Report on the Webinar

on Maritime Security in the N S D - S

Gulf of Guinea HUB

(Size of font depends on title)

2023 | MARCH

REPORT BY DR. IAN RALBY OF

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N ATO STR ATEGI C DIRECTION - SOUTH HUB 2023

W ebsite www.southernhub. org

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JFCNP Naples Italy

The NATO STRATEGIC DIRECTION -SOUTH HUB (NSD- S HUB) was

established at Allied Joint Force Command Naples in order t o improve
NATO awar eness and understanding of common global challenges in the
area of interest and t o identif y opportunit ies f or cooperation with select ed
Partners, while contr ibut ing to the overall coordination of NATO activities
and ef f orts.

NSD-S HUB products are developed with th e direct engagement of

regional experts, open -source inf ormation f rom governmental
organisat ions, non-governmental organi sations, inter national
organisat ions, academic inst itutions, media sources and militar y
organisat ions. By design, NSD - S HUB products or links to open-sourced
and independently produced articles do not necessar ily represent the
opinions, views or of f icial positions of any other organi sation.

In collaboration with Dr. Ian Ralby of I.R. Consilium, the NATO Strategic
Direction-South Hub organized a W ebinar on 3 November 2022 to develop
this report.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary ......................................................................... 4
Background ..................................................................................... 6
Discussion ...................................................................................... 9
Making Sense of UNSCR 2634 ..................................................... 10
The Current Context .................................................................... 11
W hat is Being Done and W hat Needs to Be Done? ........................ 12
Possible Roles for NATO ............................................................. 14
Conclusion From the W ebinar ......................................................... 16
Recommendations From the Panellists: ........................................... 16
Panelists: ..................................................................................... 19
Acronyms ...................................................................................... 20
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On the 3 r d of November 2022, the NATO Strategic Direction South – Hub
(“the Hub”) hosted a two -panel discussion centred on interpreting and
implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2634
– the first Resolution on Gulf of Guinea maritime security in a decade.
This conversation – involving some of the leading experts, policy -makers
and practitioners on the subject – was the continuation of a discussion
hosted by the Hub in February 2021. W hile piracy and armed robbery at
sea may be at a 30-year low in the Gulf of Guinea, all speakers agreed
that the conditions for piracy and armed robbery at sea have n ot been
addressed, meaning that a resurgence remains possible, if not likely.
This reality has been borne out in the attacks that have occurred in the
region in the weeks immediately following this event.
W hile the panellists all indicated that there was a potential role for NATO
to play, the prevailing message to NATO was to only act where and when
requested to engage by the states and institutions of W est and Central
Africa. Listening to the needs and interests of the region was repeatedly
emphasized as various partners have, often unwittingly, created tensions
by acting in a manner that was not welcomed by the sovereign states of
the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). Such tensions only make future partnerships
more difficult.

Importantly, however, the speakers al l emphasized the scope of United

Nations Security Council Resolution 2634 was far broader than piracy
and armed robbery at sea and included a spectrum of maritime security
concerns, even adding terrorism, which had not appeared in previous
resolutions. Transnational organized crime and the proceeds of crime
were also a focus of the Resolution which went so far as to encourage
addressing the root causes of these illicit activities at sea. W hile the
regional architecture is working to create a comprehensive approach to
maritime security, all speakers agreed that help and support is needed.
The problem, they noted, however, is that often external actors are the
initiating force, making it so that sovereign states end up supporting
foreign efforts, rather than the other way around. Consequently, an actor
like NATO, which has not been traditionally involved in maritime security
in the Gulf of Guinea, should only engage in the region if it does so with
resolute regard for the sovereignty of the region’s states.

Perhaps the key lesson emanating from this W ebinar is that the approach
to engaging with the Gulf of Guinea is actually more important than the
substance. A well-meaning effort can become a cautionary tale of failure
if the external actor does not proce ed in right relationship with the states
of the region.
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W ith that in mind, however, there are a number of areas in which NATO,
specifically, could play a useful role, so long as it takes this collaborative
and respectful approach.

There are five leading recommendations for NATO emerging from this
discussion:

1. Use the Hub as a means of continuing to bring the different

stakeholders – including government, military, industry, civil
society, practitioners, academics, and others – to have open
dialogue about issues, pitfalls and possible approaches to
addressing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

2. Offer to the region a means of learning from NATO’s experience

as a multinational force, particularly as it establishes more
operational elements within the Yaoundé Architecture.

3. Offer to the region a means of lea rning from NATO’s experience

in counter piracy operations in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of
Aden.

4. Offer to the region assistance on establishing some of the tools

and building blocks on which it relies for its own operations,
including confronting challe nges of interoperability, standard
operating procedures, information sharing, standardization of
information, and even overcoming linguistic barriers.

5. In addition to proactively listening to the region, work to bolster

and strengthen the region’s own ins titutions, specifically those
that have been set up to confront maritime insecurity like the
Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Yaoundé Architecture, and
potentially help support a meeting of the Heads of State in which
they can revisit the Yaoundé architec ture and steer the course
for the years ahead.

The process of implementing these five recommendations could reveal

other ways in which NATO could be helpful in supporting the Gulf of
Guinea states and institutions in securing the waters of Atlantic Afric a.
At this time, though, these are the five main areas in which NATO can
be a force for good in advancing implementation of UNSCR 2634.
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BACKGROUND
Much of the contextual background for understanding the current
maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea is available in the Hub’s
2021 Report 1. W hile that W ebinar and the corresponding Report both
focused on coordination of education, training an d exercising in the
region, it provided a good primer on regional maritime security threats
and the responses to them. There are, however, some important
contrasts to raise and additional aspects to review to understand the
current state of affairs for mar itime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
Central to the most recent event at the Hub, the United Nations Security
Council in May of 2022 passed Resolution 2634 2, specifically focused on
maritime security in W est and Central Africa. This latest Resolution ca lls
on states in the Gulf of Guinea to criminalize a wide spectrum of maritime
offenses in their domestic laws and to cooperate, not only on pursuing
interdiction of maritime crimes, but prosecution of them, as well. It
encouraged the states to continue t o build out the regional architecture
for maritime security, and it encouraged enhancing bilateral cooperation
and, when requested, cooperation with the international community. It
also encouraged the states to work to address the root causes of
maritime crime including piracy and armed robbery at sea, but also
transnational organized crime and terrorism. Beyond this Resolution,
however, a few other aspects have changed since the last Hub W ebinar
on this subject.

At the time of the Hub’s February 2021 event on maritime security in the
Gulf of Guinea, piracy in the region, particularly focused on kidnap for
ransom, was at a peak, as 95% of all seafarers abducted at sea in 2020
were taken in the waters of W est and Central Africa 3. By contrast this
latest event took place amid the period with the fewest incidents of piracy
in decades 4 . That said, 2022 has seen other significant securit y
challenges, most notably Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February.
As was highlighted in the opening discussion, howev er, Russia’s
invasion was partly guaranteed by a trade deal with China on 4 February
2022 5. Given that China, and to a lesser extent, Russia, were focal
points of the discussion in 2021, it is significant to note that the

1https://thesouthernhub.org/systems/file_download.ashx?pg=285&ver=12&name=MARITIME%20S

ECURITY%20IN%20THE%20GULF%20OF%20GUINEA.pdf
2 http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2634
3

https://thesouthernhub.org/systems/file_download.ashx?pg=285&ver=12&name=MARITIME%20S
ECURITY%20IN%20THE%20GULF%20OF%20GUINEA.pdf
4 https://gcaptain.com/global-piracy-falls-amid-cautious-gains-in-gulf-of-guinea/
5 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/27/russia-weaponizing-food-supply-chains-

00012130
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globalization of insecurity has b roken down traditional “areas of

responsibility” and forced security actors to address challenges
worldwide. Furthermore, with 2022 already seeing a significant food
price crisis and 2023 likely to see a food availability crisis 6, the global
significance of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is really
coming to a head. Few places on earth have a more active challenge
with IUU fishing than the Gulf of Guinea and that point was made
extensively at the Hub’s 2021 event, encouraging security ac tors to not
solely focus on piracy.

This confluence of issues and actors has led the NATO STRATEGIC
DIRECTION – SOUTH Hub to question whether NATO may have a useful
role to play in addressing the maritime security challenges in the Gulf of
Guinea. This e vent, therefore, centred on the May 2022 UN Security
Council Resolution 2634, and explored what, if any, assistance NATO
could provide in implementing it.

Importantly, this latest UN Security Council Resolution is not the first on

Gulf of Guinea maritim e security. It is, however, the first in a decade.
Resolutions 2018 7 in 2011 and 2039 8 in 2012 both brought global
attention to the problems of piracy, armed robbery at sea and maritime
insecurity in the region, but encouraged the states of W est and Centr al
Africa to work together to combat these challenges. Indeed, in 2012,
most of what was being called “piracy” was actually armed robbery at
sea, with attacks inside of the territorial sea, focused on stealing oil.
Changes in the oil market and in regional security capacity, however,
pushed the criminals farther out to sea and changed their model to focus
on kidnap for ransom. Ironically, some of the more recent piracy
challenges – sometime several hundred miles offshore – are the result
of improved securit y along the coast as the nearshore waters have
become more inhospitable to attacks 9. Over the last ten years, the states
of the region made significant progress, particularly with regard to
cooperative architecture for maritime security 10.

The 2013 Code of Conduct Concerning the Prevention and Repression

of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illegal Maritime Activities
in W est and Central Africa (“Yaoundé Code of Conduct”) and

6 https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/09/Cafe-Econ-a-looming-Food-Crisis
7 http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2018
8 http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2039
9 https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/piracy-armed-robbery-declining-gulf-guinea-enhanced-

national-regional-efforts-needed-stable-maritime-security-top-official-tells-security-council
10

https://thesouthernhub.org/systems/file_download.ashx?pg=285&ver=12&name=MARITIME%20S
ECURITY%20IN%20THE%20GULF%20OF%20GUINEA.pdf
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accompanying Declaration helped set forth an interregional approach to

securing the waters of Atlantic Africa.

The so-called Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety and Security

(YAMS) is made up of three layers of institutions. At the apex is the
Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (ICC or CIC) in Yaoundé, Cameroon
that serves as the focal point for maritime security as well as the main
interface with its oversight bodies – the Economic Community of W estern
African States (ECOW AS), the Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GG C) – as well as
other bodies like the African Union (AU) and the Maritime Organization
of W est and Central Africa (MOW CA).
Then at the regional level, the Maritime Security Centre of W est Africa
(CRESMAO) in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Maritime Secur ity Centre
of Central Africa (CRESMAC) in Pointe -Noire, Congo, both feed into the
ICC.

Then at the most operational level, the creation of zonal centres under
the auspices of the Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres
(MMCC), such as Zone D in Camer oon, Zone E in Benin and Zone F in
Ghana, have all been working on getting fully operational.
Zone A remains inchoate, but just before the 3 r d of November event at
the Hub, Zone G signed the memorandum of understanding between the
states to establish a multinational maritime coordination centre (MMCC)
in Praia, Cabo Verde, bringing to life the latest piece of the YAMS.

Despite the commendable work done, however, challenges remain. In

response to those challenges – particularly the threat to international
commerce posed by piracy and armed robbery at sea – external actors
have initiated various approaches to maritime security in the region over
the last few years. Several states and entities, like the European Union
Coordinated Maritime Presences in the Gulf of Guinea (CMP) and the
Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), have
sent warships in support of ongoing efforts in the r egion stationed
outside of the territorial sea. Under these auspices, the Danish Frigate
ESBERN SNARE deployed to the area. On 24 t h of November 2021, that
vessel was involved in a kinetic incident 11. W hile the news in Europe
and North America celebrated a n operational success against pirates,
the response in the region was critical 12. The issues raised were the
perceived infringement of sovereignty, the potential violation of human

11 https://news.usni.org/2021/11/25/danish-navy-frigate-kills-4-pirates-in-gulf-of-guinea-anti-
piracy-mission
12 https://safety4sea.com/legal-concerns-raised-after-danish-frigate-kills-pirates-off-nigeria/
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rights, and the failure – regardless of the outcome – to have coordinated

with local authorities to determine the legal options for either prosecution
or adjudication of any incidents 13 . These points were all raised
repeatedly in the latest Hub W ebinar, as the ESBERN SNARE – which
left the region early following the invasion of Uk raine – is now seen as a
cautionary tale.

Ensuring a path to legal finish – as was not done with the ESBERN
SNARE – is a major challenge. UNSCR 2634 places particular emphasis
on filling current legislative gaps, but as a point of process, even where
the law exists, there are exigent concerns. The HEROIC IDUN, a tanker
currently held in Nigeria, is becoming a key example of this issue, as
well. In August 2022, the vessel arrived in Nigeria to load crude, was
partially loaded, and then told to leave and come back. It was 200 miles
off Nigeria, waiting, when it claims it was under apprehension of being
attacked by pirates 14. The suspected pirate vessel was actually a patrol
ship of the Nigerian Navy. The HEROIC IDUN fled and was captured at
gunpoint by the Equatorial Guinean Navy, accused of oil theft from
Nigeria. Equatorial Guinea transferred the vessel back to Nigeria and
the captain and crew are being held pending a trial on 10 January 2023.
Meanwhile, international actors including the major shippi ng
associations, are all calling for the crew’s release given the strange
circumstances and unclear accusations 15.

The lack of clear, consistent approaches – internally or externally – to

piracy and maritime crime remains a challenge for the Gulf of Guine a.
This W ebinar is part of an effort by the Hub to ascertain the nature and
scope of those challenges and to discern if NATO may have a useful role
to play in addressing them. W hat follows is an encapsulation of the key
points from the discussion, and, th ereafter, an enumeration of the
prevailing recommendations made for NATO engagement.

DISCUSSION
The discussion, which spanned more than four hours, covered four main
themes:
1. The content of UNSCR 2634, 2. The current context in the Gulf of
Guinea, 3. Efforts that are underway or need to be undertaken in

13 https://euobserver.com/world/156362
14 https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/statement-issued-by-owners-of-the-heroic-idun-idun-
maritime-limited/
15 https://maritime-executive.com/article/ics-calls-for-nigeria-to-release-crew-of-heroic-idun
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furtherance of UNSCR 2634, and 4. W ays in which NATO and other

partners could further help with implementation of the Resolutions.

Making Sense of UNSCR 2634

Unlike the previous UNSCRs 2018 and 2039, this new UNSCR 2634 is
not limited to piracy and armed robbery at sea. This new Resolution
includes more emphasis on a few areas that were either not mentioned
or lightly treated in the previous Resolutions. Th ose include:

1. Terrorism
2. Transnational Organized Crime
3. The Proceeds of Crime
4. Sustainable Development
5. Root Causes of Piracy and Other Maritime Crimes

Some panellists felt that these were part of the spirit of the earlier
Resolutions, while others, particularly the lawyers, highlighted that these
differences were significant. Indeed, the mention of the 1988
Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea (SUA) Convention was note d as a
new development, distinct from the previous Resolutions and indicative
of the added emphasis on terrorism. Even the mention of the African
Union itself was a contrast to previous Resolutions.

Some of the most significant additions were mentions of democracy,

women’s rights, youth interests, human rights, sustainable development
and the root causes of piracy. Indeed, addressing the root causes has
not been a focus previously, but was a major theme in the 2021 W ebinar
at the Hub. Interestingly, how ever, that W ebinar focused extensively on
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and the nexus to the
conditions that allow for piracy.
Yet, in UNSCR 2634, IUU fishing is mentioned, but only once and only
in the preamble. There had evidently been greater attention paid to it in
early drafts of the Resolution, but those provisions were cut from the
final version. Interestingly, fisheries crime – the use of the fishing sector
for non-fishing criminal offenses like trafficking or smuggling – was also
not mentioned.

As one panellist stated, “transnational crime knows no borders…” so,

ever-mindful of sovereignty, it is absolutely critical for the states to
cooperate. In that vein, the Resolution also strongly encourages the
region to fully impleme nt the maritime security architecture established
in Yaoundé in 2013 in response to the previous two Resolutions. The
panel underscored the need for this to be a major focus, as this
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architecture is also representative of the sovereign states of the regio n.

The sanctity of that sovereignty, while mentioned in the Resolution, has
not always been respected by external actors according to much of the
panel.

The Current Context

As several panellists highlighted, the 2022 downturn in piracy and armed

robbery at sea does not indicate an end to the problem. As was noted
by several speakers, “…the pirates are simply on holiday…”, as the root
causes of piracy have not yet been addressed. Piracy and other maritime
crimes should be considered land -based problems with maritime
symptoms, and, as of now, the problems on land remain. Indeed, the
conditions which gave rise to this scourge of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
still need to be addressed, and UNSCR 2634 even points to these
conditions with its language about fo stering sustainable development,
countering illicit financial flows and strengthening democratic
institutions. As one panellist described it, there are at least five key
conditions needed to produce a society in which pirates are not welcome:

1. Legal
2. Political
3. Security
4. Economic
5. Social

At present, these five conditions are not, according to the panel, being
met in the Gulf of Guinea, and all five are required to rid the region of
piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as to diminish other maritime
crime.

W hile some states have adopted new legislation to criminalize piracy and
other maritime offenses, many have not. But even beyond the specific
status of maritime crime legislation, many of the legal capacities and
institutions are not in place in the s tates of the region. Because the legal
and political conditions are insufficient, so, too, are the security
conditions and the UNSCR 2634 even links terrorism to the legal,
political and economic conditions, underscoring what a critical
vulnerability these voids create. W hen you’re lacking in legal, political
and security conditions, it is very hard to have good economic conditions,
so in the Gulf of Guinea, you have the co -existence of poverty and
abundant resources, a contrast felt particularly by the youth. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the social conditions are also lacking, creating a
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five-factor confluence of issues on land that give rise to the sorts of

offenses UNSCR 2634 is aiming to counter at sea.

At the same time as these internal challenges complicate the context at

the local, national and regional levels, the panellists pointed out the
global significance of the region. In addition to the concerns about food
security that can somewhat be met by agricultural and fisheries
production in the region, the Gulf of Guinea is critical to global energy
supplies. This nexus to external interests also underscores the need of
the region to find a means of cooperating with foreign actors in a manner
that supports their security without undermining their sovereignty.

What is Being Done and What Needs to Be Done?

The Resolution highlighted both some of what is being done and what
still needs to be done. The discussion on the 3 r d of November centred
primarily on these two questions. Development of national maritime
strategies, improvement of national legislation and enhancement of
national maritime security capacity were all emphasized as critical to
realizing a regional approach to security. The di scussion drew attention
to the varying laws across the region, noting that only a few states have
piracy legislation, but underscoring that when it is implemented,
particularly through prosecution, it seems to have a profound deterrent
effect. To that end , it made sense that UNSCR 2634 put such an
emphasis on the need to criminalize maritime offences and cooperate on
ensuring the prosecution of them. At the same time, the discussion noted
that more legislation is not always a uniformly positive factor, as laws
that curtail the ability to pay ransoms hamper international commerce by
making it difficult for ship owners to risk entering the region. The goal
of shipping is to reduce the friction for trade getting into and out of the
region, but laws can actual ly have the opposite effect when their
implications are not fully considered.

At the national level, the success of Deep Blue Project – Nigeria’s

Integrated National Security and W aterways Protection Infrastructure, a
multidimensional and multi -agency effort led by the Nigerian Maritime
Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) – was highlighted as a
remarkable strategic and operational success. Many of the speakers
discussed the need to learn from that project and even suggested that
the Hub host an eve nt on it. At the same time, the Harmonized Standard
Operating Procedures (HSOP) for consistency of action in Nigeria were
raised as another success. This also sparked discussion of the need for
assistance in developing both national level and regional stan dard
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operating procedures (SOPs) on a variety of topics, starting with

information sharing.

Information sharing was a major topic of discussion, as well, particularly

in the context of the Yaoundé Regional Information Sharing (YARIS)
Platform. That too l, introduced by the European Union, is one of several
being used by the Yaoundé Architecture. But what was clear was that
there are differing views as to what it will provide. The need for maritime
domain awareness touched on the possibility of sharing the costs for
satellite infrastructure, as well as using different platforms for tracking
vessels. That sharing, however, was focused on GoG states only,
seemingly rejecting the role of external institutions like the MDAT -GoG.
But what was clear was that there is no universal understanding of what
information is needed for creating a common operating picture, never
mind how that information should flow. It was emphasized that analytical
training is absolutely key, as there is a deficit in capacity at the moment
to interpret information and to use it as the basis for initiating an effective
response. W hat was vital, however, was the sense that that information
should originate in and remain in the Gulf of Guinea, noting the
disaffection with MDAT -GoG as an external tool, and emphasizing that
some Gulf of Guinea states are the last to find out about what is
happening in their own waters.

This puts the emphasis on the regional bodies as well as the states of
the region to have the capacity and capability – as well as the will – to
address maritime crime in all its forms. These regional bodies, however,
have proliferated over the years, and it was suggested by several of the
panellists that there is a need to revisit them.

Two keywords were put forward to guide the process of analysing what
has been done and what should be done in the future: 1) practical and
2) coordination. Many of the efforts have seemed sensible on paper, but
have not been practical in reality. There is often a disconnect between
external actions and the actual needs of the region, as well as a lack of
convergence between the efforts of external actors and local actors.
Everyone needs to come together to determine how to make that work
better.

W ith regard to the Yaoundé Architectur e, the need for the Code of
Conduct to be upgraded to a legally binding mechanism was emphasized
repeatedly. The Gulf of Guinea Commission was noted as being a
potential focal point for all of this engagement, though at present it does
not serve that funct ion. The relationship between the YAMS and the
Maritime Organization of W est and Central Africa (MOW CA) was also
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noted as an area for greater development. And talk of Task Force within
African Standby Force led to questions about whether its mandate –
effectively to prevent wars – made it even viable for dealing with maritime
crimes. Above all these questions, however was an important note: the
Yaoundé Architecture was born in 2013 through a meeting of the heads
of state of the regional states. Since th en, however, those heads of state
have not come back together. In the views of several participants, the
heads of state must meet again to jump start progress toward any kind
of revised architecture or even improved functionality.

Everyone agreed that cooperation is the only way for the states of the
region to successfully combat the transnational maritime threats in the
region. But that cooperation has to originate from the states. As was
noted, the national, regional and international layers to this cooperation
are formed with states as the fundamental building block, so the heads
of state must direct how things proceed from here.

Possible Roles for NATO

Many external actors have become involved in the Gulf of Guinea

maritime security through the recently established Gulf of Guinea
Maritime Collaboration Forum and its Shared Awareness and De -
confliction (SHADE). Other externally -driven bodies, like the G7++
Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (FOGG), the Atlantic Security Centre in the
Azores and others, increased to support regional maritime security. That
externally-based initiation of maritime security efforts means that the
region’s needs and interests are not always front and centre. It is part
of what has led to what one panellist called an “elitist” approach in
UNSCR 2634 where a lot of emphasis was put on the international
community. As was noted, however, maritime security cannot be
outsourced to other states or entities. The caveat to external assistance
– when requested – is particularly imp ortant for NATO to keep in mind.
So rather than coming to the region and saying “we know you have this
problem, this is what we’re going to do,” come to the region and ask “we
know you have this problem, how can we help?”

To that end, it was recommended that NATO not take any action unless
requested to do so. That does not mean, however, just waiting. It means
that NATO must educate itself on what the region has done, is doing and
wants to do, and identify offerings it can put forward in support. Notabl y,
UNSCR 2634 was not under Chapter 7, meaning that the UN is not going
to act directly – it is leaving the responsibility and onus on the states of
the region. UNSCR 2634 even expressly asks the UN Secretary General,
the UN Office for W est Africa and the Sahel (UNOW AS) and the UN
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Office for Central Africa to “ continue to report and to support States and
sub-regional organizations in their efforts to combat piracy and armed
robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, including with respect to mobilizing
resources following the adoption of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to
assist in building national and regional capacities in close consultation
with States and regional and international organizations.” Thus the
extent to which NATO could be involved is up to those so vereign states
and the regional organizations that represent them. The responsibility is
on NATO, however, to offer up what support it could provide – be it
through deployment of assets, provision of training, technical assistance
or otherwise.

A number of external actors have become very involved in doing things

in the region, but it is not clear what their strategy is or really what they
are trying to achieve. For example, what is the EU’s entry port for the
CMP? How is YARIS going to be sustained? To be able to take proper
advantage of the international community’s capacity to assist, the region
must understand not only what the international community is willing and
able to do, but what it wishes to achieve in the long -term. The spectres
of both colonialism and slavery are not merely historic legacies, but
ongoing concerns, so transparency of objectives is critical for an external
organization like NATO to be successful in truly helping advance
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

NATO’s lessons f rom being a multinational force, as well as its

experience in the Gulf of Aden were of particular interest to the panel.
Inviting Gulf of Guinea maritime security professionals to use facilities
and resources in NATO – like the NATO Maritime Interdicti on Operational
Training Centre (NMIOTC) in Crete or Maritime Security Centre of
Excellence (MARSEC COE) in Istanbul – was specifically noted as being
potential ways to build relations and trust while also building capacity.
Sharing information – on transnational crime networks and other
maritime threats – was also highlighted as being an area of real interest
for the region.
Training on information collection, as well as analytical capacity building
to interpret information were both highlighted.
Also, platform interoperability is seen as one of the areas in which NATO
has leading insights.

W hile it may be beyond NATO’s traditional roles, both crime prevention

and pursuit of legal finish were emphasized as key areas of need. To
the extent NATO may not be able to provide assistance directly, it may,
perhaps through the Hub, nevertheless facil itate interaction between the
Gulf of Guinea actors and the partners who could be most helpful.
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CONCLUSION FROM THE WEBINAR

The overwhelming consensus among the panellists was threefold:

1. The event on the 3rd of November was a useful dialogue whereby

many of the issues were put on the table in an open, honest and
constructive fashion. More such discussions are need and the Hub could
be a useful forum for continuing the conversation.

2. There is a potential role for NATO to play in the region and it should
explore what is might be able to offer based on what was said at this
event and others.

3. NATO should not act unless and until requested to do so by the

states and institutions of the Gulf of Guinea.

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PANELLISTS:

Over the course of the discussion on the 3 r d of November 2022, the
following five recommendations emerged.

 Use the NATO STRATEGIC DIRECTION – SOUTH Hub as a

means of continuing to bring the different stakeholders –
including government, military, indus try, civil society,
practitioners, academics, and others – to have open dialogue
about issues, pitfalls and possible approaches to addressing
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

The Hub is a uniquely well -placed vehicle for supporting the Gulf of
Guinea’s efforts to secure the region’s waters. Bringing different voices
to the conversation – like independent experts, analysts from other parts
of the world, and industry actors (not just trade associations), the Hub
can continue to contribute meaningfu lly to the conversation around
implementation of UNSCR 2634 and the wider maritime securit y
ambitions of W est and Central Africa.
Among other things, the Hub could help with some of the analysis of what
has led to this downturn in piracy and what could c ontinue to not only
suppress it, but root it out.
As a platform, the Hub can also help to amplify the voices of African
experts who would not otherwise be heard in Europe, North America or
beyond. This is a critically important role to support the ongoi ng
development of regional capacity.
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In that vein, it was specifically noted that positive success stories don’t
often get communicated to actors outside the region, so the Hub could
also help balance out what has otherwise been a strongly critical
understanding of maritime security in the Gu lf of Guinea.

 Offer to the region a means of learning from NATO’s experience

as a multinational force, particularly as it establishes more
operational elements w ithin the Yaoundé Architecture.

The theory of being a multinational force is one thing, the practical reality
of it is another. NATO, as the largest military alliance – and the one with
the most linguistic diversity – could be hugely helpful in supplying advice
and assistance as the Gulf of Guinea seeks to operationalize military and
law enforcement cooperation into one unified security construct. As was
noted, there is no jurisdictional gap when it comes to the maritime la w
enforcement concerns – any such challenges can be overcome – so
NATO could really help the region by sharing insights on how to make
things work operationally.

 Offer to the region a means of learning from NATO’s experience

in counter pirac y operations in the Gulf of Aden .

W hile in 2011 and 2012, there were many re asons to emphasize the
distinctions between piracy off the Horn of Africa and piracy (and armed
robbery at sea) in the Gulf of Guinea, there is now a need to revisit both
and draw lessons. NATO is uniquely well placed to do this. As one
panellist put it, NATO could help the Gulf of Guinea “adapt” the lessons
from the Gulf of Aden to meaningful effect.

 Offer to the region assistance on establishing some of the

tools and building blocks on which it relies for its ow n
operations, including confronting chal lenges of
interoperability, standard operating procedures, information
sharing, standardization of information, and even overcoming
linguistic barriers.

NATO has had to develop a wide array of tools for operating as a

multinational force. From interoper ability of equipment to
standardization of analytical abilities, there are a lot of tools that a
nascent multinational force might not even realize it needs. It is in this
space that NATO could offer training and at least sensitization that would
be useful to the Gulf of Guinea.
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 In addition to proactivel y listening to the region, w ork to

bolster and strengthen the region’s ow n institutions,
specificall y those that have been set up to confront maritime
insecurity like the Gulf of Guinea Commission and th e Yaoundé
Architecture, and potentiall y help support a meeting of the
Heads of State in w hich the y can revisit the Yaoundé
architecture and steer the course for the years ahead.

To the extent that NATO could support bringing the heads of state
together, it would provide tremendous benefit to all. The need for
revisiting the approach has come, and given NATO’s own experience in
rallying the leadership of all the allies to help mak e progress on key
security initiatives, NATO could be a useful voice in calling for such a
meeting. NATO’s experience in general of having to revise its own
internal structure and cope with contextual changes make it a credible
potential partner to the Gu lf of Guinea. It is from that standpoint of
credibility – through analogous experiences – that it could work to help
the region achieve its ambition on maritime security cooperation.
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PANELISTS:
The 3 r d of November event at the Hub was split into two panels, each
with four panellists. The full event was moderated by Dr. Ian Ralby, CEO
of I.R. Consilium, an expert in maritime law and security, and moderator
of the 2021 event at the Hub, as well.

The first panel was titled “Substance and Strategic Significance of

UNSCR 2634: W hat Does it Say? W hat Does it Mean? And W hy W as it
Necessary?” The four panellists were:

 Ambassador Namira Negm, Director of the African Migration

Observatory and former Legal Counsel of the African Union
 Captain Dr. Kamal-Deen Ali (Ghana Navy, ret.), Director of Centre
for Maritime Law and Security (CEMLAW S) Africa and former Legal
Advisor of the Ghana Navy
 Professor Assis Malaquias, Dean of the United States Department
of Defense’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies
 Mr. George Mangos, Principal at the Interunity Group

The second panel was titled “Options for Implementing UNSCR 2634
Through Both the Yaoundé Architecture and the African Standby Force.”
The four panelists were:

 Dr. Dakuku Peterside, former Director General of the Nigerian

Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA)
 Rear Admiral Narciso Junior, Director of the Inter -Regional
Coordination Center in Yaoundé, Cameroon
 Prof. Ifesinachi Okafor -Yarwood, Lecturer in Sustainable
Development at the University of St. Andrews
 Captain Loïc Moudouma (Gabon Navy, ret), former Deputy Chief of
Naval Staff of Gabon

W hile these experts shared their experiences and insights generously,

they did so under the Chatham House Rule, so will not be quoted directly
in the following summary of the discussion.
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ACRONYMS
AIMS Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy
ASF African Standby Force
AU African Union
CEMLAW S Centre for Maritime Law and Security
CFMCC Combined Forces Maritime Component Commanders
CIC Centre Inter -Regional Coordination
CMP European Union’s Coordinated Maritime Presence
CRESMAC Maritime Security Regional Centre for Central Africa
CRESMAO Maritime Security Regional Centre for W e st Africa
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOW AS Economic Community of W estern African States
FOGG Friends of the Gulf of Guinea
GGC Gulf of Guinea Commission
GoG Gulf of Guinea
HSOP Harmonized Standard Operating Proced ures
ICC Inter-Regional Coordination Centre
IUU Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
MARCOM NATO Allied Maritime Command
MARSEC COE Maritime Security Centre of Excellence
MDA Maritime Domain Awareness
MOC Maritime Operations Centre
MOW CA Maritime Organization of W est and Central Africa
MMCC Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIMASA Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
NMIOTC NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Trainin g
Centre
NSC NATO Shipping Centre
NSD-S Hub NATO Strategic Direction – South Hub
REC Regional Economic Community
SHADE Shared Awareness and De -confliction
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
SUA Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Convention
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
YAMS Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety and Security
YARIS Yaoundé Architecture Region al Information Sharing
Platform
ZOPACAS Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic
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