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W A I T I N G F O R T H E P E O P L E
WAITING FOR THE P
EOPLE
The Idea of Democracy in Indian Anticolonial Thought
• NAZMUL SULTAN
T H E B E L K N A P P R E S S O F H A RVA R D U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S
First printing
9780674295049 (EPUB)
97806742945070 (PDF)
Introduction
Waiting for the People 1
CHAPTER ONE
CHAPTER TWO
CHAPTER THREE
CHAPTER FOUR
CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion
The Futures of Anticolonial Political Thought 219
NOTES 235
ACKNOWLE DGMENTS 289
INDEX 293
vi C ontents
W A I T I N G F O R T H E P E O P L E
VLADIMIR: . . . What do we do now?
ESTRAGON: Wait.
1
Stuart Mill and Thomas Babington Macaulay had already helped estab-
lish. Yet the question of the Indian p eople—despite its putative historical
nonbeing—proved to be both tenacious and decisive. This book is the
story of the abstract figure that s haped the terms of anticolonial struggle
and the pursuit of democracy in India: the p eople.
The Indian anticolonial democratic project would be fundamentally
driven by the perceived need to transform the historically “backward” and
politically amorphous colonial “masses” into the people: this I call the
problem of peoplehood. There was more to the problem than the chal-
lenge of constituting preexisting groups into a cohesive p eople, which
is an indispensable element of democratic politics anywhere. Rather,
because the political qualities of peoplehood themselves appeared to be a
product of historical development, the project of turning the masses into
the p eople became embroiled in a set of paradigmatic problems ulti-
mately to do with the conditions of possibility of democracy in the colo-
nial world. As a conceptual dilemma proper, this problem of peoplehood
transcended its British uses as a legitimating trope. Nearly all the canon-
ical anticolonial thinkers—ranging from Surendranath Banerjea (1848–
1925) to Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964)—struggled with the seemingly
irrefutable premise of an absent Indian peoplehood. Having offered com-
pelling arguments for Indian self-rule, thinkers as different as Dadabhai
Naoroji (1825–1917) and Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920) found them-
selves left with a “not-yet” people whose right to self-government could
not be articulated in sovereign terms. B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956), a fter
submitting the draft constitution of the new republic of India, considered
it necessary to remind his audience that Indians w ere still not a p
eople at
3
home with the demands of democracy. The figure of the p eople—the sine
qua non of modern democracy—had turned out to be the marker of an
enduring problem in India.
Contrary to the well-worn trope, the history of popular sovereignty
in the colonial world was not simply one of sovereignty denied (by em-
pire) and reclaimed (by anticolonial actors). The structure of the “denial”
unalterably transformed the meaning of p opular sovereignty and demo
cratic government for Indian political thinkers. Modern colonialism
was not simply a new spin on the timeless trope of conquest, nor was an-
ticolonial political thought a mere exercise in overcoming foreign rule.
From the nineteenth century onward, colonialism was understood and
2 W A I T I N G F O R T H E P E O P L E
justified in what might be called democratic terms. Central to the demo
cratic signification of colonialism had been the framework of develop-
mentalism, whose historical and analytical purchase surpassed its use
as an imperial promise of progress. That British rule was an undemo
cratic form of foreign rule was not in doubt. Yet the developmental ho-
rizon initially claimed by the empire ultimately became inseparable from
the emergence of democracy as a globally legible category. The develop-
mental vision located the source of global p olitical differences in dif
ferent stages of peoplehood, thereby rendering the globe politically
thinkable as a hierarchy of peoples.
The question of the people consumed Indian political life well be-
fore its juridical triumph at postcolonial founding: the force of its pur-
ported absence had already begun to shape p olitical imagination in the
nineteenth century. That the power exercised by “the authority of the
‘absent people’ ” is a constitutive element of modern parliamentary de-
mocracy has been underscored by scholars of democracy.4 Its reach, how-
ever, was deeper in colonial India and of a fundamentally different sort,
for it originated a political tradition where democracy itself was experi-
enced in a distinct manner. Thanks to the diagnosis that the p eople as a
political entity was lacking in India, the premise of sovereign peoplehood
could not be taken for granted; it had instead turned into the goal to be
aspired for. Self-government, then, appeared to be something not so
much authorized by the people as generative of sovereign peoplehood.
Against this backdrop, Indian p olitical thinkers took it upon themselves
not just to reclaim the sovereignty denied to their people but also to ad-
dress the theoretical assumptions that rendered the democratic ideal
compatible with the imperial geography of the globe. At once the ground
and promise of colonialism, the figure of the p eople came to be central
to Indian anticolonial thinkers’ quest for democracy in a world fractured
along the purportedly m easurable capacity for self-rule.
T H E G L O B A L C A R E E R O F P O P U L A R S O V E R E I G N T Y
Though the study of p opular sovereignty has long been beset with fun-
damental disagreements, the conflicting series of propositions associ-
ated with the discourse of p
opular sovereignty have propelled, rather than
stymied, its emergence as the ground of modern democracy. Popular
I ntro d uction 3
sovereignty thrived, as it w ere, on its many claimants and detractors.
Reflecting on the revolutionary origins of the idea of p opular sovereignty,
Hannah Arendt speculated that “if this notion [le peuple] has reached
four corners of the earth, it is not because of any influence of abstract
ideas but b ecause of its obvious plausibility u nder conditions of abject
5
poverty.” I do not share the assumption that “abstract ideas” of the
people were unimportant in the global career of popular sovereignty, or
that “abject poverty” has a universal political import.6 However, Ar-
endt’s underscoring of the singular global reach of the p opular sover-
eignty discourse captures a point of utmost importance: if democracy
has now acquired the status of the sole “secular claimant” of p olitical
7
legitimacy, it is primarily b ecause of the incontestability of the founda-
tion of p opular sovereignty.
While representative and centralized forms of democratic govern-
ment faced much skepticism in the global nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, the sovereignty of the p eople, as an ideal, met with no mean-
ingful normative challenge. A fter storming the heaven of sovereignty, 8
the “people” seemed to have conquered the globe—sometime between
the g reat eighteenth-century revolutions and mid-t wentieth-century
decolonization, and somewhere behind the main stage of social and
economic history. The story of this singular conquest is generally told
with reference to the tremendous social and economic transformations
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But alongside these changes,
the global rise of the p eople was also a story of intellectual transforma-
tions. The stubborn persistence of diffusionist approaches in the
global history of democracy means that the framework of dissemina-
tion and reception tends to obfuscate the transformation and reconsti-
tution of democratic ideas themselves. As we shall see, anticolonial
aspirants for popular sovereignty were locked in a conflict with an impe-
rial project that had—however contradictorily—sought to derive its le-
gitimacy from a contesting, global narrative of peoplehood. It is partly
due to the history of this conflict that the age of decolonization dou-
bled as the global vindication of p opular sovereignty.
The strength and ubiquity of popular sovereignty lies in its roots as
a discourse of authorization. The modern recognition that the figure of
the p
eople no longer amounts to a “visibly identifiable gathering of au-
tonomous citizens”9 shifted the primary stake of the popular sovereignty
4 W A I T I N G F O R T H E P E O P L E
discourse to the processes of claiming authorization from the abstraction
called “the p eople.” Invocations of the p eople in p
olitical modernity are
necessarily an exercise in speaking in the name of an entity that does not
empirically exist as a homogeneous, empirically locatable subject. This
foundational abstraction of “the p eople” notwithstanding, much of the
contemporary theoretical dispute around popular sovereignty concerns
not whether the people is the ultimate political authority but instead
how to enact and institutionalize the authority vested in it. Regardless
of how critical of p opular rule a contemporary liberal political thinker
might be, the procedure of p opular consent—which traces the sovereignty
of the state to the p eople—is essential.10 Radical d emocrats—while over-
whelmingly critical of representative democracy—a rticulate their extra-
institutional vision of democracy through the figure of the p eople.11
Deliberative democratic theorists too find it necessary to account for a
procedural authorization of rights and laws in the w ill of the people,
notwithstanding their attempts to render the people as “ ‘subjectless’
forms of communication circulating through forums and legislative
bodies.”12 Though disagreements over what exactly constitutes p opular
authorization—and how it must be politically instituted—are abundant,13
what has come to be beyond dispute, barring some residual protesta-
tions, is the idea that democratic legitimacy requires an authorization
from the people.
The distinction between sovereignty and government was crucial to
the formation of modern popular sovereignty as an authorizing ideal.
The concept of sovereignty, since its medieval origin, had implied that
“authorising the actions of a government” is not the same as “governing.”
Sovereignty thus meant not so much the holding of p olitical offices as
the power to decide who would constitute the government and to pass
fundamental legislation. As Richard Tuck has shown, the sovereignty–
government distinction was constitutive of the idea of p opular sover-
eignty since Jean Bodin and ran through canonical modern political
philosophers ranging from Thomas Hobbes to Jean-Jacques Rousseau.14
The very emergence of a constitutional theory of public authority in the
early modern era was likewise indebted to the incipient doctrine of
popular sovereignty. The limited government of the constitutional order
had become theoretically possible owing to the “unlimited” power ascribed
eople.15 It was, however, only with the two classical revolutions
to the p
I ntro d uction 5
of the late eighteenth century—the French and the American—that
popular sovereignty began to acquire the public legitimacy that it now
enjoys. The French and American revolutionaries vigorously debated
the meaning of popular sovereignty, taking paths that were neither
identical nor short of novel challenges. The limited government of
American constitutionalism and the transformative vision of French re-
publicanism both nevertheless emboldened the idea that the p eople are
the source of authority and the foundation of legitimacy.
For all its centrality to the modern constitutional order, p opular sov-
ereignty has been no less salient to extraconstitutional claims of
political authorization. The invocation of popular sovereignty both by
institutional and extra-institutional actors, as Jason Frank has argued,
is enabled by the fact that “the p eople” is more of a claim than a deter-
minate object. The “constitutive surplus” of popular sovereignty—t he
surplus that remains despite institutional authorization derived from
the p eople—tends to outlive the founding event and continues to serve
as a reservoir for popular claim-m aking.16 Modern democracy rode
the waves of many popular insurrections, and the founding power
associated with the self- authorizing people shaped institutional
ideals of democracy as much as the dictions of p opular politics. To
complicate the m atter further, the essential claimability of the people
means that both governmental and extragovernmental actors could
invoke the name of the p eople, thus transcending strict constitutional
protocols for popular authorization. Indeed, as Bryan Garsten ar-
gues, the multiplication and contestability of “governmental claims
to represent the people” is a germane feature of modern representa-
tive democracy.17
The figure of the insurrectionary p eople no doubt coexists with the
specter of the riotous mob. The “strong cleanser of rationality and the
stiff brush of virtue” notwithstanding, the idea of the p eople has proved
to be hard to sanitize,18 resisting its circumscription to either constitu-
tional or extraconstitutional guises. Though the power of the people may
seem to be anchored in a naturalized “folk foundationalism,” the plural
purchase of p opular sovereignty is more than a symptom of its intellec-
tual deficiency.19 The concept of the p eople works as more of a “bedrock”
(in a Wittgensteinian sense) than as a transparent epistemic foundation: it
is the ground where “the spade turns,” not so much because it is an
6 W A I T I N G F O R T H E P E O P L E
intrinsically self-justifying foundation but rather because it is “held fast
by what lies around.”20 The concept of the people operates as the legiti-
mating ground for almost all modern democratic reasoning and prac-
tices, from the constitution to routine electoral politics. The self-
evident character of popular sovereignty owes essentially to the way in
which the complex order of modern democratic norms and institutions
trace their ultimate foundation in it.
That the question of popular sovereignty also animated the modern
history of colonialism and anticolonial resistance in all its messiness
has been less studied and less understood. This is in part because in the
colonial world the emergence of the people was neither historically par-
allel nor conceptually analogous to the European experience. The begin-
ning of the British conquest of India in the mid-eighteenth century
triggered thorny questions of conquest and legitimacy (without any
meaningful reference to p opular sovereignty), leading to Edmund
Burke’s famous trial of Warren Hastings and the larger “scandal of
empire.”21 The framework of ancient constitutionalism shaped the
terms of the dispute concerning what gave the British the right to rule
over India in the final d ecades of the eighteenth c entury. 22 As the self-
understanding and legitimating discourses of imperial rule went
through a transformation in the early nineteenth century, the question
of the people—or rather its absence in India—slowly emerged as the main
framework for the p olitical legitimation of British rule. The British claim
that the justification of imperial rule consisted in developing the people
so as to make India fit for self-government paradoxically conceded
the supremacy of the principle of popular sovereignty. A principle but
not a fact, the question of peoplehood turned into the end goal of for-
eign government. In this way, as we s hall see throughout the book, the
modern distinction between sovereignty and government found a new
expression in the colonial world. This colonial birth of popular sover-
eignty was not centered on debates around democracy ancient and
modern; rather, it was born out of a paradigmatic conviction about the
untimeliness of democracy in the backward non-European world vis-
à-vis the European world.
“The people,” argues Bernard Yack, “exists in a kind of eternal present.
It never ages or dies.”23 Though Yack notes that the concept of the p eople
is of relatively modern origin, its conceptual significance, he contends,
I ntro d uction 7
is primarily spatial, not temporal. In its global unfolding, the concept
of the people, on the contrary, has been entangled in temporal—or to be
more specific, developmentalist—concerns. To be sure, in normative
and constitutional reasoning, the people necessarily features as a given
entity. While one might dispute who the “real” people are and what
their authority may entail, the question as to the existence of the people
is not a problem that one is ordinarily faced with. This was precisely the
assumption that came to be undone in the colonial world. In colonial
India, as we s hall see, the name of the p eople was replete with temporal
markers—its existence as a recognizable p olitical entity was rendered
conditional on prior historical criteria. The conceptual birth of the
people in India, strangely, amounted to its historical absence.
From the nineteenth c entury onward, the figure of the Indian p eople
came to descriptively embody the underdevelopment ascribed to its
moral and material history. If, in the modern European history of
popular sovereignty, the s ociological deprivation and historical subjec-
tion of the masses bolstered the argument concerning their unrealized
sovereignty,24 these same phenomena would stand for the disqualification
of the sovereign claim of the people in India. The social lack attributed
to the Indian p eople directly undermined its claim to “political abstrac-
tion.”25 Throughout the colonial era, representations of mass underde-
velopment pervaded Indian political thought: expressions such as “the
starving millions” and “ignorant masses” bled into the characterization
of the Indian people as politically unfit. Likewise, the diversity of India
across regional and religious lines appeared as evidence of the absence
of a unified entity called the people. Normatively, the perceived inade-
quacy of Indian peoplehood helped legitimate the suspension of their
sovereignty, for only a fit people could institute and practice self-
government. The institution of self-government among a backward
people was claimed to be not just impractical but, more damningly, a
hindrance toward the growth of developed peoplehood. The ultimate
promise that the empire made was not simply the prosaic objective of
training a p eople in the institution of self-government; it was to bring
into being the Indian people itself.
In established accounts of anticolonial p olitical thought, the nation-
alist claim to popular sovereignty is understood to be central to over-
turning imperial sovereignty in the twentieth century, with l ittle or no
8 W A I T I N G F O R T H E P E O P L E
differentiation between the “nation” and the “people.”26 In Waiting for the
People I present a different story. The democratic dilemma that was con-
stitutive of modern colonialism can scarcely be captured through the
category of the nation. From Bipin Chandra Pal to Jawaharlal Nehru, In-
dian political thinkers, despite their qualified acceptance of “anticolo-
nial nationalism,” struggled to posit sovereign authority in the Indian
people. For most of the colonial era, the questions pertaining to the
boundary and common belonging of the people—the standard elements
of nationhood—were recognized and yet understood in relation to the
broader normative horizon centered on the problem of the democratic
fitness of the Indian masses. The entanglement of the concept of the
people with a powerful narrative concerning the global progression of
democracy meant that Indian p olitical thinkers could not simply claim
the atemporal universality of popular sovereignty, turning a blind eye
to their all-too-developmental existence. What they did—a nd what I re-
cover in this book—is wrestle with the terms and times of modern p opular
sovereignty, and thereby investigate the meaning of democracy itself.
D E V E L O P M E N TA L I S M A N D T H E D E M O C R AT I C L E G I T I M AT I O N
OF EMPIRE
I ntro d uction 9
developmentalist paradigm. It is curious, then, that for most of the
twentieth c entury, an age of global democracy marked by innumerable
anticolonial rebellions and foundings, the problems of empire and an-
ticolonialism posed questions pertaining to the applicability of ideas
and norms rather than foundational matters in the discipline of
political theory. This neglect had much to do with the p olitical success
of anticolonialism. The rise of new postcolonial states, along with the
normative codification of the right to self-determination in the inter-
national domain, had seemingly settled the colonial question. It had
become simply a “morally objectionable form of political relation”: the
unjust domination of one people over another.29 The moralization of
the question of colonialism, however, runs a distinct risk: it obscures
how colonial rule in Asia and Africa was fundamentally predicated on
claims about the condition of possibility of the otherwise unquestioned
(moral) norm of democratic self-r ule.
The reinvention of empire in the age of the democratic revolution
transformed the ideal of democracy as much as it remade the meaning
of imperial rule. The temporal texture of the democratic revolution—that
the rise of equality was the sign of a universal future to come—not only
facilitated a new approach to pre-democratic pasts but also rendered
philosophically superfluous the question concerning the immediate uni-
versality of p olitical norms. The lesson of the nineteenth century, John
Stuart Mill once noted revealingly, was to historicize the “ought”: “dif
ferent stages of h uman progress not only will have (which must always
have been evident), but ought to have, different institutions.”30 The norms
were not to be simply relativized; if anything, the universality of a
political norm such as self-government rested directly on the necessarily
provisional history of its antecedent. The entwined history of empire and
democracy lay in this very conjuncture.
In the wake of the postcolonial turn later in the twentieth century,
historians debated the exact manner in which colonialism constituted
a break with the precolonial past and the new forms of practice global-
ized through colonial governmentality. 31 The ensuing reconsideration
of colonial statehood and ideology further established that colonialism
could be neither reduced to universal sociology nor analytically circum-
scribed to the realm of exceptions. Political theorists have also amply
demonstrated that the extraordinary confidence with which E uropean
10 W A I T I N G F O R T H E P E O P L E
empires ruled over the world was not unrelated—to put it mildly—to the
heartland of E uropean intellectual preoccupations, be it liberalism
or the rise of social theory.32 The result has been a coming together of
otherwise sequestered worlds of p olitical thought. In particular, the
framework of liberalism, thanks to its overt commitment to the idea
of prog ress, has inspired some of the most powerf ul observations on
the mutual constitution of the metropolitan and colonial intellec-
tual worlds. The pioneering work on liberal imperialism has recov-
ered the pivotal role that the discourses of progress and development
played in nineteenth-century legitimations of empire. T hese explora-
tions of the intimacy between progress and empire laid bare the forma-
tive reconciliation of the despotic fact of imperial rule with the norms
of liberalism. 33
Though E uropean imperial expansion flourished in the age of demo
cratic revolutions, the question of democracy has mostly been a foot-
note to the scholarship on liberal imperialism. 34 Beneath the liberal
motifs of civilization and progress, as we shall see from the colonial
vantage point, lay the foundational problem of democracy. In this book’s
telling, the category of the p eople was central to the theoretical assimi-
lation of prog ress and empire in democratic thought. In the global
nineteenth century, democracy was neither simply a humanistic cate-
gory nor merely a problem of reason and cognition. W hether we look at
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America or Mill’s Considerations on Represen-
tative Government, democracy was ineluctably mired in a paradoxical
struggle with its own historical conditions. This struggle simultaneously
necessitated the containment of the p eople possessed by sovereign drives
in the metropolitan world, and the prioritization of the development
of modern peoplehood elsewhere. The progressive ordering of the
people, forged in the global landscape of empire, resulted in an inge-
nious democratic gloss on foreign despotism. The argument that despo-
tism was necessary for certain stages of historical development for the
sake of democracy itself was no doubt a sleight of reason, but it was a
move that capitalized the immanent contradictions of demo cratic
thought. The liberal-imperial discourse of progress, in the p rocess, es-
sentially performed a “democratic” justification of imperial rule.
Perceptive liberal imperialists like Mill, not to mention Indian
political thinkers, found it difficult to ignore the patent despotism of
I ntro d uction 11
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
[20] R. P. Bernadot, O. P. : « L’action surnaturelle dans
la restauration dominicaine au XIXe siècle : La Mère Claire
Moës ». Je m’appuie, pour cette étude (qui a paru dans
La Vie spirituelle) sur cet excellent opuscule, et j’utilise la
biographie d’Anna Moës adaptée de l’allemand, d’après
l’ouvrage de l’abbé Barthel : La Mère Marie-Dominique-
Claire de la Sainte-Croix (Couvent des Dominicaines, à
Limpertsberg, Luxembourg, 1910).
D’autre part, son catholicisme lui valut des hostilités sans merci ;
l’intransigeance, en critique, de ses convictions, gênait les croyants
de moyenne espèce non moins que les libres penseurs. Quand les
catholiques subissaient l’erreur du libéralisme, d’Aurevilly, avec ses
axiomes foudroyants pour la tolérance, sa fidélité à expliquer
l’histoire dans le sens absolu de l’Église et à scruter les événements
sous le flambeau de ses seules doctrines, effarait la quiétude des
compromis. Comme il ne s’embrigada dans nulle faction politique,
pas plus qu’il ne voulut être d’aucun cénacle ni d’aucune Académie,
les milieux cléricaux se méfièrent d’un si redoutable paladin. La
médiocratie, soi-disant religieuse, réprouva, plus que des maîtres
incroyants, un artiste qui, s’avérant catholique, représentait sans
fausses décences les désordres de la chair, ou ailleurs exaltait le
saint et le pauvre, ces deux épouvantails des honnêtes gens.
Et pourtant, dès ici proclamons-le, Barbey d’Aurevilly restera une
des gloires les plus solides du catholicisme intellectuel, au siècle
dernier. Ses romans ont prouvé — ce que Chateaubriand n’avait su
démontrer par l’exemple — qu’un art imbu de surnaturalisme, six
cents ans après Dante, est encore possible, et que les sources des
intuitions supérieures ne sont point fermées pour nous. En tant
qu’essayiste et philosophe catholique, moins perçant que Joseph de
Maistre dans l’acuité des aperçus, il le vaut par la décision et
l’ampleur de son dogmatisme. Il ramena toutes les modulations de
ses idées à cette unique évidence « qu’en dehors du catholicisme il
n’y a rien de profond nulle part » ; postulat dont sa propre
expérience vérifia l’absolue justesse ; car si sa foi ne fut pas tout son
génie, son génie, hors de sa foi, n’eût été qu’une flamme errante,
dévastatrice, s’agitant au gré des partis pris et des passions.
Ce qu’il dut à ses croyances, il le savait d’autant mieux que, sans
avoir jamais renié son patrimoine de catholicisme, jusqu’à son âge
mûr il le laissa dormir infructueusement. Ses deux premiers
Memoranda (1836-1838), ses poèmes de jeunesse, Léa, Amaïdée,
Ce qui ne meurt pas, accusent les égarements de sensibilité, la
détresse d’orgueil où ses forces eussent dépéri, s’il ne fût enfin
revenu, de tout son élan, aux tonifiantes réfections des nourritures
sacramentelles.
Après une phase juvénile, celle de son droit à Caen, — il rêvait
alors « d’une vie fringante, du bruit militaire, des charges et des
sonneries, des uniformes et des aiguillettes », — il éprouva, entre
vingt-cinq et trente ans surtout, une période d’anémie sentimentale,
« de tristesse sèche », de « sensation du néant ». Le byronisme
l’atteignit plus intimement que bien d’autres, parce qu’il trouvait une
séduction à cette amertume méprisante de l’aristocrate qui s’ennuie.
L’ennui devenait « le dieu de sa vie ». Il se jugeait « vieux, vieux,
vieux ». Des veilles démesurées, un régime bizarre — souvent il
dînait d’une tranche de melon ou d’un morceau de sucre, ou même
ne dînait pas du tout — entretinrent son état mélancolique. Lorsqu’il
restait seul, dans sa chambre, au crépuscule, des angoisses
indéfinies l’oppressaient ; un temps pluvieux, l’après-midi d’un
dimanche, par les rues désertes, le navraient comme un abandon.
Irrégulier d’humeur, capricieux, à ses moments les plus moroses
il débitait « des folies et des fatuités » ou cédait à une paresse
torpide, singulière chez un artiste, plus tard si productif — sa
promptitude d’action ne devait, au reste, en nul temps, exclure une
certaine pente à l’indolence, au reploiement ; empoigner son labeur
« avec une rapidité d’oiseau de proie », n’était-ce pas une façon de
s’en libérer plus vite ? — Sa voracité de lectures trompait son
isolement ; il lisait n’importe quoi, même les Mémoires du Diable de
Soulié, pour « voir ce que c’était ». Avec cela, des riens frivoles
comblaient le vide de ses heures : la venue du coiffeur est rarement
omise dans son journal ; il se faisait de l’essayage d’une redingote
une affaire grave. Il fréquentait quelques salons, s’y composait un
rôle de nonchalante et sarcastique supériorité, ne trahissant son
fond passionné que par des concetti et des traits étincelants. Mais,
quoiqu’il se donnât le maintien d’un héros selon Stendhal, il n’aurait
pu, comme Stendhal, rester sèchement l’analyste retors des
hypocrisies mondaines. Dès son petit livre du Dandysme et son
roman de l’Amour impossible, la verve du poète frémit sous les
rigueurs de l’analyse.
Ses froideurs de dandy cachaient une ténuité d’impressions
morbide, des facultés d’analogies aussi subtiles que celles des
lyriques anglais. La vue d’une capote de soie blanche avec un nœud
flottant le remuait pour toute une soirée ; un beau jour de
septembre, dans une lumière ambrée, lui causait des sensations
« inavouables, tant elles étaient incompréhensibles. » Ses idées,
quand elles se cristallisaient en maximes, affectaient une finesse
d’antithèse presque féminine :
« Si la perte de ce qui fut est amère, notait-il un matin, la perte
de ce qui n’a pas été l’est bien davantage [30] . »
[30] Deuxième mémorandum, p. 23.
Une grande affection sans espoir pour une femme qu’il revit à de
rares intervalles creusait au centre de sa vie comme un puits de
silence et de douleur murée ; des passades sensuelles eurent peine à
l’en divertir ; il aimait, en damoiseau nerveux qu’il était, les femmes
sculpturales, ou d’une animalité provocante ; toutefois, peu capable
de plaisir, lorsqu’il ne l’intellectualisait point par le sentiment et
l’imagination.
Ses amis, Guérin et Trebutien entre tous, l’occupaient plus que
ses maîtresses : il s’enivrait de causeries métaphysiques, de
correspondances insatiables.
D’Aurevilly, vers cette époque, semblait promettre une sorte de
Musset, moins impulsif, plus abstrait, plus réfléchi.
Chez lui, la violence des instincts n’opprima que par crises le libre
arbitre. Son besoin de domination sur les autres et sur lui-même, ou,
pour mieux dire, son invincible aristocratie le préserva des grossiers
dévergondages. Porté, comme tout Normand, aux liqueurs fortes, il
s’interdisait d’en faire abus ; il s’exerçait à ne point se rendre
l’esclave même des femmes qui lui plaisaient. De même que Julien
Sorel, dans le Rouge et le Noir, il cherchait les occasions de petites
victoires réitérées, afin de se prouver la force de son ascendant :
« On obtient tout ce qu’on veut des hommes, écrivait-il, par la
persistance sans colère et par l’idée fixe éternellement reproduite
dans les mêmes termes et les mêmes accents. » En attendant, il se
contentait, au cours d’une discussion, de « ne pas se laisser
désarçonner plus qu’un centaure » ; il s’imposait d’accepter avec
calme les déconvenues ; il aurait voulu, à l’exemple de Napoléon,
pouvoir prendre et quitter librement « le poids de ses pensées, se
maintenir maître, en toute occurrence, de transposer son attention ».
Il s’indignait, approchant de la trentaine, d’avoir, jusque-là, si peu
agi :
« Qu’ai-je fait et que suis-je ? Qu’est-ce que je laisserais d’achevé,
de forclos, si je mourais ? »
Mais sa volonté se cherchait encore sans objet vital, et aurait pu
s’ankyloser dans le vide, ou dévier vers de faux principes.
Actuellement, par cela seul qu’il se détermina dans un autre sens, on
le concevrait mal, confondant, comme le Vigny d’Eloa, l’amour avec
la pitié, puis, détrompé des faiblesses du cœur, se raidissant vers un
stoïcisme de désespoir, celui des Destinées. Tel est l’orbe pourtant
où s’enferme Allan de Cinthry, le héros de Ce qui ne meurt pas.
Ailleurs, le philosophe Altaï — c’est d’Aurevilly lui-même — s’est mis
en tête de sauver la courtisane Amaïdée ; il l’entraîne dans la
solitude, au bord de l’Océan, auprès de son ami, le poète Somegod
(Maurice de Guérin). Amaïdée, s’ennuyant, prend la fuite, retourne à
sa vie d’esclave, et Altaï conclut en fataliste : « On ne relève pas une
femme tombée, et toujours la chute est mortelle. »
Il eût été difficile à Barbey d’Aurevilly, avec sa claire vue ironique
des indigences humaines, de s’en tenir à de folâtres chimères, de
croire à la bonté de l’espèce et à la souveraineté de la raison. Le
danger, pour un byronien épris de Stendhal, paraissait plutôt de finir
dans un pessimisme insultant ; les perverses leçons du XVIIIe siècle,
dont il ne fut pas indemne, — et c’est pourquoi il l’eut si fort en
exécration, — l’incitaient à envisager l’existence comme une
fantasmagorie d’art, ou une grimace de vanité plus ridicule encore
que féroce, et derrière laquelle il n’y a rien. Il serait alors devenu ce
qu’une malveillance radoteuse s’entête à déprécier en lui, un homme
tout de décor et d’attitude, un cabotin de haute parade.
Son retour au catholicisme disciplina ses penchants, rectifia les
oscillations de son intelligence, ouvrit à ses énergies instables un
champ de certitude et d’alacrité. Eugénie de Guérin le définissait
auparavant « un beau palais où il y avait un labyrinthe ». Désormais,
le labyrinthe simplifié se convertit peu à peu en une crypte aux
assises granitiques, mâle et pure dans son ensemble, quoique
précieuse d’ornementations et traversée encore de souffles lascifs.
Quant au palais, toutes ses fenêtres s’embrasèrent, comme si un
concile œcuménique y fût venu siéger.
Cette conversion se fit par un travail lent, sans coup de foudre,
attendu qu’il n’avait jamais rompu désespérément avec ses
croyances. Les supports de la foi, sinon la foi, lui restaient : tels, au
donjon de Chandos, à Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte, ces puissants gonds
des portes arrachées qui s’enfoncent, intacts, au vif des murailles
géantes. Lorsqu’il séjournait chez son père, il assistait aux offices le
dimanche ; il aimait les traditions liturgiques, dédaigneux cependant
du moyen âge, et il eût « donné, disait-il, toutes les cathédrales pour
une tresse de Diane de Poitiers ».
Ce ne fut ni l’esthétisme ni une exaltation de sensibilité qui
rapprochèrent des sèves catholiques sa vie intérieure. A cet égard,
son catholicisme se révèle autrement sérieux que celui d’un
Chateaubriand et d’un Lamartine. Sa raison positive fut reconquise
en même temps que ses facultés de poète.
Un attrait dominateur le tournait vers l’histoire ; en étudiant les
gestes de la Papauté (l’Innocent III de Hurter) il admira de plus en
plus « l’imposance » du point de vue catholique. Il lisait avec
enivrement Joseph de Maistre [31] ; cet indomptable logicien de la
théocratie unitaire le gagna sans effort à une thèse qui rencontrait
au fond de son tempérament des concordances impérieuses. La
stabilité de l’Église, son entente du gouvernement des âmes et des
états, tout ce qui a le plus mis en rébellion contre elle des cerveaux
anarchiques et inconsistants, c’est là que d’Aurevilly trouva un motif
initial de croire. Il ne concevait rien en ce monde au-dessus du
prêtre, parce que le prêtre est, plus que nul autre, fait pour
commander, étant investi d’une puissance tellement formidable que
Dieu même, une fois qu’il l’y a constitué, ne peut plus l’en faire
déchoir. Les plus éclatantes figures de l’histoire laïque lui
paraissaient d’une piètre mine auprès des saints et des porteurs de
tiare ou de pourpre qui ont mené, depuis le pré-moyen âge
jusqu’aux siècles révolutionnaires, les affaires surnaturelles et
temporelles de tous les grands peuples.
[31] « Lu la moitié du second volume de de Maistre sur
Bacon. J’ai une jouissance inexprimable à lire cet
homme ; ce sont des frémissements de plaisir que
j’éprouve quand je me plonge dans l’eau vive des
abstractions au sein desquelles son merveilleux esprit ne
l’abandonne jamais. » (Deuxième mémorandum, p. 189.)