the
terms upon which the sentence shall be suspended.949
4) Conditional pardon is given by the Chief Executive after conviction under the
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, while parole is given by the
Board of Pardon and Parole to a prisoner who served the minimum of an
indeterminate sentence.;
Article 97. Allowance for good conduct. – The good conduct of any
offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article
29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution,
rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall entitle him to
the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for
each month of good behavior during detention;
1) Nature.
a) Good conduct time allowance reduces the actual time a prisoner will serve
his prison sentence. It arises from having observed prison rules and
regulations and it automatically accrues whenever a person exemplifies
good behavior or spends time for studying, teaching, or mentoring other
prisoners.
a) The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive
imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code; and
b) any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention
center or any other local jail.
3) Period to be deducted.
7) Concepts.
Article 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. – A deduction of one fifth
of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having
evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the
circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the
authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation
announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in
said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period of his sentence shall be
granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement
notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in
Article 158 of this Code.
2) Requisites
a) First type.
952 Kabigting v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-12276, Aug. 26, 1958.
iv) He gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity
or catastrophe or mutiny.
b) Second type.
c) Period of deduction
ii) For second type – two-fifths (2/5) of the period of the sentence.
3) Concepts.
b) Take note, however, that Article 158 has not been amended unlike Article
98 of the Code. Under Article 98, the prisoner is either a detention prisoner
or a convict by final judgment. The offender for evasion of service under
Article 158 is a convict serving final judgment.
a) While the purpose of criminal action is not only to punish offender and deter
others from committing crimes, the purpose of civil action is for the
restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the felonious act of the
accused.954
i) Article 100, Revised Penal Code. Every person criminally liable is civilly
liable.
954 Lo Bun Tiong v. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008.
ii) Article 20, New Civil Code. Every person who contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
iii) Article 2176, New Civil Code. The civil liability arising from negligence
under the Revised Penal Code is entirely distinct and separate from
responsibility for fault or negligence called quasi-delict.
iv) Article 1161, Civil Code. Civil obligation arising from criminal offenses
shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 2177.
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law;
(5) Quasi-delicts.
iii) State of necessity - Generally, the offender is not civilly liable. The
person benefitted by the act is civilly liable.
i) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted except (a) where
there is waiver, (b) there is reservation to file it separately; or institution
of civil action prior to criminal action.957
ii) What is deemed instituted is only the action to recover civil liability
arising from the crime.
iii) The waiver must be made before the court where the criminal action is
pending. It must be made by the offended party.
iv) After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
entered in the criminal action.958
v) The offended party is given the option to file a separate civil action by
reserving the right in the criminal action. The reservation must be made
before the prosecution presents its evidence. The offended party is
deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before
the filing of criminal action. The civil action is suspended.959
vi) If the criminal action is filed after the civil action has already been
instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final
judgment is rendered.960
vii) Independent civil actions (ICAs) are those provided under Articles 32,
33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code. They may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without reservation in the criminal
action. Failure to make reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver
of the right to file separate or independent action.
f) Rules regarding criminal and civil prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22.
(1) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to
file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
ii) With respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22, it is explicitly clear
that the corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a
reservation to file such separately is not allowed.
iv) May the accused be held civilly liable in estafa case after he was
acquitted in the case for violation of BP Blg. 22? Yes. While the filing of
the two sets of Information under the provisions of BP Blg. 22 and under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may
refer to identical acts committed by the petitioner, the prosecution
thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act
may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or
differences between the elements of an offense is one law and another
law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what
the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the
two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not
prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense.
Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself
give rise to double jeopardy.962
v) Reason for the prohibition: This rule was enacted to help declog court
dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the
961 Heirs of Eduardo Simon v. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 157457, February 23, 2011.
962 Rimando v. Aldaba, et al., G.R. No. 203583, October 13, 2014.
courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in
criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect
of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon
being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of
the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the
number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of
these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal
and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried.963
ii) Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court,
the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist. This is because when the
accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence
both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on
record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do
is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence
and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for
the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for
the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the
case.966
963 Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation, G.R. No.
163597, July 29, 2005.
964 Daluraya v. Oliva, G.R. No. 210148, December 8, 2014.
965 Dayap v. Sendiong, 597 Phil. 127 (2009).
966 Ibid. citing Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, 544 Phil. 431, 444 (2007).
iii) In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment
state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act
or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.967
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Article 105. Restitution; How made. - The restitution of the thing itself
must be made whenever possible, with allowance for any deterioration, or
diminution of value as determined by the court.
This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been
acquired by the third person in the manner and under the requirements
which, by law, bar an action for its recovery.
Article 106. Reparation; How made. - The court shall determine the
amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing, whenever
possible, and its special sentimental value to the injured party, and
reparation shall be made accordingly.
Article 109. Share of each person civilly liable. - If there are two or
more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the
amount for which each must respond.
4) Although money has been accepted as the most frequently used means of
punishing, deterring, compensating and regulating injury throughout the legal
system, it has been explained that money in the context of damages is not
5) The civil indemnity for death, being compensatory in nature, must attune to
contemporaneous economic realities; otherwise, the desire to justly indemnify
would be thwarted or rendered meaningless. This has been the legislative
justification for pegging the minimum, but not the maximum, of the indemnity.971
a) Death indemnity refers to the award given to the heirs of the deceased as
a form of monetary restitution or compensation for the death of the victim at
the hands of the accused. Its grant is mandatory and a matter of course,
and without need of proof other than the fact of death as the result of the
crime or quasi-delict. It derives from the legal obligation of the accused or
the defendant to fully compensate the heirs of the deceased for his death
as the natural consequence of the criminal or quasi-delictual act or
omission;
b) Loss of earning capacity of the deceased to be paid to the heirs of the latter;
(a) Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy,
shall be computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at
death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or
the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality.973
970 Ibid.
971 People v. Oandasan, G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016 (En Banc).
972 Ibid.
973 Candano Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Sugata-on, G.R. No. 163212, March 13, 2007.
c) The heirs may demand support from the person causing the death, for a
period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
d) Moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased
may be demanded by the heirs of the latter.
g) In addition, the foregoing are subject to interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid.
i) Frustrated:
(1) Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
(2) Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
(3) Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
i) Attempted:
(1) Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
(2) Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
(3) Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
974 People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 6, 2016 (En Banc).
c) Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
i) Frustrated:
(1) Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
(2) Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
(3) Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
ii) Attempted:
(1) Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
(2) Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
(3) Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
b) Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:
c) Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
d) Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
i) Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
ii) Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
iii) Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
3) For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death,
injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual
abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty consists of indivisible
penalties:
b) Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
4) The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime
committed. In other complex crimes where death does not result, like in
Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary
damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed, as the
case may be.
5) For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, Robbery with Rape,
Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, Robbery with Arson, Rape with
Homicide, Kidnapping with Murder, Carnapping with Homicide or Carnapping
with Rape, Highway Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Piracy, Arson with
Homicide, Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation and other crimes
with death, injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
b) For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not
for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
d) Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
e) For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not
for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
(3) Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise
apply, and that for every additional rape committed, whether against
the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the
same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as
separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple
rape/qualified rape shall apply.
6) In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of
divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to
conceal the dishonor of the offender, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
b) Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes
where there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under
tumultuous affray:
i. Frustrated:
(1) Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00
(2) Moral damages – ₱30,000.00
b) Attempted:
(1) Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
(2) Moral damages – ₱20,000.00
7) In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and
death occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are
entitled to the following:
i) Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
ii) Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
iii) Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
a) For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the
rebellion and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the
following shall be awarded:
975 Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013.
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have
given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation
of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code deals with the subsidiary liability of
innkeepers, tavern keepers, and proprietors of establishments.
2) In the second paragraph of Article 102, when all of the following elements are
present, the innkeeper is subsidiarily liable:
3) Even if the guests did not deposit their goods and a notice of disclaimer of
liability was posted in a hotel, it does not free the owner from subsidiary liability.
It is enough that the goods were stolen within the inn.
The elements:
ii) Article 1161 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from
criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the
provision of Article 2177. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative
remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the
possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-
delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of
action in his initiatory pleading or complaint,979 and not with the
iii) Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct
or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.
iv) Distinctions of subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code and
Civil Code.
(1) Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from
a delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor
and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is
to be based. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be
proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal
action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and
corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was
instituted, the employer's liability would not be predicated under
Article 103.
(2) On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code,
liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer
primarily liable for tortious acts of its employees subject, however, to
the defense that the former exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employees.980
1) payment or performance;
2) loss of the thing due;
3) condonation or remission of the debt;
4) confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
980 Franco et al., v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 71137, October 5, 1989.
5) Compensation;
6) Novation
a) Loss of the thing due does not extinguish civil liability because if the
offender cannot make restitution, he is obliged to make reparation.
Unless extinguished, civil liability subsists even if the offender has served
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights or has served
the same, due to amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any
other reason.
Unless extinguished, civil liability subsists even if the offender has served
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights or has not served the
same, due to amnesty, pardon, commutation of the sentence or any other reason.
1) Under the law as amended, even if the subsidiary imprisonment is served for
non- payment of fines, this pecuniary liability of the defendant is not
extinguished.
2) While amnesty wipes out all traces and vestiges of the crime, it does not
extinguish the civil liability of the offender.981 A pardon shall in no case exempt
the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.982