Week 5 & 6 Notes
Week 5 & 6 Notes
Week 5 & 6 Notes
Introduction
After the enactment of a statute questions about the scope, nature and
applicability of the legislation to a particular factual situation may
arise. The judicial authority to interpret law is vested in the various
courts and tribunals established under the constitution and other
written laws. Statutory interpretation connotes the act or the process
through which courts, in trying to understand a piece of legislation,
confer a particular meaning to a word or phrase used in the legislation.
Justice Holmes in Tomne v. Eispzer explained the elusive nature of
words as follows: -
Logical Approach
•Preambles
•Enacting statement.
This states the authority that promulgated the Act or Regulations. From
the above mentioned Regulations the enacting statement reads
• Title/Citation
This section states how the particular Statute may be cited for
instance
• Purpose provisions
This section explains the purpose for the enactment of a particular law,
for instance, “An Act of Parliament to establish a Capital Markets
Authority for the purpose of promoting, regulating and facilitating the
development of an orderly, fair and efficient Capital Markets in Kenya
and for connected purpose.”
This provision states when the Statute shall commence application, for
instance, “Date of commencement: 15th September, 2015: Section 1;
6th November, 2015: Parts 1–14, 23, 31, 32, 38, 40, 42, 1st Sch., 2nd
Sch. and 6th Sch.; 15th June, 2016: Others Parts and Schedules.”
• Application provision
This provision usually presents issues concerning the scope and period
of application, for instance, Section 50 of the Copyright Act provides
(2) This Act shall not affect contracts on works, performances, sound
recordings and broadcasts concluded before the commencement of
this Act.”
•Schedules
Parts
Subparts
Parts may be divided into sub-parts to identify various divisions
under the part. They save a purpose similar to that served by parts
Schedules
Schedules are normally divided into parts, subparts, clauses and sub-
clauses.
Statutory aids
Non-Statutory aids
Statutory Aids
These are means which are contained in the act that assist in
interpretation of the statute. As discussed above under the structure of
statutory rules, the components of statute may be useful in
interpretation of certain words or phrases used in the legislation. For
instance, the under the interpretation section certain words may be
conferred a technical meaning different from its colloquial meaning.
Courts will consider the meaning given under the statute first and will
only resort to other means where the word or phrase has not been
defined under the statute.
Non-Statutory Aids
One of the leading statements of the literal rule was made by Tindal CJ
in the Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Olefin 85:
“…the only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they
should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which
passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise
and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound
those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves
alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.”
“If the words of an Act are clear then you must follow them even
though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The Court has nothing to do
with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity.”
The plain meaning rule has led to harsh decisions by the courts due to
its literal application. In London & North Eastern Railway Company
v Berriman (1946) a worker in the railways was killed while
undertaking maintenance work of oiling points along a railway line. His
widow later claimed compensation but failed. The court construed the
words, "relaying" and "repairing" in their literal sense and held that
oiling points could only be maintained and not relayed or repaired.
It ignores the fact that language has its limitations. Words may
turn out to be ambiguous and the original intention of parliament
may be lost.
Courts have had the tendency to over-emphasize the literal
meaning of statutory provisions without giving due weight to
their meaning in wider contexts thus resulting unreasonable
conclusions.
It assumes that parliament members who draft legislation were
properly informed of the subject matter. In fact, some may have
no interest at all or the subject matter may be too technical thus
no clear intention can be perceived.
Decisions made through this interpretation can be harsh or
absurd due to the elusive nature of some words.
The only way to resolve issues that arise through this mode of
interpretation is by Parliament passing an amending statute
which may take very wrong thus result in massive injustice.
In Jones v DPP (1962) Lord Reid while applying this rule observed
that: -
Prevents the harsh and absurd decisions that may result from the
use of the literal rule by judges.
Prevents the occurrence of repugnant situations.
The court plays more than a mechanical role in the
administration of justice thus the results may be more
satisfactory as compared to giving words their plain meaning.
The rule was first set out in the Heydon’s Case [1584] 76 ER 637,
and allows the Court to look at the state of the former law in order to
discover the mischief in it which the present law was designed to
remedy. The Court, in an action to determine the validity of a lease,
formulated the Mischief Rule and in applying it required Courts to
ascertain and consider the following -
1. What was the Common Law before the making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which Common Law did not
provide?
3. What remedy did the parliament resolve and appoint to cure the
mischief in the Common Law?
The ruling in this case required Courts to make such construction and
interpretation as shall suppress the mischief and at the same time
advance the remedy intended by parliament.
"We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and carry it out, and
we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the
enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis."
In the case of Smith v Hughes, the Street Offences Act 1959 made it
an offence for a prostitute to solicit men “in a street or public place”.
The question thus arose of whether a woman who had tapped on a
balcony and hissed at men passing by was guilty of an offence under
the Act, Parker LCJ found the woman guilty and stated: